Lessons from PFI and other projects - Public Accounts Committee Contents


2  The returns to investors

8.  Investors typically provide 10% of the finance of a PFI project. There are primary investors (developers and constructors) and secondary investors (those who acquire shares in operational PFI projects). The secondary investors are typically specialist PFI investment funds which manage a portfolio of PFI contracts to generate an income stream for those who have invested money in the funds.[25]

9.  There is little information available on the returns made by primary and secondary investors on their PFI investments making it impossible for the public sector, Parliament and the public to assess whether the investors' returns are reasonable for the risks they bear.[26]

10.  Innisfree told us that there was little money to be made in the initial stages of a traditional construction project - contractors on big construction projects typically worked to profit margins of 2% to 3%.[27] Yet a recent report[28] suggested that primary investors in PFI projects could sell their shares soon after construction is complete and average a profit of over 50%.[29] Innisfree, which is involved in developing PFI projects, did not accept the accuracy and objectivity of the report's findings. They argued that they had suffered losses on the Cornwall Schools and Dalmuir PFI projects which had to be balanced against the opportunities for profits.[30] Innisfree and Semperian agreed to make information available on the purchase and sale of their PFI investments.[31]

11.  There is no limit to the returns which investors can make from PFI projects. There is also no requirement for the gains on the sale of shares in PFI projects to be shared with the Government other than through the taxation of capital gains which investors may be able to avoid.[32] Innisfree argued that any attempt to significantly reduce the returns of its investors on existing contracts would damage the UK PFI market's credibility.[33] Semperian was, however, willing to consider new contract arrangements which allow the Government to share in investors' returns above a defined threshold.[34]

12.  Innisfree told us that it aimed to achieve returns of between 8% and 10% per annum for its investors.[35] Investors in its four funds were predominantly UK pension funds, looking for low risk investments that offered a good return.[36] The rewards to investors and managers of the funds appear to us to mean that the private sector was receiving excessive profits on the back of Government funded projects at the expense of the taxpayer.[37]

13.  Public scrutiny of investor returns has been inhibited by the absence of an obligation on investors to disclose full details of their profits and gains on PFI deals. The Treasury cited commercial sensitivities for not allowing freedom of information provisions to apply to the private sector.[38] While aspects of some deals may be commercially sensitive, it has been all too easy for departments and investors to hide behind commercial confidentiality, rather than provide full disclosure of costs and benefits to inform value for money.[39] These are publically funded investments and should be subject to public scrutiny.

14.  We heard that the public sector has not made full use of available investor and contract information. Normally it has information on the primary investors' expected rates of return when assessing bids. In recent contracts the public sector also has the right to obtain information which investors provide to the banks which are providing debt finance. However, the public sector has rarely used this information provision. Whilst these arrangements, if fully utilised, are helpful they fall short of full transparency. [40]


25   Q 4 Back

26   Qq 126, 128 Back

27   Q 4 Back

28   European Services Strategy Unit Report Number 4 - http://www.european-services-strategy.org.uk/publications/essu-research-reports/essu-research-report-no-4-the-ps10bn-sale-of-s/10bn-sale-of-ppp-shares.pdf Back

29   Qq 2, 3 Back

30   Qq 44, 45, 64 Back

31   Qq 116-117  Back

32   Q 28 Back

33   Qq 78, 83 Back

34   Qq 84, 108 Back

35   Qq 10, 82 Back

36   Q 72 Back

37   Qq 97-99 Back

38   Qq 124, 125 Back

39   Q 128 Back

40   Qq 14, 15 Back


 
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Prepared 1 September 2011