House of Commons - Implications for the Justice and Home Affairs area of the accession of Turkey to the European Union

Implications for the Justice and Home Affairs area of the accession of Turkey to the European Union - Home Affairs Committee Contents

2 Organised crime

Organised crime originating in Turkey

8. The Member States of the European Union are currently affected by organised crime carried out by Turkish groups or by other networks based in Turkey. In its most recent Organised Crime Threat Assessment report,[6] Europol, the EU's law enforcement agency, stated that Turkish criminal groups are significantly involved in various forms of organised criminality, including the trafficking of heroin from Afghanistan into Europe, of synthetic drugs[7] into the Middle East from Europe, and of cocaine into Europe. Europol also described Turkey as a "key nexus point" for the transit of illegal immigrants to the EU. Mr Rob Wainwright, the Director of Europol, confirmed that "criminal activities that originate in Turkey, or pass through Turkey, have a significant impact on the internal security of the European Union".[8] He added that:

What we are seeing in Turkey is what we are seeing around the rest of Continental Europe, and indeed in the UK, a general diversification of organised crime and a proliferation of different trafficking routes ... We are also seeing other new trends that are interesting in Turkey, for example Turkish organised crime involvement in the production and trafficking of counterfeit euros ... This tells us that Turkey is becoming more important not less important in terms of the internal security.[9]

9. In terms of the particular impact on the UK, Mr Steve Coates, of the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency, told us that:

Turkey is important to us in its role as a transit country. It is a transit country for heroin and also for people who are being smuggled. The greatest impact from Turkey is heroin, and the involvement of Turkish organised crime in that issue. That is by far and away the largest area of crime in which Turkish organised crime groups are involved.[10]

Mr Coates also noted evidence of the involvement of Turkish groups in fraud, firearms trafficking, money laundering and copyright offences but cautioned that "those forms of criminality are so far behind heroin ... that statistically they are almost insignificant."[11]

The drugs trade

HEROIN

10. Turkish criminal groups facilitate the trafficking of heroin from Afghanistan, the largest opium-producing country in the world, to Europe. In 2009, it was reported that the heroin supply to Europe was controlled by 138 Turkish networks.[12] Europol stated in its 2011 Organised Crime Threat Assessment report that:

The majority of illicit heroin entering the EU continues to be sourced from Afghanistan via Turkey and the Balkans ...

Turkish and Albanian-speaking criminal groups remain the most prominent in trafficking heroin to and within the EU.[13]

Around 365 metric tonnes of heroin were produced in Afghanistan and trafficked into the international market in 2009. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimated in its World Drug Report 2011 that 75-80 metric tonnes were trafficked to Western and Central Europe in 2009, particularly to Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and the UK, and that 60 metric tonnes of this were trafficked via the Balkan route. By this method, the heroin enters Turkey from Iran and is transported via the cities of Hakkari or Van to Western parts of Turkey, before passing into South-Eastern Europe.[14] Even when heroin is taken on a different route to Europe from Afghanistan, Turkish networks tend to be involved.

11. The size of the UK market for heroin is estimated at between 18 and 23 metric tonnes per annum. Mr Coates told us that Turkish organised crime groups dominate the heroin market in the UK, of which they are probably responsible for around 70%.[15] During our visit to Turkey, we were advised by the Turkish Authorities that, of the 95% of drugs in Turkey which are destined for abroad, a "significant proportion" is intended for the UK.[16] Most of the heroin entering the UK does so via the Balkan route, generally arriving by lorry or by deep sea container.[17]

COCAINE

12. In 2009, Europol drew attention to an apparent new trend in cocaine trafficking—increasing amounts of cocaine from South America were being transported to the EU via Turkey and the Balkans as opposed to the established trafficking route via West Africa and the Iberian Peninsula.[18] Mr Coates confirmed the persistence of this trend, which the Serious Organised Crime Agency consider to have arisen as a result of the ability of criminals to make use of the established route for trafficking heroin to Europe, an increasing domestic market for cocaine in Turkey and the increasing number of Turkish Airline flights to and from Africa and North America, which can be exploited to transport drugs from South America into Europe:

