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International Development Committee

Working Effectively in Fragile and Conflict–Affected States: DRC and Rwanda

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Additional written evidence is contained in Volume II, available on the Committee website at www.parliament.uk/indcom

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The International Development Committee

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# Working Effectively in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC and Rwanda

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Summary

The Department for International Development is increasing its focus on fragile and conflict-affected states and the UK will spend 30% its Official Development Assistance (ODA) — approximately £3,414 million — in these states by 2015.

Given the scale of funding for fragile states, we decided to undertake a number of inquiries into this expenditure. In general, we support the Government’s decision. Conflict and fragility impede efforts to reduce poverty; those suffering from conflict and instability deserve our assistance; and the prevention of conflict through development is cheaper than dealing with the aftermath of conflict.

However, we have a number of concerns. The rationale for DFID’s patterns of spending in conflict-affected states is unclear. It is not clear how expenditure has been allocated between states in which the UK has an obvious security interest and those in which that interest is less obvious. DFID should make explicit this rationale. In a context where the DFID budget is increasing to meet internationally agreed ODA targets, it is important that the public understands the value — morally and politically — of the decision to invest increasing amounts of aid in fragile and conflict-affected states.

There is also a danger that development funds will be diverted to meet the UK’s defence and diplomatic needs. Since other Government Departments will be spending some ODA, DFID must ensure they are clear about what activities are eligible for reporting as ODA and those which are not.

The Government’s strategy carries risks. Money can easily be wasted in fragile states. DFID says it has a zero tolerance approach to corruption in its programmes. However, in countries where corruption and fraud are rife, we do not find it convincing to argue that none of DFID’s funding is affected. DFID must be more open about the risks it faces to establish credibility with a sceptical public.

The UK will provide £90 million to Rwanda in 2014–15. Rwanda has made progress in reducing poverty. Although it is off-track to meet other Millennium Development Goal indicators, the Rwandan Government is confident it can meet them. However, concerns have been expressed about its human rights record and the lack of political pluralism. The UK Government has a good relationship with the Government of Rwanda, and must use its leverage more effectively to encourage the Government of Rwanda to increase freedom of speech and association.

DFID is investing £790 million in the Democratic Republic of Congo during the Comprehensive Spending Review period (2010–15). We support its focus on helping the poorest people in hard to reach places, even where there are no obvious UK national security interests. While the situation has improved since we last visited in 2006, fighting continues in the East and violence against women is widespread. DFID should include the reduction of violence against women and girls in its results framework for the DRC. Given the size of the DRC we recommend that DFID open a sub-office in eastern DRC to give it a better understanding of local conflict dynamics and help it to monitor and track its
expenditure properly.

Building governance capacity is key. However, DFID’s work in this area is mainly targeted at formal institutions and processes. We recommend that DFID change its priorities and invest more in community-led, local initiatives which respond to community priorities and give communities more confidence to hold their government to account.

Two thirds of the UK’s funding for Rwanda will go directly to the Government in budget support. We support the use of budget support in states such as Rwanda where DFID can monitor the potential displacement effect of its aid and ensure aid does not enable members of governments to spend money on luxuries while leaving the British taxpayer to fund the country’s basic services. Budget support is not provided to the DRC and we agree that it would not be appropriate to do so at present. DFID should nevertheless set clear conditions around transparency and accountability in the mining sector as part of its continued support to the DRC.

The UN peacekeeping force in the DRC, MONUSCO, has faced formidable challenges since it began operations in 1999 and has made considerable progress in helping to train elements of the DRC armed forces, the FARDC. However, it is time to reconsider the funding for and mandate of MONUSCO when it comes up for renewal in 2012. The UK should press for MONUSCO to become a more mobile and agile force which can quickly respond to incidents and to take a more active approach to apprehending perpetrators of violence. The nature of the force deployed by the UN depends on the mandate from the Security Council. The UK should seek to ensure mandates for more mobile and agile forces where appropriate.
Map 1: Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Map 2: Map of Rwanda
1 Introduction

Government expenditure in fragile and conflict-affected states

1. Spending in fragile and conflict-affected states will increase from 22% to 30% of Official Development Assistance (ODA) between 2010 and 2015 according to the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR). This equates to an increase in annual expenditure from £1,839 million in 2010–11 to £3,414 million in 2014–15.¹ DFID identifies 21 of its 28 (or three out of four) focus states, as being fragile or conflict-affected.²

2. The Secretary of State for International Development, the Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP, told us that the Government was committed to working in fragile and conflict-affected states because it was the right thing to do, and because it was in our national interest.³ The World Bank’s annual World Development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security and Development pointed out that:

No low income fragile or conflict affected state has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal. People in fragile and conflict affected states are more than twice as likely to be undernourished than those in other developing countries, more than three times as likely to be able to send their children to school, twice as likely to see their children die before age five, and more than twice as likely to lack clean water.⁴

3. The Government’s recent paper, the Building Stability Overseas Strategy, also highlighted that conflict detracts from development efforts, and suggested that conflicts cost developing countries the equivalent of 30 years of GDP growth.⁵ It also flagged up the interconnections between conflict in certain parts of the world and refugee flows, terrorist activity and organised crime groups which can impact on UK security. The strategy makes comparisons between the high cost of managing conflict through the use of armed forces and the lower costs of preventing or reducing instability.⁶ Thus “our security and prosperity” is seen as closely connected with “peaceful development and security across the globe.”⁷

4. In fragile states, the mechanisms for managing disputes are “weak, illegitimate or dysfunctional”⁸ and this often leads to violence. The Secretary of State pointed out: “until you tackle conflict, it is very difficult indeed for people to lift themselves out of poverty.”⁹

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¹ Ev 70. Excludes allocations for Liberia, Malawi, South Sudan and Tajikistan. These figures include programme resources and operating costs.
² Ev 74. These are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nepal, Nigeria, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, Yemen and Zimbabwe. This list was updated in May 2011.
³ Q 106
⁵ Building Stability Overseas Strategy, p 7
⁶ Building Stability Overseas Strategy, p 8
⁷ Building Stability Overseas Strategy, p 8
⁸ Building Stability Overseas Strategy, p 5
⁹ Q 132
DFID has a long track record of working in fragile and conflict-affected states and plays an important role internationally in encouraging other bilateral and multilateral donors to do likewise. The Secretary of State noted that DFID was heavily involved in the production of the 2011 World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development, and DFID has been an active member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s conflict and fragility network (INCAF).

5. Given the priority which the Coalition Government has attached to fragile states, and its increasing expenditure in these states, we decided to examine the impact of its work in this area. We propose to do this through a number of reports. This first one focuses on conflict and fragility in two of the three countries which we visited in June 2011, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. Although most of the examples used in this report are taken from DRC and Rwanda, the conclusions are not necessarily restricted to those countries: many also apply to DFID’s general approach to fragile and conflict-affected states.

Our inquiry

6. In June 2011 we visited Rwanda, eastern DRC and Burundi. All three have been caught up in often interconnected violent conflicts, with impacts which have spread across state borders. We did most of our travelling by road and boat wanting to learn more about what was happening on the ground. Our itinerary is included as an annex to this report.

7. Rwanda appeared to us to be a well-ordered country making good progress since the 1994 genocide. The economy has grown by 8% a year between 1998 and 2008, largely driven by the growth in services. It increased its per capita GDP from $200 in 2001 to $525 in 2010. However, 57% of the population still live below Rwanda’s poverty line with 37% considered extremely poor and Rwanda remains substantially off-track for Millennium Development Goal targets in maternal mortality, national poverty and use of improved water sources. Nevertheless the Government of Rwanda is confident it will meet all the targets and aims to transform Rwanda into a thriving middle income regional trade and investment hub by 2020.

8. Rwanda is heavily dependent on aid which provides 45% of government expenditure. The UK provided £62 million to Rwanda in 2010–11. Of this, approximately £35.75 million came from DFID.

10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17

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10 Q 111
11 Ev 55
12 We have published a separate Report on the Government’s decision to end its bilateral programme in Burundi. International Development Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2010-12, The Closure of DFID’s Bilateral Aid Programme in Burundi, HC 1134
13 DFID, Rwanda Visit Briefing, June 2011
14 DFID, Rwanda Visit Briefing, June 2011
15 DFID, Rwanda Visit Briefing, June 2011
16 DFID, Rwanda Visit Briefing, June 2011. This figure is for 2010.
17 Ev 70
9. We have discussed in some detail in our 10th report our concerns about DFID’s decision, arising from the Bilateral Aid Review, to end bilateral aid to Burundi. As we concluded in our report, Burundi is doing less well than its neighbours with a per capita income of £150 in 2009 and 80% of the population living on less than £1.25 per day. Burundi ranked 166th out of 169 countries in the UN’s Human Development Index and is substantially off-track for most of the MDGs. The political situation there is still unstable five years after the end of the conflict. Since our visit we have heard that the situation is deteriorating. As our findings from that leg of the visit are set out in our Burundi report, we have not repeated them here.

10. Poverty levels are high in the DRC with three out of five of its 65 million population living on $1.25 per day and the country is off-track to meet most of the MDGs. We visited Goma and Bukavu in eastern DRC. We did not visit Kinshasa on this occasion, as it is nearly 1000 miles to the west with limited air connections. DFID’s programme in the DRC is set to increase substantially from £147 million in 2011–12 to £258 million in 2014–15. Of this the largest sector increases will be for wealth creation and for reproductive, maternal and newborn health. DRC has one of the highest maternal mortality ratios in the world at 670 per 100,000 live births. However, DRC receives relatively little international aid compared to other countries with similar development indicators—receiving only £15.70 per capita.

11. Since the formal end of the conflict in DRC in 2003, fighting has continued in eastern DRC between a variety of militia groups with origins in the DRC and in neighbouring countries, especially Rwanda. Because of this, eastern DRC is host to the largest UN peacekeeping force in the world, the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). For some of us, this was our second visit to the region—our predecessor Committee had visited Kinshasa and Bukavu in 2006 as part of its inquiry into post-conflict reconstruction, and we were able to draw comparisons between the visits.

12. We received written evidence from 25 organisations and individuals including the Government, academics and Non-Governmental Organisations working on conflict issues in Africa. We held three oral evidence sessions with a cross-section of these including International Alert, Global Witness, and Drs Wheeler and Leonard from the Institute of Development Studies. We are grateful to all those who have contributed to our inquiry in:

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18 Ev 53
19 International Development Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2010-12, Burundi, HC 1134
20 DFID, DRC Visit Briefing 2011
21 This includes work on the business climate, regional trade, building roads and a new programme on reform of the mineral sector. DFID, DRC Visit Briefing 2011
22 World Bank, Gender Inequality and Development, World Development Report 2012
23 In comparison Burundi receives £42.30 and Rwanda £60 per capita. See chapter two for details on DFID’s aid to poor people.
24 International Development Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2005-06, Conflict and Development: Peacebuilding and Post-conflict Reconstruction, HC 923-1
writing or orally and especially to the people we met on our visit, many of whom were beneficiaries of UK development assistance.

13. Our report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 looks at the UK Government’s approach to fragile states and the implications of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy. Chapter 3 examines different methods of delivering aid in fragile and conflict-affected states. The importance of, and success in, improving governance and accountability to manage the risks of corruption, fraud and political repression is the focus of chapter 4. Finally, chapter 5 looks at multilateral peacekeeping efforts focusing on the UN force in the DRC, MONUSCO.
2 The Government’s approach to security and development

The National Security Council and its Strategy

14. On 12 May 2010, soon after forming a government the Prime Minister announced the creation of a National Security Council (NSC) to oversee all aspects of UK security. The Prime Minister chairs the Council whose permanent members include the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for International Development. In October 2010 the Coalition Government published its National Security Strategy. This declares that the Government will adopt a cross-departmental approach to UK security:

Our response to global instability, conflict, and failed and fragile states brings together a wide range of government activity, from diplomacy to development to overseas military operations. We favour early engagement, to prevent conflict developing or spreading and to tackle threats to our national security at source.\(^\text{25}\)

15. The Secretary of State for International Development told us: “Through the National Security Council we discuss the importance of working in conflict states and, indeed, we agreed that up to 30% of the development budget should specifically be deployed in conflict states.”\(^\text{26}\) He had high praise for the Council saying it was:

an absolutely brilliant innovation to the machinery of Government. It has brought diplomacy, defence and development together in a structural way that was nothing like so effective before. It underlines the fact that our security is not just dictated by guns and bullets but, [...] by training the police in Afghanistan, [...] building governance structures in the Middle East and getting girls into school in the Horn of Africa.”\(^\text{27}\)

We were told that the Council had discussed and determined the UK approach to Libya and that in the process the three departments had worked better together than ever before.\(^\text{28}\)

More joined up working?

16. We wanted to ensure that, as a result of the new National Security Council and its document the National Security Strategy (NSS), the way in which the three relevant Departments approached a given conflict situation would be better than in the past. We were also concerned that DFID’s primary focus on poverty reduction should not be negatively affected by wider concerns about UK security.

\(^{25}\) HMG, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: the National Security Strategy, October 2010, Cm 7957, p 33
\(^{26}\) Q 106
\(^{27}\) Q 118
\(^{28}\) Q 119
17. It is clear to us that not all areas of development concern should or will be brought to the National Security Council—only those which relate to the UK’s national security as set out in the National Security Strategy. The Council should enable the provision of a coherent response to such issues, one with which all the relevant Departments agree. DFID must ensure that funding for countries such as the DRC, which may not be viewed as important for the UK’s national security, are not abandoned in favour of more strategically important countries such as Pakistan. The formation of the National Security Council indicates a greater determination to work together, and we will monitor its impact on international development expenditure and policy choices.

**Building Stability Overseas**

18. The Government also published the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) in July 2010 which sets out how the UK will “promote stability and prosperity in countries and regions where its interests are at stake” with a strong focus on conflict prevention. Announcing the BSOS, the Secretary of State for International Development said:

The Building Stability Overseas Strategy will help the UK to work more effectively to tackle instability upstream, helping to prevent conflict and the suffering it causes. This goes to the heart of the drive to achieve better targeted, more effective aid. Not only is this cost-effective and beneficial for the security of the UK, it will also help to improve the lives of some of the poorest and most vulnerable people on the planet.

19. The Building Stability Overseas Strategy has three strands:

- Early warning: improving our ability to anticipate instability and potential triggers for conflict
- Rapid crisis prevention and response: improving our ability to take fast, appropriate and effective action to prevent a crisis or stop it spreading or escalating
- Investing in upstream prevention: helping to build strong, legitimate institutions and robust societies in fragile countries that are capable of managing tensions and shocks so there is a lower likelihood of instability and conflict.

It is intended to ensure an integrated approach to unstable countries recognising that a military response is not always appropriate.

20. As noted in the BSOS, conflict prevention is often less costly than responding to conflict and, if effective, can reduce humanitarian expenditure. The Secretary of State commented: “There is credible research now that shows it is four times the cost to deal with the dysfunctionality that now besets Somalia and Afghanistan than if you are able to tackle the causes directly upstream.” The cost of responding to the humanitarian needs created by conflict are evident in DFID’s programme in Somalia where DFID has allocated

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29 www.fco.gov.uk 19 July 2011
30 DFID, Press Release, July 2011
31 Building Stability Overseas Strategy, July 2011
32 Q 106, Q 114
£89 million since April 2010 for humanitarian assistance.\(^{33}\) In 2010–11 this accounted for 63% of DFID’s total bilateral aid to Somalia and this percentage is likely to increase in 2011–12.\(^{34}\)

21. We were concerned that the three main strands of the strategy made no reference to development and post-conflict reconstruction as a means of helping to ensure countries do not fall back into conflict. The Secretary of State reassured us that the focus on conflict prevention in the BSOS included reconciliation and stabilisation in the aftermath of a conflict even though this is not explicitly set out in the Strategy.\(^{35}\)

22. The funding streams and main delivery mechanisms for the BSOS include the cross-Departmental Conflict Pool\(^ {36}\), the Stabilisation Unit\(^ {37}\) and the UK’s contribution to multilateral peacekeeping.\(^ {38}\)

23. The Conflict Pool is funded from a separate HM Treasury settlement which is additional to Departmental Expenditure Limits, rather than pooled DFID, FCO and MoD resources. Funding for the Pool will increase from £229 million in 2010-11 to around £300 million by 2014-15.\(^ {39}\) Most funding for the work of the Conflict Pool is allocated at the beginning of each financial year. In addition there will now be a new Early Action Facility of £60 million for the period to 2015 “to help the Pool move more swiftly in response to warnings and opportunities.”\(^ {40}\)

24. Not all activities of the Pool are reportable as Official Development Assistance (ODA) under the rules set out by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC),\(^ {41}\) but the portion represented by DFID’s contribution must be.\(^ {42}\) DFID’s contribution must be used for the purposes of poverty reduction as set out in the 2002 International Development Act.\(^ {43}\) DFID told us that one of the strengths of the Conflict Pool is that it can blend ODA and non-ODA spending enabling it to work with civilian and military stakeholders.\(^ {44}\) In South Sudan the UK’s Security Sector Reform and defence transformation programme is funded from the Conflict Pool.

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33 Ev 75
34 Ev 75-76
35 Q163
36 The Conflict Pool funds discretionary conflict prevention, stabilisation and peacekeeping activities. It is funded by the FCO, DFID and the MoD
37 The Stabilisation Unit (previously the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit) was set up, in the aftermath of the UK’s involvement in the war in Iraq, to respond to the challenges of fragile and conflict-afflicted states, and works with such countries to enhance their capacity for self-governance. The Unit reports to the Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department for International Development, and includes staff from each parent Department.
38 Ev 67
39 Ev 68
40 Ev 77
41 The OECD-DAC is the body responsible for defining what types of expenditure are reportable as Official Development Assistance. The basic definition refers to financial flows to developing countries for the purposes of economic development and welfare. There are no plans to revise the current definition.
42 Ev 77
43 International Development Act 2002, Section 1 (i)
44 Ev 76; Military aid may not be reported as ODA under the OECD guidelines
25. However the BSOS makes no reference to the OECD guidelines. The Secretary of State said he did not feel constrained by the OECD-DAC rules on eligible expenditure.\textsuperscript{45} NGOs warned that it was important that poverty reduction continued to drive decisions about where the UK’s ODA budget was spent.\textsuperscript{46}

26. We are pleased that the Government is seeking to ensure through the National Security Council, the National Security Strategy and the Building Stability Overseas Strategy that the Government’s response to conflict includes diplomacy, development and defence. This must be seen to change practice. We are also pleased with the renewed focus on conflict prevention which is less costly and can reduce expenditure on humanitarian assistance and other post-conflict expenditure. These are important changes in emphasis. The impact of these changes is not yet apparent and we will continue to monitor this.

27. All UK ODA must conform to OECD guidelines and DFID’s ODA must also contribute to poverty reduction under the 2002 International Development Act. We want to ensure that OECD guidelines on what is ODA-eligible and what is not, are adhered to at all times, especially when ODA is being spent by other government departments or through pooled funding mechanisms such as the Conflict Pool. However the OECD criteria are not set out in the Building Stability Overseas Strategy. The absence of reference to the importance of rehabilitation and recovery as a means of preventing recurrence of conflict is another omission to the BSOS. DFID must explain why these were excluded from the strategy and how they will inform cross government work in fragile and conflict affected states.

\textbf{Which fragile states?}

28. There is no commonly agreed list of fragile states—different organisations use different data and draw different conclusions about which states are fragile.\textsuperscript{47} Generally these are states with weak capacity or weak legitimacy. In 2005 DFID defined fragile states as those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, where core functions include service entitlements, justice and security.\textsuperscript{48} DFID’s list is compiled from three different indices—the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), the Failed States Index of the Fund for Peace and Uppsala Conflict Database.\textsuperscript{49} The World Bank uses only the CPIA and has a different list. Depending on the definition of a fragile state, calculations about how many of the poorest people live in these, and the extent of need will vary.\textsuperscript{50}
29. In 2010 DFID decided to reduce the number of countries with which it has bilateral programmes from around 43 to 27. The choice of states was based on a number of factors including development need, likely effectiveness of assistance and strategic fit with UK Government priorities. DFID then used a needs effectiveness index to validate its proposed focus states. This index was compiled from the Human Development Index, a fragility index, the number of people living on under $2 a day and World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) scores.

30. We are concerned that this index has a built in bias towards large populous countries such as India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Ethiopia, at the expense of smaller countries like Burundi. The use of the number, rather than the proportion, of people in each country living on less than $2 a day creates this bias. If the proportion was substituted for the total number of poor people, smaller poor countries such as Burundi would have ranked higher in the index. While using poverty numbers might be appropriate for apportioning development aid between countries it is less useful for establishing the intensity of poverty. We understand that the Millennium Development Goals will not be met globally, unless they are met in these large countries, and that in seeking to reduce administrative overheads, larger programmes are more efficient. We believe a case can also be made for prioritising countries which have a large proportion of their population living in poverty and less capacity to respond to this.

31. After making its decisions on which countries to assist, DFID then determined how it would divide its bilateral aid based on the (largely quantitative) projected results each country office said it could deliver at specified costs, whilst offering value for money. However DFID maintains that it does not shy away from countries such as the DRC where it costs more to deliver programmes—“DFID does what is best value for development, not necessarily what is easiest or lowest cost.”

32. By the end of the Comprehensive Spending Review period the five top recipients of DFID aid overall will be Pakistan (£446 million), Ethiopia (£390 million), Nigeria (£305 million), Bangladesh (£300 million) and India (£280 million). All are large populous states and all except India are on DFID’s list of fragile states. On DFID’s list of those fragile and conflict-affected states it funds, five are middle income countries (Nigeria, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Pakistan, Sudan, Yemen), and the remainder low income.

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51 Now 28 with the creation of South Sudan in July 2011. In addition DFID will continue programmes in three Overseas Territories and will have three regional programmes by 2016.

52 DFID, Bilateral Aid Review, Technical Report, paragraph 19

53 International Development Committee, Departmental Annual Report, Oral Evidence taken on 2 November 2011 [not printed]

54 The list and DFID’s aid allocations are set out in Ev 70-71. In addition to those countries in the table, DFID also sets out allocations for Liberia, Malawi, South Sudan, and Tajikistan.

55 Ev 75. South Sudan has a per capita GNI of US$984 in 2010 according to the National Bureau of Statistics in South Sudan. It is therefore the verge of becoming a middle income country which refers to countries with a per capita GNI of between US$1,006 and US$12,275.
Table 1: Current Budget Allocations For Fragile States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2010/11</th>
<th>2011/12</th>
<th>2012/13</th>
<th>2013/14</th>
<th>2014/15</th>
<th>Total Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£'000</td>
<td>£'000</td>
<td>£'000</td>
<td>£'000</td>
<td>£'000</td>
<td>£'000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>178,000</td>
<td>178,000</td>
<td>178,000</td>
<td>178,000</td>
<td>178,000</td>
<td>712,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>157,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>290,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>133,000</td>
<td>147,000</td>
<td>165,000</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>258,000</td>
<td>790,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>241,000</td>
<td>290,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>345,000</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>1,325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq **</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>86,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>510,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia***</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>98,000</td>
<td>373,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>103,000</td>
<td>323,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>141,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>305,000</td>
<td>305,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTs **</td>
<td>74,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>343,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>267,000</td>
<td>267,000</td>
<td>412,000</td>
<td>446,000</td>
<td>1,392,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>330,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>89,000</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>96,000</td>
<td>99,000</td>
<td>375,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan **</td>
<td>132,000</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>185,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>390,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen **</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>305,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>94,000</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>353,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan*</td>
<td>2,218,000</td>
<td>2,302,000</td>
<td>2,894,000</td>
<td>3,036,000</td>
<td>3,036,000</td>
<td>10,450,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Tajikistan – part of a broader budget allocation for Central Asia. Budget allocations for Central Asia are £14m in each of 2011/12, 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. (Total: £56m)

** Country Plans not published externally

*** The Liberia programme will be reviewed after the elections in 2012

All above figures are indicative budgets by country as published in DFID’s Bilateral Aid Review 2011. Figures are rounded and subject to performance and sensitive to political and economic circumstances.

33. The level of funding that DFID allocates to each country per poor person living there varies considerably. Looking at the largest recipients within the fragile states group plus Rwanda, DFID provides £9.2 per poor person in Rwanda, £8.2 per poor person in Afghanistan, £7.5 per poor person in Ethiopia, £5.2 per poor person in Pakistan and only £3.5 per poor person in the DRC.
Table 2: Aid Per Poor Person

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Headcount rate $1.25 / day</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of poor people (Resource accounts)</th>
<th>Aid allocation (Resource accounts)</th>
<th>Aid per poor person (Resource accounts)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>34,385,068</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>12,378,624</td>
<td>101,105,853</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>148,692,131</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>73,751,297</td>
<td>176,697,958</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>158,423,182</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>102,024,529</td>
<td>146,547,101</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>43,551,941</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>130,314,247</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>173,593,383</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>39,232,105</td>
<td>205,591,655</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>65,965,795</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>39,051,751</td>
<td>136,141,475</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>10,624,005</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8,159,236</td>
<td>74,790,415</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:

34. The aim of the Bilateral Aid Review was to “identify a clear rationale for DFID country allocations and establish: countries in which we should retain and increase DFID presence, programmes and offices which we should close and graduation strategies when closing.” It is unclear how DFID makes decisions about the relative importance of countries such as Pakistan which may be the largest DFID programme next year and of clear strategic interest, and the DRC, which is of less strategic interest. The Secretary of State told us that the since the DRC was a large country with nine neighbouring states it was important for stability in Africa, which was also in the UK’s interest. The decision to increase funding to Pakistan from £178 million in 2010–11 to £446 million in 2014–15 was made to help build stability by focusing first on assisting with the immediate effects of the flooding, and secondly transforming education. He further explained, “These are subjective matters. Clearly, which countries you engage with depends on past history.” Written evidence supports the decision to increase funding for fragile states which are “home to some of the world’s most vulnerable and poor people.”

35. DFID should be clear and open about the reasons it operates in different fragile countries and the basis for the choices it makes. The Bilateral Aid Review led to a smaller number of focus states where DFID assessed it could make a contribution and deliver results. The needs effectiveness indicator it used in the process created a bias towards large populous countries with large numbers of poor people. If it had used an index which used the proportion of people living on less that $2 a day, the difference in score between larger and smaller countries on the needs-effectiveness index would have

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56 Compiled by the NAO
57 DFID, Bilateral Aid Review, Technical Report, Introduction
58 Q 108
59 Q 109
60 Ew 60
been smaller. We recognise that the Millennium Development Goals will not be met globally unless they are met in large developing countries but we are concerned that smaller countries, with a large proportion of their population living in poverty, for example Burundi, have lost out.

36. There were political aspects to these decisions. The public might question the large sums of money being spent in the DRC, where the UK has no historical links, and in Pakistan, a middle income country, where the motive may have more to do with national security than reducing poverty, although the two are linked. The Government must be clearer about where its development assistance is being driven by political objectives, and should explain better the choices it makes about which states to fund. In a context where the DFID budget is increasing to meet internationally agreed Official Development Assistance targets, it is important that the public understands the value—morally and politically—of the decision to invest increasing amounts of aid in fragile and conflict-affected states.
3 Delivering aid in fragile states

Managing risks

37. Working in fragile states carries risks: that DFID’s funds will be siphoned off or used for the wrong purpose, and that staff operating there will be the victims of violence. The latter is particularly acute in theatres of war, but is nevertheless a real threat in countries such as the DRC, which are recovering from conflict and where outbreaks of violence continue.

38. DFID recognises that choosing to operate in fragile and conflict-affected states is a risky strategy and that these risks need to be managed. DFID says:

Our increased focus on fragile and conflict affected states will be accompanied by a willingness to take well-judged and calculated risks and to innovate to allow us to deliver transformative results. Fragile and conflict-affected states present inherently risky environments for development assistance. However the risks of inaction in these contexts are also high. We need to find ways to engage that can deliver both short term results on the ground, and potentially transformative longer term results, but which do not cause harm or come at too high a cost. Our programmes therefore need to be accompanied by a robust approach to risk management.\textsuperscript{61}

The Permanent Secretary told us recently that DFID’s approach was “to look at proposed investment, to identify all the ways in which it could go wrong and then to design it in such a way that those things are mitigated away.”\textsuperscript{62}

Fraud and corruption

39. The National Audit Office (NAO) has highlighted risks from fraud and corruption to DFID’s programmes in fragile states. It expressed concern that many of the fragile countries where DFID was increasing its funding achieved an extremely low score on the Transparency International Perception of Corruption Index. According to the NAO “all eleven countries where the Department intends to increase spending by more than 50% over the next four years have a score of lower than 3.0 in the Transparency International index.”\textsuperscript{63} The NAO further considered that DFID greatly underestimated the extent of fraud within its own programmes.\textsuperscript{64} The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) has also found that DFID has a fragmented approach to managing corruption and has recommended that it develop an explicit anti-corruption strategy.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{61} International Development Committee, Departmental Annual Report, Oral Evidence taken on 2 November 2011, Q 34 [not printed]
\textsuperscript{62} International Development Committee, Departmental Annual Report, Oral Evidence taken on 2 November 2011, Q 34 [not printed]
\textsuperscript{63} The range of possible scores is from 0 to 10 with 0 being highly corrupt and 10 being highly clean
\textsuperscript{64} NAO, Briefing for the International Development Committee, October 2011
\textsuperscript{65} ICAI, DFID’s Approach to Anti-corruption, Report 2, November 2011
40. DFID says it has a “zero tolerance” approach to corruption in its programmes.66 We asked DFID how it could ensure its programmes were immune from the widespread corruption prevalent in some places, especially where DFID uses third parties to deliver its programmes. The Permanent Secretary said:

I accept that we need to get better at thinking forward and being proactive. I think that is especially true in the anti corruption work we do, which is not about safeguarding our own resources but is about overall corruption in the environment—strengthening accountability, media, parliaments, public accounts committees, auditors general. It is also about working with other donors in a more effective way. It is also about using capacity in the UK, as we have done with the Met Police and the City of London Police, to track down stolen resources and to go after the people who have stolen them. There is a whole load of things we can do that are more proactive and front foot. I completely accept we should do more of that and we intend to.67

**Choice of partners**

41. One of the ways in which DFID manages risk is through careful choice of its delivery partners. In countries where “government legitimacy and commitment to poverty reduction is in question” DFID does not fund the government directly but instead seeks to “ensure shadow alignment with state systems and support for key reformers in government.”68 DFID also identifies NGOs and other non-state actors through which it can deliver services in particular sectors where government systems are too weak.

42. In the DRC we spent a day with the International Rescue Committee (IRC) which received funding from DFID for increasing access to healthcare. Health care provision in the DRC is inadequate: one in seven children dies before their fifth birthday and 100 women per day die in childbirth.69 DRC will not meet MDG 4 (reducing child mortality) or MDG 5 (improved maternal health). The project will be implemented in 20 zones across four provinces in the country. It is targeting 2.1 million people.70 It will cost £60 million over a five year period from 2008 to 2013. One of the key benefits of the programme is the provision of free health care for vulnerable groups such as pregnant women and children under five.

43. IRC told us that as a result of the provision of free treatment there had been improved health outcomes: a 40% increase in the use of services and a 25% reduction in maternal mortality in the last six months. IRC also provided obstetric care, HIV/AIDS services focusing on reducing transmissions from mother to child; sexual assault services and family planning. It trained service providers and provided inputs.

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66 Q 143
67 International Development Committee, Oral evidence taken on 2 November 2011, Q 35 [not printed]
68 Ev 53
69 DFID, DRC visit briefing, 2011
70 DFID, DRC visit briefing, 2011
44. IRC’s work was closely aligned to government health services at provincial level. It helped to rehabilitate health facilities including providing essential medical and non-medical equipment, furniture and supplies. The Government did not pay salaries regularly so IRC had also started to provide incentive payments—based on performance—to encourage staff. These could amount to an extra $500 per month for a doctor and $150 per month for a nurse. 70% of this was linked to performance and 30% to improved health indicators. IRC also told us that one result of the programme was to build confidence in government systems: “the approach that has been taken has built the confidence a little bit more in the Government structures. [...] People just believe a little bit more in the system and working through the Ministry of Health.”

We were impressed with the commitment and professionalism of many of DFID’s NGO partners in the DRC.

45. In contrast, in countries where government systems have greater capacity, DFID aims to work through the state. In Rwanda, DFID has greater confidence in the Government’s ability to deliver services and has consequently put a significant portion of its funding as general and sector budget support. Budget support is likely to represent 65% of the UK’s total programme in Rwanda with 45% provided through general budget support and 20% through sector budget support.

The UK has been providing budget support (both sector and general) in Rwanda for over a decade. Budget support has proven to be both effective and good value for money. It strengthens governance and public financial management systems and builds capacity through ownership while reducing transaction costs. And it has allowed us to build a strong relationship with the Government of Rwanda and other budget support providers. In 2010–2011 [...] we are providing £35.75 million in budget support.

The Secretary of State told us: “If you can trust Governments, there is no doubt at all that budget support is the best way of doing development because it ensures that the ownership of systems rests with the country itself.”

46. It should be noted that budget support is only one, often controversial, method of delivering assistance to governments. DFID often has a number of programmes which feed into government systems but which may not be classed as budget support per se. In Ethiopia it has a social protection programme—the Protection of Basic Services—which is administered by an independent government organisation and which supports about 7.5 million people. The programme uses aspects of local government, but it does not go through the central government in Addis Ababa and it relies on regional implementation to deliver it. This method of delivery was adopted in response to specific actions by the Government of Ethiopia in 2005. The Secretary of State explained “when the Meles Government shot a number of students who were demonstrating on the street. Everyone..."
was clearly horrified by that and quite rightly people said that some action must be taken.” He explained that it was important to be able to continue to help poor people in Ethiopia by finding new ways of delivering aid.

**Working with other donors**

47. The UK recognises that no single donor or multilateral organisation can adequately address conflict and fragility on its own. DFID makes choices in each country about whether to spend its aid through multilateral organisations such as the World Bank or UN agencies, bilaterally or jointly with other bilateral donors. It may work with the other donors to carry out joint conflict needs assessments or agree national strategies such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.

48. Additionally, Multi Donor Trust Funds, where donors pool development assistance are often used in fragile and conflict-affected states to provide a higher level of reliability for donors and reduced fragmentation of aid for developing country governments. DFID is supportive of these as:

> an effective way of improving coordination, reducing transaction costs and making funding more predictable particularly in conditions where other development instruments cannot come online yet, or when budget support is a limited option. They can promote alignment by creating a joint forum between government and donors for decision-making and policy dialogue and provide a means for disbursing straight into the national budget on a reimbursement basis, even in very weak fiduciary environments.”

49. It not clear how DFID makes choices about whether to use multilateral or bilateral channels. DFID says that its 2010 Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) placed an emphasis on multilaterals’ performance in fragile and conflict-affected countries and found that, outside the humanitarian system and the European Commission, “many of the multilaterals would benefit from considerable strengthening of their work in fragile contexts.” Nevertheless DFID spent 29% of its budget in DRC and 49% in Rwanda through multilateral organisations.

50. DFID informed us that 17 donors collectively participated in the DRC Country Assistance Framework, which is the main instrument for donor coordination. In Burundi, DFID has been delivering a programme on behalf of the Swedish development agency, and has persuaded other bilateral and multilateral donors to take over some of its programmes when DFID closes its bilateral aid programme there. In the three countries we visited, DFID demonstrated a commitment to working with other donors. Where effective, this can add value for the developing country, by reducing the costs of managing multiple and competing aid programmes, and decrease risks for the donor. However, as we note in

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77 Q 127
78 Ev 53
79 Ev 65
80 Ev 110
81 Ev 64
chapter four, coordination between donors in security sector reform in the DRC, which is the responsibility of the UN peacekeeping force, has been poor.

51. DFID has a range of options to choose from in terms of how it delivers aid in fragile and conflict-affected states and whether it does this in cooperation with other donors or not. This helps DFID to opt for ways of delivering assistance which are context specific, which we support. However, DFID should be clearer about how it makes these choices. In relation to budget support for Ethiopia, we agree that poor people should not suffer as a result of the actions of their government. DFID should set out specific governance conditions under which it will provide budget support, and any under which it will be withdrawn. It should also, as a matter of course, set out clearly how its aid budget for each country is distributed between multilateral and bilateral spending and the reasons for this pattern and distribution.

Costs of delivery, achieving results

52. DFID has acknowledged that it is more costly to deliver aid in fragile states. These increased costs relate to increased security for staff as well as the need to have more staff on the ground to deliver and monitor programmes. The Secretary of State argued:

“If we look at the cost of getting a girl into school and take two of the states that you visited—Rwanda and the DRC—the cost of educating a girl in the DRC may be three times higher than it is in Rwanda because the DRC is so dysfunctional, but it may actually be better value for money because it is so much more difficult to educate children in the DRC. So it is much more difficult and, of course, the risks are greater.”

DFID sets out some of the reasons why costs may be higher in the DRC than other comparable countries in its operational plan, for example due to poor transport linkages.83 It is nevertheless difficult to ascertain whether these increased costs are justified, or whether they could be lower, if DFID chose different partners or relied less on national systems and more on community-led initiatives.

53. DFID assured us it placed a high value on monitoring its programmes. It said it was now “buying results rather than delivering budgets”.84 In the DRC DFID had “dedicated the equivalent of one full time person to results, increased measuring and evaluation capacity in programme teams and allocates up to 10% of the programme budget to measuring and evaluation.”85 DFID was confident that its structures were such that it could “follow the money”.86 Saferworld expressed some concerns:

It is important to ensure the way DFID measures impact is realistic and avoids falling between the twin traps of the “unattributable” and the limited realm of the easily quantifiable (counting the number of workshops held or training programmes

82 Q 106
84 Q 107
85 Ev 54
86 Q 107
Policies and programmes aimed at promoting changes in institutional and individual policies, attitudes and behaviour are often difficult to quantify meaningfully and require qualitative indicators to accurately assess, as much as quantitative ones.

Developing ways of assessing impact is widely and rightly recognised as challenging. Saferworld believes that a key part of such evaluation could be the measuring of public perceptions of safety and security in fragile and conflict-affected states, undertaken through a range of activities such as surveys, interviews and in-depth assessments at a local level.\textsuperscript{87} The World Development Report 2011 also recommended more use of opinion polls and surveys on whether welfare is increasing as an indicator to demonstrate progress in the aftermath of conflict.\textsuperscript{88}

54. It is more risky and more costly to deliver programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states. DFID must be open about these risks and open about the costs. However, we want to see evidence that DFID is working to bring down the cost of delivery of its programmes in these states.

55. DFID’s focus on monitoring results is welcome, and can be used to demonstrate that DFID is achieving beneficial impacts from its expenditure. However, we caution that achieving results in fragile and conflict-affected states is more complicated than in stable or peaceful countries and there is always the risk that they will not be achieved because of the lack of security, and because fragile and conflict-affected states are often also places where fraud and corruption can thrive. We do not accept that in a context where fraud and corruption are rife that DFID can always mitigate against this adequately, especially where it sub-contracts delivery of these programmes to third parties. This means it may not be able to guarantee value for money for every pound it spends. DFID should be open about this so that expectations of results are realistic, without being under-ambitious.


4 Governance and accountability

Creating inclusive public institutions

56. The World Development Report concludes that “institutional legitimacy is the key to stability.” When states cannot or do not provide basic security, guard against corruption or provide access to justice, and when there are few employment opportunities and communities lose social cohesion, the risk of conflict increases. Helping to create better institutions which can deliver security, justice and basic services in an inclusive manner to the population is therefore an important component of post-conflict state building. DFID has a role to play, along with other donors.

57. The World Development Report also points out that strengthening governance systems in fragile states is particularly difficult because citizen expectations may be too low due to mistrust, or too high, wanting immediate transformations. However, the changes needed will take time—often a generation—if they are to be durable. Expectations of change therefore need to be tempered to recognise that results may not be apparent for many years. There is an important balance to be struck between wanting to see early results from donor funding and ensuring stability.

DFID’s approach to strengthening governance

58. Strengthening governance and security in fragile and conflict-affected states is one of the structural reform priorities set out in DFID’s 2010 Business Plan. DFID focuses on the institutions responsible for supplying public services, and civil society or public demands for more accountable institutions and better services:

We support better governance at the national level by working on institutions, parliaments and service delivery, and are increasing our focus on sub-national levels including local governance structures and communities. We work closely with civil society to help deliver services but also as an agent of change and to help hold governments to account.90

59. In general DFID allocates a significant part of its assistance in country programmes to improving governance. For example in the DRC governance and security will receive £25 million per year (or 12% of DFID’s budget for the DRC) in 2011-12 rising to £30 million (or 11% of the budget) in 2014-15. DFID plans to work increasingly towards reform and strengthening capability at the local level to kick start reform of basic services. In addition it will work to build state capacity in core state functions such as civilian protection and strengthen accountability through the media and civil society.91

90 Ev 49
91 DFID, DRC Visit briefing, 2011
Support for elections

60. DFID views support for elections as one step in a much broader process of building a more inclusive political system. In the DRC DFID has been providing assistance to parliament, political parties and the electoral commission as well as supporting civil society organisations and the media to improve accountability and transparency. Donor support of the 2011 elections will cover 37% of the costs compared to 90% in 2006. DFID has provided £58.8 million through the UN Development Programme to consolidate the democratic framework and increase citizen participation in the political system. DFID says it will ensure 31 million voters are registered for the elections.

61. We visited a voter registration centre in Goma. It had a sophisticated system involving biometric data. The registration process could be completed with an hour, although people could expect to queue for many hours, collecting numbered tickets early in the morning and returning later in the day. The voter registration data was entered onto a computer, stored onto a disk and then transferred to Kinshasa for “cleaning.” This would allow management of the central data to remove duplicates and false registrations. DFID told the Committee that holding elections in a country the size of the DRC was expensive, but not excessive given the constraints. In particular the lack of infrastructure meant some communities were hard to reach.

62. Human Rights Watch have welcomed the importance that DFID has placed on “helping countries to build open and responsive political systems, [...] and empower citizens to hold their governments to account.” However, they also stressed that DFID should view elections as a starting point only in the statebuilding process. Ensuring the rule of law, protection of human rights and dealing with impunity were as important. International Alert said that, in addition to the technocratic aspect of organising elections, donors should be concerned with “empowerment, inclusion and drawing groups in that traditionally are not represented in these powerbroking elites?” In particular, they pointed out that the percentage of women represented in the national government decreased after the 2006 election from 12% to 8%.

63. A UN report on human rights in the pre-election period in the DRC found that there were 188 cases of human rights violations in the year leading up to September 2011. It noted that the situation in the East was of particular concern. Political parties were targeted and members locked up or subjected to ill-treatment. Other political parties had not imposed restraints on their followers. The report also highlighted a trend of manipulation of the police, intelligence and justice sectors by political actors. It concluded that “the continued repression of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the pre-electoral period may increase the likelihood of individuals and political parties resorting to violent means, endanger the democratic process and lead to post-electoral violence.”

92 DFID, DRC visit briefing 2011
93 Q 11
94 Q 11
95 Q 11
96 Report of the UN Joint Human Rights office on Human rights and fundamental freedoms during the pre-electoral period in the DRC, November 2011
64. As this report went to press, the results of the election were not yet confirmed, although it seemed likely that President Kabila would secure a second term with about 49% of the votes. The main opposition leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, obtained 32% according to the results and has disputed the outcome. The risks of post-election violence were real. A mediation team, formed with the backing of the election commission and the UN peacekeeping force, MONUSCO, has held talks with President Kabila and Mr Tshisekedi in a bid to defuse tensions.  

65. Support for democratic elections contributes to better governance, but it is only a starting point. We support DFID’s efforts to assist with the voter registration process in the DRC although we do have concerns about using expensive biometric systems. DFID must also ensure that wider issues of empowerment and inclusion, especially for women, are discussed as part of the wider electoral agenda. The rise in pre-election violence, especially in the East, was worrying. However, events have overtaken us and the general election has taken place. We expect the UK Government to make representations to its political partners there to ensure such violence does not also mar the local elections scheduled for 2013. The international community must obtain guarantees from the DRC Government that these less high profile elections take place as planned.

**Impunity and human rights**

66. It is widely held that the best way to strengthen governance systems is by working with them. The Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness refer to this as alignment with government systems. As discussed in the previous chapter, delivering aid through government systems in the form of general or sector budget support is one way of doing this.

67. However, concerns have been expressed about aspects of governance in Rwanda. The NGO Human Rights Watch said:

> “the Rwandan government's methods of governance have accentuated public disillusion and frustration, cutting across ethnic, regional and political lines. Although most Rwandans do not express these feelings openly for fear of repercussions, private conversations with Rwandans from a range of backgrounds reveal that many people feel alienated by the political climate.”

The organisation added that DFID tended to focus too much on “the technocratic dimensions of building up state capacity, and not enough on whether the Government is upholding human rights, whether it is respecting the rule of law and whether it is allowing journalists to operate freely.”

68. Human Rights Watch also pointed out that the UK was in a strong position to influence the Government of Rwanda. Not only was the UK the largest donor, it also had a ten year Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Rwanda which included consideration of human rights and responsible government. Good governance was a key
component of many of DFID’s programmes in Rwanda and amounted to approximately 30% of DFID’s budget there, but according to Human Rights Watch this did not appear “to have made any appreciable impact on the observance of human rights or the responsiveness and transparency of governance in Rwanda. [...] Indeed, with respect to freedom of expression and political space, the situation may even have worsened in the last 10 years”\(^{100}\)

69. On our visit we met with human rights NGOs, lawyers and journalists in Kigali. They explained how difficult it was to have a mature discussion about human rights with the Government. A recent “genocide ideology law” had made it difficult for journalists or human rights groups to express any concerns.\(^{101}\) Tensions were building up under the surface because people were unable to speak openly. The press reported that the Government of Rwanda was attempting to assassinate Rwandans in exile in the UK and that the Metropolitan Police were investigating this.

70. We asked the Secretary of State his views on the human rights situation in Rwanda. He said:

Certainly, on a number of occasions I have raised with the President and his Ministers the issue of press freedom and the issue of multi-party democracy. I think we need to respect the views of the Government of Rwanda about the difficulty of having political plurality in the aftermath of a genocide, where there are great dangers with a population that are not as literate as Western populations. We need to respect their concerns about issues of genocide ideology and so forth, but equally we need to see progress towards greater political freedom and plurality of parties.\(^{102}\)

71. We understand the difficulties faced by the Government of Rwanda in trying to forge a united country and make progress towards the Millennium Development Goals whilst still recovering from the genocide 17 years ago. Rwanda has made remarkable progress on both fronts and the UK Government has placed great faith in Rwanda’s capacity to continue to do so. We appreciate the Government of Rwanda has concerns about those who fled Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide and for whom there is no right of extradition from EU countries. Nevertheless we believe the UK Government should set out some indicators or benchmarks in its budget support agreements about what type of improvements it expects to see in areas such as freedom of speech and of association over the remaining period covered by the Memorandum of Understanding. This might include ensuring human rights organisations can operate freely and improving freedom of the press.

**Improving accountability and transparency in the mining sector**

72. Another area of concern brought to our attention has been the management of the mineral sector in the DRC. This sector accounts for approximately 70% of the country’s exports and 28% of its GDP.\(^{103}\) According to Global Witness much of this wealth is being

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100 Ev 79
101 Qqs 16 -17
102 Q 122
103 Ev 99
used to fund and perpetuate conflict in the DRC when it is used by armed militia groups to fund campaigns and prolong fighting. Others argue that, while economic profit provides one motive for fighting or prolonging conflict, longstanding tensions over ethnicity, citizenship and land rights are also relevant, especially in eastern DRC, and that the militarisation of trade in minerals has occurred because of the weakness of the Government in eastern DRC.104

73. The minerals in the DRC are a source of considerable wealth. It is estimated that DRC holds 80% of the world’s coltan, used in mobile phones and other electronic equipment, 49% of its cobalt and 10% of its copper reserves.105 The mineral sector has the potential to contribute $1,184 million per annum to government revenues between 2015 and 2020, based upon improved effectiveness of tax collection and reasonable assumptions of increased investment in the sector because of a more attractive investment environment.106 However, recent activities in the sector demonstrate that despite some improvements in governance, transactions are not always transparent, and mismanagement and corruption continue.

First Quantum and Promines

74. In the autumn of 2010 the World Bank suspended new aid disbursements to the DRC following decisions in the mining and forestry sector including the confiscation of assets held by international companies. One of these was the KMT mining operation in south eastern Katanga province. The operations were owned 65% by First Quantum—listed on the Toronto and London stock exchanges—10% by the South African state’s Industrial Development Corporation and 7.5% by the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation. The DRC Government cited irregularities as the reason for its action. The World Bank demanded that the rights to KMT not be sold on as long as the dispute remained unresolved.

75. Global Witness claimed that, in early August, the DRC announced publicly that it had sold on the rights to KMT to a company called Metalkol, owned 70% by Highwind Properties Ltd, a company owned by Dan Gertler, an Israeli billionaire who is said to be close to President Joseph Kabila.107 This, combined with other actions by the Congolese Government, led the World Bank to freeze all new programmes, including Promines, a project co-funded by DFID, to regulate the mining sector and improve its transparency.

76. For the suspension to be lifted, the DRC agreed to fulfil a number of conditions, including to publish all agreements in the mining, oil and forestry sectors. The document in which this is all laid out is called the “economic governance matrix.” Global Witness told us “The key thing […] was that the Congolese Government promised to publish natural resource contracts. All contracts in mining, oil and forest would be published within 60 days of their coming into effect. This is a really big thing and it is very unusual for any

105 DFID, DRC visit briefing, June 2011
106 Ev 72
107 Ev 100 -101
country in the world to promise to publish natural resource contracts. That is a brilliant thing.”108

77. However, Global Witness pointed out that there had been further secret sales of state owned companies and that these represented sizable sums of money: "Based on what we have seen so far, the recent secret sales amounted to well over $2.6 billion—$2.6 billion in a country with a GDP of around $12 billion. They were not announced. We have no idea what these companies are.”109 Global Witness argued that DFID should suspend a portion of its governance aid until the DRC made greater improvements in this area.110 The Secretary of State told us: "There are no easy answers to these issues. There is a longstanding issue and problem with mineral extraction in the DRC. It would be facile of me to think that any one particular measure is going to remedy that.”111

78. There is a long history of mineral wealth being used to fund and perpetuate conflict and criminality in the DRC, especially in the East. The Government of the DRC has taken some measures to regulate the industry: however, it is clear that these remain insufficient. The World Bank Economic Governance Matrix, with which the Government of DRC complied, strikes us as a good example of a means of helping to create greater transparency and accountability in the industry. We commend the Bank for this approach. However, the Bank may have been too hasty in resuming funding since the Government of DRC has continued to permit secret sales of assets and First Quantum has as yet had no redress. We recommend that DFID give transparency and accountability in this sector greater priority, building on its work with Promines. The mineral sector has the potential to generate significant wealth which must be used for the benefit of the people of DRC. Given the linkages between this sector and conflict in the DRC the risks of not properly managing this sector are that development gains made elsewhere will be forgone. DFID must set out clearly for the Government of the DRC what it expects in terms of transparency and accountability in the mineral sector and withdraw assistance if these expectations are not met.

Improving the confidence of ordinary citizens in their state

79. Improving governance involves helping citizens and communities to hold governments to account for service provision. This usually involves investing in civil society strengthening programmes. We met with the recipients of one such programme, Tuungane, in the DRC. Tuungane’s goal is to ensure that community priorities and well-being are supported by capable and accountable local governance systems. Local communities, which were chosen at random, were organised to identify a project. Some communities chose a clinic or a school; others a meeting room or a water tap. We visited two different communities benefiting from this programme—a secondary school and the Bunyakiri health centre, and a village where the local village council, headed by a woman, had decided they wanted to have a water pipe which delivered fresh water which was easy to access and keep clean. It was clear that giving communities an opportunity to prioritise

108 Q 45
109 Q 53
110 Q 48
111 Q 137
how their village would develop created a good sense of empowerment and ownership although at times there was confusion over the communities’ expectations. DFID will spend 17% (£25 million) of its annual DRC budget on such community programmes in 2011-12 but this is projected to decrease to about 7% (£17 million) of the budget by 2014-15.112

**Governance programmes**

80. It is not always easy to defend significant investments in governance which do not necessarily provide immediate measurable results. Dr Wheeler of the Institute of Development Studies told us: “It is very difficult to measure governance-related outcomes, and there is a bit of a concern that sometimes the more important things that happen in development are the least easy to measure. If there is a really heavy focus on measuring, there is a risk that we end up doing what is measurable, rather than what is actually most important to do.”113

81. Supporting better relations between the state and society, increasing responsiveness, responsibility and citizenship, should be a key component of governance programmes. Increasing the degree of local ownership over programmes helps to build bottom up accountability and increases political legitimacy—a key component of peace building in post-conflict societies. DFID should ensure that it does not focus excessively on formal institutions at the expense on informal community-building approaches. We recommend that DFID continue to invest at least 10% of its budget in the DRC on bottom-up community building programmes.
Improving security

82. Establishing a basic degree of security for citizens is essential for building peace and creating the conditions under which social and economic development can take place. In this chapter we focus on the importance of peace building, security sector reform in the DRC and the role and mandate of MONUSCO—the UN peace keeping force in the DRC.

DFID and peace building

83. According to the 2011 World Development Report on *Conflict, Security and Development*, peace building involves creating public confidence in the capacity of leaders to manage change and addressing the causes of conflict so that violence does not recur. Successful transitions, for example in Ghana, South Africa or Mozambique, have prioritised early reform of security and justice institutions, although the process may take at least 15 to 30 years. Such transitions have also been inclusive of marginalised groups, for example women, in the design and implementation of security, justice and empowerment programmes.\(^\text{114}\)

84. DFID said: "We treat security and justice as a basic service alongside others such as health and education, and seek to identify interventions that bring security and justice to the people, rather than the other way round."\(^\text{115}\) Between 2004–05 and 2008–09, DFID spent £160 million on Security and Justice Programmes in 65 countries. 75% of this was spent in fragile and conflict-affected states. This included increasing access to legal services for poor people and improving justice systems.\(^\text{116}\) Following the Bilateral Aid Review, DFID will increase support to security and justice in 18 countries with a focus on reducing violence against women in 15 of these.\(^\text{117}\)

Problems in the DRC

Continued outbreaks of violence in eastern DRC

85. In Bukavu, in eastern DRC, it appeared that there was greater confidence in peace and stability than when the Committee last visited in 2006. However the East continues to suffer from outbreaks of violence. On our visit we had to change our route from DRC to Burundi because there had been a violent incident near Uvira on the DRC-Burundi border which we were hoping to cross. As a result we had to travel back through Rwanda and then drive down to Burundi. In Goma the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that there had been 53 incidents since January against people working to provide humanitarian assistance and there were still 554,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the region. Dr Leonard from the IDS described the type of insecurity which pervaded eastern DRC as follows:

\(^\text{115}\) Ev 57  
\(^\text{116}\) Ev 57. For example support to community policing in Nigeria and support for poor women to access legal services in Bangladesh  
\(^\text{117}\) Ev 57
The violence that we see still in eastern Congo is by and large either inter-communal or is targeted on making money. We do not get fixed force fighting at all going on in eastern Congo any longer. There is no military threat to anybody coming out of eastern Congo any longer. That does not mean that there is not insecurity, it does not mean that there is not banditry and so on, that needs to be dealt with, but we are not dealing with battles of forces any longer in eastern Congo.¹¹⁸

Oxfam commented on the continued presence of armed groups which led to displacement and in turn to people having limited access to basic services, and consequently health and other development indicators became worse.¹¹⁹ The Secretary of State concurred that the conflict perpetuated poverty and suffering.¹²⁰

**Violence against women and girls**

86. We also received written evidence on violence against women. This has been identified as a significant security issue in conflict situations by UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820. A Special Representative on sexual violence in armed conflict was recently created by the Security Council.¹²¹ In her 2010 Report the DRC was labelled the rape capital of the world with more than 8,000 women believed to have been raped in 2009 alone.¹²² She has since commended the efforts of the Government of the DRC to bring the perpetrators to justice, including some members of the national army, the FARDC.

87. While donors, including DFID, did support work to tackle violence against women, NGOs claimed that not enough was being done.¹²³ The International Rescue Committee said it agreed with DFID’s approach which provided services for victims of sexual violence in regular health care and services (mainstreaming).¹²⁴ However, it wanted to see more programmes specifically targeted at violence against women, including programmes promoting behaviour change:

DFID is one of a handful of donors to fund free post rape care in health programmes and ensure the supply of appropriate medicines. This should continue, both in provision of basic services and in DFID’s support for Congolese institutions […]However mainstreaming will not by itself achieve effective reduction and response to violence against women and girls. DFID should increase its support to standalone Violence Against Women and Girls programming, including provision of holistic care to survivors, prevention programmes promoting positive social norms and behaviour change, and community-based economic assistance and reintegration.¹²⁵

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¹¹⁸ Q 89
¹¹⁹ Q 28
¹²⁰ Q 132
¹²¹ Ev w 2
¹²² UN News, DR Congo mass rape verdicts send strong signal to perpetrators, UN envoy, 21 February 2011; www.bbc.co.uk, 28 April 2010
¹²³ Q 2
¹²⁴ Q 22
¹²⁵ Ev 90
88. Dr Wheeler from IDS agreed, pointing out that responses to gender based violence needed to include both men and women to be effective since these required changing behaviour and attitudes.\textsuperscript{126} Chris Underwood from International Alert said it was important to empower women, for example by allowing more women to hold public office, as means of changing the cultural context.\textsuperscript{127} Women also needed to be involved in peace processes and governance reforms to make these more sustainable.\textsuperscript{128} Action Aid suggested that while DFID said it prioritised women and girls, the results it aspired to meet in DRC in relation to girls were mainly related to the provision of basic services. It said DFID should be more explicit about measuring progress on violence against women by including SMART indicators directly related to tackling violence against women and girls in its results framework.\textsuperscript{129}

89. Dr Wheeler also pointed out that tackling gender-based violence was not simple since the perpetrators might include the police, or representatives of the state:

> It is members of the armed forces that are seen as the greatest threats. In terms of how to improve security, we cannot necessarily base it on the assumption that the Government is the one who is going to be providing the security. The Government actually might be making the security situation worse, so that is why we have been arguing[...] for the need to really understand this from the local perspective: what is it that those women living in those villages see as a source of insecurity, and then how can it be addressed?\textsuperscript{130}

Human Rights Watch stressed the need for the perpetrators of such acts to be brought to justice. A UN mapping report looked at crimes being committed in the DRC over a 10-year period, including those of violence and rape against women and girls. When the Report was published Human Rights Watch said people wanted action to be taken:

> What civil society in the DRC was saying was, “Bring these people to justice”. It would really change the political context if some of these people who committed these extraordinary crimes were brought to book for them. Very, very few are. I think this question of dealing with impunity is a critical part of the story.\textsuperscript{131}

It argued that DFID could help strengthen the Congolese legal system so that it was able to process and adequately deal with abuses and violence against women.

90. **Violence against women and girls is a big problem in the DRC, especially in the East, where it is used as a weapon of war.** It has multiple causes, some of which are cultural. These must be tackled and will require behavioural changes in men and female empowerment. DFID has said it places a high priority on improving development outcomes for women and girls. As part of this focus, tackling violence against women and girls should be its top priority in the DRC. We recommend that DFID fund

\textsuperscript{126} Q 82  
\textsuperscript{127} Q 24  
\textsuperscript{128} Ev w 1  
\textsuperscript{129} Ev w 2  
\textsuperscript{130} Q 92  
\textsuperscript{131} Q 25
standalone projects for reducing and responding to violence against women and girls, such as those supported by the IRC. We also recommend that DFID include the reduction of violence against women and girls in its results framework for the DRC.

Understanding local conflicts

91. The problem of understanding the local dynamics of the conflict in the East was raised by a number of commentators. For example, Dr Leonard pointed out that to understand local conflicts in eastern DRC, one needed to understand the conflicts in neighbouring regions, including in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda—“We are very clear about the fact that the larger regional conflict is being fed by a number of quite local conflicts and that those local conflicts are not being addressed.” He thought DFID needed an increased presence in the region. He said the quality of donor engagement at the local level had been weak.

On our visit we spent time with the UK Government representative in Goma who also helped to oversee DFID’s programmes.

92. We asked the Secretary of State whether he was confident that the security situation in the East was improving. He said the situation in Goma had improved considerably since he had last been there three years ago. He also indicated that he would consider whether DFID should establish a base in the East, which was quite far removed geographically from Kinshasa, and with the dynamics of local conflicts not easily understandable from the capital.

93. While the war may be over, local outbreaks of violence in eastern DRC continue. These create ongoing humanitarian needs and slow down the development process. This means that the way DFID approaches development in the East needs to be tailored to responding to humanitarian needs, the risks of disruption to its programmes, and to overcoming the hurdles of trying to deliver basic services in a region where criminality and violence continue. This is very different from the situation in Kinshasa, where progress in development is better. While DFID works competently through reputable and effective non-governmental organisations in the East, its knowledge base and understanding of local conflict dynamics would be improved with a greater on the ground presence, for example in Bukavu where the security situation has improved. We recommend that DFID open a sub-office in eastern DRC so that it has a greater presence there. This could help DFID to build and maintain relationships with local civil society groups and their leaders, as well as local law enforcement authorities with a view to improving local security. It would also ensure it had greater oversight of, and capacity to monitor, its programmes in this volatile region.
Security Sector Reform

94. Reforming the institutions responsible for security is one way of delivering improved security for citizens. These are typically the army and the police, but may also include local traditional law enforcers for example local tribal leaders.

The armed forces

95. The Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) are charged with maintaining security. However, security sector reform is slow. We were told that soldiers were often untrained, undisciplined and unpaid. Some were also former rebels who had been integrated into the official armed forces as part of an earlier peace agreement, but maintained loyalty to outside groups or warlords. Some FARDC officers used rape to terrorize and control the local populations. There had been some improvements in the national army, and a number of armed groups, including the CNDP, had agreed to integrate into the national army as a result of the 2009 Peace Accords in the East. We were told that because the Congolese army in the East was “almost exclusively a Rwandaphone force, it was seen as an army of occupation.” However, this should not be oversimplified. We note that problems are caused by Kinyarwanda speaking Congolese, Kinyarwanda speaking Rwandans and other Congolese groups.

Working with other donors

96. While DFID should engage with the Government of DRC to continue to press for reforms in the army, and indeed to engage with the FARDC, DFID also needs to work with other donors and especially the UN to pursue security sector reform. DFID highlights the role it plays in relation to UN institutions, the EU and other donors, but NGOs argued that it could do more to improve coordination. As such a big donor, DFID could have a role in bringing other donors together, but, we were told, efforts thus far had been piecemeal or scattered. While the UN force, MONUSCO has the mandate to coordinate Security Sector Reform, NGOs said this was not happening and donors were doing their own thing.

