5 Commissioning public services and
the Big Society
93. The Government's aim is to open up public services
to charities, voluntary groups and the private sector. The skills
and mindsets of the responsible officials in both central Government
and local authorities (the 'commissioners') are crucial to this
process. Danny Kruger warned that in its current state
central Government is spending half a trillion pounds
a year: it is that vast, and it is not going to be able to contract
with the hundreds of smaller local charities. ... They can probably
only handle 40 contracts in central Government.[176]
94. Kevin Curley, Chief Executive of NAVCA, concurred,
setting out two case studies of poor contracting:
[...] a couple of years ago in Leeds, the contract
that was let for family support services to be provided by the
voluntary sector was so big that local charities like Home-Start
in Leeds, which had been delivering to a good standard and to
the council's satisfaction for several years, were unable to bid,
and the contract was won by a large national charity.[177]
A year ago, Hull city council put its advice services
contract out to tender, and a very well-established, well-run
and effective citizens advice bureau in Hull lost its fundingthe
contract was won by A4e, a private sector organisation. The essence
of why A4e won the competition was that the commissioners responsible
for sorting out that contracting opportunity were not able to
place any value on all the aspects of the citizens advice bureau
beyond the simple provision of advice from adviser to individual.[178]
A further example was provided by the Minister, who
reported:
A big national charity bidding for a local authority
contract to run one of the big services recently told me that
the local authority had taken the perfectly sensible view that
they wanted it to be run not in-house but by an outside provider,
and it had so far cost the charity £800,000 just to bid for
it, which is nonsense. [179]
95. The model to aim for was outlined by Polly Toynbee,
who said that
If you are serious about Big Society, you will want
to find a mechanismand it is not that difficultto
make sure that it is the small, the local, the experienced, the
people with the knowledge.[180]
96. The Cabinet Office produced a Green Paper on
modernising the commissioning system in December 2010. It sought
"views on how the Government can reform all stages of the
commissioning process at both local and national levels to ensure
civil society organisations play a full and active part in public
services".[181]
The responses to the Green Paper were intended to inform the publication
of the Open Public Services White Paper. However, that White Paper
includes little in the way of proposals to reform the commissioning
process. The Charity Finance Directors Group cautioned that "despite
publishing the Localism Bill, the Modernising Commissioning Green
Paper, and the Giving and Open Public Services White Papers, there
are still few tangible and clear policy initiatives. When faced
with this vacuum, managing risks and re-shaping responsively is
difficult."[182]
97. One of the barriers identified in the commissioning
system is the interpretation of European regulations. Local authorities
were accused by NAVCA of invoking the "full EU Public Contracts
Regulations (2006) unnecessarily, adopting competitive tendering
procedures by default" despite the fact that the regulations
were designed for large scale public procurement and specifically
exempt 'Part B services' such as "social services of general
interest" which covers some of the public services carried
out by voluntary groups.[183]
One reason for this misinterpretation of the regulations, according
to NAVCA, is the Office of Government Commerce's EU Procurement
GuidanceIntroduction to the EU procurement rules which
neither set out clearly the exemptions nor explains in practical
terms what this means for local authorities. To remedy this, NAVCA
suggested that the guidance should be revised to include "practical
examples of lawful flexible procurement of Part B services [which]
would give commissioners the confidence to make good funding decisions,
give grants, and use flexible and proportionate procurement processes".[184]
98. We welcome
the Minister for the Cabinet Office's recent announcement on the
Government's intention to re-negotiate EU procurement regulations.
We look forward to the Government setting out what changes they
are seeking, why they are sought and the timescale for implementation
of the changes. We also recommend that the Government set out
detailed plans to revise procurement guidance under the existing
regulations. We intend to conduct an inquiry into the Government's
public procurement policies in the light of the Minister for the
Cabinet Office's recent announcement of a package of measures
that are intended to reform how the Government buys from the private
sector.
99. We recommend
that the Office for Government Commerce revise guidance on the
EU Public Contracts Regulations 2006 to promote appropriate interpretation
of the regulations by local authorities in commissioning.