We have been keeping an eye on cocaine trafficking and the involvement of Turkish organised crime groups for some time. There has been some anecdotal reporting, tittle-tattle and bits of intelligence at a low level to say that this is happening. We have recently seen that solidifying; we have seen evidence of that.[19]

13. The trade is controlled to a certain extent by Turkish groups, but also by West African groups, especially Nigerians. According to the Turkish authorities, 293 kg of cocaine were seized in Turkey in 2010 (a sharp rise from figures of 2, 8 and 3 kg between 2001 and 2003) and this total was already exceeded during the first two months of 2011.[20] This included 280 kg seized during a joint operation in January 2011 between the Serious Organised Crime Agency and the Turkish National Police.[21]

14. Mr Wainwright, however, warned against making too much of this trend:

I would caution against a view that Turkey has become a leading, major transhipment point for cocaine in Europe. It is certainly a notable new feature but still we see pre-eminent in this problem the arrival of cocaine through the Iberian coastline, from West Africa as well up through the southern Mediterranean, into the Baltic Sea as well, [or] up through the Adriatic Sea.[22]

To put the figures into context, around 440 metric tonnes of pure cocaine are estimated to be consumed globally, 128 metric tonnes of which are consumed in Europe. While levels of seizures may be rising in Turkey, they are still dwarfed by those taking place elsewhere in Europe: 57 metric tonnes were seized throughout Europe in 2009 (the most recent figure available), 25 metric tonnes of which were in Spain, and there is no evidence of a subsequent decline.[23]

The trade in people

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

15. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported in 2006 that there were "very high" levels of human trafficking to Turkey, "high" levels of trafficking through Turkey; and "medium" levels of trafficking of Turkish nationals elsewhere, particularly to the United Kingdom.[24] In evidence to our inquiry, the International Organisation for Migration supported the UN's conclusion that Turkey is primarily a destination country for human trafficking victims, adding that the "vast majority" originate from the former Soviet Union, with most entering legally with a tourist visa. According to data provided by the Turkish Ministry of the Interior, 1,165 victims of human trafficking were identified in Turkey between 2004 and 2010.[25]

16. There is little evidence to suggest that Turkish nationals are trafficked to the UK. The UK Minister for Immigration, Mr Damian Green MP, told us that:

In the National Referral Mechanism in the last year there were just over 1,000 people ... of whom only one was Turkish. Even if you think Turkey is clearly a transit country potentially for trafficking, and Iran is a source country for victims of trafficking ... I think only two of the people referred to the National Referral Mechanism were Iranian.[26]

The UK Network of Sex Work Projects told us that none of the respondents to an Economic and Social Research Council-funded survey of 57 projects providing services to sex workers had cited evidence of migrant sex workers who had come to the UK from, or through, Turkey.[27] Ms Abigail Stepnitz, of the POPPY Project, an organisation that works with female victims of human trafficking in the UK, agreed that the number of victims coming from Turkey is "extremely low". Of the almost 2,000 victim referrals to the Project, only four concerned Turkish nationals.[28]

17. According to Ms Stepnitz, however, the number of female victims who are trafficked through Turkey to the UK is "quite a bit higher". She was aware of 19 women who had been trafficked in this way since April 2009, all of whom bar one were trafficked into Greece before coming either into the UK directly or via Spain and Italy. Most of the women originated from former Soviet countries or from Central Asia.[29] Mr Coates told us that Turkish organised crime groups "tend not to be involved" in human trafficking:[30] Europol does cite Turkish groups as being active in this area of criminality, but to a lesser extent than groups of ethnic Roma, Nigerian, Romanian, Albanian-speaking, Russian, Chinese, Hungarian and Bulgarian origin.[31]

