Conclusions and recommendations
More joined up working?
1. DFID
must ensure that funding for countries such as the DRC, which
may not be viewed as important for the UK's national security,
are not abandoned in favour of more strategically important countries
such as Pakistan. The formation of the National Security Council
indicates a greater determination to work together, and we will
monitor its impact on international development expenditure and
policy choices. (Paragraph 17)
Building Stability Overseas
2. We
are pleased that the Government is seeking to ensure through the
National Security Council, the National Security Strategy and
the Building Stability Overseas Strategy that the Government's
response to conflict includes diplomacy, development and defence.
This must be seen to change practice. We are also pleased with
the renewed focus on conflict prevention which is less costly
and can reduce expenditure on humanitarian assistance and other
post-conflict expenditure. These are important changes in emphasis.
The impact of these changes is not yet apparent and we will continue
to monitor this. (Paragraph 26)
3. All UK ODA must
conform to OECD guidelines and DFID's ODA must also contribute
to poverty reduction under the 2002 International Development
Act. We want to ensure that OECD guidelines on what is ODA-eligible
and what is not, are adhered to at all times, especially when
ODA is being spent by other government departments or through
pooled funding mechanisms such as the Conflict Pool. However the
OECD criteria are not set out in the Building Stability Overseas
Strategy. The absence of reference to the importance of rehabilitation
and recovery as a means of preventing recurrence of conflict is
another omission to the BSOS. DFID must explain why these were
excluded from the strategy and how they will inform cross government
work in fragile and conflict affected states. (Paragraph 27)
Which fragile states?
4. DFID
should be clear and open about the reasons it operates in different
fragile countries and the basis for the choices it makes. The
Bilateral Aid Review led to a smaller number of focus states where
DFID assessed it could make a contribution and deliver results.
The needs effectiveness indicator it used in the process created
a bias towards large populous countries with large numbers of
poor people. If it had used an index which used the proportion
of people living on less that $2 a day, the difference in score
between larger and smaller countries on the needs-effectiveness
index would have been smaller. We recognise that the Millennium
Development Goals will not be met globally unless they are met
in large developing countries but we are concerned that smaller
countries, with a large proportion of their population living
in poverty, for example Burundi, have lost out. (Paragraph 35)
5. There were political
aspects to these decisions. The public might question the large
sums of money being spent in the DRC, where the UK has no historical
links, and in Pakistan, a middle income country, where the motive
may have more to do with national security than reducing poverty,
although the two are linked. The Government must be clearer about
where its development assistance is being driven by political
objectives, and should explain better the choices it makes about
which states to fund. In a context where the DFID budget is increasing
to meet internationally agreed Official Development Assistance
targets, it is important that the public understands the value—morally
and politically—of the decision to invest increasing amounts
of aid in fragile and conflict-affected
states. (Paragraph 36)
Working with other donors
6. DFID
has a range of options to choose from in terms of how it delivers
aid in fragile and conflict-affected states and whether it does
this in cooperation with other donors or not. This helps DFID
to opt for ways of delivering assistance which are context specific,
which we support. However, DFID should be clearer about how it
makes these choices. In relation to budget support for Ethiopia,
we agree that poor people should not suffer as a result of the
actions of their government. DFID should set out specific governance
conditions under which it will provide budget support, and any
under which it will be withdrawn. It should also, as a matter
of course, set out clearly how its aid budget for each country
is distributed between multilateral and bilateral spending and
the reasons for this pattern and distribution. (Paragraph 51)
Costs of delivery, achieving results
7. It
is more risky and more costly to deliver programmes in fragile
and conflict-affected states. DFID must be open about these risks
and open about the costs. However, we want to see evidence that
DFID is working to bring down the cost of delivery of its programmes
in these states. (Paragraph 54)
8. DFID's focus on
monitoring results is welcome, and can be used to demonstrate
that DFID is achieving beneficial impacts from its expenditure.
However, we caution that achieving results in fragile and conflict-affected
states is more complicated than in stable or peaceful countries
and there is always the risk that they will not be achieved because
of the lack of security, and because fragile and conflict-affected
states are often also places where fraud and corruption can thrive.
We do not accept that in a context where fraud and corruption
are rife that DFID can always mitigate against this adequately,
especially where it sub-contracts delivery of these programmes
to third parties. This means it may not be able to guarantee value
for money for every pound it spends. DFID should be open about
this so that expectations of results are realistic, without being
under-ambitious. (Paragraph 55)
Support for elections
9. Support
for democratic elections contributes to better governance, but
it is only a starting point. We support DFID's efforts to assist
with the voter registration process in the DRC although we do
have concerns about using expensive biometric systems. DFID must
also ensure that wider issues of empowerment and inclusion, especially
for women, are discussed as part of the wider electoral agenda.
The rise in pre-election violence, especially in the East, was
worrying. However, events have overtaken us and the general election
has taken place. We expect the UK Government to make representations
to its political partners there to ensure such violence does not
also mar the local elections scheduled for 2013. The international
community must obtain guarantees from the DRC Government that
these less high profile elections take place as planned. (Paragraph
65)
Impunity and human rights
10. We
understand the difficulties faced by the Government of Rwanda
in trying to forge a united country and make progress towards
the Millennium Development Goals whilst still recovering from
the genocide 17 years ago. Rwanda has made remarkable progress
on both fronts and the UK Government has placed great faith in
Rwanda's capacity to continue to do so. We appreciate the Government
of Rwanda has concerns about those who fled Rwanda in the aftermath
of the genocide and for whom there is no right of extradition
from EU countries. Nevertheless we believe the UK Government should
set out some indicators or benchmarks in its budget support agreements
about what type of improvements it expects to see in areas such
as freedom of speech and of association over the remaining period
covered by the Memorandum of Understanding. This might include
ensuring human rights organisations can operate freely and improving
freedom of the press. (Paragraph 71)
Improving accountability and transparency in the
mining sector
11. There
is a long history of mineral wealth being used to fund and perpetuate
conflict and criminality in the DRC, especially in the East. The
Government of the DRC has taken some measures to regulate the
industry: however, it is clear that these remain insufficient.
