1 Introduction
The Committee's inquiry
1. On 7 July 2005, 52 people were killed and more
than 770 others injured in attacks on the London transport network
carried out by four men from West Yorkshire who had been radicalised
by the ideology and rhetoric of Al Qa'ida. The nature of the current,
deadly threat facing the UK from home-grown terrorism was fully
exposed for the first time. This was only one of a number of terrorist
plots which caused the British authorities to shift their attention
over the past decade from external threats to national security
to those lying within the UK borders. Radicalisation is one of
four strategic factors identified in the Government's counter-terrorism
strategy, known as CONTEST, that have enabled terrorist groups
to grow and flourish.[1]
Yet four years after 7/7, the reasons why some British-born and
raised individuals are vulnerable to violent radicalisation remain
unclear.
2. On taking office in 2010, the Coalition Government
announced a wholesale review of the Prevent Strategy (often referred
to simply as "Prevent"), which was drawn up to tackle
violent radicalisation in the UK in the wake of the 7/7 bombings.[2]
The original strategy had attracted criticism for its alleged
exclusive focus on Muslim communities, spying, and unhealthy conflation
of law enforcement with integration policy. The outcome of the
Prevent Review was published in June 2011.
3. In anticipation of this, we decided in May 2011
to launch an inquiry that would test the evidence base for the
Prevent Review and explore issues regarding its implementation.
We undertook to examine the root causes of violent radicalisation
in the UK, the individuals and groups particularly vulnerable
to radicalisation and the locations where this radicalisation
tends to take place, in relation to the primary terrorist threats
facing the UK. Specifically, we intended to:
- determine the major drivers
of, and risk factors for recruitment to, terrorist movements linked
to (a) Islamic fundamentalism (b) Irish dissident republicanism
and (c) domestic extremism;
- examine the relative importance of prisons and
criminal networks, religious premises, universities and the internet
as fora for violent radicalisation;
- examine the operation and impact of the current
process for proscribing terrorist groups;
- consider the appropriateness of current preventative
approaches to violent radicalisation, in light of these findings,
including the roles of different organisations at national and
local level; and
- make recommendations to inform implementation
of the Government's forthcoming revised Prevent strategy.
4. To this end, we took oral evidence on seven occasions
between September 2011 and December 2011 and received 17 written
submissions. A list of those who gave evidence is appended to
our Report. We visited Belmarsh prison to speak to prisoners and
staff and held a round-table discussion with a group of students
from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of
London. We also held a conference at De Montfort University on
13 December 2011, attended by around 200 people involved in Prevent,
including police officers, local authority workers, prison and
probation staff, academics, faith leaders, students, community
groups and politicians. The conference was addressed by, amongst
others, Rev. Jesse Jackson and by Dr. Dipu Moni MP, the Foreign
Minister of Bangladesh, and allowed us to hear a wide range of
views which have informed our inquiry to a significant extent.
We are grateful to all those who contributed to our inquiry. We
are particularly grateful to De Montfort University and the Barrow
Cadbury Trust for hosting and supporting our conference.
Context
DEFINITIONS
5. Much of the language used to talk about the issues
we consider in our Report is itself the subject of debate. However,
whilst we briefly consider the use of language in chapter four,
in general we use the Government's definitions as set out in legislation
and the Prevent Strategy:
- Section 1 of the Terrorism
Act 2000 defines terrorism as "the use or threat of action
... designed to influence the Government or to intimidate the
public or a section of the public ... for the purpose of advancing
a political, religious or ideological cause."
- Radicalisation is defined in the Prevent Strategy
as "the process by which a person comes to support terrorism
and forms of extremism leading to terrorism."
- Extremism is defined in the Prevent Strategy
as "vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values,
including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual
respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also
include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of
members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas."[3]
- "Violent extremism" is considered
by the Prevent Strategy to mean the endorsement of violence to
achieve extreme ends.
