Supplementary written evidence from UNISON
(PB 75)
UNISON RESPONSE
1. Examples of how governance issues and over
regulation has impacted on local delivery
UNISON would argue that the strong central influence
of NOMS on the direction of probation work has led to an overly
bureaucratic system of governance and regulation that has diverted
resources from the front line delivery of probation services.
This central control has also stifled local innovation and practice
and has altered local priorities to meet a more standard national
model. UNISON would recognise that additional money was invested
into probation services but the need to account for this investment
and at times direct its spending, led to overly complex monitoring
systems and governance, including a wholly unnecessary regional
tier costing millions that had previously not existed.
The conflict between seeking to create strong, local,
business like, probation Trusts and needing to have control from
the centre has not been resolved and now leaves the public sector
Trusts in a very precarious position. Trusts neither enjoy the
freedoms they once had, prior to the creation of the National
Probation Directorate in 1999 and later NOMS (when they were linked
closely to local government), nor do they have the benefits of
being in technical terms part of the Civil Service machinery as
the Prison Service is.
2. Impressions/lesson learnt about commissioning
of probation services from the opening stages of competition for
the provision of community payback and from previous attempts
to contract out probation services
UNISON has a vast amount experience in the commissioning
of public services both good and bad. It is our opinion that the
commissioning of probation services, first by the NPD and than
NOMS has been nothing short of disaster. A major weakness is that
the commissioning is being managed by people who have little knowledge
of what is being commissioned and little regard to the local impact
that will result. The commissioning of services by the centre
pays little regard to the individual needs of local Trusts and
how best to maximise returns and efficiencies.
The opening stages of the competition for community
payback have been little different with no understanding of how
the competition will impact on local delivery. The splitting of
England and Wales into 6 lots is designed simply to enable the
private sector to win the contracts. No emphasis has been placed
on how these contracts will operate with due regard to the needs
of local communities nor how reparations could be better delivered.
If we are developing local services why is the Centre seeking
to divide the service up into 6 lots which are not linked to traditional
regional areas in which services operate? Why not encourage local
Trusts to further develop a cooperative relationships with other
partners and to allow local commissioning of probation services?
We have no confidence in what is going on now with
community payback nor can we take comfort from what has happened
before.
The national commissioning of estates and facilities
management contracts is a classic example of how poorly the commissioning
of probation services has been managed. I would request that the
Select Committee ask to see a report commissioned by NOMS during
2009 titled 'Facilities Management and Help-desk Contract Retrieval
Project, Report and Findings'.
In the past many local services would commission
estates and FM services directly from their local government partner,
thus ensuring statutory compliance and the economies of scale
that such relationships provided. The local Trust would however
be the commissioner and control the purse strings so if it was
unhappy with services provided or the costs associated it could
seek a firm and swift resolution. The control of estates and FM
budgets also allowed local trusts to make local decisions on how
resources were used and these decision could be taken with local
knowledge. In terms of the overall monitoring of performance and
ensuring value for money this again benefited from close oversight
and effective monitoring.
Since the contracts became a nationally managed and
outsourced service it is hard to point to any positive outcome.
The supposed idea would be that estates and FM management would
be standardised across England and Wales and probation Trusts
would be free to focus on its core role of supervising offenders.
In fact the opposite took place with areas having to put more
resource in to ensure services were provided and to chase up outstanding
issues. This has not changed and is still the case today. The
costs associated with the contract were higher than the resources
already being used in this area and yet the outcomes promised
were never realised. Performance targets for the providers were
never managed and often never set. Complaints from Trusts were
often simply ignored and health and safety was compromised. Additional
costs tied into the contract had to be met by Trusts even thought
they had no control over the risk.
The centre has taken an almost arrogant view that
local Trusts in combination with other local public service providers
could not be allowed or trusted to own and manage estates. This
has always been a ridiculous proposition but one that nevertheless
is maintained still today.
