Written evidence from Catarina Tully
1. I have structured my responses to your questions
around the following headings: the challenge facing foreign ministries
globally; choices about the FCO's role; and implications for capabilities
and resources. In summary:
- The changing nature of our world means many Foreign
Ministries are wrestling with the issues and questions raised
in the FASC inquiry. The widely-claimed weakness of the FCO's
position within HMG in the past few years is mainly a result of
this changing environment.
- Despite efforts over previous years, the FCO's
strategic purpose has become blurred and requires some refocus.
More importantly, it needs the structures, capabilities and resources
to fulfill a refocused role.
- The FCO successfully acts as the international
implementation arm of HMG through its network of embassies. The
key choice on the role of the FCO is the extent to which the FCO
takes the cross-Whitehall lead on setting the strategic context
for HMG's international policy and on new international policy
challenges, like global resource constraints. A maximalist interpretation
of its role is necessary for the FCO to be at the centre of government.
- In order to fulfill its role effectively, there
needs to be more specialisation in the FCO, higher levels of programmatic
funding, strengthened analytical skills and greater cross-Whitehall
clarity on what FCO strategic leadership looks like.
2. Biography: Cat Tully is an independent consultant
working on foreign and development policy issues. She was formerly
Strategy Project Director at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
until August 2010. She has worked on strategy development across
the private, government and civil society sectors, including for
HMG Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, Procter and Gamble, Christian
Aid, World Bank and the UN. Cat's research areas include: horizon
scanning and strategic risk management; machinery of government
in national strategy-making; technology, public engagement and
governance; and global public goods and resources.
CONTEXT: THE
CHALLENGES FACING
FOREIGN MINISTRIES
ACROSS THE
WORLD
3. As highlighted by the Foreign Affairs Select
Committee, the changing nature of our world means many Foreign
Ministries are wrestling with the issues and questions raised
in the FASC inquiry. The US's QDDR, released last month, looks
at the capabilities needed by 21st century diplomatic and development
services. The German government has conducted various conferences
on what a 21st century foreign service should look like. The French
2008 White Papers on Foreign Affairs and Defence and National
Security examine the division of labour between Departments, and
the structures and capabilities needed in a Foreign Ministry.
Together with innovations introduced by Canada, Australia and
Singapore, among others, these experiences provide an evidence-base
that is worthwhile mining more systematically.[29]
4. The impact of technological, economic and
demographic drivers, and the resulting blurring of lines between
foreign and domestic policy are well documented elsewhere. I will
nevertheless briefly explicitly summarise here the challenges
and opportunities that commentators agree that the 21st century
multipolar world will bring. HMG and the FCO have made strong
progress in addressing all of these areas and are considered to
be ahead of the curve by other governments in some areas like
public diplomacy and thought-leadership on new complex global
challenges. However, we need to run just to keep still in this
situation—continual change requires continual adaptation
by HMG.
(a) New sets of policy challenges, often uncertain,
diffuse and interlinked: these include complex, non-linear systems
of global and regional public goods (eg water, labour, food, energy
and carbon security), new security challenges (in particular around
radicalisation, early intervention and conflict prevention), and
the interlinkages between economic and national security.
(b) A growth in the impact of different actors
and evolving means of engagement and influence: not just the growth
of BRIC and other countries, but also regional and local actors
(eg cities), high-net worth individuals, diaspora groups, state-owned
and multinational businesses, civil society, etc.
(c) Changing and multiplying forms of governance
within which to promote the UK's national interest: including
the different "G" groupings, ad hoc alliances, UN, revitalised
regional bodies and the European Union, counting the External
Action Service.
5. This changing environment poses three challenges
to the process of conducting HMG international policy:
(a) greater need for coherence and joining-up
as increasing numbers of Departmental and non-government actors
become involved in the international sphere;
(b) the functions and structure of the diplomatic
service need some recalibration to the new strategic context;
and
(c) the nature of running operations abroad is
different, with the changing nature and cost of security, use
of different technologies, etc.
6. The FCO is an excellent organisation, with
enviable assets including staff, analytical power, and the network.
Its strategic context however, as for other Foreign Ministries,
is increasingly challenging. The widely-claimed weakness of the
FCO's position within HMG in the past few years is mainly a result
of this changing environment. The purpose of the FCO has become
less clear as its traditional role and key asset - as gatekeeper
and conduit of international interactions - has disappeared. The
increased complexity of the environment, the increase in the number
of its partners, the participation of domestic Departments in
international networks, the different potential entry points or
ways it can make a difference, combined with a sharp reduction
in resources, has meant that the FCO has had many focal points
and spread its skills thinly. As a result, and despite various
attempts to strategically sharpen it, the FCO's strategic purpose
has become blurred and requires a gentle refocus. The FASC's inquiry
is an excellent opportunity to address what the FCO is for, namely
refine the purpose it fulfills for HMG and for the UK, describe
clearly the problems it can help address, and ensure that it has
the structures, resources and capabilities to support its purpose.
KEY CHOICES
ABOUT THE
FCO'S ROLE:
MAXIMALIST OR
MINIMALIST VISION
7. For the purpose of this paper, I have distinguished
two functions that the FCO owns in HMG. One is about acting on
behalf of HMG internationally—effectively being the international
implementation arm of HMG. These roles include running the
network of embassies internationally, including at international
organisations, providing consular support and crisis response,
being a platform for UK policy delivery in-country, and sending
expertise and knowledge about the country back to HMG.