Confidence boosting measures

97. Oxfam pointed out that, in addition to state level interventions, it was important to build confidence among citizens so they felt able to demand security. This included:

- building community capacity so that they [citizens] can create local change and engage with those who are supposed to be providing security services to them. To give you an example, somebody might be going hungry because they cannot go to

136 Ev w 8; MONUSCO briefing in DRC
137 National Congress for the Defence of the People
138 Q 84
139 Ev 66-69
140 Ev 94
141 Q 13, Ev w 10
market without paying $5 at each of the five checkpoints for the 10 km it takes for them to get to market. Enabling them on the local level—the bottom-up approach—to engage with those who might be manning those illegal checkpoints, largely police and army, to get those checkpoints out of the way, at the same time as the high-level interventions that DFID is engaged in with the police reform, is all part and parcel of helping people to meet Millennium Development Goals.¹⁴²

98. Dr Leonard had similar comments, saying one should not miss the opportunity to rebuild and strengthen governance structures in communities. “In the case of Congo it was the chiefs and the Baami (the kings) but also then the so-called police coutumière—in other words the traditional police who work to the chiefs rather than to the national police force. This is where the real policing takes place, but these people have been completely neglected in the post-conflict period.”¹⁴³

99. A cost effective way of improving the protection of civilians is through the appointment of local civilian staff to act as security monitors, or Community Liaison Assistants to help locals engage better with law enforcement agencies to provide more civilian protection. Oxfam reported that the UN Secretary General had requested larger numbers of Community Liaison Assistants who would act as the facilitator between communities and the UN peacekeeping force, MONUSCO, to identify areas where greater civilian protection was needed.¹⁴⁴ This is also potentially an area where if DFID had a local office, it could be more involved in.

100. Reforming the FARDC has been slow. Nevertheless some progress has been made. In particular the 2009 Ihusi Peace Accord was a significant step as it allowed the incorporation of rebel militias into the army. This too has not been without problems. We commend DFID for its continued support to Security Sector Reform. However, without better donor coordination in this area, progress is likely to be haphazard as well as slow. DFID has a role to play to helping donors to coordinate better with MONUSCO.

101. Security Sector Reform is essential for providing improved security and restoring citizen confidence. It is important for citizens to feel secure so that they can begin to lead normal lives—to go to markets, get jobs, send their children to school. Part of this must include ensuring the armed forces are trusted by locals. We understand there has been a shortfall in community liaison assistants. This would be a relatively low cost way of facilitating communication and better relations between communities and the armed forces, including MONUSCO and FARDC. We recommend that DFID identify the reasons for the shortfall in community liaison assistants and seek to rectify this.

MONUSCO

102. Since 1999, the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO—previously MONUC) has been the largest international presence in eastern Congo. Its
mandate includes protection of civilians and the disarmament and demobilization of combatants. MONUSCO is now the UN’s largest peacekeeping mission, with a budget of almost $1.5 billion a year and over 20,000 uniformed personnel and support staff.\textsuperscript{145} The UK will contribute £374 million annually to international peacekeeping, including MONUSCO, over the Comprehensive Spending Review period.\textsuperscript{146}

103. MONUSCO has assisted with the demobilization and repatriation of thousands of ex-combatants back to Rwanda, and with the demobilization and reintegration of thousands more into the Congolese army. We held discussions with MONUSCO in Goma and Bukavu, and had a MONUSCO escort on some of our field trips. MONUSCO told us its mandate included civilian protection. Its mission was made difficult by the lack of infrastructure and because many areas were not under state control. MONUSCO supported the national army and helped with Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of armed individuals and groups. Its main role was stabilisation and peace consolidation including support for police reform, justice system reform, and support for Government efforts to prevent illegal extraction of resources and mining sector.

104. The mandate for MONUSCO was extended in June 2011 for 12 months to cover the period of the elections and beyond. Previously President Kabila had expressed his desire to see the mandate terminated. It was suggested to us that MONUSCO should be working more regionally to deal with the Lords Resistance Army on the borders of South Sudan.\textsuperscript{147} However, we think this would stretch the limited capacity and resources of the force. A bigger question was raised about whether MONUSCO was appropriately configured, or whether it would be better to have a more mobile and agile force capable of reaching remote areas quickly:

> In terms of dealing with the kind of conflict that we are now observing in eastern Congo, which are small force operations, rapid in and out, not major force battles, and so on, MONUSCO is really set up to prevent and contain major force operations. It is rather tin-eared in picking up the sorts of very localised raiding types of conflicts that are now dominating the terrain.\textsuperscript{148}

105. DFID reported there was little evidence to support a reconfiguration of the mission this year, due the proximity of the elections and the increased stabilisation efforts introduced in the MONUSCO mandate the previous year.\textsuperscript{149} The Secretary of State said the UK was highly supportive of MONUSCO and the role it was playing in protecting civilians and helping to build stability.\textsuperscript{150} He added:

> We have been effective in lobbying for improvements in MONUSCO’s mandate, including ensuring that protection of civilians is the highest priority in the new

\begin{footnotes}
\item[146] Ev 76
\item[147] Q 33
\item[148] Q 91
\item[149] Ev 74
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mandate, underlining the importance of disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration processes, and in urging the UN to recognise the link between the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources, and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as a factor fuelling the conflict. Those were specific changes that we sought in the mandate, and argued for. I think that there have been improvements; I think that there need to be more.151

106. We asked whether the mandate included allowing MONUSCO to arrest or hold perpetrators of violence. We also noted that MONUSCO soldiers had themselves been implicated in violence committed by the national army in 2009. The Secretary of State agreed that it was “wholly unacceptable” for UN soldiers wearing the UN badge to engage in such terrible crimes against women. He further said that the current mandate allowed the UN the force to deal robustly with perpetrators of violence.154

107. MONUSCO has been a force for stability in an unpredictable and frequently unstable region of the DRC. While stability has improved, and the number of militia groups has decreased, ordinary citizens still experience violence frequently. Given the lack of infrastructure in the region, there is a limit to MONUSCO’s ability to respond quickly to reports of violence in remote areas. Following our discussions with the UN in South Sudan, it is clear that UN forces are constrained by the details of the mandate given to them. Flexible mandates are required, which allow troops to operate out of their base, rather than mandates which involve most of the soldiers guarding their base. We are concerned that the MONUSCO mandate constrains activity in this way. The UK should also seek to ensure that Security Council mandates are appropriate for the level and type of violence on the ground. It may be that MONUSCO’s mandate will not be renewed after 2012. However, if there is to be a continued UN force presence in eastern DRC we recommend that it be a more nimble and agile force suited to the terrain and to the type of violence which is now characterising the region. We also recommend that the UK Government re-examine the cost of the MONUSCO mission in relation to its mandate and progress to date.

151 Q 155
153 Q 155
154 Q 158-61; Ev 74
Conclusions

108. We support the Government’s decision to invest in fragile and conflict-affected states because countries suffering from conflict or fragility will find it difficult to make progress against any of the Millennium Development Goal indicators without reasonable levels of peace, security and governance, and because it is far less costly to prevent conflict than to recover from it.

109. There are significant risks associated with allocating sizable sums of money to fragile and conflict-affected states but also significant opportunities which we think DFID should grasp. These include:

• helping hard to reach groups who as a result of conflict have had little access to health or education or no opportunities to improve their lives;

• strengthening systems of governance to deliver services in an accountable and transparent manner and helping communities to make choices about the services they need and to hold state institutions to account;

• contributing to peace building through improved security at the local level which will allow people to go about their daily lives without fear and without needing to pay bribes.

This involves creating a context in which ordinary citizens can exercise choice about their lives and their children’s future. It is not so much about the amount of money but about the way that funding is spent. DFID’s programmes begin to do this, but could do more, for example, investing more in bottom up community building initiatives, giving greater priority to ending violence against women and girls, and helping to create better relations between communities affected by violence and the armed forces.

110. DFID needs to be straightforward that the risks of misuse of funds will be somewhat higher in conflict or fragile states. In addition, while elections in such places may not be perfect, they remain important, and DFID should continue to support these, even though their beneficial effect may not be immediately apparent.

111. DFID has already invested significantly in many fragile and conflict-affected states, often where other donors are more reluctant to invest, for example in the DRC. This is commendable, but DFID must be clearer about its conditions for providing such assistance. The UK Government’s approach to building stability overseas may rightly focus on countries such as Pakistan which pose security threats to the UK, but it must also ensure that poor countries, such as the DRC, of less direct strategic interest to the UK, are not forgotten.

112. This is the first in a series of reports on fragile and conflict-affected states. We see our recommendations as ‘rolling’ which means they may be reinforced or amended as a result of the work we look at in other countries. For example our recent visit to South Sudan has had an influence on our comments on the role of UN peacekeepers.
Conclusions and recommendations

More joined up working?

1. DFID must ensure that funding for countries such as the DRC, which may not be viewed as important for the UK’s national security, are not abandoned in favour of more strategically important countries such as Pakistan. The formation of the National Security Council indicates a greater determination to work together, and we will monitor its impact on international development expenditure and policy choices. (Paragraph 17)

Building Stability Overseas

2. We are pleased that the Government is seeking to ensure through the National Security Council, the National Security Strategy and the Building Stability Overseas Strategy that the Government’s response to conflict includes diplomacy, development and defence. This must be seen to change practice. We are also pleased with the renewed focus on conflict prevention which is less costly and can reduce expenditure on humanitarian assistance and other post-conflict expenditure. These are important changes in emphasis. The impact of these changes is not yet apparent and we will continue to monitor this. (Paragraph 26)

3. All UK ODA must conform to OECD guidelines and DFID’s ODA must also contribute to poverty reduction under the 2002 International Development Act. We want to ensure that OECD guidelines on what is ODA-eligible and what is not, are adhered to at all times, especially when ODA is being spent by other government departments or through pooled funding mechanisms such as the Conflict Pool. However the OECD criteria are not set out in the Building Stability Overseas Strategy. The absence of reference to the importance of rehabilitation and recovery as a means of preventing recurrence of conflict is another omission to the BSOS. DFID must explain why these were excluded from the strategy and how they will inform cross government work in fragile and conflict affected states. (Paragraph 27)

Which fragile states?

4. DFID should be clear and open about the reasons it operates in different fragile countries and the basis for the choices it makes. The Bilateral Aid Review led to a smaller number of focus states where DFID assessed it could make a contribution and deliver results. The needs effectiveness indicator it used in the process created a bias towards large populous countries with large numbers of poor people. If it had used an index which used the proportion of people living on less that $2 a day, the difference in score between larger and smaller countries on the needs-effectiveness index would have been smaller. We recognise that the Millennium Development Goals will not be met globally unless they are met in large developing countries but we are concerned that smaller countries, with a large proportion of their population living in poverty, for example Burundi, have lost out. (Paragraph 35)
5. There were political aspects to these decisions. The public might question the large sums of money being spent in the DRC, where the UK has no historical links, and in Pakistan, a middle income country, where the motive may have more to do with national security than reducing poverty, although the two are linked. The Government must be clearer about where its development assistance is being driven by political objectives, and should explain better the choices it makes about which states to fund. In a context where the DFID budget is increasing to meet internationally agreed Official Development Assistance targets, it is important that the public understands the value—morally and politically—of the decision to invest increasing amounts of aid in fragile and conflict-affected states. (Paragraph 36)

Working with other donors

6. DFID has a range of options to choose from in terms of how it delivers aid in fragile and conflict-affected states and whether it does this in cooperation with other donors or not. This helps DFID to opt for ways of delivering assistance which are context specific, which we support. However, DFID should be clearer about how it makes these choices. In relation to budget support for Ethiopia, we agree that poor people should not suffer as a result of the actions of their government. DFID should set out specific governance conditions under which it will provide budget support, and any under which it will be withdrawn. It should also, as a matter of course, set out clearly how its aid budget for each country is distributed between multilateral and bilateral spending and the reasons for this pattern and distribution. (Paragraph 51)

Costs of delivery, achieving results

7. It is more risky and more costly to deliver programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states. DFID must be open about these risks and open about the costs. However, we want to see evidence that DFID is working to bring down the cost of delivery of its programmes in these states. (Paragraph 54)

8. DFID’s focus on monitoring results is welcome, and can be used to demonstrate that DFID is achieving beneficial impacts from its expenditure. However, we caution that achieving results in fragile and conflict-affected states is more complicated than in stable or peaceful countries and there is always the risk that they will not be achieved because of the lack of security, and because fragile and conflict-affected states are often also places where fraud and corruption can thrive. We do not accept that in a context where fraud and corruption are rife that DFID can always mitigate against this adequately, especially where it subcontracts delivery of these programmes to third parties. This means it may not be able to guarantee value for money for every pound it spends. DFID should be open about this so that expectations of results are realistic, without being under-ambitious. (Paragraph 55)

Support for elections

9. Support for democratic elections contributes to better governance, but it is only a starting point. We support DFID’s efforts to assist with the voter registration process in the DRC although we do have concerns about using expensive biometric systems.
DFID must also ensure that wider issues of empowerment and inclusion, especially for women, are discussed as part of the wider electoral agenda. The rise in pre-election violence, especially in the East, was worrying. However, events have overtaken us and the general election has taken place. We expect the UK Government to make representations to its political partners there to ensure such violence does not also mar the local elections scheduled for 2013. The international community must obtain guarantees from the DRC Government that these less high profile elections take place as planned. (Paragraph 65)

Impunity and human rights

10. We understand the difficulties faced by the Government of Rwanda in trying to forge a united country and make progress towards the Millennium Development Goals whilst still recovering from the genocide 17 years ago. Rwanda has made remarkable progress on both fronts and the UK Government has placed great faith in Rwanda’s capacity to continue to do so. We appreciate the Government of Rwanda has concerns about those who fled Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide and for whom there is no right of extradition from EU countries. Nevertheless we believe the UK Government should set out some indicators or benchmarks in its budget support agreements about what type of improvements it expects to see in areas such as freedom of speech and of association over the remaining period covered by the Memorandum of Understanding. This might include ensuring human rights organisations can operate freely and improving freedom of the press. (Paragraph 71)

Improving accountability and transparency in the mining sector

11. There is a long history of mineral wealth being used to fund and perpetuate conflict and criminality in the DRC, especially in the East. The Government of the DRC has taken some measures to regulate the industry; however, it is clear that these remain insufficient. The World Bank Economic Governance Matrix, with which the Government of DRC complied, strikes us as a good example of a means of helping to create greater transparency and accountability in the industry. We commend the Bank for this approach. However, the Bank may have been too hasty in resuming funding since the Government of DRC has continued to permit secret sales of assets and First Quantum has as yet had no redress. We recommend that DFID give transparency and accountability in this sector greater priority, building on its work with Promines. The mineral sector has the potential to generate significant wealth which must be used for the benefit of the people of DRC. Given the linkages between this sector and conflict in the DRC the risks of not properly managing this sector are that development gains made elsewhere will be forgone. DFID must set out clearly for the Government of the DRC what it expects in terms of transparency and accountability in the mineral sector and withdraw assistance if these expectations are not met. (Paragraph 78)

Improving the confidence of ordinary citizens in their state

12. Supporting better relations between the state and society, increasing responsiveness, responsibility and citizenship, should be a key component of governance
programmes. Increasing the degree of local ownership over programmes helps to build bottom up accountability and increases political legitimacy—a key component of peace building in post-conflict societies. DFID should ensure that it does not focus excessively on formal institutions at the expense on informal community-building approaches. We recommend that DFID continue to invest at least 10% of its budget in the DRC on bottom-up community building programmes. (Paragraph 81)

Violence against women and girls

13. Violence against women and girls is a big problem in the DRC, especially in the East, where it is used as a weapon of war. It has multiple causes, some of which are cultural. These must be tackled and will require behavioural changes in men and female empowerment. DFID has said it places a high priority on improving development outcomes for women and girls. As part of this focus, tackling violence against women and girls should be its top priority in the DRC. We recommend that DFID fund standalone projects for reducing and responding to violence against women and girls, such as those supported by the IRC. We also recommend that DFID include the reduction of violence against women and girls in its results framework for the DRC. (Paragraph 90)

Understanding local conflicts

14. While the war may be over, local outbreaks of violence in eastern DRC continue. These create ongoing humanitarian needs and slow down the development process. This means that the way DFID approaches development in the East needs to be tailored to responding to humanitarian needs, the risks of disruption to its programmes, and to overcoming the hurdles of trying to deliver basic services in a region where criminality and violence continue. This is very different from the situation in Kinshasa, where progress in development is better. While DFID works competently through reputable and effective non-governmental organisations in the East, its knowledge base and understanding of local conflict dynamics would be improved with a greater on the ground presence, for example in Bukavu where the security situation has improved. We recommend that DFID open a sub-office in eastern DRC so that it has a greater presence there. This could help DFID to build and maintain relationships with local civil society groups and their leaders, as well as local law enforcement authorities with a view to improving local security. It would also ensure it had greater oversight of, and capacity to monitor, its programmes in this volatile region. (Paragraph 93)

Confidence boosting measures

15. Reforming the FARDC has been slow. Nevertheless some progress has been made. In particular the 2009 Ihusi Peace Accord was a significant step as it allowed the incorporation of rebel militias into the army. This too has not been without problems. We commend DFID for its continued support to Security Sector Reform. However, without better donor coordination in this area, progress is likely to be haphazard as well as slow. DFID has a role to play to helping donors to coordinate better with MONUSCO. (Paragraph 100)
16. Security Sector Reform is essential for providing improved security and restoring citizen confidence. It is important for citizens to feel secure so that they can begin to lead normal lives—to go to markets, get jobs, send their children to school. Part of this must include ensuring the armed forces are trusted by locals. We understand there has been a shortfall in community liaison assistants. This would be a relatively low cost way of facilitating communication and better relations between communities and the armed forces, including MONUSCO and FARDC. We recommend that DFID identify the reasons for the shortfall in community liaison assistants and seek to rectify this. (Paragraph 101)

MONUSCO

17. MONUSCO has been a force for stability in an unpredictable and frequently unstable region of the DRC. While stability has improved, and the number of militia groups has decreased, ordinary citizens still experience violence frequently. Given the lack of infrastructure in the region, there is a limit to MONUSCO’s ability to respond quickly to reports of violence in remote areas. Following our discussions with the UN in South Sudan, it is clear that UN forces are constrained by the details of the mandate given to them. Flexible mandates are required, which allow troops to operate out of their base, rather than mandates which involve most of the soldiers guarding their base. We are concerned that the MONUSCO mandate constrains activity in this way. The UK should also seek to ensure that Security Council mandates are appropriate for the level and type of violence on the ground. It may be that MONUSCO’s mandate will not be renewed after 2012. However, if there is to be a continued UN force presence in eastern DRC we recommend that it be a more nimble and agile force suited to the terrain and to the type of violence which is now characterising the region. We also recommend that the UK Government re-examine the cost of the MONUSCO mission in relation to its mandate and progress to date. (Paragraph 107)
Annex: The Committee’s Visit Programme in Rwanda, DRC and Burundi

The Committee visited Rwanda, DRC and Burundi from 15 to 24 June 2011.

Members participating: Malcolm Bruce (Chair), Hugh Bayley, Richard Burden, Sam Gyimah, Richard Harrington, Pauline Latham, Jeremy Lefroy, Michael McCann, Anas Sarwar, Chris White

Accompanied by: Mick Hillyard (Second Clerk); Anna Dickson (Committee Specialist)

The Committee divided into two groups for parts of the visit.

Rwanda

Kigali

Thursday 16 June

Meeting with Minister of Finance, Hon John Rwandgombwa and Minister of Infrastructure, Hon Albert Nsengiyumva

Briefing on human rights in Rwanda by Civil Society Organisations

Meeting with other donors on Rwanda:

Group 1:

- The United States
- European Union
- World Bank
- African Development Bank
- United Nations Development Programme

Group 2:

- Swedish International Development Agency (Burundi group)

Field Visits to

- A community supported by DFID through the Vision Umurenge Programme (VUP) for support to the extreme poor
- A genocide survivors health centre and income-generating activities run by Survivors Fund UK (SURF) and Solace Ministries
Friday 17 June

Field Visits to
- DFID’s Land Tenure Regularisation Programme
- PPIMA (Support to Civil Society Capacity Building and Engagement in Public Policy Information, Monitoring and Advocacy) programme of support to civil society

Briefing on Trade Mark East Africa

The Committee travelled by road to the DRC

Democratic Republic of Congo

Saturday 18 June

Goma

Briefing with HMG on the situation in eastern DRC

Meeting with:
- World Food Programme (WFP)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)
- United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
- United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR)

Introductory call on the Governor of North Kivu

Briefing with United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)

Meeting with NGO Partners:
- International Alert
- Oxfam
- Save the Children
- Pole Institute
- Christian Aid
- International Rescue Committee
- International Committee of the Red Cross

Group 1:

Field Visit with ICRC to:
- Water treatment plant
• Children’s reunification centre

**Group 2:**
Field visits with UNICEF to:
• UNICEF Nutrition Centre
• Heal Africa
• Voter Registration Centre
• Water Treatment Plant

**Sunday 19 June**

*The Committee travelled by boat from Goma to Bukavu*
Call on the Governor of South Kivu
Meeting with DFID partners: IRC, UNICEF

**Monday 20 June**

**Group 1:**
Field visit on the Shabunda road:
• Travel on Burhale-Shabunda road, and discuss construction and maintenance challenges.
• Meet community members and road construction teams
• Meet with local community and Village Development Committee
• Visit local clinic, school and water points

**Group 2:**
Field Visit on Miti Hombo Road :
• Discussion on road construction and maintenance
• Meet road construction team and supervisor
• Travel on Miti-Hombo road with MONUSCO escort
• Visit to a village water and sanitation project (Village Assaini) and meet community members

**Tuesday 21 June**

*Bukavu*
International Rescue Committee briefing on health, maternal care and violence against women
Meeting with South Kivu Parliamentary Oversight Committee for Security and Justice
The Committee travelled to Bujumbura, Burundi by road

Meeting with local civil society representatives and journalists:
- Evariste Ngoyagoye, Catholic Archbishop of Burundi
- Onesphore Nduwayo, Director, OAG
- Antoine Kaburahe, Editor of Iwacu, main weekly newspaper
- Cassien Ndikuryo, Help Channel
- Isidore Rufykiri, Head of Burundi Bar Association

Wednesday 22 June

Briefing with DFID

Meeting with:
- Gervais Rufykiri, Second Vice President

The Committee travelled to the Shambo Community in Karuzi Province and stayed with local families*

Thursday 23 June

Bujumbura

Meeting with:
- EU Delegation
- USAID
- Special Representative of the UN Secretary General
- French Ambassador
- German Ambassador
- Dutch Ambassador
- Swiss Political Counsellor
- IMF Country Representative
- World Bank Country Manager
- Trade Mark East Africa
- Belgian Embassy official

Meeting with:
- Refugee Education Trust
- CARE
- CRS (NZ OKIRA)
- Avocats Sans Frontieres
- Benevolencija
- ActionAid
- Christian Aid

Meeting with:
- Dr Yves Sahinguvu, ex-1st Vice President
* Those Members who did not travel to Shombo held meetings with:
  • Stéphane de Loecker, EU Ambassador to Burundi
  • Burundi Revenue Authority
  • Karen Landgren, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General
Formal Minutes

Monday 12 December 2011

Members present:
Malcolm Bruce, in the Chair
Hugh Bayley
Richard Burden
Jeremy Lefroy
Mr Michael McCann

Draft Report (Working Effectively in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC and Rwanda), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 112 read and agreed to.

Summary and Annex agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Twelfth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Tuesday 13 December at 10.00 a.m.]
### Witnesses

**Tuesday 20 July 2011**


**Tuesday 13 December 2011**

Daniel Balint-Kurti, Campaign Leader, DRC, Global Witness, and Mike Davis, Campaign Leader, Conflict Resources, Global Witness

David Leonard, Professorial Fellow in Governance, and Joanna Wheeler, Research Fellow, Participation, Power and Social Change Team, Institute of Development Studies

**Thursday 20 October 2011**

Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP, Secretary of State, Department for International Development

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Q1 Chair: Good morning and thank you very much for coming in. Sorry for the slight delay in starting. You will appreciate this is effectively the last week of the parliamentary term, which puts Members under a high degree of pressure because Committees are all trying to get things done. You are also slightly thin on the ground, which does not mean we are any the less interested in what you have to say. Given that there are four of you and I know you at least, David has to be away at 12, I do not want to inhibit your replies, but if you can try to keep them fairly concise and perhaps not everybody can answer every question, that keeps things moving around. I wonder first of all, although I recognize some of you, if you could introduce yourselves for the record.

David Mepham: I am David Mepham. I am the UK Director of Human Rights Watch.

Jennifer Miquel: I am Jennifer Miquel, Women’s Protection and Empowerment Technical Adviser from the International Rescue Committee—IRC.

Sophia Swithern: I am Sophia Swithern, Humanitarian Policy Adviser from Oxfam GB.

Chris Underwood: I am Chris Underwood, Head of Communications from International Alert.

Q2 Chair: As I say, thank you very much. You will appreciate that we are looking at the increased commitment of the Department for International Development to operate in fragile and post-conflict states. Our concern is with how you can do that, what the risks are, what the challenges are and how you can deliver it. In the context of that, again you will probably be aware the Committee visited three of those states in the last couple of weeks, namely Rwanda, eastern Congo and Burundi. I suppose the first and most obvious question is, if that is the Department’s commitment, is it a good idea to put more resources in more and more difficult places? If so, which states would you feel that they ought to prioritise in terms of their needs and also DFID’s capacity to make a difference?

David Mepham: Thank you, Chair. Human Rights Watch would argue that yes, if the world is going to make progress in relation to the Millennium Development Goals, and the countries of the Great Lakes, which are the focus of this inquiry, are going to make progress, there needs to be a more sustained effort to tackle the specific challenges that are posed by fragility, weak governance and so on. Human Rights Watch’s particular concern, which we flagged in our submission to the Committee, is that DFID and arguably the UK Government as a whole is not giving enough attention to issues around human rights, the rule of law and responsive government. We feel that what is described as state building is very focused on the technocratic dimensions of building up state capacity, and there has not been sufficient attention to whether the Government is upholding human rights, whether it is respecting the rule of law and whether it is allowing journalists to operate freely. We think more resource needs to be put into those things and more attention needs to be given to those things if the development process is to proceed effectively.

Jennifer Miquel: Just very briefly, to complement, I think IRC would agree with that. DFID has really made an impact in the fragile states that it does work in, for example in the health sector and in its approach and so on, but I would argue that, for example in eastern DRC, a lot of donors do put money into working on violence against women issues but a lot more could be done. Certainly with the scale of the problem, not enough is being done there.

Sophia Swithern: Oxfam would agree with both the previous witnesses. Speaking specifically on DRC, the scale of the need does justify the scale of the response and the increase in funding. I think the devil will be in the detail as to how well DFID can achieve its results.

Chris Underwood: Our perspective as a peace-building organisation might be not uncomplementary but slightly different in the sense that we would just sound a warning. Not to say that putting money in is a mistake but, for example, to think of the DRC as a state in the context of the state building that we heard about earlier I think would be a mistake. When you were in eastern Congo, you may have noticed that the country has the apparatus of a state but it does not function in the way that anyone would understand a modern state to be. There are risks inherent in putting in large amounts of resources into a very fragile and conflict-prone environment. The way to manage those risks, of course, is having a very thorough and ongoing understanding of the context...
in which you are working. What, for example, is the political economy? Who is fighting whom and over what? Without a good understanding, the risk is run of not being as effective with our aid as we might otherwise be and potentially more besides. So we would just place emphasis on understanding the experiences of people on the ground, rather than seeing everything through the lens of a state, which, in eastern Congo’s case, would be a mistake.

Q3 Chair: Coming to Congo, the UK moved into the DRC some years ago, a francophone country with which we have no historical connections. Overall, DRC gets $35 a head in aid, but the UK is a major donor within that. Are we right to be exposed in that way? Are others following suit? Indeed, I have just come from a meeting in which one of the DFID Ministers said effectively other EU states and donors, for example, are happy to let DFID step up to the plate, and in one connection—I will not say which country, but you can probably guess which it is—say, “Well if you want to be fool enough to do that, we ain’t going to follow you.” So the real question is: is DFID right to take the lead and indeed is DFID a good agency to be doing it, given that it does not look as if anybody else will do it if we do not?

Chris Underwood: Perhaps conversely, given what I have just said, I think DFID actually is right to take the lead and to put the resources in. But the question, as I think a number of us have said, is how it does that. It is the how; it is not the how much. Unsurprisingly, the focus is on how much money is going in, but perhaps not as much focus is on how it will be used. I think we would say that there needs to be a far greater emphasis on building peace at the outset, rather than the traditional way that has characterised interventions from both DFID and other donors, which is to put the peace after what is conceived of as the development—so the more technocratic approaches to water sanitation, to building up security forces and to investing in education—all of which is absolutely critical, not least given the framework of the MDGs. But without peace and that emphasis on building stability, those sorts of investments risk not having the impact that they were intended to have, and it is in fact for this very reason that DFID is putting this lead—but we just hope that that emphasis on peace-building is there from the outset.

David Mepham: One of the things that is interesting and I know the Committee wants to look at are these new Operational Plans that DFID has produced—the two for DRC and Rwanda were published in May of this year—which set out, as I suspect the Committee will have seen, the range of indicators by which DFID’s performance in those countries is going to be assessed and judged. Interestingly, both with the DRC, which we are focused on now, and Rwanda, they are very focused on what we might call service delivery. It is about kilometres of roads rebuilt or upgraded; the number of people who register to vote—that is an interesting one; and the number of girls and boys supported in primary school. There is less, as Chris was saying, about political space, about peace and about whether women and girls feel safe from violence. Those things are sometimes harder to measure, but it seems to us that if you are going to get progress in places like the DRC, you need to give equal emphasis—indeed arguably more emphasis—to those kinds of indicators and metrics rather than an over-focus on service delivery outcomes.

Q4 Chair: We will come to those a little later on. The only comment one would make is that, for example, when we looked at the roads that DFID was reconstructing in Congo, one of the benefits that was unanticipated was that it improved security, which was counterintuitive because people thought it might have had the opposite effect. So there were some peace benefits from road building.

David Mepham: Don’t get me wrong, Chair; I am not suggesting building roads is not important. I suppose the question is whether the comprehensiveness of the indicators that DFID has.

Q5 Richard Harrington: I must just push you again on this, Mr Mepham. From a first visit to the DRC, etc.—I cannot claim the kind of expertise that the panel have—it does seem to me that on the huge and phenomenal scale problems of the-century, with communications, education, health, and so on, I cannot accept that the state building side, which I am not saying is unimportant, can be treated as a priority, when people are hungry, dying young, being raped, and all the rest of it. I think perhaps we will just have to agree that there is a difference of opinion on that, but if you or anybody else could comment on that, I would appreciate it.

David Mepham: Can I come back on that? You are suggesting I am making a particular comment. I am certainly not saying that progress on health, education and infrastructure are not important things.

Richard Harrington: I know you are not.

David Mepham: What Human Rights Watch is saying—and I suspect there will be some sympathy for this among the panelists here—is that DFID and the UK Government need to give comparable emphasis to addressing some of the underlying causes, which in the DRC case are about the dysfunctionality of political institutions, about impunity and about the fact you have got a bunch of warlords wandering round the east of the country and not being held to account for their crimes. If you push that to one side and don’t deal with it, I suspect you won’t make the kind of progress on development that we would all like to see.

Sophia Swithern: If I could add in on that from Oxfam’s experience, to take security-sector reform as a pillar of what we call state building, it is an essential part of helping people not to be hungry and not to be pushed into IDP camps where there may be cholera outbreaks. These life-saving mechanisms are very much linked to people’s safety. I think there are two elements to state building. One is the intervention at a high level—at the political level and technical level—and the other thing is building community capacity so that they can create local change and engage with those who are supposed to be providing security services to them. To give you an example, somebody might be going hungry because they cannot go to market without paying $5 at each of the five
checkpoints for the 10 km it takes for them to get to market. Enabling them on the local level—the bottom-up approach—to engage with those who might be manning those illegal checkpoints, largely police and army, to get those checkpoints out of the way, at the same time as the high-level interventions that DFID is engaged in with the police reform, is all part and parcel of helping people to meet Millennium Development Goals: not go hungry, not go thirsty and feel safe.

Q6 Chris White: We all recognise that delivering services in countries like DRC is going to be costly and difficult. In your view, do you think DFID’s spending on healthcare is going to represent value for money?

Jennifer Miquel: I guess the straightforward answer is yes. I think DFID, certainly in DRC, has had a really big impact on people’s health. The DFID-funded health programme, if I am correct, provides medical services to about 1.4 million people right now. Certainly from IRC’s point of view, the approach that DFID has is a good one—training healthcare professionals, rebuilding health centres, providing the equipment to the health centres and so on. It has also advocated with IRC to provide free services to children under five, pregnant women and survivors of sexual violence. That has really increased the uptake of services by people from 0.37 to 0.7. That really is quite beneficial and we would advocate that it would be good to also try to provide free services for all reproductive health services; I think that would really increase the uptake and also be beneficial to people’s health. I also think the approach that has been taken has built the confidence a little bit more in the Government structures. Respect is not the word I want to use, but people just believe a little bit more in the system and working through the Ministry of Health.

Q7 Chris White: Can you comment on the high level of maternal mortality rates and what is being done to start bringing those figures down?

Jennifer Miquel: If you provide free reproductive health services, that would probably have an effect on maternal mortality rates.

Q8 Chris White: Are you seeing any shift in the numbers?

Jennifer Miquel: I am not sure about that right now. I don’t know if my colleagues are.

Q9 Chris White: If I can move on a little bit, in your collective view, does DFID have appropriate systems for measuring outcomes accurately and assessing the impact of its interventions?

Chris Underwood: As an overall observation, what we would say is that the MDGs are useful for many things, but they are not particularly useful for measuring progress in conflict-affected and fragile states, eastern DRC and Burundi being very good examples of that, for some of the reasons that I have given in earlier answers. If you are talking about measuring progress in an area where violence occurs, either of the sort that Mr Harrington was talking about in terms of rape or actual armed violence between groups, then progress needs to be measured in terms of equipping those societies to manage the roots of those conflicts without recourse to violence. That is the single most important measure of progress at that point in those communities, because the spin-off effects of those conflicts carrying on relates to some of the issues that we have just been talking about in respect of maternal mortality, lack of access to basic services and basic life expectancy. So we would say that impact and measuring progress needs to be far more about looking at the political context of those societies rather than the technocrats like how many kilometres of road have been built and how many other services have been delivered.

DFID itself, to give it credit—and in fact to give the last Government credit as well as this one—has started moving towards a position of starting to do that. We have recently seen the recruitment of what seems like lots of conflict advisers to be based in the Great Lakes region and others to carry out precisely that sort of context-led analysis. It is certainly our hope that measuring impact and progress in those ways that are more relevant to the local context is something that DFID can take forward.

Q10 Chris White: Finally, and perhaps this is a more formal way of asking Richard’s question, do you think the right balance is being struck between humanitarian assistance and long-term development?

Sophia Swithern: We are all aware that there is not a simple dichotomy between humanitarian and development, and that there is a huge area in between, which is sometimes referred to as transitional. Looking particularly at DRC, you have got 22 million square kilometres with highly localised settings. I remember doing community assessments in eastern DRC and going to two villages within 10 km of each other, one of which was in what could be described as a conflict setting with a high need for humanitarian assistance and the next which was asking for development assistance and was ready for that. It is highly localised and highly fluid as well, with the movement of armed groups and the movement of threats. Similarly in the west, which might be framed as a development setting, there is now an outbreak in the Kinshasa area. So I think there is a need to think in a much more nuanced way than humanitariandevelopment. We would say there is a need to continue with humanitarian assistance and to continue with that humanitarian assistance based on, as Chris was saying, a very clear context and needs analysis rather than a chronological or a macro narrative that says, “The country has now moved on; let’s do development assistance.” There is also a need for DFID to help to bridge the gap and provide flexible and long-term funding that is able to deal with the bits in between humanitarian and development assistance in a non-politicised way.
course there are a lot more people there. So the impression that we get is that it is patchy. DFID is making a difference—there's no question whether or not, as you say, it is strategically contributing to the long-term peace. That brings me on to the question I was going to ask Anas Sarwar to ask.

Q11 Anas Sarwar: Good morning, everyone. I just wanted to follow up on the point about governance and state building and the elections coming up. You mentioned the figure of 31 million people they are hoping to have on the electoral register by the 2011 elections, and we know that over £50 million has been going from DFID to the UNDP to support those elections and democratic institutions. I just wonder what you feel people's expectations are of the elections that are coming up.

David Mepham: I think there are a number of points about the elections. One is it is an interesting indicator about enrolment; clearly enrolment is important but perhaps the most critical thing is the elections are free and fair, and there may be some concern and scepticism about whether that will happen. I think there is also an issue about whether the UN mission in DRC—MONUSCO—is going to be appropriately equipped and mandated to provide the sort of protection for civilians that is going to be necessary in the run-up to the election. One of our concerns is that the period between now and the elections, which are scheduled for November, may see a further upsurge in violence in various parts of the country. Is MONUSCO equipped to deal with that and protect civilians?

They are the two issues that we particularly flag around the elections, but a third point that is critical is not to think that elections are the be-all and end-all of state building and stability. They are important and they have a critical role in terms of the accountability of a Government to its people, but if we put too much emphasis on elections and we neglect other critical aspects of state building, including the rule of law, dealing with impunity and protecting human rights, then we are missing something very important. I would argue that in the DRC in particular, there has been a failure on the part of the international community, including the UK Government and DFID, to give appropriate priority to dealing with impunity.

You talked about Goma. There is a guy called Bosco Ntaganda; there is an ICC arrest warrant out for him. He walks around eastern Congo not being arrested or apprehended. He is responsible for various serious human rights violations, and his presence and the presence of the forces around him is a major source of instability in that region. So alongside credible, free, fair and impartial elections, we need actions to deal with people who are responsible for war crimes as well.

Chris Underwood: Agreeing with all of that, we would add that elections take place at three different levels in DRC. They take place at Kinshasa—national; then there are regional, provincial parliaments; and then there are the local elections—at a very local level themselves. The last time there were elections in DRC, the central ones at the national level took place, as did the provincial parliamentary ones, but the local ones never did. Back in 2006 they just did not happen. I think that gets across something about the lack of a culture of political accountability that characterises much of eastern DRC. It might be helpful to bear in mind what it is that DFID’s objectives might be in supporting those elections. Is it a technocratic, “Elections are a milestone along the way towards state building,” or is it more about empowerment, inclusion and drawing groups in that traditionally are not represented in the power-brokering elites? The results are there to be seen. For example, women are highly under-represented. They actually went down in the last election from 12% to 8% in the national Government of DRC. A lot of Alert’s work in eastern Congo is with women, with the idea of empowering them politically, both to come through as potential candidates and to run for elections—at those three levels. There is not a great deal you can do when the elections themselves don’t happen at all, but we would certainly want to see donors in particular thinking about creative ways to start bringing through those under-represented groups in those elections, as well as thinking about the potential consequences of holding the elections, in terms of violence or instability.

Q12 Anas Sarwar: I was going to go on and ask about the risks—I think you have already answered it—in terms of whether there will be free and fair elections, whether there will be an upsurge in violence and whether MONUSCO is properly equipped to deal with any violence that comes forward. I was also going to ask you about whether you think DFID places too much emphasis on elections as being the catalyst for change all the time. I think you partly answered that question in what you said. I just wondered what you think donor communities can do—not only DFID but working with other donor communities along with the national organisations—to make sure that you have got an inclusive political settlement that, yes, creates an environment for doing all the fantastic health projects, education projects and poverty reduction projects, but also does the things that Chris is talking about in terms of empowerment and making sure there is equal access for all, irrespective of background, gender and what part of the country they are from. What more do you think donor communities can do working together to achieve that?

David Mepham: If I could flag two things—I touched on one of them a moment ago—I do think this impunity issue is really important in the DRC. It is an extraordinary place in the sense that huge numbers of crimes have been committed by people over decades now and very few people have been brought to account for the crimes that they have committed. There is an old debate about peace versus justice and people sometimes say, “Well you have to trade justice to get peace.” I think in the DRC that is emphatically not the case; the fact that these guys have committed abuses and committed them again and carried on committing them and never been held to account is part of the problem in the DRC. So I think a really big push by DFID, alongside the Foreign Office and other sympathetic Governments, to try to tackle this
problem is a very important part of trying to get the DRC into a better space.

I touched on this guy Bosco Ntaganda, who certainly needs to be arrested by the DRC Government. I think another critical issue in terms of civilian protection is the role of the Lord’s Resistance Army, which is a Ugandan rebel group that has a presence in the north of the Congo and probably has been responsible in the last year or so for a much larger number of killings than any of the other groups. There are killings going on all across the east of the country, but they are in the north. I mentioned the role of MONUSCO, the UN mission. Human Rights Watch and many others do not feel that enough attention is being given by that UN mission to tackling the killings and the atrocities that have been committed by the LRA. Giving more emphasis to that and giving the women support is an important way of trying to stabilise that critical part of the country.

Q13 Anas Sarwar: It is clear that without justice there will not be peace in the region. I think to say, as you quite rightly said, that you can have one or the other is simply not true. Should DFID and the UK be using their position as a large donor to gain influence with the Government to press them to do these things, or does the Government not have the capacity to do these things, or, further, does it have the capacity but the corruption and injustice themselves are so ingrained in terms of its own organisation and its own people that it does not want to do it, no matter what pressure comes?

David Mepham: Others will want to come in, but I do think that DFID and the UK Government have leverage both with the DRC and certainly with Rwanda—it has lots of leverage with Rwanda, which we are going to come on to. So yes, I think they should be exerting that leverage more proactively to address issues around impunity and some of these other questions that we have talked about.

Chris Underwood: Does DFID have leverage? Yes it does. So does the UK Government as a whole. On the point I was making about women earlier, there is already a line in the DRC’s constitution that talks about parity—in fact, 50% representation for women—at each of those three levels of Government that I was just talking about. But it is sat there and nothing much has happened since 2005–06 when that was sent to the President following the national elections. There are now protests in the streets of Kinshasa led by women’s groups, both from the east and from other parts of Congo, trying to pressurise the Parliament of Congo into pushing that principle of parity into electoral law, making it mandatory to have that sort of inclusive representation at political level. I think the UK Government can very well use leverage, because that is a political decision. That is not really anything to do with capacity; that is a political decision that could and should be taken.

Just to illustrate some of the context, because sometimes it is a very abstract discussion, there was a woman who stood, unsuccessfully, in those last elections to be mayor of Bukavu. She was a very impressive candidate, but she was characterised by some of the institutions around there, namely the church, as being first of all a prostitute and then a mistress of Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda. If you can understand the politics, as you do, that is a particularly serious charge to make on someone and, unsurprisingly perhaps, she did not win that election. Several years after that, however, that same woman was co-opted into being mayor of Bukavu because the incumbent who did win that election had to stand down.

That tells you two things. First of all, there is a lack of inclusion inherent in that region, which is perhaps responsible for the lack of inclusion in the political system, but it also tells you that there are people there who do not go along with that. Using that leverage to bring about those more inclusive political settlements is something that the UK is, I think, beginning to think about doing and could do more of. We would very much support them in that endeavour.

Sophia Swithern: In terms of the UK’s influence, there are probably five things the UK can do. One is this leverage, which we have already touched on. Another is to lead by example. Although you were saying that other donors may be regarding DFID as foolhardy, I think there is something to be said that where DFID goes, others will follow. There is also a role around coordination; as such a big donor, DFID can have a role in bringing other donors together. Previously piecemeal or scattered initiatives, to again take the example of security-sector reform, can be brought together to be more effective and DFID can have a role in that. To take the example of the LRA, on the one hand DFID’s assistance can tackle it at the political level and, on the other hand, road building in the LRA-affected areas will reduce the isolation of those communities, and therefore help them to be safer and more protected.

Then, as Chris was saying, the issue of civil society has been touched on. Not just to represent and to put political pressure on itself, but to build civil society to have its voice heard itself. I think this is a theme of all of our interventions. There are plentiful examples of where civil society can hold the Government to account. To take an education example, a coalition of Congolese education NGOs interrogated the education budget after the IMF debt relief and through parliamentary debate held the Minister to account. One of the participants said, “After 20 years, this is what it feels like to confront and hold power to account.” I think this civil society bolstering is a key component of what DFID can do programmatically as well as politically.

Q14 Richard Harrington: Leading on from that, I know we want to go on to talk about the Rwandan human rights situation, which we will, but we have mentioned human rights in the context mainly of the DRC. I would just like to put a view to you that was given to me by the European Union ambassador in Burundi, Sam Gyimah and I had lunch with him when the others were immersing themselves in Burundi. He has been around a long time; he was first posted there 15 years ago. I cannot remember his surname—Stéphane something or other. He is Belgian—a very well-acknowledged person. His view on human rights was as follows. He said people like the President of Burundi “could not care less about human rights; they...
have no interest at all. We have no leverage whatsoever on them, because they are quite happy for us to do whatever aid we want—presumably because they get their cut in different ways through budget support and everything like that—“and we have to work around it.” It was a cynical view and he said you cannot understand the mentality of people who have no interest in human rights or how people live. I have to accept his view on that. It was an experienced one; it was not like we would get from a Daily Mail reader here. But he then went on to say how important he felt everything that we do is in Burundi. He was just talking about Burundi obviously, but I am sure there are parallels to what we have been talking about today. I must say, I went along with that, because DFID does seem, as with many of the other agencies, to be doing a lot of very good work in Burundi.

It brings me back to what we were talking about before, about your view collectively, which seems to be that we have to do the nation building and the civil society stuff in parallel to it. But I get the impression that we can only do what we can do in the DRC, and the fact is we met people that I am sure have been involved in it and they have their Montblanc pens and all this kind of stuff, but the office does not give them the respectability that it would command in a non-fragile state. I would like to drill down on this leverage thing. To what extent do you really believe that DFID or the entire community have leverage, like you have said it has leverage, when we are dealing with regimes who have shown that all this human rights stuff is of no real interest to them? I am sure they are quite happy to let everything proceed; they would rather it worked than it didn’t work. But I cannot understand how you feel, given that context of these dictators, that we can really exert leverage. If you could give me an example of one thing in Burundi, DRC or Rwanda where you think the leverage of the international development/aid community has made one difference, I would feel a lot happier about running that line of argument.

Richard Harrington: I was going to then move on to Rwanda.

David Mepham: In Burundi, arguably we have less leverage because, for example, the aid programme is being closed down. DRC a little bit less; I think we still, for the reasons given, have considerable leverage there too. But certainly in relation to Rwanda, I think the UK has a very significant amount of leverage, because along with the United States, it has probably been the Government in the last 20 years that has been most supportive of Paul Kagame’s Government in Rwanda. It has been consistently championing the Rwandans in the UN Security Council. We give a very large amount of development aid to Rwanda. We give about £70 million a year currently; it is due to rise to £90 million in five years’ time. Our critique is not that suddenly we should say, “We are not giving any of that,” overnight, but there should be a much more hard-headed, tough conversation with the Rwandans about what they are doing with the resources we provide them.

Richard Harrington: We are politicians; we are used to that. In fact, it is compulsory.

Chris Underwood: You said the thing I couldn’t. If you are talking about fundamental change, particularly somewhere as physically large, let alone the size metaphorically, as the DRC, you have to consider what sort of timescales you are talking in. Are you, for example, talking about examples of leverage exercised in six months or six years? If you look at the World Development Report, which was a game-changer of a report brought out by the World Bank only a few months ago, you will see that they talk about change taking place over generations—over decades. One of the reasons why I gave the shocking example that I did from Bukavu was to illustrate where we are now. You do not change situations like that overnight. I know you are not suggesting that we do, but if we are serious about tackling progress and measuring impact, as Mr White was talking about, we have to take those sorts of timescales. We have to take the political economy, who is fighting who and over what, what some of the social inclusion or exclusion issues are—including the human rights abuses that may very well take place—and over what timescale we can affect a fundamental change. We would argue that it is a very long-term endeavour. Perhaps your question might be better phrased, “Over the next 20 to 30 years, what sort of fundamental change are we seriously about bringing about in eastern DRC?” From our point of view, you simply cannot look at it in any other way.

Richard Harrington: I think that is a reasonable answer. Should we move on to Rwanda? It is probably better. We were told in everything we read before we went there about the concern for human rights in Rwanda. Perhaps for the sake of the Committee and the record, it would be possible just to go through what you feel these concerns are in terms of things that have happened and then what DFID should be doing that is not doing to develop civil society.

David Mepham: I am very happy to kick off on that one, because we devote quite a lot of attention in our own submission from Human Rights Watch to the Rwanda example. Just to frame this in the recent history, everybody on this Committee and, I suspect,
watching these proceedings remembers the 1994 genocide. That is embedded in people's memories—
that extraordinarily shocking event where the world stood back and failed to prevent the killing of between
500,000 and 800,000 people in 1994. But I think probably quite a lot of the history after that is not so
well known. Human Rights Watch and many other human rights organisations and UN bodies have been
documenting human rights abuses that have taken place, both within Rwanda and in eastern Congo,
involving the Rwandan army and others supported by the Rwandans, and tens of thousands of people were
also killed in that period.

One of the interesting things that came out in this UN mapping report was published at the end of
2010—this was a report produced by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; it looked at what
had gone on in the Congo between 1993 and 2003—
was it identified a whole range of actors who had been
responsible for very serious human rights abuses, for
war crimes and for crimes against humanity, including
the Rwandan army and groups affiliated with the
Rwandan army. It describes tens of thousands of
people being killed inside the Congo in that period; it
also describes significant numbers of people being
killed within Rwanda between 1994 and 1999. So this
is not a new story. In a way, human rights abuses have
been occurring on a very large scale since 1994 and I
do not think that has been given the kind of attention
that it deserves. The UK Government and DFID have
had a very close relationship with the Rwandans since
the mid-1990s and I am not sure that the human rights
abuses that have been committed by the Rwandan
army have featured sufficiently in that dialogue with
the Rwandans, given the human rights abuses that
were taking place.

To bring it up to the current day, if you think back to
the 2010 elections that took place in Rwanda, none of
the three candidates from the opposition parties were
allowed to meaningfully participate in the presidential
election. Various obstructions were put in their way:
two were detained; the vice-president of a third party
was murdered, his body was mutilated. The President
won the election with 93% of the vote on a 97%
turnout. I do not think anybody objectively looking at
that would regard it as a free and fair election.

I suppose the question that we would pose is: what
were the consequences of that? Was that really raising
the level of people's knowledge that situations like
that are not acceptable. There are also serious infringements on
the capacity of civil society to operate. All of these
things suggest to us that the human rights situation
within Rwanda is very grave and this ought to be
reflected to a significant extent in the dialogue that
DFID has with the Rwandans.

Yet what we appear to have is a commitment that has
just been made in the five-year Operational Plan to
increase the budget in Rwanda from £70 million a
year to £90 million a year. Interestingly, there are four
objectives that are described in that Operational Plan
that DFID has set out for the Rwandans. Three and
four are good ones. It says, “Increased accountability
of the state to citizens and empowerment of women,
girls and the extreme poor,” and number four is a
“transition to more open and inclusive politics and
enhanced human rights”. I think we would all be very
supportive of that. But then you look at the eight or
so indicators that DFID has set itself for its
programme in Rwanda, and these kinds of issues
around political space, freedom of expression and the
rights of civil society do not feature. What we would
argue, to make it very concrete, is there ought to be
some concrete benchmarks—some indicators—that
DFID is pushing for and promoting and supporting in
terms of its programme in Rwanda rather than
appearing to turn a blind eye to very serious human
rights abuses that are taking place.

Q17 Chair: Certainly when we met human rights
groups, they commented that they felt that in Rwanda
this top-down repression was creating a pressure-
cooker effect. Nobody was predicting what would
happen, but they say that somewhere, somehow, it
could break out in a pretty negative way.

David Mepham: What is often said—and there is
clearly some truth in it—is that Rwanda has made an
extraordinary amount of progress since 1994 and
things in relation to some of the MDGs have
progressed very well. But I think you are right, Chair,
that underneath there is a great deal of fragility in
Rwanda; there is a lot of political fragmentation and
a lot of discontent that does not often get articulated
openly because people are fearful of the consequences
of that. I think if we ignore that or suggest that it is
not happening, the long-term stability of Rwanda is
also imperilled, quite apart from concerns about
human rights in the short term. Just to give one
example about media, Reporters Without Borders,
which is a body that looks at media freedom, ranks
Rwanda bottom of the list in Africa in terms of the
ability of journalists to honestly report on what is
going on in the country. I suppose the question for
this Committee is: what kind of development is it if
independent journalists are not able to report honestly
about what is going on? Isn't that an essential
component of a functioning society, a functioning
democracy and successful development?

Q18 Richard Harrington: I think we would all
agree with what you said. The fact is that the lives
of the majority of people are fundamentally better in
Rwanda than they were in the previous period that
you were talking about. That is why it is spoken of a
lot as being, to the likes of us, a successful example
of what development aid can do. It comes back to this

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lack of leverage argument, doesn’t it? We must find out more about it. It is very hard for those not there to know. David Mepham: I know others will want to come in, but can I share just one example? I know at some point soon you will be having the Secretary of State or one of the Ministers here to give evidence before the Committee. In 2006, the UK Government and the Rwandan Government signed this thing called the Memorandum of Understanding. It was a 10-year MoU that set out mutual responsibilities and rights of the two sides, and how they were going to work together. It talked a lot about human rights and responsible government and accountability and so on. I think it would be very interesting to ask the Minister what has happened to that. Has that been jettisoned? Does that still exist? It talked about an honest dialogue between the development partner and the UK Government, addressing these kinds of questions. It is not referenced at all in the five-year Operational Plan. It would be interesting to know whether the UK Government and DFID are raising these kinds of questions. It is not referenced at all in the five-year Operational Plan. It would be interesting to know whether the UK Government and DFID are raising these kinds of questions. It is not referenced at all in the five-year Operational Plan. It would be interesting to know whether the UK Government and DFID are raising these kinds of questions. It is not referenced at all in the five-year Operational Plan.

Q19 Richard Harrington: I don’t think any of us would disagree with that; that is very helpful.

David Mepham: I think it would be very useful to press the Secretary of State on that.

Q20 Richard Harrington: I would just like to discuss briefly the community building programme that we saw in DRC, which was run by IRC. I must say it was most impressive, and your colleagues there, led by Ciaran, all of us thought were very impressive. This is the one that one cannot pronounce—Tuungane?

Jennifer Miquel: Tuungane.

Richard Harrington: Wq. I didn’t do badly at it.

We saw examples of villages that had got together and had made votes for facilities that were to be implemented. We saw an example of a medical centre that was built; we saw spring water with taps and things. So we actually saw the end product of that. We could see the outcomes measured in terms of DFID’s money being put through IRC, and we saw bricks and mortar and water and heard what people were saying, but one question that we have asked ourselves as a Committee is: do we try to measure the outcomes for the British taxpayer through that or through the actual use of those facilities? For example, we saw a finished medical centre but it then depended very much on the DRC Government to actually run it—to provide the nurses, doctors, and other facilities. I think there is one question on that. I would like to ask as well what tangible results IRC would expect to see in terms of improved governance and social cohesion coming from that.

Jennifer Miquel: Just to clarify, your first question is how do you measure? Do you measure more in terms of the bricks being laid or do you measure it at the end?

Richard Harrington: The real outcomes.

Jennifer Miquel: Are people actually using the health facilities or not?

Richard Harrington: Yes.

Jennifer Miquel: I think the answer would probably be you do both. In Tuungane, as you saw, it is working really well. We are hoping that by 2015 it is going to reach 2.5 million people in 1,800 villages, but as you probably heard when you were there, we are also conducting an impact evaluation with Columbia University on this.

Richard Harrington: Yes.

Jennifer Miquel: We are expecting the results at the end of this year or some time next year. That will help us see whether these facilities have been created and whether people are using them. At the same time, it is going to help measure the social cohesion. Has it improved the governance? Has it improved the transparency? Anecdotal evidence so far reveals that this community development and reconstruction approach does give more than infrastructure, it strengthens the ownership of the communities of all these sorts of structures and increases the transparency and the inclusion in decision making—there is also a gender component to it to try to include women, of course, to play a role. So far the results are really quite positive, I would say.

Q21 Richard Harrington: You have not been excluded on purpose from this, but this is a specific question for Oxfam. What else do you think DFID should be doing in fragile and conflict-affected states that will help the communities hold the Government to account?

Sophia Swithern: Perhaps I can give an example of Oxfam’s protection committees across eastern DRC. We work with groups of 12 people in 33 communities across eastern DRC. There are six women and six men on each committee. Working with local partners, we help them to identify what protection threats they are facing, whom they are facing them from and what they can do to advocate on their own behalf. We are seeing very local impacts of that. For example, in one place where there is a lot of arbitrary arrest by the police, communities have managed to influence for less arbitrary arrest and also when people are arrested, simple things like women and men are held in different cells when the arrest is less arbitrary. There are also issues of check points being dismantled and dialogue with the police and encouraging best practice with the police. In terms of what DFID can do to help civil society hold service providers to account, it goes back to this issue of flexible funding that allows for engagement with civil society and indicators that are not just quantitative but allow that flexibility for proxy indicators and for more qualitative results.

Chair: The plight of women is central in these areas. I think if women were able to say, “We feel secure and comfortable,” you would say you had solved 99% of the problem. Pauline Latham has a number of questions on that, which we need to pursue.

Q22 Pauline Latham: Yes. I apologise for being late; I had an Adjournment debate that I had to attend. In DRC, levels of sexual and gender-based violence are incredibly high. In fact, they are almost the highest in the world, I believe. How do you think DFID can take account of this in its programmes there? Do you
think there are sufficient services provided free of charge for women? Do you think they should be standalone services or integrated into primary healthcare? How effectively do you think DFID links its approach to violence against women to its wider education and health strategies?

**Jennifer Miquel:** Firstly, how should DFID be addressing this? DFID does not fund IRC’s violence against women programmes per se, but I think how DFID has addressed this issue has been through a mainstreamed approach, for example through the healthcare system, ensuring that post-rape care and treatment is available for free, and ensuring that the healthcare is free and that the capacity of health providers is there to be able to provide those services. That is great and so mainstreaming is very important, but I would say a standalone programme is also essential. If you really want to look at preventing and responding to violence against women, you have to have a comprehensive approach; you have to look at all the different types of services. If a woman is raped, she needs the healthcare, but she also needs the counselling, the legal support and so on. So you have that, but you have to try also to look at preventing this violence. That is also very difficult to do—probably the most difficult part of working on violence against women—but there are strategies that you can take, such as working with men or working on empowering women economically, which I think DFID’s Gender House supports as well, which looks at the economic environment of women. IRC has this model called EASE, the economic and social empowerment model, that looks at working through Village Saving and Loan Associations, which help women save some money. Once they have some money saved up, we introduce some business skills so you know how to use that money and you can earn more money. But on top of that, because it is within the structure of these Village Savings and Loan Associations, their spouses are invited to discuss household issues and financial issues—never really talking about violence itself, but we know from an impact evaluation that we have conducted in Burundi, for example, that this reduces this violence. So looking at empowering women and trying to prevent violence that way can also have a real impact, but I think the main message is to try to look at this a little bit more holistically.

I think you also asked about linking it to health and education programmes. The health end I briefly touched upon; all health programmes should try to have a component of addressing the needs of survivors of violence against women. But I think with the education programmes, that can definitely be strengthened. Certainly not enough is done. If we look at studies worldwide, we know that one of the biggest threats to girls is sexual exploitation. We know that we should start teaching and working with these girls by the age of 10, because by 12 it could be too late; they are sexually exploited and you quite possibly go into pregnancies, etc, and then it is very difficult to bring them back into school or to really have any future. So I think that is a very important component.

**Q23 Pauline Latham:** But also education of boys at a very young age.

**Jennifer Miquel:** Absolutely, yes.

**Sophia Swithern:** If I may come in there, I think whilst acknowledging the primacy and the extreme importance of targeting violence against women, there can sometimes be a tendency to have gender being synonymous with violence against women and threats to civilians being synonymous with violence against women, which does two things. It first of all ignores the other threats that people face—men, women and children—and again requires a much deeper context and conflict analysis and an ongoing one that recognises what threats are foremost in people’s experiences and what solutions they suggest. I think the other thing that it does is it fails often to bring in men. Looking at the differentiated threats to men and to women, for example, men may also be subject to rape—we are seeing increasing incidences of that in DRC—targeted more for forced labour and for abductions and forced recruitments. By addressing those broader gender issues and those broader threats to civilians, it is also an entry point to bring men into discussions about violence against women. If you have committees talking not just about violence against women as their entry point but broadly about the experience of communities, that is an entry point to get men and women together talking about violence against women and how to deal with that in that context.

**Chair:** I will come back to you, Pauline, but just in passing, one of the liabilities of being Chair of a Committee is that you have to have courtesy visits on local dignitaries. Two contrasting ones: when I asked the education minister of North Kivu what she felt were the issues affecting women and children in this context, her reply was she hoped the international community would solve the problem by “sending those Rwandan rapists home”. I had the same conversation with the Governor of South Kivu. He said, “We have to recognise that a significant part of our problem is our own army,” so two completely opposite views. The disappointing thing was a woman giving the most absurd political answer and a man who actually understood what the problem was. Putting somebody like that in that position, how are women going to cope if a woman is not standing up and fighting for them? It is a passing comment, but it is kind of depressing.

**Q24 Pauline Latham:** It is very depressing. Can I also ask what wider gender equality strategies DFID should have in place to attempt to reduce levels of sexual violence? Do you think DFID place sufficient emphasis on the role of women in peace-building as suggested by UNSC resolution 1325?

**Chris Underwood:** On that last point, one of the things we are often told in the region in all three countries is that 1325 is absolutely critical and the gender action plans that flow from that are equally so. But it is worth bearing in mind that those plans are but one of lots of plans on the desks of various decision makers at various levels of Government. You have plans of various kinds coming from the international institutions—the IMF and the World...
Bank—you have donor-led plans; you have numerous plans. So the challenge is that one of the things we are told very strongly—and I was certainly told in no uncertain terms by someone from the region to relay to you today—is that what we certainly do not need is another plan. What we do need is action to turn it into reality on the ground.

Pauline Latham: To implement those you have got, yes.