PEOPLE SMUGGLING

18. People smuggling differs from human trafficking in that it involves a consensual relationship between migrant and smuggler (although it may still involve elements of exploitation). Of the 348 migrants who were interviewed as part of their participation in Turkey's Assisted Voluntary Returns programme, which is delivered by the International Organisation for Migration and supported by the UK, 92 said their migration had been facilitated by a smuggler.[32] Irregular migrants attempting to cross Turkey into the EU pay smugglers in the region of 1500-4000 euros to help them to reach Greece via land and it is estimated that organised crime groups in Turkey made $100 million from people smuggling in 2010.[33] Some 970 Turkish people smugglers were apprehended in Turkey in 2009 and, in addition, Mr Coates noted that Turkey is "an extremely attractive country" for other ethnic groups "because of its close proximity to the EU border": a further 57 smugglers of other nationalities were arrested.[34] Of the 93 facilitators apprehended in 2009 on the other side of the border, in the Evros region of Greece, 30 were Bulgarian, 19 Greek and only 15 Turkish. In 2010, there were 28 Turkish facilitators out of a total of 73.[35] The issue of irregular migration facilitated by people smugglers has become critical to the security of the EU and we consider it in more detail in the next chapter.

Capacity of the Turkish authorities to tackle organised crime

19. The European Commission stated in its most recent report on advances made by the Turkish authorities towards meeting EU standards that further "limited progress" had been made in the fight against organised crime. The Commission commended the Turkish Government for introducing a national strategy and action plan to counter organised crime and establishing witness protection units in 60 provinces but considered that a number of further actions were necessary, including the establishment of a national fingerprint and DNA database, and strengthened inter-agency cooperation.[36] The Home Office endorsed these conclusions, adding that:

All of these priority areas would lend themselves to future EU-funded project work in partnership with existing Member States.[37]

20. The EU provides hundreds of millions of euros of pre-accession financial assistance to Turkey each year (see table 1).

Table 1: EU financial assistance to Turkey 2002-2013 (in millions euro)[38]

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

126 145.1 236.7 277.7 450 497.2 538.7 566.4 653.7 781.9 899.5 935.5

The most recent Multi-annual Indicative Planning document for Turkey (2011-2013), published by the European Commission in June 2011, designates Justice, Home Affairs and Fundamental Rights as one of seven funding priority areas. A number of funding objectives are specified within this, including "effective law enforcement, successful fight against crime and corruption and improved integrated border management and prevention of illegal migration."[39]

21. There are three bodies responsible for policing in Turkey: the Turkish National Police, a civil law enforcement force; the Jandarma, a military law enforcement force; and the Coast Guard Command. Mr Coates had high praise for the Turkish National Police:

They are efficient, professional and competent. They have high-end capabilities and technical capability.[40]

Mr Wainwright was also complimentary:

From my relatively narrow perspective of what I see of the Turkish authorities' dealings with the European Union, including Europol, I am impressed by the commitment and energy.[41]

This accords with what we saw and heard when we were in Turkey. Relationships with UK police and diplomatic representatives are clearly based on joint action and mutual respect, and we were impressed with the ambitions of leading Turkish police officers in terms of training and organisation.

22. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime has noted that, along the major trafficking route, considerably more heroin is seized in Turkey than in the Balkans. In 2008, for every kilo seized in South-East Europe, six kilos were seized in Turkey.[42] Turkey is responsible for 16% of all heroin and morphine seized globally—only Iran seizes more—with seizures rising from 13.2 metric tonnes in 2007 to 15.4 metric tonnes in 2008 to 16.4 metric tonnes in 2009.[43] During our visit to Turkey, the authorities told us that heroin seizures had since fallen to 12.0 metric tonnes in 2010, owing to a 48% decline in opium cultivation in Afghanistan; a shift in the routes and modus operandi of the traffickers; and the increasing price of heroin.[44]

23. Progress has also been made to deal with the problem of human trafficking in Turkey. Some 1,336 traffickers were apprehended in connection with human trafficking in Turkey between 2004 and 2007.[45] Turkey included a sanction against the crime of human trafficking in its Penal Code in 2002, established a National Referral Mechanism in 2004, is supporting NGOs to run shelters for victims of trafficking and allows for the issuing of humanitarian visas and temporary residence permits.[46]

24. However, Ms Stepnitz raised some concerns about the Turkish response to human trafficking:

I trained the Turkish security police two years ago as part of the twinning project. They came into the training and they said, "Now, we want to make it clear that we are here in case we ever have trafficking because we don't have any right now. If we ever should in the future, we want to be prepared". I thought, "Well, that is not really what any of the reports say". I think there is a bit of hesitance on their part to acknowledge the existence of the problem in the first place.[47]