8. This role is conducted well. These roles need
logistical support and guidance from the centre (like the central
crisis response team or UKTI) but more of the decisions should
be decentralised so that strategy-making at the country level
can be made by front line staff. There is also a need to continue
to stay abreast of technological developments that provide the
potential to drive value for money, like laptop diplomats.
9. Recommendation: decentralise more decision-making
powers to embassies so they have a stronger lead on developing
cross-HMG country strategies. Continue to develop innovative solutions
to provide network coverage that drives value for money.
10. The other function is leading policy.
Some narrow policy areas are squarely within the FCO's remit,
eg non-proliferation. But to fulfill the Foreign Secretary's vision
of the FCO being at the centre of government, the FCO also needs
to take the lead on setting the strategic vision for HMG's international
policy. This means two things. First, to hold the overview and
collaboratively set the framework within which all of Whitehall
Departments' international policy interventions can sit coherently
(this overview needs to be strategically aligned with the SDSR
and DFID's plans and agreed by the National Security Council).
Second, the response to the challenges and opportunities identified
in paragraph 4 need to be led somewhere within government—and
they should be led by the FCO. I have highlighted the gaps that
remain in addressing these new issues:
- New complex policy issues: The gap here is around
upping analytical (and economic) skills on complex systems, enhancing
creativity and innovation in policy responses and initiatives,
leading horizon-scanning and identifying discontinuities. There
is excellent work done across different government Departments,
but there is not one place where it is fully pulled together.
- Growth in different actors: The gap here is around
thinking innovatively on engaging with new actors; enhancing the
UK's influencing strategy, especially on the sub-multilateral
forms of governance (regions and cities) and the use of soft power;
and coordinating a joined-up and innovative government approach
to engaging with international non-traditional actors eg private-public
partnerships with businesses to achieve common goals.
- Changing governance: The gap here is around promoting
greater creative thinking on promoting UK's national interest
within different forms of international governance and fora.
11. Recommendation: that the FCO takes
the strategic lead for setting the context for UK international
policy (with the SDSR and reporting to/agreed by the NSC); takes
the policy lead on global public goods issues; takes the overview
on international horizon-scanning across government; and leads
coordination on engaging with different international actors.
IMPLICATIONS FOR
CAPABILITIES AND
RESOURCES
12. None of my commentary is new analysis: indeed
the FCO is engaging already with many of these issues and has
embarked on various initiatives to improve its capability. Notable
examples include excellent analysis and innovative policy/approaches
led by Research Analysts, Communications Directorate, the Global
Economy Group, Middle East and North Africa Directorate, among
many. The question remains therefore why there is a certain fuzziness
to the traction of the FCO centre. And how to address it without
committing significantly more resources. There are five areas
that can be addressed:
- FCO staff are currently required to have a very
broad set of skills. The FCO's two distinct functions (running
the international implementation arm of HMG and leading policy)
arguably increasingly require two different skill sets, with a
lot of overlap in between. Skills required in Posts include managing
the post, detailed analysis and reporting, influencing skills,
consensual negotiations, crisis response, and a practical ability
to respond to the plethora of different challenges thrown up daily
in often difficult environments. Skills at the policy centre require
deep knowledge and networks in Whitehall, systems thinking, horizon
scanning, and analytical skills around prioritising options, exposing
policy tradeoffs, identifying synergies and developing innovative
responses. Recommendation: There is a case to be made for
FCO staff to specialise within two separate career streams. A
diplomatic embassy staff run the embassies, possibly with longer
posting duration, themselves led by ambassadors from across different
Whitehall Departments where appropriate. And policy staff at the
centre would focus on policy expertise and analysis, developing
the skills to lead strategic thinking across government, and horizon
scanning. There would be secondments between these two cadres,
but in particular the policy staff should be open to cross-Whitehall
and external secondments. This would permit staff to focus on
specialising their skills and expertise, where at the moment they
are asked to be generalists.
- The FCO faces financial resource constraints
that limit its ability to promote its policy agenda both with
other government departments and international partners. Relatively
small amounts of additional programmatic funding could get value
for money in terms of traction. Recommendation: that FCO
programmatic funding is increased.
- The FCO's analytical capability has been reduced
in recent years in various economic and geographic policy areas,
thankfully now being addressed. Recommendation: to maintain
and develop the FCO's analytical, policy and language expertise;
create an external think tank with DFID and MOD that can introduce
innovative ideas; use both government and external intellectual
resources (eg the Royal College of Defence Studies, National School
of Government, Institute of Government, Chatham House and RUSI);
and systematically engage with senior international foreign policy
thinkers and leaders via high-profile conferences.
- Other government Departments can be resistant
for the FCO to take the role in setting the strategic context
because they feel that the FCO does not always reflect their interests,
perspective and analysis. Recommendation: At a macro-level,
an agreed regular FCO-led process for setting the strategic vision
should occur, similar to the US' new QDDR process. This could
be arranged to coincide with a new government term and the Defence
Review. On a micro-level, the FCO and other Departments should
develop a clearly defined process and methodology for developing
thematic and country strategies and coordinating Departmental
business planning processes. Organisational innovations (like
bringing together the Strategy Units or Policy Units across MOD,
DFID, FCO and Cabinet Office NSS) could also be explored. Joint
training and secondments would also be valuable as would a forum
for FDNS Department senior leaders/policy DGs to meet and discuss
common issues and align strategic vision.
23 January 2011
29 This is a piece of analysis I am embarking on, conducting
a cross-country comparison of the UK with various other OECD and
BRIC countries. Back
|