100. Another alleged bureaucratic barrier identified
by the charity Community Links was the Transfer of Undertakings
(Protection of Employment) Regulations (TUPE), which
protects employees' terms and conditions of employment when a
business is transferred from one owner to another. These arise
from the European Acquired Rights Directive. They require that
a charity or voluntary group wishing to deliver a public service
has to take on the cost of personnel currently employed in providing
the service, along with their existing pensions entitlement, annual
leave, and other employment benefits. Charities delivering these
promises will face potentially different sets of terms and conditions
and employment benefits among their workforce.[185]
Community Links argued that the TUPE regulations restricted the
ability of charities and social enterprises to "innovate
or redesign services to better meet need."[186]
101. We recommend
that the Cabinet Office consult the voluntary sector on the legislative
and bureaucratic barriers which inhibit voluntary groups from
delivering public services. We note the commitment of the Chancellor
of the Exchequer, in his 2011 Autumn Statement, to a review of
TUPE regulations, and we urge the Government to give special consideration
to smaller charities in this review.
102. The system of 'payment by results' for public
services was also identified as a major barrier to opening up
public services, as it could exclude from public service delivery
some small and local charities and voluntary groups who did not
have the working capital to continue operating while they awaited
payment.[187] It also
may not be suitable for all types of public service. The National
Council for Voluntary Youth Services spoke of work which focuses
on "increasing the social and emotional development of young
people", a measure which they say cannot be immediately measured
but which in the long term can provide savings for the public
purse by steering away young people from socially costly choices.[188]
Timebank identified "payment by results" as the "biggest
preventer of participation in public service provision by the
voluntary and community sector".[189]
Case study 1 provides further details.
Case Study 1: WLAC - West London Action for Children
West London Action for Children is a charity that
provides support to vulnerable parents and children in West London.
It relies for almost half its income on contracts with local authorities.
The NHS provides the remainder of its income through payment for
the provision of counselling services to victims of domestic abuse,
mental illness and poverty.
For many of its clients, WLAC is the only organisation
that provides support at the end of a long journey. One client
explained how her first interaction with the state following an
incident of domestic violence was with the police, who then passed
her on to the local NHS service, who finally passed her on to
WLAC. At the end of this journey, WLAC provides one to one counselling,
opportunities to learn new skills and support with child-care
at a cost to the public well below equivalent state providers.
WLAC is one of the only providers of this service
in West London, but its primary source of income is currently
said to be under threat due to a combination of local public service
cuts and commissioning practices.
Trustees of the organisation, who have years of experience
in the public and private sector, explained that the Government's
emphasis on payment by results is welcomed, but that small charities
are not being given a fair chance to compete for tenders. They
lack the finances and resources to bid for services, which are
often inflated by the complexity of the process, and local government
re-organisation has created even greater uncertainty around funding.
Government action on cuts, and inaction on public
service reform, has added an extra level of difficulty to the
job of WLAC's management at a time of broader economic uncertainty.