Although the Turkish Government set up a national hotline in 2007 for anyone who has suspicions that someone has been trafficked or who needs assistance, Ms Stepnitz advised that they have not fulfilled promises to fund it. Furthermore, the three national shelters are "abysmally under-funded"; and in 2007 there were only 13 prosecutions arising from 308 trafficking-related arrests.[48] The European Commission monitoring report for 2010 also outlined the need for "further work" to bring the national legislation into line with the Council of Europe's Convention on action against trafficking in human beings and to establish a clear timetable for its ratification.[49]

25. The Turkish National Police have tended to focus their efforts to tackle organised crime on the drugs trade, and UK representatives are now encouraging them to put more resources into tackling organised immigration crime. The EU has praised the fact that sentences for those involved in migrant smuggling were increased in 2009-10; however the data below from the Turkish Ambassador to the UK shows that the number of arrests went down.[50]

Table 2: Illegal migration organisers apprehended in Turkey (2005-2011)

Year Number

2005 834

2006 951

2007 1,242

2008 1,305

2009 1,027

2010 750

2011* 8

TOTAL 6,117

* Figure for January and February 2011.

The Turkish National Police told us that, other than with the UK, there is insufficient operational cooperation to disrupt people smuggling between Turkey and other European countries.[51]

Cooperation between Turkish and European law enforcement agencies

26. Transnational cooperation is crucial to tackling the challenges posed by cross-border organised crime. In terms of the UK, Mr Coates told us that:

The relationship with the Turkish National Police at the moment is the best it has ever been. The UK is the preferred partner of the Turkish National Police.[52]

During the last reporting year, activity by the Serious Organised Crime Agency and their overseas partners led to the seizure of around two metric tonnes of heroin before it reached UK shores.[53] Mr Coates directly attributed this to cooperation between the two countries:

I think that we can say with a degree of certainty that the shortage in heroin is not entirely down to law enforcement action, but we have had a significant impact on it ... We have had a series of significant operations where we have actually gone into Turkey with the Turkish National Police and impacted on some high-end traffickers, and that has also extended recently into cocaine.[54]

27. This was substantiated in discussions we had with UK and Turkish law enforcement personnel during our visit to Turkey. While the level of cooperation varies in scale, Turkey and the UK have carried out eight joint operations in five years, resulting in 22 detentions and 635 kg of heroin seized. The largest number of joint operations undertaken by the Turkish National Police are with the Serious Organised Crime Agency.[55] Mr Wainwright confirmed that:

What I see also from my own experience as a senior member of the Serious Organised Crime Agency is certainly bilateral co-operation between the Serious Organised Crime Agency and Turkey is very strong and it is what the Turkish authorities still tell me in my new context.[56]

Germany also has a strong track record of cooperating with the Turkish authorities but cooperation with other European countries appears to be more variable, despite 17 countries having deployed liaison officers to work with the Narcotics Department in Istanbul and the Turkish National Police officially cooperating with 25 different countries.[57] We were told that cooperation with France was particularly poor.

28. Some cooperation to counter organised crime in the EU takes place within the framework of Europol. As well as providing greater opportunities for operational cooperation, full membership of Europol allows national law enforcement forces to share best practice and learn from each other.[58] While Turkey has had a bilateral agreement with Europol since 2000, the European Commission has noted that conclusion of an agreement between Turkey and Europol to allow for operation cooperation is "proving difficult".[59] Mr Wainwright advised that:

Importantly, [the current agreement] is yet to extend to cover the exchange of operational data. It is a first stage in terms of our co-operation with the Turkish authorities, so we are not engaged directly in operational co-operation with the Turkish authorities yet ...

