The role of the Probation Service - Justice Committee Contents


Written evidence from Jeremy C Britton, Avon and Somerset Probation Trust (PB 33)

1.  Are probation services currently commissioned in the most appropriate way?

1.1  I would respectfully wish to recommend consideration of what surely must be the way forward for probation: the commissioning of all services by local probation trusts. Such a move would give clear recognition of sound principles of trust status. Devolving decision making through decentralization of power would provide local trusts with the ability to determine and commission the best providers available to meet local need.

1.2  Clearly, decision making needs to be based on sound business principles. The skills and wealth of experience at all levels (probation boards, chief executives, wider management and operational staff ) demonstrates that it is local trusts that are best placed to determine who to commission to deliver services, serve local communities and offer best value to the taxpayer. Indeed, any alternative surely brings in to question the purpose of trust status and the relationship between central Government and trusts operating within the public sector.

1.3  The current arrangement, NOMS, has had a significant negative impact on probation during the last five years. NOMS has involved considerable bureaucracy and often meaningless change. For example, the change of name from community service to community punishment and then unpaid work but community payback for branding purposes whilst the media largely still refers to community service.

1.4  Probation has seen increases in funding but this has not reached the front line to the level suggested and widely reported. NOMS operating costs, failed IT projects and inefficient buildings maintenance contracts have diverted additional money away from core service delivery.

1.5  Policy and decision making has increasingly been decided centrally without consultation, often based on consultancy advice, whilst the valuable experience of highly trained and skilled probation staff has increasingly been sidelined. The result has been frustrated and demoralized staff, continually responding to endless directives in which they have had no input and directives that often serve central priority rather than local need. Indeed, increasingly, priorities and focus have moved away from front line delivery and serving local communities. I am frequently asked by staff: "why are we being asked to do this?" and "why is money being spent on that?"

1.6  The contestability model, leading to an offender management/interventions arrangement, has also created unnecessary difficulties including conflicting priorities, duplication of process and a lack of cohesion.

1.7  From my experience, probation trusts are ready and waiting to accept the responsibility that trust status should surely have realised a year ago and be able to determine their own local practice. Such a move would result in immediate efficiency gains:

—  allowing local boards, chief executives, and their staff to fully apply their knowledge and expertise;

—  removing bureaucracy, duplication and box ticking;

—  controlling the business and carrying out the responsibilities that would; and

—  allow trusts to exercise powers commensurate with trust status.

1.8  Of course, a simplified structure would address the current need to achieve significant financial savings within the public sector and would realise considerable reductions in operating costs as a proportion of overall probation financing.

1.9  Devolved power would require accountability. At a local level this could be scrutinised through current partnership arrangements, successful outcomes requiring effective partnerships with police, local authorities, health and housing providers. Further, courts create the work of probation and therefore probation must be in a position to continue to respond effectively, offering the best possible community sentences, ultimately protecting the public and punishing while effectively rehabilitating offenders. Clearly, the proper maintenance of this relationship would provide further local critique.

1.10  National scrutiny arrangements could be reformed as appropriate to address the revised commissioning model and to ensure compliance in respect of key Government targets.

1.11  When considering much of the work of the probation service - prisons, whilst key partners, should not be considered the exclusive partners that the current NOMS model dictates. The clear focus on prisons driven by NOMS has marginalized probation. It is well documented that senior appointments largely come from a prison background, as a result, probation no longer has a voice or proper central representation. This is of particular concern at the present time since it appears to leave the probation message being heard through often emotive media commentary which can be misleading and therefore damaging, undermining and unrepresentative of the professional work of probation.

1.12  Recommendation: The Justice Select Committee should recommend a structure involving probation trusts as commissioners of all services within probation.

2.  Does the probation service have the capacity to cope with a move away from short custodial sentences?

2.1  Clearly, my own area of responsibility, unpaid work/community payback, will be a primary sentencing option as a result of any decision to reduce short term prison sentencing. I believe that trusts' community payback units are well placed to deliver on any such outcomes due to tried and tested structures and processes, implemented by skilled staff, often with many years experience. Indeed, nationally, probation trusts are currently delivering in well in excess of five million hours of unpaid work every year. Communities within my own area benefitted from over £900,000 worth of work in the last financial year (2009-10).

2.2  I have no doubt that the majority of staff across community payback units will continue to create opportunities to work increasing offender numbers wherever possible, within sensible limits. This has been the case over a significant number of years: In 2004-05, a regular maximum group size in Avon and Somerset was six. That figure is now at least eight with many supervisors prepared to take ten offenders where the risk assessment allows and the placement can adequately accommodate. This has increasingly ensured that community payback is a particularly competitive sentencing option.

2.3  While the above approach benefits reduced costs and increased throughput, understandably, managing such numbers in the community can present challenges. Reflecting society generally, community payback is increasingly dealing with more challenging offender behaviour. In my own probation trust, supervisors are trained and supported in managing risk and dealing with difficult situations but as lone workers, in the community with eight or more offenders, we recognise that our staff can be vulnerable at times.

2.4  Further, while increasingly sentencing to unpaid work, on occasions, courts need to give a more decisive message to offenders who are in breach. Where an offender is clearly not willing to engage and will not comply with such a disposal, revocation rather than allowing an order to continue repeatedly, will ensure the integrity of the disposal. It will also support the ability to determine and plan expected attendance and therefore accommodate larger groups of offenders.

2.5  The introduction of branded high visibility clothing has been hugely positive but with increased visibility naturally comes the opportunity for criticism as community payback staff try to effectively engage larger groups of offenders.

2.6  Indeed, while community payback rightly promotes the opportunity for the public to nominate projects, the projects suggested will often not usefully engage eight or more (often fit, young) offenders for up to seven or eight hours at a time. Therefore, trusts need to communicate with the public to ensure that they understand the types of projects that are normally suitable and explain why some projects will reluctantly be rejected. At the same time, trusts need to continue to develop placements linked to local action groups and crime and disorder partnerships, since much of this work is recognised by and has the confidence of the public.

2.7  The issue for probation trusts in respect of this work surrounds the taking of work from paid employees. Therefore, if community payback is to be completely effective in partnership with other Government departments and fully realise the huge potential to do good, there needs to be serious consideration of this specific issue/concern at a national level with clear negotiation as necessary. For example, a project maintaining the grounds of a National Health Service hospital was recently rejected within my own probation trust due ultimately to the possible impact upon existing paid employees.

2.8  Importantly, Government needs to recognise the issues that present themselves on occasions as a result of increased throughput and actively support the excellent work of the majority of staff within community payback.

2.9  Recommendation: Probation trusts are well placed to deliver on any such decision to reduce short term prison sentencing due to tried and tested structures and processes, implemented by skilled staff, often with many years experience. However, to achieve greater reliance on popular non-custodial sentences such as community payback, some transfer of resources will be necessary.

September 2010


 
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Prepared 27 July 2011