|
103. A further critical barrier was what Shaun Bailey,
one of the Government's Big Society Ambassadors, identified as
a "culture of being afraid, of not wanting to try" in
Whitehall, preventing small and medium-sized charities and enterprises
contracting with government.[190]
Mr Bailey argued that the challenge of the Big Society would be
providing "the political leadership" for local authorities
and Whitehall to commission services from the right provider,
even if they were not the cheapest. Kevin Curley of NAVCA neatly
summarised the change in attitude required, stating that:
it is absolutely crucial that they do not apply the
same approach to buying advice services and support for women
fleeing domestic violence that they apply to buying wheelie bins
and computer systems.[191]
Francis Maude recognised that "risk averse"
commissioners who designed big contracts with a minimum turnover
requirement for the bidders led to an "oligopoly of big,
national and multinational providers, which is not what we want
to see".[192]
104. There is also a skills issue. Mr Bailey told
us that if officials had the skills to carry out the tendering
process, the Government would receive a better service with greater
value for money for taxpayer, but "if you force them [charities]
to act like a general business contractor then you have lost the
whole point of using them".[193]
Mr Maude told us that civil servants were "not yet at all
good" at being "commissioners and contract managers
rather than line managers ... [they require] a different set of
skills".[194]
However, the Minister for Decentralisation and Cities, the Rt
Hon Greg Clark MP reported a more positive approach by officials
in the Department for Communities and Local Government:
I have found the officials I have worked with on
this, far from having any degree of resistance to this whatsoever,
have been delighted and inspired to get out there and work with
communities. This is what people go into public life for: to make
things happen on the ground.[195]
105. Sir Ronald Cohen also held a more optimistic
view, assuring us that we "are not going to have to worry
about whether or not this can get off the ground" as his
experience with officials at the Ministry of Justice when developing
the social impact bonds was that although there were sceptics,
many officials were "very positive about trying this new
idea".[196]
106. For rapid
and successful commissioning, there must be a cultural shift in
departments. Ministers must set out what practical steps are required
to change the commissioning culture in Whitehall and how success
will be measured. In particular, the objectives, roles and tasks
of commissioners must be identified and skills shortfalls must
be addressed both through training and through the recruitment
of suitable staff.
107. The design of contracts was identified as critical
to bringing in the charitable sector. The Employee Ownership
Association stressed the importance of commissioners considering
social value in addition to immediate cost savings when designing
the terms of contracts for public services.[197]
The Third Sector Research Centre warned that
narrowly targeted outcomes (such as the number of
jobs created) can create incentives to abandon those clients whose
social needs are most acute and costly to address.[198]
108. Two potential solutions were recommended to
us. The London Civic Forum recommended that commissioners work
with local communities and service users to determine the results
a commissioned service is required to deliver.[199]
NAVCA recommended that the guidance issued by the Office for Government
Commerce, 'Social Issues in Purchasing', should be "updated
and strengthened to reflect a positive commitment to commissioning
social, economic and environmental value and to include the work
that has been carried out in local areas to take this agenda forward".[200]
109. We also heard that the length of the contract
to deliver a public service must be substantial, in order to provide
groups tendering with the security required to deliver services.[201]
UNISON warned that the contracting process at present rewarded
only short-term results and discouraged innovation by voluntary
organisations.[202]
110. Contracts must also be of a small enough size
for local groups to be able to fulfil the contract without "experiencing
significant change to their values, ethos and delivery through
upscaling by merger or participation in consortia".[203]
Holding a much greater number of smaller contracts will be a far
greater challenge for commissioners than "to deal with fewer
larger contracts with people with a track record of doing what
you have asked them to do and can provide the data you need to
see that they have done it".[204]
It may also be at far greater expense. This was agreed by the
Minister, who accepted the failings of the system at present and
spoke of the necessary solution:
The key elements are that you need to chunk up projects
more into smaller bites so that smaller local enterprises, whether
for profit or VCS [voluntary and community sector] and social
enterprises, are better able to bid effectively.[205]
111. To utilise the skills of charities and voluntary
groups in tackling complex social issues, civil servants and commissioners
must be able to work across Whitehall silos to ensure that contracts
reflect the cross-departmental nature of the work of such groups,
as Case study 2 demonstrates.
Case study 2: Emmaus
We visited the Emmaus Community in South Lambeth
as part of our inquiry. Emmaus describes itself as the "homelessness
charity that works", providing a solution to the 'revolving
door' problem of homelessness, where the same individuals frequently
return to hostels, by offering the long-term support needed to
break the cycle of homelessness. In fact, Emmaus' effectiveness
rests on their ability to address all the issues which a homeless
person may confront, such as addiction, mental illness and repeat
offending.
There are 21 Emmaus Communities in the UK, with 505
current residents, known as Emmaus Companions, who agree not to
claim primary benefits and work full time in their Community's
social enterprise, refurbishing and selling unwanted furniture
and other household goods donated by local people. Companions
typically have multiple needs, and each receives personalised
support to help them regain control of their lives, for example
through counselling, addiction support and training opportunities.