We have co-operation instruments with 17 non-EU countries and about seven or eight are full-blown co-operation that allows for the exchange of what we call personal information as well, for example with the United States. We have not yet concluded that agreement with Turkey, as per the requirements of a legal framework, principally because we are going through the stages of assessing, for example, the data protection standards in Turkey.[60]

The Turkish Ambassador clarified in March that a draft Personal Data Protection Act, which would allow for progress on the agreement to be made, was before the Turkish Parliament and was expected to be adopted by the new parliament following elections on 12 June.[61]

29. While not yet part of Europol, Turkey is a member of the South-East European Cooperative Initiative (known as SECI) Center, a regional organisation bringing together police and customs authorities from 13 member countries in South-East Europe to facilitate the exchange of information and coordinate joint operations with the aim of preventing, detecting, investigating, prosecuting and repressing trans-border crime.[62] Turkey is also a member of Interpol. While the SECI Centre has signed a Letter of Intent with Europol and Europol is regularly invited to attend SECI Task Force meetings, they have not yet discussed a cooperation agreement which would allow for information exchange and creating joint cases, and there are few examples of operational cooperation.[63] Nor does SECI have any agreement in place with Frontex, the EU Border Agency, which could facilitate efforts to combat people smuggling. Interpol is a permanent advisor at SECI and the two agencies have signed a Co-operation Agreement on communication connectivity for the exchange of information. Interpol also signed a co-operation agreement with Europol in 2001 to allow for the exchange of strategic information and the agencies have been able to exchange operational information since 2009.[64]

Implications of accession for organised crime in Europe

30. The UK Minister for Immigration emphasised a major concern about the accession of any new Member State to the EU when he stated that "clearly the more open borders become then the more opportunities there are for organised crime."[65] Most types of organised criminality involve the transport of commodities across borders, which can only be made easier where there are weaker controls in place. Initially, as with new member states generally, Turkey would not participate in the Schengen area, which effectively does away with internal border controls, but the expectation would be that they would have the option of doing so eventually. This makes it all the more important to strengthen links between law enforcement agencies within the EU and the agencies in Turkey well in advance of accession, perhaps by admitting Turkey to Europol. It can be argued that this would be sensible irrespective of whether progress is made on accession or not.

31. The European Commission report looking at issues arising from Turkish accession noted that the amount of drugs passing through Turkey is largely dependent upon demand in the Member States, which would be unaffected by Turkish accession, and therefore did not anticipate any increase in the scale of the drugs trade in Europe.[66] The International Organisation for Migration took a similar view in relation to levels of human trafficking in the Union:

The International Organisation for Migration believes Turkey would remain as a destination country even if it becomes an EU member. The International Organisation for Migration does not think that Turkey's membership will affect the status of any EU country on the trafficking of human beings.[67]

32. However, Ms Stepnitz disagreed with this latter point, citing the experience of previous enlargements, and in particular the case of Romania and Bulgaria which she described as "very acute". Prior to accession, only five Romanian women were referred to the Poppy Project in 2006; this had risen to 23 in 2009 and Romanians now constitute the fifth largest group of women trafficked to the UK. There was also a "massive increase" in the number of men trafficked for labour exploitation from Romania following accession in 2007. She explained the reason why:

Obviously, the easiest thing that changes when you have freedom of movement is that you no longer have to go to the trouble of securing false documents. About 35% of the women we see come in on false passports. If you don't have to go to that trouble, that is quite a saving, not only in terms of time but financially.[68]

To avoid this pattern repeating itself, she advocated that the EU take a different approach in accession talks to that taken with Romania and Bulgaria, to encourage Turkey to tackle the root causes of human trafficking, addressing general gender-based violence, educational and employment opportunities for women: "the types of things that will make women less likely to take the bait in the first place."[69]

33. It is sometimes claimed that accession can bring advantages in the form of closer ties between states affected by cross-border organised crime. The House of Lords European Union Committee, in a report anticipating future enlargements, noted in 2006 that, if the experience of the last enlargement is anything to go by, "it may even become easier" for the EU to address organised crime once Turkey is inside the EU and takes part in EU cooperation.[70] That Committee cited in particular the precedent of a reduction in crime emanating from Poland following Polish accession to the EU.

