6 Conclusions
108. We
support the Government's decision to invest in fragile and conflict-affected
states because countries suffering from conflict or fragility
will find it difficult to make progress against any of the Millennium
Development Goal indicators without reasonable levels of peace,
security and governance, and because it is far less costly to
prevent conflict than to recover from it.
109. There are
significant risks associated with allocating sizable sums of money
to fragile and conflict-affected states but also significant opportunities
which we think DFID should grasp. These include:
- helping hard
to reach groups who as a result of conflict have had little access
to health or education or no opportunities to improve their lives;
- strengthening systems of governance
to deliver services in an accountable and transparent manner and
helping communities to make choices about the services they need
and to hold state institutions to account;
- contributing to peace building
through improved security at the local level which will allow
people to go about their daily lives without fear and without
needing to pay bribes.
This involves creating a context in which ordinary
citizens can exercise choice about their lives and their children's
future. It is not so much about the amount of money but about
the way that funding is spent. DFID's programmes begin to do this,
but could do more, for example, investing more in bottom up community
building initiatives, giving greater priority to ending violence
against women and girls, and helping to create better relations
between communities affected by violence and the armed forces.
110. DFID needs to be straightforward that the risks
of misuse of funds will be somewhat higher in conflict or fragile
states. In addition, while elections in such places may not be
perfect, they remain important, and DFID should continue to support
these, even though their beneficial effect may not be immediately
apparent.
111. DFID has already invested significantly in many
fragile and conflict-affected states, often where other donors
are more reluctant to invest, for example in the DRC. This is
commendable, but DFID must be clearer about its conditions for
providing such assistance. The UK Government's approach to building
stability overseas may rightly focus on countries such as Pakistan
which pose security threats to the UK, but it must also ensure
that poor countries, such as the DRC, of less direct strategic
interest to the UK, are not forgotten.
112. This is the first in a series of reports on
fragile and conflict-affected states. We see our recommendations
as 'rolling' which means they may be reinforced or amended as
a result of the work we look at in other countries. For example
our recent visit to South Sudan has had an influence on our comments
on the role of UN peacekeepers.
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