An economic evaluation of an Emmaus Community in
2008 undertaken by the Cambridge Centre for Housing and Planning
Research found that Emmaus currently delivers savings to the taxpayer
of £13.0m per annumbased on a saving of circa £26,000
per Companion per year in reductions in offending, reduced time
in the legal system, more efficient use of health services and
benefits voluntarily relinquished.[206]
In September 2011, Emmaus representatives met Rt
Hon Oliver Letwin MP, Minister of State for the Cabinet Office,
Rt Hon Chris Grayling MP, Minister for Employment, and Rt Hon
Grant Shapps MP, Minister for Housing and Local Government to
discuss how the work carried out in Emmaus communities fits into
the Big Society. The work of Emmaus covers several government
departments: the Department of Health, the Department for Work
and Pensions, and the Cabinet Office as well as local authorities,
who have the statutory responsibility for homelessness. Existing
Government programmes, such as the Work Programme, work in only
single departments, and are not suitable to people with multiple
and complex needs.
Ministers recognised the need to develop outcomes
measurement towards a Social Return on Investment measurement
tool-kit which could provide the basis for a Payment by Results
agreement in return for a Social Impact Bond that would provide
the necessary start-up capital to enable the development of nine
new Emmaus communities (at a cost of £10.5 million). There
have not been any further attempts to work across Government silos
to enable Emmaus Communities to contribute to Big Society policy
delivery. Emmaus requires a single contract to address the multiple
needs of its companions. So far, departments can envisage offering
separate contracts through the Work Programme or through programmes
operated by the Home Office or the Department for Communities
and Local Government.
|
112. Attempts
to open up public services to charities and voluntary groups may
encounter the difficulty that services provided by such organisations
do not fit easily into the siloed mentality of Whitehall departments,
who are unable to address the multiple needs of the service user
- even where this approach is the very key to the success of voluntary
organisations. We regard the challenge to government presented
by charities such as Emmaus as a litmus test of the Government's
Big Society project. We believe that joint funds, managed by local
authorities and financed by separate departments, may be the answer.
We expect the Cabinet Office to lead decisively on this matter.
113. Offering charities and social enterprises only
sub-contracting roles will not be sufficient. Claire Dove, Chair
of the Social Enterprise Coalition, told us that some of her organisations
would not take a Department for Work and Pensions contract that
had gone to a private sector provider who was then subcontracting
out to social enterprises "because the levels that they want
to subcontract with are not acceptable if you are running a business".[207]
Case study 3 provides further details.
Case study 3: The Work Programme
The Department for Work and Pension's flagship programme
to tackle unemployment has been cited as "a massive boost
to the Big Society".[208]
The Department's press release noted that "almost 300 voluntary
sector organisations are to be part of a massive national programme
to tackle long term benefit dependency".[209]
Francis Maude has also said that an estimated 35
to 40% of the value of the contracts in the Work Programme will
go to voluntary and charitable organisations, with a value of
over £100 million a year. However, 16 of the 18 prime contractors
are private sector companies, with only two prime contractor contracts
won by voluntary sector organisations. A further 289 voluntary
organisations have sub-contractor roles.
Prime contractors were expected to contract out significant
proportions to voluntary organisations. However, a significant
number of the charities that applied as sub-contractors have subsequently
dropped out of the programme.[210]
Locality reported that many of its members had had "reported
very negative" experiences of being involved in the Work
Programme, which they argue has, instead of empowering communities,
"merely shifted power from the state to private companies
who now act as the commissioner (and in some cases deliverer as
well) in their role as prime contractor."[211]
Locality further report that some of their members named in winning
bids as sub-contractors were "being offered contracts that
run at a loss for five years" while other members had reported
reporting that prime contractors were asking them to deliver services
for free.[212]
A report by the Association for Chief Executives
of Voluntary Organisations stated that many of the charities involved
felt like 'bid candy', that the primes were not serious about
involving them, and only 9% were confident that the programme
will meet its outcomes.[213]
The National Council of Voluntary Organisations in its written
evidence argued that the Work Programme's decision to have 11
contracts covering the country was an example of contracts spreading
across too large a geographical area.[214]
The Minister defended the outcome of the Work Programme
process, highlighting the number of charities and social enterprises
in the Work Programme "underneath the prime contracting level".