3. What discussions, if any, have you had
with the MoJ/NOMS about what you would like to see in the comprehensive
competitions strategy?
We have had almost no discussion with the MoJ on
any matter concerning the probation service. We do have a dialogue
with NOMS officials including the Director General. Their has
only been a very limited discussion on the competition strategy
and UNISON has struggled to obtain documentary evidence despite
requests. We have raised our general concerns on the way the community
payback competition is being handled. We were promised regular
dialogue on this competition but this has not happened. We have
had meetings with the probation Minister Crispin Blunt but the
Justice Secretary Kenneth Clarke has thus far declined to meet
us and has not responded to letters sent regarding issues of pension
provision.
4. Is the role of Trusts to protect the public
at odds with the proposals to assess their performance against
reductions in re-offending?
Although seeking to prioritise reductions in re-offending
does help protect the public it will ultimately lead to some conflict
with this requirement. The focus of recent debates around re-offending
has largely been concerning the group of offenders who actually
are not under the remit of the probation service, as they are
short term custodial sentences and the risk of harm to the public
of their offending is generally assessed as being low. The way
that probation manages risk is to ensure that those who are likely
to cause the most harm if they re-offend get a greater degree
of supervision and oversight. A murderer who is released on licence
will get more time and resources allocated to them on release
from custody than someone who has committed a series of shop thefts.
If the focus was solely on preventing re-offending the person
who has committed the shop thefts may get additional resources
devoted to them as they are likely to commit more crime however
this will come at the expenses of the time spent with the murderer.
This diversion of resources would ultimately undermine the public
protection role.
5. Examples of how cuts in Trusts budgets
have had an impact on sentencing outcomes
It is hard to give immediate examples of how cuts
to Trust budgets have impacted on sentencing. The cumulative effect
of year on year cuts will clearly lead to reductions in services
offered to courts but we are only now beginning to see this being
discussed. In terms of report writing we may already be starting
to see less complete short format reports being chosen ahead of
standard delivery reports as they are cheaper to produce.
6. What sort of training opportunities should
be available to probation officers at middle and senior management
level?
There has been an assumption that because an individual
is a trained probation officer they can automatically step up
and become a manager without much further investment. We believe
this to be wrong and the competences and requirements of a good
manager require additional investment to produce good leaders.
This is an area that does need improvement and should be developed.
Training exists in other public sector environments and these
should be made available to probation management and time allowed
for this development to take place. UNISON also believes that
good managers can come from other probation and non probation
roles.
7. Additional UNISON Comments
UNISON remains very concerned that staff working
in the probation service will be disadvantaged by the introduction
of competition and greater plurality of provision. Although TUPE
protects staff transferring to new providers it does not protect
pension rights and the vast majority of staff are members of the
LGPS (local govt pension scheme) which is a defined benefit scheme.
At present the provisions of 'Fair Deal' for public sector worker
applies meaning that any new provider needs to ensure a broadly
comparable scheme is in place following transfer. The 'Fair Deal'
provisions are at present being consulted on by the Government
and should the provision be scrapped the pension rights of probation
workers will disappear overnight when new providers win contracts
from the public sector. This would be a tragedy for hard working
and committed workers and will result in numerous disputes up
and down the country. It would also mean the public sector will
be unable to compete for probation contracts as it currently provides
a decent pension which any competitor will not. This will result
in the ending of probation Trust as local public sector bodies.
Alongside Fair Deal for pensions, UNISON would also
ask how will the professional development and training of staff
be safeguarded in a multi provider environment. At present probation
Trusts invests considerable time and resources into ensuring a
highly skilled workforce is working with the offender population.
They invest in staff knowing that they are likely to use those
skills over a number of years working within the Trust. When new
providers win contracts for 3 or 5 years how will this professional
development and investment be secured. Indeed will the public
sector faced with losing business on cost grounds want to carry
on the levels of investment it currently does if this is not required
of competitor providers.
June 2011
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