Chris Underwood: Therefore, that brings me to my second point, which relates both to this question and your last, if I may. The issue of violence against women—the sharp end, if you like—needs to be dealt with in two parallel ways. One is dealing with the very obvious physical, psychological and traumatic effects of that. That is dealing with victims. On the other hand, there are the issues that I have been talking about in response to other questions about empowerment and inclusion. If there are female politicians giving those sorts of answers, that rather begs the question why there are not more female politicians giving perhaps a more balanced and nuanced view.

The answer to that question is because they are simply not being allowed to come through, both by things that are actually in, for example, the DRC’s constitution not being put into electoral law, but also by some of the social situations. Before you came in, I was giving an example of a woman who stood to be mayor of Bukavu in South Kivu, who was characterised by, among others, the local church as being a prostitute and a mistress of Paul Kagame. That gives some flavour of the lack of empowerment. From our point of view, that is a critical part of the equation, when you are talking about dealing with a situation fundamentally that permits such things to happen on such a scale. How long will it take to change that? Generations. I think all of those points come into one on that issue of violence against women.

Q25 Pauline Latham: DFID are placing huge emphasis on women and girls. Do you think it is implemented as well as it could be? The answer is probably no, but do you see the implementation of it in the fragile and conflicted states? Is it making progress there, do you think?

David Mepham: Could I add a comment on that? Others may want to come in. I agree with everything that has been said by my co-panelists on this, but I think it is incredibly important to link this issue of the terrible level of violence against women and girls in places like the DRC to the broader context around how we reform the security forces. You have got a situation in eastern Congo where you have got the Congolese army committing a lot of these atrocities, you have got the FDLR committing them, you have got MONUSCO to do is to have it written into their terms of reference that they should not just let them go back into the bush, because it is such a difficult area to police; the police arrive and they have gone. MONUSCO to do is to have it written into their terms of reference that they should not just let them go back into the bush, because it is such a difficult area to police; the police arrive and they have gone.

David Mepham: Could I add one further comment related to your intervention? I have mentioned a couple of times this UN mapping report, which I think is an incredibly important document that you should encourage the Secretary of State to comment on. It was published at the end of last year and it talks about war crimes over a 10-year period in the DRC. The Government of the Congo has said that it welcomes the report and says that it would like to get to the bottom of this. Given the fragility of the Congolese legal system, what is being talked about is some kind of mixed-court system, so you have some international legal expertise combined with Congolese expertise. That strikes me as something quite practical where DFID could really try to help to buttress and justice.” It would really change the political context if some of these people who committed these crimes were brought to book for them. Very, very few are. I think this question of dealing with impunity is a critical part of the story.

Jennifer Miquel: If I could just complement all this, it is about having a comprehensive approach. It is not just mainstreaming, which is very important, but having standalone programmes that look at all these different issues—impunity, services, prevention and empowerment and advocacy on this—is how you are going to really address it. I know there are a lot of other institutions and donors that do put money into this, but it is not to the scale of the problem. As you know, the eastern DRC is certainly one of the worst places to be a woman. I think a lot more could be done and a lot more could be invested in this issue.

Q26 Pauline Latham: I know you are going to come on to this, Chair, but I think this issue links in quite well here. I asked the question about MONUSCO—because they know who the rapists are—and what they are doing about it. We were told, “Well they are not there to arrest anybody.” So I said, “Couldn’t they just keep them until the police arrived, and then hand them over to the police so the police could then take them through the judicial process and they could get prosecuted?” That might stop some of it. But at the moment they cannot even do that. It seems to me that it ought to be written into their new terms of reference that that is something they should do; they should hang on to the perpetrators when they know who they are and then hand them over to the police. Then the United Nations people said, “We must keep our troops safe.” But the troops are very often the perpetrators, so they have got a huge problem to be able to change that mind-set. They are not just looking after the soldiers; they should be looking after the raped women and holding the soldiers to account and handing them on to the police or whoever can take it forward and prosecute them. Until that happens, the raping is just going to continue and continue and continue. It does not matter what you have in place, the rapes will continue. You can help people afterwards, but we should be trying to stop them in the first place. I think a really important thing for MONUSCO to do is to have it written into their terms of reference that they should not just let them go back into the bush, because it is such a difficult area to police; the police arrive and they have gone.

David Mepham: Could I add one further comment related to your intervention? I have mentioned a couple of times this UN mapping report, which I think is an incredibly important document that you should encourage the Secretary of State to comment on. It was published at the end of last year and it talks about war crimes over a 10-year period in the DRC. The Government of the Congo has said that it welcomes the report and says that it would like to get to the bottom of this. Given the fragility of the Congolese legal system, what is being talked about is some kind of mixed-court system, so you have some international legal expertise combined with Congolese expertise. That strikes me as something quite practical where DFID could really try to help to buttress and
strengthen the Congolese legal system to try to address some of these abuses to address the violence against women and girls that you have described.

Pauline Latham: I think that is something we ought to follow up.

Q27 Anas Sarwar: Turning to the security sector and justice reforms, there are many diverse armed groups operating in eastern DRC. How does this affect the work of DFID and other donors?

David Mepham: The short answer is it makes it very difficult.

Sophia Swithern: I suppose the resounding silence from the panellists is because I certainly do not have a geographic map of where DFID’s operations are.

Q28 Anas Sarwar: Give the example of some of Oxfam’s work in the DRC then. How might the fragility impact on some of the work that Oxfam does? DFID would probably have the same problems.

Sophia Swithern: The presence of armed groups in many ways creates the raison d’être for our interventions in the east. It is as a result of the armed groups and the violence that people are displaced, that people are moved away and have limited access to basic services, and that we see health indicators go down. So I think in many ways where there are armed groups and where there is active conflict is where humanitarian intervention needs to be placed. To take the example that David was citing of the LRA, there is insufficient donor attention to the LRA-affected areas, but there is a pressing need. Very few agencies are there. Oxfam is there; MONUSCO has a very small presence in relation to the need. I think about 20% of eastern DRC’s displaced people are up in the LRA-affected areas, but only about 5% of MONUSCO’s troops. So in many ways, looking at where the armed groups are should be part of the conflict analysis that guides where interventions should happen.

Looking at DRC in comparison with many places in the world, the presence of armed groups and the fragility of the situation does not make programming too difficult. Although there has been an increase in attacks against humanitarians, relatively speaking there are fewer targeted attacks against humanitarians. There is not a widespread or a systemic hostility to international presence and international intervention there. There is the peacekeeping force there. So the conditions are there that, with sensible intelligence, risk assessment and good programming, it should not prevent DFID from doing good programming there.

Q29 Anas Sarwar: Are there any specific examples of obstruction that has taken place in any programmes, whether it be a DFID programme or an Oxfam-run programme or any other programmes?

Chris Underwood: To give you an example—and this is not of obstruction to a DFID programme or even our work, but it might give an illustration of what you are talking about—the last time I was in eastern DRC I was giving a training programme to many partners in South Kivu. The training was in advocacy and communications to make their case primarily to MONUSCO in relation to some of the issues that your questions were relating to. The example is that one woman who was taking part in that training programme ran a local human rights organisation. She had started that local human rights organisation, which essentially gathered evidence and tried to prevent human rights abuses taking place by publicising them where they did, in Ituri, which is in the north of the east of the country, but she had had to move four times because she had been threatened successively with death by the FDLR, members of the Congolese army, a militia called the Mai Mai and then another one whose acronym I forget. So that woman had to uproot herself, her family and the organisation. You are absolutely right; thankfully international humanitarians are generally not the targets for this sort of thing, but do not underestimate the impact of these armed groups on local civil society, because it is very profound indeed.

Q30 Anas Sarwar: Given the risks that are in place because of the fragility of the state and the armed militia groups, and given the drive for DFID to focus on results, is there a risk that DFID will concentrate more on the stable parts of the country in order to get those better results? Are there any examples of that?

Chris Underwood: I think there is a real temptation to focus on short-term results. That is an understandable one from the UK Government and, for that matter, any other donor Government. It is very hard to explain to a very hard-pressed public the fact that you are spending taxpayers’ money in places that have such profound and deep-rooted problems. So the temptation, understandably, particularly from the Secretary of State but others as well, will be to look for the quick wins—to look, perhaps, for some of the more technocratic investments that can be made that you can point to perhaps one or two years down the line: “Those buildings now exist”; “That road is now built”; “Those services are now there”. That is not an argument not to do them, but it is an argument to measure progress over the timescale—

Q31 Anas Sarwar: Is that happening in the most fragile parts as well as the more stable parts?

Chris Underwood: In terms of that focus on results and the focus on the programmes. Is it happening in even the most difficult parts of the eastern DRC where there are the militia groups, or is it happening in the eastern DRC but in bits and patches where things are a bit more stable and a bit safer for people that are there doing programmes?

Chris Underwood: I think the temptation is overall, but clearly where you have got the sorts of challenges that we have just been talking about in places like eastern DRC the temptation is ever greater, because it is easier to retreat back into more stable areas and to focus on technocratic results. If you are trying to achieve the fundamental shifts that we have been talking about in this session, you have to be talking about a much longer timescale and talking about things that at first sight are less tangible than buildings, roads or infrastructure. How do you change the political space in which conflicts over land, for example, can be managed without recourse to
violence—that there is a system and a culture of law that people have confidence in and that, if they do not get their way this time around, they will live to fight another day? Those sorts of changes take place over a much longer period of time. That is not just us talking; that is what the World Bank are now saying in the World Development Report. So I do not mean to say that DFID is now focusing on being short-termist, but I think that temptation is there and the problem will grow.

**David Mepham:** I think it is a really important question to put to DFID. I think Chris is right; because the Government has set itself this very results-oriented framework, there is a tendency and all the incentives will be built up to deliver against those indicators, understandably. So I think it is worth pushing how they are going to deal with that potential incentive structure and what the geographical spread of their programming is. Are they going to be going to the easily reached communities or is there going to be a more concerted attempt to get to the poorest, the most marginalised and the most excluded, which is what development is all about? If those people are marginalised and overlooked because they are too difficult, that is problematic.

**Q32 Anas Sarwar:** Just following on from what Chris said, it is clear that DFID concentrates on the consequences of violence and conflict. Do you think it spends enough time and resource on the causes of the conflict and violence?

**Chris Underwood:** Unsurprisingly, I would say no, to date, but I would say, in credit to the Secretary of State, I think he gets this, judging by what he has said and some of the country plans that have come out, particularly the DRC’s. There is a recruitment drive at the moment for conflict advisers—people with the skills, the experience and the technical knowledge to understand how to deal with that potential incentive structure that needs to be done. So to date no, but that would not be just a criticism you would make of DFID; that would be a criticism I think we would make of the way that the aid industry has worked to date. There is a preoccupation, for example, with the MDGs, which are completely inappropriate for situations in which what really makes a difference, as well as the troops, is the civilian capacity to speak to them to find out what the issues are and to deal with problems at civilian level rather than just troops with guns. In the SRSG’s report, he was talking about the need for at least three community liaison assistants. These are local civilian staff, which is probably the equivalent of trying to deal with problems in villages divided by—

**Sophia Swithern:** You were talking about the two and a half soldiers in each area. I was interested to hear about the half.

**Richard Harrington:** I think it is just the number of villages divided by—

**Sophia Swithern:** Yes. Of course in addition to the troops, there is the need for the civilians. What we are hearing again and again from communities is that what really makes a difference, as well as the troops, is the civilian capacity to speak to them to find out what the issues are and to deal with problems at civilian level rather than just troops with guns. In the SRSG’s report, he was talking about the need for at least three community liaison assistants. These are local civilian staff, which is probably the equivalent of trying to deal with problems in villages divided by—

**Another thing that we have touched on is the need for the civilians.** A common complaint in the subject that Pauline Latham brought up before,MONUSCO is the deployment in problem areas. We talked about the half soldiers in each area. I was interested to hear about the half.

**Richard Harrington:** I think it is just the number of villages divided by—

**Sophia Swithern:** Yes. Of course in addition to the troops, there is the need for the civilians. What we are hearing again and again from communities is that what really makes a difference, as well as the troops, is the civilian capacity to speak to them to find out what the issues are and to deal with problems at civilian level rather than just troops with guns. In the SRSG’s report, he was talking about the need for at least three community liaison assistants. These are local civilian staff, which represents a very cost-effective way of improving the protection of civilians, which is, under MONUSCO’s Chapter VII mandate, one of its primary objectives.

**Another thing that we have touched on is that we could better respond and implement that protection mandate is the deployment in problem areas.** We talked about the LRA and the need to deploy more troops to the LRA-affected areas and to move the bases. At the moment, for example, the base for the LRA-affected areas, which as you know are way up in the north, is in a place called Bunia, which is probably the equivalent of trying to deal with problems in villages divided by Calais. There is a reluctance to move the base up to that area because it is a little bit less comfortable up there. Things like that could make a massive difference.

There is a need for better coordination with other missions in the region around the LRA. Because the LRA is a regional problem—a cross-border problem—MONUSCO needs to be joining up with, for example, the new force in South Sudan. There have been examples of demobilisation of children from the LRA and nobody knows what to do with
them. There was one example of a boy who was hanging around with MONUSCO and being moved around the region for longer than he was within the LRA because nobody managed to identify that he was South Sudanese and they needed to be speaking to UNMIS across the border. These kinds of coordination issues are very important. There needs to be better reporting at the UN level. This is certainly something that the UK can be demanding at the UN. Taking the example of the UN mission in Afghanistan, there is very good, clear reporting on exactly what the mission is doing to address protection threats in quite some detail, rather than just saying, “There was a problem and we did some deployment.”

There is lots of good practice that can be replicated. For example, in an area called Kanyaruchinya, in Masisi, the South African contingent did foot patrols with the community along the road to market and significantly increased their protection there. These low-cost interventions can be replicated. Of course there is a need, as the new mandate says, for enablers, namely helicopters. MONUSCO is seeing its aerial force reduced as the Indians withdraw their helicopters, and they are the only ones who are able to land in the remote parts of DRC where we are seeing the majority of the problems.

Q34 Richard Harrington: Conscious of the time, could we just move on to the role of MONUSCO in being involved with the reforming and training of the Congolese army? This was mentioned in outline by the Indian general in charge that we met, but not very much. Is it just fanciful? Is it a question of if they get too involved now they are just going to be training up more people that are not part of a cohesive army and who effectively are the problem rather than the solution? Or do you feel that a lot more could and should be done with the Congolese army?

Sophia Swithern: It brings in a broader question. I think, of DFID’s engagement with security sector reform. On MONUSCO specifically, there is a conditionality clause for MONUSCO’s engagement, certainly where it supports operations with the FARDC, and it should not be engaging in operations with those forces that have been identified as being human rights abusers. That conditionality clause needs better monitoring and better implementation. One would hope that the training would contribute to an army that is less likely to perpetrate abuses against civilians. But it brings in this wider point about coordination for security sector reform that MONUSCO might be doing MONUSCO has a role and a mandate to coordinate security sector reform but donors are also doing different pieces of the jigsaw and not necessarily joining up. I think there is this need for enhanced coordination of interventions on security sector reform as well as continued pressure on the DRC Government to have a vision and political will to reform the army and what shape that army should take.

David Mepham: Can I make a one-minute contribution on that? There has been this attempt, as you know, to try to integrate some of the different groups from the east into the Congolese armed forces. That is clearly hugely important but I do not think it is going very well. One concrete example of that is this CNDP force, which is nominally part of the Congolese army now, but this guy Bosco Ntaganda is effectively operating autonomously and independently; he is not properly under any kind of Congolese Government control and we are very concerned about some of the things that he is doing in terms of war crimes, abuses and human rights violations. So it is hugely important, but I think the process is very messy and a lot of the people that are at senior levels with military responsibility are behaving in a way that is completely inappropriate, including violating human rights.

Q35 Richard Harrington: I have the unique position of being the only person around this table that went to see the Rwanda Revenue Authority. Actually, I saw the Burundi one, but it is run by the same guy that set up the Rwanda Revenue Authority, which is regarded as being a great success in DFID’s circles. Would people like to comment on that? Is it true how effective it has been in Rwanda? Is it the kind of activity that DFID should be doing in other conflict and fragile areas? As I say, I saw it in Burundi.

Chris Underwood: Enhancing the ability of a state to collect taxes is clearly a good thing to do, both for developmental objectives but also this thing about the relationship between a citizen and a state. We all pay tax, but we have a relationship with the state. With those taxes come expectations of how the state is going to behave, how it is going to deliver services and to what extent we can interact with that. From a peace-building point of view, it is absolutely critical, but perhaps more for those reasons than the technical side. I have to say I am not aware of the precise measures that were taken in respect of the revenue authority there, but taxation per se is a critical part of that.

Q36 Richard Harrington: Except in Burundi it could quite clearly be argued that all we are doing is raising money to go into the President’s pocket, because it goes into the budget pot and we have absolutely no control whatsoever of the budget pot, which as an aid community we are contributing half.

Chris Underwood: Which is precisely why I think we have all been saying in different ways that what must not be lost is the idea of civil-society oversight in how that money is spent or not spent, either at central level in the way that you just talked about or at local level. Where you have got infrastructure projects that will contribute to the local infrastructure of villages or regions, it is really critical to have civil-society oversight of the priorities for that spending and how that spending takes place. From that comes accountability.

Q37 Richard Harrington: Except that the tax authority stuff is purely national budget stuff; there is no way of making it local or giving any form of accountability other than through the Government. If the Government itself does not abide by what we would expect it to, it seems to me there is not much
we can do. But as a comparatively corruption-free collection exercise, which of course is what it was intended to be, would you agree that significant improvements have been made in Burundi? They have designed it, for example, with open-plan floors, so that if you are going to bribe someone you have to do it outside of working hours rather than during them.

**Chris Underwood:** I have to say I am not au fait with the details.

Q38 **Chair:** In all of this context—you are talking about human rights, the plight of women, ill-discipline in the army, lack of justice and so forth—at the end of the day, what you are trying to do is give people the opportunity to build livelihoods in spite of all of this. So as a final point, how, when you are engaging as a development partner in these very fragile post-conflict states, can you help create a successful private sector? Just a couple of points. Yes, in Rwanda there was clear evidence of an ability to do that, and indeed we saw some very impressive examples of it. The reverse in Burundi and DRC. In Burundi, the Second Vice-President said action was being taken to prosecute corruption and people were being arrested, but we also heard from business people when we were in Goma—it was a particular reception with some of the business people—that they were effectively run out of town because they had not bribed the right people or had been on the wrong side of people. We have had the case of Quantum Mining, who have been literally run out of the country and their massive investments are inactive. Is it possible to build a successful private sector? What should a donor like DFID be doing to try to make it happen, if it is possible, and to tackle corruption in the same context?

**David Mepham:** I shall go first on that, and then, I must apologise, Chair, I have to go to an interview; I have to slip away; that is pretty bad precedent.

**Chair:** I know; I appreciate you are past your time.

**David Mepham:** Thank you very much for coming along.

**Chair:** Thank you very much for coming along.

**Chris Underwood:** One example that might answer your point as well—and I would share the analysis about development being about progress rather than technocratic steps along the way—is in our work in Rwanda, which has been sponsored by DFID, we have run a project that is microfinance based. The aim is to stimulate economic development at local level. But it is a project that combines microfinance with trauma counselling and reconciliation. Those are the three elements of that particular project. So it is dealing very much with the drive for economic development, which is absolutely fundamental. If you compare the levels of money going in from overseas development aid to the private sector, the aid is dwarfed. So we need to see economic development equitably, but we also need to deal with some of the very deep-rooted legacies, particularly in Rwanda from the genocide. That is what the project, bringing together local partners who are specialised in each of those three elements, is designed to do.

The example I wanted to give, in part stemming out of that project, is that we know of a woman who has just opened a business. She, as a child, survived the genocide. She has now opened a business with an individual who was imprisoned for being a genocidaire, who took part in that genocide in 1994. If you can try to imagine the journeys that they have both been on in order to be in that position to take those sorts of decisions, it is quite an inspiring story. The point I really want to make is that, from a donor’s point of view, those sorts of projects are not particularly expensive, but in terms of the sort of contribution they make to the society, both on a reconciliation level in dealing with some of the really deep-seated traumas and also to the economic development that we all want to see, we would argue that those are the sorts of projects that should really be looked at in greater detail.

**Jennifer Miquel:** I would definitely concur. You can work at the local level and focusing on the economic empowerment of women can have further positive benefits as a whole and on the reduction of violence. I mentioned this EASE model before. IRC is trying to implement this model in many different countries and so far we have worked with about 3,000 women. These are very poor women, but they have managed to save $50,000, which is a huge sum of money in that context. So if you can build that level of economic empowerment at that level, you can see the benefits. You do not have to choose which child goes to school and you can access your healthcare, and the whole community benefits.
Q39 Chair: Just a final point on corruption. One thing we were told is as soon as you appear to have any money, somebody is around to take it off you. Have those women got themselves into a position where they can challenge the corruption and say, “We are not paying these bribes and we are strong enough together to do it”? That is the best thing, rather than having a law up there that does not get enforced—the people on the ground saying, “We are not going to do this anymore.”

Jennifer Miquel: Yes. These things are set up within these Village Savings and Loan Associations that create their own bylaws and everything is done in an extremely transparent manner, which also builds governance and so on. The way they save—there is one person that saves but everything is counted in front of everybody else and so on, so it is done in a quite transparent manner. These women are elected as well.

Chair: Well, huge challenges. The whole point of this inquiry is that the UK Government has really stuck its neck out to say we are going to put more and more of our rising budget into these difficult places. What we have been doing is exploring what all the challenges are and I think you have been very helpful in giving us positives as well as negatives: “You could do more of this. That works. Don’t do that.” Once we have digested the transcript, I want to say thank you very much for giving us that diversity of views. We as a Committee want the Government to succeed. What they are trying to do is important. We accept that those are areas where poverty is at its greatest and where the risk of falling back into conflict is at its greatest, and we should be trying to do something to tackle the poverty and prevent that, but it is very, very challenging. In a situation where you have got the British taxpayer saying, “What are you doing in those places?” we have got to be able to help the Government to find answers, and I think you are part of that process. So thank you very much indeed for coming along and giving us the benefit of your experience.
Members present:
Malcolm Bruce (Chair)
Pauline Latham
Jeremy Lefroy
Mr Michael McCann
Chris White

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Daniel Balint-Kurti, Campaign Leader, DRC, Global Witness, and Mike Davis, Campaign Leader, Conflict Resources, Global Witness, gave evidence.

Q40 Chair: Good morning. Thank you very much. Thank you very much indeed. To come in to give evidence. We have, as a Committee, had submissions in evidence from you before, and indeed not least on the issue of conflict states and specifically the DRC, so I have no doubt we will be going over ground that we have been through before, but thank you very much. I just wonder if you could, for the record, introduce yourselves, then we will start.

Daniel Balint-Kurti: I am Daniel Balint-Kurti. I head the DRC team at Global Witness.

Mike Davis: My name is Mike Davis, and I am a campaign leader at Global Witness, covering what we call Conflict Resources.

Q41 Chair: Thank you both very much indeed. To take the basic question to get us into this, I think it is generally acknowledged that the DRC in particular is one of the richest countries in Africa in terms of its resource allocation but not in terms of its people. What do you think are the links between the conflicts that have been going on for so many years in the DRC and the natural resource extraction?

Mike Davis: In the east of the country, as you probably know, there has been conflict of varying levels of intensity going on for around 15 years. You have an array of armed groups operating there, and I include in the term “armed groups” units of the national army, which are all, to a greater or lesser extent, involved in the mineral trade, in terms of deriving financing from it and illegally controlling it. All of those different armed actors also have an appalling record in terms of human rights abuses against the civilian population. The minerals in question are primarily the ores from which you get tin, tantalum—which is often known by the name of the ore coltan—tungsten and gold. The armed actors involved include the FDLR, a Hutu-led militia whose command includes people believed to have been involved in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Also, as I said, there are units of the national army. Many of the most powerful of those are former rebels from another insurgent group called the CNDP.

The means by which these diverse groups derive financing from the mineral trade include primarily the illicit control of mine sites, the control of transport routes by which the materials are conveyed once they are mined and the illegal taxation of these materials along those routes. You also have illicit business interests, which are sometimes operated by civilian proxies on behalf of more senior commanders. You also have a pattern of armed raids and ambushes by some of the groups to derive money from the minerals trade. The reason that this is important is that it allows groups that would otherwise struggle to survive and continue to operate in the abusive way that they do to sustain their operations. It also—“it” being the opportunities to gouge monies from the minerals trade—provides a perverse incentive to units of the national armed forces that should be curtailing this kind of activity.

The consequence of that is that you have what one might call a militarisation of the minerals trade. You have a very powerful agent for the continuation of the conflict, in terms of the money flowing in and those incentives. This exacerbates an existing problem of the widespread predation of armed groups, state and non-state, on the civilian population. In some cases, this link between the natural resources exploitation and the activities of armed groups is very acute indeed. You may have heard of a particularly notorious series of mass rapes in the Walikale district of North Kivu a little over a year ago. Those were instigated in part by groups that the UN Group of Experts has described as a criminal network set up by the national army. One of the primary purposes of this group is to earn for itself and its military patrons a bigger share of the minerals cake. They have been advised by members of the national army command that one of the best ways of doing this is to terrorise civilians through sexual violence, so that they can achieve greater notoriety and power in the region.

Q42 Chair: That raises the next question of the role of donors in this situation. As a passing comment, however, I have to say that I had a meeting with the Governor of North Kivu and the Education Minister. It is interesting what you said about the role of the army because when I asked the Education Minister to give her comment on this, she said, “All we need to do is get these Rwandans out of our country and we’ll solve our problem”, in other words, a total blanking of what you have just described is happening. That clearly indicates there is a problem of local governance not facing up to the issue, but what is the role for international donors? Can they and, if so, how can they ensure that these minerals are actually used for the benefit of the region rather than to tear it apart? Is that through greater regulation and transparency? Is it by supporting the local governments’ capacity and willingness actually to police, regulate and enforce what you might call lawful, rather than unlawful, extraction?
Mike Davis: We believe that there is a very important role for donor governments to play, not least the UK Government, which, along with the USA, is the leading donor to the Government in Kinshasa, as well of course as neighbouring Rwanda. We would draw your attention to two things in particular, which we think the UK and other donor governments should be doing. One is to do with influencing the behaviour of companies that use these materials. I doubt that you are fully aware that the companies along this international supply chain, which is generally global in scope, include British and European ones. The other thing is using the influence that the British Government does have, as the leading donor in Kinshasa and also in Kigali, to persuade those Governments to take more action themselves to address this problem. With respect to Congo itself, the key thing that we believe the UK Government needs to do more to impress upon counterparts in Kinshasa is the need to pull their national army out of the illegal minerals trade.

To elaborate slightly on the first point about company behaviour, it is widely acknowledged, including by the UN Security Council and the UK is a permanent-five member—that natural resource exploitation plays a key role in furthering the conflict in eastern Congo. Companies of course are key conduits for that. These materials do not stay in eastern Congo after they are mined; they do not stay in Africa. They go primarily to Asia and then on to markets around the world, including this one. We have international companies involved in all parts of the supply chain, including some British firms even at the top end of the supply chain involved in trading and smelting. We believe, and the UN Security Council and its group of experts believe, that one of the best ways of tackling this minerals conflict nexus is to set clear standards for companies to make sure that they are making sure that their transactions are not putting money in the wrong hands and not facilitating violence and abuse in eastern Congo.

Those standards are in fact very clearly laid out already. They are called due diligence standards for supply chain controls. They were developed by the OECD and the UN Group of Experts, and signed off last year. The UK Government, as an OECD member and a member of the Security Council, has, at least on paper, fully bought into those standards, but could be doing a great deal more to ensure that British companies are abiding by them. So far, few companies are. This is a big problem for obvious reasons, and is the main rationale for our call on the UK Government to follow the lead already taken in the USA and push for legislation to be passed, at the European level, to put these due diligence standards into law.

Q43 Mr McCann: That brings me seamlessly to my question. What impact the Dodd-Frank Act has actually had on mineral trade in the DRC?

Mike Davis: The very simple answer is that we do not know what the long-term impact is yet, because the law has not even been fully completed, as you know. The Securities and Exchange Commission has yet to announce the regulations that flesh out what the legislators have called for. However, we have already seen a number of changes in the minerals sector, which can, in part or in whole, be attributed to the impending arrival of Dodd-Frank, or rather Dodd-Frank in its full form. Those include some very positive impacts. For the first time in five years, the Congolese Government has removed national army units from the region’s most important mine, which is called Bisie in Walikale in North Kivu, which accounts for around 70% of the tin ore production from the province. That is pretty unprecedented in terms of the history of this conflict.

Despite the comment about denials in some quarters, the Congolese Government has also begun to address publicly the role of its own armed forces in the conflict minerals trade. You have had President Kabila speaking out against mafia groups within his own army, which is extraordinary. You also had tacit support from the Congolese Government for UN Security Council sanctions resolutions last November, which are aimed at cutting the national army out of the minerals trade as much as the rebels. You have also had some initial moves towards reform closer to the ground, at the provincial level: the establishment of committees in North and South Kivu, involving government, industry and the military to look at this problem.

At the same time, there have been negative trends in the sector too, in the past year. The level of declared trade from North and South Kivu provinces has declined significantly. Smuggling has continued, but the overall impact is that quite a lot of people have, for the time being at least, lost opportunities to work in the sector. In the first instance, that is directly attributable to President Kabila’s suspension of mining in the east between September last year and March this year. It is also to do with purchasing decisions announced by the two major electronics industry organisations, the ICC and JESSI, which demanded a higher standard of control for minerals coming out of Congo than, in fact, Dodd-Frank demands, but there is no doubt that these moves are definitely being enacted in a landscape that is shaped by Dodd-Frank.

We do not believe that the downturn in the sector will last. Partly, that is simply because of the equation of supply and demand. Congo is a very important producer of tantalum in particular. It is a significant producer of tin. Its sector is not being efficiently exploited at the moment and everyone knows this. There are untapped reserves that it will be difficult for industries to ignore in anything beyond the short term. We also point to the fact that a number of companies, amid the current hue and cry that we cannot trade in Congolese materials, have actually been making moves to be embedded in the sector in eastern Congo.

You have the world’s leading capacitor manufacturer, AVX, teaming up with Motorola to pilot a project, which they claim will use these due diligence standards, nearly in Katanga. You have the third-biggest producer of tin in the world, Malaysia Smelting Corporation—the main destination for tin ore from eastern Congo—setting itself up with the Congolese Government with the framework for industrial mining in eastern Congo for the first time. You have a delegation that will shortly go to eastern
Congo, headed by one of Hillary Clinton’s deputies, in which she will be accompanied by an array of companies that are sufficiently interested in doing further business in Congolese materials that they are making the trip.

While we believe that the short-term downturn in the trade is real and has harmful impacts on quite vulnerable people—and I have been part of meetings myself, in the Kivus, where I have seen this—we do not believe that that is the long-term impact or the legacy of the law. We think that, in a very short space of time, the positive impacts, which we are already seeing, are going to accelerate and we will be looking at a situation where you have the establishment of clean trade, which is playing a hugely important role in pushing out the dirty trade, which everyone acknowledges is a problem.

**Q44 Mr McCann:** Do we have to wait and see the evidence that Dodd-Frank is making a difference to the due diligence, or are there other ways or other pressures that can be exerted now to improve due diligence? Given the significant influence that China has in the area, do you think that it will be a positive or negative influence on the whole question of due diligence?

**Mike Davis:** Those are really important questions. In response to the first part, yes, we believe there is more that can be done now. As I mentioned, we have these international standards ratified by the OECD and the UN Security Council already; they have been in place for several months. They are not legally binding, but they were produced out of a tripartite group involving industry, NGOs, including us, and governments. They were developed and signed off at the end of last year, with a clear commitment, at that time and since, from industry groups to use them. The UN Security Council, in its Resolutions, has encouraged member states to do whatever it is they can to push companies domiciled in their jurisdictions to start implementing these measures. We believe that there is a lot more the UK Government could be doing now to go to companies and say, “Okay, the debate about a law is currently centred primarily in the US, but we have these standards. You know what they are. They are very clear. The industry has signed up to them. Now please, get on with it and implement them.”

As regards the role of China, that key factor is often raised. We are confident that the due diligence standards, which have been developed and are likely to be enshrined in American law, will force a change in the behaviour of Chinese companies, because most of the companies concerned are ultimately suppliers of components and other materials to Western companies that are domiciled in countries that are part of the OECD, domiciled in the US or reporting to the US regulator or domiciled in countries that take these kind of Security Council Resolutions rather more seriously than China does. We think that they will be caught up in the net, if that is the right analogy to be used. They do not have a closed loop within China, at this stage, whereby China could take these raw materials, process them, turn them into consumer goods and sell them only to Chinese. That cannot happen at the moment and they know it.

The other thing to bear in mind is that, in recent discussions we have had with the Congolese and Rwandan authorities, both have spoken in quite serious terms—admittedly this is only talk—about passing these OECD due diligence standards into their own domestic law. Now, if they did that—and it is something we think the UK Government should encourage—that may well have quite an immediate impact on Chinese companies. The general trend that we see in our work, and we do a lot of work to do with corporate behaviour across the world, including Chinese firms, is that while in general Chinese companies and Chinese state interests are often not too fussed about international norms and standards, unless they are forced to be, they do not like to be shown to be breaking their host countries’ own laws, because it goes against the rhetoric of peaceful co-existence, “We are a partner in this with you together,” and all this kind of thing. We have seen this in work we have done in the past on Burma, for example, where Chinese companies could not care less about dealing with interests that are associated with grave human rights abuses, but they did not like it all when we pointed out that they were breaking the Burmese Government’s own laws. They changed their practices quite quickly.

I am not suggesting that that will provide an absolute magic bullet, but it is something worth considering when we think about what it is that influences the behaviour of Chinese companies and encouraging the Congolese Government, the Rwandan Government and other neighbouring Governments to pass their own laws. Putting these due diligence regulations into legislation would probably go a long way to address that issue.

**Q45 Jeremy Lefroy:** On the issue of transparency, what steps do you believe the Government of the DRC has taken to comply with the Economic Governance Matrix?

**Daniel Balint-Kurti:** The Economic Governance Matrix was pushed on the DRC. They agreed to it but under pressure from the donors, notably the World Bank. This came about as a result of a major donor initiative called PROMINES, along with other programmes, being suspended as a result of a scandal over the confiscation of mining assets from a UK- and Toronto-listed company, First Quantum. The World Bank was a shareholder in that mining project. When the mine was confiscated and sold on to companies based in the British Virgin Islands, the World Bank was livid, and they suspended aid and said to the DRC, “You have to comply with a number of things.” Together with the Congolese Government, they agreed on this thing called the Economic Governance Matrix, under which there were a lot of pledges by the Government, mainly on transparency. The key thing, a really big thing, was that the Congolese Government promised to publish natural resource contracts. All contracts in mining, oil and forest would be published within 60 days of their coming into effect. This is a really big thing and it is very unusual for any country in the world to promise to publish natural resource contracts. That is a brilliant thing.
Q46 Jeremy Lefroy: Has it happened?
Daniel Balint-Kurti: It has happened to a certain extent. A lot of contracts have been published online, not all of them. Contracts have not been published relating to some of the more controversial deals, but it has been partially complied with, which is to be welcomed. Also, there was a decree passed in May where the pledge to publish contracts was enshrined in law. Yes, it has been partially complied with, but there are recent deals, for which contracts have not been published.

Q47 Jeremy Lefroy: Is the World Bank therefore going back and saying, “Hang on, you’re not complying with this. You had better do it or we will need to take action again”?
Daniel Balint-Kurti: It is unclear. We have tried contacting the World Bank since it decided to restart aid to the DRC. It clearly decided that the compliance with the Economic Governance Matrix was sufficient. I think that recent developments and the news that came out in August about secretive sales of mines by the Congolese authorities—by Congolese state mining companies—raised new questions. We think this throws everything into question again. There is a $92 million aid programme with a second phase planned of around $80 million. A large part of that money, tens of millions of dollars, is being given to the Congolese authorities to help them govern the sector. At the same time, the authorities are selling off mines and stakes in mines, worth billions of dollars, without informing anybody, to companies we have never heard of before—nobody has ever heard of before—linked to people close to the President, without telling anybody about it.

We do think there is a contradiction there. You are giving money to help the Government with transparency and governance and, at the same time, the same authorities are conducting major business deals completely behind closed doors. We find out about it almost by chance. Journalists make inquiries to the right people and, eventually, they find out about it, but often there are official denials, and even the denials do not ring true.

Q48 Chair: Do you think the World Bank is turning a blind eye? In the light of what you said, you would not have thought the World Bank would not have rescinded their decision. Clearly companies like First Quantum feel they have been abandoned. Is that your take?
Daniel Balint-Kurti: We do need to know what the World Bank and DFID are doing. PROMINES was funded $50 million by the World Bank and $42 million by DFID. It is a major programme aimed at the Congo. So we need to know if DFID and the World Bank are going to the Congolese authorities and saying, “What has happened here?”, demanding explanations, demanding who owns these companies that they have sold all these rights to. “Why did you choose these companies? How much were they sold for? Were they sold for a pittance or nothing at all? Who knows?” They need to be asking for that information.

I think that a lot of the governance aid to Congo should be suspended again. It was suspended after the First Quantum fiasco. Now there is a new fiasco of a similar nature, so a lot of that governance aid should be suspended, because what has happened raises so many questions—questions that need to be answered. If there is a proper explanation, if everything becomes clear, the information is released and we are happy, then start again. The concerns over these secret sales are so strong, because they involve many billions of dollars in a country with a GDP of only around $12 billion and a budget of $6 billion, that it just does not make sense to give tens of millions of dollars in governance aid at a time when we are facing austerity measures. We are cutting back on spending in all areas of social services in Britain. We need the money. If we are going to spend money on aid, it should be money well spent, which is going to bear fruit. We need to think again.

Q49 Jeremy Lefroy: Do you think there is any coincidence between the fact that these sales were made in August and there are elections later this year?
Daniel Balint-Kurti: It is possible. The announced sales were not made in August; the news came out in August. The fact is that the sales appear to have been made this year. Some of them were made, I think, towards the beginning of the year. Yes, there is an obvious connection with the elections coming up on 28 November.

One concern is over the fact that the companies are based in the British Virgin Islands. Also, a concern is that they are linked to this businessman, Dan Gertler. I have recently, just yesterday, been in touch with Dan Gertler’s people, so I am hoping to get a proper explanation from them about what has happened and for them to release information. I am reserving my judgment, but I think there is enough cause for concern for us to say we need answers to these questions. Dan Gertler’s people say they are doing a good job for Congo; they are paying money into the tax coffers and doing business in an area where few other people want to take the risks, but from my point of view so many things raise concerns. Donors need to be asking hard questions and telling us, communicating to MPs, NGOs and the world, what they are doing in these circumstances.

Q50 Jeremy Lefroy: You talked about taxation revenues in relation to Mr Gertler and his company, and we will come back to a question about First Quantum. Are you aware of the amount of taxation revenues received from the mineral sector by the Government of the DRC at the moment?
Daniel Balint-Kurti: I am afraid I do not have those figures in my head. I could pull them out for you, but I do not want to give any wrong information.

Jeremy Lefroy: We would be very grateful.
Daniel Balint-Kurti: A large proportion of tax revenues did come from First Quantum’s Frontier mine, for example. They stated that in their filings. That mine was confiscated and, from what I hear indirectly, it seems that the mine is now flooded, which also raises questions about whether the Congolese authorities are then confiscating the mines.
and not taking care of the pumps, ensuring they continue to turn over while the previous operators are not around.

We are talking about money that is coming into the government coffers. A lot of that money does come from multinationals. One reason that we in the UK have a particular responsibility regarding Congo’s mines is that they play a large role on the London Stock Exchange and in the FTSE 100. In the case of First Quantum, a scandal that has been widely reported, there is a link to the company ENRC, a FTSE 100 company into which UK pension funds are investing. Ordinary UK investors are putting their money into the FTSE share index, into all FTSE 100 companies, so our money is going into companies that own these mines.

In the case of one of the recent secret sales, regarding Mutanda and Kansuki mines, eventually the news came out in a Glencore initial public offering prospectus. It was on page 800 or something. Somebody found it eventually in August, months after the details of this deal were published. Again, we have reason to look at that closely, because Glencore are partners with the Dan Gertler companies in the Mutanda and Kansuki mines. These deals are not a million miles away from—

Q51 Jeremy Leفay: Can I just interrupt you there? Are we therefore saying that a company like Glencore, which, as you say, has been subject to a huge initial public offering recently, has actually been participating in deals that have not conformed with the transparency rules that DFID has been co-funding with the World Bank?

Daniel Balint-Kurti: The thing is that the deals may have been done before that Economic Governance Matrix was signed. Regarding the decree that was passed in May, it is unclear whether it applies to natural resource contracts signed before May. They are certainly not complying with the spirit of it. Over and above that, there is the bigger moral question of Congo being a country that is deeply poor; it is 168th out of 169 in the Human Development Index. However, it has massive natural resources, and one of its biggest hopes to become a more prosperous country, for its people to suffer less, is that its natural resources are used for the good of the people. That is not going to happen if deals are done in secret.

I do think that Glencore and ENRC have a moral responsibility. It is also in line with what the Congolese constitution and the Congolese mining code say. The Congolese constitution says that all Congolese should benefit from the country’s resources—that the state has the duty to equitably distribute the benefits of the mining sector. In the mining code, it is stated that the state manages the mining sector. That should be for the good of all. It should not be seen—that there should not even be a perception—that these deals are being done for the benefit of a small handful of people in the elite, and not for the good of people on the whole. This is a really big issue.

Q52 Chris White: You argued your case very passionately regarding transparency. I wondered about your having contacted DFID and the World Bank. Would you welcome the support of this Committee to try to help you get some sort of answer?

Daniel Balint-Kurti: It is absolutely necessary. These issues need to be tackled. For people in Congo, it is very difficult for them to raise these issues. We are in a very privileged position where we can say, with responsibility, what we like without the fear of someone coming knocking at our door, without the fear of arrest. We have a duty and we have the opportunity to take action on this, so yes, we should speak up. We should lead inquiries; withdraw aid where necessary, so that we are not wasting money, and exert pressure as well. Putting pressure on the Government through suspending aid has been shown to work. It showed the first time round, when we suspended aid for PROMINES, when we got the Economic Governance Matrix put in place. Yes, I think we should all be putting pressure in that direction.

Chris White: If you do get a response, the Committee would welcome having sight of it.

Chair: We do have a Minister in front of us, so will have an opportunity to press him.

Q53 Chris White: Moving on slightly, what is the extent of state mining companies allegedly being sold in secret?

Daniel Balint-Kurti: I have done a back-of-the-envelope calculation based on what has been announced so far and what has been publicly released. I am not saying there is not a second word on this, and I believe the Dan Gertler companies and the Congolese authorities may argue the figures are different. Based on what we have seen so far, the recent secret sales amounted to well over $2.6 billion—$2.6 billion in a country with a GDP of around $12 billion. They were not announced. We have no idea what these companies are. Yes, it is a lot of money. We are talking about a lot of money.

Q54 Chris White: Would you have any idea of who is actually benefiting from this $2.6 billion?

Daniel Balint-Kurti: As I was saying earlier, Kansuki and Mutanda are two of the four mines involved. Stakes of between about 20% and 25% each were sold in Kansuki and Mutanda to companies that were linked to Dan Gertler. That is announced in the Glencore prospectus. In the case of Frontier and Lonshi, which were two mines that were confiscated from First Quantum, you had the KMT project; that was sold on to ENRC. Later on, Frontier and Lonshi mines were confiscated from First Quantum as well, those two remaining mines. They have now been sold, I believe in their entirety, to a company based in an offshore tax haven called Fortune Ahead—again a company that nobody had heard of before; we have no idea who the owners are. Whether it is linked to Dan Gertler or someone else, we just do not know.

Q55 Chris White: Just for the sake of clarity, who do you think is in a position to monitor and approve these activities?
Daniel Balint-Kurti: The Congolese state. There is a mining ministry, but I was speaking to a donor recently who said that—

Q56 Chris White: I am sorry. Is it constitutionally defined who would approve?
Daniel Balint-Kurti: When you look at the constitution of the mining code, it simply says the state has the duty to manage the country’s resources. There is a mining ministry in Congo, so they manage the mining sector. What happens behind closed doors, we do not really know, but a lot of people talk about people in the presidency exercising a great deal of influence over the mining sector. This is reported in the UN Group of Experts’ reports. They talk about a man called Katumba Mwanke, who some people refer to as B. He has said before in a meeting with Katumba Mwanke: I mean “we” as in the UK. We are paying a lot of money for governance reforms in Congo. PROMINES, in the first phase, was $42 million of government money, but from what I understand we do not seem to be in an actual dialogue about these things with the presidency. Now, if the UN Group of Experts is reporting that key figures of the presidency are exercising a lot of influence over the mining sector, deciding on sales and so on, even if this information goes back several years, those same people are still around. We should be speaking with those people. There is a feeling that we are speaking to a few people that we regard as key reformers within the mining ministry—important people, yes—but then other people are taking the decisions.

Q57 Chris White: You keep using the word “we”. Presumably you mean the UK Government. When you say “a dialogue”, how would you put that down in a couple of bullet points of what you think the UK Government should actually be doing about this?
Daniel Balint-Kurti: On the UK Government should suspend at least part of the PROMINES aid, because tens of millions of dollars are going towards governance and transparency. The Government of Congo at the moment is not clearly indicating that it is on board with the basic programme. They should then insist on full disclosure of information. That is why the tax havens based in the British Virgin Islands and perhaps other tax havens handed over these resources? Who are the ultimate owners, the people we call the beneficial owners of these companies? I am not saying this is happening in these deals; it may or may not be happening, but the danger is that the shareholders of those companies include people who are corruptly benefiting from the deals. They hide behind the tax havens.

This is something that is a key demand of Global Witness: we should think in wider terms. Tax havens, over which the UK has a lot of influence, including through its membership of the Financial Action Task Force, are a means through which companies can not only deprive very poor nations of huge amounts of revenues, but they also allow people to hide behind screen companies. They do the deals; we have no idea who the shareholders of those companies are. Every jurisdiction in the world should open up the books of the companies that are registered in those countries, and they should say who the ultimate owners of every company registered in their jurisdiction are, otherwise we are essentially allowing financial crime to take place. Otherwise, countries that allow companies to register with anonymous shareholders and anonymous directors are making it much more likely that corruption will be taking place.

Q58 Chris White: I absolutely support what you are saying. In your view, as Global Witness, how achievable do you think this goal is?
Daniel Balint-Kurti: It is very achievable. There are discussions that will be happening over the coming weeks, at the Financial Action Task Force, and they will be considering, among other things, Recommendation 33, which deals with disclosure of ownership of companies. They are going to be looking at their guidelines. When the UK is engaged in those discussions, they can say that every jurisdiction in the world needs to be open about who owns companies based in their jurisdictions. It is something that the UK has a huge amount of influence over.

Look at what has happened in Congo with the Governance Matrix. It is amazing that the Congolese Government has started publishing contracts. That is a very good step and the Congolese Government should be commended for that. It shows that things that people may imagine just cannot happen—the Government will never do that—can happen. We need to ask; we need to put pressure. A lot depends on the stance that the UK Government and other countries in Europe take.

Q59 Pauline Latham: Clearly it is really criminal that the Congolese Government have got these fantastic resources and they are not benefitting the real people who live there. On every single measure that can come up with, DRC is right down at the bottom and they just need the help. They need that money investing in the country, and it could take off so much pressure from people and help them so much that this just really has to be exposed. The whole business environment in DRC is not good. What three things could DFID actually do to make it better for business to operate and make it more transparent and easier to see what is going on? I am talking about business generally, not just mining.

Daniel Balint-Kurti: My suggestion would be to create a proper environment in which development can take place and in which donor aid would have a much greater effect. One thing I would say is the UK delivers huge amounts of aid to the developing world and we have the ambition to provide more donor aid. Aid to the DRC is going to go up, in a few years, to £258 million a year. Within the space of five years, the UK Government and DFID are going to be providing nearly £1 billion to Congo. In this circumstance, my first recommendation would be that, if the UK authorities see that gross corruption is taking place or even, because often with corruption you just do not know—that is the thing about it—that there are danger signs like the ones I have described, we should never call for humanitarian aid to be
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As Mike was saying earlier, we have already been telling you about. I will repeat all of that, but it is crucial that we tackle the issue of offshore tax havens, otherwise known as secrecy jurisdictions, because it is not just about tax; it is about secrecy.

Thirdly, a lot of these people who are involved in corrupt deals or deals that look very suspicious come to the UK to conduct business, so it would definitely put pressure on them. Global Witness is an organisation that works around the world, and we will be making those same demands of several other countries. You can push for those things. The UK Government can push for those things at the European level. There is no one panacea that will solve everything, but the UK Government has to do its bit to fight against corruption. Those are actions that will have an effect, and then the UK will be doing its bit.

Q60 Pauline Latham: Do you think that would stop it? If they did not come to London, they would go to Paris or New York. They would still be doing it. Just by saying, "You cannot come to Britain," it does not mean they will stop doing what they are doing.

Daniel Balint-Kurti: It would put pressure on them. A lot of people do come to the UK to conduct business, so it would definitely put pressure on them. Global Witness is an organisation that works around the world, and we will be making those same demands of several other countries. You can push for those things. The UK Government can push for those things at the European level. There is no one panacea that will solve everything, but the UK Government has to do its bit to fight against corruption. Those are actions that will have an effect, and then the UK will be doing its bit.

Q61 Chris White: Are your colleagues having the same discussions in Paris?

Daniel Balint-Kurti: These are the recommendations that we are making across the world. Our recommendations, for example regarding the Financial Action Task Force, are made internationally and Global Witness is very engaged with all the people on the Financial Action Task Force. These are not UK-specific recommendations.

Q62 Pauline Latham: But if they cannot go to anywhere in Europe or the States, they will go to China, because China is unlikely to sign up to this as well.

Daniel Balint-Kurti: As Mike was saying earlier, we do think about that and try to put pressure where it counts regarding China. We are increasingly in dialogue with China as well. Global Witness has been looking into this $6 billion Congo/China resources-for-infrastructure deal, so we are making recommendations on transparency to the Chinese authorities as well. One could make the same arguments about many moral issues, including selling arms to a brutal dictatorship, where you just say, "If we don’t do it, someone else will, so what the hell?"

The thing is that every Government should play its role and do the right thing, and then put pressure, yes, in other areas. The fact that they can then go to other people and do dodgy deals with other people is no excuse for us saying, "Do what you want over here then."

Mike Davis: If I could just add to that very briefly, and it is just a remark that goes beyond Congo, what we see in the work that we do, which focuses very heavily on despotic leaderships in various countries as well as armed groups too, is that, yes, it is quite true that China’s influence is increasing all the time. If you are an up-and-coming or even a quite well established kleptocrat somewhere in the world, you will have China very much on your radar. It remains the case, and I think it will remain the case for quite some years to come, that if you are in that kleptocrat’s shoes, when you want money, you are going to look to China as well as to the West. When you want political respectability to buttress your position, China cannot give you that; you have to keep looking to Europe and North America. I do not think that is going to change anytime soon.

Q63 Chair: And a villa on a lake you can visit from time to time.

Mike Davis: That is obviously very nice too.

Q64 Mr McCann: In response to Pauline’s question about what three things DFID could do, the first answer you gave was that you would continue humanitarian aid but you would cut back aid for governance. One of the schemes that we saw when we were in the DRC was voter registration. We know that these governance issues are not sexy; they do not provide and help children to access medicine, but we know that they are imperative in order to build a generational cycle that will see the country improve.

You effectively propose that, if they do not behave properly and there is corruption, we should cut programmes like that because that is aid for governance. I just wonder, although I understand this is an extremely complex issue, whether or not that is just a simplistic approach that cannot be put in place in practice, because it would damage the whole infrastructure of what we are trying to achieve.

Daniel Balint-Kurti: Let me be clear: I am not saying all governance aid should be suspended or cut off. What I am saying is that, at the moment, we have secret deals relating to at least $2.6 billion of mining assets and some of our aid, at least some of our governance and transparency aid through PROMINES, should be suspended. Generally that should be the approach of DFID. When there are very serious corruption issues—I am not talking about a penny here or a penny there, but very big corruption issues—some of our governance aid should be suspended. DFID should be commended for the support it is giving to issues like the elections. Congo does need aid to help it with its elections. Congo benefits greatly and the world benefits greatly from there being democratic elections in Congo. No, I am not saying we should cut off all governance aid and
cut off aid for voter registration but, when you are 
giving money for governance—huge amounts of 
money for governance in the mining sector—and, at 
the same time, you are seeing such secretive deals 
being carried out, yes, there does need to be a 
reassessment of that particular tranche of aid.

Q65 Pauline Latham: You talk about $2.6 billion. 
Do you think that is the tip of the iceberg? That is 
what you know about; do you think there is much 
more than that?

Daniel Balint-Kurti: The $2.6 billion, which is, I have 
to stress, a back-of-the-envelope calculation here, is a 
figure relating to the recent secret sales, the news of 
which came out in August. I am not including in that 
what happened between First Quantum and ENRC, and also the several billion dollars’ worth of deals that 
the UN Group of Experts had similar concerns about 
back in 2002. What is concerning about this is there 
is a pattern; it is not just a one-off. It would be bad 
enough if it was a one-off but, when you see similar 
things with slightly different variations happening 
again and again, you have to stop and think, “Obviously something is going wrong.”

Q66 Pauline Latham: Obviously DFID puts a huge 
amount of money in and is going to continue to put 
more in. Do you think they should try, by reducing 
the amount of money they are giving to various things 
over there, working with other donors to say they need 
to be doing this as well? Do you think they have got 
enough influence with other large-ish donors, not as 
large as the UK but other ones? Do you think that 
they could influence that?

Daniel Balint-Kurti: Yes. They should be very much 
discussing this with other donors. DFID does a pretty 
good job of co-ordinating with donors. PROMINES is 
a joint DFID/World Bank programme, so, ideally, 
these decisions should be made jointly with other 
donors. I would very much encourage that.

Q67 Pauline Latham: Do you see it making a real 
difference to their behaviour? It is such a big place; 
do you not think it will just continue no matter what 
anybody else outside does?

Daniel Balint-Kurti: I think that it can make a 
difference. We have seen what has happened with the 
Economic Governance Matrix. We have got the 
Congolese Government to start publishing contracts; 
that is great. I cannot stand here and affirm that, if we 
cut off a tranche of aid, suddenly the Congolese 
Government’s behaviour is going to become really 
good. The thing is, at least the UK will not be 
spending tens of millions of dollars—we are talking 
about $42 million with PROMINES—of taxpayers’ 
hard-earned money on schemes that are greatly 
threatened by the behaviour of people in the 
presidency or people working in the state mining 
companies. We are not looking at the state mining 
companies or people in the executive. We are dealing 
with a very specific area of the mining ministry. Let 
us not spend large amounts of moneys if they do not 
actually bear fruit. Hopefully, by putting pressure in 
the right direction, yes, we can have more positive 
steps towards transparency and a proper responsible 
way of doing business.

Q68 Chair: Earlier this year, First Quantum spoke at 
a reception on the Terrace of the House of Commons. 
Apart from making the case that they felt their assets 
had been illegally seized and they had not got any 
satisfaction, the point they were making was that they 
were a British company; their assets were seized and 
eventually sold to another British-registered company, 
apparently with connections in Kazakhstan. The 
London Stock Exchange took no action. The World 
Bank appear, having initially been very mad about it, 
to have effectively given the Government of the DRC 
a second chance. How do you think the Government 
of the DRC would react to any kind of reduction of 
aid? Is it not the reality that what some of these people 
can get in secret deals over minerals is far more 
valuable than any UK aid? Isn’t the attitude likely to 
be to shrug?

Daniel Balint-Kurti: I think that the UK Government 
and other major donors do have influence, because 
President Kabila cares about his reputation. He cares 
about his country’s reputation, which affects his own 
reputation. At the moment, there is a ranking of how 
easy it is to do business in a list of countries, and the 
DRC is very, very near the bottom. Kabila has said he 
wants to get the DRC much further up to the top. The 
DRC is not going to get further up that list if it is 
seen to be doing business in a suspicious manner, in 
a manner that raises concerns. If DFID and the World 
Bank speak out and say, “We are very, very worried 
by these deals,” it does affect his reputation and the 
Congolese Government and the President can react. 
As I have said, that has been demonstrated by what 
has happened with the Economic Governance Matrix. 
So yes, I think the Congolese Government can be 
influenced. I am not saying that is guaranteed, but it 
can be influenced.

Q69 Chair: On the issue of transparency, should not 
the London Stock Exchange be doing something 
about this?

Daniel Balint-Kurti: Yes. As I said, it is a great 
concern to us that FTSE 100 companies are linked to 
these deals in one way or another. What happens is a 
mine is transferred to a company based in an offshore 
tax haven, like the British Virgin Islands, and then, in 
the case of ENRC, the company steps in and buys that 
asset from the company based in the British Virgin 
Islands. That may happen again, because we have had 
recent transfers of stakes in mines to companies based 
in offshore tax havens. So yes, there is a link to the 
companies on the London Stock Exchange and, yes, 
the London Stock Exchange should be inquiring about 
what is happening. We should have transparency so 
that, when a UK investor puts money in a company, 
it knows what business that company is doing. It is a 
basic thing. With ENRC, maybe it is complicated, 
because I think only 20% of ENRC is listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. Nevertheless, it is listed on 
the London Stock Exchange; we should have 
transparency.
Q70 Chair: The point I am making is to talk about due diligence; the due diligence should be practised not just by the companies trading in these commodities, but by the various agencies that transact the securities attached to them.

Daniel Balint-Kurti: Absolutely. The London Stock Exchange should know the owners of every company that is listed there and all of their subsidiaries. Global Witness published a report about Kazakhmys, the Kazakh mining company, in which we refer to various companies that were linked through ownership to Kazakhmys. The financial authorities in the UK had no idea who owned these companies. When you read it, it is just incredible. We do not know where the money from our FTSE 100 companies is actually going.

Chair: Thank you, both, very much. It was a very interesting insight, and you have offered positives as well as negatives. It is not all bad, but clearly it is still a very messy situation and your evidence is extremely helpful to us and will enable us to question our own Secretary of State very thoroughly. Thank you very much indeed for coming in.

Examination of Witnesses


Q71 Chair: Thank you very much for also coming in to give evidence. The Committee has been extremely interested by the previous session of evidence. We know that we are dealing with difficult countries, but it is important to know what you are dealing with and to consider what actions you can take to improve the situation. Thank you for coming in to give us your views on this topic. Please introduce yourselves for the record.

Joanna Wheeler: My name is Joanna Wheeler, and I am a research fellow in the Participation, Power and Social Change Team at the Institute of Development Studies. I have been doing a lot of work for the past 15 years on questions related to citizenship, accountability and participation, particularly in violent contexts.

David Leonard: I am David Leonard, a professorial fellow at the Institute of Development Studies. I have been working in and on Africa since 1963, and I have done a fair amount of fieldwork within the last year in South Kivu in the DRC. It is a pleasure to be here.

Q72 Chair: Thank you very much. DFID, particularly under the new Government, is very focused on measuring results, outcomes, value for money and so on, and being able to say that our money on water sanitation, education, maternal health, or what have you. Is that kind of approach really the right way to judge the impact of our aid development assistance to a country like the DRC?

Joanna Wheeler: That is quite a controversial question. There has been a lot of debate within development circles about the relative merits of a results-based approach. On the one hand, it is important to demonstrate that the aid that is being given is being used effectively, but there are some real difficulties with doing this in conflict contexts. I am not saying that the Millennium Development Goals as a set of indicators do not matter: it definitely matters if more children are getting access to school, if more people are getting access to safe drinking water, if those goals are being met. The question is whether or not, in trying to meet those goals, we are also addressing the underlying issues about political equality and justice in those societies. Those issues are sometimes obscured by a focus on the Millennium Development Goals. For example, the question is not necessarily whether you should build a school or a well. The question is, in building a school or in building a well, what opportunities are being given to the citizens in that place to have a stake in how that is being done, or is the building of the school and that well just reinforcing the existing arrangements and potentially worsening the conflict?

David Leonard: To focus more narrowly on the issue of conflict, obviously we are interested ultimately in improving the well-being of poor people in the world. Obviously people who die in an extended conflict have not had their well-being improved. We estimate that about 6 million people have died in the Congo wars so far. The problem is not with the goals that have been mentioned, but we will only achieve those goals if we are able to bring peace over most of the country. If we bring peace over most of the country, we will achieve them rather easily.

Q73 Chair: That perhaps raises the question whether there are indicators that enable you to measure how effectively you are bringing peace as opposed to delivering outcomes.

David Leonard: There are a couple of things that fit within the Millennium Development Goals that are more sensitive to this: mortality rates, child and infant malnutrition rates and school enrolment, in particular school completion rates, both for boys and for girls. All of these things are very highly sensitive to whether or not there is conflict going on in the country. They are indirect measures, but at least they are sensitive to whether or not those things are happening. Joanna, you have also thought a lot about this issue.

Joanna Wheeler: One of the problems with the Millennium Development Goals is they do not necessarily tell us very much about whether the countries in which we are working are becoming more or less democratic, whether or not citizens are more able to hold the Governments to account, or how transparently those Governments are behaving. This was coming up quite clearly in the last evidence session from the previous witnesses. I think we need to look at other indicators, such as empowerment, accountability, the degree of political legitimacy,
governance institutions, the degree of local ownership over programmes that are being implemented, and the strength of the civil society in those contexts. I would also argue that there is sometimes a tendency to see these sorts of indicators as only being relevant in a post-recovery phase. Actually we should be thinking about them right from the beginning, even as part of the humanitarian work; we should not only ask those questions later.

Q74 Chair: The Committee, as you know, when it visited the region, took surface transport to get around. It was not a huge area, but we wanted to be a little more in contact physically with the geography as well as with the political dimension. You drive through Rwanda and into the DRC, and the contrast is huge. The army of the DRC, the FARDC, has become basically what is nominally a domestic army is seen as an army of occupation by most of the population which is still pretty much in the middle of a conflict. Bukavu was somewhat more settled. Since the appalling genocide, Rwanda appears to be making good progress in practical terms—it is still poor, but it is delivering—whereas the DRC is still very fragmented. Given the relationship that DFID has as a major donor in both Kigali and Kinshasa, the question you are left with is what should DFID do that will make a difference and, indeed, should they have a more physical presence in eastern Congo?

David Leonard: I think it is absolutely vital that DFID has a very much increased presence in the eastern Congo.

Q75 Chair: It does not have any presence at the moment. It shares one civil servant in Goma with the FCO.