The full level of the value of such contracts cannot be known
until the results of the Work Programme are clear, as they are
based on the payments by results system, but this would reward
the organisations from the charitable sector who succeed in finding
employment. [215]
Responding to these criticisms, Nick Hurd accepted
that many voluntary sector groups involved in the Work Programme
had concerns over its working, but that Chris Grayling, the Minister
responsible for the programme, was monitoring the concerns closely
and would act "very robustly with prime contractors who have
been proven to be acting irresponsibly with their supply chain".[216]
The issue has also recently been raised with the Prime Minister
who accepted that there was a potential conflict between getting
smaller organisations involved in the Work Programme because "you
need an organisation that has got the ability, the working capital
and the size to cope with training people on jobseeker's allowance
or incapacity benefit or employment and support allowance-the
full spectrum-you need to be quite a big organisation". The
Prime Minister did speak of the "tough rules for subcontracting"
and the "success, not at the top level, but at the subcontracting
level".[217]
|
114. The Minister for the Cabinet Office spoke of
the need to "be much better at commissioning in a way that
creates a genuinely level playing field".
[218]
On the evidence before us we find little reason to have
faith that large contractors will subcontract to smaller, charitable
or voluntary providers. We recommend that departments should keep
public sector contracts as small as possible to ensure contracting
with as wide range of providers as possible. Ministers should
regularly review and publish the scale of public sector contracts
and the size of organisations they procure from. The objective
of the Big Society project of empowering communities will not
be achieved by simply contracting with private companies and large
national charities.
115. Furthermore
it must be recognised that commissioning is but the first stage
of the delivery process. Consideration must be given to by whom,
and by what means, contracts are to be policed for quality of
delivery, and complaints and problems dealt with.
Charities and value added tax
116. The Charity Tax Group published new research
in February 2011 which revealed that charities were paying between
£2.7 and £3.7 billion a year in tax.[219]
The two main taxes paid by charities are National Insurance for
employers, which makes up 54% of their tax liability, and VAT,
which makes up 37.5%.[220]
One of the stumbling blocks to charities delivering public services
is that they are not eligible for the VAT rebate that public sector
bodies receive. This creates an uneven playing field.[221]
117. The NCVO told us that "irrecoverable VAT
is a significant issue for the VCS [voluntary and community sector]
- it threatens the existing work of voluntary and community organisations
[VCOs] at a challenging time and will act as a disincentive to
developing the sector's public service delivery role." It
costs charities significant sums: one average estimate is 4% of
total expenditure.[222]
118. The NCVO proposed a number of priority areas
for review including VAT on social welfare services, where charities
are complementing/substituting government provision: "VCOs
should be compensated here and not have resources taken from them
in the pursuit of delivering public services. This would ensure
fair treatment across local government/private sector or VCS [voluntary
and community sector]."[223]
119. We put these concerns to the then Economic Secretary
to the Treasury, Rt Hon Justine Greening MP. She explained that
the sector already benefited significantly from tax relief in
a variety of ways: "the UK is held as a good example of a
tax system that supports charities".[224]
She added that large areas of charitable activities are already
tax exempt and that spending review settlements took account of
VAT rebate entitlement in the public sector. She did agree that
"as the landscape around public service delivery changes,
and as charities get more involved, it is a fair point that we
have to make sure that there is a level playing field."[225]
120. We recommend
the Government extend eligibility for the VAT refund scheme which
currently applies for public sector bodies, to charities who deliver
public services under a contract with a public sector organisation.
This recommendation should be considered as a pre-budget representation
addressed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for implementation
in the 2012 Budget.
Public sector mutuals and the
commissioning system
121. The Open Public Services White Paper sets out
the Government's commitment to promoting mutualism among public
sector staff, stating:
We are giving public sector staff new rights to form
new mutuals and bid to take over the services they deliver, empowering
millions of public sector staff to become their own bosses. This
will free up the often untapped entrepreneurial and innovative
drive of public sector professionals.
