Supplementary written evidence from the
Probation Association (PB 74)
What is the place for an offender management model
in a more locally determined system?
1. A national offender management (OM)
model can still fit with a local system, as it encourages integration
of services to meet offender need. If OM became a more locally
determined system, it could encourage more flexibility to target
offenders that local partners see as problematic. Historically,
the model of offender management has its origins in locally
planned and delivered services to offenders, Courts and victims
- the locality is the place for many of practices which
are subsumed within the model of OM.
2. The concept of offender management (OM)
is not new in terms of many of the practices or processes it includes.
The introduction of NOMS in 2004 provided a timely opportunity
to formally review and update probation/prison processes developed
piecemeal from the ground up over the previous 40 years and to
bring best practice together within a framework henceforth known
as Offender Management.
3. OM now provides a formal, holistic, detailed
and computerised framework for Risk and Needs Assessments, (starting
at the Pre Sentence Report), community and sentence/release plans
and the identification of interventions. OM formally identifies
the Offender Manager (replacing the title of probation
officer) as responsible for overseeing the process of individual
offenders' progress through community order and prison processes.
The offender manager has responsibility for ensuring both the
offenders compliance with statutory instructions and the delivery
of his/her sentence plan, which includes access to the necessary
interventions during and after a prison sentence.
4. Offender management, in its many guises has
and always should be locally driven. There is no inherent tension
between what is now a national framework and more locally focussed
policies surrounding devolved commissioning - quite the opposite,
as in reality as many of the shortcomings identified in OM practices,
particularly related to the lack of the necessary local providers
of interventions, could be mitigated by Trusts having prime responsibilities
for local commissioning or co-commissioning within local partnership
arrangements.
What evidence is there to suggest that the existing
delivery of community sentences is not sufficiently effective
and/or robust? What do you believe can or should be done to improve
the effectiveness of community sentences?
5. Probation resource limitations mean particularly
lower tier offender needs may not always be met and this inevitably
jeopardises effectiveness. If an offender feels his/her needs
are not being met, he/she is likely to be less compliant or to
complete successfully. Resources follow risk is the principle,
which makes economic sense, but does not necessarily fit with
the new desistance research which is about making someone feel
valued and building up their social and human capital. For community
sentences to be effective, such flexibilities need to be built
into guidance and performance frameworks thereby removing the
previous negative emphasis on moving straight to breach as dictated
by targets.
6. A depressing feature of the recent past has
been the frequency with which community sentences in their
entirety have been criticised by politicians and the right
wing press as being "ineffective" or insufficiently
"robust". Undoubtedly, the notoriety attached to high
profile tragedies such as Sonnex in London has provided critics
of "rehabilitation" with an opportunity to extrapolate
from the clear fateful shortcomings of a few specific cases to
the generality of the many thousands of "effective"
and "robustly" supervised orders staff are managing
daily. Probation Trusts have been required to follow rigid guidelines
and meet national targets for enforcement and breaching which
have largely been met thus contributing to the rise in the prison
population, an unintended consequence of over-prescription (see
response to question on levels of breach below).
7. The reality is that reoffending rates for
community punishment are significantly lower than for offenders
released from prison (as Ken Clarke acknowledges) and most offenders
complete their orders without further offending or being breached.
The more demanding an Order in terms of conditions or requirements,
the greater becomes the risk of non-compliance. Currently there
is no mechanism to enable Trusts to measure performance (e.g.
reoffending rates, compliance with orders) within complex orders.
In its recent publication, "Contract Outcomes" (link
below) the Probation Association advocates a more positive,
outcome-based approach to future performance frameworks which
rewards Trusts for efforts made in ensuring greater compliance
within different types of orders and licences:http://bit.ly/ContractOutcomes
8. Probation Trusts are always looking for ways
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of community punishments
- for example, the quicker commencements of programmes, reducing
drop-outs from demanding offending behaviour programmes, offenders
starting work as soon as possible after an Order is made and working
more hours of community payback in every week are constant themes
of managers and front line staff.
