House of Commons - Rules governing enforced removals from the UK

Rules governing enforced removals from the UK - Home Affairs Committee Contents

Report

Background

1. In recent years a number of non-governmental organisations and media reports have raised concerns about the treatment of people who are being removed from the UK on the grounds that they had no right to remain here. These concerns grew in autumn 2010 when Mr Jimmy Mubenga died during a deportation flight from Heathrow to Angola. The three civilian security guards accompanying Mr Mubenga, who were employed by the private security contractor G4S, were arrested and bailed pending further inquiries. This case continues, and we do not intend to comment on it here, but it was the impetus for us to start a broader inquiry into the rules governing enforced removals from the UK, and in particular the role of the UK Border Agency in overseeing the contractors acting on its behalf in escorting those being removed.

2. In November 2010 we took oral evidence from the then head of the UK Border Agency, Lin Homer, and from managers of G4S, the contractor providing escorts for enforced removals. We received written evidence at that time from the UK Border Agency and G4S. We publish the written evidence and the oral evidence from G4S with this report. Lin Homer's evidence has already been published, with our report into The work of the UK Border Agency, in January 2011.[1] Several people who had been or were still employed in the custody and security industry expressed an interest in contributing to our inquiry, but were unwilling to give formal evidence on the record. In March 2011, Amnesty International UK sent to us a memorandum which included some allegations from these 'whistleblowers'; this memorandum has subsequently formed the basis of Amnesty International UK's report Out of Control—the case for a complete overhaul of enforced removals by private contractors.[2]

Use of force in the removals process

3. The UK Border Agency set out the consequences when someone claiming asylum or seeking a visa to remain in the UK has their claim or request refused. The Agency expects such people to leave the country promptly. If they fail to do so, they may be subject to enforcement action, including detention and removal. Convicted foreign national criminals whose continued stay in the UK is considered not to be conducive to the common good similarly are subject to enforced removal. The Agency told us:

In the vast majority of cases where we detain and remove individuals, they are taken to the airport by escorts, but leave compliantly, travelling home alone. In a small number of cases, escorts may need to travel with the detainee either because they are unwilling to leave voluntarily, because they are otherwise vulnerable (e.g. they have a condition which requires the presence of a medic) or because they are being removed on a flight chartered by the UK Border Agency. Even then, the vast majority of these individuals leave the UK compliantly, but in a small number of cases, escorts may need to use restraint to ensure the individual complies with their removal.[3]

The Agency has provided us with figures for the number of removals over the previous three years, distinguishing between escorted and unescorted returns, and for escorted returns showing the number of times physical restraint was used. [4]

Number of removals

G4S said that since the start of its contract in April/May 2005, it had "removed or attempted to remove" 125,462 detainees and dealt with 59,244 as 'turnarounds' at airports (someone stopped at a port of entry, refused leave to enter and returned from that port)—a total of 184,706.[5]

4. Operational instructions governing forced removal of illegal immigrants provide that force can be used "to keep a detainee in custody, to prevent violence, to prevent destruction of property of removal centre or of others, and to prevent detainees from seeking to prevent their removal physically or physically interfering with the lawful removal of another detainee".[6]

5. The death of Jimmy Mubenga was the first to occur during enforced removal since Mrs Joy Gardner died after being gagged and restrained by officers from the Metropolitan Police's specialist deportation squad at her home in London in 1993. The officers involved in Mrs Gardner's death were found not guilty of manslaughter at a subsequent trial, but the specialist deportation squad was disbanded and the job of carrying out forced deportations is now contracted out by the UK Border Agency to private security firms.

