The role of the Probation Service - Justice Committee Contents


Supplementary evidence from Professor Hazel Kemshall following the evidence session on 8 June 2011 (PB 78)

1.  The government says that what works should be the touchstone for practice. Will payment by results work to achieve this aspiration?

In principle yes—it should incentivise the best practice to achieve the most desirable outcomes, in this case offence reduction. However, there are some caveats, in brief:

—  The danger of "cherry picking" easy, and low risk cases especially by third sector providers—an issue that has been much discussed recently and about which you no doubt have other evidence.

—  The variation and inconsistency across Probation Trusts—there is not actually a national probation service in that sense. The best performing areas on work works have had strong management commitment to it and strong quality assurance, guidance and training initiatives. It is imperative that the recent national standards and the recent performance measures reinforce what works—and the concentration on the four domains should achieve this. However, any discretion must be exercised within a "what works" framework not outside of it. In addition, should poorly performing Probation Trusts on effective practice be penalised—for example following poor HMIP thematic reports on effective practice?

—  PbR has a number of metric/measurement difficulties. I have found a recent paper by Collins 2010 (appended) helpful in reviewing these quickly in an accessible way. I think although the paper has a "stance", the issues are well reviewed and speak to a number of the committee's concerns.

2.  How should practice be measured or evaluated? Can you think of any consequences to the Government's proposals that may not have been sufficiently foreseen or any unwanted consequences that have not been adequately guarded against?

Professors Pease and Hedderman are likely to assist you rather better here. I can only add:

—  Would comparisons of the best performing Probation Trusts on re-offending and effective practice measures to the poorest assist with identifying the environmental, organisational, cultural, management and practice differences that may subtly influence practice performance?

—  This may also assist with the complex difficulties in identifying the causal links between inputs, outputs and outcomes that have proved so challenging.

—  Interventions are often complex and multi-factorial and delivered in partnership, thus identifying what has made the difference can be difficult, perhaps case comparisons over a two to five year time line would be beneficial. The Collins paper may assist with the second half of the question.

—  Finally, the potential to "park" high risk offenders, (both risk of harm and risk of reconviction), in addition to stop start provision and lack of continuity or sustainability in provision for this difficult group.

—  How can third sector providers be adequately incentivised to provide the range of services and respond to the range of offender risks presented? What will be an acceptable level of risk transfer from government to the Third sector? Will providers wish to stay within a comfort zone of well known and easy to deliver services to responsive and low risk offenders, rather than innovate and develop and services for more challenging and risky offenders? (see for example Dicker 2011 on this point pp: 18-20, appended).

3.  What difficulties could commissioners and providers encounter in demonstrating the effectiveness of complex partnership arrangements on reductions in reoffending?

In brief:

—  Identifying and sufficiently evidencing the causal chain of impact- who did what that made the difference?

—  The cumulative or holistic impact of the "package" of interventions is likely to prove difficult to trace and evidence over time, and may need time consuming and costly data collection, and prove burdensome to suppliers.

—  The potential to over-rely on proxy and intermediate measures (eg accommodation, employment, skill development), rather than long term reconviction rates.

—  What has been learnt from the IOM pilots on data collection and evidencing impact that is transferable?

June 2011


 
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Prepared 27 July 2011