Are existing case management systems fit for purpose?
How effectively does the tiered approach to enabling resources
to follow risk work in practice? Is it an appropriate model to
pursue in the context of greater professional discretion?
9. The concept of a cradle-to-grave offender
management is sound. However, core features such as the OASys
(Offender Assessment System) have become overly complicated. Originally
introduced as a tool to supplement professional judgement, driven
by the centre, OASys completions have unfortunately now become
an end in themselves (Trusts have had to reach national targets
for such completions, irrespective of quality) and have now morphed
into a mechanism more geared towards management reporting. OM
depends on the availability of programmes both inside prisons
and in the community which can be unavailable for numerous reasons.
The role of Offender Supervisors in prisons, their fluctuating
availability due to other demands on their time and relationships
with community based offender managers can be problematical.
10. Tiering is based on risk, and some offenders
are low risk but very high need - this particularly applies to
women offenders who are rarely high risk, but are frequently high
need. They often have complex needs and safeguarding issues and
the level of intervention they require is not always reflected
in their tiering, which has implications not only for resourcing,
but for the workload allowance given to that case for a member
of staff.
11. Based on OASys scores, the tiering of cases
was originally introduced to guide Pre Sentence Report authors
towards an appropriate recommendation to the Court and to assess
the level of overall risk and resource to be allocated in any
subsequent community order. Tiers 1 and 2 are usually supervised
by unqualified probation service officers (PSO's) and tiers 3
and 4 by qualified probation officers.
12. In practice, risk is individual, dynamic
and rarely a static feature of the supervision of any case. Many
Serious Further Offences are committed by offenders originally
assessed as tier 1 or 2. Some PSO's do not have the experience
necessary to manage an offender whose changing behaviour indicates
an escalating risk of reoffending. Becoming "risk averse"
by unnecessarily exaggerating levels of risk to ensure resources
are allocated has become an unwelcome feature of front line and
middle manager practice, incentivised by the centrally driven
emphasis on inputs and process targets. Conversely, there is perceived
pressure by staff that cases are down-tiered to enable management
to allocate more cases to them. There are real tensions here between
resourcing effectively and meeting need, which can probably never
be completely matched.
13. The recent NOMS pilot project in the Surrey
and Sussex Probation Trust area aimed at relaxing the rigorous
approach required to National Standards (and tiering) demonstrates
that staff can be enabled (freed!) to take the necessary decisions
without the necessity for tick boxes, provided the appropriate
help and encouragement is available. To move from the previous
formulaic/bureaucratic approach to one where "professional
judgement" is expected takes time and resources. Recent generations
of new probation staff have been inducted into a service which
has been measured against such rigid parameters and therefore
not encouraged to make such judgements.
What were the intentions of the Offender Management
Act 2007? How could it be used to meet the current Government's
aspirations?
(The response to this question is quoted from the
PA evidence submitted to the MoJ "Breaking the Cycle"
Green Paper)
14. Unfinished business - the Offender Management
Act and the role of probation trusts boards: essential pre-conditions
The Offender Management Act was intended to create
enterprising, innovative and results orientated probation trusts.
Chairs and members of probation boards were selected for their
experience and skills, e.g. at senior levels in business, public
or charitable sectors, which would enable them to lead arms' length
bodies in a competitive environment. Trusts were to be allowed
freedoms and flexibilities to be successful as business-like entities
delivery high-quality, low-cost public protection, offender rehabilitation
and punishment.
15. In practice trusts have remained constrained
within a line-management relationship with MoJ. Whilst there has
been little incentive or enabling flexibility from the
centre to think independently in pursuit of better outcomes, many
proactive trusts have introduced innovative practices within local
partnership arrangements and forged strong local alliances with
both private and third sector organisations. They are nevertheless
subject to a weighty regulatory framework that requires compliance
with centrally-set standards, instructions, targets, reporting,
inspection and audit. Trust contracts focus on inputs and process
and there is virtually no differentiation between the 35 contracts:
the intended role of trust boards leading the delivery of differentiated,
locally relevant services has not materialised.