6. However, in July 2008, Birnberg Peirce & Partners (a London firm of solicitors), Medical Justice (a charity that campaigns for adequate healthcare provision for immigration detainees) and the National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns published a report entitled Outsourcing Abuse, which gave details of almost 300 cases which it claimed showed evidence of abuse:

We have found an alarming and unacceptable number of injuries have been sustained by those subject to forced removals ... In all cases in our dossier, what may have started off as 'reasonable' force turned into what we consider to be excessive force.[7]

7. Dame Nuala O'Loan (now Baroness O'Loan) was appointed by the then Home Secretary to investigate the claims made in Outsourcing Abuse, which covered both detention prior to removal from the country and escort during removal. In March 2010 she published a report which:

Rejected the claim of "systemic abuse", saying there was no pattern of inappropriate force by any individual.
Criticised the UK Border Agency for failing to investigate complaints of abusive treatment properly—three cases had involved serious injuries including a punctured lung, a broken finger and a dislocated knee.
Concluded that: "Over the period under investigation there was inadequate management of the use of force by the private sector companies. This resulted, on occasion, in failures properly to account for the use of force by recording fully the circumstances and justification for the use of force."
Concluded that: "The use of force training which officers receive does refer to the legal obligations governing the use of force. However this was not reflected in the bulk of the case papers which I examined. I have therefore made recommendations to address this issue."
Expressed concerns in relation to the guidance, management and training for the use of handcuffs.[8]

8. Both G4S and the UK Border Agency assured us that Baroness O'Loan's recommendations were being implemented, although the Agency argued that the original Outsourcing Abuse report had exaggerated the extent and seriousness of the problem of excessive force. Lin Homer, Chief Executive of the UK Border Agency, told us: "I think much of it was not capable of being evidenced by Medical Justice or by Birnbergs, despite a very lengthy period being provided to them to provide evidence to support that."[9]

9. G4S told us that from April/May 2005 to November 2010 they had received 481 complaints relating to removals. Of these, 252 involved escorting removals overseas, of which 25 (or 10%) were substantiated; and 186 alleged assault related to the use of force on overseas escorting, of which six (or 3%) were substantiated. The six substantiated complaints were that: a detainee's arm was held too tightly leaving pressure marks (in 2006); a detainee was restrained by using an inappropriate neck hold (in 2006); a detainee was left too long in handcuffs (in 2008); a detainee was controlled inappropriately by pulling handcuffs (in 2009); inappropriate force (leg strikes) was used to dress a detainee (in 2009); and an escort applied pressure to a detainee's handcuff (in 2010).[10]

10. G4S argued that serious injuries to detainees were extremely rare, even when detainees became disruptive, violent or attempted to escape, although minor injuries were almost inevitable where physical restraint had to be used.

There is a risk of injury to detainees involved in the Use of Force. The response letter sent to detainees by UKBA following an investigation by Professional Standards Unit (UKBA body) in assault complaints almost always states that some relatively minor injury is inevitable. In such situations, especially if handcuffs have to be applied, the most common form of minor injury to detainees is reddening and soreness of wrists following handcuffing during Control and Restraint.

Occasions when detainees have been seriously injured (broken bones, cuts requiring stitches or above) are rare.

G4S records on Use of Force (compiled from information supplied on Use of Force Incident Reports and notified to UKBA) note if a detainee has sustained injury. These have been examined to identify injuries other than minor injuries and only the following are recorded:-

11/10/2005, Glasgow Airport—detainee with cut head. No complaint received.

13/05/2006, Glasgow Airport—detainee with broken bone in hand. No complaint received but investigation completed by UKBA and no further action required.

24/01/2006, Heathrow Airport—detainee with cut above eye. No complaint received.

01/10/2006, Heathrow Airport—detainee with two broken bones. Complaint received. The complaint was not substantiated by UKBA.

29/01/2007, Heathrow Airport, detainee with dislocated knee. Complaint received. The complaint was not substantiated by UKBA.

16/05/2009, Gatwick Airport, detainee lost a tooth. No complaint received.