The World Bank Economic Governance Matrix, with which the Government
of DRC complied, strikes us as a good example of a means of helping
to create greater transparency and accountability in the industry.
We commend the Bank for this approach. However, the Bank may have
been too hasty in resuming funding since the Government of DRC
has continued to permit secret sales of assets and First Quantum
has as yet had no redress. We recommend that DFID give transparency
and accountability in this sector greater priority, building on
its work with Promines. The mineral sector has the potential to
generate significant wealth which must be used for the benefit
of the people of DRC. Given the linkages between this sector and
conflict in the DRC the risks of not properly managing this sector
are that development gains made elsewhere will be forgone. DFID
must set out clearly for the Government of the DRC what it expects
in terms of transparency and accountability in the mineral sector
and withdraw assistance if these expectations are not met. (Paragraph
78)
Improving the confidence of ordinary citizens
in their state
12. Supporting
better relations between the state and society, increasing responsiveness,
responsibility and citizenship, should be a key component of governance
programmes. Increasing the degree of local ownership over programmes
helps to build bottom up accountability and increases political
legitimacy—a key component of peace building in post-conflict
societies. DFID should ensure that it does not focus excessively
on formal institutions at the expense on informal community-building
approaches. We recommend that DFID continue to invest at least
10% of its budget in the DRC on bottom-up community building programmes.
(Paragraph 81)
Violence against women and girls
13. Violence
against women and girls is a big problem in the DRC, especially
in the East, where it is used as a weapon of war. It has multiple
causes, some of which are cultural. These must be tackled and
will require behavioural changes in men and female empowerment.
DFID has said it places a high priority on improving development
outcomes for women and girls. As part of this focus, tackling
violence against women and girls should be its top priority in
the DRC. We recommend that DFID fund standalone projects for reducing
and responding to violence against women and girls, such as those
supported by the IRC. We also recommend that DFID include the
reduction of violence against women and girls in its results framework
for the DRC. (Paragraph 90)
Understanding local conflicts
14. While
the war may be over, local outbreaks of violence in eastern DRC
continue. These create ongoing humanitarian needs and slow down
the development process. This means that the way DFID approaches
development in the East needs to be tailored to responding to
humanitarian needs, the risks of disruption to its programmes,
and to overcoming the hurdles of trying to deliver basic services
in a region where criminality and violence continue. This is
very different from the situation in Kinshasa, where progress
in development is better. While DFID works competently through
reputable and effective non-governmental organisations in the
East, its knowledge base and understanding of local conflict dynamics
would be improved with a greater on the ground presence, for example
in Bukavu where the security situation has improved. We recommend
that DFID open a sub-office in eastern DRC so that it has a greater
presence there. This could help DFID to build and maintain relationships
with local civil society groups and their leaders, as well as
local law enforcement authorities with a view to improving local
security. It would also ensure it had greater oversight of, and
capacity to monitor, its programmes in this volatile region. (Paragraph
93)
Confidence boosting measures
15. Reforming
the FARDC has been slow. Nevertheless some progress has been made.
In particular the 2009 Ihusi Peace Accord was a significant step
as it allowed the incorporation of rebel militias into the army.
This too has not been without problems. We commend DFID for its
continued support to Security Sector Reform. However, without
better donor coordination in this area, progress is likely to
be haphazard as well as slow. DFID has a role to play to helping
donors to coordinate better with MONUSCO. (Paragraph 100)
16. Security Sector
Reform is essential for providing improved security and restoring
citizen confidence. It is important for citizens to feel secure
so that they can begin to lead normal lives—to go to markets,
get jobs, send their children to school. Part of this must include
ensuring the armed forces are trusted by locals. We understand
there has been a shortfall in community liaison assistants. This
would be a relatively low cost way of facilitating communication
and better relations between communities and the armed forces,
including MONUSCO and FARDC. We recommend that DFID identify the
reasons for the shortfall in community liaison assistants and
seek to rectify this. (Paragraph 101)
MONUSCO
17. MONUSCO
has been a force for stability in an unpredictable and frequently
unstable region of the DRC. While stability has improved, and
the number of militia groups has decreased, ordinary citizens
still experience violence frequently. Given the lack of infrastructure
in the region, there is a limit to MONUSCO's ability to respond
quickly to reports of violence in remote areas. Following our
discussions with the UN in South Sudan, it is clear that UN forces
are constrained by the details of the mandate given to them. Flexible
mandates are required, which allow troops to operate out of their
base, rather than mandates which involve most of the soldiers
guarding their base. We are concerned that the MONUSCO mandate
constrains activity in this way. The UK should also seek to ensure
that Security Council mandates are appropriate for the level and
type of violence on the ground. It may be that MONUSCO's mandate
will not be renewed after 2012. However, if there is to be a continued
UN force presence in eastern DRC we recommend that it be a more
nimble and agile force suited to the terrain and to the type of
violence which is now characterising the region. We also recommend
that the UK Government re-examine the cost of the MONUSCO mission
in relation to its mandate and progress to date. (Paragraph 107)
| 
