Written submission from Oliver Miles CMG
1. For reasons of geography and history as well
as because of our trading economy, international factors weigh
larger in Britain than in other countries of comparable wealth
and size (excepting France, which is comparable with Britain).
This rather than any political will to punch above our weight
accounts for the traditional political clout of the Foreign Office
within government, and for the development of a Diplomatic Service
which outclasses those of other European states and is a match
for those of larger nations such as the USA, Russia and China.
2. These assets are needed to minimise the negative
consequences of international events which by their nature are
outside our control, such as the development of Soviet power in
the 20th century or of Islamic extremist violence in the 21st,
and also to take advantage of opportunities when they arise. Most
of the foreign policy disasters of the last hundred yearsMunich,
Suez, Iraqare exceptions that prove the rule: the Prime
Ministers of the day deliberately bypassed the Foreign Office,
and in the Iraq case we had not had an embassy there since 1991.
We were slow to grasp the opportunities created by the collapse
of the Soviet Union, but that was mainly because the government,
led by the Treasury, refused to accept that we could not do so
without modest additional resources required to open posts in
the "new" capitals. This was the background to the unhappy
story of the Tashkent embassy seven or eight years ago.
3. The Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service
have therefore a vital national and indeed international role,
since most big international problems require us to work with
allies. If our institutions are strong they can exercise a powerful
influence within the British government and within our alliances.
"Strong" in this context means that they must have deep
understanding of the issues, and ability to formulate policy and
negotiate effectively. In most of the international crises in
which I was personally involved, Aden, Cyprus, Arab/Israel and
Libya, the Foreign Office commanded confidence because of its
professional understanding of the issues and knowledge of the
personalities and history behind the events of the day.
4. The exception was Yugoslavia. For the first
time, taking part in policy discussions at prime ministerial level,
I felt that we were exposed by our lack of expertise. There were
two reasons: first, the collapse of Yugoslavia was unexpected,
and to understand it required knowledge of factors which had been
largely invisible, though latent, for more than a generation.
But this was made worse by our failure to mobilise such expertise
as we did have. This can be attributed at least in part to concentration
on process and management at the cost of neglect of our fundamental
role.
5. By the time I retired from the service in
1996 I felt (and I said as much to the then head of the Diplomatic
Service) that we had compromised our traditional position of strength
by allowing deep understanding of the world outside Britain to
be sacrificed in favour of peripheral objectives. A symbol and
more than a symbol of this is the fact that in the region I know
best, the Arab world, too many key positions at home and abroad
are now occupied by non-Arabic speakers. This is sometimes unavoidable,
but it is nonetheless deplorable. Nothing more clearly indicates
the professionalism of our Diplomatic Service compared with others
than our ability to work in "difficult" languages.
6. One problem is that performance measurement,
which has been imported from the private sector into the civil
service including the foreign service over the last 25 years,
is not applicable to all the work of the FCO and the Diplomatic
Service. Indeed the attempt to apply it can have a distorting
effect. Money is measurable, passports, visas, prison visits,
entertainment, trade are all measurable. But the value of an export
promotion exercise cannot easily be measured, and much political
work cannot be sensibly measured at all. How to count how many
times diplomatic action has prevented or contributed to ending
a war, perhaps the highest function of political diplomacy? Distortion
arises because activities that can be measured come to be regarded
as more important than those that cannot, often the reverse of
the truth.
7. To me the most shocking piece of evidence
given to the Iraq enquiry was the statement by Sir John Sawers
that "Very few observers actually highlighted the scale of
the violence that we could face. I think about the only person
in my recollection who got it right was President Mubarak."
He described the level of violence that we encountered as "unprecedented".
These comments indicate a failure by the FCO in its most essential
function: to convey to No. 10 and the Cabinet an appreciation
of reality which was shared by pretty well everyone with knowledge
of Iraq. As for "unprecedented" one has only to think
of the extreme violence associated with the 40 years of the British
period in Iraq from World War I to the1958 revolution from start
to finish.
8. Radical reconsideration of objectives is required:
less emphasis on presentation, image, process, diversity, management,
more on the core strength of the FCO and the Diplomatic Service.
Just one Alice in Wonderland example: the major functions of the
consular and protocol departments are protection of British subjects
and conduct of relations with foreign embassies in London, so
why is the official who supervises them entitled "Director
General of Change"? There should be more area and language
studies, greater specialisation of some officers without detriment
to careers, full use of research and analysis resources, continued
or enhanced co-operation with outside bodies such as think tanks
and universities. This is not to belittle the requirement, in
the Diplomatic Service as in the Home Civil Service, for the experienced
professional generalist.
9. The channel through which advice and information
goes from the FCO and the Diplomatic Service to No. 10 and the
Cabinet, and policy decisions and instructions come back, needs
attention. Perhaps because of the Thatcher/Charles Powell phenomenon
this function is now mainly performed by the private offices,
which are essential and efficient but not robust enough to carry
the weight. Papers for Cabinet may no longer be an adequate option,
for reasons outside the remit of your committee; many with government
service experience will regret the decline of collegiate government,
with the Foreign Secretary and the FCO and Diplomatic Service
playing a full part in policy making at the appropriate levels
including Cabinet. Let us hope the National Security Council experiment
will provide an answer.
10. Heads of mission are held strictly to account
in some secondary areas, including in particular finance (where
the formal requirements placed on them are unrealistic). More
attention should be given to holding them to account on policy
issues. For example, when WPC Yvonne Fletcher was murdered and
I had to break off relations with Libya, apart from half an hour
with the Prime Minister (when rather surprisingly she did most
of the listening) I do not recall being asked difficult questions:
did I foresee it? If not, why not? What did I do, or recommend
London should do, to avoid it? What lessons could be learned?
Dialogue between the FCO and heads of mission should routinely
include re-examination of opportunities and threats.
11. Some British ambassadors were advised during
the Blair years that it was not worth making recommendations which
were contrary to established policy. This is a betrayal of the
professionalism of the Diplomatic Service, with grave dangers
for the national interest. The American foreign service has been
widely praised for the quality of reporting revealed by WikiLeaks,
but not much independence of mind has been in evidence. It is
essential that heads of mission should feel free to submit reports
and recommendations which are out of line with current policy.
Political advisers and political appointments have a proper role,
but they must not tarnish the political impartiality of the Diplomatic
Service. It is galling when the mistakes of political implants,
often highly paid, are attributed to the Service. An example is
the drafting of the "dodgy dossier" on going to war
in Iraq.
12. Support for British business, which the Prime
Minister has emphasised, is part of a broader picture. To quote
the 1969 Duncan report on overseas representation "The commercial
work of the Diplomatic Service cannot have absolute priority,
since the preservation of peace and security must clearly be an
overriding aim" but "in our present circumstances [economic
crises are always with us, 1969 no exception] ...export promotion
is bound to become an even more crucial part of overseas representational
work". Probably the most useful thing an ambassador can do
for business is to advise how decisions are made and who makes
them. Good advice, both to ministers and to businessmen, depends
on getting to know and if possible understand the culture and
motivation of the country or institution in which you work, what
makes the people as well as their government tick. Modern communications
and the ease of travel enable ministers to meet and get to know
their foreign colleagues, and that can be invaluable, but such
acquaintances and flying visits only scratch the surface of the
knowledge of foreign countries.
27 December 2010
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