01 /10/2010, LHR/Lagos Flight, detainee with suspected broken nose. No complaint received.[11]

11. Those who have no right to remain in the UK must leave the country and, if they refuse to do so voluntarily, they may have to be detained for a short time, if necessary escorted throughout the flight and, in extreme situations, may have to be restrained physically in order to prevent greater harm. However, whenever the state uses force to coerce a person, there need to be checks on that force. These checks take the form of carefully constructed procedures to limit harm, of adequate training and proper supervision of staff, and adequate means of complaint and redress if anything goes wrong. Where the state has contracted out responsibility for coercion, it retains ultimate responsibility for ensuring that all the checks are in place and working well. It is important that this is understood within the culture of both the Agency and that of its contractors, and not just acknowledged in formal documents. This is one of a number of areas of activity where there appears to be a reluctance by officials to accept constructive criticism, and as the UK Border Agency is not an independent body, but is in fact an integral part of the Home Office, this is a matter that we call on the Home Secretary to require the Permanent Secretary to address as part of the central management responsibilities of the Department.

CONTROL AND RESTRAINT PROCEDURES

12. Contractors working for the UK Border Agency may use only the control and restraint procedures developed and approved by HM Prison Service.[12] G4S said: "As a company we cannot alter the guidance or training methods from that approved by the relevant Government agencies."[13] These comprise a series of detailed procedures which are intended to minimise the possibility of pain and injury to the detainee, or to those required to restrain him or her. Different techniques apply if the detainee is a minor.[14] G4S said that the key difference in the approaches was that juveniles could not be subjected to methods intended to cause pain, whereas adults could.[15] Both the UK Border Agency and G4S emphasised that force could lawfully be used only as a last resort and that any use of force must be necessary and proportionate.[16]

13. In July 2010, the Ministry of Justice published a document entitled 'Physical Control in Care Training Manual', following a campaign by the families of two youths who died whilst being held at secure training centres in 2004. The Manual warns that certain restraint measures can cause permanent injury, and, for example, under the heading of 'Medical Advice' warns that the single greatest risk factor for permanent injury or death is prolonged restraint, where the person violently resists for an extended period of time.[17] G4S assured us that the changes in the treatment of minors recommended in these guidelines had been implemented by November 2010.[18]

14. We asked about the restraint techniques used, in particular in the difficult and confined conditions of aircraft. G4S said detainees might be handcuffed in aircraft, or they might be subject to shoulder holds and arm locks to keep them seated, or their head might be physically restrained in an upright position; it denied that any techniques to hold the neck or keep the head down were used.[19] Ms Homer said that, where there were specialised requirements not fully covered by normal Ministry of Justice or National Offender Management Service guidelines—such as the problem of escorting people in confined but public spaces such as aircraft—the Agency tended to commission the Ministry of Justice to conduct research on techniques and to provide advice on medical issues, specific training, and the evaluation of techniques.[20] This seems to suggest that the Agency—which, as we have commented elsewhere, is in fact an integral part of the Home Office—should be commissioning work from another government department. We suggest that this should have been referred to as work being commissioned by the Home Office from the Ministry of Justice, and that the lines of responsibility for such commissioning activity should be made clear.

15. The difficulty of restraining detainees in an aircraft seat was highlighted in July 2011, with the publication of new research evidence, funded by the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, which showed that seated restraint positions in which the person is leant forwards may increase the risk of harm or death when they are used for prolonged periods.[21] Researchers noted that the level of force applied by staff carrying out the experiment (on student volunteers) was slight compared to what might be expected in a resisted, real-world restraint; but volunteers nonetheless reported a feeling of being unable to breath, and a significant reduction in lung function was measured. In one case, the volunteer felt obliged to abort the procedure.

16. Although the Agency and its contractors deny that head-down restraint positions are used, the O'Loan Report noted that "under current Control and Restraint techniques a person's head will be held down to prevent them from biting",[22] and Outsourcing Abuse describes several incidents in which detainees claim to have been restrained with their heads held down or with their bodies bent forwards.[23] It is difficult to believe that all these accounts are complete fabrications.