David Leonard: That is a big improvement. The problem here is that we are dealing with a conflict that has both very deep local roots and complex regional roots. It seems to me that one cannot deal with what is happening in the eastern Congo without dealing with Rwanda, and vice-versa; you cannot think about Rwanda without thinking about the DRC as well. For example, we do not know how much of the wealth that we see evident in Rwanda today is coming from mines in the eastern Congo. There is a complex set of interrelationships here, and that is why the location of the FCO—somebody in Goma is extremely important, because one needs to have a co-ordinated response over the DRC, over Rwanda, over Burundi, and over Uganda, most especially in thinking about how to move forward in this region.

Certainly part of the problems that we are dealing is that some in the region are being more successful at pursuing their own legitimate interests than others are, and that we have a situation that needs very careful balancing. The presence of DFID in the region needs to address local conflicts. We are very clear about the fact that the larger regional conflict is being fed by a number of quite local conflicts and that those local conflicts are not being addressed. That may dry up the tinder that helps to feed the larger conflict, and that involves managing a set of national and international NGOs operative in the region that can do the kind of mediation, negotiation, peace-building and so on between the groups within the eastern DRC, which is not happening at the present. MONUSCO has not done an adequate job in that particular regard. Part of a larger co-ordinating exercise is then also about what one’s response is in Burundi, in Rwanda, and Uganda. This is both a diplomatic and a developmental challenge.

Q76 Jeremy Lefroy: You mentioned the importance of looking at the situation in Rwanda, in particular. From your experience in South Kivu, would you say the same about Burundi, and does that have much of an influence on what is going on in the DRC at the moment?

David Leonard: You are already aware that the security situation in Burundi has deteriorated over the last year and a half, and some of that seems to be spilling over. One of the groups, the FNL, seems to perhaps have some operatives in the eastern Congo at the moment, south of South Kivu. There is some spillover here. It is likely that Rwanda is taking the major lead here; it is very difficult to know. We know that the army of the DRC, the FARDC, has become essentially a Rwandaphone force in the eastern Congo. Now, where do those Rwandaphones come from—those who speak Rwandese? Are they Burundian? Are they Rwandan? Are they from the eastern Congo? Are they from all of those places? Probably, but they are perceived by the other groups in the region as an army of occupation. It makes it a very, very volatile situation, because basically what is nominally a domestic army is seen as an army of occupation by most of the population of the eastern Congo. That is why one has to deal with the legitimate problems, the legitimate conflicts, that involve Rwandaphone speakers, both in North and South Kivu, and deal with those conflicts, and bring them to some sort of manageable conclusion while, at the same time, trying to deal with the great involvement, probably particularly of Rwandans, in the mines throughout all of eastern Congo. Making all of this work together is a complex task.

Q77 Mr McCann: Can I go back to the governance issues? We know in terms of the MDGs that it is much more difficult to measure your success in governance issues, as opposed to how many children have got access to fresh water, schools, or whatever. Do you believe DFID should increase its work with civil society organisations in governance, and, if so, what objectives do you set and how do you measure those outcomes?

Joanna Wheeler: It is very difficult to measure governance-related outcomes, and there is a bit of a concern that sometimes the more important things that happen in development are the least easy to measure. If there is a really heavy focus on measuring, there is a risk that we end up doing what is measurable, rather than what is actually most important to do. It is not impossible, and there have been innovations recently in different ways of measuring things that are not as concrete as the number of schools or levels of infant mortality. There has been some very interesting work on how to measure empowerment, which looks at asking the people who are involved how they themselves understand empowerment and how they would rate...
their level of empowerment along a set of criteria. There are some ways it can be approached, but we need to use more caution in demanding the measurement of those outcomes. In these contexts, even the act of trying to measure them can be counterproductive.

In answer to your question about working with civil society organisations: yes, quite strongly, there needs to be more work with civil society organisations, there needs to be more focus on civil society strengthening in these contexts. A really important issue within that is: which civil society organisations, and how should you go about it? Obviously some civil society organisations are involved in the conflict. They have a stake in the conflict, and by working with civil society you could potentially be contributing to the conflict.

I wanted to refer to some research that we did over a 10-year period, which looked at the outcomes of citizen participation in a range of countries. In those countries classified as tier three, which are considered to be the least democratic and the most fragile, the most successful forms of citizen participation were in very local, very traditional village-level, very local level grassroots associations. They were not necessarily in the formal political process you might expect, and these results were stronger in these fragile countries than they were even in middle-income countries.

The implications of this research are that this local level is a very important area for development intervention to be focusing on and, at the moment, it is relatively absent from DFID’s approach to conflict and fragile affected countries. That is not to say there are no risks involved in working at that level, because there certainly are risks. It is not just because associations are local that they are going to be non-violent and more responsive to and accountable to their citizens. I would say that in combination with working more locally, there needs to be a careful analysis of the context. This comes back to David’s point about the need for staff in DFID who really have grounded local knowledge. This is another reason why working with partners who are international NGOs or national NGOs that have this local knowledge is so important, because that is a way to mitigate the risks that DFID is potentially exposing itself to by working at this local level.

Q78 Mr McCann: On that specific point, can DFID do that with all its staff based in Kinshasa or does it need an office in the east of Congo with its staff based there as well?
David Leonard: DFID absolutely has to have someone based in eastern Congo. Perhaps that could be a joint appointment with FCO. I know that FCO has now located someone in eastern Congo; the question is what that person’s brief is and whether they, in fact, have the time to do more than what FCO requires of it. If they are fully occupied already, then a DFID presence is essential as well. This is a vast country. You cannot get from Kinshasa to eastern Congo except on UN flights. You probably went in through Rwanda when you were there.

Q79 Chair: It is only a three-hour drive from Kigali to eastern Congo, but it is a major flight operation.
David Leonard: Yes. I have been over those same roads. The UN can fly you directly into Goma or Bukavu, but depending on the UN, these are long flights, and you are not getting the local knowledge. I have learned over the years that the lessons I learn in spite of the questions I ask, in spite of what I thought I knew already, rather than because of it, are often the most profound lessons I learn. It is the things you pick up by osmosis that give you the feeling for what is in fact happening, and whether or not your relationships with a particular NGO, and your trust in it, are well founded, or whether you need to move slightly differently. When you are talking about mediating intense and quite violent local conflicts, obviously whom it is that you work with in trying to get those conflicts taken care of is extraordinarily important.

Ideally MONUSCO would be doing this, but we have two big problems with MONUSCO: one is that it is an Anglophone operation in a Francophone country. Virtually all of the soldiers are Anglophone, speak no French whatsoever: they come from Pakistan, India, they are basically coming from the UN, and so on. In fact, its discussions within UN headquarters are in English, and most senior staff frequently do not speak good French. Furthermore, the UN has decreed that, as this is a dangerous zone, all the senior officers and all troops are on six-month rotations. Nobody has any chance to get a detailed understanding of what is going on and they do not follow up.

You get what was a hopeful UN initiative on dealing with the Banyamulenge-Babembe conflict in the south of South Kivu. They had a big meeting, they reached some important first agreements, and then the person left because her six-month contract had come to an end, and there was no follow-up. That is a disaster. DFID plays a very major role in Congo. To use an analogy, you punch well above your weight. You both have the money that DFID is putting in, which is quite substantial, but, in addition, as I saw very clearly when I was doing an evaluation of DFID’s work on the last elections, when DFID, France and Belgium agreed on something they could dictate what it was that the EU did. The poor EU officer would say, “No, we should not spend more money on x or y.” France, Britain and Belgium would then cable Brussels that it should be spent, and the money would be spent.

Britain influences the expenditure of moneys that are very substantially greater than what you spend yourselves. Particularly in the eastern Congo, where the French are still persona non grata, so far the French have had to rely on Britain to take the lead. Maybe that is going to change for Rwanda now that President Kagame is visiting Paris as we speak. DFID has a very major role here. Britain is not a trivial actor, it is not a small bit actor; it is a major actor, and how it does its job matters hugely.

Q80 Chair: One comfort is our man in Goma does speak fluent French.
David Leonard: This is not a criticism of the quality of people that DFID has in Kinshasa. When I was doing work there a couple of years ago and met with people in DFID, I was extremely impressed with the
quality of people they had. With Oliver Blake in particular, who had served there for about six years and was rewarded with a posting to South Sudan for his success in Congo, I felt, to use an old imperial analogy, that I was looking at a junior Lord Milner at work: somebody out there in the field who was really able to use the strength of Britain and use the relationships with the EU in a way that was carrying very substantial weight. The FCO and DFID have quality people, and have the ability to put people there who can deal with the local languages and so on. We just need to get them into the field so they can make up for the deficits that are particularly evident in the albeit necessary, but still in some ways flawed, MONUSCO operations.

Joanna Wheeler: Can I come back to make a point about that? The implications of what David is saying is that, if you do not have staff outside of the capital city, what you end up with is support for suitcase NGOs; they have a suitcase, and they set up office in the capital city, because that is where the donors are, that is what they know, and that is what they do. They do not necessarily have very much connection back to the communities in other parts of the country.

Q81 Chair: From the practical experience we had—it was International Rescue—they were based in eastern Congo. So the point there is, is it not reasonable for DFID to say, “We are actually working through an organisation on the ground, and given the staffing constraints we cannot afford to have a significant office in Bukavu as well as in Kinshasa, but we do have contracts and deals”? Does that not cover the ground a bit?

Joanna Wheeler: Yes, that helps, but it would help even more if the staff who were in Kinshasa spent more time on trips outside of Kinshasa, for example. There have been some interesting programmes that the World Bank and others have been experimenting with, called Reality Checks and Immersions, in which they send their staff to spend time with a family in a village for four or five days.

Mr Mccann: That is what we did.

Chair: A day and a night.

Joanna Wheeler: I read about that in the transcript. You would understand what could be gained from that kind of experience. A lot of staff—this is not a criticism of the staff themselves, because they face a lot of constraints—are not necessarily incentivised to do that. The repercussions are that you tend to have a very small group of donor-darling NGOs who get all the funding, and then when something goes in a completely different direction, because they are not connected to those communities and they do not really know what is going on back out in other regions of the country, everyone is very surprised. This is exactly what happened in the Arab Spring.

David Leonard: My sense from conversations with DFID staff personnel—I do not speak for or have knowledge of what DFID headquarters would say—is that they would very much like to have someone present in the east. I think they feel the lack of which I have spoken. Bukavu is a viable place to post somebody; Goma is less pleasant—having a volcano going down the middle of the town does not give you the aesthetic pleasure of Bukavu—but it is a viable place and staff could be found who would be happy to work there. DFID itself feels that lack; at least the field staff feel that lack.

I did not set out to, nor do I wish to, express an opinion about the various international NGOs that are there, but I think we need follow-through and very often effective follow-through requires connection with diplomatic efforts that are going on with other countries in the region. That is something that an NGO, even a very high-powered international NGO, does for us with great difficulty.

Q82 Pauline Latham: You talked about levels of sexual violence, and clearly in conflict areas it is used as a tool of war. It does not just happen there; it happens in other parts of the country just because of the way that women are in the view of society, and there is a lot of gender-based violence. How do you think DFID could take account of that in its programmes over there?

Joanna Wheeler: This is a really important issue for DFID to consider. I would make two concrete suggestions. The first is to recognise that gender-based violence and violence against women is not completely separate from other forms of instrumental and political violence; these things are all related. Experiences of one kind of violence in one setting can affect people in other settings. If women are facing extreme levels of violence in the home, that affects how and whether or not they can be engaged politically, let’s say, and their prospects of acting as political leaders.

We need to look at gender-based violence not as something that happens in isolation but as something that happens in relation to the general conflict, and the dynamics that are fuelling the general conflict. In terms of what DFID needs to do to to work on this issue, I would say that they need to work not only with women but also with men. There needs to be a much stronger focus on bringing men in to the work to try to prevent this kind of violence. There have been some quite successful security-sector-based reforms in other countries that have looked at ways of dealing specifically with gender-based violence that I think DFID could draw on.

David Leonard: If I may, please, I just want to add that I think this is something DFID knows how to do. I have done fieldwork also in Sierra Leone. The change in the climate around gender issues in Sierra Leone is quite dramatically different; the international community made a very substantial difference. I have encountered in Hargeisa a detective inspector from Manchester. I think, training the Somaliland police on how to deal with gender issues. This is something that DFID knows how to do and is something to which I believe that it gives priority.

Q83 Pauline Latham: You talked about empowering women, and women getting involved in politics. We are not very good at getting women in here particularly, and a lot of African countries can give us a lesson in how to get more women involved, but not in DRC, because the number of their women elected
in the last election went down from 12% to 8%. How do you think donors can help these under-represented groups in DRC to get into positions of power where they can actually influence policy and what is going on in DRC? Do you see any specific development dividends that you would expect to see as a result of more women being involved and empowered in politics?

Joanna Wheeler: Yes. It depends on which women. There has been quite a bit of research recently at IDS on the role of quotas in bringing women into politics, and, as I am sure you probably know, some countries have been much more successful than others. Rwanda tops the table in terms of percentage of women elected into parliament. The research shows that quotas, if they are adequately enforced and supported with the right kinds of legislation, can and do lead to greater numbers of women in political office.

The question is: what constituencies do those women represent, and does having more women in political office lead to changes in gender relations in the society? That is what we are really interested in; it is not actually the number of women per se in parliament. Therefore, the question is: how do women become legitimate political leaders in those settings, and how do they then get into an elected position in which they can put that leadership to use?

A lot of what happens in different contexts with the quotas is that women are elected, but then they are completely sidelined in the parliamentary or the legislative process. They are not able to really play a substantial role in the decisions that get made. They may be forced to represent, or may actually be actively representing, the perspective of elite groups, as opposed to a broader base. The question is: how can we address the underlying issues around women’s empowerment and, at the same time, push the representation of women formally, which has an important role.

There was some interesting research recently done that looked at the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone, and women who had been elected in those contexts. What it showed was that, once women were elected into parliament, there was a huge need for support for those women in those roles. In other words, they were often being elected with no education. They were illiterate. They had problems even getting to and from meetings, because they did not have the financial resources. They were being threatened by various interests. The getting the women into the office is really only the tip of the iceberg. It has to go much further than that to look at what those women are able to do when they are in office, and also who they are actually representing, and how you can address those much wider social dynamics about the limits on women’s empowerment.

Q84 Chris White: What should DFID do differently now to help improve security for civilians in the DRC?

David Leonard: In some ways that is really an extension of comments that I made already. Let me just go over a couple of bullet points. The key thing is addressing local conflicts, and we should bring those to fruition. This means also supplementing and backing up work that is not being done fully by MONUSCO at the moment. It involves paying particular attention to the way in which Congo conflicts are relating to Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, and being able to have a co-ordinated response, on the part of the Government of the UK, to the African Great Lakes region. I think one needs to think about that in a co-ordinated way.

At the community level, I would say that the whole approach to state reconstruction in Congo has been very much a top-down one—very much one of: let us rebuild the institutions from Kinshasa out. This neglects the structure of governance that we have had historically within Congo and, in fact, for that matter most other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, where you have got a basic unit of governance at the community level, very often, in fact most often, some sort of remnant of a traditional government structure, which then relates to a very thin presence of the central state on the ground.

By focusing only on rebuilding the army, or rebuilding the national police, you miss the rebuilding of the structures of governance and strengthening of the structures of governance that are at the community level. In the case of Congo it was the chiefs and the Baami (the kings) but also then the so-called police coutumière—in other words the traditional police who work to the chiefs rather than to the national police force. This is where the real policing takes place, but these people have been completely neglected in the post-conflict period.

The other big issue around the security sector in eastern Congo is to work on basically a repositioning of the army. When the various militias were folded into the Congolese army about three years ago, other ethnic groups were willing to be posted outside of eastern Congo. Rwandophones were unwilling to be posted outside the province, so that in fact the Congolese army in eastern Congo is almost exclusively a Rwandaphone force; it is seen as an army of occupation. That is a problem.

Finally, there is the issue more broadly of security-sector reform. This is a serious challenge, and whether one can do much about it at the present is unclear to me. If you read the statutes, we have just completed doing a study of security sector reform in Bas-Congo—in other words, facing the Atlantic rather than the Great Lakes. We have found that basically nothing has happened at all. If you read the statutes that govern the national police force, it is extremely clear, and, if it were not clear in the law, it is extraordinary clear in practice that the function of the national police force of Congo is to protect the state, it is not to protect the citizens. That is explicit in the legal codes, and it is very thin on the ground.

Trying to approach the security of citizens through the national police force of Congo is approaching it in a way that is likely to be highly resisted and is not likely to be effective in terms of things at the bottom. The long term, of course, and this relates to the testimony that you were having earlier, is the situation that one has at the present, in which basically no security sector personnel, either police or army, are actually being paid. Everybody is living off their posting, and no national tax revenues are being used to pay even
subsistence allowances for people operating at the community level, and that sets up a dynamic in which they can be extremely predatory toward their communities.

If you look at the history of armies before the French Revolution, and even during the French Revolution, that armies should be quartered on communities is not historically a new thing. If that practice is regularised, and regulated so that it does not become extreme, that is a possible, viable way of dealing with these problems. In some communities in the eastern Congo they have negotiated relationships with security sector personnel, where basically the community says, “If you would please agree not to rape and kill our women, we will arrange for a certain amount of money, food and housing to be made available for you each month.”

In eastern Congo, a well-disciplined security sector personnel are referred to as those who only take what they need. Undisciplined forces are those who predare on their community beyond their own immediate needs. This is the nature of what one has to work with.

**Q85 Mr McCann:** Is that subsistence corruption?

**David Leonard:** Yes, it is corruption, but, as I said, well into the French Revolution, well into the 19th Century, it was common for armies to be quartered in an area, and to live off what they were able to take off the land. That was Napoleon’s problem in Spain, which is that there was great resistance to the quartering of French troops in Spain.

I want to put it in a historical perspective, so we do not get completely hung up in a country like Congo with the way in which the UK would do it if it were engaged in a campaign in Europe today. There are ways of dealing with this that are somewhere in between, but the way that it is at the present in Congo is extraordinarily unsatisfactory, and that is a problem that one needs to work carefully toward.

Britain was extraordinary successful with security sector reform in Sierra Leone, really outstanding. Probably the best instance of security sector reform that I know of anywhere in the world, certainly in Sub-Saharan Africa, was what Britain was able to do in Sierra Leone. Whether this is the right moment for Britain to be involved in that or not is something that I would leave to DFID personnel in the field. I would hate to make that judgment from London.

**Q86 Chris White:** Thank you for that response; it was very full and wide. Carrying on with the issue of security and donors, how should donors take account of the risk associated with armed conflict and how this will affect them in terms of their results?

**David Leonard:** We get into this complex issue here about duty of care and about what we do allow and how this will affect them in terms of their results?

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am not even clear about what I know and what I do not know, but from those sources at the moment it seems to be low-level violence, stretching beyond security targets but still something in need of mediation.

Let me just add that Burundi has not been a major target for DFID involvement, but what is happening there is extraordinarily important in terms of the larger regional dynamics. As you all know, Burundi and Rwanda are sort of the evil twins. Who is evil and who is not at any one moment is not clear, but what is happening in one is not happening in the other, and vice-versa, consistently over time. Burundi never reached the level of genocide that Rwanda did, but it did have genocidal types of conflict over a 25-year period—a very extended period. In the case of Burundi, it was Tutsi dominance rather than Hutu dominance, and that dominance was finally negotiated to an end in the Arusha Accords of 2003, and we have been seeing this fragile movement into a situation in which the rights of Tutsi minorities, and of the Twa minority are protected by the constitution. Therefore, the integrity of the constitution and its enforcement, and the security sector reform that is the key to that, becomes an extraordinarily important issue, which you will immediately see also has long-term implications for Rwanda.

If Burundi fails that carries a particular message for Rwanda that is very unhappy for the future. In that sense, I see Burundi, Rwanda, eastern Congo, as sort of a three-legged stool, and you cannot choose which of the legs you want to work on. If you are going to get security in that region, you are going to have to address, in some sense, all three legs. That does not mean that DFID needs to be active in Burundi; it does mean that the UK really has to have a very active watching brief in Burundi. You need to have people on the ground who are able to relate to what is happening in Rwanda and eastern Congo, and also probably Uganda, and to play that information actively into what is happening in the other places, and be prepared to take diplomatic action, if not developmental action, in order to deal with the situation.

My argument here is not that DFID open a programme office in Bujumbura, but that the UK FCO needs to have a brief that goes beyond just looking after what is happening in Rwanda and eastern Congo, and also probably Uganda, and to play that information actively into what is happening in the other places, and be prepared to take diplomatic action, if not developmental action, in order to deal with the situation.

David Leonard: Let me address the elections issue first: that is something that the UN tends not to get perfectly. They screwed up in Kenya, but then everybody screwed up in Kenya, including the UK. They did not see the signals in Kenya of what was quite clearly coming. The UN tends to have a specialised branch in dealing with election operations, and their support, and they do it rather well. For my mind, it is a thankless set of tasks trying to provide technical support for an election. As all of you know, from being involved in elections, to have somebody whose whole life is spent doing nothing but dealing with elections is a rather frantic and unsettling life. I cannot imagine why anybody would choose it. If you imagine that your whole life was spent in campaign, it would be an unpleasant life.

The UN deals with that reasonably well. They are able to protect elections, they are able to protect polling stations, to monitor them, and so on. That part I am less worried about; it is not that I am not worried about the elections, but I am not worried about MONUSCO making a good effort in that. Radio Okapi, the UN radio station in Congo, is an extraordinarily important resource, and it is really the only reliable source of information that most people have.

On the other hand, in terms of dealing with the kind of conflict that we are now observing in eastern Congo, which are small force operations, rapid in and out, not major force battles, it is an extraordinarily important issue, which you will immediately see also has long-term implications for Rwanda.

Q91 Jeremy Lefroy: I wanted to come back to the question of MONUSCO. You have already been fairly clear about the problems of being an Anglophone operation in a Francophone country and the six-month rotations. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of MONUSCO’s peacekeeping, and in particular how do you think they are equipped to deal with the elections in November?

David Leonard: Let me address the elections issue first: that is something that the UN tends not to get perfectly. They screwed up in Kenya, but then everybody screwed up in Kenya, including the UK. They did not see the signals in Kenya of what was quite clearly coming. The UN tends to have a
helped, and reduced some of the sexual violence that is happening all the time. Those are on the localised skirmishes.

David Leonard: I would support you in that.

Joanna Wheeler: Can I add something to that? That is a good point, but the question that it raises is, who is actually the source of insecurity in these places? Some of the time it is the police, or is representatives of the state—it is members of the armed forces that are seen as the greatest threats. In terms of how to improve security, we cannot necessarily base it on the assumption that the Government is the one who is going to be providing the security. The Government actually might be making the security situation worse, so that is why we have been arguing, both of us, for the need to really understand this from the local perspective: what is it that those women living in those villages see as a source of insecurity, and then how can it be addressed?

Q93 Jeremy Lefroy: My understanding is that the MONUSCO mandate is up pretty soon after the elections. A general perception we had was the MONUSCO mandate was not rigorous enough. Britain and other countries—Britain is spending £100 million or $100 million certainly a year—are spending a lot of money on a mandate that actually, as you say, is good at perhaps preventing large-scale conflict, but is not advancing the situation from there at all. I wondered whether you felt that, building on what Pauline has asked, if the mandate was extended, which clearly is not certain at all—sorry, I am being passed a note here. It has been extended to 12 months in July, so at least it is 12 months next year, but whether DFID or the British Government in this case, because it is a FCO responsibility, should be looking for a stronger mandate at present, or if it is renewed again next July?

David Leonard: I would be reluctant to see the MONUSCO mandate operation completely shut down after the elections. That would be premature. As to whether or not there is a case for scaling back the operations, redefining them, that is a complex question. One thing that does concern me is that redefining the mandate will mean that the force is not as ready to respond as it is now. I am quite confident the mandate will be renewed through the elections. The elections are scheduled for November. There is a high change that will be postponed, so they may stretch out into the New Year, but I cannot imagine any situation in which MONUSCO would be removed before then. The question is what happens afterward, which also means a lot depends on what happens in the election, which will also give us some further insight as to what the nature of the challenges are. Probably one of the most serious challengers—if not the most serious—to President Kabila in this coming election is from the East: Kaberje, who was the Speaker of the House, is certainly one of the most significant challengers. I expect Kabila to be re-elected as President; I do not think the Presidency will allow that not to happen, but there could be a significant change in Parliament in the national assembly, and that could also lead to some shift in the dynamics of Congolese politics. It is premature to judge that.

Q95 Jeremy Lefroy: Can I return to MONUSCO? I think this is extremely important for the UK’s national interest, and for DFID, because we are major contributors there. You have quite rightly indicated that the force format of MONUSCO is not particularly well suited to dealing with the problems that exist now. There are 22,000—that is the full deployment; I do not think there are as many as that there at the moment—but they are a very large, several brigade-strong force in eastern Congo. That format was introduced, I think, in 2007. I am not sure MONUSCO is still active in the North; you have got various minor—not minor for the people involved—incidents of banditry and more in North and South Kivu. What seemed to me, and generally to the team, was that the force format was the wrong force format to counter what is going on at the moment. If there was a renewal of the mandate, do you think DFID should be exercising a lot of pressure, given our major contribution financially to it, significantly to change that format to make it more mobile, with more helicopters and perhaps more use of special forces included in that mandate, rather than the fairly static infantry companies that we saw?

David Leonard: Let me make several suggestions here. One is that I do not immediately know why it is that we remain committed to an Anglophone force presence in eastern Congo. The presence of France would be objectionable to Rwanda, but both Mali and Senegal have a very good record in peacekeeping, or we could move to a Swahiliphone operation: Kenya has had a very good record in international peacekeeping operations, and Tanzania could be easily involved. In other words, there are some alternatives here that would give an ear to what is happening that is not as tin as we have got right now. The second thing that you are suggesting is moving to a more mobile type of force. One might really think of this as a gendarmerie type of response. I am not sure helicopters are necessarily—

Q96 Jeremy Lefroy: That is what we were told.

David Leonard: But that is also from the point of view of an army. What we have got there at the moment are armies who are used to moving as armies, and armies move rapidly with helicopters. Gendarmeries move more flexibly. Let me be clear: I am a pacifist; I refused armed service when I was drafted when I was young, so I am not an expert on military matters. You have to take anything I say on this matter with several grains of salt. I do think there is a possibility of a different model here. Whether or
not that would be appropriate or not, what the requirements of that are, is certainly something to be explored, but you would need other expertise on this particular matter.
The final issue that you raised had to do with the Lord’s Resistance Army. I personally think that this is really not an appropriate MONUSCO task. We are dealing with a very small residual force of about 200 people that is highly mobile and highly skilled at hiding itself, and the Ugandan armed forces are highly committed to tracking them down and getting rid of them. I do not see that a UN operation would be at all effective or add anything to that security situation that is not already being done. By no means am I suggesting the LRA is not an important problem—it is an important problem—but I do not see that a UN operation would be at all effective or add anything to that security situation that is not already being done. By no means am I suggesting the LRA is not an important problem—it is an important problem—but I do not see MONUSCO, or any other UN operation that I have ever seen having the skills that would be necessary to root out the last bits of this particular problem. We have to see this as a Congolese problem and a Ugandan problem.

Q97 Chair: Thank you very much indeed. Exploring the dynamics of conflict is something that is multi-layered, and could probably take you in an awful lot of different directions, but we certainly have covered a lot of ground, and we are very grateful to you for both the written evidence you have given and coming in to share the evidence with us. I do not think this is the area where you come to definitive conclusions but hopefully some sensible recommendations as to how you use your aid and your influence in ways that actually meet the objective of providing peace and some development opportunities, more than anything else, in a very tormented region. Jeremy?

Jeremy Lefroy: I just wanted to add the point that none of the questions we are asking are in any way playing down the role that MONUSCO plays. We are saying that they have done a good job in getting it to where it is now. It is the question of where it goes from here. They have suffered quite considerably themselves and shown a lot of bravery.

Q98 Chair: I think that point is given; it is the biggest deployment of UN forces in the world, but what we are saying is it looks to us as if the circumstances have changed sufficiently to require it to be approached in a different way. Pauline obviously was making very specific points, but it actually is on the ground and not able to do some of the things that the local community might expect. I take your point: it is very important that you ask the local community how that would work before you just mandate it from New York or whatever. Thank you very much. I think you have given us a lot of food for thought.

Joanna Wheeler: Thank you very much.

David Leonard: Thank you very much for your kind and informed attention.
Thursday 20 October 2011

Members present:
Malcolm Bruce (Chair)
Hugh Bayley
Richard Burden
Richard Harrington
Pauline Latham
Mr Michael McCann
Alison McGovern
Anas Sarwar

Examination of Witness

Witness: Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP, Secretary of State, Department for International Development, gave evidence.

Q99 Chair: Good afternoon, Secretary of State. Thank you very much indeed for making time to see us. We do appreciate that it was relatively short notice and we are grateful to you. This is the final evidence session on our Report on conflict with a particular focus on the three states we visited: Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC. We have not signed off the Burundi Report, though, and there is one question that we wanted to put to you before we do. In a nutshell, it was about the fact that the advice we asked for from you as Ministers about the options for Burundi and why you made that decision has been redacted and the fact that it was indicated that it would not be made available under freedom of information. Is there anything you can tell us about that, or the decision, because obviously we are in some difficulties, not knowing the basis on which Ministers have been advised or the decision they have taken, to make a judgment about the quality of that decision? We felt if we had you in front of us we would at least put that to you and see whether you feel able to give us a little bit more insight into how that decision was made and what the options were in front of you.

Mr Mitchell: I cannot immediately recall why the advice was redacted, but it is not because there was great controversy about it. It was not a difficult decision and I know that the Committee has thought carefully about Burundi. Indeed, I have spoken to a number of people from the church communities on this subject too. In the end, we have had to make some tough decisions about value for money and effectiveness, as I think the Committee would expect. In terms of Burundi, we had a very small programme there and we concluded that it was not the best use of British taxpayers’ money to deploy it through a bilateral programme. The Committee will appreciate there are many ways in which we seek to help different countries. Sometimes it will be through a bilateral programme; sometimes it will be through multilateral programmes—the EU, the World Bank or the United Nations, and its agencies are in Burundi. On other occasions it will be perhaps through the mechanisms of the Global Poverty Action Fund, where you have a very strong British NGO presence in a particular country.

In Burundi, having a small programme of about £10 million did not seem to us to be justifiable in terms of value for money and effectiveness. I think the Committee will be aware of the quite substantial amounts of British taxpayers’ money that are going in through the multilateral agencies, in particular the Bank, the UN and the European Union. Our judgment on Burundi is that the most helpful thing we can do is to help them integrate more into the regional community in terms of boosting their trading links and, indeed, assisting in the building of their revenue-raising capacity. That is why we have decided to close the bilateral programme, possibly taking some of the money away from others in the region, which would have therefore been viable to administer. Also, through TradeMark East Africa we will continue the very important work we have been doing on building up their revenue.

Finally, if I may just give the Committee this figure: last year Britain’s part in TradeMark East Africa and the other British support that helped the revenue was about £35 million. This dwarfs the bilateral programme, but has a huge effect upon the ability of the state to pay for basic services and the other services that a state would undertake. What I am saying to the Committee is that we must take tough decisions about the expenditure of British taxpayers’ money in this in this area as in others. The bilateral programme was not, in our judgment, the most effective way of delivering British support. There are many other ways of doing so, some of which I have outlined. Of course, through those other mechanisms we will continue to give support to Burundi but I think in a more cost-effective and sensible way.

Q100 Chair: I appreciate that this is not an inquiry on Burundi and, of course, Stephen O’Brien gave us fulsome evidence and explained the Government’s position. We have no quarrel with that at all. The only supplementary I would have is that I think the Committee completely accepts that the £10 million programme would not be viable. What we were concerned about was that we were led to understand that one of the options was to have a more substantial programme, possibly taking some of the money away from others in the region, which would have therefore been viable to administer. Firstly, is that the case? If so, are you able to say why that would be rejected? The point you have made about the £10 million is well-made and understood.
Mr Mitchell: You would have to have a very substantial programme there to make a real difference and then you would have to evaluate whether that is a difference that works for us. From memory, the current programme represents about 3.6% of aid in Burundi, so to have a bilateral programme that really had a big impact you would really have to scale it up quite significantly. I note that, for example, in recent months the Belgian Government has increased substantially the support they give to Burundi in education. That underlines the importance of not cluttering up the landscape with so many different countries and bilateral programmes, but supporting those that are best placed to have a real effect there. In our judgment, that is TradeMark East Africa, which has the potential to transform living standards in Burundi. There are other multilaterals that we support: for example, and as the Committee will know, in the case of the World Bank, we have great influence as virtually the top-equal supporter of IDA, so we are able to influence the work they do and we were responsible for ensuring the spring WDR on conflict.

Clearly that has a big impact on an area like Burundi.

Chair: Unless Members have any other supplementary questions, that has clarified the position from our point of view.

Q101 Richard Burden: Just so we can be absolutely clear on the issue of the methodology, because I am still a little hazy about that, when you talk about the £10 million programme not being viable, are you talking about the programme or are you talking about the existence of an office in Burundi?

Mr Mitchell: I am talking about the bilateral programme in Burundi and whether or not, as a result of the Bilateral Aid Review, it was a sensible programme to maintain. I am making clear that our judgment, following official advice, was that it was not.

Q102 Richard Burden: And is that purely because of the size of it by country?

Mr Mitchell: No. The questions we asked ourselves were whether this was the most effective way of helping Burundi and whether it fitted in with our strategy? The answer to both questions was no.

Q103 Richard Burden: If you look at it in an East African context, and in a sense that is what you are doing because you are looking at TradeMark East Africa, I still do not understand the methodology that says that the bit of that bilateral programme that is labelled “Burundi” does not provide value for money, does not lever in extra resource and does not add enough value, but all of the much bigger programme in the DRC provides such value for money and does lever that in. If you cut it by country by country, and you look at each in its little box, I guess you can do that, but if you do not look at it in that context, why have you reached that conclusion on Burundi but have assumed that everything is fine in relation to DRC? I just do not understand.

Mr Mitchell: I do not have much to add to what we have already said to the Committee on this. I can assure you this was not one of the more difficult decisions we had to make, in respect of Burundi. There were many others as part of the Bilateral Aid Review and, indeed, the Multilateral Aid Review, that were more difficult. It is a question about the strategic nature of the programme; whether this is where we think British taxpayers’ money can have a transformative effect; whether or not it was the right way of doing aid in Burundi for Britain; and whether or not there were other countries much better placed to carry out their bilateral work. Our conclusions were as set out in the Bilateral Aid Review.

Chair: To be fair, we are at the end of that Report and we just wanted to clarify. The most important point was that information had been redacted. You have explained the situation and we need to move on, but I think Michael has one more question.

Q104 Mr McCann: Good afternoon, Secretary of State. You are on record as saying that aid spending decisions should be made on the basis of evidence and not guesswork. I buy into that completely. In terms of our role as a Select Committee and in scrutinising the work of your Department, do you accept that it will be made more difficult if the documents that you supply to us are substantially redacted, which would mean that we would not be able to do our work?

Mr Mitchell: I hope the Committee will accept on record that I am someone who is very strongly supportive of the greatest possible transparency. We strive always to give the Committee the maximum amount of information we can. The Committee will understand that in some cases where civil servants are giving advice or where there are issues relating to some matters that we do not think are relevant precisely to the Committee’s inquiry, it may, from time to time, be necessary to redact those documents. I can certainly give Mr McCann the undertaking I think he is seeking that in order to help the Committee, we do try to release as much information as we possibly can to the Committee on whatever basis we can.

Q105 Chair: It does present us with a difficulty where we do not have the full information, but we do understand and I appreciate you answering the questions. Obviously, Burundi is very much relevant to this inquiry. The previous Government prioritised fragile states and you have accentuated that priority. First of all, how do you define a fragile state that enables you to say that 30% of the money is going to fragile states, one third of the world’s poor live in fragile states and that that is an increasing part of the focus. Probably the first point we need to establish is what is the definition that you are working on?

Mr Mitchell: There is no one definition of fragility. We say that of the 27 or 28 bilateral programmes that we have, something like 21 are in fragile states. I have a list of those if it would be helpful to the Committee. As I think the Committee will appreciate though, fragility is multi-dimensional. There is no universal definition of fragility, nor indeed a consensus among donors about what is and is not fragility. We reach our own conclusions on the basis of publicly available indices: there is the Failed States Index of the Fund for Peace, the World Bank’s Index and the Uppsala
The level of support and its accountability and value for money. Do you accept that?

Mr Mitchell: I think that the emphasis on working in conflict states is a cross-Government emphasis. It is not just my Department. Through the National Security Council we discuss the importance of working in conflict states and, indeed, we agreed that up to 30% of the development budget should specifically be deployed in conflict states. I take the Committee back to the first hearing after the election, when you kindly invited me here, and I made the point that we have stood by our commitments because it is the right thing to do and also because it is very much in our national interest.

Mr Mitchell: That is fair enough, and there are, as you say, external statuses or figures for that. Clearly, it is an increasing risk to go into countries where, by definition, the state is dysfunctional. Obviously, the PAC has reported today that the increased spending in fragile states is likely to increase the risks to accountability and value for money. Do you accept that?

Mr Mitchell: I think that the emphasis on working in conflict states is a cross-Government emphasis. It is not just my Department. Through the National Security Council we discuss the importance of working in conflict states and, indeed, we agreed that up to 30% of the development budget should specifically be deployed in conflict states. I take the Committee back to the first hearing after the election, when you kindly invited me here, and I made the point that we have stood by our commitments because it is the right thing to do and also because it is very much in our national interest.

It is the right thing to do because a child born into a very poor and underdeveloped part of the world has to grapple with all of that. Also, if living in a state that is beset by conflict, they will grow up frightened and miserable. It is undoubtedly the right thing to do, but it is also hugely in our interest. I think it was Paul Collier who defined conflict as “development in reverse” in very poor countries. If you take a state like Somalia or Afghanistan, we are dealing there with the symptoms of dysfunctionality and poverty because we cannot tackle the causes upstream. There is credible research now that shows it is four times the cost to deal with the dysfunctionality that now besets Somalia and Afghanistan than if you are able to tackle the causes directly upstream, so it is a national interest issue.

Is it more difficult? It certainly is. For example, in terms of our focus on results, if we look at the cost of getting a girl into school and take two of the states that you visited—Rwanda and the DRC—the cost of educating a girl in the DRC may be three times higher than it is in Rwanda because the DRC is so dysfunctional, but it may actually be better value for money because it is so much more difficult to educate children in the DRC. So it is much more difficult and, of course, the risks are greater.

The PAC has elided a number of different issues here. Because, for example, in the DRC it is so much more difficult, we do not work through the DRC Government, whereas, in Rwanda we substantially work with the Government because we can follow the money and we can see how the money is being spent in Rwanda. We cannot do that in the DRC, so we find credible partners to work with, often in the NGO sector in the DRC, and we can hold them accountable in a way we would never be able to do with the Government. It is more difficult, but we find structures that satisfy us so that we can follow the money.

Mr Mitchell: I do accept that it is much more difficult to work in conflicted environments. I am making the point that I think it is absolutely the right thing to do. We must take on these challenges, and things will go wrong along the way; that is for sure. However, we try and make sure we have the right structures to follow the money. We insist now not on deploying budgets in the way that used to be the case, but on buying results. Where we can, we have competitive bids for those results. For example, we have just launched a challenge fund to get girls into school in some of the most difficult parts of the world. We see what comes back to us about achieving those results, we see what the cost is and we then hold people to account for delivering them. That is the right way to work in these more difficult environments. Of course, we also have the independent evaluation that the ICAI has brought in, which will mean that there is independent evaluation of what we are doing, including in conflict states, which the Committee and the public can then review and see for themselves.

Mr Mitchell: In the end these are judgments and decisions for Ministers.

Richard Burden: Th QUESTION 107: Chair: I am really pressing you on the fact that you have made a very strong pitch to say you are determined to have transparency, value for money and I think on many occasions you have said, “I want every pound to be identified and measured”. However, do you not accept that by putting more of your resources into these more fragile environments, it will be more difficult for you to actually achieve that transparency?

Mr Mitchell: I do accept that it is much more difficult to work in conflicted environments. I am making the point that I think it is absolutely the right thing to do. We must take on these challenges, and things will go wrong along the way; that is for sure. However, we try and make sure we have the right structures to follow the money. We insist now not on deploying budgets in the way that used to be the case, but on buying results. Where we can, we have competitive bids for those results. For example, we have just launched a challenge fund to get girls into school in some of the most difficult parts of the world. We see what comes back to us about achieving those results, we see what the cost is and we then hold people to account for delivering them. That is the right way to work in these more difficult environments. Of course, we also have the independent evaluation that the ICAI has brought in, which will mean that there is independent evaluation of what we are doing, including in conflict states, which the Committee and the public can then review and see for themselves.

Richard Burden: How does the Department differentiate its approach to fragile states that are judged to pose a threat to UK security; I guess an example would be Pakistan?

Mr Mitchell: How do we differentiate what?

Richard Burden: The level of support and its approach to what kind of support and the level of support that is given. For example, how do you distinguish between somewhere like Pakistan, which is fragile, is judged to pose a threat to the UK in various ways, but is, objectively, actually also on the verge of becoming a middle-income country, and somewhere like the DRC, which is probably not a threat to the UK’s security but where poverty is more extensive? How do you make those judgments?

Mr Mitchell: In the end these are judgments and decisions for Ministers.

Richard Burden: That’s why I’m asking a Minister.

Mr Mitchell: I know and I am going to try and satisfy you, Mr Burden, with my response. I do not know what the Committee’s reaction was when they went to the DRC, but when I first went to the DRC I was certainly deeply sceptical about the expenditure of British taxpayers’ money there. I went there to find out why we were doing it and, I have to say, I came back absolutely clear that it was the right thing to do—this was in 2006 or 2007—because you will never have a stable Africa unless you have a stable DRC. The instability that flows out from the DRC means that it is a key area and a British interest too. I think there are 14 countries that abut the DRC; the destabilising effect of a very unstable DRC on the whole region is enormously significant. That would be the particular parameter that we were applying
when we were looking at the DRC, obviously in the context of trying to make sure that we secure the results from our funding there that help to build that country.

Pakistan next year may be our largest programme. This year is the first year since the Second World War where India is not our largest programme; I think Ethiopia is our largest programme this year. In Pakistan we looked at how we could help to build stability and assist. Obviously, our first task was to help with the immediate effects of the flooding last year and the aftermath of it. We were able to try and work out what we could do that would be most transformative and most effective in Pakistan. We determined that actually building up education in Pakistan was the way we could make the greatest difference. It is the sort of thing that would deliver value for money for the British taxpayer by assisting 4 million children getting into school in Pakistan in the next four to five years. I can think of nothing that would be more transformative in Pakistan than that, nor which would blunt the appeal of the terrorist recruiters' aims. After all, if you are a child born in Karachi today, your chance of getting into school is worse than in any other major city in the world.

You have mentioned those two countries. Those are the sorts of things we looked at in determining what results Britain could procure that would help these societies to build themselves, which would certainly assist in Britain’s security and help their prosperity and, ultimately, our prosperity as well.

Q109 Richard Burden: If I understand you correctly, you try to be as systematic as you can about it, but ultimately, Ministers have to make subjective decisions about these issues. You talked about the list of 27 countries and it might be helpful if you could give us that list. We probably have it, but it might be helpful. It is the thought that you could deliver value for money for the British taxpayer by assisting 4 million children getting into school in Pakistan in the next four to five years. I can think of nothing that would be more transformative in Pakistan than that, nor which would blunt the appeal of the terrorist recruiters’ aims. After all, if you are a child born in Karachi today, your chance of getting into school is worse than in any other major city in the world.

You have mentioned those two countries. Those are the sorts of things we looked at in determining what results Britain could procure that would help these societies to build themselves, which would certainly assist in Britain’s security and help their prosperity and, ultimately, our prosperity as well.

Mr Mitchell: First of all, what we consider to be a fragile or conflict-affected country is one that scores less than 3.2 in the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, appears on the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index Listing or on the Uppsala Conflict Database. Those are the three things I mentioned before. Let me give the Committee the list of the 21 countries where DFID will have a bilateral programme going forward because I happen to have it in front of me: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, the DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nepal, Nigeria, OPTs, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and, since July this year, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, Yemen and Zimbabwe. We will review this list again in two years. Those are the facts of the matter.

Mr Burden, you then asked me about whether this was a subjective judgment and about Libya and the OPTs. You can see that the OPTs are indeed there and I hope to visit them before too much longer. Libya is not on the list, although we have led the humanitarian effort during the fighting in Libya and pooled together much of the advice on stabilisation; of course the stabilisation process will and can be led by the new Libyan Government. They have shown themselves adept at stabilising the areas when the fighting has been going on. If you look at Misrata, for example, which had a very difficult phase during the warfare, the Libyan authorities managed to bring about basic stabilisation there themselves very quickly. Our work tends to be on technical assistance and, indeed, on the bigger picture through the Arab Partnership Funds in working together with the big sources of capital, and bringing our technical assistance to bear, to assist them in their work of economic development. I have never thought as they are again, looking back on the bilateral programme in Libya. Libya is a rich country. Now that the funds are unfrozen and the oil is coming back on-stream, it is quite clear that Libya will not need a bilateral programme, but may require some technical assistance, and we have been very clear with the authorities in Libya that we will assist them in any way we can.

Finally, these are subjective matters. Clearly, which countries you engage with depends on past history: we have a very strong focus on Commonwealth countries, and consider whether there has been a legacy of British activity and involvement in the past and whether we think we can be effective—some of the considerations that we were discussing just now about Burundi.

Q110 Richard Burden: Looking forward, do you have some way that you try to plan for the possibility that states that appear to be stable right now have a high risk of becoming fragile? Does that affect your projected allocations or do you feel that you have to look at things as they are today and not be planning for the reasons you said about history, relationships and so on? Do you look essentially at what is now or do you say, “Well, this is where that country is now, but we can see there are various developments there that could mean in a year or two years’ time it could be very different.”

Mr Mitchell: On the financial, budgetary point you made, there is a reserve that we keep to tackle humanitarian crises. That reserve clearly has been deployed, in part, last year as a result of the Pakistan floods and, as of now, following Britain’s lead in what is happening in the Horn of Africa, which the Committee will be aware is a disaster that is unfolding every day. There is a strategic reserve. In the case of Libya, for example, we are aware that the results we are trying to secure in Yemen are unlikely to be secured this year, so some of the budget can be transferred. Although we have a ringfenced budget, this budget is very stretched—we could spend it twice over, as I am sure the Committee will appreciate. We have a limited reserve, but if we need more revenue for humanitarian crises where Britain wants to engage we have to find it from existing allocations.

In terms of identifying countries that may fall back into conflict, the conflict strategy that the National Security Council agreed embraces three aspects of...
of the causes of conflict. First of all, the strategy is to try and stop it starting and, therefore, having an early warning approach to seeing countries that may be either drifting back into conflict or in danger of conflict is very important. Once conflict starts, the strategy is to try to stop it and, once it is over, to try to reconcile people, which has been one of the quite remarkable achievements that the Government of Rwanda has been able to achieve since the genocide 17 years ago.

Q111 Mr McCann: Secretary of State, DFID have listed four priorities for fragile and conflict-affected states. Where do you believe that DFID’s comparative advantage lies in relation to those?

Mr Mitchell: The advantage comes from physically being there on the ground; the advantage comes from the history and the long involvement on this work over many years; it comes from our very substantial involvement with the multilateral agencies and the work that we do with those; and it is projected, for example, in the work we did with the World Bank, to secure a World Development Report that is specifically focused on conflict and the importance of tackling conflict states. It comes from all of those things and we regard it as extremely important.

Q112 Mr McCann: I have the advantage of having those priorities before me, and they are about addressing the causes and effects of conflicts, supporting inclusive political settlements and processes, developing core state functions and responding to public expectations. Are there any of those on which you would place more emphasis than others, or do you feel that they are equally weighted?

Mr Mitchell: If you look, for example, at the World Development Report, it sets out three particular parts to the approach that I do not think directly coincide with the points you have just been mentioning. First of all, it is framing a clear approach and setting priorities, which means putting an emphasis on building capable and legitimate institutions that deliver citizen security, justice and jobs, which help to break the cycles of conflict; it is transforming donor systems, looking at risks, results and flexibility, so that you take well-managed risks where opportunities exist for achieving transformational results; and it is building up knowledge, evidence and collective effectiveness about what works and what does not work. I think all of those things come out of the World Development Report.

Q113 Mr McCann: Does that mean that you are abandoning yours in favour of those? Those were your priorities that I read to you.

Mr Mitchell: No. I would say they both are. I was trying to expand on the point that you were rightly making.

Q114 Mr McCann: In terms of the causes of conflict, you mentioned earlier in an answer that they could regional, global, linked to organised crime, drug trafficking or corruption. How do you believe that DFID can have a major impact in those areas?

Mr Mitchell: Very much in the ways that we have just been discussing: what you said and the points that I extracted for the Committee from the World Development Report. You made a reference to what I said on another occasion about tackling these issues that emanate from Somalia, the most dysfunctional conflicted state in the world, whether it is piracy, drug running, migration, conflict or the spread of disease; they all have to be tackled. There are different ways of tackling them, but my initial point about how much more difficult it is to deal with those symptoms of poverty if you fail to address the causes upstream is very relevant.

Q115 Mr McCann: In terms of the World Bank’s World Development Report that you have already mentioned and quoted from, are you going to change anything on the back of that? Do you believe they will naturally dovetail with what you were doing in any event?

Mr Mitchell: The World Development Report on Conflict, which was discussed at the spring meetings this year in Washington, followed our lobbying and asking the World Bank to do that and to produce that report. We had heavy input into it and it is a very good report indeed. I do not know whether the Committee has had a chance to look at it in any detail, but it is an excellent report and it very much reflects British thinking.

Q116 Mr McCann: My final point would be that the OECD and DAC have found that few donors have improved their performance since 2007. How does DFID fare in respect of that particular aspect?

Mr Mitchell: Was this the recent report that was published?

Mr McCann: Yes. Mr Mitchell: I think that report was slightly unfair, methodologically, on my Department. There was certain methodology that specifically excluded some of the most forward-leaning and effective things we have been doing. I would be very happy to give the Committee a note, since I do not carry it around on the top of my head, about why we felt that the OECD DAC’s recent report understated the effectiveness of what we have been doing, if that would be helpful.

Mr McCann: It would be very useful.

Q117 Hugh Bayley: When I visit places like DRC, Southern Sudan or the Occupied Palestinian Territories, it is clear to me that to build conditions in which development can take place, you need a security sector response as well as a development response. Do you find that you are constrained as a Secretary of State for Development by the DAC rules in some of these cases? For instance, in Afghanistan there is this doctrine of “clear, hold, build”. At what stage, once a hamlet or a township has been taken back under political control of the Khartoum Government, does the development approach become your Department’s responsibility? Do you think there needs to be some change to the DAC rules in order to make sure that there is sufficient resource from well-funded Departments like yours for DDR-type activities for reform of the military and other security forces?
Mr Mitchell: The technical answer to Mr Bayley’s question is no, because we have the conflict pools. We have tri-Departmental funding, which goes into the conflict pools from my Department, from the Ministry of Defence and from the Foreign Office.

Q118 Hugh Bayley: Which is DFID money that is non-DAC-able?
Mr Mitchell: The DFID money that goes in is DAC-able and can only be spent on DAC-eligible activities, but the effect of those conflict pool fundings is to do what Mr Bayley was describing. I do not think there is a case for changing the OECD DAC rules; it is very important that we should all know what is and is not development, and they are a good definition of that. Equally, it is important that they should be reviewed from time to time. Changing them is enormously difficult; you have to get very widespread agreement. We should look carefully, from time to time, at what they are saying, but we should not exhaust ourselves on trying to get them redefined. We should exhaust ourselves on making development yet more effective and one of the things that the conflict pools do is to help us to do that.

The mechanism of the National Security Council, which we have discussed previously when I have given evidence, is an absolutely brilliant innovation to the machinery of Government. It has brought diplomacy, defence and development together in a structural way that was nothing like so effective before. It underlines too the fact that our security is not just dictated by guns and bullets but, as I have mentioned before to the Committee, by training the police in Afghanistan, which is a DAC-able activity, building governance structures in the Middle East and getting girls into school in the Horn of Africa. Those things too help determine our security in Britain and in London and Birmingham.

Q119 Hugh Bayley: Given that we are writing a Report about how the UK does development and politics in conflict and post-conflict states, are you able to give us either a paper that you write or examples of position papers or policies that have been developed, possibly redacted, from the National Security Council that would illustrate the point you have made to us that you have a new mechanism in Government that is improving the way that you knit together the diplomacy, the development and the defence strands in some of these places?
Mr Mitchell: I think there is a lot of evidence of that already. There will be quite a lot that comes out from the work we did on stabilisation in Libya that will show that the three Departments have worked better together than ever before and I hope that will come into the public domain. Mr Bayley will appreciate that the release of documents is not just a matter for me on the National Security Council, but I will investigate whether or not any documents produced by my Department that help to demonstrate that point can be released.

Chair: I would perhaps just make the point from the Chair that I am an ex officio representative of the National Security Strategy Committee, the Joint Committee of both Houses. Maybe I can channel some of that through that. We are feeling our way, but I think it is relevant to that as well. I would just make that point.

Q120 Pauline Latham: Could we turn to Rwanda? Do you feel that DFID’s budget support is being used to support the Government in Rwanda as effectively as possible?
Mr Mitchell: Yes, I do. Rwanda is one of the countries where we have very few doubts about the efficacy of budget support. The Committee may be aware that I have reduced the percentage of direct budget support by something like 43% over the spending period, and tightened up very considerably the provisions by which it is made. For example, we have now moved to either six-month or more, usually quarterly, disbursements of budget support so that we are able to keep very tight control of it.

In Rwanda, the line of sight on budget support that we can see through the accountancy and transparency mechanisms of the Rwandan Government—the way in which the money is being spent and the results that it is delivering—give us great confidence that the money is being really well spent. That is one of the reasons why we regard Rwanda as one of our best development partners. That is not to say there are not other aspects of the relationship that can be quite challenging, but in terms of the way in which we do budget support in Rwanda, this is an extremely effective programme and we are very pleased with that partnership.

Q121 Pauline Latham: I know that a lot of work has been done on collecting taxes, for instance, so that they have more revenue themselves to spend, which is obviously a very good mechanism that means that, eventually, we will be able to pull out as countries get better. There is good progress in many respects, but there are, as you say, some challenging areas. The 10-year memorandum of understanding with the Government in Rwanda discusses human rights and responsible Government. Is that still in place?
Mr Mitchell: Yes. Part of the new structures of budget support is that up to 5% of the funding that goes in should be used for civil society and legislatures to hold the Executive to account, to try and increase accountability mechanisms for the way in which that money is spent. I hope the Committee will not mind my mentioning that as part of Project Umubano—the Conservative Party’s social action project with which I and Mrs Latham are involved each year—this year a group of volunteers went to the Rwandan Parliament to help them build up accountability sinews. They worked with Parliamentarians and their staff on how you try and hold Ministers and the Executive to account for the programmes they are conducting and the spending they are making. All of that helps to drive the accountability agenda.

I do not know whether Mrs Latham was referring specifically to some of the challenges in the political party and press space in her comments.

Q122 Pauline Latham: I am really referring to their human rights record more than anything else. Certainly, Human Rights Watch and other NGOs do
have a lot of concerns about it. Do you think that DFID should begin to have more meaningful dialogue with the Government of Rwanda to challenge them further so that they actually do improve their human rights? There were lots of issues surrounding the last election in particular that caused great concern to a lot of people. Until they put that side of their governance right, they are not going to be seen as a country that is coming out of the conflict and all the rest of it. I would be interested in your views on that.

Mr Mitchell: First of all, I am a very strong supporter of Human Rights Watch, and whenever they publish a report we always look with very great care at what they are saying. We do not always agree with them, but we respect them very much and we look carefully, when they produce evidence of human rights abuses, at whether or not they are valid. One of the reasons why you can raise these matters quite robustly with the President, and I have done so in the case of Rwanda, is that we are a very strong partner of theirs; we are a very close friend of Rwanda and we are a candid friend. We express our concerns and our doubts when we have them and I think that the closeness of the partnership in Rwanda is a direct contributor to a better life for the people in Rwanda and the building up of governance structures. Certainly, on a number of occasions I have raised with the President and his Ministers the issue of press freedom and the issue of multi-party democracy. I think we need to respect the views of the Government of Rwanda about the difficulty of having political plurality in the aftermath of a genocide, where there are great dangers with a population that are not as literate as Western populations. We need to respect their concerns about issues of genocide ideology and so forth, but equally we need to see progress towards greater political freedom and plurality of parties. We are seeing that; there is an Act of Parliament going through the Rwandan Parliament at the moment that allows for a new way of registering political parties and new political freedom. Similarly, there is a Bill going through Parliament about media self-regulation. Of course, the question will be whether or not the spirit of these new laws is adhered to by the Government, but certainly we should recognise what they are trying to do, encourage them to do it and help with technical support and other support, as we are, so that they can move from the extraordinarily difficult circumstances that characterised Rwanda only a decade ago to a much better place. The point I want to make in response to your question is that they are moving in that way.

Q123 Pauline Latham: When you go there, year on year, you can see huge improvements so there is clearly a tremendous vision for the country to move forward, but this is one matter where they have had huge problems and people have been very critical. They have asked why we are still spending so much money there when there are still human rights abuses and the Government have a poor record on many of the issues that they should not have a poor record on. I accept that we should respect their views, but I think if you can perhaps put more pressure on them to move a little bit faster, you would satisfy many of the people who are critical of the aid that is going there.

Mr Mitchell: I think that is a very fair point. I make these points when I go to Rwanda and when I see their Ministers when they come through London. I agree about the importance of freeing up the system in the areas that Mrs Latham has mentioned, two of which I specifically referred to. As I say, it is quite possible for us to have a very strong relationship with Rwanda as a development partner and also to raise these points about human rights and wider development in a constructive way, while being a candid friend in the process.

There is one other point that Mrs Latham made about the support we give for growing the tax take within the country. Of course, that has meant that from a very low base, Rwanda is now raising more than half its budget itself. That is an absolutely key development programme that Britain has led and has given very strong support to the Rwandan Government to create. It underlines the effectiveness of the partnership, as well as the fact that aid is a means to an end, not an end in itself. That is a very good example where aid and technical support is helping develop the sinews of the state and moving towards a time when aid will no longer be needed in Rwanda.

Q124 Chair: The Committee saw extremely impressive examples of real competent political will and delivery, but we have also had credible threats reported in London towards Rwandan-British citizens here. They have denied it, of course, but those threats as articulated by the Metropolitan Police were clear to be real. I am quite certain that you and Foreign Office colleagues would have made clear to the Rwandan Government that any such action is intolerable, but it does not help the relationship if that sort of thing is emerging. You see fantastic political will, but there is a unity of purpose that gives the impression that anybody who challenges that or steps out of line is somehow a traitor, and that is disturbing.

Mr Mitchell: Those are issues that are directly addressed by the two laws I mentioned that are passing through their Parliament: the issue of media space and the issue of political space. I think we do Rwanda a service by being strong advocates of opening up in both those two areas. I merely make the point that we need to show some respect for a country and a Government that came down and rescued their country from a genocide where more than 800,000 people were killed in a 90-day period when the international community turned their back on Rwanda. Some respect for the speed at which they move in those directions should be given, although the importance of particularly those two issues is without doubt.

Q125 Alison McGovern: May I apologise briefly for being slightly late? It was due to the reorganisation of this meeting at the last moment. I might build on Pauline’s question and the comments you just made about the tax project. We know that accountability and knowing that our spending, especially via budget support, is being spent on productive outcomes is incredibly important to people in Britain.
Accountability is necessarily harder in fragile states, though thankfully, as you have mentioned, Rwanda seems to be a success story as far as it goes in that sense. We are going to have fewer DFID staffing resources to give that accountability and I am assuming, though I do not know, that the tax project you are talking about began some time ago when that balance between DFID staff and the DFID budget was somewhat different. Is it possible, in a worst-case scenario, that we could end up, in relation to fragile states, with a kind of accountability perfect storm, where we have an increasing budget but fewer DFID resources, both competent staff and their ability to be in the fine-grain detail of some of these projects, which thus undermines our ability to provide that accountability to the British people in the future? Is that possible?

Mr Mitchell: I am extremely grateful to Mrs McGovern for asking that question.

Alison McGovern: Alison, please.

Mr Mitchell: It was a point that the PAC ventilated in their report today. The answer is it is not possible that that can develop for this reason: we are reducing the administrative cost and our staffing in the UK, as are all Departments around Whitehall. That is the right thing to do and, in terms of the admin programme, DFID, like every other Department, must bear its share of the burden. We are absolutely not reducing—indeed we are increasing—the programme staffing. For example, this year we have been seeking to recruit specialists in conflict, specialists in accountability and audit, particularly specialists in the work of the private sector that the new private sector division within the Department is carrying out. Therefore, there is a big recruitment programme going on to make absolutely certain that the very danger that Alison identifies does not arise.

We cannot be in the position where we have an expanded budget, doing these important and vital things, but a lack of staff to administer it. That would be the tail wagging the dog rather than the reverse. We are absolutely committed to ensuring that these programmes, especially the ones that are scaling up, are properly staffed and properly accountable. That is why the work of internal accountability, to demonstrate that we are getting value for money and the right results, has been stepped up since the coalition Government came into office. I am most grateful to Alison for giving me the opportunity to dispel this point that was made by the PAC.

Q126 Richard Harrington: Incidentally, owing to the fact that I am referred to by this Committee and the general public alike as being a sycophantic stooge of yours, Secretary of State, I think Mr Harrington is probably better than Richard, perhaps not following the precedent of the honourable lady.

Mr Mitchell: Perhaps I can put on the record, Mr Chairman, that the idea that Mr Harrington is the stooge of anybody is patently absurd.

Q127 Richard Harrington: Except my wife, of course. To return to budget support, the serious point, as I am sure you are aware and as I think was typified by your “Newsnight” interview last month, is that the budget support bit, particularly with fragile states, is the thing that we get questioned about the most. In many cases, it is the most confusing and hard to sustain: what constitutes budget support? Is it national government? Is it through some of the sector-based Government budget support things that we are supporting in Ethiopia, for example? With that in mind, it would be most helpful if you would answer the critics who say that budget support simply should not be used in fragile or conflict-affected states? On what conditions would you agree with them and on what conditions would you disagree with them?