16. The Green Paper signals a clear opportunity
for positive change and we welcome this Government's approach
to regulation, outcomes and innovation. In support, underpinning
pre-conditions for delivery of the aspirations of the Green Paper
are set out below and these inform our responses throughout this
submission:
(i) The Secretary of State should contract with
trusts to deliver all probation outcomes in order to retain a
safe and cohesive system.
(ii) Trusts should competitively test all provision
(other than court services) including core services in pursuit
of value for money.
(iii) Trusts should be incentivised financially
in order to achieve best outcomes at lowest cost.
(iv) Regulation should be as light as possible
in order that trusts can be innovative and efficient.
(v) National requirements, including contracts
between the Secretary of State and trusts, should reflect the
converging and overlapping relationship between probation, local
authorities and others at a local level.
(vi) All trusts, local authority and private
and voluntary sector partners' crime reduction performance should
be measured against a flexible, outcome-focussed, national performance
matrix, which reflects both national and local priorities.
What remedial action, if any, has NOMS taken regarding
trusts' negative experiences of existing national contracts, including
for estates and facilities management?
17. NOMS inherited a legacy of centrally negotiated
contracts from the era of the National Probation Directorate (2001
- 2004). Probation Boards (as they were then) had no involvement
in this process. The experience of such contracts, from a Board/Trust
perspective, has been overwhelmingly dismal.
18. Remedial action taken by NOMS to address
failings of national contracts?
Facilities Management (FM) & Estates
Major improvement effort made in 2010:
— Home
Office Procurement Group has become more accountable to MoJ/NOMS
via the introduction of an SLA.
— Better
visibility/tracking of works orders by Trusts.
— Improved
estate management resulting from more accurate and comprehensive
property data.
— National
condition survey resulted in £25m investment in 2009/10.
But:
— Arrangements
remain flawed, with (still) little control for Trusts as customers
(no SLA with the centre or suppliers).
— Recent
experience in one Trust (Feb 2011) demonstrates continuing failings
of current FM arrangements (risked the Trust's ability to comply
with statutory H&S requirements).
ICT:
Incremental change is happening:
— National
data centres established with a programme of migration to these
by Trusts.
— Slow
implementation of new (better) national systems eg case management.
But:
— OMNI
(Offender Management National Infrastructure) key local ICT platform
contract remains until 2013 and again is flawed through rigidity,
lack of transparency and lack of control for Trusts over performance
of Steria as main OMNI supplier.
NB: NOMS ICT recently established a remedial work
programme with PA and Trusts.
Please can you provide us with some examples of
how governance issues and over-regulation impacts on local delivery?
19. By the MoJ's own calculation*, only 24%
of front line probation staff time is spent in front of offenders.
A classic example of impact on front line staff:
— Probation
staff can be at times be reluctant to spend time referring to
a voluntary agency as a referral takes time, (form filling, accompanying
offender to appointment, three way meetings etc), and although
it may help the offender, Trusts are not measured on these criteria
so is more important to complete the supervision plan document
on time which does contribute to a target…
20. The document published by the Probation Association
"Hitting the Target, Missing the Point" (link
below) and originally submitted to the JSC provides the most
comprehensive response to this question:
http://bit.ly/HTTMTP
* Ministry of Justice Direct Survey Report
December 2008
What difference will the removal of the regional
tier of NOMS make to the work of trusts and to relationships with
NOMS HQ?
21. Whilst the welcomed removal of the regional
tier will have little impact on front line staff, the intended
"added value" of the regional tier of NOMS has never
been realised. Very costly in terms of time (Trust Chairs, CEO's
and managers) and regional staff numbers, buildings etc , an added
level of (confused) accountability and bureaucracy, with little
discernible benefit to Trusts or front line staff, the eventual
removal of this tier will reflect these now accepted conclusions.