17. It is sensible for a single agency—HM Prison Service—to take the lead in developing and evaluating safe control and restraint procedures. However, there is the danger that the specific needs of other agencies, including the UK Border Agency, might be overlooked. This is particularly true of techniques which can be used safely in the confined, crowded and public space of an aircraft. Reports of head-down restraint positions are troubling in the light of recent evidence which shows that the prolonged use of such positions might carry a risk of death. Equally troubling is the denials by G4S management that such techniques are ever used, by which they appear to mean that staff are not trained to use seated, head-down positions and that the use of such techniques is not reported back to them.[24]

18. We are not persuaded that head-down restraint positions are never used, even though they are not authorised. We recommend that the Home Office issue urgent guidance to all staff involved in enforced removals about the danger of seated restraint techniques in which the subject is bent forwards. We also recommend that the Home Office commission research into control and restraint techniques which are suitable for use on an aircraft. The use by contractors of unauthorised restraint techniques, sanctioning their use, or failing to challenge their use, should be grounds for dismissal.

Escort to detainee ratios

19. One of the findings of the inspection reports was that there were too many escorts on the flights. Instead of the notional complement of around two escorts to one detainee, there were 104 escorts accompanying 35 people on the Jamaica flight, and on the Nigeria flight there were 131 staff for a planned total of 59 people (though in the event only 53 people were removed). The inspection report on the Jamaica flight recorded that the number of staff present created unnecessary crowding at some stages of the process, which put extras pressure on detainees.[25] The Chief Inspector told us that

It is a lot of people [...] and I think some of the problems that occurred were simply because some of the escort staff did not have anything to do, they were bored.[26]

20. The high ratio of staff to detainees was at least in part due to a number of those who were scheduled to be removed dropping out of the process at a late stage, mostly due to High Court injunctions.

21. The use of excessive numbers of escorts, to the extent that HM Chief Inspector of Prisons believes that escort numbers are in some cases detrimental to the removals process, is hard to justify against a background of reduced staffing levels across the public sector. It is a symptom of a weakness in the contracting process that the contractor is able to supply more staff than are required to do the job, with costs passed on to the Home Office. When the contract for enforced removals is next revised, it should specify precise ratios of escorts to detainees and the contractor should be able to depart from these only for clearly-defined, operational reasons.

THE USE OF "RESERVES"

22. In order to maximise the occupancy of seats on charter flights, the Agency uses "reserves"—detainees who are taken to the airport in order to fill a vacant space should another detainee's removal be blocked at a late stage in the process. This means that in some cases, more detainees are taken to the airport than there are available seats on the flight. Moreover, detainees are not told that they are going as reserves. Some of them, having prepared to return to their country of origin, are returned to detention if no seat is available on the flight. These people may be returned to a different immigration removal centre from the one which they have just left.[27]

23. The Chief Inspector describes this practice as "objectionable and distressing", and "inhumane.[28] Although he has recommended that it should cease, the Home Office continues to defend it on the grounds of efficiency.[29] We agree with HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, that the use of reserves on enforced removal flights should be discontinued.

PRACTICALITIES OF REMOVALS

24. Before any detainee is removed from the UK, a detailed form has to be completed by Agency staff and those escorting the detainee which—among other things—gives an indication of any problems that might arise during removal and lists risk factors, and includes a health review completed by medical staff at the detention centre.[30] This assessment enables the Agency and its contractor to determine the number of escort staff, the route, the flight to be taken, and so on.[31] We were provided with a copy of this form, which is reproduced at Appendix 1.[32]

25. It seems to us that the form concentrates mainly on any risk to those escorting the detainee rather than to the detainee him/herself. Moreover, the section on health is cramped, and it is not at all clear that it would necessarily be completed in a way to make it immediately comprehensible to a non-medical expert, like an escort officer: the lack of space would tend to force the experts to make terse notes rather than giving helpful detail. This is of special importance if the use of some—or any—restraint techniques might exacerbate an underlying medical condition, such as heart disease or asthma.

26. While we do not want to add to the paperwork which detention centres and escort officers have to deal with, we consider that there is a strong argument for providing a simple indication on the front page of the form flagging up the fact that the detainee has a medical condition which might lead to problems in the stressful conditions of enforced deportation. If a possible problem is flagged up, then the escort officers should be briefed on the practical consequences before the removal begins.

