Supplementary written evidence from the
London Probation Trust (PB 70)
CONSTRAINTS ON
PROBATION TRUSTS
INTRODUCTION
Probation Trusts were first introduced in 2008 when
five former Probation areas gained Trust status. The offer was
that areas who demonstrated strong performance and organisational
capability would be granted Trust status with various freedoms
attached. These "freedoms" eg ability to disengage from
national contracts, have less monitoring etc did not materialise
and within a year the whole approach to Trust status changed and
new contracts were drafted. Two further probation areas were granted
Trust status with a different style of contract and a new test
was put in place and all probation areas, including the five areas
who had initially become Trusts were told they must apply or disappear
as an entity. There was no longer any offer of freedoms and indeed
the constraint within the contract was even more restrictive about
what a probation area could do.
CONSTRAINTS ON
PROBATION TRUSTS
1. Performance
Probation Trusts have been held to account by a series
of performance frameworks eg Integrated Probation Performance
Framework (IPPF), Probation Trust Rating System (PTRS). These
are made up of a range of mainly process measures that in many
cases record the time it takes to undertake activities eg complete
OASys in 15 days, and very few outcome measures. The lack of focus
on quality is compounded by measures such as "complete high
risk OASys in five days"—these are the most difficult
and complex cases and yet there is much less time to undertake
a proper assessment. Trusts acknowledge that timeliness measures
are important but to have a framework based on so many such measures
which can drive perverse performance is frustrating. Several of
the measures require a great deal of recording, chasing and auditing
eg number of offenders who sustain employment for four4 weeks.
Time spent on counting would better be spent actually helping
offenders into work. In summary there have been too many measures
with too little focus on quality and real outcomes.
Trust status did not bring with it any freedom from
recording, monitoring and auditing, even for those Trusts who
had consistently high levels of performance. Although NOMS have
now said there will be a lighter touch and a "revised"
PTRS, the early drafts have changed little.
2. Standards and Specifications
The Probation Service works within a set of National
Standards (currently under revision) which are highly prescriptive
about the number of appointments and contact levels. These are
monitored monthly and deviations attract negative consequences
for performance. There is virtually no room for professional discretion
or amendments. This limits ability to innovate eg do intensive
work in the first six months when change is more effective, and
much less in the latter part. There is also a set of specifications
being developed for every aspect of probation practice. Whilst
standards and specifications are helpful, Trusts should have more
ability to deviate when there is sound evidence or cost reasons.
3. IT
Trusts are part of a national contract held by Steria
and part of a national infrastructure called OMNI. Early indications
that areas who became Trusts might have the freedom to do things
in a way that is more responsive to local area need were never
forthcoming. There are a number of constraints with the current
situation. The first is cost—areas are locked into buying
through the Steria contract which appears very expensive eg blackberry
monthly charge is £75 but there are many more examples. If
an area wants to develop an application a business case has to
be made and the costs are often so high that no progress can be
made.
Because we have a national infrastructure the needs
of individual Trusts are often not met because small areas have
different needs to large areas. The ability to innovate is severely
constrained eg it would be good to develop hand held devices for
staff on community payback placements or out on home visits. This
would be much more efficient and when Trusts are facing competition
it seems to give other providers an advantage. Young staff who
join the service are severely frustrated by the poor quality of
IT—eg it is impossible to access most websites from desktops
as these are blocked.
4. Premises and Facilities Management
Prior to 2001 individual probation areas owned or
leased their property but a national contract was then put in
place. A similar national contract for facilities management was
instigated. Both are highly inflexible and inefficient. It is
almost impossible to either downsize or access additional property.
Properties are in a very poor state of repair and decoration is
rarely done so that Trusts have to spend money provided for offender
services to maintain even a minimum standard. Again this was a
freedom or flexibility highlighted as possible with Trust status
but was never allowed.
5. Financial inflexibility
One of the biggest barriers to good management of
the budget has been the lack of any year end flexibility. There
were periods in the past when Trusts could have limited flexibility
eg 2% or even 4% carry forward or overspend, this was removed
several years ago. This makes financial planning extremely difficult
particularly in times of reducing resources so, for example, a
Trust cannot make savings in one year to carry forward to help
mange further cuts in the year ahead. Any underspend is given
back to NOMS. With a budget the size of London, £145 million,
it is extremely difficult to spend exactly within a year. All
redundancy costs must be met by Trusts in year - there is no other
"pot", and given that about 85% of our budget is on
staffing (and because we have limited opportunity to cut other
budgets such as IT and premises as per above) managing staff cuts
is extremely difficult. Also the information about actual budget
always comes late—I do not at this point know the budget
for London Probation Trust for 2011-12—it could be anywhere
between a 4.5% and a 6% cut which would make a difference of almost
£2 million and as the main way to make the savings is by
staff cuts is extremely difficult to plan. We do have an underspend
which has been saved for this purpose but knowing how many staff
we need to cut cannot yet be set. Again with the approach of competition
Trusts do not have a level playing field and the ability to innovate
is seriously limited.
6. The Contract
The actual contract between Probation Trusts and
NOMS was rewritten after the first wave of Trusts and is much
more inflexible and less similar to a contract given to a private
or voluntary sector provider. One example is the media protocol
in which Trusts have limited ability to respond or do proactive
work with the media without involving the MOJ press office whose
main focus is to protect the reputation of Ministers. This is
particularly difficult for London where most media matters attract
national interest and at this point the MOJ take control of the
response.
The contract includes a number of volume targets
eg number of accredited programmes to be delivered. These do now
always match the demand of such orders coming from the court eg
London was contracted to deliver 370 domestic violence programmes
completions but the actual number coming from court is likely
to be over 1,000. The resources to deliver at this level were
not provided nor planned for but the need is there and these programmes
have to be delivered.
7. National Versus Local delivery
Probation Trusts are local delivery organisations
but work within a national organisation, NOMS that does not support
or in many cases understand local delivery. Reducing reoffending
at a local level requires investment in good partnerships with
police, health, local authority and the voluntary sector but this
work is not valued or recognised by NOMS eg there is little mention
in the contract or the performance frameworks. The prison service,
also part of NOMS, is a national organisation and this impacts
on both cost and effectiveness eg most probation areas have offenders
in every single prison in England requiring probation staff to
travel significant distances for essential visits. It also makes
resettling offenders back into a local area more challenging.
CONCLUSION
Probation Trusts struggle with a myriad of constraints
that mitigate against being innovative and efficient. Probation
Trusts should be supported in their role as local commissioners
and providers of services for offenders. The framework in which
they operate should be less tightly controlled with more focus
on outcome measures. Clearly this is the direction of travel referred
to in the Green paper but there needs to be much speedier progress
towards this goal. This is particularly imperative if Probation
Trusts are to compete alongside other providers.
January 2011
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