34. When asked to describe the impact of previous enlargements on the ability of states to tackle organised crime, Mr Coates said:

The key element is co-operation. We have been able to use existing European legislation to co-operate more effectively with other law enforcement partners, which has made the exchange of intelligence much easier ... It is fair to say that eastern European organised crime has had some effect on western European society, but our ability to work more closely with foreign partners, such as Europol and other agencies, has enabled us to tackle that reasonably effectively and to neutralise it.[71]

He was, accordingly, positive about the prospect of Turkish accession:

I think there are advantages to it in terms of our intelligence systems, intelligence pathways and operational ability to work on operations with other partners. We can use Europol and various pathways and facilities to exchange information in a more streamlined, structured and fast manner.[72]

35. Mr Wainwright considered that Turkish membership would make a "big difference" from Europol's perspective:

Because [Turkey is] not a member of Europol, for example, they don't enjoy the same services that other European law enforcement has in terms of our ability to connect police teams together in order for us to make connections between the intelligence picture, for example, of organised crime across Europe. With Turkey being outside of the EU, therefore, it certainly makes co-operation more difficult.[73]

Mr Wainwright agreed with the suggestion that there is a risk that Turkey could lose the incentive to put resources into cooperation with the EU in terms of the drugs trade should Turkey not be allowed to accede, particularly given the relative lack of a domestic market for heroin in Turkey.[74]

36. Moreover, the very process of reform that candidate states are obliged to go through in order to attain EU membership can be positive. The Home Office described the accession process as a "catalyst for Justice and Home Affairs reform".[75] The Minister for Immigration told us:

One of the things I think we have all observed from previous accessions is that the act of application and going through the process of accession does wonders to ensure that people do all the things that are good for them and are good for the rest of Europe as well.[76]

However, some countries cannot be said to have had entirely successful transitions. Bulgaria, for example, acceded to the EU with an unfinished reform agenda, primarily in the Justice and Home Affairs area,and is still subject to ongoing annual assessments by the European Commission with regards to progress made to tackle judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime.[77]

37. Turkish organised crime groups pose a substantial threat to the internal security of the EU, largely owing to Turkey's position along the heroin trafficking route from Afghanistan to Europe. It is estimated that 75-80% of the heroin trafficked from Afghanistan to Western and Central Europe comes via Turkey, and Turkish networks continue to account for around 70% of the UK heroin market. The proportion of cocaine bound for the EU that is seized in Turkey has increased over the last few years, although it is by no means approaching the volume seized along the established cocaine trafficking route through the Iberian Peninsula. Turkey also represents a "key nexus point" for the transit of illegal immigrants to the EU. Our evidence appeared to support findings published in 2006 by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime that Turkey is predominantly a destination rather than a source country for human trafficking, with only one Turkish national amongst more than 1,000 victims offered support in the UK via the National Referral Mechanism last year. However, the volume of irregular migrants being smuggled voluntarily into the EU via Turkey by criminal groups reached crisis levels at the end of 2010.

38. More open borders in an enlarged Union bring greater opportunities for organised crime and facilitate the illegal smuggling of goods and people. We judge that Turkish accession would be unlikely to lead to an increase of narcotics into the EU market, given that the major factors influencing drug flows into the EU appear to be production levels in the source countries and domestic demand in the EU Member States, neither of which would be affected. Furthermore, accession will bring opportunities for greater cooperation between Turkish and EU law enforcement agencies, which could bring about a more robust response to drug trafficking.

39. There is some disagreement about the impact of accession on levels of human trafficking but we are concerned by evidence highlighted by the Poppy Project of an increase in trafficking following previous enlargements of the EU, of Romanian victims in particular. We also note that there may be some reluctance among Turkish law enforcement authorities to recognise that human trafficking into and through Turkey is already a problem. An understanding of the nature of human trafficking will be critical to preventing an increase in trafficking following enlargement, as well as supporting victims of trafficking in Turkey now. We therefore welcome the European Commission's focus on closely monitoring Turkey's progress in tackling human trafficking and we expect the UK—as a fellow destination and transit country—to provide advice and assistance to Turkey if required.

40. We consider the issue of people smuggling with related issues concerning illegal migration in the next chapter, but the likely impact of more open borders on this phenomenon is an area of major concern to us.