Supervision and monitoring of removals

27. It is impossible for either the contractors or the Agency to supervise all removals, so reporting and monitoring are vital. We were told that, where this was practicable, CCTV cameras and audio recording equipment were installed to monitor the movement of detainees, for example in detention holding rooms and in the vehicles used to transport detainees to airports, with recordings being kept for three months. Moreover, on charter flights, two medical practitioners and at least one Agency official were present.[33]

28. Whenever physical restraint is used, escort officers have to complete a detailed report explaining the circumstances of the incident, why restraint was necessary and what was done. These reports are made in the first place to the senior managers of the contracting company, but are then sent at once to the Agency's contract monitor for review.[34] If the contract manager considers that the use of force may have been inappropriate, the report is passed to the Agency's Professional Standards Unit for investigation.[35] In the most serious cases, the police may also be informed so that they can investigate. However, while escorts were required to note any minor injuries to the detainee or the fact that there were no signs of injury, there was not an automatic medical examination if the detainee appeared to have been injured, unless the injury seemed serious.[36]

29. As far as monitoring is concerned, the Agency's contract manager makes what the Agency describes as "ad hoc visits" to airports to check on the procedures being used, and HM Inspectorate of Prisons also regularly inspects and publishes reports on all immigration detention facilities, including noting and commenting on concerns related to the use of force during removals. Independent Monitoring Boards at Heathrow Airport, Manchester and in Scotland make frequent unannounced visits to detention centres and review the care of those being escorted at the time.[37]

30. Earlier this year, inspectors from HM Inspectorate of Prisons observed removal flights first-hand for the first time. Inspectors accompanied a flight to Jamaica in March and a flight to Nigeria in April.[38] Some findings were positive—collection from detention centres and transport were generally well-organised, escorts were generally calm and professional and dealt sensitively with the inevitable stresses and complications which arose. However, inspectors also recorded instances of the use of racist language by some contractors:

Some officers used highly offensive and racist language during conversations that could be overheard by detainees.[39]

A senior officer used wholly unacceptable terms to describe some minority groups; these included 'gippos', 'pikeys' and 'typical Asians'. This was not in the hearing of detainees, but it could be heard by other officers and communicated a disrespectful and racist attitude.[40]

31. We confirmed with HM Chief Inspector of Prisons that the offensive language came from contractors and not from UK Border Agency staff and that the staff knew that HMIP staff were present when the remarks were made.[41] Agency staff who were present did not challenge the contractors when they made these comments.

32. It is a matter for serious concern that contractors should use racist language among themselves. That they were content to do so in front of not only UK Border Agency staff but also inspectors from HM Inspectorate of Prisons is shocking. It is possibly the result of a relationship between the Agency and its contractors which had become too cosy. We recommend that the senior management of the UK Border Agency send a clear and strong message to staff who are involved in removals, that they have the full support of senior management in challenging the use of racist language by contractors, and that they are expected to do so. The contract should be amended to include a provision which requires the contractor to pay a financial penalty to the Home Office where there is a proven incident of the use of racist language by its staff.

COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE

33. G4S said that every complaint of ill-treatment by a detainee or a third party not notified directly to the UK Border Agency was immediately forwarded to the Agency by the company. The Agency's Professional Standards Unit would then carry out an investigation, which it tried to complete within twelve weeks. Where assault or other criminality was alleged, the complaint would be automatically referred to the police at the same time. If the complaint was substantiated, the Agency's response varied according to the seriousness of the ill-treatment, ranging from the provision of informal guidance by the company to the officer concerned through to revocation of accreditation to work as an escort. Any detainee dissatisfied with the Agency's investigation could refer the matter to the Prisons and Probation ombudsman.[42]

34. G4S and the Agency provided us with figures on the number of complaints made and upheld. According to G4S, from April 2005 to November 2010, 186 complaints were made about the use of force during overseas escorting, of which six had been wholly or partly substantiated.[43] The Agency gave figures for complaints between January 2009 and November 2010, stating that no records of complaints were kept centrally before January 2009. The Agency's figures are set out in the following chart:[44]