Ownership and control, through mutualisation, empower
employees to innovate and redesign services around service users
and communities, driving up quality. We will not dictate the precise
form of these mutuals; rather, this should be driven by what is
best for the users of services and by employees as co-owners of
the business. Options include wholly employee-led, multi-stakeholder
and mutual joint venture models.
The Government will take steps to identify and overcome
the barriers placed in the way of public sector workers who want
to exercise these rights.[226]
122. To promote mutualisation, the Cabinet Office
has set up a taskforce led by Professor Julian Le Grand, who described
public sector mutuals as an idea which he believed would have
"enormous resonance" in the future.[227]
123. Increasing the number of mutuals delivering
public services will mean specific challenges for the commissioning
system. Professor Le Grand warned that mutuals would need considerable
support at the start:
Many of the people who start mutuals have no experience
of, or often indeed very little understanding about, what is involved,
and the business of setting up a business, which, to some extent,
is what is going on here, is very difficult. [228]
124. Adrian Brown from the Institute for Government
warned of the danger of romanticising mutuals, arguing that the
'very enticing' rhetoric could lead to the underestimation of
the new challenges that public sector workers might have to face,
such as arranging their own IT and back-office functions.[229]
To address this, the Employee Ownership Association recommended
that during the early development of a mutual, commissioners should
be able to see "market-building" as a legitimate goal,
when new mutuals and established private companies were competing
for a contract.[230]
125. Professor Le Grand identified four issues being
considered by the Mutuals Taskforce which would need to be resolved
to allow mutuals to flourish. The first was whether mutuals should
have an "infant protection" period, to allow a new mutual
time to develop without being exposed to competition from private
companies, other mutuals and social enterprises or charities.
This was, the Employee Ownership Association advised, "imperative"
to ensure that new mutuals "do not risk losing out the moment
they leave the public sector because they simply cannot compete
with larger competitors".[231]
Once developed, Professor Le Grand also raised the prospect of
a new mutual being subject to an asset lock - a mechanism wherein
the previously publicly owned asset is "not prone to takeover
by large organisations or private sector organisations of various
kinds". The remaining two issues were the application of
value added tax to mutuals, and the question of whether working
conditions and pensions of public sector employees wishing to
mutualise would be transferred with the employee.[232]
126. A culture change within the public sector will
be necessary for mutualisation to succeed. In early 2011, the
Minister for the Cabinet Office set out a "very ambitious
[...] but not inconceivable" target of one million public
sector employees moving into mutuals by the end of the Parliament,
representing one-sixth of the total public sector workforce.[233]
The Open Public Services White Paper goes even further and talks
of "empowering millions of public sector staff to become
their own bosses".[234]
Limited progress has been made towards this target, with 45,000
public sector staff are expected to have moved into mutuals by
November 2011.[235]
127. One reason for this slow progress was identified
by the Prime Minister, who recently told the Liaison Committee
that "change was difficult" and that employees were
likely to encounter "institutional resistance" of people
higher up in the organisation who do not support part of the organisation
breaking away.[236]
Both Ed Mayo, the Secretary General of Co-operatives UK and Professor
Le Grand described this resistance as commonplace both within
Whitehall and the wider public sector:
I am continually shocked, unfortunately, by the lack
of understanding of co-operative and mutual models right across
Whitehall[237]
We have a particular issue with middle managers in
local authorities who are approached by a set of employees who
say they would like to spin out and develop a mutual, and they
are simply told, "No, it is not possible." It is not
part of the culture.[238]
To address this resistance, Ed Mayo suggested that
each major spending department should appoint a mid-or senior-level
employee as a "co-operative" contact to liaise with
the Cabinet Office and increase understanding of mutual and cooperative
models within the department.[239]
128. The success of mutuals depends not only on a
redesigned commissioning system, but enthusiasm among the staff.
The TUC warned that the benefits of mutuals, such as increasing
innovation and productivity would only accrue "where there
is genuine employee ownership and buy-in".[240]
They contend that mutualisation is at present mainly being driven
by management, not staff: staff in turn feel pressurised to support
the change. Mutualisation has also been more common in healthcare
than in other public sectors.