Mr Mitchell: The first point is that to say they should not be used in fragile states is the wrong way of looking at it. The first point is: can you follow the money? Can I look Parliament in the eye and say that I believe the deployment of budget support in a country is accountable? Can we see that money is being well-spent? Is it securing the results to which we are committed and is it delivering it in an effective way? Those are the first questions. Then you come up against what perhaps I could call the Ethiopian dilemma; I think it was Ethiopia that was the subject of the “Newsnight” report.

Richard Harrington: Yes, that's correct.

Mr Mitchell: In Ethiopia, the last Government faced a dilemma following the 2005 election, when the Meles Government shot a number of students who were demonstrating on the street. Everyone was clearly horrified by that and quite rightly people said that some action must be taken. The dilemma, of course, is that if you remove aid in those circumstances you will have very little effect on the leading members of the Government who made the decision to allow those students to be shot on the street, but you will effectively take girls out of school. That was the Ethiopian dilemma and the then Government decided that they could not just withdraw budget support to the national Government and that they should find alternative ways of achieving the then Ethiopian programme, and set out finding alternative funding mechanisms to do so.

Of course it is right that we should take into account human rights issues. Over the difficulties earlier this year in Malawi, I took the decision that we would cease giving direct budget support to that Government because of the actions they had taken, but equally that we should not withdraw from the important programmes in Malawi that were helping people in a very stressed and difficult part of the world, living in great poverty, to lift themselves out of poverty. Therefore, we find other mechanisms for delivering that. In the case of Rwanda though, we can follow the money very clearly; they are extremely transparent and accountable in the way they spend direct budget support and, for that reason, we continue to deploy it in that way.

One final point, overall we are reducing significantly the proportion of direct budget support. I think in an earlier answer I gave the Committee the figure of 43% over the five years.

Q128 Richard Harrington: I understand that and I can also see the rationale that if we want to actually use the money in the end to help the people who need...
helping, sometimes we just do not have a choice other than to do it via budget support. I am not bringing up the old argument on Burundi, but the international community generally seem to use that argument for budget support for Burundi generally. Without the World Bank and other money that goes to the Government in Burundi, the Government effectively would not exist.  

**Mr Mitchell:** We do no budget support there.  
**Richard Harrington:** I know that, but I am just saying sometimes the argument is that in the end, it is better than nothing. Of course, we do leave ourselves susceptible, as you and all of us have been questioned about many times, to these stories about Ugandan jets being purchased for the use of the Prime Minister and this sort of thing. Those that are anti DFID and anti the whole programme use that sort of example. More specifically, do you feel that it is practical to apply governance conditions to budget support or to sectoral budget support such as in Ethiopia? Are there generally cases where whatever conditions we do apply it is not really going to make much difference and we just have to have the overriding interest of helping to advance the prosperity of those countries?  

**Mr Mitchell:** Budget support is part of a debate with Governments. We always have to decide whether or not it is the best way of doing it. If you can trust Governments, there is no doubt at all that budget support is the best way of doing development because it ensures that the ownership of systems rests with the country itself. I completely concede that it is the best way if you can trust the way the money is being spent and our reduction in the level of budget support is carried out because we feel that we cannot follow the money; we are not confident that it is being well-spent and, therefore, we have reduced it. We clearly take into account, as part of that partnership, human rights issues; we take into account the effectiveness of the spending, the accountability, the way in which countries themselves are able to hold their Governments accountable for the use of budget support. All these things help us to decide, as well as the effectiveness, whether it is the right mechanism to use.  

Q129 **Richard Harrington:** If it is possible we could move on to the state-building and peace-building side of things because we were recently in DRC. Witnesses have pointed to us that in DFID’s operational plans in the DRC they are usually measured by indicators of improvements in service delivery rather than in relation to progress in peace-building. Would you agree with that?  

**Mr Mitchell:** We do both. I think. Clearly, part of the programme in the DRC, which the Committee would have seen, addresses conflict, dysfunctional and justice. There is then the PROMINES programme, with which I think the Committee are familiar. There is also the work that is being done, not least through the United Nations force in bringing much greater stability. There is all the election work as well, where we have been heavily engaged in trying to make sure that people are registered for elections and that there is a transparent process, which is obviously extremely difficult, but where progress has been made and where, indeed, on the last occasion of the election, a surprisingly good election was held, according to the observers at the time, all of which was effectively paid for by the international community. In this election this year we expect that half of the cost will be paid for by the DRC, so that represents some progress on that.  

Q130 **Richard Harrington:** In fairness to DFID, we did, at the electoral registration programme, see many people who had walked for hours, if not days, to get to actually register. Of course, when one also observes the poverty in a place like the DRC, it is sometimes possible to think that the governance side of it is a bit of a luxury when people do not have enough to eat and are being slaughtered around them. We certainly saw the results of that. On state-building at the smaller level, we saw programmes where communities were encouraged to take their own decisions to allocate money. I cannot remember the name of the programme, but we saw a village where they decided, for example, to have water pumps and a medical centre compared to a school, or vice versa. Do you think this is something that would increase in the future? Are indications good?  

**Mr Mitchell:** Yes, I think it is a very important programme and you will see it all around the world. I have seen it in probably the most difficult area where we support such programmes, which is in Afghanistan. Quite apart from enabling people to decide whether they want to build up their local medical facilities or have easier access to water, it is a way of their seeing some benefit from Government centrally. For example, the Government is seen as an entity that contributes to their security rather than takes away from it. In Britain a policeman or policewoman is generally seen as a reassuring presence; in parts of the world the Committee has visited that is not always the case.  

Q131 **Richard Harrington:** Absolutely. I must say, I was cynical before I saw that particular programme that I mentioned, but I think most of us were impressed by it. I take it that you think we are going to increase our spending on this kind of programme. What percentage of DFID’s budget in the DRC is spent through civil society organisations for this sort of thing? Would you happen to know that?  

**Mr Mitchell:** I cannot give you the figure off the top of my head, but if you do not already have it we can certainly give the Committee the breakdown of the results we are seeking to secure and the people we are working with to secure them.  

Q132 **Richard Harrington:** That would be appreciated. As you said, Rwanda generally seems to be making good progress on some of the indicators. As you mentioned, we have seen progress in many of the MGD indicators and other indicators. What lessons from the Rwanda experience could be applied to the DRC?  

**Mr Mitchell:** In the DRC you see the effects on people’s lives of the weakness—you see the complete failure in Somalia—of governance structures that do not provide the basic things that their people need, in
terms of the provision of food, education and basic healthcare on the one hand and of security on the other. There was insecurity for many years, for example, in Eastern DRC and in the Kivus, following the genocide in Rwanda and the fact of the Lord’s Resistance Army being in part of the national park in the north-eastern part of the DRC. They were hugely destabilising factors. It underlines the essential message of development: until you tackle conflict, it is very difficult indeed for people to lift themselves out of poverty. In the end, it is conflict and dysfunctionality above all that defines poverty. If you are living in a village, either in a refugee camp or you have been displaced, as is the case in many parts of Eastern DRC, until the conflict is over and you have the confidence to go back to your home and not to fear for the safety of your family and your relations, you are not really going to make progress. That is the message that you see in the contrast between the DRC on the one hand and Rwanda on the other.

Q133 Chair: As you may be aware, Secretary of State, we travelled by surface transport, mostly, when we were there because we wanted to get the physical idea of the landscape and the connections. We drove from Kigali to Goma and we took a boat from Goma to Bukavu, and then drove to Bujumbura, so I think we did get a good impression of the interaction. Goma is literally under the volcano and feels like it, in terms of the novel, because it is full of displaced people and there is virtually no real organised activity; we were not allowed out of the hotel; it wasn’t safe; and we have one UK Government representative, our man in Goma, who I think is shared between the FCO and your Department. He is a very impressive individual, but do you get the impression that we are making any progress? I say that because when we travelled down to Bukavu, which some of us were in five years ago, it has definitely moved into a better space. You could feel it and you could see it. Goma, if anything, has moved into a worse space, although we did not visit it five years ago. What is your sense of progress and what can the UK do to try and turn that around?

Mr Mitchell: I was in Goma about three years ago and it is definitely in a much better situation than it was then, when you had two warring armies and 60,000 people caught between the guns of the two sides, just on the outskirts of Goma, with no support structures at all. At least in that respect the position in Goma has improved. I do not know whether this was the Committee’s experience, but the contrast at the border between coming out of Rwanda or into Rwanda from Goma, and the order, stability and good organisation on the Rwandan side and the very reverse on the Goma side, underlines the contrast between the two countries and those two particular towns. I think that there is greater peace in Goma now, and the work that MONUSCO has done there and the rather encouraging way in which the Indian troops and the deployed Pakistani assets work seamlessly together in pursuit of MONUSCO’s mandate have led to a degree of stability in Goma that was not present before, but I do not deny the point that you are making.

Q134 Chair: We will come onto the role of MONUSCO, but I think the point we were making is that people have piled into Goma because of the insecurity around about. Maybe the town itself is more secure, but that is partly because the rest of the area is less secure. They have all piled in. We did see a water programme or something being done in public work, but fundamentally there is not a functioning economy. People are herded in there; the numbers have grown up and the infrastructure is under strain. Obviously, we spent time with International Rescue, who are funded by DFID and doing extremely good work, but the point was made that it is a hell of a long way from Kinshasa to Goma or Bukavu. No disrespect to the DFID officials we met, but they are Kinshasa-based, and there was one official shared between DFID and the Foreign Office. Given the importance and the interaction of the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, should there not really be a DFID office of some kind on the ground that can actually have day-to-day engagement with what is going on? There are no direct flights; they are dependent on UN flights. Is it really efficient and functional to try and run that programme, albeit through NGOs that you maybe can trust and manage, from Kinshasa?

Mr Mitchell: We always consider whether to deploy staff outside of capital cities. That is a function of their own security; we have a duty of care that we must always exercise in full. It is also a product of whether or not we need to have policy officials on the ground working with our partners. You mentioned the IRC, who I think are doing some brilliant work in the DRC. If that were the Committee’s impression, having visited Goma and seen what we are doing there, I will certainly consider it. We are always careful to ensure that the relationship between our programmes and those who are running them is a close one and is properly staffed. In view of what you have said though, Mr Chairman, I will have a look at that.

Chair: We will take that on board.

Q135 Mr McCann: Could we move on to effective governance and stick with the DRC. Are you confident that the Government of the DRC has put in place sufficient measures to avoid further improper confiscation of mining assets in the country?

Mr Mitchell: The PROMINES programme, which I think the Committee may have seen, is an important contribution. What we know about the mineral assets and other assets in the DRC is that they have been subject to extensive pillaging over many years by different groups. As is clear, for example, in the excellent book, “The Plundered Planet”, by Paul Collier, the transparent exploitation and development of mineral wealth is a key asset in countries lifting themselves out of poverty.

It starts in the beginning with ensuring there is not asymmetrical knowledge about what the mineral resources are, so the Government and those seeking to develop them have the same knowledge and moves on to the way in which they are extracted and exploited, what is the sharing of the profits and the fact that the profit goes in a transparent way into the state’s coffers. The process then addresses the way in which the profit is spent by the state. All of these
things are part of the process by which the exploitation of mineral wealth should take place. I think that PROMINES, which has the specific goal of improving the governance of the mining sector and increasing its contribution to economic growth, sustainable development and poverty reduction, has made a good start. We fund it; it is a programme with the World Bank and we must give it strong support and I think it is a very useful contribution to the process that I described.

Q136 Mr McCann: But the World Bank suspended its funding of PROMINES and I was going to ask you if DFID suspended the funding at the same time. With the greatest respect though, the question was: do you think the DRC Government has put in place measures to stop the mining assets being sold off? I am going to ask you the question: did we suspend our money at the same time as the World Bank did?

Mr Mitchell: Yes we did, but I think that PROMINES is part of the answer to your question.

Q137 Mr McCann: But it is not going to be solved if the DRC Government do not also put in place the measures. Is that a sensitive area?

Mr Mitchell: There are no easy answers to these issues. There is a longstanding issue and problem with mineral extraction in the DRC. It would be facile of me to think that any one particular measure is going to remedy that.

Q138 Mr McCann: Therefore, can I take it from your answer that you still think there are problems in terms of the Government of the DRC effectively ensuring this is not going to happen in the future?

Mr Mitchell: There are such problems, yes.

Q139 Mr McCann: Just a final question: has the Government drawn a line under the First Quantum affair or are there any further issues that you are going to pursue on that?

Mr Mitchell: I would have to refresh my memory on precisely where we have got to on that. If it would be helpful to the Committee, I should be very happy to let them have—

Q140 Chair: I was going come in behind that because the story may have moved on. First Quantum basically say that having invested nearly $1 million in a mine, which is apparently closed and not functioning, it was sequestered from them. It was then sold to another company that was also registered on the London Stock Exchange, which raises questions about how that would come about. There are now reports of secret deals of mining concessions being signed between the Government and others. It frankly gives the impression that everything is going back to what caused the war in the first place. How much pressure can the international community bring to bear? First Quantum would say the World Bank suspended payments, but in the end they reinstated them without having resolved what they would regard as their issue. They feel hung out to dry and abandoned. They would say that wouldn’t they, but that’s how they feel.

Pauline Latham: Can I just follow on from that?

Chair: Yes, by all means.

Q141 Pauline Latham: My understanding is that not only are they registered on the London Stock Exchange, which is a bit bizarre, but the money is going out to the Cayman Islands, or an offshore place where they can hide, and nobody can find out who the directors of the organisations are. There is an awful lot of scepticism about anything being resolved.

Mr Mitchell: Both Mrs Latham’s and the Chairman’s contributions underline the reasons for my answer to Mr McCann that there is still a great deal more that needs to be done.

Q142 Chair: I understand the sensitivities, but the point one would want to make is if there is to be a future for the DRC, and as you rightly say the biggest resource in Africa, abutting on 14 countries, there has to be some indication, does there not, of a commitment by the Government of the DRC to deliver openness and transparency? Otherwise, is that not precisely how it will fall back into conflict?

Mr Mitchell: That is absolutely at the heart of the discussions we have with the Government of the DRC. It is an extremely difficult area, beset by the problems that have been articulated, but all of us understand the importance of promoting transparency in the exploitation of the mineral wealth, not having allegations of secret deals or secret deals themselves and ensuring that the pillars of transparency are there, and that the Government of the DRC adheres to them.

Q143 Mr McCann: Can I ask, putting all that together and understanding the massive ramp-up of resources that we are going to be putting into the DRC as a country over the next few years, is there any tipping point in your mind where the issues of corruption, or the Government of the DRC not playing ball, would then lead you to the conclusion that you would pull out?

Mr Mitchell: We are deeply conscious, particularly in the DRC, of the dangers of corruption. As Mr McCann will be aware, we have a zero tolerance position on corruption.

Mr McCann: It isn’t that zero because we know it is going on, and we are still giving them money.

Mr Mitchell: In terms of our intervention in DRC, we seek to secure very specific results in a whole range of different areas, including basic services, which I think were referred to, as well as in mineral development. Those are the results we seek to achieve and we work through credible partners to ensure that we achieve them. In terms of the Government policy you are referring to and whether or not they stand by commitments they give, we are forthright in arguing the importance of transparency and openness in the exploitation of their mineral wealth because it is so important to DRC lifting itself out of poverty. In terms of our own taxpayers’ money and the work that we are doing, we are absolutely clear that we will not tolerate corruption and that we will work through credible partners to deliver the results that we are buying.
Chair: Because it is such an important country we still have more questions relating to the DRC.

Q144 Richard Burden: There has been some speculation that the November elections are likely to be postponed. What is your take on that and is the Department making any contingency arrangements if that is what happens?

Mr Mitchell: I cannot assist the Committee on whether or not they will be postponed. What I can say is that the preparations for these elections are advanced, but the timetable is extremely tight. The logistics challenge for delivering these elections is unprecedented.

Q145 Richard Burden: If they do go ahead, is it your judgment that they will actually make much difference to the conflict in the east of the country?

Mr Mitchell: I think the desire that has been demonstrated by the millions of people who have registered for these elections underlines the importance that people themselves attached to the right to vote—the ability to vote and have an influence on those who govern them. I think we must do everything we can to ensure that those expectations are fulfilled. I am not in a position, though, to give the Committee a judgment on whether they will be postponed, except to say that we are doing everything we can to assist in ensuring they are not.

Q146 Richard Burden: Both my questions are really about the appropriate use of DFID resources. We have heard the same reports as you of people queuing to become registered and so on. As you say, amongst large numbers of people the elections and the prospect of elections are very important indeed. However, the foreign donor proportion of support for the elections has actually gone down, not up.

Mr Mitchell: It was entirely funded by foreign donors.

Richard Burden: That’s right.

Mr Mitchell: It is now about 50:50.

Q147 Richard Burden: Yes, just under, I think: about 40%. Therefore, the question really is, regarding the UK’s contribution, whether it make sense and whether the priority is still that we should be spending quite a large amount of money on elections, or could our money be better spent on other projects in the DRC or in other parts of East Africa?

Mr Mitchell: We are engaged on many other projects as well, but in addition to funding voter registration, we are also supporting voter education campaigns; we are supporting electoral observation teams; and we are helping their independent electoral commission and trying to ensure that the police are trained and equipped to keep the peace and play their part in securing a properly functioning election. We are engaged in all those things. I think they are all very important, but of course it is part of a much wider programme in the DRC.

Q148 Richard Burden: If fighting in the east does continue in the run-up to the elections, which is possible, what arrangements—it is back to the question about contingency arrangements again—does DFID have in place to try to ensure that its other programmes are able to continue? Could they be jeopardised by continued or increased fighting?

Mr Mitchell: The programmes in the DRC are quite robust, precisely because of the instability that Mr Burden is addressing. In terms of the elections though, we have a lot of experience from working in the DRC and on elections from the last time around, and we will be doing our best to ensure that credible elections take place and when the undoubted difficulties emerge we will tackle them and play our part in helping in the best way we can.

Q149 Chair: Should we not be sending more monitors? “We”, that is, the international community. The UK has put a lot of money into voter registration and voter education in order to have successful elections and yet—tell me if this Daily Telegraph report is wrong—we are sending just five observers and the EU is sending 112 compared with 300 previously, and there are something like 100,000 polling stations. There is a campaign, as you will be well aware, saying not so much that we should do something differently, but that we should monitor what is going on more vigorously and in more numbers. Our Report will be too late to make any recommendations about that, so it has to be an interface here, but do you think maybe we need to ensure that there are more observers for this election, especially as it is being more financed by the Government?

Mr Mitchell: We are very much aware of the importance of observers for an election. Of course, it is not just for the time the election takes place; in the period before the election takes place observers can play an enormously important role. Britain always plays a part in these arrangements when we can. The decision about the number of election observers is not only a matter for us, of course, but for others who are engaged in election monitoring too and, indeed, for the DRC electoral commission. I think no one is in any doubt about the importance of having well-trained election observers on the ground who are able to give confidence to the process, as well as carry out the traditional role of observing, which is part of their remit.

Chair: I have provoked an intervention from Hugh Bayley.

Q150 Hugh Bayley: Provoked more by having been an observer last time and, of course, it is important for the process and the process of observing to guard against intimidation, fraud and mishap. A point I have to stress more than anything is the need to build robust systems. I recall polling day going off reasonably well and then polling materials—ballot papers—being brought to consolidation centres and there was absolutely no recording of what happened. Piles of paper were blowing about on the ground outside 10 feet high. All the data were being destroyed and I did actually call our Ambassador at that point to say, “Something needs to be done very quickly to capture the raw data caught at polling stations, and enough of it” to be sure what the outcome of the election was. There was no real system to cope with widespread and
We said we would come. This is slightly taking us back to MONUSCO, which you touched on earlier.

Mr Mitchell: Mr Bayley was clearly in the finest tradition of election observers who actually drew attention to these difficulties and tried to resolve them, which is what election observers should do. The primary responsibility, and of course we have put a lot of effort into this, rests with the police to ensure that the elections are properly conducted. The role of the observers in an election that will not be perfect but in which we know people, through the high level of registration, are keen to participate in, is extremely important. The lesson from the elections that took place in Zimbabwe last time and many other elections too, is that having a good web of election observers who do not just come in at the last moment but are part of this process in the run-up to it, is enormously important, as the Chairman’s comments implied.

Q151 Alison McGovern: This is slightly taking us back to where we started on this subject. You mentioned that conflict prevention was at the heart of reducing poverty. It does not need a complicated answer at all, but in terms of measurement of success of conflict prevention, is there a process that DFID expects to go through with that? Is there a matrix of some kind of proxies: “Conflict prevention will mean X, Y, and Z proxy and we’ll track it via these means”? Is that how it is going to work in terms of measurement of conflict prevention?

Q152 Chair: How do you prove you stopped a war? Alison McGovern: Yes, difficult.

Mr Mitchell: There are many aspects to conflict prevention. We know, for example, that if people are employed, if there are basic services provided, if there is a security and justice system that is user friendly and even transparent, then we know those are things that you can help to build—we do an enormous amount of work in all those areas—which have the ability to stop conflict from starting and to prevent it. As the Chairman said though, you are seeking to prove a negative, which is always difficult.

Q153 Alison McGovern: Just to question you there, if I may, very briefly: all of those things were provided and were true for people in this country during the Second World War, for example, yet we were a country at war. There are possible scenarios where we do all of those things and yet a conflict is still occurring. It does not quite feel enough to me.

Mr Mitchell: The seeds of the conflict in the Second World War were not in Britain, they were elsewhere, so I am not sure I would completely accept your analogy. It remains the case that there are a huge number of things you can do. The strategy for tackling conflict and trying to prevent it from starting is a wide one. There are an enormous number of things that we get involved in in the specific areas that I mentioned.

Q154 Pauline Latham: We said we would come back to MONUSCO, which you touched on earlier. They have been heavily criticised. MONUSCO does not speak the language; it does not get out to remote places; and it has itself been accused of irregularities. Do you think that MONUSCO represents value for money?

Mr Mitchell: MONUSCO is the largest and most expensive United Nations force deployed anywhere and I think they do an extremely difficult job. We are very strongly supportive of them. The British Government thinks that MONUSCO is playing a vital role in the DRC. There have been some very specific concerns about discipline and about some of the things that soldiers who are part of MONUSCO have got up to, and they should be held to account for those. We have made that absolutely clear, but we do think that it plays a critical role in protecting civilians and helping to build stability in the DRC.

Q155 Pauline Latham: We met with them when we were there and obviously we had long discussions about it, but I was quite shocked to find that in their mandate they have no way they can hold people. If they know who these soldiers, or whoever they are coming from different armies and other groups, are, coming into rape and use women as a tool of war, they are not allowed to hold them and hand them over to the police. The police are not blameless because they also have been taking part in these vile activities. It seems to me that when the current mandate expires, one of the things that should go into the next one is the fact that if they know who the perpetrators are, they should hold them until they can hand them over to the country’s law. We should be helping the country’s legal service, and the whole system that goes through from the police arrest to remand and then going to court, to get these people who are perpetrating these vile crimes against women; they should be being held to account. One way it could happen would be MONUSCO holding on to them to hand them on, rather than saying, “Well, we know who they are”, but by the time they get the police there they have all disappeared. It seems crazy that they have no mandate to hold onto anybody. First of all, can we press for that as being part of their next mandate, and what else do you feel could change in the new mandate when this one expires?

Mr Mitchell: I completely agree with the point that Mrs Latham is making. I am aware of the recent circumstances in which MONUSCO has assisted with the transfer of soldiers accused and convicted of rape, and that obviously is an encouraging sign. We have been effective in lobbying for improvements in MONUSCO’s mandate, including ensuring that protection of civilians is the highest priority in the new mandate, underlining the importance of disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration processes, and in urging the UN to recognise the link between the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources, and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as a factor fuelling the conflict. Those were specific changes that we sought in the mandate, and argued for.

I think that there have been improvements; I think that there need to be more. I completely agree with you about the wholly unacceptable behaviour of UN
soldiers wearing the UN badge engaging in such terrible crimes against women. As a former UN peacekeeping soldier myself I am horrified that people who wear the blue beret with the authority of the United Nations should ever behave in that way.

Q156 Pauline Latham: Do you feel that the police should be better trained there so that they do not become perpetrators of rape? They should actually be doing the job that they are obviously employed to do if they are being paid, to make sure that they do ensure that these perpetrators go through the processes of law, are convicted and are sentenced. This would set an example to others who are looking from the sidelines who are thinking, “Oh, they’re getting away with it. What’s going on?”

Mr Mitchell: I do agree with what Mrs Latham is saying. When I was last in Kinshasa I had a lengthy meeting with the Chief of Police in Kinshasa and I made these points then to what I thought was a receptive audience. However, it is obviously one thing at the top of the police to have support for these, but for that discipline and important training to percolate right the way through down to grassroots level is another.

Q157 Pauline Latham: Again, it is in Kinshasa, not up in the east where all these things are happening. That is another issue about the distance; they do not seem to get out there in the same way that they should do. It is difficult to communicate with people when it is such an enormous country. It is so far to go. Do you think that MONUSCO could or should be reconfigured to be a much more mobile force than it is currently?

Mr Mitchell: I think the way in which the force commander deploys his assets in accordance with his mandate is a matter for him. I think he has to juggle with a large number of different priorities and requirements. Clearly, the ability to move quickly in such a large country is extremely important, but it is not easy for me from here to second guess his priorities outside of saying that we should lay down a very clear mandate to which he has to operate.

Q158 Pauline Latham: Because it is happening in a relatively small area, they should be able to catch the majority of these gangs that are out there fighting. If they could get rid of them, as a peacekeeping force, and get them out of the country if they have come from other countries, it would stabilise.

Mr Mitchell: This is the soldiers in MONUSCO?

Pauline Latham: Yes. If they could capture the gangs that are causing mayhem in the country and causing death, rape and all the other things that are going on, it would clearly make that country much more stable. I think something has to happen there to do it. To go back to the election, do you think MONUSCO should have a role in relation to the forthcoming elections and should they be helping to provide greater security for the elections?

Mr Mitchell: They will have an indirect role, inevitably, in that and quite rightly so. I think it is important, in respect of the first part of your question, to underline the fact that this is quite a robust force. It is a Chapter VII, not a Chapter VI, peacekeeping force, so it has the ability to take robust action in conjunction with the DR Congo’s security forces if appropriate. It is not constrained or fettered in a way that a Chapter VI force would be, so we expect them to take robust action in some of the circumstances you describe.

Q159 Pauline Latham: Coming back on that—just before you answer the second bit—when we met I did not get the feeling that there was much robustness, I have to say. I do not know if the rest of the Committee agree with me, but I felt that they were saying, “Well, there’s not much we can do about it, really”: I was very disappointed by that because there is so much that should be being done.

Mr Mitchell: I agree entirely with the point you make about the extent to which action should be taken, but they have a Chapter VII mandate. We always encourage them to take robust action, particularly against the perpetrators of violence and in terms of the other issues that you mentioned. There is no lack of support for the Chapter VII mandate from us.

Q160 Chair: One of the duties of the Chair sometimes is to go through protocol meetings, so I missed the MONUSCO briefing, but I was actually meeting the Deputy Governor and some of the Ministers at the time, and I was very disappointed when I asked the Education Minister what their concerns were about women and children in the conflict areas where there was general lawlessness and rape. Her response was, “We wouldn’t have a problem if we just got all these Rwandans out of the country” and I thought for a Minister—admittedly a local, regional Minister—to say it was all being perpetrated by Rwandan exiles in Eastern Congo, when all the information we had was it was a much more complicated situation, was a gross oversimplification and, indeed, very far from the truth. If you do not have that kind of wealth then that does rather inhibit MONUSCO’s ability to act if the Government authorities on the ground are clearly not backing you up.

Mr Mitchell: The Chairman’s comment speaks for itself.

Q161 Mr McCann: The division seems to be about the powers that they have under Chapter VII and the willingness or unwillingness to use it on the ground. I appreciate the sensitivities of that in terms of the diplomacy of that situation, but where can we then, as a British Government, put our views on the record about using the full weight of the Chapter VII opportunities they have available to them?

Mr Mitchell: We do that. I should make that very clear. The British Government strongly supports the mandate, with the reservations that I mentioned to the Committee, and strongly supports the Chapter VII mandate. We expect this force not to be fettered in the way that is characteristic of a Chapter VI mandate, but to defend civilians who are in danger of being hurt or the subject of violence, and to defend them robustly. The British Government has been very clear
that this is a Chapter VII mandate and it must be used with full authority in that respect.

Q162 Richard Burden: Right at the start of this session, when we were talking about different approaches in fragile states, if I recall, Secretary of State, you said that there were three things that were really important. The first was to have an early warning system. The second was to try to arrest conflict where it was taking place and the third was to get involved in the reconciliation and post-conflict activities. That being the case, at the end of July the Government published its Building Stability Overseas strategy, which appears, unless I have read it wrongly, to deal with the first two of those: it talks about early warning; it talks about rapid crisis prevention and response and then it talks about investing in upstream prevention. Am I reading it wrong or is a bit missing from that, which is post-conflict recovery?

Mr Mitchell: No, Mr Burden is entirely correct about the strategy that we published in July. It was of course developed jointly by the Foreign Office, MOD and us. It is based on a strong, integrated approach, bringing together development, diplomacy and defence assets, in the way that I described as the hallmark of the National Security Council. It is based on those three pillars. The early warning pillar is designed to improve our ability to anticipate instability and potential triggers of conflict, and an early warning system has been established to strengthen understanding of where the risks of conflict and instability are high.

Secondly, rapid prevention and response, to which Mr Burden referred, is where a £20 million early action facility has been created within the conflict pool, which will enable swifter responses to warnings and opportunities. Of course, stabilisation response teams are part of that, the first of which we deployed to Benghazi in Libya. That will further our ability—and some of the lessons learnt from the Benghazi deployment assist with this—to develop responses to emergencies based on real-time information.

Thirdly, the point Mr Burden made about upstream prevention is about tackling the underlying drivers of instability before a crisis occurs. A new cross-Government approach to strategic conflict assessments will inform the way in which we develop strategies that are properly integrated in key countries and also in key regions.

Q163 Richard Burden: I understand that, but that does appear to miss out the third element that you mentioned at the start, which was post-conflict reconciliation. Should that not really be part of the picture there?

Mr Mitchell: That is a debatable point. In Rwanda, for example, that work which was done by the Rwandans themselves, but latterly with British Government support, was very specific. In other areas, it quite quickly filters into the basic work of stabilisation, providing proper justice and security systems and improving governance, which is at the heart of reconciliation as well. You could argue that it is not a distinct part of the strategy, which is why it is not specifically singled out. Nevertheless, there is no question but that reconciliation, following a conflict, is a vital part of the work of preventing conflict from re-emerging.

Q164 Richard Burden: And post-conflict recovery in terms of rebuilding infrastructure.

Mr Mitchell: That includes all the work of stabilisation.

Q165 Chair: This inquiry is focused on the Government’s strategy right across fragile states, but for practical reasons we have obviously gone to three countries that we physically could visit to get some examples. It is not exclusive to those three countries. Indeed, even in East Africa, before you even look at Afghanistan or Pakistan, it is the interconnection of all these conflicts and how they spill over that is part of the problem. You cannot talk about East Africa without talking about Somalia, whether it is Somali pirates, what we have witnessed on the Kenya-Somalia border of kidnapping people or abducting them, and you yourself have been there, which is entirely creditable. How are we going to deal with Somalia and, indeed, how can we tackle conflict and spill-over conflict in that region without doing so? We obviously see the impact in Kenya; we hear that refugees are causing destabilisation in Tanzania; and, clearly, piracy on the high seas is almost an every-day news headline. You have been there; what is the strategy to deal with Somalia?

Mr Mitchell: That is a very big question. Mr Chairman, and I can perhaps just give you some views of the strands that are part of the answer to it. First of all, the importance is to get access, which is very difficult, to address the urgent needs of health and food by a pipeline over the next few months, and then to begin a strategy of resilience and attempting to ensure that it does not happen again. The one encouraging point is that where we have been able to set up these strategies you can see clear evidence of success. In Ethiopia, we have been able to assist the Government there with very specific programmes that ensure that people do not starve or suffer from the extremes of malnutrition. We have cut the prevalence of malnutrition in Ethiopia amongst very young children by something like 50% over the last 15 years or so. We have to do that, immediately.

Secondly, the TFG, the Government in Somalia, such as it is, needs a new mandate, which we hope will take place in the next year. There is clearly a requirement to have, from the bottom up in Somalia, a reflection of what sort of Government people want. There are a variety of different ways in which that can be progressed, but it is not an easy situation. Thirdly, you need to have a degree of stability, which AMISOM, the international force deployed out of Mogadishu led by the Ugandans and the Burundians, is seeking to promote. This is probably the most dysfunctional country in the world. It is extremely difficult to see progress in any simplistic way, but there are three areas where I submit that progress needs to be made for any improvement overall to take place.
Q166 Pauline Latham: At the party conference, you heard as I did the lady from Somaliland. I met her afterwards and she was also talking about huge numbers becoming refugees, the fact that again they are being raped and thousands of children are dying. Her view is that the country, the Government, does not care and all they are concerned about is feathering their own nest and not looking after the people. Because there are so many refugees, I just wondered what we are doing there to help.

Mr Mitchell: First of all, we are trying to stop the need for people to migrate. The Committee will be aware of the enormous numbers of people who have come across the border at the rate of 1,000 a day into Dadaab, the biggest refugee camp in the world, into other camps as well, and also into Mogadishu, which I visited in the summer. Trying to stop people having the need to migrate, with the terrible effects it has in terms of their being attacked, being unwell and being unfed, is very important. There has been some improvement in access, particularly by UNICEF and the ICRC, but also by Save the Children, who are doing brilliant work inside Somalia.

As of today, Britain has led the relief effort. We have made some progress; we are feeding millions of people in that part of the world; we are vaccinating 1.3 million children against measles and 680,000 children against polio; we are supplying 160,000 bed nets, because when the rains come, which are starting now, waterborne disease will cut through a very malnourished population like a knife through butter, and so we are trying very hard to stop what is a disaster already turning into a catastrophe.

Regarding the comments about the Government of Somalia, the Government’s writ does not run throughout most of Somalia. This is not a functioning Government in the terms that we would define it and in order to make progress I think you have to achieve, in each of the three areas I set out, progress there to secure progress overall.

Q167 Chair: Thank you very much, Secretary of State. I have just had a BBC newsflash that Libya’s interim Prime Minister has confirmed that Muammar Gaddafi has been killed. That brings an end to that particular episode. Thank you very much for your attendance. I am afraid it has taken the full two hours that were allocated, but this is central to your Department’s strategy. It is a huge part of your budget that is going into it. Obviously, its success has to be measurable and, if it is delivered it will have a very positive contribution but it is an extremely difficult, complicated and risky area and you understand that the Committee really does need to probe this as effectively as we can. I thank you very much for coming in and giving evidence and I hope the Report we can produce will have some useful and constructive suggestions. Obviously, some of the things we have discussed today are more topical than that, so I can only ask that you reflect on them and if you feel they justify any action you will take it.

Mr Mitchell: Thank you very much, Mr Chairman. I am particularly grateful to the Committee, too, for focusing on these three countries, from which I think there is a great deal to learn, to make a success of the overall work we are embarked on. I will await the Committee’s Report with even more interest than I do normally await the excellent and very helpful Reports of the Committee.

Chair: Thank you very much indeed.
Written evidence from DFID

SUMMARY

(i) Conflict and fragility is one of the most urgent and important challenges facing the developing world. Poor people living in these countries suffer twice over—from poverty and from conflict—and no low income fragile state has yet achieved a single MDG.

(ii) In response, the Coalition Government is putting development at the heart of an integrated approach that supports the world’s most vulnerable people and protects Britain from external threats. The creation of the National Security Council on which the Secretary of State for International Development sits, the commitment to spend 30% of ODA to support conflict affected and fragile states by 2014–15, and the strong focus in the Strategic Defence and Security Review on upstream prevention, will all strengthen UK efforts to prevent and tackle conflict.

(iii) Speaking at the Royal College of Defence Studies on 16 September 2010 the Secretary of State for International Development set out the case for a renewed emphasis on tackling conflict and fragility, and his vision for the more effective of use of aid as part of an integrated UK approach. Work to prevent and respond to conflict and fragility saves lives and reduces human suffering, it is essential for poverty reduction and progress against the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and it can help to address threats to global and regional stability.

(iv) In fragile and conflict affected countries (FCAS), the UK’s priority is helping to build peaceful states and societies by working to achieve four key objectives: address causes and effects of conflict; support political settlements; develop core state functions; respond to public expectations. This framework shapes what we do in-country, although decisions on exactly which issues to focus our efforts on will depend on a robust analysis of the country context.

(v) The UK has been at the fore-front of international and national learning on effective mechanisms for delivering aid in FCAS. There are a number of aid instruments we can choose from including humanitarian aid, where necessary; pooled funding with multilaterals, “bottom-up development” working with communities and civil society; and, where the circumstances are right, working directly through local government systems. Public confidence that people’s expectations are being met is crucial to sustain peace and build stability. Development programmes can play a vital role in helping to strengthen security and justice, promote job and wealth creation, and deliver basic services like health and education. Our approach is conflict sensitive and underpinned by Do No harm principles.

(vi) We support better governance at the national level by working on institutions, parliaments and service delivery, and are increasing our focus on sub-national levels including local governance structures and communities. We work closely with civil society to help deliver services but also as an agent of change and to help hold governments to account. The UK government is also committed to ensuring that girls and women are at the heart of our development policies, strengthening women’s political participation in peacebuilding, and improving women’s access to security and justice.

(vii) A strong focus on results is fundamental to the UK’s ability to deliver in FCAS and crucial for building public confidence in the role of their Governments. We need to overcome the practical difficulties of collecting data, and ensure we can measure progress in addressing conflict and fragility. Therefore, DFID has been strengthening its systems, corporate planning processes, guidance, and set of indicators. This will inform programming and ongoing risk management.

(viii) The Coalition Government recognises that no one single donor or international actor can address conflict and fragility alone, therefore we work closely with others at both the international and the country-level. We are supporting reforms to the UN and other multilaterals to strengthen their work in FCAS and work effectively at country-level with pooled funding arrangement and joint analysis and implementation.

(ix) The HMG Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010) makes a firm commitment to taking an integrated approach to building stability overseas that brings UK Government Departments together. The forthcoming Building Stability Overseas Strategy, which is being written jointly by FCO, MOD and DFID will set clear direction for achieving the Government’s shared objectives.

INTRODUCTION

1. Conflict and fragility present some of the most urgent challenges facing the developing world. The International Development Secretary’s speech at the Royal College of Defence Studies on 16 September 2010 sets out the ways in which conflict and fragility are threats to global and regional stability, and major obstacles to poverty reduction and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Much of the world has made rapid progress in reducing poverty over the last 60 years, but areas affected by repeated cycles of violence have effectively been left behind. Countries that have experienced protracted violence have on average
a poverty rate over 20% higher than countries that have not experienced violence. No low income fragile state has yet achieved an MDG and few if any are expected to meet the targets by 2015.1

2. Fragility and conflict have a devastating impact on human and economic development. The costs of late response to crisis are high. Violent conflict reverses economic growth, causes hunger, destroys roads, schools and clinics, and forces people to flee across borders. Needs and unit costs are high; war badly affects welfare, displacing people from their homes and undermining human resources and organisation capacities. Violent conflict can grossly affect neighbouring countries, with nations losing an estimated 0.7% of their annual gross domestic product for each neighbour involved in civil war.

3. The MDGs will not be achieved without more progress in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS). Fragile countries account for a fifth of the population of developing countries, but they include a third of those living in extreme poverty.2 People in FCAS are more than three times as likely to be unable to send their children to school and twice as likely to see their children die before age five. They are more than twice as likely to be undernourished as those in other developing countries, and more than twice as likely to lack clean water.3

4. Conflicts overseas can seem far away and hard to understand. But strengthening our efforts to tackle conflict and fragility is not just morally right, it also in our national interest. Conflict and instability overseas also has direct and indirect impacts on our security in the UK by creating environments in which terrorists and organised crime groups can recruit for, plan, and direct their operations. For example groups operating in countries like Somalia and Yemen represent a direct terrorist threat to the UK; criminal gangs use West Africa for smuggling goods into the UK; and conflicts overseas disrupt our trade and energy supplies.

5. This is why the UK Government places a high priority on increasing its efforts to tackle these challenges, increasing to 30% the amount of official development assistance it will spend in fragile and conflict-affected states by 2014.

6. This evidence note sets out some of the key policy priorities, aid delivery mechanisms, partnerships, and corporate processes that the Coalition Government is focusing on in order to ensure that it is working effectively.

Question one. The key development priorities DFID and other Government Departments should be addressing in fragile and conflict affected states

7. By 2014–15, 30% of overall UK aid will be spent to support fragile and conflict-affected states. We will help address the causes of conflict, strengthen security and justice, lay the foundations for growth and improve access to basic services.

8. Given the huge extent of needs in most fragile and conflict states, it will seldom be possible to prioritise based simply on need, but also on where we can add most value in terms of results on reducing poverty and fragility.

9. A Bilateral Aid Review was carried out in 2010 during which each of the teams in DFID focus countries and regions were asked to develop a “results offer” which set out what they could achieve over the next four years. Following a detailed process of challenge and scrutiny, Ministers took up a set of costed offers for each country and regional programme. Operational Plans have been developed for each programme which set out in more detail how the results prioritised by Ministers will be delivered between April 2011 and March 2015 using the resources allocated. These results offers and planning processes were underpinned by evidence, analysis of value for money and a focus on girls and women—and in fragile and conflict affected countries used a peace building/state building framework in their analysis, prioritisation and overall strategy.

10. Under this framework the UK’s priority will be to help build peaceful states and societies using an integrated approach that brings together four key objectives

— Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms.
— Support to inclusive political settlements and processes.
— Develop core state functions—such as security, justice and financial and macroeconomic management.
— Respond to public expectations—such as for jobs and basic services.

11. Fragile and conflict affected states are diverse in nature and the development priorities must be tailored to suit the situation in each country. Our approach to building peaceful states and societies is further discussed below with examples of how these priorities relate to country programmes.

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2 DFID staff estimates (2009) using World Bank World Development Indicators database 2009 (for data on population and the proportion living in extreme poverty [on less than $1.25 a day])
Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms

12. Conflict and fragility are caused by a complex range of factors, including grievances, opportunities and feasibility. Identity groups facing discrimination and inequality are easier to mobilise for violence. Extremist groups are likely to take advantage of grievances and build them into their narratives. High rates of unemployment and poverty can exacerbate grievances and fuel conflict. Conflict becomes more feasible when security forces are weak. It also becomes more feasible when high value natural resources or other sources of finance are available, and also with availability of weapons due to wider conflict in the region.

13. As well as national factors, there are also regional and global drivers of conflict and fragility, including organised crime, drug trafficking and corruption linked to high value natural resources.

14. Analysis of the causes end effects of conflict and fragility is essential in developing responses. In DRC analysis of the causes of conflict and the effectiveness of current programming in achieving results, helped the country team to identify a number of priority interventions and rebalance the overall portfolio. These ensure that DFID contributes to meeting immediate needs by scaling up assistance to basic services and infrastructure and at the same time focus more strategically on the longer term objectives of building state capacity and accountability. They include strengthening democratic institutions, security sector reform and mineral sector reform, including implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

15. It is important to consider the regional dimensions of fragility and conflict. For example, the UK is a significant donor to the World Bank-led Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), which has demobilised around 300,000 former combatants in seven countries since 2002—Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, DRC, Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. The programme has successfully arranged the demobilisation and return of many members of foreign armed groups operating in the region, such as the Rwandan Hutu Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) based in DRC. The programme is considered a major factor in improving security in the Great Lakes region in recent years.

Support to inclusive political settlements and processes

16. The UK’s aim is to promote inclusive settlements that meet public expectations and address the underlying causes of conflict and fragility such as discrimination—as this is critical to state legitimacy and the sustainability of the settlement in the long-term. This requires being sufficiently flexible to appropriately support formal/informal and state/non-state institutions as opportunities arise. For instance, in Burma the UK is supporting a £3.5 million Pyoe Pin (“Green Shoots”) programme to strengthen local civil society and support the development of coalitions around issues, a flexible approach designed to respond to the changing political and social context.

17. Donor support has often been focused on elections. (Over the past four years, the UK has provided support to elections and political systems in 25 countries with a combined electorate of over 600 million.) Elections can legitimise a new government internally and internationally, as in Nepal, DRC and Sierra Leone in recent years. However the timing of elections in post-conflict or fragile situations is particularly challenging—they can destabilise an already fragile situation by renewing contestation for power. However, postponing democratic reforms leaving the concentration of power within the hands of elite groups, without checks and balances, may also bring risks and reinforce the causes of conflict and fragility. Therefore the UK sees support to elections as one step in a much broader process towards building a more inclusive political system.

18. For example in 2006, DRC held credible national elections. They took place shortly after the end of the conflict, without many of the ideal preconditions for elections. Despite this a study for DFID in 2008 concluded that they had a positive effect. DFID’s programme in DRC now has a focus on strengthening accountability mechanisms including assistance to parliament, political parties and the electoral commission; anti-corruption; decentralisation programmes; and work with civil society and the media to improve accountability and transparency. Support is also being provided for the next round of national elections, due to commence later this year. This includes funding voter registration, voter education, and supporting the electoral commission.

Develop core state functions such as security, justice and financial and macroeconomic management

19. Without security for the people and the state, the economy and public services cannot function. People should have confidence that they will be protected, and not threatened, by the police, the military and the justice system. Effective support to security sector reform requires coordination between development, diplomacy and defence actors.

20. In Sierra Leone DFID, FCO and MOD have come together to support the Security Sector Reform Programme, which embraces a wide range of state and non-state institutions. The linkages between security and justice institutions have also been strengthened through the DFID-funded Justice Sector Development Programme—particularly the police, prisons and judiciary—to improve case management. Reviews have considered DFID to have been effective in building capacity and giving full responsibility to national bodies. The armed forces were effectively downsized and the capacities of the national police force were increased, helping to facilitate free and fair elections in 2007 and 2008.
21. DFID will work where possible with state institutions to ensure a minimum level of financial and economic stability and sound macro-economic management. States need to raise and manage revenue (eg from taxation, aid or natural resources). Where taxes are raised and managed responsibly, they can have a significant impact on people’s trust in state institutions.

22. The Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) was established in 1997 as a semi-autonomous executive agency. With substantive financial and technical support from DFID, and driven by high-level political commitment to change on the part of Rwanda’s leadership, the RRA has helped raise revenue collection from 8.5% of GDP to over 15% of GDP.

Respond to public expectations such as jobs and basic services

23. Responding to public expectations can help states to maintain legitimacy and stability, conversely lack of or inequitable access to jobs and basic services (such as health, education, water, security and justice) can fuel grievances and further fragility.

24. Support to job creation such as through labour based contracting should be conflict sensitive and ensure that benefits extend to all groups, and not just those involved in the conflict. In the longer-term the development of a healthy, diverse private sector is essential for jobs and tax revenues.

25. Many physical and institutional components of service delivery are destroyed by fragility and conflict, often from an already weak base. The UK has recognised the need to work more effectively in FCAS which are lagging behind on progress towards the MDGs. We will support service delivery in ways that reduce the potential for conflict and do not undermine state capacity.

26. In Sudan, the UK is supporting UNICEF to deliver a rapid school-building and education programme in the conflict-affected area of Abyei. By benefitting both sides of a divided community—the Dinka and the Misseriya—the programme is making education a “connector” between the communities, reducing tensions and increasing support for peace on both sides.

Humanitarian

27. Where people’s lives and dignity are at risk, one of the leading priorities will be humanitarian action to alleviate suffering. For example, the indirect deaths from conflict, forced migration, war-exacerbated disease, lack of clean water and malnutrition, generally far exceed the battle related deaths—and humanitarian aid has a direct role in preventing these. In severely conflict-affected situations humanitarian action may be the only way to provide basic services. While the focus is rightly on meeting humanitarian needs, international actors should ensure that such efforts help rather than undermine state capacity during crises (where feasible) and are built upon in longer-term capacity building work.

Sound analysis of context must inform prioritisation

28. Getting our analysis of the context right in fragile and conflict-affected situations is a critical starting point for developing effective responses. Analysis enables us to direct interventions more accurately towards the sources of conflict and fragility and improve the conflict sensitivity of all our activities. DFID uses a range of analytical tools and approaches including political economy analysis, strategic conflict assessment, gender and exclusion analysis, the Countries at risk of Instability framework and the Critical Path Method. For example, in Nepal conflict and exclusion analysis led to a major reorientation of the UK programme towards excluded groups.

29. Within Government, DFID has the mandate for international development and poverty reduction overseas. However, where possible it is beneficial to have joint analysis with other UK Government Departments from an early stage to ensure a coherent UK approach while recognising the mandates of different departments. The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is covered later in this written evidence in more detail. It makes clear that an integrated approach is essential for all of HMG’s efforts in FCAS, from analysis to planning to joint interventions where appropriate. The SDSR also clearly states that all Official Development Assistance (ODA) will be fully consistent with OECD rules, and must be focused on the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries.

From the outset we must think in terms of priorities over both the short-term and long-term

30. The UK recognises the need in fragile and conflict affected states to act fast in order to bring tangible confidence raising measures to the population and encourage a conducive environment for early peace-building, as well as the need to stay engaged in the longer term to be supportive of positive trajectories of change within a realistic time frame to help build peaceful states and societies. This requires us to use a variety of mechanisms to deliver aid as discussed below.

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Footnote:

4 Human Security Report, 2005. Figure 4.2—Battle deaths as a percentage of total war deaths—6% DRC (145,000 battle-deaths, 2.5 million total war deaths)
Question two. The most effective mechanisms for delivering aid, and the role of DFID’s focus on results in FCAS

Effective Mechanisms for delivering aid

31. The UK’s approach to selecting the most effective mechanisms for delivering aid in different fragile and conflict-affected situations is driven by on-going analysis of the context within our commitment to implementing the OECD-DAC “Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States and Situations”. There is no single approach for all FCAS, but there are some general principles which guide our decisions.

32. It is important to make politically informed choices about the mix of approaches in a given context, and the degree of alignment with national systems that is possible. Evaluations have shown that development outcomes are maximised where there is strong national leadership and if we disregard country policies and systems we risk undermining the capacity and legitimacy of the state.

33. In situations where the government is increasingly responsive and demonstrates commitment to poverty reduction albeit with weak capacity, there are likely to be significant opportunities to work through the state. In these contexts, we consider using both budget support and sector reform programmes. At the same time, our engagement will have a strong focus on programmes which empower citizens to hold their governments to account, strengthening the relationship between people and their governments.

34. Although often a challenge in FCAS, in the right circumstances, budget support can be an appropriate way to deliver aid. The evidence shows that countries that received budget support over the last decade have seen improvements in macroeconomic stability, and have been able to deliver more pro-poor services, and strengthen public financial management systems. Where we provide budget support, DFID will aim to allocate an amount equivalent to 5% of the budget support funding to help build accountability.

35. For example, the UK has been providing budget support (both sector and general) in Rwanda for over a decade. Budget support has proven to be both effective and good value for money. It strengthens governance and public financial management systems and builds capacity through ownership while reducing transaction costs. And it has allowed us to build a strong relationship with the Government of Rwanda and other budget support providers. In 2010–2011 (June to July) we are providing £35.75 million in budget support. Some of the results that this investment will deliver include: 1700 fewer children dying before their fifth birthday; 30,000 more children sleeping under Insecticide Treated Long lasting mosquito Nets; 90,000 more kids in primary school; and, 400,000 more people with access to basic health care.

36. Where government legitimacy and commitment to poverty reduction is in question or political relations strained we are more likely to deliver aid outside the state, off-budget, with consideration of shadow alignment with state systems and support key reformers in government. That means providing aid in such a way as to mirror national systems to enable a shift to real alignment with those systems when conditions allow. At the same time, we have an increasingly strong focus on programmes which empower citizens to hold their governments to account.

37. In fragile and conflict affected states, particularly where state responsiveness is mixed, we recognise the importance of working with local government, communities, civil society and the private sector. In these contexts we have an increasingly strong focus on “bottom-up development”, for example through NGO-implemented programmes that use community-driven approaches to empower people at the local level to take control of their own development, channelling funds directly to communities and using participatory approaches. These approaches can help rebuild links between communities and the state particularly at local level. An example is the Tuungane programme in DRC, a large scale community recovery programme.

38. The choice of aid mechanisms in many fragile contexts will include consideration of pooled funding arrangements with other donors often managed by either the UN or by the World Bank—such as Multi-donor Trust Funds (MDTFs). These can be an effective way of improving coordination, reduce transaction costs and make funding more predictable, particularly in conditions where other development instruments cannot come online yet, or when budget support is a limited option. They can promote alignment by creating a joint forum between government and donors for decision-making and policy dialogue and provide a means for disbursing straight into the national budget on a reimbursement basis, even in very weak fiduciary environments. Their performance record to date has arguably been mixed but all actors involved have been engaged in lessons learning exercises over the past year and more and more are trying to maximise their potential.

39. Services in fragile and conflict affected situations are likely to be delivered by a mix of state and non-state actors. NGO delivery of services can facilitate more rapid coverage into unserved areas. Design of donor support to this mechanism should take into account the political and historical context and consider from the outset the longer-term transition from relief to development. Whether services are delivered by state or non-state actors, the role of government in a policy making and supervisory role remains crucial.

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6 Analysis of assessments using the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability performance measurement framework shows that five countries who receive budget support from the UK have been assessed more than once and all have demonstrated an overall improvement in public financial management.
40. We will also use humanitarian projects in response to humanitarian need and partner with non-state actors, and where possible with local government or reformist elements in central government.

41. Lord Ashdown led the production of the Humanitarian Emergency Review Report (HERR), which was issued on 28 March 2011. DFID is preparing a response to Parliament for the middle of May 2011.

42. In all fragile contexts, DFID has risk management systems in place that enable us to monitor carefully and be flexible about how we deliver aid in response to changes in the political context.

The role of DFID’s focus on results

43. Delivering results in FCAS is fundamental to DFID’s ability to deliver on its commitment to poverty reduction, and our Business Plan commitment to strengthen governance and security in fragile and conflict-affected countries. The focus on results is particularly critical in the context of the 30% ODA commitment, to ensure DFID programmes are effectively addressing poverty, conflict and fragility, and are therefore value for money, in FCAS. The majority of DFID’s focus countries are now affected by fragility and conflict, so this focus on results is essential to measure progress as well as informing ongoing planning, country programme design and risk management.

44. The results challenge in FCAS is two-fold. Firstly we need to measure our impact on conflict and fragility (in addition to MDG indicators etc)—because addressing conflict and fragility has to be central to supporting partner countries towards a path of sustainable and peaceful development and prosperity. Secondly we are developing ways to overcome the challenges of measuring the impact of our interventions in difficult contexts—dealing with incomplete or unreliable data, security concerns and logistical difficulties, political sensitivities and volatile and unpredictable environments.

45. The focus on results needs to be a continual process, with measurement considered from the outset to ensure that base-line information is known. It needs to take into consideration different time-scales—experience shows that delivering both short and long term results is critical in fragile and conflict affected states. The WDR 2011 sets out the importance of delivering some results quickly on the ground to build confidence of the population, while at the same time supporting transformational reform—which can take a long time to show results.7

46. DFID’s focus on results in FCAS has been reflected in new corporate planning processes over the last year. Country offices were required in their BAR offers and in their Operational Plans to demonstrate how they will address conflict and fragility through their programmes. The new Business Case guidance similarly requires staff to set out how proposed interventions in FCAS will address conflict and fragility and how this will be monitored. Country offices are required to provide evidence to support proposed approaches. Where an intervention is innovative and evidence is inadequate, DFID will start small and build in robust mechanisms to monitor and gather evidence on whether the new approach works, before scaling up.

47. To support DFID staff to manage for results effectively in fragile and conflict-affected states, DFID has developed guidance for country offices. This includes examples of good practice in a) Measuring and managing for results at country level—including setting appropriate goals and using suitable indicators; and b) Measuring and managing for results at intervention level—including guidance on measuring impact on conflict and fragility throughout the project cycle (including evaluation), and monitoring in difficult contexts. The guidance also sets out some of the main links between results management and both value for money and risk management. Monitoring risk and results together at country level enables us to track changes in the operating environment and assess the implications of these for each individual intervention.

48. DFID has also developed a toolkit of indicators and guidance on value for money for governance programming. This is for use primarily by DFID governance and conflict advisers, as well as other DFID staff designing programmes with governance and conflict elements. It provides an analytical framework for VFM, for consideration in Business Case design that relates to governance activity. On Value for Money (VFM) in particular, guidance is intended as “interim” whilst further research is undertaken: measuring the VFM of governance interventions is a new practice globally. During 2011–2012, DFID will work with others to determine best practice and establish agreed approaches and mechanisms in this area. This guidance will therefore be updated accordingly subject to research findings as they are made available.

49. Some country offices have re-structured to be better placed to measure and manage for results. For example, DFID-DRC has dedicated the equivalent of one full-time person to results, increased M&E capacity in programme teams and allocates up to 10% of programme budgets to M&E. The Results Team is central to DFID-DRC’s results system. It integrates two functions: managing development results, which relates to the content of programmes, and managing for development results, which relates to systems and organisational management. All new programmes have to be “passed” by the results team, which gives it the authority to ensure that sound M&E frameworks and plans are in place from the start. During programme design phases, a member of the Results Team joins lead advisers to discuss M&E plans with partners. The team also has a role in ensuring on-going programme quality through review processes. The team therefore provides a quality

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7 Research conducted for the WDR 2011 shows that it takes 15–30 years for a country’s institutional performance to improve from the level of a fragile state like Haiti to the level of a functioning state like Ghana.
control function for all programmes. DFID-DRC has recently recruited a second Deputy Head who will lead the results agenda, increasing capacity further. This new post is also responsible for VFM and risk management.

50. A focus on results is equally important when we are working with or through other organisations. The Coalition Government recently undertook a Multilateral Aid Review to assess the effectiveness of working with key multilateral partners, and will ensure that an emphasis on results is maintained. Similarly it is crucial when we provide aid through our partner government systems. The results of our aid through Budget Support is closely monitored. For example in Rwanda, the UK and six other Budget Support donors have agreed common terms, conditions and procedures for the provision of budget support for financing the Government of Rwanda’s new Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS). The Budget Support MoU specifies the use of three complementary frameworks for assessing performance against clearly measurable performance targets and corresponding policy commitments against which Budget Support partners and the Government of Rwanda judge performance.

51. Country offices are developing innovative approaches to measuring results in difficult environments. For example, in DRC, the DFID-funded Healthy Villages water and sanitation programme, implemented by UNICEF, is testing the use of mobile phone technology for monitoring. There is a lack of data at all levels, due largely to constraints associated with major logistical challenges across very large areas. The system aims to collect and validate real-time programme data for monitoring and planning, using text messaging and the internet. The first tests, carried out with programme partners from Ministry of Health, have confirmed the feasibility of the method. Larger scale tests are now taking place the provinces of Bas Congo and Kinshasa and there are plans to extend the scheme to all provinces in 2011.

Question three. Whether DFID works effectively in fragile and conflict-affected states

52. Faced with insecurity, weak state capacity, difficult political environments and acute humanitarian crises, conventional approaches to aid delivery will often be inadequate and can risk doing harm. Working effectively in FCAS therefore requires us to be flexible and innovative, taking a conflict-sensitive approach, while maintaining a rigorous focus on value for money and achieving results.

53. Our focus is on helping poor people in difficult circumstances and getting results. The UK recognises that to work effectively in FCAS there will be risks and we need to manage them. Our increased focus on fragile and conflict affected states will be accompanied by a willingness to take well-judged and calculated risks and to innovate to allow us to deliver transformative results. FCAS present inherently risky environments for development assistance. However the risks of inaction in these contexts are also high. We need to find ways to engage that can deliver both short term results on the ground, and potentially transformative longer term results, but which do not cause harm or come at too high a cost. Our programmes therefore need to be accompanied by a robust approach to risk management. For innovative interventions in particular, this may call for starting small and then scaling up.

54. We are strengthening our systems to ensure that they go beyond simply assessing risk upfront and including mitigating actions in the intervention design. Our risk management will be a continuous part of intervention management, providing us with a means of operating in a volatile environment and making adjustments to activities, modalities and partnerships in a timely way. This will involve investing in a higher level of monitoring and evaluation of risks and results as discussed above.

55. At the same time as developing and continually refining our own approaches, the UK has been at the forefront of international lesson-learning on effective working in FCAS. We are engaged in the OECD DAC International Network in Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)—where we played a lead role in developing the Principles for good international engagement in fragile states. The key messages in the World Development Report (WDR) 2011 and the new OECD-DAC Statebuilding Guidance (2011) are consistent with and build on DFID’s statebuilding and peacebuilding approach (2010).

56. We currently co-chair with East Timor the International Dialogue on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding, which was created in 2008 at Accra to remove obstacles to effective international action and bring together fragile countries to share experiences on tackling conflict and fragility. The International Dialogue has a wide membership of over 40 development partners, international organisations and governments experiencing conflict and/or fragility. It provides a unique opportunity for fragile states (through G7+) to voice their own priorities and hold international agencies to account on our commitments on aid effectiveness in fragile states.

57. Alongside the statebuilding and peacebuilding framework, DFID has developed a series of briefing papers providing operational guidance on the OECD-DAC Principles to help country offices to develop more effective responses to the challenges they face.

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8 The donors were the UK, European Community, World Bank, African Development Bank, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden. Belgium is also a member of the Budget Support Harmonization Group as they provide Sector Budget Support although they are not signatories to the MoU. The IMF is also a signatory.
Answers to the Committee’s specific questions are outlined below:

**DFID’s efforts to strengthen governance and national institutions (including parliaments) to deliver services, security and justice**

58. DFID recognises that poor governance and weak institutions are closely associated with fragility and the lack of progress towards the MDGs. Strengthening the institutions that enable a state to deliver for its people will help provide a more stable and predictable environment for the private sector, to deliver health and education whether directly or through non-governmental providers, and to provide policing and security for everybody.

59. DFID’s work on governance includes support to free and fair elections, representative parliaments, improved public financial management, increase security and justice and reduced violence against women. DFID service delivery programmes for health, education and water and sanitation include a strong focus on strengthening governance systems and increasing citizen accountability and choice.

60. As summarised in our recent Governance Portfolio review, in 2004–5—8—9, DFID invested £4 billion (including multilateral) in governance, averaging 17% of DFID’s total programme. The share of programme spend on governance was higher in FCAS than elsewhere. Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Sudan, West Bank/Gaza, and DRC, all spent more than 25% of total programme spend on governance.