Complaints received by current status of investigation

35. G4S could not tell us specifically what happened to the relevant officers as a result of the six complaints that had been substantiated, but they did say that two people had been dismissed during that period for inappropriate behaviour, and one had resigned before the investigation had finished.[45] They later confirmed that, since 2005, twenty staff in total had been disciplined, ranging from written and verbal warnings, additional obligatory training to dismissal. Of these, they told us that the majority of the actions were taken due to the company's own internal reporting process.[46]

36. It is impossible to be sure whether the low number of complaints of inappropriate use of force during removals reflects a system that basically works well or one where potential complainants do not act because they have been removed from the country and think it not worth their while, or because they expect agents of the state to use violence, or because they hope to return to the UK and do not wish to appear to be troublemakers.

37. The number of incidents recorded in Outsourcing Abuse, together with the findings of the O'Loan Review, suggest that the scale of the problem is likely to be much greater than the number of complaints would suggest. We accept Baroness O'Loan's finding that there is no evidence of systematic abuse rather, it suggests a significant number of isolated incidents. As with the use of racist language, we are concerned that this is an area where UK Border Agency staff may not feel confident to challenge contractors when they really should do so. The Agency cannot rely on the complaints process to flag up recurrent problems because most people, once they have been removed from the country, will either find it too difficult to make a complaint, or will not see the point in doing so.

38. We have heard concern from a range of sources about the treatment of detainees on enforced removal flights, which is not reflected in the number of complaints, for understandable reasons. Those who have already been removed from the country are less likely to see the complaints process through to its conclusion. Part of the problem, in our view, is that the Agency's monitoring of contractors has not been sufficiently robust. HM Chief Inspector of Prisons clearly has a significant part to play in ensuring that high standards are achieved and maintained, but there is a limit to the number of inspections that the Inspectorate can undertake.

39. An important safeguard against the ill-treatment of prisoners is the Independent Monitoring Board, a group of independent volunteers who have unrestricted access to the prison, who can talk to prisoners privately, away from the hearing of staff. Board Members are able to deal with specific problems relating to individual prisoners as well as wider issues affecting the whole prison. Immigration removal centres also have Independent Monitoring Boards, as do some holding facilities at airports. It would clearly not be possible to provide Independent Monitoring Boards with access to removals flights in exactly the same way that they have access to prisons, but access could nonetheless be provided. For example, it might not be possible for each Board to monitor the removal of detainees from its own removal centre since detainees from several centres may be removed on the same flight, but is should be possible for a representative of one Board to have access to each flight. An independent presence on removals flights would be a positive influence on those conducting the removal, as well as providing public reassurance about the standard of care and decent treatment that is provided on flights.

40. We recommend that members of the Independent Monitoring Boards for immigration removal centres—or a similar independent monitoring network—be given access to chartered removal flights. However, the main issue is the need for better management and more confident behaviour by staff of the Agency and this is a matter that must be addressed by the Permanent Secretary in relation to removals as well as to the generality of the work of this Agency which is—as we have pointed out repeatedly—an integral part of the Home Office and not an independent or arm's-length agency.

1 Fourth Report of Session 2010-11, HC 587 In this report, Lin Homer's evidence will be distinguished by references in the form Q x (UKBA) Back

2 Published on 7 July 2011 Back

3 Ev 15 Back

4 Letter from the Chief Executive of the UK Border Agency dated 16 November 2011 (Annex A). The figures were provided with the caveat that the information was based on local management Information rather than published statistics and was therefore subject to change. Back

5 Ev 15. The figures were supplied in October 2010. Back

6 Report to the UK Border Agency on "Outsourcing Abuse" by Baroness O'Loan DBE (UKBA, March 2010) Back

7 Birnberg Peirce & Partners, Medical Justice and the National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns, Outsourcing Abuse, July 2008 Back

8 Report to the UK Border Agency on "Outsourcing Abuse" by Baroness O'Loan DBE (UKBA, March 2010) Back

9 Qq 54-56 (UKBA), see also Q4 (G4S) Back

10 Ev13 Back

11 Ev 13 Back

12 Q 44 (UKBA) Back