41. A stringent law enforcement response will be required to minimise the impact of organised crime originating in Turkey in an enlarged Europe. We are encouraged by the evidence brought to our attention both in the UK and in Turkey of the efficiency and capability of the Turkish National Police, particularly in respect of drug trafficking—with heroin seizures made by the Turkish authorities dwarfing those made in South-East Europe—and their willingness to cooperate with most EU counterparts. We are particularly impressed by the close working relationship between UK and Turkish law enforcement agencies, which is clearly helping to reduce the supply of heroin to the EU, and we urge the Home Secretary to ensure that the resources which the UK brings to this partnership continue to be provided through the new National Crime Agency.

42. We recognise the positive impact, albeit variable, made by international institutions such as Europol, Frontex and Interpol in combating cross-border crime in this region, but recommend that, as well as fostering ever-closer linkages with each other, these bodies cooperate more closely with the SECI Center, which is responsible for facilitating information-sharing and joint operations between the law enforcement agencies of its member states in South-East Europe.

43. We note that a substantial proportion of pre-accession funding from the EU to Turkey is currently directed towards law enforcement. Two areas where this money could perhaps be used to particular effect are building capacity for greater intelligence sharing between agencies both nationally and internationally, and tackling organised immigration crime. We urge the UK Government to use its influence at European level to direct available funding towards these areas, and to report back to us on the outcome with a detailed breakdown of future pre-accession spending on programmes to tackle organised crime.

44. In the long-term, we believe that the risks that Turkish accession poses for organised crime in the EU are considerably outweighed by the potential benefits—partly in terms of the standards the Turkish authorities will be required to meet to bring their systems and capabilities in line with the rest of the EU but largely owing to the opportunities it will bring for increased cooperation with EU law enforcement agencies and with Europol. We also fear there is a risk that, if Turkey is not permitted to join the EU, the Turkish authorities may lose their incentive to prioritise tackling criminality which affects EU Member States to a far greater extent than their own population (Turkey does not have a big domestic drug market and most immigrants transiting the country do not intend to stay), and to cooperate with their EU counterparts. However, we recognise that ultimate decisions on membership of the EU will be based on a far wider variety of considerations than these. Clearly these problems—and the ability of law enforcement agencies to deal with them—do not conveniently follow the boundaries of the European Union. We need law enforcement agencies to work together effectively both inside and outside the EU borders. It is clear that the Turkish authorities are proving more effective than some of the authorities that lie within the EU border, such as Greece, and that bilateral arrangements—for example, between SOCA and the Turkish authorities—are maturing well.

45. In the meantime, it is clear that building a closer relationship between Turkey and EU law enforcement agencies should not be deferred until the membership negotiations are completed. In the first instance, we encourage the new Turkish Parliament to continue the work of its predecessor in bringing into effect a data protection law that will allow for a higher level of cooperation with Europol prior to accession, and again encourage the UK Government to offer any assistance that will further this end. It is clear that our UK police and diplomatic representatives have a relatively high level of respect for their Turkish counterparts and spoke positively about the ambition, rate of progress and strategic grasp of the Turkish police and associated authorities. In the medium-term, we consider that the EU should consider making special arrangements for Turkey to assume some of the attributes of EU membership in areas which would be feasible and mutually beneficial. We strongly recommend that Turkey be allowed full membership of Europol (or at the very least a special and enhanced level of associate membership) and of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Addiction, prior to (and irrespective of) full membership. It became clear to us that the fact that Turkey is not a full member of Europol poses obstacles for our own diplomatic and policing work and makes it more difficult to promote multilateral joint working across the EU. Not to admit Turkey to membership of those bodies would be to cut off the European nose to spite our face and we hope that our Government will press for Turkey to be admitted formally to both bodies at the very least. We recommend that the UK Government discusses this approach with their European partners and reports back to us on the outcome.

6 Europol, EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2011, April 2011 Back

7 Synthetic drugs are artificially produced substances for the illicit market which are almost wholly manufactured from chemical compounds in illicit laboratories . Back

8 Q 79 Back

9 Qq 80, 91 Back

10 Q 3 Back

11 Q 6 Back

12 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drugs Report 2010, 2010, p 57 Back

13 Europol, EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2011, April 2011, p 8 Back

14 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2011, 2011, pp71-2 Back

15 Qq 5, 11 Back

16 Annex A, Note of our visit to Turkey Back

17 Q 17 [Mr Coates] Back