61. A significant amount of overall direct governance investment focused mainly on strengthening budgetary and financial management as part of our budget support (£931 million). Other major areas of investment were public financial management, including taxation (£365 million), strengthening civil society (£266 million), national government (£239 million), decentralisation and local government (£192 million), and conflict prevention and resolution (£154 million). The Governance Portfolio Review also reviewed measured performance and impact and found no significant differences in overall performance scored between fragile and non-fragile states. Following the Bilateral Aid Review, governance will remain a key pillar of DFID programmes in all fragile and conflict-affected states. We will be particularly scaling up work on building more inclusive political systems, including support to parliaments in at least 15 countries.

**Service Delivery**

62. DFID has a strong record on support to strengthening governance and institutions to deliver services such as health, education, water and sanitation. To avoid ineffective blueprint approaches we place strong emphasis on in-depth analysis and regular monitoring. As discussed above, our approach will be based on a careful analysis of context and appropriate risk management.

63. We recognise that where possible, one of the most effective ways to strengthen capacity and use of systems is through “learning by doing”. For example in Rwanda, we provide a significant amount of our support to basic services through budget support. We are complimenting this with support to a PFM reform basket fund that will enable the government to implement their PFM reform strategy across all sectors. We are also contributing through SIDA to a citizen empowerment programme that strengthens individuals and communities ability to hold government (local government in particular) to account for the services they deliver. Budget support in Rwanda has enabled the introduction of fee-free primary education which has allowed an additional 400,000 children to attend school between 2003 and 2006. The UK contribution to this was an additional 76,000 children in school. An economic appraisal of the Rwanda General Budget Support Programme has concluded that GBS was currently the most cost effective way for the UK to help deliver development outcomes in Rwanda. Achieving the same results outlined above would cost at a minimum an additional £2.55 million per year due to the increased administrative costs of setting up parallel projects.

64. In comparison in DRC, DFID currently funds a rural water, sanitation and hygiene project which is managed by UNICEF and the Government of DRC. Our funding goes to UNICEF, because we do not currently put funding directly through Government systems, but programme implementation is through the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education. The programme includes capacity building to ensure decentralised service delivery (training of local government staff) and some financial control will be handed over to government where capacity allows. The programme is designed in such a way that as capacity increases the management of it can eventually be transferred over to the Government and it is aligned with national priorities and strategies.

65. In DRC, DFID, the World Bank and UNICEF are working closely with the Government to try to reach the goal of “free” primary education can eventually be realised. As a first step, DFID is funding a comprehensive census of DRC’s schools and teachers, and working with UNICEF to investigate the obstacles preventing children, and especially girls, from going to school. Plans are also being developed to provide direct support to schools in some of the poorest parts of the country, in an effort to get up to 100,000 new children into school each year.

66. In post conflict countries aid financing to services must consider the immediate need to provide basic services (which have commonly been provided by NGOs during the conflict) and the longer-term need to rehabilitate and build government capacity and systems. The UK is assisting national governments to support services during this transition to development. In Liberia, the Liberia Health Sector Pooled Fund is widely
recognised to provide efficient disbursement and sound and transparent financial management. Financing decisions are embedded in a strong sector strategy that has allowed the health ministry to effectively prioritise and drive the fund’s interventions, and one third of government hospitals and clinics are now financed through it. The health ministry’s early policy decision to use fund resources to support NGO delivery of services was a strong demonstration of the Government’s commitment to delivering results. The DFID project to support financial management in the Ministry was started in 2007, but still some of Liberia’s other large donors are unable to comingle their funds. DFID appears to be one of the leading donors in terms of adopting appropriately flexible approaches and it seems that there is scope for further gains to be made through dialogue and influencing of our international partners.

Security and Justice

67. In 2004–05 to 2008–09, Security and Justice Programmes costing £160 million were financed in 65 countries, 75% in FCAS. They were often a catalyst to increased access to legal services for poor people and improved capability of justice systems. Following the Bilateral Aid Review, the UK is committed to scaling up support to security and justice in 18 countries, with a focus on reducing violence against women in 15.

68. DFID has had a significant impact through strengthening governance and national institutions to deliver security and justice in a number of fragile and conflict-affected states. For example, since its creation, we have worked with the Government of Southern Sudan on developing oversight structures for a security sector that was only a guerrilla army as recently as 2005. From a zero base, we have helped establish a civilian defence ministry, the beginnings of parliamentary oversight and a forum for civil society engagement with the military.

69. Our support to security sector reform in Sierra Leone embraces a wide range of institutions including the Office of National Security, intelligence, defence, police, internal affairs and accountability institutions (parliament, civil society, media and academia) with a successful transfer of ownership to the Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence. An independent evaluation of DFID’s support to security and justice sector reform in Sierra Leone between 1997 and 2007 judged that our interventions had improved personal security for citizens over that period*.

70. A key lesson that we have learnt through experience is the need to take a citizen first approach to institution building, as there is risk of focussing on top down institutional reform programmes that have limited impact on the vast majority of the populations’ lives. We treat security and justice as a basic service alongside others such as health and education, and seek to identify interventions that bring security and justice to the people, rather than the other way round.

71. In Bangladesh, our community legal service programme is providing access to legal assistance for 10 million poor people, 80% of which are women. Direct returns to the poor from the previous programme amounted to more than 50% of DFID’s investment of £2.9 million. In Nigeria, we have supported the development of community policing approaches in half of Nigeria’s 36 states. In Kano state, public opinion surveys over the period of the programme showed fear of crime fell 20%; 56% reported less corruption; and 93% said police behaviour had improved.

72. In Burundi, our research has shown that formal courts are seen as legitimate: Burundians cite them as a dispute resolution mechanism twice as often as they cite customary institutions. In this context, DFID funding is giving 55 local courts the means to work effectively, build capacity of magistrates and monitor the quality of judicial decisions. This will help improve the quality of decisions and increase the proportion of decisions enforced by 25%, making the justice system more effective and fairer for 2 million Burundians. It will also facilitate the emergence of a dialogue around the role and relationship of formal courts to customary justice.

Ongoing Learning and Evaluation

73. While we have made significant strides in ensuring that our support to services, security and jobs has the maximum possible impact at grassroots level, we know that more needs to be done. Crucial will be ensuring that we have access to better data to monitor the impact of our programmes, ensuring that we and our national partners can be clearer about the results being obtained. This is the current focus of our policy work in the security and justice area, and we will build on innovative approaches such as those being taken in DRC.

74. Difficult political conditions sometimes require the UK to rethink how assistance is delivered. In Ethiopia, for example, DFID moved from budget support to a more targeted form of assistance for basic services, sending a clear political signal while avoiding the damage that an interruption to aid flows might have had on such services. Similarly, over the past decade, DFID assistance to Nepal has been through a number of different phases, from support to government reforms to delivery of pro-poor programmes through non-state channels, depending upon the state of the conflict. In Zimbabwe, despite difficult relations with the government and the decision of the UK and the wider donor community not to provide bilateral government-to-government support, DFID has maintained a development programme to support the provision of basic services and for the protection of lives and livelihoods using UN agencies, NGOs and private sector institutions as mechanisms for delivery.

DFID’s efforts to support to civil society organisations and communities directly

75. DFID considers civil society organisations to be critical partners in supporting the development of strong state-society relations. In some contexts our main entry point in supporting peace-building and state-building is through working with civil society (eg in Burma).

76. We recognise the diversity of civil society organisations (CSOs) which include such groups as registered charities, non-government organisations (NGOs), community groups, women’s organisations, faith based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, social movements, business associations and advocacy groups. Particularly in FCAS it is important to have a good understanding of both formal and informal dynamics, and whether the elites or poor people are being represented. Addressing issues of discrimination, inequality and human rights is a core challenge of the state-building and peace-building process.

77. Civil society organisations can be a key agent for changing the status quo and building stability and can play an important role in enabling individuals and communities to influence and hold their governments to account for promises made and actions taken. In addition, FCAS are often marked by the government’s inability or an unwillingness to provide services to its citizens. In these contexts civil society organisations often have a role in enabling the provision of goods and services to the poor and marginalised.

78. In 2008–09 DFID spent circa 15% (£515 million) of bilateral aid through non-government organisations many of which tend to work in partnership with national CSOs in countries. The majority of this (67%) was spent in FCAS.

Examples of how DFID has supported communities in FCAS

79. It is critical that DFID’s work to has a positive impact on poor people at the community level. DFID adopts a number of approaches to ensure this. One of which is working directly with communities. In Rwanda, for example, DFID is supporting poor communities directly through its contribution to the Government of Rwanda’s innovative social protection programme, Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP). This large scale, government led, social protection programme comprises four components (cash transfers; public works; financial services; underpinned by community training and sensitisation) which are expected to provide a “staircase out of poverty”. The programme prioritises poor geographical areas and extremely poor households within these. DFID is providing £20 million in financial aid and technical assistance over five year (2008/9–2013).

80. In addition to programmes that bring services or access to finances to the community level, DFID also works to support democratic processes within communities. In Burundi, in the run up to the 2010 elections, DFID supported partnerships between media bodies to promote constructive coverage of the elections and debate amongst political parties and candidates. This enabled citizens to be better informed and less prone to manipulation through payment for their vote by a particular party.

81. In Sierra Leone DFID has been providing funds to enable the re-establishment of local councils and ward development committees. This is vital to bring government closer to people, particularly those living outside major towns. Lack of presence of and trust in government was a significant driver of the past conflict.

82. In DRC the DFID funded community driven reconstruction project, Tuungane, seeks to bring democratic processes at the local level together with service delivery objectives to ensure that communities are engaged in the decisions over resource allocation that effect them. To date over 1,200 village development committees have been elected and trained in the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusion and responsiveness. The committees are applying these skills to make democratic decisions about how to spend the grants provided by the project on community priorities. For the most part, the grants are spent by communities on education, water and sanitation and health projects for the most part.

83. Likewise, DFID Sudan’s Safety and Access to Justice Programme, through the “Leadership and Development” and “Community Policing” modules aims to bring communities into planning processes. The UK is training senior police officers in the poorest and most FCAS in North Sudan to re-design operational plans in partnership with local civil society and community members, including women to improve the relevance and quality of operational plans, making them appropriate to the community context. Early results in one State, Blue Nile, indicate stronger relationships with all community members.

Examples of how DFID has supported Civil Society Organisations in FCAS

84. As noted above civil society organisations are important development partners for DFID in FCAS and a considerable amount of support is provided through them for poverty reduction. A key focus of much of DFID’s support to civil society organisations is to strengthen the link between people and governments, improving accountability mechanisms between the two and ensuring that citizens have a voice in decision-making processes.

85. DFID Rwanda provides £1.7 million support to 14 Rwandan civil society organisations through the Civil Society Capacity Building and Engagement in Public Policy Information, Monitoring and Advocacy (PPIMA) project. This is an empowerment and accountability project which aims to promote citizens engagement in and
influence on national and local level policies and plans for poverty reduction. The project is rolling out new approaches to community monitoring of service delivery, such as a community score card which will be implemented in 128 villages in 2011.

86. In DRC DFID has a Civil Society Fund, the goal of which is to strengthen citizens’ voice to improve accountability between the state and its citizens. The Fund makes grants to local civil society organisations to help them influence policies at local, provincial and national levels. The Fund couples this with support to build the skills and capacity of civil society organisations and share lessons and experience.

87. In Sierra Leone, DFID supports ENCISS a civil society programme that aims to bridge the relationship between the public and government, ENCISS is providing significant funds and support to build the capacity of civil society to help them work with local and national government. Much of this support is going to small scale community groups so that they can communicate with and influence formal government structures.

88. DFID also recognises that civil society organisations are well placed to have a direct positive impact upon potential sources of tension or conflict within fragile contexts. The DFID funded Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund helps diverse communities in Darfur to establish mechanisms to resolve and prevent conflict at the community level. The project works through either NGOs or civil society organisations, who partner with local community based organisations and civil society groups to indentify interventions and deliver solutions. For example the NGO “Fellowship for African Relief” [FAR] recently worked with local communities to establish a set of Community Peace Centres (CPCs), which trained local leaders and provided resources to enable them to monitor, identify, reconcile and manage localised conflicts. One tool, a monitoring system for conflict cases involving criminal activities, such as crop destruction and animal theft, enabled the CPCs to significantly increase trust in the local court, thus reducing tensions between communities.

89. Similarly, the DFID funded South Sudan Peace Building Fund helps communities (including civil society) respond to threats to community stability. The SSPB gives small grants to communities to do reconciliation and mediation work and to implement activities to reduce conflict. A total of 60 different organisations have received funding through this mechanism. Activities implemented include firstly political dialogue eg. prior to the South Sudan Referendum communities in the state of Northern Bahr el Ghazal held a three day inter-political parties dialogue. It was attended by all the key political parties and influenced non-cooperating political parties to work together for a successful referendum. Dialogues and agreements are often followed by wide variety of cross-community infrastructure projects—such as wells, reservoirs, school buildings—which serve as a means of cementing peace agreements and in many cases reducing conflict over disputed resources or community assets.

EXAMPLES OF THE IMPACT THAT DFID’S SUPPORT TO CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS AND COMMUNITIES HAS IN FCAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>The VUP project that DFID supports in Rwanda which provides cash transfers directly to the community level has seen a reduction in extreme poverty in its target areas from 39% in 2006–7 to 35.1% in 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>40% of citizens reported that current affairs debates with political party representatives before and during the 2010 elections which were broadcast through a variety of media outlets had helped them to better understand party priorities and make their voting decisions.</td>
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| Sudan | By 2014 DFID investment will have contributed to the following outcomes:  
—Increase from 27% to 80% the proportion of local government offices demonstrating accountability by opening their budgets to public scrutiny.  
—A 460% increase in the number of community police posts in IDP camps in Northern Sudan.  
—Reintegration back into communities of 12,000 ex-combatants associated with the armed forces (including both men and women). |

Ongoing Learning and Evaluation

90. DFID is currently undertaking a thematic review of its £130 million Governance and Transparency Fund. The Governance and Transparency Fund or GTF provides grants to civil society organisations to help them hold governments to account and improve the transparency of their governments. The current review aims to pull together lesson learning from projects in receipt of grants around the thematic areas of: media, conflict, service delivery and new technologies. Issues of fragility and conflict should be picked up across all themes. This will provide lesson learning to feed back into DFID’s work with civil society in fragile and conflict affected contexts.

91. DFID is also in the process of further developing work around empowerment and accountability. This has implications for the way we work in FCAS and will strengthen the work that we do with communities and civil society. DFID’s empowerment and accountability work is complementary to the peace-building state-building framework and will help to strengthen work to build strong society-state relations.
DFID’s efforts to involve women in peace-building and state-building processes including security, justice and economic empowerment programmes

92. The UK’s work in fragile and conflict affected states recognises the need to consider men, women, boys and girls separately, noting that peace-building and state-building processes can offer an opportunity to address past injustices and challenge old, previously entrenched inequalities, including those linked to gender.

93. DFID’s peace-building, state-building framework states that, whilst gender inequality is rarely a cause of violent conflict, reshaping gender relations is often central to addressing the legacy of violent conflict which often disproportionately affects women. It also recognises that building inclusive state-society relations in which women are able to contribute alongside men will increase the prospects of a durable peace by maximising the contribution of all citizens. This includes ensuring women have a voice within the development of political settlements, ensuring women and girls have access to security and justice on an equitable basis alongside other core state functions, and ensuring that the government is able to meet the expectations of both men and women—including economic expectations—past inability of the state to do this may have contributed to the causes of conflict in the first place.

Examples of how DFID involves women within its Peace-Building and State-Building Work

94. DFID seeks to ensure women are included throughout peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. Strengthening women’s ability to participate politically is critical. For example, in DRC, DFID is providing funding for CAFCO (an influential national women’s network) to encourage political parties to increase enrolment of women on electoral lists and within party leadership positions to enable women candidates to be in a good position for the coming elections. DFID also provides funding for the “Democracy and Accountability Programme” led by UNDP which aims to increase the representation of women in politics in DRC by 30% by the end of 2011. Similarly in DRC, funding for the Tuungane community recovery programme aims to increase the capacity and visibility of female elected representatives.

95. In fragile and post conflict contexts security and justice are vital state functions that need to be developed promptly. Women’s ability to access security and justice is often different from that of men with women often experiencing additional obstacles to access. As a result the UK has a number of programmes in which support to improve access to security and justice is specifically targeted towards women and girls. Four different examples follow.

96. DFID has supported UNIFEM’s “Women’s Peace-building and Preventing Sexual Violence” programme over a number of years. The programme covers countries in Africa and some in the Caribbean. DFID has committed £3.25 million over three years to this latest phase of the programme. The current phase of the programme aims to a) Strengthen women’s security and voice in peace-building at community and national levels b) institutionalise the protection of women in the work of local policy, national security service and peacekeeping forces and c) build accountability for Resolutions 1325 and 1820 though improved design and use of indicators.

97. In Burundi the joint DFID/SIDA governance programme provides £2.4 million to promote access to justice for vulnerable groups, including poor women. Over 5,000 poor women have received assistance, primarily in cases of land disputes, sexual violence and family conflicts.

98. In Sierra Leone, DFID’s Gender Technical Resource Unit demonstrates DFID’s commitment to ensure women are involved in state-building processes. The Unit will support the implementation of a joint donor gender equality and women’s empowerment action plan. An example of what this unit will support is the Access to Security and Justice Programme which has a strong focus on women. Improving personal safety for women is an important factor that enables women’s participation within society. The programme will specifically focus on gender based violence, and women’s access to justice services.

99. In Nepal DFID is supporting the Paralegal Committee Programme (managed by UNICEF) to increase the number of paralegal committees providing protection, mediation and legal services to women and children from 500 in 23 districts to 1,300 in all 75 districts of the country.

100. Ensuring people are able to access economic opportunities in fragile contexts is also important. Again, DFID works to ensure that women in addition to men are able to access economic opportunities and make the most of them. In DRC, DFID supports a road building project (£76 million) which aims to ensure women in the Eastern DRC benefit from infrastructure development which is a critical component of economic empowerment. This is complemented by a joint World Bank and DFID project which includes efforts to increase employment and safety for women working within or associated with the DRC mining sector.

101. In Burundi DFID has recently closed a long-running £6.5 million programme supporting orphans and vulnerable children. This targeted 34,000 of the most vulnerable girls and boys in Burundi and promoted economic empowerment and access to services.
102. A number of DFID programmes work to improve women’s access to finance and economic assets so that an important initial barrier to economic empowerment is removed at the outset. In Afghanistan DFID contributed over £40.5 million (2002–2009) to the Micro Finance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA). This fund helps give small loans to poor individuals looking to invest in small businesses. Nearly 60% of those receiving loans are women.

103. DFID Rwanda is ensuring that women have direct access to economic assets through support the land tenure regularisation programme (2009–10 £20 million). The programme will issue registered land title to every land holder Rwanda. The Rwanda Organic Land Law of 2005 gave women and men equal rights to land ownership, including joint ownership for married couples. Global evidence shows that security in land tenure is key to increasing the agricultural productivity of rural women and enabling them to access credit and improve incomes.

EXAMPLES OF THE IMPACT DFID SUPPORT IN FRAGILE CONTEXTS HAS ON WOMEN WITHIN THE SECTORS OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE, ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT AND RIGHTS

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<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>Globally</td>
<td>DFID’s support to security and justice sector will help 10 million women access justice through the police and courts by 2014.</td>
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| Kenya, Rwanda and Nigeria | (i) 18 million women and girls access financial service;  
(ii) 2.3 million get jobs; and  
(iii) 2.2 million to strengthen their property rights. |
—National statistics in Rwanda expected to see women owning 52% of land under the new land tenure system. Data from the programme indicate that this figure is in fact 66% of land parcels being owned or co-owned by women. DFID is currently investing in monitoring the impact of secure land tenure on women in Rwanda. International evidence indicates that it is critical for improved livelihoods. Evidence has also shown that it enables women to leave violent relationships.  
—By 2014:  
—8.8 million land parcels registered and titled, of which 3.2 million owned by men and 3.2 million by women.  
—1,374,800 people of which 680,000 men and 694,100 women reached through access to financial services. |
| Burundi         | (i) 80% more girls completing secondary school by 2015  
(ii) An additional 173,000 girls enrolled in primary school  
(iii) An additional 25,000 girls complete secondary education  
(iv) 100% increase in births attended by skilled personnel by 2015 (from 28,000 to 56,000) |
| Pakistan        | —30,711 women victims of violence provided with legal aid, counselling and rehabilitative support  
—1.2 million microfinance loans provided to poor women to help them lift their families out of poverty through economic activity  
—Fund job and skills training for 125,000 people in the Punjab by 2015 and help 75,000 rural dairy farmers, predominately women, increase their income by improving the quality and quantity of met and milk produced by 2015  
—Support the implementation of legislation tackling unequal rights in marriage, property, and inheritance  
—Provide monthly stipends to 680,000 poor girls to help keep them in school and provide them with free text books. |

Ongoing Learning and Evaluation

104. In order to continue to improve our work in this area DFID has a number of ongoing initiatives. DFID is currently in the process of collecting together the evidence of what has worked and what has not worked for women and girls in peace-building and state-building processes from across the international community. This process is starting with two studies one focusing on gender in peace-building processes and the other focusing on gender in state-building processes. This work will lead to immediate, concrete recommendations for ways in which DFID can improve its focus on gender throughout its work in fragile and post conflict contexts and a broader programme of work to fill in gaps in both HMG’s and the international communities’ knowledge in this area. The timing for this is particularly pertinent as DFID has just launched its gender vision which provides key objectives for how DFID’s work should change the lives of women and girls. The gender vision
will have a particular impact on fragile and conflict affected countries given the increasing focus that DFID is placing on these contexts.

**Whether DFID is organised to work effectively in difficult environments including staffing, skills, evaluation tools and incentives**

**Staffing, skills and incentives**

105. The significant increase in our aid budget, and the increasing focus on our work in FCAS, will require a shift in the numbers and skills sets of those working on the front line delivery of our programme over the next few years. The overall staffing complement is expected to remain broadly the same, with increases in the number of programme staff being offset by a commensurate reduction in the numbers working in our corporate services areas.

106. We are currently in the process of recruiting around 150 new advisory staff (both UK based and Staff Appointed In Country) to meet this surge in programme capacity, and we will also be assessing the extent to which our existing staff can transition into new roles. Comprehensive induction and core training will be provided for all new recruits on arrival.

107. The SDSR place conflict prevention and response high in the Government’s policy priorities and this, combined with the outcome of DFID’s own Bilateral Aid Review, suggests that there will be increased demand within DFID and other parts of HMG for DFID conflict advice. The Chief Professional Officer for Governance, Conflict and Social Development, and the Head of Profession for the joint Governance, Conflict and Humanitarian Cadre commissioned a review of conflict advisory capacity within DFID to make recommendations for future workforce planning. The report was finalised early in 2011, and a number of its recommendations are now being taken forward. These include:

- The recruitment of a new Head of Profession for a separate conflict cadre with responsible for cadre management including maintaining and developing technical skills and competence, knowledge management and thought leadership on conflict.
- An update of the technical competencies which now include whole of government approaches to conflict prevention, conflict, and stabilisation, as related to HMG engagement in FCAS.
- And following an internal DFID and cross-Whitehall process to accredit existing DFID staff and civil servants as DFID Conflict Advisers, the external recruitment of up to 15 new conflict advisers at a range of grades.

108. Within DFID, the recruiting department takes responsibility for determining the skills, qualifications and experience levels that are required to meet the demands of the job, based on local operational needs. Prospective candidates, whether internal applicants or new recruits, are assessed against a rigorous set of technical and generic competencies to ensure that they are capable of undertaking the work within that specific environment.

109. DFID’s country offices, HR Division and Heads of Profession work closely together to ensure that we employ maximum flexibility to the posting arrangements that apply to difficult posts and FCAS. This enables us to optimise the number and quality of staff that are available to fill any posts that become vacant, and to plug critical staffing gaps at the earliest opportunity.

110. As part of the pre-deployment checks, candidates being posted to the most difficult environments, for example Afghanistan, are required to undergo a full assessment of their capability to live and work in those environments. This is achieved through a series of interviews, including one with an occupational psychologist that ensures their state of readiness, awareness and coping mechanisms to work and live in such an environment. Within DFID this is called Personal Awareness Training. In addition, all DFID staff being posted to the most difficult and challenging environments are required to undergo comprehensive Hostile Environments Training.

111. DFID provides a counselling and de-brief service through its global Employee Assistance Programme (EAP) contract. Whilst serving at a difficult location, all DFID staff can access these services which are provided by experienced EAP counsellors. We encourage staff to talk to a counsellor on a routine basis every six months to ensure that they continue to cope in that environment.

112. It can be challenging to fill some posts in the more difficult environments; therefore DFID does ensure that appropriate incentives are in place. Staff serving in the most challenging environments, receive an enhanced leave entitlement to allow them to take frequent breaks away from their post to enable them to recuperate from the stresses and strains of working under these conditions. By way of illustration, DFID’s policy on decompression for staff based in Afghanistan is that they work six weeks in country and two weeks out of the country. They also have the option of working three weeks in country and one week out of the country. This allows them to have regular time away, and the opportunity to access support services.
113. Staff working in difficult locations also receive a hardship allowance in recognition of the challenges they face at post. The allowance varies according to the difficulty of the post.

114. On returning to the UK from a hostile environment, staff must take an extended period of recuperation leave before taking up their next posting. For example, at the end of a posting in Afghanistan a minimum four weeks annual leave break must be taken after one year, five weeks after 18 months and six weeks after two years. Staff can also undertake a final de-brief session within three months of leaving post and can arrange further counselling sessions as required.

Country-specific evidence on Staffing and Skills

115. Burundi is in the middle of a transition from post-conflict to traditional development status. The strategic peace-building framework that has sat alongside the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) will be subsumed into the new PRSP from 2011. Burundi remains on the agenda of the Peace-Building Commission (PBC), although this will start to focus more strongly on economic issues as a strong factor in peace-building. The DFID programme has responded to this evolution, focusing more strongly on state-building (in particular social service delivery and access to justice) in the last two years in line with DFID FCAS policy. It is now emerging as a leader in the move to ensure Burundi profits both economically and regarding stability from greater regional integration. Staffing is well adapted to the environment, with advisory skills in governance reinforcing those of health and education. Country experience of staff covers a range of fragile and stable countries, including the Balkans, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Bangladesh and DRC. Flexible solutions are found when sufficient skills are not available, including back-up from regional departments and from DFID Rwanda.

116. Rwanda’s context is post-conflict but fragile. Conflict, post conflict and reconciliation issues are at the heart of the political and economic settlement on which the government is working. Given the country context, all staff members need to have conflict awareness, and the office contains considerable experience in working in conflict-affected areas, including Afghanistan, DRC, Sierra Leone and Iraq. The team recognises a need to understand more clearly how their programme fits with the country’s post-conflict social cohesion agenda. This is one of the reasons for which the DFID Rwanda BAR offer included a strengthening of the governance team.

Corporate Processes

117. Strengthening governance and security in fragile and conflict-affected states is one of six key structural reform priorities set out in DFID’s Business Plan.10 This Business Plan sets the overarching framework for DFID’s Operational Plans at country level. As described in paragraph 45, country offices were asked in their Operational Plans to spell out how their programmes would be aligned to DFID’s priorities.

118. Guidance developed as part of the planning process set out how plans in fragile and conflict affected states should demonstrate the use of the peacebuilding/state-building framework to underpin the overarching strategy. Offices were encouraged to use the framework to identify, prioritise and design interventions across all areas of their programmes. The guidance asked for linkages to be made between service delivery, wealth creation and governance and security. As part of the planning process all fragile and conflict affected states were required to take account of the government’s shared priorities as outlined in the SDSR. And for NSC priority countries all Operational Plans were required to be fully consistent with HMG joint strategies.

119. As set out in paragraph 46, DFID has also developed further guidance to encourage good practice on measuring and managing for results in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations. This includes guidance for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) at both the country programme and individual intervention levels. This note supplements a range of other generic guidance developed to improve results monitoring and help ensure the value for money of all DFID programmes.

120. DFID has established systems in place to assess risks and monitor the results of all its interventions. Since June 2010 the Department has embarked on a major programme to strengthen its focus on results and value for money, alongside the creation of a new Independent Commission for Aid Impact. The Department is strengthening the use of evidence, commercial awareness, evaluation and value for money in all programme spending decisions. This has been formalised through the introduction of a new Business Case format for project design documents based on rigorous Treasury investment appraisal criteria. Under the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee, introduced in June 2010, the Department, for the first time, is publishing full information on all new projects and programmes approved from January 2011, including Business Cases, annual reviews of progress, project completion reports and evaluations to enable full public scrutiny of results and value for money of the Department’s investments. In addition, the guidance on the Business Case asks that for all interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states, staff set out how the proposed intervention and possible approaches will address conflict and fragility and monitor this.

121. In early 2011, DFID created a new role of Conflict Champion, currently assigned to the Director for Security & Humanitarian and Middle East, Caribbean & Overseas Territories in order to further promote conflict and fragility issues across the department and among senior management. DFID has also recently created an internal Fragility and Conflict Policy Group which is a virtual network that brings together staff working on a range of policy issues who have a responsibility or interest in ensuring fragility issues are

addressed in their area (e.g., climate change, private sector development, service delivery). The group regularly shares ideas and materials by email and will meet quarterly. This helps to ensure that information is shared and policy development is coherent.

Evaluation Tools

122. Evaluation in fragile environments is more challenging than in more stable countries. DFID’s Structural Reform Plan priorities include strengthening evaluation throughout DFID. Bilateral programmes in FCAS will benefit from, and be a specific focus within, DFID’s overall drive to improve its approach to evaluation.

123. DFID has established the Evaluation and Evidence Strategy Group (chaired by a Director General) tasked to manage the process to develop a culture of evaluation within DFID including in difficult environments. The main phase of this change programme will take around two years with significant progress expected during 2011.

124. The Group’s objectives are to:

- put in place credible evaluation arrangements for our major and most innovative programmes backed up by strong evaluation skills in operational teams;
- expand and develop the range of quality programme evaluations commissioned each year, including some impact evaluations in key areas; and
- build a culture where rigorous evaluation is a routine and accepted part of the policy and project cycle and is fully owned at the operational level.

125. The change programme includes providing new evaluation guidance, training and a refresh of DFID’s evaluation policy. It will also develop a professional cadre of evaluation specialists with new dedicated advisory posts in operational divisions.

126. DFID is developing some specific evaluation tools that can help us measure progress towards our peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives in fragile and conflict-effected states. Any progress towards these objectives is likely to be a result of multiple influences, and cannot be attributed solely to any single intervention. Impact evaluations with control groups are one approach to measuring this. These use theory-based approaches to assess whether our activities have made a plausible contribution to progress. Such methods acknowledge the complexity and interdependent nature of events in the real world and ask not, “did x cause y?” but rather, “what happened?” and “why?”

127. Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) are considered by many as a gold standard to obtain an unbiased estimate of impact and establish a causal relationship between the intervention and the outcome or outcomes. RCTs have been and are being conducted in fragile and conflict-effected states and DFID plans to increase our use of these. For example, in 2009, a randomised field experiment in Liberia evaluated the impact of a Community Driven Reconstruction (CDR) programme in northern Liberia from 2006–2008. The evaluation tested the hypothesis that exposure to the programme would enhance the ability of communities to act collectively for mutual gain. To test this hypothesis, IRC agreed randomly to assign communities to a treatment group that received the CDR programme and a control group that did not. The study found that in communities exposed to the CDR programme, the share of available cash earned by the community was 6.5% greater than in the control communities.

128. In FCAS, many interventions will have outcome and/or impact level targets that cannot be assessed within the lifetime of the intervention. At the design stage it is therefore important to consider not only the end of project evaluation but also to plan for ex-post evaluation. DFID is now encouraging ex-post evaluations, for example, five years after project completion, to examine the full impact of interventions and is exploring the possibility of embedding this as standard DFID practice through a new approach to project scoring, which will be introduced later in 2011.

Question four. How well DFID works with multilateral organisations, including the World Bank, the EU and the UN, including its peacekeeping forces, and non-traditional donors in fragile and conflict-effected states

129. The UK clearly recognises that no single donor or international player can address conflict and fragility alone. Uncoordinated assistance may be harmful to early recovery, peace-building and state-building, and we are strongly committed to working through the international system to lay the foundations for peace. Building peaceful states and societies should ideally be at the heart of joint assessments (such as joint UN/World Bank/EC Post Conflict Needs Assessments) and national strategies (such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers or Transitional Results Frameworks) in conflict-effected and fragile situations.

130. For example, the main instrument for donor coordination in DRC is the Country Assistance Framework (CAF). The CAF was a joint initiative with the UN, the World Bank and 17 donors (including DFID) participating. It is projected to cover 95% of all external assistance to DRC. It consists of a joint country analysis, high-level objectives across five programme areas, a results matrix and a risk-management strategy. The objective is to build an overall coordinating framework that each partner can use as a basis for individual planning and programming. The donors aligned the CAF to the five pillars of the existing national Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (governance, growth, social sectors, HIV/AIDS and community dynamics), in
the hope of engaging the government in substantive policy dialogue. The CAF has been credited with achieving a higher level of strategic coherence among donors, compared with the fractured nature of support during the transition period before the 2006 election. However, it has struggled to get full and genuine Government buy-in, and separate bilateral agendas remain apparent particularly in the security field.

131. The UK prioritises its alliances and partnerships with multilateral organisations to tackle fragility and conflict and has used its position as a major donor to form partnerships at both headquarters and country level that are strategic, constructive and critical. The UK has in this way, made major contributions to shape the multilateral system and improve its performance in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

132. The UK supports multilateral organisations on conflict and fragility through core funding; targeted non-core funding eg from DFID or through the Conflict Pool; bilateral funding for specific interventions at country level; through secondments; and through policy and technical support and dialogue. HMG departments work across Whitehall to coordinate the UK’s engagement with multilaterals across the political, development, security, and humanitarian spectrum to ensure effective, integrated responses to conflict and fragility.

133. A series of recent reports, including the UN Secretary General’s 2009 Report on Peacebuilding, the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report (WDR) and the 2011 report to the UN Secretary General on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict, set out the key changes needed to ensure that the international system works more effectively in conflict and fragile countries. The UK has been strongly engaged in the debates leading to the production of these reports, as well as to their implementation and follow-up. The reports include a number of recommendations such as a stronger focus on citizen security, justice and jobs; reform of internal procedures to match the needs of violence affected contexts—including in the areas of risk, budget, staffing and fiduciary systems; strengthened monitoring of results to demonstrate returns on investment in both the short and long term; and better more integrated working across the UN and World Bank.

134. DFID’s 2010–11 Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) placed an emphasis on multilaterals’ performance in fragile and conflict-affected countries. It found that, outside the humanitarian system and the European Commission, many of the multilaterals would benefit from considerable strengthening of their work in fragile contexts. DFID’s overall approach will be to continue to help to drive reforms in individual institutions, but at the same time to put greater emphasis on demanding that commitments are met in the field. This will include working with FCO to monitor and support progress on the ground in key countries (such as DRC, Liberia, and Sudan).

135. The UK works through multilateral organisations in many critical statebuilding and peacebuilding sectors at country level, drawing on their unique mandates, expertise, and reach while constantly seeking to address performance challenges.

The World Bank

136. The UK has been a key advocate of improving the performance of the World Bank Group in contexts of conflict and fragility. We have helped to ensure that fragility was considered as a special theme under IDA 15, and that this remained the case for IDA 16 with critical performance improvements a key condition for our replenishment contribution. We have also actively supported and engaged with the WDR 2011 on conflict, security and development and are pressing to ensure that its findings will be taken up by the Bank and the wider international system.

137. DFID, jointly with the Netherlands, has financed since 2008 advisory support from the IMF to the Government of Burundi on public financial management. This has resulted in the development of Burundi’s first Public Financial Management strategy. DFID is also funding an adviser to the World Bank to support the Bank’s performance in donor coordination and harmonisation.

138. DFID Sudan also supports two World Bank administered Multi-Donor Trust Funds, one in the South (MDTF-S), and one National. These are both part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Wealth Sharing Protocol, and were designed to be the primary donor support mechanisms for the priority reconstruction and development needs of (i) Southern Sudan, and (ii) war-affected regions in northern Sudan and the border areas, as well as for joint north-south projects respectively. We have learned a huge amount about what works for quick delivery and transferring responsibilities to the local authorities.

139. By the end of 2010, the MDTF-South had achieved:

— 2 million patients gained access to pharmaceuticals;
— 1 million bednets distribution of creating 225,680 disability-adjusted life years;
— 3,600,000 text books and 10,472 student kits distributed;
— 1300 previously untrained teachers received training;
— 100,000 people gained access to tertiary health care;
— 85,000 people had access to safe water;
— roads construction reduced some journey times by up to 80%; and
— over 513 km of road rehabilitated and 959km maintained.
The UN

140. The UN has a unique global legitimacy, credibility and authority stemming from its universal membership. But a variety of factors can undermine its effectiveness. Different agencies have separate governance, management and funding arrangements, and varying degrees of effectiveness was measured under our MAR progress. The UK has been supporting a number of reform efforts to strengthen the capacity of the UN and improve coordination.

141. The Strategic Defence and Security Review (UK, 2010) underlined the UN’s importance to the UK’s global security and prosperity interests, and set out HMG’s key objectives to ensure that conflict prevention plays a central role in UN efforts to foster global peace and security, alongside more effective peacekeeping. We are also promoting reforms to ensure a United Nations that better integrates political, security, development, humanitarian and human rights efforts; and to promote better coordination between the UN, NATO and the EU. We take a number of approaches to doing this, eg by supporting the UN’s key conflict prevention institutions such as the Department of Political Affairs, which has helped to prevent or stop conflict through preventive diplomacy (such as Sudan’s peaceful independence referendum, or the defusing of violence in Kyrgyzstan); and by contributing to the UN’s peacekeeping budget and engaging with the Department for Peacekeeping Operations on key strategic issues. The UK was also a key stakeholder in creating the UN Peacebuilding Architecture in 2005. DFID has led a group of like-minded donors in engaging with the Peacebuilding Fund to improve its performance, resulting in the Fund developing its first comprehensive results framework for the period 2011–13. We have also made consistent efforts through targeted non-core funding and policy dialogue to improve UNDP’s performance in response to conflict and fragility through its Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.

142. We also work extensively with the UN agencies at regional and country level:-

— In DRC, the UN stabilisation mission (MONUSCO) is coordinating international efforts to support the government of DRC’s stabilisation and reconstruction plan for conflict affected areas in the east (STAREC). Assistance is channelled through an International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy, to which DFID is providing support. This framework allows the work being done in DRC by DFID on community recovery, basic services, and roads rehabilitation in the east to be clearly linked to a wider partnership between the Congo and the international community to bring peace to the Great Lakes region.

— In Rwanda, between April 2007 and April 2011, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) implemented a primarily DFID-funded Programme for Strengthening Good Governance. Through this programme, a number of governance institutions were supported to implement their mandates around human rights, anti-corruption, reconciliation, accountability, conflict management, transparency and gender equality. This programme will be evaluated before the end of 2011. Outputs include increased capacity to record and respond to human rights and corruption-related concerns of Rwandan citizens, fact-finding field visits for parliamentary committees with an oversight responsibility around implementation of government programmes, and an internationally conducted survey (2010) capturing progress made towards post-genocide reconciliation.

— In Sudan, the Integrated Strategic Plan for Abyei identified education as a key priority for both communities. In response to rising tensions and against a background of limited local capacity, DFID has supported UNICEF to develop and implement a rapid school building and education programme. The goal is to reduce conflict and support the implementation of the peace agreement through creating school places and basic education programmes for adolescents, serving both communities, thus creating a point of common interest.

— Given the central importance of the environment and natural resources in conflict in Sudan, DFID supported UNEP to establish a presence in the country. While still in its early days, this is proving to be a successful partnership in a fragile environment.

— The Darfur Community Peace and Security Fund (2008 to 2011) is a UN managed Multi-Donor Trust Fund, with six donors. It is DFID’s biggest non-humanitarian programme in Darfur. It helps diverse communities in Darfur to establish mechanisms to resolve and prevent conflict at the community level. The project works through UN agencies, NGOs or civil society organisations, who partner with local community-based organisations and civil society groups to indentify interventions and deliver solutions.

The EU

143. The SDSR also committed HMG committed to ensuring that the EU External Action Service places a particular emphasis on conflict prevention and developing partnerships with the UN and NATO. The UK will also continue to support EU missions—military or civilian—which are in the UK’s national interest, which offer good value for money, and have clear objectives.

144. In Burundi in 2009, DFID funded a strategic conflict assessment on behalf of EU Heads of Mission (including both the EU Delegation Ambassador and EU Member States HoMs), looking particularly at renewed risks of instability around the forthcoming 2010 elections. In the lead-up to and during the election period, DFID then funded an Elections adviser to the EU heads of mission (£186,000). The terms of reference and
profile were jointly agreed and the candidate jointly endorsed. This small but highly strategic investment enabled the EU (Delegation + Member States) to develop a joint political and strategic dialogue with Government and other donors. China and Egypt were among the non-traditional partners who supported financially the elections process.

145. The UK, along with other EU Member States, subsequently contributed to a UNDP-managed Basket Fund (£1 million) to support the 2010 local, presidential and parliamentary elections. Both bilaterally and through the Elections adviser, DFID engaged with UNDP on the design, content and management of the programme. This coordinated support enabled the Elections to go ahead largely as planned and avoid the widespread violence which many had feared. The outcomes of the elections were recognised by the International Community.

146. DFID and SIDA (DFID manages SIDA funds in Burundi through a delegated partnership) are contributing £1.6 million (50% each) to an EU programme aimed at strengthening local justice delivery, including the prevention and judicial treatment of land conflict which represents 70% of the caseload in local courts. 23% of all land plots in the areas where we intervene are disputed, and this together with the inability of the judicial system to deal with the caseload, undermines social cohesion and reconciliation.

**Non-traditional donors**

147. The UK is also enhancing its relationships with non-traditional donors such as the Gulf States, who are major contributors to investment, poverty reduction and stability in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. For religious and cultural reasons, Arab donors can wield influence in areas critical to HMG objectives (eg in fragile Islamic States), enjoy good access to decision-makers, and can carry moral authority with Islamic partners.

148. The UK is building relationships bilaterally with Gulf States. These are the first steps to understanding more deeply our different working practices and looking for ways to work together in countries of mutual interest. Generally countries of mutual interest are FCAS. For example the United Arab Emirates and the UK recently organised a joint seminar on international development. While the objective was closer working more generally, the seminar focused on Pakistan and Yemen and resulted in clear steps for cooperation. There are other examples, including shared mapping and influencing work at the time of the Pakistan floods to facilitate aid effectiveness. The UK is hosting the DAC/Arab working group in July this year.

**Question five. Cross-Government working in fragile and conflict-affected states and regions including support for policing and security and justice sector reform, the role of DFID in the Building Stability Overseas Strategy, and the contribution of the Conflict Pool**

149. Helping to tackle conflict and instability overseas means making sure that the Government finds ways to draw together all of the development, diplomatic and defence tools at its disposal. Unlike previous Defence Reviews, the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in October 2010 was a cross-departmental exercise and for the first time, DFID was fully involved from start to finish. The SDSR made a firm commitment to taking an integrated approach to building stability overseas that brings all UK Government Departments together. This will mean building on past experience of increased co-operation between departments and making sure we work together from the beginning to the end of our joint interventions; from shared analysis and planning, to implementation, to review and evaluation.

**Building Stability Overseas strategy, and DFID’s role**

150. The SDSR set the scene for enhanced cross-Government working and committed the Government to publishing a Building Stability Overseas (BSO) strategy, which will provide clearer direction and a greater focus on results. The SDSR identified the Foreign Secretary and the International Development Secretary as lead Ministers for Building Stability Overseas, and the FCO Director General for Political Affairs and DFID Director General Country Programmes as lead officials. The DGs have formed an informal group known as the BSO Steering Group, which includes the MOD DG Security Policy, in order to take this forward. The BSO Strategy will be published in June, and we will ensure that the IDC receives a copy. The SDSR also committed to cutting bureaucracy by establishing one single cross-Government Board to deal with conflict overseas.

151. The Building Stability Overseas Board was established at the end of 2010, bringing together pre-existing architecture that governed the Conflict Pool, the Stabilisation Unit and the UK contribution to multilateral peacekeeping. The Board is working well, and enabling a much more strategic overview of the issues that impact upon the government’s conflict and stability objectives. For example, the Board is better able to make the links between strategy and delivery through its responsibility for directing the production of the BSO strategy, and its role in managing the SU and the Conflict Pool, which are the major delivery mechanisms.
152. DFID is also working closely with colleagues in FCO, MOD and Cabinet Office to improve the UK’s approach to early warning. We are bringing together UK internal assessments with respected external analysis in order to help strengthen the links between early warning and early action. The DG-level BSO Steering Group has overall responsibility for looking at this analysis and recommending action as appropriate. An initial meeting of the DGs piloted this approach by focusing on two countries in order to assess the risks of conflict and instability and how best the UK might respond to them.

Stabilisation Unit

153. One of the Government’s key resources for working effectively across Whitehall in fragile and conflict-affected countries is the Stabilisation Unit (SU). The SU is the Government’s centre of expertise and best practice in stabilisation, and home of the Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG). The SU is jointly owned and governed by DFID, FCO and MOD and has a key role developing cross government stabilisation planning and execution, delivering expertise to the right place at the right time as well as capturing and feeding back lessons from the field into cross-Government policy. The CSG comprises over 1,000 experts (civil servants, police and others) that HMG can use to help stabilise fragile and conflict-affected states. It is proving its utility, with 175 deployments in over 20 countries around the world in March 2011. The UK’s approach to stabilisation is world-class, with a number of partner nations interested in learning from our Stabilisation Unit and the Civilian Stabilisation Group model.

154. The Stabilisation Unit is currently working closely with FCO, DFID and MOD in response to the SDSR commitment to bring military and civilian expertise together in Stabilisation Response Teams, which will be bespoke teams able to deploy at short notice to provide an integrated UK response. We expect the details of our approach to be finalised and approved by early summer.

The Conflict Pool

155. The SDSR also committed the government to increasing the size of the Conflict Pool (it increases from £229 million in 2010–11 to £300 million in 2014–15), enabling better long-term planning, increased investment in upstream conflict prevention and stabilisation. The Board has set a workplan for 2011, which tasks the three departments with: designing a mechanism to allow programmes to make multi-year programming commitments, while ensuring the Pool remains able to respond to short-term crises such as the Libya conflict; harmonising and streamlining project documentation using the Treasury’s five-case business model that is mandatory for all government investments; and, a robust results framework for the Pool that will demonstrate impact on the ground, and increase our ability to monitor and evaluate programmes.

156. Much of the Conflict Pool’s investment supports policing and other elements of the security and justice sector (see section below for examples). As a means of delivering on its commitments to help build stability overseas, the Government also plans to step up joint working on security and justice sector reform. Whether resources for this come from the Conflict Pool or from bilateral budgets, it will be underpinned by joint analysis, strategy and planning.

Support for policing and security and justice sector reform

157. The UK can demonstrate many strong examples of effective cross-departmental working on strengthening the security and justice sector.

— Peacekeeping Support—African Union and the East African Standby Force. The AU plays an increasingly important role in managing and resolving conflict and the UK is a key partner in building AU capacity. The Conflict Pool supports the AU Strategic Plan; the FCO leads on work to develop early warning and political mediation expertise, DFID supports other governance work and the MOD is taking the international lead on developing the AU’s Eastern Brigade (the USA and France focus on other regions). With international financial and technical support, including from the Pool, the East African Standby Force, a component of the Africa Standby Force, held its first deployed Field Training Exercise in Djibouti in December 2009. Troops from ten nations participated in exercise AMANI CARANA, marking a significant step to achieving full operating capability by 2015.

— Somalia. The UK plays an important role in seeking to promote greater stability in Somalia. Conflict Pool funding for peacebuilding initiatives and security and justice sector reform projects are complementary to DFID governance projects funded through the bilateral aid programme. The Pool also supports activities aimed at strengthening the UN-endorsed AU peacekeeping force deployed in Somalia, and funds a political and a military secondee in senior positions in the UN Special Representative’s office.
The UK has been the main bilateral donor in Sierra Leone since the British intervention in support of the internationally backed peace process. We are the lead nation in supporting the reform of the security sector. The Conflict Pool has supported the reform of the military and intelligence forces (using non-ODA), while DFID has implemented a complementary programme on police reform from its bilateral programme (ODA eligible). We have thus contributed to continued improvements in coordination and accountability within Sierra Leone’s security sector. This has resulted in a smaller, well trained military which is now at its target manning figure of 8,500; the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces are now successfully deploying Sierra Leone’s first ever peacekeeping force on the UNAMID mission in Sudan. The Police have successfully provided security for the past two presidential elections, and the intelligence services have had some success in combating the drugs trade with Europe. The security sector is transforming from a burden on the Government to an asset.

Afghanistan. HMG has an agreed cross Government approach which directs UK efforts to support the development of a stable state, capable of managing its own security. DFID is integral to this and works closely with the FCO and MOD to support progress in the security and political tracks and particularly in helping Afghanistan to become a viable state. DFID contributes to a set of cross-Government bodies including the tri departmental provincial reconstruction team in Helmand, the stabilisation unit and the Afghan Drugs and Justice Unit; and is a key element of cross-Government coordination and joint delivery bodies in Whitehall and Kabul.

DRC. Following on from the success of a regional demobilisation programme led by the World Bank that demobilised around 300,000 combatants in the Great Lakes region, the Conflict Pool has been supporting a programme led by MONUSCO (the UN Stabilisation Mission in DRC) that has demobilised around 3,500 more over the past two years. Most of these have been from the FDLR—the militia group founded by Rwandan genocidaires. Combined with military operations, this work is thought to have cut the FDLR’s strength in half since 2008.

Rwanda. Due to the regional prioritisation of work in DRC and Kenya, the Conflict Pool has reduced its funding to Rwanda. In the past, however, the Pool has funded training of Rwandan peacekeepers in Darfur (managed by the Kampala-based Defence Attaché), genocide education work with the Aegis Trust (managed by DFID Rwanda) and outreach through Internews aimed at persuading the return of armed Rwandan exiles in the DRC (managed by FCO).

DFID is not strongly active in the Justice and Security sector in Rwanda—due to “division of labour” agreements with the Government of Rwanda and other donors. In the recent past, however, we have provided funding for some limited police training, and for strengthening of the Rwandan Prosecutor General’s office to more effectively handle work around the possible extradition of genocide suspects currently in the UK. These small projects have been managed by FCO colleagues in the British High Commission. DFID and FCO also worked with the Rwandan military through the Aegis Trust (managed by DFID Rwanda) and outreach through Internews aimed at persuading the return of armed Rwandan exiles in the DRC (managed by FCO).

The UK Government is increasingly joining up at the policy level both at headquarters and overseas. DRC and Burundi demonstrate that innovative ways of working together at the practical level also bears fruit.

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Burundi: Cross-DFID/FCO staffing

The DFID Burundi programme (£10 million in 2011/12) is staffed by three UK staff in Bujumbura and four national staff. FCO has a British Embassy Liaison Office (BELO) collocated with DFID, and reporting to the British Embassy in Kigali. BELO is staffed by a Political Secretary, who is responsible for political reporting and influencing, supported by a locally engaged officer, who also works to implement and protect the recent UK/Burundi memorandum of understanding on the return of failed asylum seekers and immigration offenders. The Ambassador visits from Kigali roughly once a month.

The cross-Whitehall regional conflict advisor based in Nairobi has responsibility for Burundi. With the Ambassador is based in Kigali, the Head of DFID Burundi represents the UK in meetings of the Heads of Diplomatic Missions. This post has previously been filled by an FCO officer on loan to DFID, and is now performed by a DFID manager. The current set-up works well. It is consistent and commensurate with the level of UK interest in and assistance to Burundi.

DRC: One Government, One Embassy, One Peace

The team at the British Embassy has shown that joined-up government can deliver important benefits. In Kinshasa, the DFID, FCO and MOD team has pushed the boundaries for joined-up work, not just by working as a joint team, but also by creating joint management functions and a joint Communications Unit to handle press and public affairs work. The FCO, MOD and DFID staff in the embassy work to one set of shared objectives, under one roof and as one team.
162. The joined-up government team has already had an impact through:

— Coordinated military analysis, diplomacy and development funding contributed to the successful elections in 2006. The UK earned a reputation for speaking with one voice and linking strong analysis, political pressure and programmes to help keep the process on track.

— Working together on security sector reform involved the pooling of analysis, ideas and problem solving across the three departments, and helped shift funding flexibly to take advantage of opportunities and to influence partners.

— During fighting in Kinshasa in August 2006 and March 2007, all embassy staff worked together, across traditional departmental divisions, to ensure staff safety and an effective response to the political and consular consequences.

— Setting up three joint teams across the Embassy to work on security sector reform, elections, and improving the business climate to deliver a joint business plan that has been described as “a model” by DFID and FCO Africa Directors.

May 2011

Further written evidence from DFID

1. DFID’s increase in funding to Fragile and conflict affected states: (a 33% increase) Can you set out how much currently is allocated to FCAS and what this will rise to in each of the years of the CSR period.

DFID are bound by the terms of our SR10 settlement letter to spend 30% of total UK ODA to support fragile and conflict affected states by 2014–15. This equates to an Annual spend of £3.414 million. Further allocations for the later years of the spending review period will take place as part of the annual planning and budgeting cycle.

Approved operational plans currently identify the following spend in Fragile & Conflict affected states:

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<td>£’000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budgets in Conflict &amp; Fragile Affected States</td>
<td>1,839,452</td>
<td>2,171,856</td>
<td>2,279,138</td>
<td>2,863,237</td>
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2. Which countries will receive this? Would be useful to have not just the list of countries but the portion of the increased aid which is allocated to them—again in each year of the CSR period if possible.

A country specific analysis is available in the attached file.

3. On DRC in particular, it would be useful to have a sectoral breakdown of the aid budget—again for each year of the CSR period so trends can be identified.

The sectoral breakdown for DFID DRC is included below.

CURRENT BUDGET ALLOCATIONS FOR FRAGILE STATES—(PROGRAMME RESOURCES ONLY)
**Promines**

The overarching goal of the Promines project is “To improve governance of the mining sector and increase its contribution to economic growth, sustainable development and poverty reduction”.

Its development objective/purpose is “To strengthen the capacity of key institutions to manage the minerals sector, improve the conditions for increased investments and revenues from mining, and help increase the socio-economic benefits from artisanal and industrial mining”.

It has four components as follows:

- Component A. Improve basic conditions for access to mineral resources to encourage increased investments in and revenues generated by the mining sector.
- Component B. Strengthen the Government’s capacity to manage the mineral sector.
- Component C. Strengthen the Government’s capacity and accountability in mining tax collection.
Component D. Develop innovative approaches to improve socio-economic impacts of artisanal and industrial mining in three provinces.

The spending profile for Promines is as follows:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>£0.0 m</td>
<td>£3.0 m</td>
<td>£7.4 m</td>
<td>£7.4 m</td>
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<td>£0.0 m</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>£6.2 m</td>
<td>£8.6 m</td>
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<td>£4.6 m</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>£3.3 m</td>
<td>£9.2 m</td>
<td>£16.0 m</td>
<td>£17.4 m</td>
<td>£13.8 m</td>
<td>£1.3 m</td>
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Note—that the World Bank financial years run from July to June, but the figures have not been adjusted to April to March.

**Economic Governance Matrix**

The background to agreement of the Economic Governance Matrix, as presented to the World Bank Board in late 2010 was a deterioration in economic governance in DRC in the following broad areas:

— Stalled procurement reform.
— Weak judicial system and declining respect for the rule of law [perhaps shouldn’t explicitly quote, but we understand that this included the perceived judicial harassment of the Project Coordinator for another World Bank Project].
— Reports of cases of non-transparent concession transfers and wards in the extractive sectors, reportedly leading to rent-seeking.
— Imposition of ad hoc taxes (eg on copper exports).

The matrix itself sets out agreed actions and timelines within the following areas (with 44 indicators, some with sub-divisions):

— Exploitation of natural resources is done in a way in which to derive the maximum benefit to the state—with particular reference to the Mining, Forestry and Oil sectors.
— Legal certainty of the business environment.
— Transparent and efficient use of public resources once allocated: Competition and publication of information.

The Bank Board considered that sufficient progress had been made against the matrix by June 2011 for it to relax its slow down on preparation/approval of new programmes for DRC (which had affected DFID-Bank partnerships on supplementary financing for ProRoutes as well as ProMines).

**Tax Revenues from the Mining Sector**

The 2009 baseline for the mining sector contribution to government revenues is $155 million, according to DFID’s economic analysis for the project. The potential annual contribution (with the Promines project) was estimated at an average of $1,184 million per annum between 2015 and 2020, based upon improved effectiveness of tax collection and reasonable assumptions of increased investment in the sector because of a more attractive investment environment.

**Programmes which Empower Citizens to Hold their Governments to Account**

**DRC**

Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform (SSAPR) Programme includes a £10 million external accountability component—£2 million per year from January 2010–January 2015. It supports the development of accountability across the security and justice sectors: within GoDRC institutions in terms of civil oversight of security organs; with the legislative arm of government at the national and provincial levels to strengthen their capacity; and through supporting the capacity of key non-state actors (eg the Church, media and civil society organisations) to represent the needs of communities effectively and to engage the security sector and justice sectors directly.

Strengthening Democracy & Accountability programme includes an “Election Cycle Support” project that supports the setting up of a democratic, stable and legitimate governance system that encourages sustainable development. It is implemented by UNDP, who is supporting CENI (National Independent Election Commission) and the electoral process in DRC. The five year project started in 2008 with a budget of £26,870,770—disbursed £22,692,122 to March 2011. We plan to disburse £2,089,000 in each of 2011–12 and 2012–13.

The Civil Society Fund for good governance is intended to support civil society organisations (CSO) to empower citizens and their representatives to monitor and hold government to account. Our lead implementing partner is Christian Aid who works with a Consortium of CSO. Total project budget is £10 million, with a yearly breakdown over the SR period of: 2011–12 £2.5 million; 2012–13 £4.25 million; 2013–14 £1.124 million; and, 2014–15 £1.125 million.
Media for Strengthening Democracy and Accountability in the DRC supports the development of an independent, well regulated and professional media sector, which gives information and voice to the Congolese people and helps them hold decision-makers to account. We have a silent partnership with France Cooperation / France Expertise International. The total budget for the programme is £11,275,598; of which £2,161,430 is budgeted for 2011–12. The programme is due to end in December 2012.

Bottom-up development programmes—community driven approaches to empower people at the local level to take control of their own development.

DRC

Tuungane is a community-led recovery programme to empower rural communities to have a greater voice and help them become active agents of their own development in eastern DRC. It supports beneficiaries to take ownership of their own development through a series of actions, including: analysing their context, electing representatives, defining community recovery priorities, participatory processes to identify priorities, managing block grants, and contributing to oversight and implementation of a community project. The project started in 2007 with a £90 million budget. Funding per year over the SR period is: 2011–12 £16,164,840; 2012–13 £16,528,429; 2013–14 £13,996,744; and, 2014–15 £13,996,744.

FINANCIAL SUMMARY OF EXISTING PROGRAMMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>SSAPR</th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>CSF</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Tuungane</th>
<th>Total spend</th>
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<td>budget</td>
<td>£10,000,000</td>
<td>£26,870,770</td>
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<td>£11,275,598</td>
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<td>£148,146,368</td>
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<td>2011–12</td>
<td>£2,000,000</td>
<td>£2,089,000</td>
<td>£2,500,000</td>
<td>£2,161,430</td>
<td>£16,164,840</td>
<td>£24,915,270</td>
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<td>2012–13</td>
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<td>£13,996,744</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014–15</td>
<td>£2,000,000</td>
<td>£1,125,000</td>
<td>£13,996,744</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total in SR</td>
<td>£8,000,000</td>
<td>£4,178,000</td>
<td>£9,000,000</td>
<td>£2,161,430</td>
<td>£60,686,757</td>
<td>£84,026,187</td>
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Note: DFID DRC is in an intensive period of design with a number of existing programmes due to close next year. The percentage of annual spend 2012–13 onwards may increase as new programmes come on stream.

RWANDA

DFID Rwanda currently has one project which focuses specifically on citizen empowerment—the £1.7 million Public Policy Information Monitoring and Advocacy programme (PPIMA).

The Project Purpose “to strengthen monitoring, analysis and advocacy skills for Rwandan civil society and citizens to monitor and inform service delivery”.

The expected results are:

- Increased citizen satisfaction with the delivery of services in education, health, water and agriculture;
- Citizens have better access to information and take part in monitoring the delivery of services;
- Local government and service providers are more accountable to the communities; and
- Better results monitoring and accountability on the delivery of services at the national level.

The project is co-funded by DFID, the Swedish Development Agency (SIDA), and Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), and implemented by NPA. Two international NGO’s, CARE and Save the Children also provide some funding.

Civil society partners in the project include:

- District-based Civil Society Organizations: ADENY A, ADI-TERIMBERE and URUGAGA IMBARAGA.

Since the programme started in 2010, DFID has disbursed a total of 566,500. Below is indication of the total budget and tranches per each year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Years</th>
<th>2010–11</th>
<th>2011–12</th>
<th>2012–13</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFID SPEND IN GPS</td>
<td>566,500</td>
<td>566,500</td>
<td>567,000</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The programme is scheduled to end in 2013, but we are currently considering extending it for an additional two years.
VISION 2020 UMERENGE PROJECT (VUP)

In VUP, a mechanism for handling appeals and complaints (related to the cash transfers, public works or financial services provided through the programme) was developed and successfully pilot-tested in five VUP sectors. As of December 15, 2010, there were 291 primary and 257 formal appeals, (but the appeals process is available to the entire adult population of these five sectors). We don’t currently have enough information to estimate what proportion of DFID’s funding of VUP can be attributed to the pilot.

EDUCATION SECTOR BUDGET

DFID’s Sector Budget Support for Education will support Parent Teacher Committees. By 2015 it is expected that support to 3,669 parents (to hold teachers and schools to account) can be attributed to DFID.

MONUSCO

In the renewal of the MONUSCO mandate (to 2012) what discussion was there about changing the nature of the mandate or the scope of the mission?

There was little evidence to support a reconfiguration of the mission this year, due to the proximity of the elections and the increased stabilisation efforts introduced in the MONUSCO mandate the previous year. Troop levels were therefore retained at their current level of 20,000 uniformed personnel.