22. As NOMS centrally restructures, (work still
in progress), the now direct relationship between Trusts and NOMS
centre will theoretically become simpler in terms of contracted
performance, national contracts and policy development and implementation,
the unknown being the degree to which Trusts, as NDPB's, will
be given the necessary freedoms to manage their own affairs (see
paragraphs 14-16 above) and the degree of de-regulation MoJ/NOMS
will approve as recommended in "Hitting the Target, Missing
the Point".
23. The removal of the regional tier opens up
significant opportunities for NOMS to facilitate the capacity
of Trusts to deliver this Governments policy on rehabilitation,
performance "outcomes", Payment by Results and the "localism"
agenda.
Has NOMS devoted any resources to enable trusts
to develop as commissioners? What further training, skills and
support do trusts require to enable them to develop as commissioners?
24. For a full response to this question, the
Probation Association has just published a Position Statement
which calls for investment in Trusts as commissioners (page 4).
Link to "A Commissioning Model for Probation":
http://bit.ly/Commissioning
To what extent are MoJ/NOMS collaborating with
PCA and PA in testing potential arrangements for payment by results?
25. Since its inception as a policy priority
by the Minister, MoJ/NOMS has included PA in Payment by Results
(PBR) scoping seminars and events for potential suppliers. It
is gratifying to acknowledge the openness and inclusivity with
which MoJ has approached what is for all concerned a new, untested,
exciting and complex area. MoJ has taken the correct approach
which is to include Trusts in the development of the model and
trialling implementation in the number of pilots under consideration.
The Probation Association welcomes the opportunities provided
by PBR as long as a level playing field is guaranteed for commissioning
and cherry picking of less problematical offender cohorts is prohibited.
What more can trusts realistically do to reduce
levels of breach?
26. Relaxing the inflexibility of current national
standards related to breach requirements (resulting in more professional
discretion) and in future Trust contracts rewarding the efforts
of staff to ensure more offenders comply with orders (thus increasing
the number of order/licence completions), will reduce breach activities,
Court time and the consequent use of custody. The introduction
of performance criteria which positively reinforce efforts to
ensure compliance, as opposed to the previous emphasis on "failure
to comply" is recommended in the "Contract Outcomes"
briefing referred to above.
To what extent is it, or should it be, the responsibility
of trusts to ensure that reparation or restoration is made to
victims, and what mechanisms would be required to make it, or
enable it, to happen?
27. Reparation to victims covers a spectrum
of services and mechanisms and can involve numerous organisations
- ranging from a straightforward Compensation Order, Community
Payback hours, "victim" modules in community punishment
programmes to meetings between offenders and their victims. Thames
Valley Probation Trust, for example, offers Courts a requirement
in Community Orders which aims to facilitate such victim/offender
meetings. In the latter case, Trusts clearly comply with such
Orders.
28. The Probation Association fully supports
greater integration of victim services into mainstream criminal
justice processes, particularly the principles and practice of
Restorative Justice (RJ). RJ principles and practices are now
sufficiently validated to justify inclusion of RJ as a formal
aim of sentencing. PA proposes the existing power in the 2003
Act (purposes of Sentencing) to "the making of reparation
by offenders to persons affected by their offences" should
in future become mandatory. Subject to the assessment in a Pre
Sentence Report, Courts will sentence with this purpose in mind
which would result in RJ activities becoming a necessary feature
of sentence plans and community orders. In the event of RJ services
becoming mandatory, Trusts will become legally responsible for
ensuring compliance with such orders and a national guideline
will be necessary clarifying minimum quality standards for all
Trusts.
29. There are significant implications, not
in terms of skills and experience, which probation staff already
possess, but in the overall resourcing necessary to take RJ activities
to scale. PA would urge the development of a business case to
identify and cost the implications for probation and its partners
of widening the scope of RJ activities.
June 2011
| 
