2 Who is at risk of radicalisation?
The scale of radicalisation
10. In 2007, the Director-General of MI5 said that
there were "at least 2,000 people" in the UK who posed
a threat because they supported terrorism, a figure that had increased
by 400 from the previous year. Charles Farr, Director-General
of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism at the Home Office,
told us that, more recently, "we have seen that sympathy
for violent extremism is declining rather than increasing".[11]
Most witnesses were more or less in agreement, in relation to
Islamist terrorism. Professor Peter Neumann, of the International
Center for the Study of Radicalisation, said that is it "definitely"
on the decrease, citing a large decline in the number of people
mobilised by organisations like Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun.[12]
Witnesses did not consider that this was necessarily reflected
in the conviction data;[13]
however, we note from the most recent statistics published in
December 2011 that only four people were convicted of terrorist
or terrorism-related offences in Great Britain in the 2010/11
financial year, compared with 19 the previous year and a peak
of 51 in 2006/07. Even allowing for the fact that some cases are
still awaiting prosecution, only three individuals were charged
for these offences in the year ending June 2011, compared with
27 during the previous year.[14]
11. Charles Farr thought that the reasons for this
decline were unclear. While we received no definitive answers,
it was suggested to us by a student from SOAS, during our round-table
discussion, that supporting violent extremist preachers had been
a "novelty" for some young Muslims, which had largely
worn off.[15] Ali Soufan,
a former FBI agent who now runs a counter-radicalisation organisation,
also posited that the Arab Spring had contributed to the waning
appeal of global jihad.[16]
12. However, some witnesses were concerned about
a growth in non-violent extremism, including Maajid Nawaz
of the Quilliam Foundation.[17]
Jamie Bartlett of the think-tank Demos told us:
Other types of extremism appear to be on the increase.
Part of that may be what Professor [Roger] Eatwell [of the University
of Bath] calls cumulative, that groups feed off each other. Classic
examples are the English Defence League and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, who
require each other's presence in order to justify their continuing
existence and just continually spur each other on.[18]
The Government cites in the Prevent Strategy examples
of where those who have previously been members of non-violent
extremist groups have gone on to support terrorism.
13. Some witnesses and participants in our conference
at De Montfort University suggested that the threat from the far
right was increasing in two ways. The number of supporters for
non-violent extremist groups was growing, and, while support for
more explicitly violent groups remained low, Dr Matthew Goodwin,
of the University of Nottingham, asserted that "the far right
is becoming far more confrontational and willing to engage in
violence".[19] Much
of the current discourse about the far right tends to focus on
the self-styled English Defence League, which recent research
estimates has 25,000-35,000 online supporters but is not seen
as a terrorist threat.[20]
Dr Matthew Feldman, of the University of Northampton, made the
point that there are other groups that are far more extreme, such
as the Aryan Strike Force, four members of which have been convicted
of various acts of preparation for terrorism.[21]
The drivers of radicalisation
14. The Prevent Strategy cites research suggesting
that, in relation to Islamist terrorism, the following groups
are particularly vulnerable to radicalisation:
- young people and people from
lower income and socio-economic groups;
- those who distrust Parliament and who see a conflict
between being British and their own cultural identity; and
- those who perceive discrimination, experience
racial or religious harassment, and have a negative view of policing.[22]
15. It became apparent during our inquiry that radicalised
individuals come from a wide range of backgrounds: recent research
described them as "demographically unremarkable".[23]
For example, although only five women were convicted of Islamist
offences between 1999 and 2009 and over 90% of referrals to the
multi-agency Channel programme, which evaluates referrals of individuals
at risk of radicalisation, were male,[24]
we heard that Al Qa'ida is "specifically launching and targeting
women for violent acts of radicalisation" and that "there
is absolutely no gender imbalance whatsoever" in terms of
support for extremism.[25]
The majority of individuals referred to the Channel programme
were aged between 13 and 25 and just over two-thirds of all terrorist
offences since 2001 were committed by those under 30, but the
age of offenders ranged from 16 to 48.[26]
Education levels and economic status vary.[27]
Those particularly vulnerable to radicalisation include converts
to the Muslim faith, meaning they may originate from many different
ethnic communities rather than what we would regard as "traditional"
British Muslim communities. Rashad Ali, of the counter-radicalisation
organisation Centri, concluded that "I don't think there
is a typical profile ... It actually could be anybody".[28]
16. Evidence to our inquiry suggested that there
were also many drivers of, and routes into, Islamist radicalisation.