THE TERRORIST THREAT
6. The Government concluded in its Prevent Review
that the Strategy should continue to focus on radicalisation linked
to the main terrorist threat facing the UK, from groups that are
usually collectively referred to as Islamic fundamentalist, Al
Qa'ida-related, or Islamist terrorists (we will use this last
term). Other than the 7/7 bombings, some of the most high-profile
Islamist plots discovered by the authorities involving British
citizens or residents over the last decade included:
- the attempt by Richard Reid
to detonate explosives in his shoes while on board a flight from
Paris to Miami in December 2001;
- the conviction of Kamel Bourgass for his role
in a plot to produce ricin for use in a terrorist attack in London
in 2003;
- the conviction of five men in 2004 for attempting
to produce explosives to attack utility companies, the Ministry
of Sound nightclub, Bluewater Shopping Centre and Amec construction
firm;
- the conviction of four individuals who tried
and failed to detonate bombs on London's transport network on
21 July 2005;
- the conviction of seven individuals in connection
with the Bojinka II Plot to blow up six to ten flights from the
UK to the US;
- the discovery in June 2007 of two improvised
devices in a car outside the Tiger Tiger club near Trafalgar Square—the
following day the two perpetrators drove a Jeep packed with gas
cylinders into the lounge at Glasgow Airport; and
- the jailing of Rajib Karim for 30 years in March
2011 after he joined British Airways in order to plan suicide
bombings.
The threat level from such groups has reached the
highest level of CRITICAL over the past decade (meaning an attack
is expected imminently) but was most recently lowered in Great
Britain from SEVERE (meaning an attack is highly likely) to SUBSTANTIAL
(a strong possibility) in July 2011. [4]
7. However, the Government also believes that "Prevent
should be flexible enough to address the challenge posed by terrorism
of any kind" and cited two further forms of terrorism in
the Strategy.[5] Firstly,
it noted the threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism had
"increased significantly" over the past two years.[6]
The current threat level from Northern Ireland-terrorism is set separately
from that for Great Britain and currently stands at SEVERE.
The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has responsibility
in government for Northern Ireland-related terrorism with most
relevant policy areas the responsibility of the devolved administration.
8. Secondly, the Strategy cited extreme right-wing
terrorism, which in the UK has been "much less widespread,
systematic or organised than terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida";[7]
however, there are 17 people in Britain currently serving prison
sentences for terrorism offences who are known to be associated
with extreme right-wing groups.[8]
Although the last major terrorist attacks by a right-wing extremist
in the UK took place in 1999,[9]
there have been more recent convictions for offences connected
with planning terrorist attacks, including:
- Nathan Worrell, jailed for
at least seven years in December 2008 for possessing material
for terrorist purposes and racially aggravated harassment;
- Neil Lewington, convicted and sentenced for a
least six years in September 2009 on seven separate charges, including
preparing acts of terrorism;
- Martyn Gilleard, sentenced to 16 years in prison
in June 2008 for preparing for terrorist acts and possessing articles
and collecting information for terrorist purposes;
- Ian and Nicky Davison, convicted in May 2010
of preparing a terrorist attack to target Jews, Muslims and ethnic
minorities using ricin poison; and
- Terence Gavan, jailed for 11 years in January
2010 for assembling one of the largest arms caches found in England
in recent years.[10]
DELIVERY OF THE PREVENT STRATEGY
9. The Prevent Strategy is coordinated by the Office
for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office and delivered
in partnership with a number of other Government Departments and
statutory agencies and community groups at a local level. The
Home Office currently funds Prevent coordinators in 25 priority
local authority areas and also provides grant funding for project
work within these areas. The Home Office provides further funding
to police forces for officers to fulfil Prevent coordination and
engagement roles. Key to local Prevent delivery is the Channel
programme, a multi-agency programme coordinated by the police
to identify individuals vulnerable to radicalisation and direct
them towards appropriate support, supplied by a Channel provider.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office provides funding for Prevent
work overseas (which we do not consider in our Report).
1 HM Government, Contest: The UK's Strategy for
Countering Terrorism, 2011.The other three factors are conflict
and instability; ideology; and technology. Back
2
"Prevent" is one of four strands of CONTEST. The others
are "Protect", "Pursue" and "Prepare". Back
3
HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, Annex A: Glossary
of Terms Back
4
The Security Service website, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/threat-levels.html#history. Back
5
HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, para 6.11 Back
6
HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, para 5.6 Back
7
HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering
Terrorism, July 2011, p 30 Back
8
Ev 89, para 1.18 Back
9
Hansard, 26 April 1999, col. 37ff. Back
10
Alexander Melegrou-Hitchens and Edmund Standing, Blood and
Honour: Britain's far right militants, Centre for Social Cohesion,
January 2010, pp 36-7; HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom's
Strategy for Countering Terrorism, July 2011, p 30 Back
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