We pushed strongly for Protection of Civilians to remain the number one priority for MONUSCO. We also supported the inclusion of an additional role for MONUSCO to provide advisory, technical and logistical support for the organisation and conduct of national, provincial, and local elections, as requested by the Congolese authorities. In addition, UNSCR 1991 requests the UNSG to report on the electoral process, including on MONUSCO’s support, as well as a comprehensive assessment of the political, security, humanitarian and human rights environment during and after the elections.

In particular, was there any discussion about the ability of MONUSCO soldiers to hold or arrest perpetrators of violence?

The UK strongly supports the continuation of the Chapter 7 mandate which allows for robust peacekeeping measures. We strongly encourage MONUSCO to be proactive in dealing with perpetrators of violence. We regularly encourage MONUSCO to work closely with the DRC security forces to prevent human rights violations by their members, and ensure the detention and prosecution of those responsible. MONUSCO has recently assisted with the transfer of soldiers accused and convicted of rape.

The UK also supported reiteration of the need for Congolese Authorities to combat impunity against all perpetrators of human rights and international humanitarian law violations, including those committed by any illegal armed groups or elements of the Congolese security forces.

Was the cost of MONUSCO discussed?

The UNSC determines troop and police ceilings and the mandated tasks. We look to make peacekeeping as efficient and effective as possible but costs for the mission are not discussed in the UNSC. DPKO planners assess the needs of the mission, including civilian staff, which is then presented as a budget to the ACABQ committee in advance of agreement at the UN’s 5th Committee.

What is the UK Government’s view on the appropriateness of the MONUSCO mandate?

MONUSCO plays an essential role providing civilian protection and helping to build stability in DRC. The UK fully supports the MONUSCO mandate, but will continually keep it under review, to ensure it is configured to meet the evolving challenges on the ground.

14 October 2011

Further written evidence from DFID

EVIDENCE SESSION, 20 OCTOBER 2011—ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. The list of fragile states

Of DFID’s 28 focus countries, we consider the following 21 to be fragile or conflict affected:
   Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nepal, Nigeria, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan & South Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

The list was compiled in May 2011, using the latest available data from the World Bank’s CPIA, the Failed States Index and Uppsala Conflict Data. We will review it again in two years.
Table 1 below indicates which of these countries are Low Income Countries or Lower Middle Income Countries (from WDR 2011 p 343 drawing on World Bank Data).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Income Countries</th>
<th>Lower Middle Income Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nepal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Nigeria, OPTs, Pakistan, Sudan, Yemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The recent OECD DAC report


While the underlying text of the report was overwhelmingly positive about the UK’s performance it suggested that UK performance against the Paris indicators declined overall between 2007 and 2010.

There are, however, aspects of the methodology adopted in the report that may underestimate UK performance:

- The OECD-DAC methodology around two indicators—related to aid recorded on budget and aid predictability—could be improved. Averages are used with no regard for the total volume of assistance in each country. These indicators would show stronger UK performance if these volumes were taken into consideration. Therefore, adopting a weighted methodology would increase the accuracy of the information and better represent UK performance.

- Furthermore, given the need to mitigate the risks of corruption, it may not always be most appropriate to channel aid through partner countries’ budgets within fragile and conflict afflicted states. Consequently, data underpinning this indicator (aid recorded on budget) show falls on the 2007 levels of UK aid reported through partner country budgets in a number of fragile states (including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, DRC and Sierra Leone).

It is important to note that UK performance showed an overall improvement since 2005 and this is corroborated by conclusions of other reports. However, there had been some slippage relative to a strong 2007 performance. The UK has performed better than key peers such as Germany, the UN, the EU and the US; with performance broadly similar to Sweden. The recent Action Aid report also placed DFID second of all donors for the effectiveness of its aid.

3. What percentage of DFID’s budget in the DRC is spent through civil society organisations for peacebuilding?

DFID has no programmes in the DRC that are exclusively labelled as peace-building initiatives. However, many DFID DRC programmes contribute to peace building objectives such as our community recovery and reconstruction programmes and the civil society fund.

In 2011–12, we estimate that 15% of overall DFID funding will be spent through civil society organisations on activities that support peace building objectives.

4. Has the Government now drawn a line under the First Quantum case or are there further issues it intends to pursue?

DFID, with other donors, will continue to press the Government of DRC for greater transparency in all its mining transactions, including by state-owned enterprises, through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the joint DFID-World Bank PROMINES project.

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank had a stake in First Quantum’s Kingamanyambo Musonoi Tailings (KMT) Project, which was the origin of the Government of DRC’s dispute with First Quantum. The IFC has assured DFID that in advance of its investment in KMT it had undertaken a thorough review of First Quantum’s contract with the Government of DRC and satisfied itself that the terms were fair and in accordance with the current DRC Mining Code, and that it viewed the Government of DRC’s reasons for subsequently cancelling that contract as unjustifiable. The case is now under arbitration in the ICC, with IFC a joint claimant with First Quantum against the Government of DRC.

Since the case is under arbitration, no further action seems appropriate at this stage in the particular case of First Quantum Minerals Ltd (FQM).

5. How much humanitarian relief has DFID provided to Somalia since 2010? What percentage of the DFID budget for Somalia does this represent?

DFID has allocated £89 million for humanitarian relief in Somalia since April 2010. This includes £30 million spent in FY 2010–11 and £59 million committed in 2011–12.

11 South Sudan data not yet available. Initial estimates of South Sudan’s GNI per capita indicate that it is a Low Income Country close to Lower Middle Income status. However, oil revenues, which account for a large share of South Sudan’s GNI, are currently forecast to drop over the next decade.
The £30 million in 2010–11 represented 63% of DFID Somalia’s spend in that financial year.

DFID’s allocated framework for Somalia for non-humanitarian activities in 2011–12 was initially £25 million, but this is subject to change in the remaining months of the year. So at this stage it is difficult to establish percentage of the overall budget for this financial year.

6. What is DFID’s contribution to the Ugandan/Burundian Peacekeeping force in Somalia and to peacekeeping training programmes there?

This financial year the UK will support AMISOM in the following ways:

- Africa Conflict Pool (AMISOM training, equipment and capacity building support and Contingent Owned Equipment)—£4.1 million.
- UN assessed costs (8.16% of UN logistics support package)—£11.2 million.
- DFID-funded EU African Peace Facility (14.82% of troop allowances)—approx £12 million.

Total = approx £27.3 million

7. What is the projected contribution of each of DFID, FCO and MoD to the conflict pool over the CSR period? How have budget cuts in the FCO and MoD Departments impacted on their contribution?

The Conflict Pool is funded from a separate HM Treasury settlement which is additional to Departmental Expenditure Limits, rather than pooled DFID, FCO and MoD resources. The Treasury settlement also provides resources to cover the cost of HMG’s obligatory contributions to international peacekeeping. Conflict resources are set to increase annually until 2014–15—see Table 1 below—reflecting the Government’s commitment to conflict prevention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONFLICT RESOURCES: TREASURY SETTLEMENT (£ M)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping (non-ODA)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Pool</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256</td>
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<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Settlement</td>
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<tr>
<td>630</td>
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<td>of which ODA</td>
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<td>130</td>
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<tr>
<td>of which non-ODA</td>
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<td>500</td>
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</table>

8. What is the split between security related (DDR) programmes and non-security related activities, such as job creation, funded by the conflict pool?

The Conflict Pool spends a mixture of ODA and non-ODA resources (the table in the answer to question 7 breaks this down over the Spending Review period). All Conflict Pool expenditure, whether ODA or non-ODA, is designed to have an impact on conflict and security.

The Building Stability Overseas Strategy sets out three key themes for the Conflict Pool: free, transparent and inclusive political systems; effective and accountable security and justice; and local, regional and multilateral capacity building.

The ability to blend ODA and non-ODA is one of the Conflict Pool’s key strengths, providing a comparative advantage for engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states by enabling the Pool to take an integrated approach to working with both civilian and military stakeholders. Some examples of Conflict Pool work which mix ODA and non-ODA spend are provided below:

- In Sierra Leone, capacity-building support for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) has resulted in a smaller, well-trained and more cost-effective military which is now at its target manning figure of 8,500 personnel. In 2009 the RSLAF deployed its first-ever peacekeeping force on UNAMID in Sudan.
- In South Sudan there is an integrated defence, development and diplomacy programme on Security Sector and defence transformation. This involves: supporting a sustainable policy, institutional and legal framework for the security sector; defence engagement with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (ex-guerrilla force, now legitimised); and, support to peacekeeping, post-referendum negotiations and international architecture.
- In Afghanistan, 3,300 Afghan Uniformed Police have been trained in Helmand on counter insurgency, counter narcotics and public accountability.
9. Is there a context in which DFID would be able to request additional funding for security measures, for example from the conflict pool, and if so, what are the limitations on this?

A strong focus of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy, which sets the overarching strategic direction for the Pool, is rapid crisis prevention and response. From 2012–13, a £20 million annual Early Action Facility (£60 million over SR 10) will be set up to help the Pool move more swiftly in response to warnings and opportunities. It will be a mix of ODA and non-ODA. Tri-departmental Conflict Pool programmes will be able to call on this additional funding. The facility is still in design phase and eligibility criteria are yet to be decided.

The majority of Conflict Pool resources are allocated to programmes in advance of the start of the Financial Year. A small reserve is retained to cope with in-year pressures such as the rising costs of international peacekeeping missions and exchange rate fluctuations, or unexpected crises. In financial year 2011–12, the reserve was £7 million. It was allocated to the Libya programme in April in response to the emerging crisis there.

DFID bilateral programmes can also request additional funding from central contingency funds. DFID holds in year contingencies to manage unforeseen events, for example humanitarian crises; unforeseen policy priorities driven by international or domestic events; and changing circumstances in specific countries.

10. Can the Government share NSC papers with the Committee to illustrate the NSC's role in coordinating work across Government?

Decisions to release NSC papers are a matter for the Cabinet Office. As a general rule, such papers would not be shared with a Select Committee/outside of Government.

The NSC considers a broad range of domestic and international issues relating to UK national security. It brings together the key Ministers, as well as military and intelligence chiefs to cover foreign policy; defence; international relations and development; resilience, as well as energy and resource security.

26 October 2011

**Written evidence from Human Rights Watch**

I. SUMMARY

(i) Human Rights Watch’s submission to the IDC focuses primarily on DFID’s role in Rwanda, given the UK’s particularly important role in that country and Rwanda’s critical role in the Great Lakes region. It includes a brief section on the regional dimension, which covers both the DRC and Burundi. However, it does not include detailed comments on DFID’s programmes in the DRC or Burundi. In light of Human Rights Watch’s expertise and mandate, the submission concentrates on the human rights dimension of DFID’s strategy. While our observations and recommendations relate directly to DFID policy towards the Great Lakes region, they have wider relevance and application for DFID’s policy towards fragile and conflict-affected states elsewhere in the world.

(ii) In an oral statement on the bilateral and multilateral aid reviews to the House of Commons on 1 March 2011, Secretary of State for International Development Andrew Mitchell stated: “Recent events in North Africa and the wider Middle East have demonstrated why it is critical that the UK increases its focus on helping countries to build open and responsive political systems, tackle the root causes of fragility and empower citizens to hold their governments to account. It is the best investment we can make to avoid violence and protect the poorest and most vulnerable in society.”

(iii) Human Rights Watch agrees strongly with this statement and the analysis that underpins it. DFID policy towards fragile and conflict-affected states should indeed be focused on building open and inclusive political systems, where human rights are respected and where citizens can hold their governments to account. But in respect of Rwanda in particular, DFID has not given adequate priority to human rights or responsive governance.

(iv) The unstated rationale for this approach is that Rwanda is a country that has made great strides since the genocide of 1994 and that to “rock the boat” by pushing human rights concerns would put this progress at risk. But as recent events in the Middle East and North Africa have demonstrated clearly, undemocratic and repressive regimes are a recipe for instability, conflict and economic stagnation, not for inclusive development and social stability. It is both wrong in principle and unwise—in terms of longer-term interests—to set aside human rights concerns in the interests of state building or stability.

(v) As well as not holding Rwanda to its existing national and international commitments on human rights, DFID has often presented an overly optimistic picture of the situation in Rwanda. For example, DFID’s Country Plan for 2008–2012, under the heading “What we have already achieved—the good news”, states that “political stability has been matched by economic stability”. It does not explain what it means by “political stability” and makes no reference to the political tensions in the country. According to Human Rights Watch’s research, the Rwandan government’s methods of governance have accentuated public disillusion and frustration, cutting across ethnic, regional and political lines. Although most Rwandans do not express these feelings openly for
fear of repercussions, private conversations with Rwandans from a range of backgrounds reveal that many people feel alienated by the political climate.

(vi) DFID’s apparent lack of attention to the human rights situation has encouraged the Rwandan government to believe that respect for human rights and good governance matter little to its largest donor.

(vii) This submission makes a number of recommendations:

— In the context of DFID’s new operational plan for Rwanda, it is essential that much greater priority be given to human rights, the rule of law, and transparent and responsive governance.

— The 10 year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the UK and Rwandan governments, signed in 2006, should be revitalised, with DFID and the Rwandan government making an annual public statement on their respective commitments under the MOU.

— DFID, together with other donors, should ensure that the new Joint Governance Assessment (put together by donors and the Rwandan government) refines the indicators from the 2008 assessment and makes them more precise, especially around human rights and transparent and responsive governance.

— DFID should develop a programme of support for independent civil society organisations in Rwanda.

— Together with the British High Commission in Kigali, DFID should develop a strategy for the protection of human rights defenders—in line with the European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders—and be prepared to intervene when activists are threatened.

— DFID should reinforce its regional strategy on the Great Lakes, which takes into consideration the impact of events and actors in Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, with a view to addressing the cross-border nature of conflict and instability.

— Following the departure of its Great Lakes analyst, DFID should appoint a new regional analyst as soon as possible. DFID staff should also establish more regular communication with the Great Lakes analysts in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) so that findings and analyses are shared and UK policy is more coherent.

II. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH’S WORK IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

(i) Human Rights Watch (HRW) is a non-governmental human rights organisation established in 1978, which now has more than 280 staff members around the globe. Each year, HRW publishes more than 100 reports and briefings on human rights conditions in some 90 countries.

(ii) HRW has been working on the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi for nearly 20 years. With a presence on the ground in all three countries, HRW has closely monitored the human rights situation and has produced numerous reports and other documents describing its research findings (available at www.hrw.org). HRW has closely followed UK government policy in the region and has regularly engaged with DFID as well as the FCO.

III. THE ROLE OF THE UK IN RWANDA AND THE GREAT LAKES REGION

(i) Following the genocide in Rwanda, the UK has emerged as one of the most important bilateral aid donors. The UK government also plays a key role as a member of the European Union (EU) which maintains an important presence in Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC. A number of other EU countries often look to the UK for leadership on strategy and responses to particular situations, especially in Rwanda. The UK government is therefore well placed to influence events in all three countries.

(ii) Rwanda has made a remarkable recovery since the genocide in 1994, particularly in economic terms, where it has secured a strong growth rate and made progress against certain human development indicators in recent years. Nevertheless, Rwanda still relies heavily on foreign aid. The UK is the largest bilateral aid donor to Rwanda, contributing over £380 million in aid between 1998 and 2008. In 2011, it announced that it would spend an average of £83 million per year in Rwanda until 2015, rising from around £70 million in 2010–11 to an anticipated £90 million in 2014–15.

(iii) DFID has repeatedly praised Rwanda’s successes since the genocide and has held it up as one of the UK’s flagship countries for development in Africa. Senior DFID officials, including successive Secretaries of State for International Development, have frequently described UK aid to Rwanda as “money well spent”. DFID’s development agenda has also had a clear influence on the UK’s foreign policy towards Rwanda. While the FCO has sometimes been more critical of Rwanda’s human rights record than DFID, it too has downplayed the gravity of human rights violations in Rwanda. This was illustrated mostly recently in the FCO’s 2010 annual human rights report, which did not include any information on Rwanda.

14 See, for example, DFID Country Plan: Development in Rwanda 2008–2012.
IV. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

(i) The UK government has provided constant support for Rwanda despite clear evidence indicating Rwanda’s involvement in grave human rights violations, including killings of thousands of unarmed civilians in Rwanda between 1994 and 1999, and in the DRC during and after the Rwandan invasions in 1996 and 1998.16 This period was also marked by assassinations, disappearances and arrests of opposition politicians, attacks against journalists, and intimidation of human rights defenders.

(ii) While the present submission concentrates on the current situation, it is important to recognise that the patterns witnessed in Rwanda today are not new. In many respects, the human rights landscape has changed little since the ruling party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), first formed a government in Rwanda in 1994. Over the 17 years that followed, HRW and other organisations have documented a consistent pattern of human rights violations by Rwandan government agents.

(iii) The human rights situation in Rwanda deteriorated in 2010 in the run-up to presidential elections, with a crackdown on opposition parties, journalists and other critics. None of the three new opposition parties were allowed to contest the 2010 elections; two of them were prevented from registering as political parties. Two opposition leaders were charged with serious criminal offences. One was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment in early 2011; the other has spent seven months in pre-trial detention. Lower-ranking members of their parties were also arrested and threatened, and several detained and ill-treated; some of them remain in prison in 2011. The vice-president of a third party was found murdered, his body mutilated; an independent journalist was shot dead outside his house; and a former army general, once one of the most powerful men in Rwanda, turned outspoken critic of the government, narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in South Africa. It was against this backdrop that the incumbent president Paul Kagame was re-elected with 93% of the vote in August 2010, with the National Electoral Commission reporting a 97.5% turnout.17

(iv) Freedom of expression, more broadly, continues to be severely restricted in Rwanda. A variety of laws have been used to prosecute critics—in particular, a law on “genocide ideology” adopted in 2008. Ill-defined, vague and open to abuse, this law has been used, among other things, to target critics of the government or of the RPF.18 Critics have also been charged with other serious offences such as endangering national security.

(v) Rwandan human rights organisations have borne the brunt of the government’s repression in the post-genocidal years. International NGOs have also faced difficulties. In 2008, HRW’s advisor on the Great Lakes region, Alison Des Forges—a world-renowned expert on Rwanda who had documented the genocide, as well as other crimes, and testified for the prosecution before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on multiple occasions—was twice prevented from entering Rwanda; previously, senior Rwandan government officials had accused her of being a spokesperson for “genocide ideology” after she had called for all perpetrators of crimes to be brought to justice, including those from the ruling party. In 2010, immigration authorities cancelled the work visa of HRW’s senior researcher on Rwanda and refused to grant her a new one, effectively forcing her to leave the country.

V. DFID, RWANDA AND HUMAN RIGHTS

(i) “Good governance” is included in DFID’s programmes in Rwanda: 30% of a total of £52.8 million bilateral aid to Rwanda in 2009–10 was spent on “governance”.19 DFID and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducted a four year joint “programme for strengthening good governance” from 2007 to 2010.

(ii) However, DFID’s programmes do not appear to have made any appreciable impact on the observance of human rights or the responsiveness and transparency of governance in Rwanda. DFID’s aid to Rwanda has increased year by year, without any corresponding improvement in these areas. Indeed, with respect to freedom of expression and political space, the situation may even have worsened in the last 10 years.

(iii) Some UK government officials, responding to the political crackdown around the 2010 elections, expressed the hope that these problems might be “just a blip” and that the situation would improve after the elections. This position took no account of the fact that these events mirrored those which had surrounded the


19 Figures downloaded from DFID’s website, 10 May 2011.
2008 legislative elections and the 2003 presidential elections. Far from being a “blip”, they were consistent with the behaviour of the Rwandan government over the previous years, and there was no reason to believe that this behaviour would change in 2010. This has since been further demonstrated by the continued harassment of opposition party members, journalists and other critics since the 2010 elections and into 2011.

(iv) DFID missed a number of opportunities to demonstrate its concern to the Rwandan government during 2010. For example, DFID chose not to renew its support to the government-affiliated Media High Council (MHC) after the MHC suspended two independent newspapers, Umuvugizi and Umuseese, in April 2010.20 Instead of taking this opportunity to make clear to the Rwandan government that it would not support institutions which curtail freedom of the press, DFID simply waited for the current phase of funding to end, then did not renew support for the MHC. To HRW’s knowledge, DFID did not make any statement as to the reasons for not renewing the funding.

(v) In 2011, discussion is ongoing in Rwanda on possible reforms to laws and regulations governing the media, including a proposal to revise the mandate of the MHC to remove its media regulatory function. These would be welcome developments, but DFID should be cautious before rushing to resume its support to this institution: the media environment in Rwanda is still extremely restrictive. Two journalists are in prison after being sentenced in 2011 to 17 and seven years respectively for writing articles which were viewed as critical of the government and the president; several other independent journalists have gone into exile; and most others are afraid of investigating sensitive issues. Almost all active media outlets in Rwanda are now either controlled by the government or compliant with its directives.

(vi) DFID often refers to “evidence-based policies”. DFID’s Country Action Plan 2008–12 states: “We have based our strategic choices on firm evidence”. The MOU also refers to “policies based on evidence”. In the case of Rwanda, however, it appears that DFID has sometimes been willing to discard evidence relating to human rights abuses, with the result that the evidence on which it has based its policies has been selective and incomplete.

(vii) It is worth noting that DFID’s views on Rwanda are increasingly at odds with those of independent researchers, academics and political analysts from different countries, as well as, increasingly, other international donors. In recent years, Rwanda’s political direction has been the object of increasing concern on the part of these constituencies.21

(viii) Apart from the human rights concerns addressed in this submission, some academic researchers have documented the increase in coercive laws and regulations governing the everyday lives of ordinary people in Rwanda,22 while others have questioned widely-held assumptions about economic reforms in Rwanda by pointing to growing inequalities.23 A report published by the UNDP in 2007 also found an increase in economic inequalities and the depth of poverty in Rwanda.24 HRW has not carried out in-depth research on all these areas, but believes that these findings should be taken into account in development strategies.

(ix) We understand that DFID is in the process of putting together a new operational plan for Rwanda.

(x) Recommendations:

— In the context of DFID’s new operational plan for Rwanda, it is essential that much greater priority be given to human rights, the rule of law, and transparent and responsive government.

— DFID plans and strategies should build in evidence relating to a broader range of aspects of the situation in Rwanda, including the human rights situation, and from a wide range of sources.

— DFID should refrain from resuming its support to official or quasi-official media institutions in Rwanda unless or until the media climate and respect for freedom of expression and the media improve in a demonstrable way.

VI. THE 2006 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

(i) In 2006, the governments of the UK and Rwanda signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), valid for 10 years. The MOU “provides a transparent framework for accountability between our two Governments and between each Government and its Parliament and people.” It lists a number of shared commitments, commitments by Rwanda, commitments by the UK, a process for monitoring and review, and “circumstances under which development assistance would be interrupted or reduced”.

20 This support was part of the joint programme with UNDP, through which DFID provided funding to several government-appointed institutions, including the MHC, the National Electoral Commission and the National Human Rights Commission.


22 In his article “Do we understand life after genocide? Center and periphery in the construction of knowledge in post-genocide Rwanda” (in African Studies Review, volume 53, no.1, April 2010), Bert Ingelaere includes a list of 29 “forbidden or obligatory activities” and corresponding fines which local authorities are expected to impose, ranging from “house without table to put cooking utensils on” to “someone without clean clothing and body hygiene”.


The Rwandan government categorically rejected the report and sought to discredit it, claiming that it was orchestrated by government opponents. For further commentary on the Joint Governance Assessment, and donor policy in Rwanda more generally, see Rachel Hayman, “Official Government of Rwanda comments on the draft UN Mapping Report on the DRC”, 30 September 2010.

(ii) Points 2 and 3 of the “shared commitments” refer to “the principles of good governance, and respect for human rights” and “the promotion of peace and stability in the Great Lakes region”. The Rwandan government’s commitments include a section on good governance and human rights, which covers the promotion of a democratic and inclusive state and the promotion and protection of economic, social, political, civil and cultural rights; and a section on conflict prevention, with a commitment to promoting peace and stability in the Great Lakes region.

(iii) Section 6 of the MOU states that one of the “circumstances in which the UK will consider reducing, interrupting, changing the modalities of, or terminating aid” is if “the Government of Rwanda is in significant violation of human rights or other international obligations, especially those relating to regional peace and security”. It states “the UK will take a long term perspective and is more likely to respond to a systematic pattern of events over time. However, a single event might trigger a response if sufficiently serious in nature.”

(iv) There have been numerous occasions on which these circumstances have occurred since the MOU was signed, both in Rwanda and in the DRC, where Rwanda has backed violent armed groups with a well-documented record of attacking civilians (see below). These repeated breaches of Rwanda’s commitments under the MOU do not appear to have called into question DFID’s relationship with the Rwandan government.

(v) Recommendation:
— The 10 year Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and Rwandan governments should be revitalised, with DFID and the Rwandan government making an annual public statement on their respective commitments under the MOU. This would be in line with DFID’s new commitment to accountability and transparency.

VII. J O I N T G O V E R N A N C E A S S E S S M E N T

(i) In 2008, a Joint Governance Assessment was conducted by the government of Rwanda and its development partners. One of the subjects covered by the assessment was “ruling justly”, a heading which incorporated the rule of law, human rights and civil liberties, political rights and accountability. The final report of the assessment made a number of recommendations and included a framework for assessing progress based on 45 indicators.

(ii) Several compromises and alterations were made to the final report of the Joint Governance Assessment in order to accommodate the Rwandan government. Nevertheless, the report could have been used as a starting point for reviewing progress in governance in Rwanda, not least because the Rwandan government itself had signed up to it. To HRW’s knowledge, DFID has not used the Joint Governance Assessment and, as with the MOU, has not incorporated its indicators into its strategy.

(iii) A new Joint Governance Assessment was reportedly conducted in 2010 but its report has yet to be published.

(iv) Recommendation:
— DFID, together with other donors, should ensure that the final version of the new Joint Governance Assessment refines the indicators and makes them more precise, particularly around human rights and transparent and responsive governance, and incorporate these into his own strategy.

VIII. A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y

(i) DFID has frequently praised the Rwandan government for its increased “accountability”. The term is used in a narrow, technical sense and seems to refer primarily to financial accountability. The notion of accountability is strikingly absent in relation to human rights.

(ii) DFID’s use of the term “accountable” to describe Rwanda also ignores the impunity which continues to protect Rwandan government and military officials involved in carrying out or ordering human rights violations. This absence of accountability was demonstrated recently in the Rwandan government’s response to the UN Human Rights Mapping Report on the DRC which found that Rwandan troops and their Congolese allies were implicated in crimes against humanity in the DRC in 1996 and 1997. The Rwandan government categorically rejected the report and sought to discredit it, claiming that it was orchestrated by government opponents. In both its content and tone, the Rwandan government’s response to the UN mapping report demonstrated that it does not feel it has to account for its actions either to its own people or to the international community.

27 The UN mapping report, published by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on 1 October 2010, describes the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the DRC between March 1993 and June 2003.
IX. How DFID CHANNELS ITS AID

(i) HRW is not calling for a halt or suspension of aid to Rwanda, but recommends that DFID review the beneficiaries and the channels through which it dispenses aid. HRW urges DFID to develop its governance and human rights programmes and to increase support to independent non-governmental organisations working in these areas.

Support to civil society

(ii) Independent civil society in Rwanda has been seriously decimated. It is one of the areas in which state intimidation, threats and infiltration have succeeded in silencing criticism. In the aftermath of the genocide, a number of independent Rwandan human rights organisations were still able to investigate and report on human rights violations, albeit at great risk. Over the subsequent years, they have been silenced one by one. In 2011, there are barely two or three active human rights organisations left in Rwanda, and even they are struggling to remain active. Aside from problems emanating from their relationship with the state, these organisations suffer from a lack of financial support which has greatly hampered their activities.29

(iii) DFID does not have a track record of supporting independent civil society in Rwanda. Although at times it has explored proposals for doing so, such proposals have not materialised. Instead, DFID has channelled aid to state institutions such as the National Commission for Human Rights (NHRC) and the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). These commissions are appointed and tightly controlled by the government and the ruling party, and have very limited scope for independent oversight or action.

(iv) Support to such institutions cannot be considered a substitute for, or even a credible alternative to, support to non-governmental organisations. Indeed these institutions have sometimes actively undermined civil society initiatives. For example in 2010, commissioners from the NHRC tried to stifle discussion of a collective civil society report on the human rights situation in Rwanda submitted to the UN Human Rights Council in advance of Rwanda’s Universal Periodic Review in 2011. At least two NHRC commissioners put pressure on several civil society organisations to publicly denounce the report and withdraw their support for it. One NHRC commissioner later co-authored a letter to the Human Rights Council challenging the accuracy of the civil society report. Such conduct illustrates the close links of the NHRC to the government and its inability to deliver on its core functions of human rights protection and promotion.

(v) In the past, DFID has sometimes supported NGO coalitions such as the Civil Society Platform (CSP), one of the tools created by the government to control civil society activity. The CSP has often aligned itself closely with the government.

(vi) DFID provided financial and technical support to the CSP to observe the 2008 parliamentary elections and the 2010 presidential elections. In addition, in 2008, DFID staff in Kigali spoke out against allowing human rights organisations to observe the elections independently from the CSP and tried to dissuade other donors from supporting alternative NGO election observer missions outside the framework of the CSP.

(vii) DFID could play a key role in helping rebuild and reinvigorate independent civil society in Rwanda. This will not be an easy task. It will require a creative and bold approach and will mean supporting organisations which may voice criticism of government policies. International support in this area is essential to help Rwandans overcome not only state intimidation, but also the self-censorship which is pervasive in Rwandan society.

(viii) Recommendations:

— Through discussions with Rwandan and international NGOs, DFID should develop a programme to empower Rwandan civil society actors and enable them to resume their important and legitimate role in monitoring the government’s actions and holding it accountable.

— DFID should acknowledge the Rwandan government’s control over fora such as the CSP and distance itself from endorsing structures which constrain civil society organisations.

— together with the British High Commission in Kigali, DFID should develop a strategy for the protection of human rights defenders—in line with the European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders—and be prepared to intervene when activists are threatened. DFID staff in Rwanda should maintain regular communication with human rights defenders and encourage them to report problems or threats.

— DFID should not support state institutions which actively undermine human rights protection.

X. THE REGIONAL DIMENSION

(i) The security, stability and politics of Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC are intimately linked, as evidenced by the conflicts which have unfolded in all three countries. Approaches to development in any of these countries

should therefore take into account events in neighbouring states. As a major partner of both Rwanda and the DRC, the UK government is well placed to address these issues from a regional perspective.

**Rwanda's role in the DRC**

(ii) Ever since the 1996 and 1998 wars which began with Rwanda’s invasion of eastern DRC, the relationship between Rwanda and the DRC has been a determining factor in regional stability. The Rwandan government and army, as well as the Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR),30 have been key protagonists in the conflict. Even after withdrawing its troops from the DRC, Rwanda has continued to back various armed groups in the east of the country, notably the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), one of several groups notorious for carrying out serious human rights abuses against civilians.31 In January 2009, Rwanda turned against Laurent Nkunda, the then head of the CNDP, and arrested him. He has remained under house arrest in Rwanda ever since—an illegal form of detention without charge or trial, in clear violation of both Rwandan law and international standards.

(iii) Rwanda’s arrest of Nkunda and the integration of the CNDP into the Congolese national army marked the beginning of a diplomatic rapprochement with the DRC, and the two countries currently enjoy a more harmonious relationship. However, Rwanda continues to support Bosco Ntaganda, the military leader of the CNDP who has since been awarded the rank of general in the Congolese army. In 2006, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Ntaganda for war crimes of enlisting and conscripting children as soldiers and using them in hostilities. Nevertheless, he continues to move about freely in eastern DRC. He and individuals loyal to him have been responsible for killings, disappearances and arrests of individuals close to the Nkunda wing of the CNDP, some of which have occurred inside Rwanda.32 Rwanda’s support for Ntaganda, and Ntanganda’s activities in eastern DRC, remain a source of instability in the region.

(iv) With its record of extreme violence against civilians, the FDLR too remains a major source of instability and conflict. While some FDLR members have been through a demobilisation programme and have been repatriated to Rwanda, many others continue their operations in eastern DRC and show no sign of returning to their country. The arrest of three senior FDLR leaders in Germany and France in 2009 and 2010 represents a major breakthrough, but the FDLR retains the capacity to inflict huge suffering on the Congolese population.

(v) Donor strategies aimed at restoring peace and stability in the Great Lakes should consider the creation of conditions in which FDLR members might contemplate disarming and returning to Rwanda. HRW does not advocate a political role for the FDLR, but believes that the absence of political space in Rwanda, the repressive nature of the Rwandan state and the lack of an independent justice system in Rwanda are genuine deterrents to the return of some FDLR members. FDLR propaganda has frequently exaggerated the levels of insecurity in Rwanda, but objective data on the situation in Rwanda, including HRW’s own research findings, point to a number of real obstacles.

**Burundi’s role in the DRC**

(vi) The Burundian army also fought alongside Congolese rebels during the war in the DRC in the late 1990s, although its role was less prominent than that of Rwanda. Following Burundi’s 2010 elections, which were boycotted by most opposition parties, members of Burundian armed opposition groups fled to South Kivu province, in eastern DRC, from where they have resumed their activities. In late 2010 and 2011, there have been several incidents of clashes between Burundian armed groups and the Congolese army, as well as reports of Burundian security forces crossing over into the DRC to pursue these armed groups. The security situation in Burundi itself remains deeply worrying, with an alarming number of apparently politically-motivated killings in late 2010 and early 2011. The spillover of Burundi’s conflict into neighbouring DRC is an additional cause for concern.

(vii) Recommendation:

— DFID should adopt a more explicitly regional strategy on the Great Lakes, which takes into consideration the impact of events and actors in Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, with a view to addressing the cross-border nature of conflict and instability.

**Staffing and coordination with FCO**

(viii) Like other government departments, parts of DFID suffer from a lack of institutional memory, with staff appointed to country or regional positions for short periods of time. The recent retirement of DFID’s London-based Great Lakes analyst—one of the few members of staff with in-depth knowledge and experience of the region—will weaken DFID’s Great Lakes team.

30 The FDLR is a predominantly Rwandan armed group operating in eastern Congo. It is composed in part of individuals who took part in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.


(ix) Recommendation:
— Following the departure of its Great Lakes analyst, DFID should appoint a new regional analyst as soon as possible. DFID staff should also establish more regular communication with the Great Lakes analysts in the FCO so that findings and analyses can be shared on a regular basis.

XI. References

HRW can make any of the following documents available to the IDC on request. Most of them are also available on the internet.


DFID, Bilateral Aid Review results: country summaries (Rwanda), 2011.

DFID Bilateral Aid Review technical report, March 2011.


Human Rights Watch


(iii) “Rwanda: attacks on freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of assembly in the run-up to presidential elections, January to July 2010”, 2 August 2010.


(v) “Rwanda: stop attacks on journalists, opponents”, 26 June 2010.


US Department of State 2010 country report on human rights practices in Rwanda.

*May 2011*
**Written evidence from International Alert**

**Summary**

1. International Alert welcomes this inquiry, which comes in the wake of the 2011 World Development Report (WDR), itself a potentially transformative assessment of the ways in which the international community has sought to achieve development goals in fragile and conflict-affected states.

2. The WDR concludes that donor governments, multilateral institutions and recipient governments themselves need to fundamentally alter their approach in order to genuinely work effectively in these contexts, with a focus on building institutions that are both effective and legitimate in the eyes of the population. These institutions not only include Government Ministries, the police and civil service, but also associations of citizens in their communities, in voluntary organisations. While the institutions of government are routinely part of “state-building” strategies, the institutions of society are not. That is a deficiency that must be corrected.

3. These institutions—governmental and social alike—are critical to transforming relationships between groups in society that have previously been in conflict with each other, and between the people and the state. This process is a pre-requisite for achieving a transformation from actual or threatened violence to long-term peace, which itself is the necessary foundation for equitable economic development that leads to a reduction of poverty.

4. The findings of the WDR and of both the previous and current UK Governments’ own reviews into working in conflict-affected states lead to the conclusion that the international community—donor and recipient governments—must re-evaluate the overall approach and how to measure the impact of our activities in those areas.

5. The current UK Government has increased the focus on achieving results, which has driven the recent Multilateral and Bilateral Aid Reviews. The outcomes of these internal processes, if fully reflected in reconfigurations of DFID offices and staffing structures, have the potential to improve the UK’s effectiveness in conflict-affected states. Care is required, however, because there is a real risk that the political temptation to focus on short-term results will be irresistible, which would undermine the potential for long-term transformations from violence to peace in conflict-affected states.

6. Alert believes that the development of effective institutions is critical to the effectiveness of donor interventions. With equal emphasis, we want to stress that this is different from and broader than the predominant approach to “state building” hitherto. It has tended to focus almost exclusively on national institutions and electoral processes. But effective “state building” also requires improving accountability links between local populations and state officials, with an increased emphasis on province- and local level political dynamics.

7. Such increased analysis and understanding of complex local circumstances and dynamics requires capacity from within DFID that does not currently exist. We conclude this submission with five policy recommendations for bridging that gap.

**Introduction**

8. The WDR notes that some 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by repeated cycles of political and criminal violence—causing human misery and disrupting development to the extent that not a single MDG has been met in any fragile state. It argues that to break these cycles, it is crucial to strengthen legitimate national institutions and governance in order to provide citizen security, justice and jobs—as well as alleviating the international stresses that increase the risks of violent conflict.

9. Alert’s experience of working on the ground in conflict-affected and fragile states across Africa and Asia is that institutions are strong when they have participation from their populations. This illustrates the point that “state-building”, if it is to be applied holistically, needs to include the building of civil society’s capacity to hold those institutions to account and contribute to their work. Failing to do this and simply concentrating on constructing the institutions themselves risks allowing well-intentioned “state building” initiatives to be manipulated by local elites for the purposes of retaining political power, rather than meeting the actual needs of their citizens.

10. The WDR states that business-as-usual through either multi or bilateral development initiatives will continue to be less than effective in achieving long term development goals in fragile and conflict affected areas. That is to say, a continued lack of attention to how emerging institutions funded by donors interact with and are perceived by local people will fail to deliver real progress, and risks doing harm.

11. These shortcomings were noted by the previous Government towards the end of their tenure when they stated, as a “key lesson” from a review in March 2010, that “effective responses to conflict and fragility must include an appropriate balance of political, security and development activities. Development interventions alone cannot deliver state-building and peace-building”.

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12. And the Conservative Party, while in Opposition, reached a similar conclusion when they argued, in their Green Paper, “the importance of conflict has been systematically neglected and overlooked by those interested in development. It is seen as too messy, too difficult, too political. Yet conflict and insecurity, more than anything else, are key drivers of continued poverty... If a community is trapped by violence and oppression, its people will remain poor and vulnerable until the fighting stops—no matter how much aid or trade they receive.”

13. The business as usual approach has become comfortable with seeing government institutions as a goal in their own right. In this approach, key milestones have been achieved when the government institutions exist, no matter how they actually function. For example, it is rare that much attention is paid to the way in which a newly created police force operates and is viewed by the local community, whether the force is seen as representative and to what extent the local population participates in setting the priorities for policing their community. In Nepal, for example, International Alert with Danish and Norwegian funding has succeeded in creating space for local communities (including young people and local business) and police to discuss sensitive security issues, and address political interference in the delivery of basic security and justice. This has taken place while waiting for the formal security sector reform process to unfold (a process that after four years is still stalled by political in-fighting between the parties to the peace process). One participant said:

“I now have a different understanding of security. Previously I thought of it as national security and ‘out of bounds’—now I understand it more broadly, in terms of human security and as a right”.

And Alert’s research in Liberia’s Bong, Lofa and Grand Gedeh counties has shown that the deployment outside of the capital Monrovia since 2006 of the restructured Liberia National Police has not served to make the population feel more secure. Indeed, in many areas the presence of an under-resourced police force, ineffectual at either deterring unrest, solving crimes or holding prisoners, has served to underline the perceived impotence of the post-war Liberian state. In Bong County, police posts have become targets of popular unrest against local insecurity and socio-economic dislocation. Even more so than education and healthcare (provided by NGOs), security and justice have come to be seen as private goods, even though the service provider draws a government salary. In other words, an institution has been created but the underlying problems it was designed to tackle have actually worsened.

14. Alert believes that in order to contribute effectively to a transition from conflict to peace, the international intervention must start with a thorough understanding of the political economy of the country. This includes recognising existing coalitions among groups. The point is to build the intervention upwards from that understanding to help institutions emerge in tune with the needs and preferences of the communities they are there to serve. Conceiving a strategy externally, without reference to the nuances of the country, and then searching for local implementation partners, is very likely to fail. Sadly the latter approach has often characterised interventions in conflict affected and fragile states. The result, for conflict affected states as the WDR notes, is that no low-income fragile or conflict affected country has yet achieved a single MDG, while poverty rates are on average more than 20% higher in countries where violence is protracted than in other countries

15. The WDR notes that “weak and illegitimate institutions that are unable to provide citizen security, justice and jobs can lead to crises in countries that on the surface appear stable.” This means that such a context specific approach is applicable to all states—even those that do not appear fragile at the present time.

16. A key practical policy implication of these findings for the UK is that the Government must pay particular attention to the way in which DFID and other Departments as appropriate (eg, FCO, MoD) measure success.

17. To measure impact and guide actions in fragile and conflict affected contexts, a specific set of metrics is required, different from those that are normally applied in development aid. Two reasons nail this point:

(a) first, the costs of misjudging our activities in fragile places are potentially catastrophic for the local population; and

(b) second, the current set of measurements are part of an approach that has so far failed to deliver progress towards economic development in these places because it has not adequately distinguished them and the challenges of supporting development there from work in more stable environments.

18. These metrics relate not only to the specific circumstances on the ground—such as the extent to which all communities are able to participate in their emerging institutions—but also to the timeframe over which interventions take place. In short, achieving progress in societies that have been devastated by long-term violence is of necessity a long term, generational endeavour. Encouragingly, the 2009 Conservative Green Paper stated: “... we will stick to the task for the long haul: helping to rebuild states is a job of years and decades, not months.”

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19. In fact the WDR talks in terms of several decades: “The task of transforming institutions and governance is slow. Historically, no country has transformed its institutions in less than a generation, with reforms taking from 15 to 30 years.”

20. In adopting this approach, and the practical activities that flow from it, Alert believes that it is possible to build effective relationships within previously fractured societies at both the community and national level. On this basis, effective institutions can develop that are capable of long term peaceful management of conflict and of stimulating equitable economic development.

**WHETHER DFID WORKS EFFECTIVELY IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT AFFECTED STATES**

21. DFID has reached a number of positive conclusions as a result of the recent multi and bilateral aid reviews. For example, it has re-stated the importance of addressing the specific needs of women and girls, and placed conflict and fragility centre stage in its approach to alleviating poverty.

22. This has led to a welcome recruitment of a new cadre of staff who, we understand, are to be based in-country and for the long term, who have specific conflict analysis and peace-building skills. This is an essential first step in developing the bottom-up analysis needed to design programming according to the unique circumstances that prevail in each country.

23. While the reviews have also reached welcome conclusions about the long-term nature of development assistance in fragile and conflict affected states, at the time of writing it is not clear how those conclusions together with the new cadre of staff are likely to be used, because the individual country plans have yet to be published. So while the direction of travel is positive it will be important to see the results of this followed through in practice.

24. DFID, we believe, will become more effective as a catalyst for change than it has hitherto been, if:

   (a) it operationalises the principle of putting people and relationships into plans to build institutional capacity in-country; and

   (b) Measures results on that basis.

25. This means basing all state building initiatives on the principle of that a meaningful two-way relationship between citizens and the state has to be built as well as formal, functional structures. Failure to do so is likely to lead to the state continuing to be regarded by citizens as an instrument by which local elites perpetuate their power and extract resources from them. The populations in turn see no reason to subscribe to these institutions without coercion and do not, for example, pay tax or willingly recognise their authority.

26. Inclusive institutions and an increase in citizen participation by a variety of means should not be an afterthought or a substitute for a result regarded as more concrete such as improved health and education outcomes. Those outcomes are measurable but ephemeral and may be relatively superficial—that is, achievable without development; institutional strength in the sense meant by the WDR, by contrast, is not only measurable but deep and lasting.

27. The starting point for these institutions in conflict affected states is not to provide basic services alone but also to guarantee citizens’ security, justice, participation and access to employment. As the WDR states: “without a basic level of citizen security there can be no enduring social and economic development; and without a sufficiently broad coalition based on confidence in improved justice and shared economic prospects, it is difficult to sustain the momentum for change”.

28. In Nepal, DFID has led the way in trying to address key security sector reform issues, including through coordination with other agencies. However, the approach has been hindered by a tendency to take a state-centric approach. Working with and through state institutions is critical for local ownership and institutional capacity building. However, there are multiple non-state actors and civil society actors at the community level who need to be brought on board with national reform processes; these include not only youth, women, traditional leaders, traders and entrepreneurs and the police, but even armed gangs and militia groups. This takes time; it needs preparation long before any formal process starts and will continue well after it has ended. More work to support this community security approach could provide a significant contribution to peace and security in Nepal.

29. Further, though efforts are made to work across DFID team’s in-country; there can be a tendency to put issues into silos. In Nepal, for example, the DFID teams work with security and business actors separately, when it is evident that bringing them together would assist reintegration processes.

30. The publication of the 2011 WDR is a landmark moment; there is the possibility of recasting the framework of development assistance. DFID has not only been instrumental in the emergence of the thinking reflected in the WDR; it has also been a key partner and supporter of new, conflict-sensitive approaches by the 

World Bank in many countries. One example of this was its support for the development (with Alert’s assistance) of a “peace filter” for the World Bank in Sri Lanka and Nepal. The aim was to help make in-country analysis and activities sensitive to conflict issues. This welcome recognition of the need for conflict sensitivity, however, was hard to follow through in practice. The experience has confirmed our view that in order for an international organisation to become fully aware and able to operate effectively in a fragile environment, it needs a fundamental overhaul. Getting expert advice is a critical first step, but any organisation working in areas of fragility needs to ensure it adopts this approach throughout every aspect of its work, which in turn means that the staff and management must absorb it. In organisations where senior country positions change hands every few years, this means organisation-wide training and career development has to take the specific needs of fragile and conflict affected countries into account.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

We commend the emerging political consensus across all three political parties in the UK on the need to place conflict and fragility at the centre of the UK’s agenda to work effectively in some of the most challenging and complex regions of the world. The current Government is correct to drive this agenda in the way it has to date.

Taken alongside similar developments in thinking by the World Bank, some UN agencies, including the peacebuilding architecture, and many other donor governments, this represents a major policy making opportunity: not simply to increase the effectiveness of development assistance in areas that represent both the greatest challenges and the greatest need, but to re-cast the international framework as a whole for alleviating poverty in the developing world. The UK’s weight as a provider of ODA means it is centrally placed in facing this opportunity.

In seeking to exploit this opportunity, the difficulty is likely to lie in the detail and complexity of each of the recipient countries.

Therefore each of those international organisations, including DFID, will need the capacity to analyse and then understand that detail and complexity, in order to respond to them and design the UK’s activities on the ground in the most effective way to help the country move from conflict and poverty to peace and growth over the long term.

The necessary capacity is in principle available within DFID in the expanding cadre of advisers. We perceive, however, shortcomings in that the relevant expertise is not broadly enough spread. As a result, the goal of addressing fragility and conflict often remains in practice subordinated to goals in, for example, health or education that are still seen as contributing more directly to poverty alleviation targets.

We make the following five recommendations to DFID’s approach which are intended to assist in bridging that gap:

1. Define metrics to assess results and impact in a country on the basis of a thorough understanding of the local context, rather than externally defined targets.

2. Provide incentives for staff within DFID to focus on these issues for the long term, such as long term career paths that centre on conflict and peace building, and linkage between performance reviews and conflict-related knowledge and experience on the part of staff who focus on other specialisations.

3. Move as far as possible towards providing predictable aid flows through long-term agreements where the development partners on the ground are reliable. While the form of this assistance may differ, from budget support through to framework agreements, the principle of long term engagement leading to a consistent direction of travel in those partnerships is critical for building the relationships between and among those local partners on which the future stability and growth of the country will be founded.

4. Along with DFID’s welcome recent attention to the role of the private sector in promoting equitable economic development, it would benefit greatly from a similar investment of attention to the role of civil society and state-society relations within some of the most difficult and complex states.

5. Utilise DFID’s leadership status to take a leading role in building a coalition for fundamental change in the international aid system, taking fragility and conflict as the problem and local needs and context as the starting point for addressing it. Along with the World Bank’s WDR and the attention it is garnering, and working with the UN peace building architecture and like-minded donor governments, there is the prospect of building a critical mass for change leading up to and beyond the Busan High-Level Meeting of OECD-DAC.

May 2011
Written evidence from The International Rescue Committee

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

1. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) works in fragile and conflict affected countries to deliver lifesaving assistance to people affected by violent conflict and disaster and to support their recovery. We work to empower communities to lead their own recovery and development as we restore safety, dignity and hope to millions who are uprooted and dispossessed. Our work across 25 countries in education, health, protection, gender-based violence and economic recovery provides us with a unique understanding of the humanitarian and development challenges in the context of conflict and fragility.

2. Working in DRC since 1996, IRC is one of the largest providers of humanitarian aid. With 1,000 staff and multiple local partners working across the country, IRC runs a range of programmes designed to have a long-term impact. We provide services in five key areas: health, education, governance and reconstruction, emergency response, and women’s protection and empowerment. Due to our significant experience and current presence in the country, our evidence will focus on the example of DRC.

The key development priorities DFID and other Government Departments should be addressing in fragile and conflict-affected states

3. DRC faces many of the challenges common to other fragile and conflict-affected states. A combination of relatively weak institutions, corruption, a state which lacks the resources and capacity to control its borders, ensure security for its population or to provide basic services, limited local governance and lack of accountability, and widespread violence and insecurity (with state security forces both failing to prevent and at times actively contributing to the violence) has left a huge section of the population vulnerable, marginalised, and without access to basic assistance. This in turn is feeding into communities’ lack of trust in the government and the ongoing cycle of violence and impunity.

4. While the Department for International Development (DFID) cannot address all of these issues directly, in DRC they will maximize their impact by focusing on those programmes that simultaneously support services to and greater protection for the population, whilst building and strengthening governance and appropriate institutions.

5. This should include:

(i) Supporting provision of basic services through appropriate mechanisms, thereby restoring trust of individuals and communities in the system;

(ii) Building governance, including at the local and community level;

(iii) Protection and empowerment of women and girls—reducing the negative impact of sexual violence, and enabling women to fulfil their potential to contribute to development, peace and stability in DRC;

(iv) Security and Justice Sector Reform; and

(v) Economic Recovery and livelihoods.

Basic Services

6. Development indicators in DRC, both in the east and elsewhere, demonstrate the catastrophic impact of decades of conflict, poor governance and weak state structures. Life expectancy in Congo is 48 years; one in every five children risks dying before the age of five; one of every 13 women risks dying as a result of pregnancy or childbirth; 58% of Congolese enrol in primary education, and only 29 % thereof finishes primary school. Only 1 third of the children in the East have been in a classroom. The GDP per capita is $300 (2009).\(^{40}\) Only an estimated 3%-5% of the government budget is allocated for health, and 7–9% for education.\(^ {41}\)

7. Provision of basic services will not only serve to address these issues and support Congo to progress towards the Millennium Development Goals but, if provided through appropriate mechanisms, will also build the trust of individuals and communities in the state. For example IRC’s DFID funded health programme in DRC provides medical services to some 1.4 million people in partnership with the government Health Ministry. Our staff train health workers and government health authorities in resource management and the provision of quality care, repair and rebuild health centres, ensure health facilities are equipped with drugs and other necessary supplies and encourage community implication in the management of these resources. By supporting this approach, DFID both responds to the immediate health needs of people, and strengthens the capacity of the national health system to improve the long term response to health. This increases citizens’ faith in the government’s ability and will to provide such services.

8. In addition to availability and quality of services, DFID has the ability to help improve the affordability of services. User fees form a major barrier to accessing health care among the largely poor Congolese population. Recognising this, DFID worked with IRC towards the targeted abolition fees for pregnant women, children under five, and survivors of sexual violence in DFID supported health zones. The association between the

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\(^{40}\) Source: World Bank.

\(^{41}\) Source: Stratégie de Renforcement du Système de Santé (Health System Strengthening Strategy) p 17.
uptake of these services and the reduction of fees shown by the facility records has been encouraging, with the utilisation rate in Province Orientale instantly increasing from 0.37 visits per person per year to 0.7 once targeted user fees were abolished. To help guide its health focus in the DRC, DFID is encouraged to undertake comparative analysis of DFID programmes and those with other cost recovery models to build evidence on the relative effectiveness of such models, with a particular focus on the impact of user fees on health seeking behaviour among vulnerable groups.

9. In addition we would encourage DFID to extend free health care to women for all reproductive health care. This would boost the ability of women to access a comprehensive reproductive health care package and would increase detection and prevention of sexually transmitted infections.

10. DFID should continue and build their efforts to support government health and education systems to deliver quality and affordable services, ensure government commitment to invest adequate resources in this system, and identify and invest in appropriate delivery mechanisms.

Building governance at the local and community level

11. A long history of autocratic rule and conflict in DRC has left a weak governance system at all levels. The introduction and progressive adoption of governance reforms—including free and fair elections at national, provincial and local levels, justice system reforms, improved social service delivery, and decentralisation and local governance reforms—is key to rebuilding the state, and ensuring long-term stability. Strengthening citizen voice, through civil society organizations, direct elections, or empowering them to demand service delivery improvement (such as through the introduction of community “scorecards” used by IRC), is also essential to improving governance and fighting corruption and elite capture.

12. DFID supports IRC’s innovative community driven reconstruction (CDR) programme in Eastern DRC, “Tuungane”, which works with communities to identify their priority needs, and establish services and facilities that contribute to addressing those needs. We support community members to understand, analyse, and take initiative to secure their own rights and needs in dialogue with service providers. Through the use of community scorecards and a joint service improvement processes, communities can also improve social service delivery in sectors such as health, education, and water-sanitation. Tuungane currently benefits some 1.8 million people in over 1,000 villages, and we aim to reach 2.5 million people in 1,800 villages by 2015.

13. IRC is undertaking a major impact evaluation, in partnership with Columbia University, to understand how community-driven development approaches such as CDR actually affect communities, their perceptions and governance practices. It will provide a substantive evidence base for design of future programming, both in DRC and elsewhere. Both IRC and DFID can build on this learning to consistently improve vital efforts to build governance at the local level in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

Protection and empowerment of women and girls

14. In common with other fragile, conflict and post conflict contexts, violence against women and girls (VAWG) is rife in DRC. IRC is a leader in aiding survivors of rape—delivering emergency medical care, counselling and innovative prevention and economic empowerment programmes. We urge donors to address VAWG as an urgent priority as part of an ongoing humanitarian response, as well ensuring such efforts form an integral part of recovery, stabilisation and reconstruction efforts.

15. DFID does not fund IRC’s VAWG programmes in DRC, and have historically prioritised gender mainstreaming and medical response to VAWG over standalone programming. Mainstreaming is vital; for example DFID is one of a handful of donors to fund free post rape care in health programmes and ensure the supply of appropriate medicines. This should continue, both in provision of basic services and in DFID’s support for Congolese institutions (including in security sector reform and governance programmes).

16. However mainstreaming will not by itself achieve effective reduction and response to violence against women and girls. DFID should increase its support to standalone VAWG programming, including provision of holistic care to survivors, prevention programmes promoting positive social norms and behaviour change, and community-based economic assistance and reintegration.

17. We welcome DFID’s new “Gender Strategy House”, which emphasizes economic empowerment of women and girls. If designed appropriately, such programmes can also deliver benefits in terms of reducing the impact of VAWG. The IRC has seen that investing in women’s economic and social empowerment benefits entire families and strengthens communities, as well as lessening both the incidence and impact of sexual violence. The IRC has developed an innovative model, EASE (Economic and Social Empowerment), which we are implementing in DRC, Burundi and elsewhere which use a Village Savings and Loan Association (VSLA) model to help women access small loans in their own communities. It also provides a critical safety net in the form of an “emergency fund” that VSLA members contribute to support one another in times of hardship. Additionally, IRC provides business skills trainings to VSLA members and IRC works with the members their partners to discuss gender issues and power relations within the household. An evaluation of the programme in Burundi revealed that those women who had participated in the programme were less likely
to suffer from domestic violence. In Cote d’Ivoire, we are evaluating the impact of VSLA on economic independence, gender-based violence and household decision-making. In collaboration with John Hopkins University, in DRC we are evaluating how VSLAs can help survivors of sexual assault recover and rebuild their lives. IRC encourage DFID to support the development of such programmes that link economic empowerment and VAWG in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

18. While there are other donors funding VAWG programmes—the funding and support is still not on a scale commensurate with the problem. There is also a lack of coordination, divergence of approaches, and in some cases a lack of expertise and effective monitoring and evaluation to ensure programmes are truly delivering change. As well as providing financial support, DFID could play a key role in coordinating efforts among donors and providing expertise and analysis to ensure programmes are holistic, well targeted and effectively deliver results.

Security & Justice Sector Reform

19. Security and justice sector reform are critical to ending impunity and reducing the continuing horrific levels of violence against women and girls, as well as addressing the drivers of conflict and insecurity in Eastern DRC. The UK should press for and support genuine security sector reform, including: adequate integration of other armed forces or finding means to provide them with a new social prospect; effective prosecution of human rights violations by security forces; establishment of a well-trained, equipped and financed police force that respects human rights and ensures the protection of civilians; and an independent, fair and transparent court system.

Economic recovery & livelihoods

20. The IRC works around the world with people whose lives have been drastically affected by conflict and crisis. Many have lost their homes, their possessions and often friends and family members, yet their top priority is often to get back on a sound economic footing—to get a job or otherwise be able to support their families. Our economic recovery and development programmes not only seek to address the immediate needs of people in crisis, but are also designed to sow the seeds for long-term recovery. While IRC do not currently have large programmes in this sector in DRC, we view this as a critical need in DRC and other conflict and fragile states. DFID should prioritise economic recovery and livelihoods efforts even in the earliest response to fragile and conflict affected contexts.

The most effective mechanisms for delivering aid, and the role of DFID’s focus on results in fragile and conflict affected states

21. Delivering effective aid in DRC is incredibly challenging due to high levels of insecurity, poor infrastructure and local delivery capacity, environmental challenges, and perhaps most importantly a constantly changing and unpredictable context, particularly in the east. As in many such contexts, there is no linear continuum from conflict and humanitarian response to recovery and development. Context analysis instead shows repeated large and small-scale conflicts and insecurity interspersed with periods of localized relative calm. This requires humanitarian, early recovery and development efforts to run alongside one another, and a comprehensive, flexible response that is tailored to the very specific context of a community at a given time. Wherever possible programmes should be designed to respond to a range of short and long term needs, reinforcing systems of response and recovery where possible, and to still deliver enduring results despite short-term shocks and disruption (such as IRC’s CDR and VSLA programmes described above).

22. Overall DFID have shown that they are aware that these challenges impact both on ability to deliver and predictability of results, and that to meet these challenges aid funding needs to be long term, yet flexible enough to deal with short-term shocks. DFID have also worked hard to select programmes and partners that can best deliver results in the particular context. DFID should continue to identify and invest in those actors best placed to deliver results in the particular contexts (whether state, UN, NGO or community based organisations).

23. Long term investments and funding cycles are also critical to deliver results effectively in challenging settings such as fragile states, where implementation may be costly and suffer setbacks, and will require sustained engagement to deliver results. DFID have to date performed well in this regard both recognizing the challenges of programming in difficult environments (for example IRC has been able to provide essential health care services since 2008 to conflict affected populations of Minembwe and Itombwe on the Haut Plateau of South Kivu, where safe access is only via charter plane), and the need for long term commitment.

Innovation and learning

24. Recognising that new and different approaches to development are needed to break the cycle of conflict and build effective states, DFID should continue to support the development of pioneering programming.

25. DFID could take a lead role within the international community in and addressing identifying gaps in the current state of knowledge. Both donors and implementing partners are applying an enormous range of

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42 For example, following the programme both male and female partners were less likely to accept violence within the household, and there was an 11% increase in couples’ negotiation around fertility decisions.
approaches in DRC, which provides an opportunity in terms of building an evidence base for the relative effectiveness and impact of different interventions and policies. DFID should consider taking on a lead role in supporting comparative analysis and research, which could include, for example, analysis of the impact of different models of user fees, or support piloting and impact assessments of innovative approaches to VAWG.

26. Given the continued prevalence of sexual and other violence in Congo, DFID should also promote a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of violence and prevention strategies adapted to different types of violence and different contexts.

**DFID’s efforts to strengthen governance and national institutions (including parliaments) to deliver services, security and justice**

27. DFID should continue to invest in programmes that meet immediate needs while simultaneously strengthening local capacity and avoid creating parallel systems. Strengthening capacity should include of both civil society and state institutions and social services structures. We commend DFID’s support to IRC’s work to rebuild state health systems and community driven reconstruction programmes which promote local level governance and contribute to system strengthening from the bottom up.

**How well DFID supports civil society organisations and communities directly**

28. Through IRC’s “Tuungane” community driven reconstruction programme, DFID is providing support directly to communities. By ensuring that communities take ownership of each project, and that the village committees who lead implementation are accountable to the community as a whole, Tuungane has multiple impacts: providing desperately needed facilities; building grassroots and local level governance and accountability; and building or restoring social cohesion among communities previously riven by conflict. DFID’s long-term commitment to the project has been critical to ensuring its lasting impact and to enabling communities to develop and institutionalize desired change. We hope DFID will continue to support, and expand, such projects in DRC and other conflict affected and fragile states.

29. Outside of Tuungane, IRC’s work on VAWG has shown that one very effective way of working with communities is by supporting initiatives that were spontaneously developed and initiated by the communities themselves; our work with Community Based Organisations in tackling VAWG is one such example. Such initiatives respond to the needs identified by the communities themselves, and are appropriate and tailored to what is possible in the context. This approach also ensures a level of ownership of the intervention by the community.

**How effectively DFID involves women in state-building processes including security, justice and economic empowerment programmes**

30. In line with the new Gender Strategy House, DFID should consider supporting projects that specifically support social and economic empowerment of women and girls, such as IRC’s EASE programme described above, in conflict-affected and fragile states. Where well designed, such projects can provide further benefits, in terms of additional economic benefits to the household and the community, addressing gender and power relation issues, and supporting survivors of sexual violence.

**How well DFID works with multilateral organisations, including the World Bank, the EU and the UN, including its peacekeeping forces, and non-traditional donors in fragile and conflict-affected states**

31. In the health sector, DFID is an active member of the Groupe Inter-haillleur santé (GIHS) where they work with other donors, including the World Bank and EU. The GIHS are planning a joint field visit to see how each donor implements health projects. This is an opportunity to highlight the pros and cons of each donors approach, and to contribute to the evidence base for the most effective interventions (see paragraph 25 above).