We initially heard that there were four main pathways: ideology,
theology, grievance and mental health problems.[29]
Further evidence emphasised grievance[30]
and its links to social exclusion.[31]
Arguments about social exclusion were not entirely convincing,
given that 42% of offences were perpetrated by individuals either
in employment or full-time education, and the recent Home Office
research finding that individuals tend to have similar socio-economic
status to the broader population in which they live.[32]
Genuine theology also appeared to play a very limited role: Alyas
Karmani noted that the Islamic understanding of individuals at
risk of radicalisation seen by his organisation, STREET, "equated
to a primary school level".[33]
17. Charles Farr argued that "we have a fairly
good idea about what is driving radicalisation".[34]
However, a recent Home Office-commissioned research paper contradicted
this:
The empirical evidence base on what factors make
an individual more vulnerable to Al Qa'ida-influenced violent
extremism is weak. Even less is known about why certain individuals
resort to violence, when other individuals from the same community,
with similar experiences, do not become involved in violent activity.[35]
The weakness of the evidence base came across strongly
during our inquiry. Jamie Bartlett said that there were three
reasons for this: the difficulty in generating primary evidence
because of the lack of research subjects and their unwillingness
to participate; the fact that research tended to be theoretical
rather than evidence-based; and the difficulty in analysing personal
stories in a rigorous, scientific way.[36]
Much of what is cited as "evidence" is often anecdotal.
Professor Peter Neumann, of the International Center for the Study
of Radicalisation and Political Violence, told us there was some
good understanding of the "ingredients" for radicalisation
but "do we not know absolutely everything about how these
ingredients fit together, how to cook the recipe".[37]
18. However, most people with whom we spoke mentioned
the centrality of grievance to the radicalisation process.[38]
The Prevent Review found that sources of grievance included 'stop
and search' powers used by the police under counter-terrorism
legislation; the UK's counter-terrorism strategy more generally;
a perception of biased and Islamophobic media coverage; and UK
foreign policy, notably with regard to Muslim countries, the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and the war in Iraq.[39]
This was supported by evidence to our inquiry. Maajid Nawaz, who
was formerly a member of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, told us:
I had many grievances, including experiencing violent
racism on the streets of Essex as a teenager before the age of
16; being stabbed at in the street by Combat 18; being falsely
arrested by Essex police authorities. I saw what was happening
in Bosnia.[40]
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh, of the Averroes Institute,
argued in particular that "the common denominator is not
the foreign policy but the perception, whether it is perceived
or real, that there is an attack or a targeting or a singling
out or a discriminatory attitude towards Muslims and Islam."[41]
19. Charles Farr told us that the drivers of terrorism
in Northern Ireland-related terrorism, Al Qaeda-related terrorism
and far right extremism tended to be "comparable in type
but not in detail" in terms of the combination of ideology
and personal vulnerabilities.[42]
In Prevent, the Government claims the drivers for extreme
right-wing terrorism include a combination of supremacist ideologywhich
in recent years has increasingly encompassed Islamophobiapeer
pressure, and the prospect of personal benefit, with individuals
involved tending to be male, poorly educated and unemployed, in
some cases with a criminal record.[43]
Dr Goodwin stated that, while their demographics might vary dependent
on the organisation they supported, far right supporters were:
United through a heavy preoccupation with immigration,
profound levels of concern over the effects of immigration on
British society, high levels of dissatisfaction with all of the
mainstream parties and anxiety over the role of Islam and British
Muslims in wider society.[44]
As with supporters of Islamist terrorist groups,
however, "not enough systematic, longitudinal research has
been done to paint an accurate picture of who they are, how they
come to be radicalised".[45]
20. Violent extremists reject mainstream methods
of political participation. Dr Goodwin argued that "the vast
majority of far right supporters are so dissatisfied with mainstream
parties, and so distrustful of the political system generally
that they either refuse to believe anything is being done or they
simply take the view that what is being done is insufficient".[46]
Akeela Ahmed, of the Muslim Youth Helpline, considered that the
summer riots had highlighted some of the challenges facing young
Muslims: they do not feel like they are being heard; they do not
have the tools to express their grievances in the right way; and
they feel disempowered and unable to effect change or influence
what is going on in their lives.[47]
A student from SOAS told us that Muslims felt particularly targeted
by the police in legitimate protests.[48]
21. We suspect that violent radicalisation is
declining within the Muslim community. There may be growing support
for nonviolent extremism, fed by feelings of alienation, and while
this may not lead to a specific terrorist threat or be a staging
post for violent extremism, it is nevertheless a major challenge
for society in general and for the police in particular. There
also appears to be a growth in more extreme and violent forms
of far-right ideology. Indeed it is clear that individuals from
many different backgrounds are vulnerable, with no typical profile
or pathway to radicalisation. However, there is a lack of objective
data, much of the evidence inevitably being anecdotal. Only 250
people have been convicted in the UK of terrorism-related offences
since 11 September 2001. However, there is a wealth of knowledge
held by people working with individuals judged to be vulnerable
to violent radicalisation at a local level that could better inform
our understanding of why some of these individuals do become radicalised
and, crucially, why some do not. One of the aims of the increased
auditing demands to be placed on Channel providers should be the
collection of a wider range of data to contribute to this evidence
base. We recommend that the Government publish the methodology
whereby this data will be collated and analysed, and make arrangements
for suitably de-sensitised data to be made available to the wider
research community.