129. The Employee Ownership Association describes
the potential loss of a public sector pension scheme as "the
single biggest disincentive to transfer" for current public
sector employees. They warn that to avoid this disincentive, it
is necessary to go further than merely stipulating that historically
accrued rights will be transferred.[241]
130. It is not
clear to us that the Mutuals Taskforce is equipped to overcome
the resistance to public sector mutuals. This resistance goes
beyond bureaucratic inertia in Whitehall. The lack of understanding
in Whitehall and local government about mutuals and cooperatives
must be addressed by indentifying and training the key personnel
who make the decisions. If the Government had a coherent implementation
plan, this matter should already have been addressed.
131. Public
sector workers will weigh up the choice between the advantages
of mutualisation against the risk of losing their public sector
pension provision and may decide against spinning off into a mutual.
It needs to be recognised that the support for mutuals has so
far been dependent on exceptional circumstances. We recommend
that the Government take a fresh look at this issue and develop
innovative approaches to encouraging and incentivising participation
in mutuals.
176 Q 82, 84 Back
177
Q 405 Back
178
Q 444 Back
179
Q 588 Back
180
Q 79 Back
181
Cabinet Office, Modernising Commissioning, December 2010,
p 5 Back
182
"Charities need clarity to adjust to changing environment"
Charities Finance Directors Group and PKF Accountants 7
September 2011 Back
183
Ev 122 Back
184
Ev 122 Back
185
Ev w36 Back
186
Ev w107 Back
187
Ev 125 Back
188
Ev w140 Back
189
Ev w104 Back
190
Q 86 [Shaun Bailey] Back
191
Q 448 Back
192
Q 588 Back
193
Q 94 Back
194
Q 525 Back
195
Q 585 Back
196
Q 268 Back
197
Ev w268 Back
198
Ev w240 Back
199
Ev w296 Back
200
Ev 122 Back
201
Ev w268 Back
202
Ev w5 Back
203
Ev w240 Back
204
Q 202 Back
205
Q 588 Back
206
Emmaus, Sharing in success: An economic evaluation of Emmaus
Village Carlton, (Cambridge: 2008) Back
207
Q 266 [Claire Dove] Back
208
Massive boost for the Big Society' Department for Work and
Pensions website 1 April 2011 DWP.gov.uk Back
209
Ibid. Back
210
HC Deb, 13 June 2011, c662W Back
211
Ev w286 Back
212
Ev w286 Back
213
"ACEVO - Third Sector Work Programme survey", ACEVO
website, October 2011, www.acevo.org.uk Back
214
Ev w248 Back
215
Q 604 [Francis Maude] Back
216
Q 604 [Nick Hurd], Q 635 Back
217
Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence taken before the Liaison
Committee on 8 November 2011, HC (2010-2012) 608 iv, Q 326 Back
218
Q 588 Back
219
Charity Tax Group and Nuffield Foundation, Charity Tax Map,
(London: 2011), p 119 Back
220
Ibid. p 109 Back
221
Ibid. p 109 Back
222
FVS Ev 53 Back
223
Ibid Back
224
FVS Q 201 Back
225
Q 197 Back
226
HM Government, Open Public Services White Paper, Cm 8145,
July 2011, p42-43 Back
227
Q 515 Back
228
Q 472 Back
229
Q 211 Back
230
Ev w268 Back
231
Ev w268 Back
232
Q 472 Back
233
"Minister calls for one million public sector co-owners"
Public Finance 24 February 2011 www.publicfiance.co.uk
Back
234
HM Government, Open Public Services White Paper, Cm 8145,
July 2011, p 43 Back
235
Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence taken before the Liaison
Committee on 8 November 2011, HC (2010-2012) 608 iv, Q339, 340 Back
236
Ibid. Back
237
Q 480 [Ed Mayo] Back
238
Q 474 [Professor Le Grand] Back
239
Q 481 Back
240
Ev 106 Back
241
Ev w268 Back
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