May 2011

Written evidence from Oxfam

**Introduction**

1. Oxfam welcomes the opportunity to make a submission to the International Development Committee’s inquiry into working effectively in fragile and conflict affected states. Oxfam works with partners around the world to find lasting solutions to poverty and injustice. Currently, we work in more than 70 countries—including the UK—and respond to an average of 30 emergency situations each year. Oxfam believes that people are entitled to five fundamental rights: a sustainable livelihood; basic social services; life and security; to be heard; and equity. We work to support people in realising these rights and fight poverty and suffering through campaigning, long-term development work, and emergency response. Oxfam GB is a member of Oxfam International, a confederation of 14 Oxfam affiliates around the world.
2. This submission provides Oxfam’s perspectives on how the Department for International Development (DFID) can work effectively to tackle poverty and instability in fragile and conflict-affected states. It sets out guiding principles learnt from Oxfam’s programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states from Sri Lanka to Kenya and Afghanistan. However in keeping with the remit of this inquiry, this submission draws specifically on our long-standing programming in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Many of these issues have also been raised in Oxfam’s contributions to the Multilateral and Bilateral Aid Reviews.

**PRINCIPLES FOR WORKING IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES**

3. Oxfam welcomes DFID’s commitment to fragile states including its long-term commitment, increase in funding to countries such as DRC, initiatives on transparency, and its overall model of change.

4. The experience of Oxfam’s own programmes suggests several principles that may maximise the positive impact of the UK’s international development efforts on reducing both poverty and violent conflict. UK development aid to conflict-affected and “fragile” states should:

- be focussed on reducing poverty and inequality in the long term;
- be preventive, rather than concentrating only on places where states and societies have already failed;
- be aligned to recipients’ priorities, and where possible not create parallel structures to deliver results; and
- empower communities with a view to building the capacity of citizens to hold states to account as well as, and as part of, building institutional capacity.

**DEVELOPMENT IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT AFFECTED STATES**

5. The relationship between development, conflict and state stability is extremely complex. The evidence suggests that long-term state stability is improved by reducing poverty and inequality, particularly horizontally between groups; and ensuring that states are capable of delivering essential services such as health, education and security equitably to their citizens. Amidst ongoing violent conflict, however, economic interventions clearly cannot supplant political settlement and political will to provide the means to effectively protect civilians. In DRC, for example, continuing conflict and armed violence, development opportunities and transitional contexts coexist. As elaborated below, across the country security sector reform (ensuring effective and accountable army, police and justice institutions) should remain a priority for UK involvement. Without an army that can effectively protect civilians and does not itself pose a threat to them, long-term stability and protection will not be possible.

6. Reducing poverty and inequality in difficult settings such as DRC requires resourcing that reflects the complexity of the context. This includes flexible funding streams that can address immediate needs, and support livelihoods and service delivery in the medium to long-term, coupled with sectoral and geographical flexibility to respond to shifting patterns of need, violence and development opportunities. For example, in the North Eastern Districts of DRC affected by violence from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), it is crucial that there is a sufficiently resourced, long-term and multi-track approach. This must provide protection, and meet immediate humanitarian needs. At the same time, it must also seek to address underlying vulnerabilities through security sector reform, demobilisation, return and reintegration programming and development to improve access and communications. A long-term commitment is essential to support these communities and to address their vulnerability to threats.

7. Directing resources to shifting needs and opportunities also requires strong, ongoing contextual analysis, which can only be provided by on-the-ground staff. Given expected pressures on staff costs, we urge DFID and FCO to maintain its strong capacity and expertise of their overseas personnel in DRC and other conflict-affected and “fragile” countries so that resources can be effectively and appropriately directed, and so that DFID can retain its influence on other donors and national institutions.

**DFID’S FOCUS ON RESULTS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT AFFECTED STATES**

8. Monitoring and accountability of all aid programming is crucial and Oxfam welcomes an emphasis on the results that aid is having on the lives of beneficiaries. However, the environment in conflict and fragile states is by definition complex and unpredictable. In these highly complex and challenging contexts, it is important that DFID balances an emphasis on results with an allowance for risk-taking and innovation. There is also a need to recognise that programmes may sometimes experience setbacks (for example due to upsurges in violence), may be hard-to-measure, located in difficult environments, and it may take many months, if not years, to show the impact of projects especially in areas like civil society empowerment. A long-term commitment is essential.

9. So, whilst ensuring UK aid is of the highest quality, including through an emphasis on greater accountability and a focus on results, this must be part of a comprehensive approach to development that recognises that some results are easier to measure than others.
**Improving and Reforming the Security Sector**

10. Ultimately, national governments must have the will and capacity to protect their citizens and nationally driven peacebuilding and security sector reform processes must be supported more than ever. DFID is among the more progressive Security Sector Reform (SSR) donors in viewing the provision of security and justice as an integrated set of basic services for citizens. This approach should be maintained.

11. Oxfam’s experience in a number of unstable settings shows that although physical security is vitally important, access to justice is an equally significant component of security for community members, particularly women and other marginalised groups for whom the absence of judicial recourse may be a matter of life and death.

12. Police reform is also an essential component of SSR. In DRC, communities tell us that a functioning police force could do much to address the daily protection threats they face such as extortion and sexual violence. Oxfam welcomes DFID’s commitment to continuing its support to police reform as a much-needed and cost-effective response to community level security needs.

13. Oxfam welcomes DFID’s level of spending and approach to SSR in DRC, but recognise that overall more effective where donor governments and multilateral actors (including the UN) coordinate with each other and of course with the state in question. We urge the UK to coordinate their SSR contributions as much as possible with other donors and MONUSCO, and to contribute and coordinate where the UK can add particular value especially in civilian policing and judicial capacity-building.

14. Effective SSR in DRC involves not only technical reforms such as better training, equipment, pay and garrisoning but also military justice and political pressure to make sure that the army behaves professionally and accountably, and that citizens are able to safely and effectively access security and justice institutions. Donor assistance should support the ability of citizens and civil society to hold security institutions to account and support solutions produced by communities and citizens themselves. SSR programmes also need to involve community consultation to take into account particular vulnerabilities of different groups, especially women and how they interact with the army.

15. Consulting and supporting communities to hold security and justice institutions to account should not be—and does not have to be—a peace-time luxury. Even in the midst of conflict, modest change in the accountability of such institutions is possible. In eastern DRC, for instance, Oxfam has helped establish 33 community-based Protection Committees. In some villages, after negotiation with the army and police, they have been able to dismantle illegal “barriers” (checkpoints) where people were previously stopped by armed men demanding payment or goods, and in some cases attacking and even killing those who refused. They have also addressed the major problem of illegal detentions, often used to extort money from the families of those detained. The committees have disseminated information on due process and carried out training with army and police officers. Some police officers have consequently stopped the practice of detaining people until their families pay “fines”. In one area the police have started holding men and women in different cells. Elsewhere, a woman will no longer be arrested in the place of her husband: small gains—but important ones.

16. The international credibility of UK SSR efforts, particularly in politically sensitive places, will also rely on the UK having clear guidelines and procedures to ensure that all its security sector reform efforts help not just to communicate international human rights and humanitarian law obligations, but to operationalise them in the practices and operating procedures of security and justice sector institutions. At a minimum, the UK must be able to demonstrate that its SSR efforts never resource further human rights violations.

**Building Local Humanitarian Response**

17. The citizens of fragile states are particularly vulnerable to recurrent humanitarian crises. With the international humanitarian system increasingly overstretched, it is crucial that effective national and local response capacity exists to respond to humanitarian disasters. The UK government, through DFID, should work with and help build the capacity of a range of national and local actors—government authorities; civil societies and NGOs; the private sector; and communities themselves—to meet humanitarian needs in fragile states. National and local-level responders are likely to have a better understanding of the context and needs, greater access to affected populations, and, with the right support, the collective ability to scale-up quickly to respond to disasters. Supporting greater domestic response capacity and building the preparedness and resilience of communities in disaster-prone areas of fragile states will not only make for a more effective humanitarian response but will contribute to stability over the long-term.

**Supporting Civil Society Organisations and Communities**

18. DFID’s “fragile states” analysis, and Oxfam’s overarching theory of change, both emphasise that effective, accountable and responsive states are critical to reducing poverty, and to long-term state stability. Their essential counterpart, however, as Oxfam’s theory of change also emphasises is active citizens capable of holding such states to account, and making state institutions respond to their needs.

19. We therefore welcome the Government’s overall recognition of the importance of supporting people to be able to play a role in influencing the decisions that affect them, and helping people hold authorities to
account. However, we would encourage DFID to ensure that this is adequately prioritised in programming decisions and country operational plans, including through implementation of the commitment in DFID’s Business Plan to spend up to 5% of budget support on “accountability institutions”.

20. The UK and other donors should therefore be ready to fund and support the strengthening of civil society voices in situations of fragility: not only supporting civil society-led development projects, but also an independent media, groups promoting women’s rights, measures to enable citizens to engage with state service providers, and so on. While this is often a sensitive area for donors to fund, political risks and costs can in many cases be hedged through pooling funding for civil society from a number of influential donors and partnering with international NGOs.

WORKING WITH PEACEKEEPING FORCES

21. The UK has been at the forefront of efforts to ensure that UN peacekeeping mandates for countries like DRC and Sudan prioritise civilian protection. We urge the UK to continue this effort on the UNSC.

22. Getting civilian protection language into peacekeeping mandates is, however, only the first step and Oxfam’s programme staff, including in DRC and Sudan, are acutely aware of the overstretch, under-resourcing and shortage of expertise within UN-mandated multilateral peace support missions.

23. The mandates of UN peacekeeping missions must be matched with the requisite resources, training, in-country leadership and, ultimately, robust action on the ground. Although the UK is one of the top funders of UN peacekeeping operations through its assessed contribution, it only contributes a fraction of the personnel: as of July 2010, the UK had provided 302 of some 90,000 UN peacekeeping personnel. Effective peacekeeping requires adequate funding, but also expertise, capability and personnel—both military and civilian. After UK operations in Afghanistan are drawn down, we urge the UK to shoulder a fair burden of UN-mandated peace support. The UK should also press for peacekeepers to systematically engage with affected communities, in particular women, to better understand the threats they face and improve protection responses.

REFERENCES


v D Green, *From Poverty to Power* (Oxfam: 2008).


vii For more information on how engaging with community can improve protection by peacekeepers, see *Engaging with Communities: The Next Challenge for Peacekeeping*, Oxfam briefing paper, 22 November 2010 at: http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/engaging-with-communities.html May 2011
Written evidence from Global Witness

Please find below our briefing on concerns over the Democratic Republic of Congo’s natural resources sector. Our key concerns are highlighted in bold. Global Witness believes the International Development Select Committee could help push for improvement in the management of the country’s natural resources by pushing these points with government officials and others (including donors and private sector representatives) with whom they speak. This would help ensure that DRC’s natural resources are used for the benefit of the population as a whole.

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Following a series of highly controversial moves in the mining and oil sectors, including the confiscation of key assets held by international companies, the World Bank suspended new aid disbursements to the DRC in the autumn of 2010 (excluding humanitarian aid). For the suspension to be lifted, the DRC agreed to fulfil a number of conditions, notably saying it would publish all agreements in the mining, oil and forestry sectors. The document in which this is all laid out is called the “economic governance matrix”.

In May the DRC passed a decree in response to this pressure, stating that all natural resource contracts would be published within 60 days of their coming into effect. This is a welcome move that could help prevent corruption. However, while several contracts have already been published online, these do not include opaque oil deals signed last year or revisions to a huge resources-for-infrastructure deal with China (see below). It is crucial that these and all other active contracts are published.

Global Witness has been pushing particularly for the official publication of some of the most recent revisions to a $6 billion deal with China, under which the DRC is to provide millions of tonnes of copper and cobalt in return for an array of infrastructure projects. The deal could transform the country by providing new roads, hospitals and other infrastructure. But anti-corruption safeguards—particularly transparency measures—should be taken to ensure it really delivers. As a first step the latest version of the contract (from late 2009) should be made public to allow proper scrutiny. In addition, the DRC and China should systematically declare what infrastructure is being provided under the deal and how the minerals being exported from the DRC are to be valued: in other words, they should say what the DRC is getting and what it is giving. The government and companies concerned should also properly account for all financial and in-kind payments made in relation to the agreement (according to the principles of EITI). These payments include signature bonuses and taxes. In the absence of such basic information, it is much easier for corrupt individuals to profit from the deal.

Global Witness is also concerned about the DRC’s confiscation of mines belonging to First Quantum and oil licences belonging to Tullow, and their subsequent reallocation to companies based in offshore tax havens in 2010. It is unclear, for example, why the companies Caprikat and Foxwhelp—based in the British Virgin Islands—were given control of oil Blocks 1 and 2 of the Albertine Graben, in the northeastern area of Ituri. As well as having potential tax implications for the DRC, the fact that the companies are registered in the BVI means it is virtually impossible to trace their chain of ownership through company documents. The blocks could prove of major importance to the country’s economy. It is crucial that such contracts are officially published and that the true or “beneficial” owners of the companies are made known.

Key documents:

— Economic Governance Matrix:

— Global Witness report, China and Congo: Friends in Need:

— Global Witness press release on transparency in the DRC:

CONFLICT MINERALS

For 15 years now, armed groups have been preying on the mineral trade in eastern Congo. Within the last year serious moves have been taken at the international level to stem the trade in conflict minerals. In July 2010, the US Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, requiring companies buying minerals from the Great Lakes Region to conduct due diligence on their supply chains to ensure they are not buying conflict minerals. The UN Security Council has also endorsed rigorous due diligence standards (ie measures companies must take to make sure they are not buying conflict minerals), as has the OECD.
Global Witness is backing these due diligence standards, which focus not just on rebel groups and militias, but also on official army units that have been profiting from the minerals trade. The International Development Select Committee will probably have been informed about traceability schemes in DRC and Rwanda, aimed at tracking minerals from the mine to the point of export. These schemes are a necessary part of due diligence, but they should be accompanied by on-the-ground checks of the supply chain, as a bagging- and-tagging system alone cannot guarantee a clean minerals trade in eastern DRC. The kind of extortion commonly carried out by armed groups along transportation routes, for example, need not interfere with tags. Diggers or traders transporting sacks of minerals sealed and tagged can be illegally taxed by men with guns just as easily as those carrying unmarked or untagged bags. Carrying out comprehensive due diligence—which includes but is not limited to establishing mineral traceability—is currently the only credible way for companies to assess whether armed groups have interfered with and benefited from the trade at any point along the supply chain. The field assessment component of due diligence is particularly critical if companies are to identify extortion or situations where members of the military are using civilian proxies to represent their interests in the mineral trade.

In an April field visit to eastern Congo, Global Witness was encouraged to learn that the biggest tin ore mine in eastern Congo, Bisie (which accounts for some 70% of North Kivu’s tin ore production) had been mostly or entirely demilitarised. This is a major development but measures should now be taken to ensure that armed groups do not return to the mine—and that, if they do, trade with the mine stops. For this purpose, the UN force MONUSCO should ensure that peacekeepers are present at or near the mine and along mineral transportation routes to deter any renewed attempt by armed groups to control or otherwise profit illicitly from the minerals trade.

On the international level, Global Witness is pushing for other jurisdictions to follow the US government’s lead, and pass legislation obliging companies to carry out due diligence on their supply chains.

Key Global Witness documents:

The Hill Belongs to Them
(http://www.globalwitness.org/library/hill-belongs-them-need-international-action-congos-conflict-minerals-trade) and our last press statement

**DIAMONDS: THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS**

The DRC currently chairs the Kimberley Process—the scheme set up to prevent the trade in conflict diamonds. This should be an opportunity for the DRC to demonstrate its commitment to promoting good natural resource governance. However, so far their performance as Kimberley Process chair has not been encouraging. In April the Chair, Matthieu Yamba, stepped far beyond his remit to attempt to unilaterally lift restrictions on diamond exports from Zimbabwe’s troubled Marange region, to the dismay of numerous Kimberley Process members. The Congolese government will be hosting the Kimberley Process intersessional meeting starting June 20th in Kinshasa. It is vital that the DRC does not allow regional political loyalties to take precedence over the urgent need to introduce reforms and restore some credibility to this once pioneering scheme.

**FORESTS**

Given the UK Government’s development strategy focus on the private sector, Global Witness is concerned that an area of significant private sector activity—namely logging in the DRC—risks massive environmental, social and economic damage. Global Witness urges MPs to look closely at this issue during their forthcoming visit.

The DRC sits in the Congo Basin, the second-largest rainforest in the world and a vital asset that needs to be preserved in order to fight global climate change. Logging operations are a grave threat to the survival of the remaining intact rainforest. Most of the timber from the DRC is shipped to European markets and because of a lack of controls, there is a high risk that a significant amount of this timber is illegal.

There appears to be a rush to expand industrial-scale logging into DRC’s intact forests without: (1) micro-zonation—an inventory of how forests are being used by local populations; (2) a national forest plan and a national forest (tree) inventory; and (3) a functioning forest control system to ensure regulations are adhered to and that there is no illegal logging.

In 2002 the DRC government passed a new Forest Law which made it obligatory for companies to negotiate and sign Social Obligation Contracts (cahiers de charges) with local communities affected by their logging operations. These Social Obligations involve the logging company paying into a “Community Development Fund”, in proportion to the amount of timber extracted from ancestral forests. These funds are to be used to refurbish and build schools, health centres and roads.
In March and April 2011, Global Witness visited 21 communities in the Provinces of Equateur and Bandundu. Among numerous concerns over the negative impacts of logging, villagers claimed that “development projects” provided minimal benefits—for example, schools with no furniture; health centres with no medical equipment and hardly any beds; buildings with non-durable material that fall apart within a few years.

We confirmed this through visits to 54 projects. We also saw evidence of new social agreements being rushed through without the “beneficiary communities” being properly informed or prepared for negotiations.

Global Witness is concerned about the tension we observed between communities and logging companies as a result of the failure to implement development projects in compliance with contracts with communities. Main complaints include:

1. no or only minimal employment of local people by logging companies, which are removing timber from ancestral forests;
2. logging related destruction of forest biodiversity, from which villagers draw their food and traditional medicines;
3. demands to respect traditional and customary rights and benefit-sharing agreements is often met by force (arrests, beatings, destruction of homes, with dozens of reported rapes by security forces); and
4. authorities in Equateur and Bandundu Provinces taking the side of logging companies in conflict; eg reports of deploying police and military to quell resistance to logging operations.

There are allegations that in May this year two of the biggest logging companies operating in Congo, which are subsidiaries of multinationals, provided logistical support to military and security forces to arrest and imprison number of representatives of villages who requested that their rights and social obligation agreements reached with the companies were respected.

There are reports that in May this year two of the biggest logging companies operating in the DRC—Siforco and Sodefor, both of which are subsidiaries of multinationals—provided logistical support to military and security forces to arrest and imprison a total of 22 representatives of villages who requested that their rights and social obligation agreements reached with the companies were respected. In the Siforco case, on 2 May 2011, naval forces reportedly beat numerous people and raped three girls and three women. One of those beaten, Frédéric Moloma Tuka, a man in his late fifties, died that same night, allegedly from his injuries. Global Witness has not investigated these reports directly and has not substantiated them but we are sufficiently concerned that we are calling for an independent investigation.

Global Witness is concerned that huge oil deposits recently discovered in the “Cuvette Centrale” (a region covered by intact natural forest) could lead to an extensive allocation of drilling rights. Brazilian oil service firm HRT Petroleum, hired by the government to survey the Cuvette Centrale basin, has reportedly estimated that it could hold potential reserves of 7.3 billion–13 billion bl of oil and 4 trillion ft (113bn m) of gas. Whilst the Minister of the Environment and Forests has suspended drilling in Virunga National Park (not part of the Cuvette Centrale), we fear that non-protected areas could be vulnerable to drilling. Involving thousands of miles of roads and pipelines, this could have a devastating impact on the forests and its inhabitants, and given experience in Nigeria and Ecuador is likely to increase the risk of conflict between companies and local communities.

In order to get funding from international bodies working to prevent climate change, the DRC has developed plans to reduce emissions from deforestation. These plans, including the Readiness Preparation Proposal, bizarrely, actually proposes to increase the amount of forest to be opened for logging by about 10 million hectares.

Global Witness is deeply concerned that, according to forest administration officials interviewed by Global Witness in Equateur and Bandundu Provinces, the government has not yet put into place a control system to monitor compliance with the law of operations in the country’s forests. Timber is leaving sites without any inspection of species felled or volumes produced. Worse, according to government sources the upgrading of roads in the Provinces of Orientale and North Kivu has accelerated the transport of illegally cut timber to Rwanda and Uganda. The lack of any road control facilitates the illegal trade of timber.

8 June 2011
Further written evidence from Global Witness

The first section provides additional background on the UK’s aid to the DRC and on the DRC’s mineral wealth. The second section provides more background on the case of First Quantum and on recent developments connected with the controversial and secretive sale of mines and stakes in mines to offshore-registered companies.

Section I

(a) Background on UK aid to the DRC

The UK is the second biggest donor nation to the Democratic Republic of Congo, after the United States.43 In 2010–11, UK bilateral aid to the DRC came to £133 million.44 This is due to steadily increase to £258 million in 2014–15. During the period 2010–11 to 2014–15, according to current plans, the UK will have provided over £900 million in bilateral aid to the DRC, not counting many tens of millions of pounds more in multilateral aid.

According to the data from 2009–10, 38% of the UK’s aid to the DRC went on humanitarian assistance, 36% on governance and 14% on health.45

There are many reasons for aiding the DRC. Since 1996, it has gone through a period of horrific violence, in which millions have died. The worst of the unrest has subsided but serious conflict still riddles the east, while outbreaks of instability have affected several other parts of the country over the past year.

The country is extremely poor but immense in covers an area two thirds the size of western Europe. Under-five mortality is 199 for every 1,000 births. Over half the population lives on less that $1.25 per day.46 The country ranks 168 out of 169 on the Human Development Index.47 Yet, with open and responsible management, the DRC’s mineral resources could be used for the good of the country as a whole—rather than mainly serving the interests of the elite.

Here are a few figures to give an idea of the DRC’s mineral wealth. The DRC accounts for about 48% of the world’s cobalt reserves, according to the United States Geological Survey.48 According to data from the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Congo produced 15% of the world’s rough diamonds in 2010.49 Congo claims to hold between 60% and 80% of the world’s tantalum reserves—a rare, strategic mineral prized for its ability to store electric current in devices such as mobile phones, and for its extreme resistance to heat for use in the defence industry. Although the reserves figure cannot be verified, the DRC did account for at least 9% of world output of the metal in 2009.50

Mining accounts for over 70% of the country’s exports and 28% of its GDP.51

(b) The role of DFID in the natural resources sector

DFID’s main involvement in the DRC’s natural resources sector is through a project called Promines. Promines is a wide-ranging technical assistance project to the mining sector, financed to the tune of $92 million by the World Bank and DFID, with the World Bank providing $50 million and DFID $42 million.52 Before 2015, the donors have planned for a second phase of Promines to start, called Promines 2, which is to receive $80 million in funding,53 bringing the total for both phases to over $170 million.

The aim of the project—the first phase of which is to run for a total of five-and-a-half years, ending in December 2015—is, according to the World Bank, “to increase transparency and accountability in the mining sector so that natural resources will be used for inclusive and sustainable growth”. Other aims are to strengthen...
institutions to manage the minerals sector, to help increase the benefits from artisanal and industrial mining in project areas, and to increase production and revenues from mining.

It is unclear, however, what the **main** aim of the project is, as different aims have been given front and centre stage at different times. This is problematic—without a clear idea of what the primary aim is, it is easier for the project to get pulled in different directions, and end up the weaker for it.

Out of the first $92 million in funding, $31 million is to be used to improve the management of resource allocation, $28.5 million to improving the authorities’ capacity to manage the sector and $6 million to transparency, with the remainder going on sustainable development areas and management of the project.54

The aims of the project are all laudable. Greater transparency in the mining sector would greatly lower the chances of corruption, as indeed should a greater professionalisation of the mining administration and a more organized approach to artisanal mining.

However, Global Witness believes that there is a high risk of corrupt practices undermining the project. This was evident in the second half of last year, when a questionable deal over a major mine led the World Bank to freeze all new lending to the country (including Promines).55 (It should be noted that the aid suspension was on the side of the World Bank, not DFID, but this resulted in the entire Promines project being suspended.)

Now, however, with the first $10 million or so in funding for Promines about to be disbursed, recent secretive sales by Congolese state mining companies again throw doubt over the Congolese government’s commitment to developing the country’s mining sector in a responsible manner. Four large stakes in huge copper concerns—together worth well over $2.6 billion—have been secretly sold off by the state mining firms Gecamines and Sodimico. In one case, a mine was sold off for under one-sixteenth of its audited value. In two cases the direct beneficiaries were offshore-registered companies linked to Dan Gertler, a mining magnate close to President Joseph Kabila.56

The secret sales raise various questions. How is it that mines worth billions of dollars can be sold off in secret, while the government is publicly committed to transparency over its natural resources trade (eg. the Economic Governance Matrix and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative)?

What does this mean for Promines? Is it worth going ahead with a project aimed at improving the governance of the mining sector, when such dubious practice is taking place? Of course, any corruption in these cases would benefit the elite and not the many thousands of Congolese employed in mid-ranking and more junior levels in the mining sector—people who could, in theory, benefit from Promines. Nevertheless, if the signal given from the top is that it is business as usual, then it could be that fundamental change will be difficult to achieve. Rather, it becomes likely that others will follow the bad example set by the governing elite. At that point, it seems questionable whether donors could achieve much by pumping tens of millions of dollars of taxpayers’ money into improving the DRC’s governance of its natural resources.

Yes, it would be unrealistic for donors to wait until the DRC’s mining sector was squeaky clean before engaging in serious initiatives but the kind of apparent gross malpractice seen in recent months is of such an order that donors should pause and consider whether a new suspension of the project is not in order. Questions should also be asked of the Congolese government. For example, who were the beneficial owners of companies involved in the deals and at what prices were the various mines and mining stakes sold.

It should be noted that when Promines was last suspended, there were positive results, as this helped put pressure on the Congolese government to pass a May 2011 decree committing it to publish natural resource contracts (see previous Global Witness submission). This demonstrated the positive influence that donors can have when they condition aid on transparency and anti-corruption measures.

**Section II. Background on First Quantum and the Recent Secret Sales**

**The First Quantum case**

In August 2009 the Congolese Government, citing irregularities, confiscated the Kingamyambo Musonoi Tailings mining enterprise in and around the southeastern town of Kolwezi, in Katanga province. KMT is made up of millions of tonnes of waste from old mining activities—waste that can now be profitably mined using modern technology. KMT was owned 65% by London—and Toronto-listed company First Quantum (via its British Virgin Islands-registered subsidiary Congo Mineral Developments). A further 10% of KMT was owned by offshore-registered companies linked to Dan Gertler, a mining magnate close to President Joseph Kabila.

Promines Summary, provided to Global Witness March 2010.

Global Witness interviews and e-mail correspondence with aid officials in 2010 and 2011.

For Gertler’s links to Kabila, see, for example, Jason Stearns’s Congo Siasa blog of June 21 2010 (http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2010/06/dan-gertler-at-it-again.html): “Dan Gertler: at it again?” The piece says Mr Gertler “was one of the only westerners to be invited to Kabila’s wedding in 2006, and has very close links with Katumba Mwanke, the president’s closest financial adviser.” It also prints a photo of Mr Gertler congratulating the President and his bride. See also Sunday Times piece of 6/3/11: “Israeli holds key to Congo riches”, by Danny Fortson. The article says that Dan Gertler and Joseph Kabila became friends soon after Laurent Kabila came to power, having ousted former president Mobutu Sese Seko. Gertler provided Laurent Kabila with $20 million and in 2000 was granted a two-year monopoly on artisanal diamonds, according to the piece.
by the South African state’s Industrial Development Corporation and 7.5% by the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation. The remainder was owned by the Congolese government (5%) and Gecamines (12.5%).

At the time of the confiscation, First Quantum had invested about $450 million in the KMT plant, on top of the roughly $250 million it had paid to acquire the company owning KMT, Adastra, back in 2006 (KMT was Adastra’s main asset and the chief reason for First Quantum purchasing it). On 21 May 2010, two more First Quantum mines, including the valuable Frontier mine, were also confiscated and handed to state mining company Sodimico.

On 30 June and 1 July, the IMF and the World Bank forgave the DRC $12.3 billion of debt. The World Bank had demanded that the rights to KMT not be sold on as long as the dispute remained unresolved.

By early August 2010, however, the DRC had announced publicly that it had sold on the rights to KMT to a company called Metalkol, owned 70% by Highwind Properties Ltd., a company that—it later came to light—was owned by Dan Gertler, an Israeli billionaire close to President Joseph Kabila. The World Bank was furious. This, combined with other actions by the Congolese government, led the World Bank to freeze all new programmes, including Promines.

After that, the World Bank and DRC agreed on a framework of actions, mostly to do with transparency. Compliance with this framework—called the Economic Governance Matrix—would be necessary for the aid to be unfrozen. At the end of June 2011, the World Bank agreed for the freeze to end and in mid-July Promines was given the official go-ahead. The first tranche of money under Promines, however, has not yet been released—more paperwork needs to be sorted out, and that usually takes 90 days from the signing of an agreement, which would bring us to mid-October.

In the meantime, FTSE 100 miner ENRC has bought a majority stake in KMT, through a shares purchase in a Gertler-owned company (Camrose, which owns Highwind). Scandal has surrounding ENRC’s move, and First Quantum has launched legal action against Highwind and against companies jointly owned by ENRC and interests that are (or at least were until recently) tied to Dan Gertler.

Since July this year, Bloomberg and other media outlets have revealed new developments: the secret sell-off of mines worth billions of dollars by state mining companies. This raises new questions over how the DRC is managing its mining sector. Here are the nuts and bolts of the case. Some of the wording comes from the news articles referenced in the footnotes.

In a prospectus issued by Glencore in May, it was revealed that the main state mining company, Gecamines, secretly sold off large stakes in two mines to companies based in the secretive tax haven of the British Virgin Islands and associated with Dan Gertler. The information went unreported until it was spotted by Bloomberg in July this year.

The assets sold were: 20% in Mutanda and 25% of Kansuki.

Bloomberg wrote in an article of 13 July 2011: “The net present value, a measure that includes future earnings prospects, of Gertler’s stake in Mutanda alone may be more than $800 million when royalties and other payments are taken into consideration, according to calculations using figures in Glencore’s prospectus. The entire Mutanda project is worth about $3.1 billion and could produce 110,000 tons of copper annually by 2012, the prospectus said.”

According to Bloomberg: “The net present value, a measure that includes future earnings prospects, of Gertler’s stake in Mutanda alone may be more than $800 million when royalties and other payments are taken into consideration, according to calculations using figures in Glencore’s prospectus. The entire Mutanda project is worth about $3.1 billion and could produce 110,000 tons of copper annually by 2012, the prospectus said.”

See ENRC press release of 20/8/11, which announced the purchase: Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation PLC: Acquisition of 50.5% of the Shares of Camrose Resources Limited. Regarding the ownership of Camrose, ENRC said: “The Camrose shares have been purchased from Silvertide Global Limited, Zanette Limited and Cerida Global Limited (‘Cerida’) which are held by the Gertler Family Trust (the ‘Acquisition’).” Up until this point, Dan Gertler’s involvement in the deal had been held secret.


Glencore said in late August 2011 that it wishes to buy up at least some of these shares and ramp up copper production at Mutanda, according to a Dow Jones article.

Details of the Gecamines sales have not been officially released.

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57 Information from the statement of claim of Congo Mineral Developments Ltd vs: (1) Highwind Properties Ltd. (2) Pareas Ltd. (3) Interim Holdings Ltd (4) Blue Narcissus Ltd.
58 Interview with source familiar with the affair, 20/1/11.
59 http://ft.allafrica.com/stories/201008230261.html
60 Interview with donor source familiar with the affair, 9/3/11.
61 See ENRC press release of 20/8/11, which announced the purchase: Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation PLC: Acquisition of 50.5% of the Shares of Camrose Resources Limited. Regarding the ownership of Camrose, ENRC said: “The Camrose shares have been purchased from Silvertide Global Limited, Zanette Limited and Cerida Global Limited (‘Cerida’) which are held by the Gertler Family Trust (the ‘Acquisition’).” Up until this point, Dan Gertler’s involvement in the deal had been held secret.
63 Bloomberg, Gecamines Sale of Congo Copper Assets May Undermine Offer, by Michael J. Kavanagh and Franz Wild, 13/7/11.
64 Bloomberg July 13th article states that this 40% is held via Samref, half-owned by Glencore.
In mid-August two more secret sales were revealed. This time the sales involved a 30% stake in the Frontier and Lonshi mines that were confiscated in 2010 from First Quantum. The state-owned mining company selling the stakes, Sodimico, received just $30 million—less than a sixteenth of the stake’s estimated value.

Bloomberg: “Numis Securities valued Frontier at about $1.6 billion and Lonshi at $400 million in a research note last year, while Oriel Securities in September valued Frontier at $1.4 billion and Lonshi at $250 million.” The buyer was Fortune Ahead, a Hong Kong-listed shell company.

Modeste Bahati Lukwebo, the head of the audit board of the National Assembly’s economic and financial committee, said Mines Minister Martin Kabwelulu ordered the sale of the 30%, and imposed the $30 million price tag. (Reuters).

Sodimico was asked to make a $10 million payment to the Treasury to help finance upcoming elections after the sale. Mr Lukwebo claimed the funds were being “diverted” and another Congolese MP reportedly said the cash would be used to fund Kabila’s re-election campaign.

These secret sales are a major development in the DRC. It seems there is a high likelihood of malpractice here. We have mines being sold off in secret, to companies whose ownership is secret. In one case, the immediate beneficiary is an individual known to have a history of close relations with the current president, and with his predecessor, Laurent Kabila. In the other case, the two mines were sold off for a small fraction of their estimated value, and it is claimed that the head of the state mining company was acting under orders from his political superiors.

In such circumstances, allegations that the $10 million was diverted should be taken seriously and looked into. If donors want to be assured that gross corruption is not taking place, they should ensure a full investigation is carried out and all results made public.

The UK Government must show it takes apparent malpractice seriously and that, when necessary, it takes action to curb such malpractice or, at the very least, to avoid financing those who are responsible. Similarly, the UK Government should hold the DRC and other countries to their commitments over transparency. Such actions on the part of the UK, as a major donor to the DRC, are necessary if UK taxpayers are to be convinced that their money is being spent wisely.

7 September 2011

Written evidence from MICROCON, Institute of Development Studies (IDS)

MICROCON AND THE INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) is a leading global charity for international development research, teaching and communications.

MICROCON is a five year research programme funded by the European Commission and based at IDS. The MICROCON consortium is made up of 22 institutions, based in 16 different countries across Europe and beyond. It comprises a team of over 60 internationally recognised researchers in conflict analysis, as well as individuals and institutions with extensive practical experience in the field of research in conflict areas and in policy analysis and advocacy.

The main purpose of the programme is to promote understanding of individual and group interactions leading to and resulting from violent mass conflicts, aiming to better inform conflict policy and place individuals and groups at the centre of interventions.

OVERVIEW

We welcome the opportunity to submit evidence to this inquiry. Our evidence focuses on the overarching issue of a lack of research and evidence on fragile and conflict affected states, rather than examining specific aspects of the UK Government’s approach to these regions. We feel that is a fundamental problem which has resulted in a lack of effective evidence-based policies able to deliver the long term change required.

Fragility and conflict have become central to international development with poor governance and violence placing substantial constraints on development processes such as economic growth, democracy building and the reduction of worldwide lawlessness and terrorism.

Fragility and conflict affect people as well as processes. Fragile and conflict affected countries contain one third of those living in extreme poverty, are responsible for almost one half of child mortality in the world and
are the arena of serious human rights violations (Collier 2007, DFID 2009, OECD 2009). Millions of people within these states face destitution, poverty and misery due to the inability or unwillingness of their governments to deliver basic services, social protection and access to adequate livelihoods. International development simply has to be effective in such contexts.

In trying to assess how effective the UK Government’s policies are, we need first to understand the vacuum that currently exists in terms of rigorous evidence and evaluation of what works in relation to fragile and conflicted states. This dearth in evidence can only limit effective policy making.

Understanding Local Contexts

Much of the knowledge and evidence underlying effective international development policy derives from contexts that are relatively stable and resilient. Some of this is applicable to fragile and conflict affected contexts, but much is not. We have very limited knowledge of how people live in contexts of fragility and conflict: what options they have and choices they make to secure and protect lives, basic needs and livelihoods, how institutional arrangements affect and are affected by these decisions, and what policy interventions work to deliver effective services, support resilience and improve security in communities affected by fragility and conflict. New ideas, evidence and ways of working have to be found if development policy and practice is to have greater traction in areas characterised by combinations of poor governance, violence and lawlessness.

We welcome the commitment from UK Government departments including DFID to engage more closely with people and communities in fragile and conflict affected situations and their recognition that effective state-building requires the construction of citizenship values and identity, and the creation of mechanisms for collective mobilisation around the provision and distribution of public goods and services.

However, donor interventions tend to be driven by regional, national and international concerns to do with state security and capacity. Local level engagement remains patchy. It is either uncoordinated, driven by actions of non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations working in difficult and often hostile relief situations, or motivated primarily by short term concerns of new military approaches to gain the “minds and hearts” of populations living in unstable political environments. Moreover, these short term and uncoordinated responses are designed in a vacuum, with little available hard evidence or reliable evaluation.

This piecemeal approach to development policy and service delivery in fragile and conflict affected situations has done little to mitigate or prevent fragility. Thirty-five countries regarded as fragile by the World Bank in 1979 are still fragile today (OECD 2009), while several pockets of fragility persist amongst most of the developing world. Most countries classified as fragile will fail to reach the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 or well beyond (DFID 2009). Entrenched conflicts, urbanisation, market volatility and climate stress will continue to weaken state institutions in many areas in the world, further pushing vulnerable populations into poverty.

The Way Forward

The current development approach to fragile and conflict affected situations needs to change in order to break persistent cycles of poverty, war, misery and bad governance. The first step in designing and implementing more effective service delivery, social protection measures and livelihood interventions is to build up better evidence bases to inspire, guide and support new ways of working in fragile and conflict affected contexts. Building our knowledge in this way presents several challenges. Field work in fragile and conflict affected situations is perilous, in-country research capacity is disrupted or suppressed, the activities that research seeks to analyse may be hidden and invisible, and acting on research can be dangerous.

However, the UK Government needs to continue working closely with the academic community, NGOs and civil society organisations to ensure that this essential research work is undertaken in order for us to improve our understanding of the make-up of fragile and conflicted states and the communities within them. Rigorous evidence and continuous evaluation is fundamental to building our capacity to design effective and targeted policies that deliver long term change.

**Burundi**

RWP5: Health and Civil War in Rural Burundi.
RWP9: Consumption Growth, Household Splits and Civil War.
RWP11: Rebel Recruitment in a Coffee Exporting Economy.
RWP21: Does Conflict affect Preferences? Results from Field Experiments in Burundi.

PB6: The Impact of Violent Conflict on Child Health: What Are the Channels?

**DRC**

RWP38: Forced Displacement and Youth Employment in the Aftermath of the Congo War: From making a living to making a life.
Rwanda
RWP4: Poverty Dynamics, Violent Conflict and Convergence in Rwanda.

September 2011

Written evidence from Professor David Leonard, Professorial Fellow, Governance Team, Institute of Development Studies (IDS)

Institute of Development Studies

The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) is a leading global charity for international development research, teaching and communications.

IDS hosts five dynamic research teams, one of which is the Governance Team. Governance research team members work in collaboration with scholars and institutional partners in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe on issues of public authority and state capacity, security and peace-building. The team produces cutting edge, policy oriented research on governance which is multi-level and networked, operating at transnational, national and local levels.

Among the current research being undertaken by the team is a project looking at “Security In an Africa of Networked, Multilevel Governance”, funded under the Global Uncertainties initiative of the Research Councils of the UK and lead by David Leonard. Countries in which this project has been doing field work to date include the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, and Somalia.

Professor Leonard has spent his career, dating back to 1963, working on governance issues in sub-Saharan Africa. The theme underlying most of his work has been methods of improving the delivery of public services in the rural areas of Africa, both directly through managerial and policy reform and indirectly through partnerships with private actors. His recent work has concentrated on rebuilding conflict-affected countries.

Overview

We welcome the opportunity to submit evidence to this inquiry. The evidence focuses specifically on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It highlights the positive contribution DFID has already made in DRC, what more it can do, how it can work more effectively with partners and the external factors, at a local, regional and national level, that need to shape donor relations and policy in the future.

The Wider Context

Historically, donor activity in the DRC has been focused at a national level. This has been appropriate and worked relatively well. Yet persistent conflict is now centred in the east of the country. This conflict currently operates at both a local level and a regional level, and there is a complex interaction between local conflicts and the wider geopolitical regional conflict involving Rwanda. As a result, a more targeted and localised approach is required.

To date there has been limited donor activity outside of Kinshasa in the East, and this has achieved some level of success. However, evidence suggests that the quality of donor engagement at a local level has generally been weak. Engagement has been further limited by the high turnover of donor organisations’ staff in the region and a serious lack of continuity. Considered a dangerous and volatile environment, UN related staff are limited to a six month “tour of duty”. Lower level African staff often sign on for further tours but more senior personnel coming from other regions generally do not. This means that continuity at the programme level is a problem, which severely restricts the opportunity to engage with communities, build valuable local knowledge and develop a long term approach.

Interaction with local communities is also hindered by cultural and language barriers between local communities and donor agency employees. For example, MONUSCO (the UN peace keeping force) operates in English although the DRC is a Francophone country and Swahili is the language used between local communities. Many of the force speak little French or Swahili and have a limited understanding of local cultural and socio-economic dynamics. These factors are exacerbated by the fact that they live in closed compounds.

As a donor agency, DFID is well respected in the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi and is perceived to be driven by an overwhelmingly humanitarian agenda. In 2006, DFID played a central role in co-ordinating donor activity in the run up to the national elections, and no doubt will play a similar role once again in advance of and during this year’s elections. DFID has the capacity, as demonstrated in the past, to take a leadership role in the region and could potentially play an instrumental role in facilitating the shift in approach required.

This is a very brief insight into the situation in the DRC, and some of the challenges currently facing both the country, its citizens and the donor agencies working within it. As with many development issues, a common thread emerges that there is far too little conflict resolution work ongoing at the local level, that a lack of knowledge exists on the part of donor agencies of local contexts and there is not enough evidence-based policy making. However it would seem that DFID is well placed to address some of these issues and develop experience and insights of value to partner organisations.
We have outlined a series of recommendations below on how the UK Government and other donor agencies can work more effectively in the DRC.

**Recommendations**

- Donor activity needs to shift away from Kinshasa and a national approach to the eastern provinces of DRC, where conflict persists at both a local and regional level.
- Donor agencies need to develop their understanding of local contexts within eastern DRC and how local conflict interacts with the wider geo-political conflict involving Rwanda.
- DFID is uniquely well placed to negotiate with Rwanda with regard to pulling back from DRC. DFID enjoys a level of respect in both DRC and Rwanda over and above other donor countries, and should leverage this in trying to alleviate tensions between Rwanda and eastern DRC communities.
- Unlike other agencies, DFID staff in the region are not subject to short term six month contracts. This means that they are able to build better relationships with local communities and develop their local knowledge. This is a vital resource which can be shared with partner agencies, and means DFID is well placed to take a leadership role in donor activity and work with partner organisations to review how they recruit, train and deploy staff within the region.
- DFID has a wealth of experience and expertise in terms of rebuilding infrastructure, conflict resolution and engagement with local communities. Again it is well placed to share best practice with donor organisations and precipitate a shift in approach and policy that would ensure more effective local engagement.

*September 2011*

Further written evidence from Professor David Leonard

*The key development priorities DFID and other Government Departments should be addressing in fragile and conflict-affected states*

Using diplomacy to undercut the international sources of domestic violent conflict; Police reform; Generating employment for less educated young adults. Democratisation should be a high priority for conflict-affected states only as it is demanded by combatants and/or the bulk of civil society as a part of any peace process. The first step for security is to achieve a peace that enjoys broad support and to build a functioning set of governance institutions around it. Many experts believe that democratisation is premature in the early stages of recovery from violent domestic conflict—but this view is NOT shared by most African citizens, who worry that early autocracy may preclude later democracy.

*The most effective mechanisms for delivering aid, and the role of DFID’s focus on results in fragile and conflict-affected states;*

**Whether DFID works effectively in fragile and conflict-affected states including:**

**Its efforts to strengthen governance and national institutions (including parliaments) to deliver services, security and justice**

DFID is one of the more effective donors at this type of activity. The staff it has working on these issues in London and in the field are well-trained and experienced. It did a particularly good job on security in Sierra Leone, carrying out reform of both the army and the police. It has put a good deal of effort in Africa into democratisation, although with more modest results. The institutions of justice, in my limited experience, have not received priority from DFID—and this may be a problem, as the foundation of African governance systems is local justice. [proposing to do so now in DRC?]

**How well it supports civil society organisations and communities directly**

My impression is that DFID works well with its civil society partners. But in large countries such as DRC it will need to have more staff outside the capital in order to manage effectively in the face of complex local conflicts.

**How effectively it involves women in state-building processes including security, justice and economic empowerment programmes**

As in the preceding.

**Whether DFID is organised to work effectively in difficult environments including staffing, skills, evaluation tools and incentives;**

Needs expert staff outside the capitals. Work in a conflict-affected country is labour-intensive and one cannot assume that personnel of the national government are above the conflicts. This staff preferably would be on DFID’s own payroll or, even better, be jointly appointed with FCO (as a part of the conflict is international as
well). But they might also be provided through an international, intermediary NGO with expertise in this area, eg InterPeace

How well DFID works with multilateral organisations, including the World Bank, the EU and the UN, including its peacekeeping forces, and non-traditional donors in fragile and conflict-affected states;

DFID is a lead partner in the networks of donors in conflict-affected countries. It is able to keep staff in place for longer and is recognized as having security expertise that is better suited to conflict-resolution than that of the US or France. In Sierra Leone and the DRC DFID was highly skilled at building donor partnerships that enabled it to leverage European Community funding far beyond what it could provide itself.

Cross-Government working in fragile and conflict-affected states and regions including support for policing and security sector reform, the role of DFID in the Building Stability Overseas Strategy and the contribution of the Conflict Pool

In the field, the links between DFID and FCO are not as close as would be desirable. In many conflict-affected situations FCO is pulled in two directions by pressure on neighbouring countries. But FCO can be too oriented toward international and national political considerations and needs DFID to help it understand and respond appropriately to the usually complex local conflicts that are unleashed by and then perpetuate the larger national (or international) one.

September 2011

Written evidence from Rosemary McGee, Joanna Wheeler and John Gaventa in representation of the Citizenship DRC, Institute of Development Studies

1. Based at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), the Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability (Citizenship DRC) has worked with universities, research institutes and nongovernmental organisations in more than 25 countries to explore the new ways that citizens are shaping our states and societies. The research, which was funded by the UK Department for International Development from 2001 to 2010, offered a unique perspective on global challenges from the bottom up—a window onto the world through the eyes of its citizens. Over 60 researchers were involved, and many more academics, activists and policy-makers collaborated. For more information visit www.drc-citizenship.org.

2. One research group within the programme sought to explore how people move from violence, through participation, to substantive citizenship. The focus of the research was on micro-level experiences of diverse forms of violence, and how these experiences relate to the prospects for greater citizenship. The local settings for the research include the partner countries of Brazil and Nigeria, with additional work in Mexico, Haiti, Jamaica and Uganda. While these are not the focal countries of the present Select Committee inquiry, the present submission summarises general findings emerging from the research group’s work, which we know to be broadly relevant to fragile and conflict-affected states.

3. Looking at issues of security and democracy from the perspectives of those worst affected by violence can unsettle many common assumptions, among them that states have a monopoly on the use of violence and that they exercise the security function in the best interests of all citizens. While the assertion is hardly ground-breaking today, surprisingly often it remains absent from development and security policy and practice.

4. Innovative policy approaches and new funding mechanisms have been trialled in recent years to reduce violence in such settings, including measures to address the specific security needs of marginalised population groups, women, youth and children. These have tended to be top-down in design and application, working through or with the state or its agents at national or local level. However, they tend not to recognise that poor and dispossessed people often experience the state as a perpetrator or accomplice—by active complicity or passive omission—in the violence they suffer.

5. If development policy and aid programmes are to move beyond top-down approaches to reducing insecurity and violence so as to transform the daily realities of citizens in these settings, they need to be informed by and enable local residents’ direct involvement in formulating solutions to their insecurity and livelihood needs. Our research shows that the spaces in which citizens can take action in non-violent, socially legitimate ways can be broadened and safeguarded by external actors. But the external interventions need to be based on grounded understandings of the complex relationship between violent and non-violent actors, and between forms of “everyday” violence and political violence. Our research has generated the following implications for policy and practice, directed at donor agencies and aid policy makers:

6. Recognise that state actors can be a source of insecurity as well as security: State actors may protect some sectors, tolerate or actively perpetrate violence against others, or simply abdicate responsibility to protect some groups of citizens. It is imperative that policy makers design specific strategies for coping with statesponsored violence, and to address the consequences of state failure to provide security. Many current policies fail to safeguard programmes and communities against state-sponsored violence and much security-sector reform is premised on an overly benign view of security forces or the state.
7. Recognise the threat of violence in “non-fragile” contexts: International donors have increasingly worked to address violence in “fragile” or “conflict-affected” states. Yet violence—or the threat of it—is an everyday reality for many people across the world including in states considered fairly “effective” in delivering rights and resources to their citizens. Policy makers can usefully build on the recent work of the OECD-DAC and Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence Reduction to support interventions in “non-fragile”, “democratizing” or “democratic” states that suffer from pockets of very high levels of violence.

8. Work at both state and community level: State-led initiatives to strengthen judicial systems and security forces are important, but in order to build effective state-society interactions, attention must also be paid to supporting the capacity of non-violent civil society organisations in these contexts. It can be particularly fruitful to work with individuals and organisations who have already well-placed to effect positive change, but caution must be exercised in understanding the positions and interests of different actors.

9. Conduct detailed analysis of local power dynamics, actors and relationships: It is essential to fully understanding the often complex medley of state and non-state actors, their roles in security provision and perpetration of violence (including that committed in the name of “security”), and the linkages between them. Participatory approaches to development programmes can be effective to elicit citizens’ local knowledge, raise awareness and build ownership and sustainability of initiatives to reduce violence.

10. Develop intervention strategies based on the local context: There is no “one size fits all” model for community security or violence reduction programmes. Universalist or overly state-centric initiatives can do more harm than good at a local level.

11. Recognise that citizens’ responses to violence are not necessarily benign: The strategies citizens adopt in the face of violence can have positive or negative consequences for democratic participation and levels of violence. Parallel non-state structures can act as building blocks towards state accountability, yet they can also reproduce the selectivity, violence and anti-democratic tendencies of state provision, as well as undermine the state’s legitimacy.

12. Build on existing sources of resilience, “safe spaces” and structures for change: In many cases it may be better to find an entry point unrelated to violence, and then proceed to build awareness and broaden the intervention’s focus to issues of violence and insecurity.

13. Use aid programmes and aid partnerships and policy dialogues to promote active citizenship in such settings: This should be promoted at the level of both individuals and organisations, and should include the de jure as well as the de facto—the establishment of legal frameworks and creation of actual opportunities for people’s participation in policy design, implementation and monitoring, including in policy areas not traditionally opened up to public scrutiny or participation, such as security policy.

14. The promotion of citizen-led accountability, including in non-traditional policy areas: The deficiencies of formal political accountability mechanisms are well-recognised and perhaps nowhere more than in fragile contexts, where political institutions and relationships between states and citizens have broken down. Donors can promote and legitimise citizen-led accountability initiatives and help extend current thinking and practice on this into policy arenas as security and defence, where public participation, engagement and scrutiny have traditionally been non-existent as compared to, say, the social sectors.

15. In applying results-based programming, favour an empirical and micro-level approach: To be most useful, results-based programming in this complex and sensitive subject area needs to emphasize the empirical identification of results, at the local level, amid the complex, context-specific and messy dynamics of homes and communities, in qualitative as well as quantitative forms, and via contextually-attuned research methods.

September 2011

Further written evidence from Rosemary McGee, Joanna Wheeler and John Gaventa in representation of the Citizenship DRC, Institute of Development Studies

The operational relevance of Citizenship DRC findings are limited because the research was not conducted as an evaluation of DFID’s programmes, but they do provide some important insights into 1) the broad framing of DFID’s priorities and programmes and 2) examples of why a local approach to building citizen’s capacities matters.

I have provided feedback on DFID policy in this area, including the State-building/Peace-building paper, given two seminars at Parliament on this subject, and given talks at DFID based on this research. I also work closely with a number of INGOs working on conflict and peace-building.

Professor David Leonard has kindly provided examples from the Great Lakes region included in this document.

Preface: There is a need to focus on the local level through better analysis of the “political economy” (the power relationships, relative winners and losers, who is included/excluded in decision-making, etc) is about providing greater transparency and accountability in development aid. There is a need for robust analysis by DFID’s own country staff of the local contexts as the basis for DFID/HMG decisions, that can be subject to
scrutiny and can be put to stakeholders in order to ensure greater transparency. This is not to suggest that it will be easy to reconcile political decision-making with deeper analysis as a basis for decision-making, but it is necessary to effectiveness. This kind of in-depth understanding of the context is a prerequisite for working more closely with citizens and local level civil society groups, since these groups will be implicated in the dynamics of the conflict.

1. The framing for policy: service-delivery and meeting the MDGs versus building sustainable peaceful and more democratic states

Is the focus on meeting MDGs and “results based approaches” as the driving force for interventions in contexts of violent conflict and fragility appropriate? More emphasis needs to be given to understanding the “real” problem, that is to separate the immediate needs from underlying structural problems. Too often the focus is on the former. This is a difficult tension as DFID is a development agency and needs to balance service delivery and results with engaging with riskier but more important areas (in relation to long term goals) around governance reform, the distribution of power, inclusiveness of political settlement, etc. An MDG-led approach focussing on services leads to certain modalities which may shut down other possibilities rather than opening up deliberative space for people to decide about their own governance.

State-building/Peace-building paper, OECD-DAC, and WDR 2011 all say that a step change is needed to achieve more peaceful and democratic states in the longer term: in these contexts, we can’t just look at interventions in particular sectors, we must see how interventions will play out in terms of the overall political project (ie who decides how power and resources are allocated).

This can be illustrated through an example if we compare and contrast a programming focus on service delivery targeted at the MDGs versus a programming focus that starts with an analysis of the political relationships at the local level, and thinks through the nature of citizen-state relationships.

A good example of the problem we address here is the current famine in the Horn of Africa. The media has started to describe this as a failure of development assistance. But it is nothing of the sort. The area most severely affected by the famine is one in which relatively little development work has been possible because of on-going conflicts and a dysfunctional Somalia state. Conflict resolution and the re-building of governance are the prerequisites to achieving MDGs, not an alternative to it. It is our argument, however, that conflict resolution and governance can be achieved in these areas where the state has failed only by paying more attention to local conflicts and governance systems.

The same is true for the eastern Congo. It is estimated that the conflict there cost six million lives! And the reconstruction of health, education and other services in the area depend on bringing this conflict under control. The UN’s MONUSCO has been one part of the solution to this problem but effective resolution to local conflicts is another central part—one that has not been adequately addressed. In Congo, as it is in Somalia, and as it was in Sierra Leone, conflict resolution and the re-establishment of moderately effective governance are not an alternative development strategy; they are prerequisites to the enhancement of the MDGs and they are something on which the UK has a great comparative advantage. Our research shows that the way to strengthen governance and civil society capacity in these context MUST include strengthening the capacity of citizens to engage with the state, to hold state institutions to account (as well as working to strengthen state institutions at the national level).

Develop intervention strategies based on the local context: There are no blanket recommendations for how to work in conflict-affected and fragile contexts; this requires detailed political economy analysis, and DFID needs to be able to base interventions on this (even if they are contested), understanding the context nationally and locally, in order to ensure long term sustainability. The question is not necessarily what interventions DFID makes, but how DFID goes about them. (ie not whether to put in a school or a well, but how do you negotiate the way that you put it in) In order to understand you need to include, requires analysis of who holds power, who are the invisible, and who needs to be included?

Conduct detailed analysis of local power dynamics, actors and relationships: It is essential to fully understand the often complex medley of state and non-state actors, their roles in security provision and perpetration of violence (including that committed in the name of “security”), and the linkages between them. To do development in these environments (where DFID can make a sensible external contribution) requires really understanding what is going on not just at state but at local level.

What the work of the Citizenship DRC illustrates is about the role of power/agency at the local level, the environments in which DFID has to work and how difficult this in politically complex settings (with high levels of violent conflict). We need to emphasise the importance of understanding the double-edged nature of citizen agency, understanding the importance of uncertainty in terms of how work at the local level in contexts of conflict.

In the case of eastern Congo, we are NOT advocating research per se nor even the advice of external consultants. Instead we are urging that effective conflict resolution work requires that a DFID (or DFID/FAO) officer who has experience in conflict settings and is fluent in either French or Swahili receive an extended posting to the region, gain his/her own in depth understanding of the local political and social dynamics, and oversee the work of NGOS which can be contracted to implement the conflict resolution work. In this case,
and violence unfold, and tend to pervade many different aspects of society. While there is clear evidence that state’s legitimacy.

parallel non-state structures can act as building blocks towards state accountability, yet they can also reproduce the selectivity, violence and anti-democratic tendencies of state provision, as well as undermine the violence. This approach is not without its risks, since at the local level, many of the groups will have a role in the decision-making even if it is imperfect. It is necessary to avoid understanding political process in a cookie cutter way (with a narrow definition of civil society centred on capital cities and formal organisations, and a narrow definition of state building as elections). Operational approaches need to protect the space for citizen participation for longer-term results.

If you take a perspective of what is going to work in the longer term, the key question is what are the appropriate responses for building longer-term stability/institutional resilience. DFID needs its own in-house analysis of local contexts that can speak to operating principles in the shorter term, but can also provide foundational work that will help support longer-term goals. This is consistent with the findings of the WDR 2011 and others. The policy responses that should be encouraged are those that over the longer terms will be more sustainable, which means they need to have greater buy-in by citizens at the local level, and they need to be calibrated in terms of astute analysis of local politics.

There is tension between increasing funding and working more at the local level/variety of stakeholders, which requires great staff capacity within DFID. It seems that a context of increasing levels of funding and growing constraints on administrative and professional capacity are not compatible with working well at the local level.

DFID will be well-placed to do this, only if it makes an exception in these areas to the general trend toward cuts in staff and increased pressure to distribute funds. One solution is to consider working more with INGOs and NGOs who are better placed to do this work at the local level in a sustained way. Incorporate systems to learn from these experiences in a systematic way to inform general policy/interventions. But in the case of the Congo, a need to coordinate local peace-building in the country’s east with work in Rwanda means that there has to be a strong DFID (perhaps joint with FCO) presence on the ground in Goma or Bukavu to coordinate the work.

Citizenship DRC research shows that in Tier 3 countries (most fragile/least democratic), highest outcomes from citizen engagement come from working through very local associations (better outcomes comparatively than in middle income countries). These kinds of very local and grass roots associations are not usually part of the approach to state-building. Research shows that formal participatory processes much less successful in this context.

Even in cases where there is assumed to be “no functioning civil society” there can be very grass-roots and local associations that can be very important:

Angola case: limited effects of electoral reform, local associations emerging out of traditional associations and humanitarian response at the local level very important in terms of articulating agenda for participation.

Congo: The most urgent need is to mediate local conflicts is the east, to which relationships with Rwanda are contributing and vice versa. This requires both close relationships with local groups and neutral leadership to lead the mediation and see to it that agreements are followed through.

This approach is not without its risks, since at the local level, many of the groups will have a role in the violence and a stake in the conflict (such as local militias).

Recognise that citizens’ responses to violence are not necessarily benign: The strategies citizens adopt in the face of violence can have positive or negative consequences for democratic participation and levels of violence. Parallel non-state structures can act as building blocks towards state accountability, yet they can also reproduce the selectivity, violence and anti-democratic tendencies of state provision, as well as undermine the state’s legitimacy.

Working at the local level carries a relatively high degree of risk, because of the complexities of how conflict and violence unfold, and tend to pervade many different aspects of society. While there is clear evidence that…
working at this level can lead to positive outcomes in terms of greater citizen capabilities contributing to more accountable states, very powerful examples of social mobilization at the local level are also violent—militias, para-militaries, gangs, etc.

**Build on existing sources of resilience, “safe spaces” and structures for change:** Our research has shown that this is another very important element of how to work at the local level to strengthen citizen capacity for holding the state to account. In many cases it may be better to find an entry point unrelated to violence, and then proceed to build awareness and broaden the intervention’s focus to issues of violence and insecurity.

Somalia: The international community (in this case probably not DFID directly) needs to substantially reduce its efforts to work through the (largely illusory) Transitional Federal Government and work with communities and areas that have established viable local systems of governance through which real aid can be delivered responsibly.

*September 2011*

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**Further written evidence from DFID**

**DFID’S BILATERAL PROGRAMMES IN RWANDA AND DRC: BREAKDOWN IN BILATERAL, MULTILATERAL AND HUMANITARIAN ALLOCATIONS**

1. **Rwanda Bilateral Programme**

   **What is the total spent through multilaterals for 2010–11 £31 million**

   **What is the total spent bilaterally?**

   2010–11 was £63 million;
   2011–12 it will be £75 million;
   2012–13 will be £8 million;
   2013–14 will be £85 million; and
   2014–15 will be £90 million.

   **What proportion of each is spent on humanitarian assistance?**

   Zero.

2. **DRC**

   **2010–11—£133 million + imputed multilateral shares**

   Total bilateral spend: £133 million (includes multilateral spend and humanitarian assistance).

   **2010–11—38.5 million bilateral spend through multilaterals**

   Humanitarian assistance: £47 million.

   **2009–10—£188 million inc. imputed multilateral shares**

   Total bilateral spend: £119 million (inc. £35 million bilateral above and £41 million humanitarian below).
   Spend through multilaterals: £69 million imputed shares. £35 million bilateral spend through multilaterals.
   Humanitarian assistance: £41 million.

*December 2011*