22. One of the few clear conclusions we were able
to draw about the drivers of radicalisation is that a sense of
grievance is key to the process. Addressing perceptions of Islamophobia,
and demonstrating that the British state is not antithetical to
Islam, should constitute a main focus of the part of the Prevent
Strategy which is designed to counter the ideology feeding violent
radicalisation.
23. The Government notes in the Prevent Strategy
that individuals "who distrust Parliament" are at particular
risk of violent radicalisation. This appeared to be borne out
in our inquiry, both in terms of Islamist and extreme far-right-
radicalisation. Individuals are frustrated because they feel unable
to participate in the political process and feel that mainstream
parties do not recognise their concerns. This may not be true
and we stress that we are talking about perceptions. Clearly there
is much to be done by Parliamentarians and by the political parties
to ensure that there is a nonviolent outlet for individuals throughout
society, but we also consider that there is an insufficient focus
within Prevent on building trust in democratic institutions at
all levels. This should be emphasised more strongly, including
how work currently being undertaken by the Government Equality
Office to implement the 2010 recommendations of the Speaker's
Conference on Parliamentary Representation feeds into Prevent.
11 Q 299 Back
12
Q 349 Back
13
Ibid Back
14
Home Office, Operation of police powers under the Terrorism
Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stop
and searches, Quarterly update to June 2011, Great Britain,
December 2011, Table 1.04; Home Office, Operation of police
powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation:
Arrests, outcomes and stop and searches, Great Britain 2008/09,
November 2009, Table A Back
15
Annex C Back
16
Q 105 Back
17
Q 93 Back
18
Q 349 Back
19
Q 205 Back
20
Q 359 [Mr Bartlett - citing his own research published by Demos,
2011] Back
21
See Annex A Back
22
HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, paras 5.26-5.30 Back
23
Home Office Occasional Paper 98, Understanding vulnerability
and resilience in individuals to the influence of AQ violent extremism,
November 2011 Back
24
Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, Houriya Ahmed, Islamist Terrorism:
The British Connections, Centre for Social Cohesion, 2010 Back
25
Q 55 [Mr Ali; Mr Nawaz] Back
26
HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, para 9.23;
Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, Houriya Ahmed, Islamist Terrorism:
The British Connections, Centre for Social Cohesion, 2010 Back
27
Q 214 [Sir Norman Bettison] Back
28
Q 53 Back
29
Qq 45, 54 [Mr Ali] Back
30
See for example Q 139 [Mr Hassan Shaikh] Back
31
See, for example, Q 139 [Mr Karmani] Back
32
Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, Houriya Ahmed, Islamist Terrorism:
The British Connections, Centre for Social Cohesion, 2010;
Home Office Occasional Paper 98, Understanding vulnerability
and resilience in individuals to the influence of AQ violent extremism,
November 2011 Back
33
Q 139. STREET is a Brixton-based project working with young Muslims
at risk of criminality, social exclusion and violent extremism.
It was until recently funded as a Channel provider by the Home
Office. Back
34
Q 306 Back
35
Home Office Occasional Paper 98, Understanding vulnerability
and resilience in individuals to the influence of AQ violent extremism,
November 2011 Back
36
Q 347 Back
37
Q 348 Back
38
See also Annex A, Annex B, Annex C Back
39
HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, para 5.27 Back
40
Q 48 [Mr Nawaz] Back
41
Q 140 Back
42
Q 309 Back
43
HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, paras 5.43-5.45 Back
44
Q 187 Back
45
Q 187 Back
46
Q 189 Back
47
Q 145 Back
48
Annex C Back
|