Conclusions and recommendations
The forensics market
1. Given
that the Government expected private forensic science providers
(FSPs) to pick up the FSS's 60% share of the external forensics
market, it is disappointing that the Government does not appear
to have gathered any market intelligence on the capacity and commercial
willingness of private forensic science providers to take on the
FSS's work. (Paragraph 42)
2. The apparent lack
of transparency over the size of the forensics market is unacceptable
and we see no reason why the FSS and other forensic science providers
should have been unaware of police forensic expenditure figures.
The levels of police expenditure on internal and external forensics
should have been published, and we recommend that they are published
in detail in future. If the Government expects the private sector
to pick up the FSS's market share, it must be clear with private
forensic science providers about the size of the market and anticipated
future trends. (Paragraph 43)
3. The Minister's
lack of awareness that private FSPs have concerns about police
expenditure on forensic science is worrying. The Government must
now ensure that the views of private FSPs are sufficiently taken
into account during the transition period; it runs the risk otherwise
of having unrealistic expectations about what private FSPs can
deliver in a shrinking market. (Paragraph 44)
4. In our view, collecting
data on police expenditure is not at odds with enabling the police
to have operational independence. We are concerned that neither
ACPO nor the Home Office could provide us with the full cost of
internal forensic science activities. We recommend that ACPO and
the Home Office gather and publish data on the full police expenditure
on internal forensic activities, including capital, training and
skills, forensic testing and administration over the last five
years, and continue to publish this information in future. If
the Government's policy of a market in forensic science services
is to operate effectively, it is important that the full costs
of internal forensic expenditure are fully and accurately reported.
In addition, we consider that the statement given to Parliament
on 14 December 2010 was inadequate as the information on police
expenditure, on which it was based, was incomplete. (Paragraph
49)
5. Given the marked
decrease in the external forensics market in 2010-11, it is reasonable
to expect that the market may shrink to £110 million or less
before 2015, particularly given that spending cuts have yet to
bite on police budgets. While we agree with the Minister that
it would be wrong to speculate, we recommend that the Government
re-evaluates the future of the forensics market in light of the
cuts to police budgets and planned withdrawal of the FSS from
the market. (Paragraph 52)
National Forensic Framework Agreement
6. It
is our understanding that some areas of forensic science provision,
particularly complex, interpretive analyses, are not profitable
under the current procurement strategy, although this does not
make them less important to criminal justice. In considering the
proposed closure of the FSS and development of a future procurement
strategy, the Government must recognise and address this issue.
(Paragraph 62)
7. The risks of fragmentation
cannot be managed if the extent of fragmentation and the reasons
for it are unknown. It is the responsibility of the police to
monitor whether fragmentation, whereby crime exhibits from the
same crime are sent to different FSPs, has been occurring. ACPO
and the NPIA (or its successor) should conduct a survey of police
forces to determine the extent to which fragmentation has occurred
under the National Forensic Framework Agreement, and reasons for
any fragmentation. This should be fed into future forensic procurement
frameworks and continually monitored. (Paragraph 68)
8. The expiration
of the current procurement strategy provides an ideal opportunity
for the NPIA, ACPO and the Home Office to review the successes
and failures of the National Forensic Framework Agreement. We
recommend that the following questions are answered and resolved:
(i) whether all forensic services, particularly complex interpretations,
are adequately valued; and (ii) whether the procurement strategy
has encouraged fragmentation of casework. (Paragraph 72)
Financial position of the FSS
9. The
Government announcement that the FSS was losing £2 million
a month was not the full story. It should have been made clear
that (i) the figure did not take into account the savings expected
to be delivered by the transformation programme; (ii) it did not
account for potential further declines in business; and (iii)
while some monthly losses may have been £2 million, the average
monthly loss over the past year was lower. As a result, evaluation
of the proposal to close the FSS from the taxpayer's perspective
was difficult. (Paragraph 80)
10. We are dismayed
that the FSS was not privy to information on the forensics market.
There has clearly been a persistent failure to communicate information
to the FSS about the market environment in which it was expected
to find a way to thrive. The PwC report on the state of the forensics
marketplace and figures on police expenditure should have been
available. (Paragraph 86)
11. If the Government
wants a competitive market in forensic services it must ensure
that the market is not distorted by the police customer increasingly
becoming the competitor. Otherwise the ambition for a truly competitive
market is fundamentally undermined. We consider that the Government's
ambitions for fully privatised forensic science provision are
jeopardised by its complacent attitude towards police forensic
expenditure. (Paragraph 91)
12. We are concerned
that there are no measures in place to curb further in-sourcing.
We recommend that the Government introduce measures to ensure
that the police do not further in-source forensic science services
that are already available from external providers through the
National Forensic Framework Agreement. Regulations should apply
to any successor frameworks. We disagree with the Minister that
the FSS transition period may not be the right time to put these
measures in place - given the fragility and uncertain future of
the market it is the ideal time to do this. (Paragraph 92)
Quality standards and impartiality
13. In
the transition period to 2012, the Government must ensure that
none of the FSS's work is transferred to a private forensic science
provider that has not achieved accreditation to ISO 17025. (Paragraph
100)
14. We have serious
concerns about the potential transfer of the FSS's work to non-accredited
police laboratories. We agree with the FSR that the transfer of
work from the FSS to a non-accredited police environment would
be highly undesirable, as this would pose significant and unacceptable
risks to criminal justice. If a sufficient match in quality standards
cannot be met elsewhere, the Government should, at the least,
reconsider the 2012 closure deadline. The needs of criminal justice
must come before considerations of financial convenience. (Paragraph
109)
15. We have seen no
evidence to suggest that private forensic science providers would
be less impartial than the FSS, but they must be accredited to
at least the same standards. (Paragraph 114)
16. No quality standard
or code of conduct can guarantee impartiality. However, we consider
that adherence to ISO 17025 and the Codes of Conduct being developed
by the Forensic Science Regulator would be a good place for police
forensic laboratories to start. Compliance with ISO 17025 is already
planned, albeit on a generous timetable. We recommend that existing
police forensic labs also commit to the FSR's Codes of Conduct.
(Paragraph 123)
17. We agree that
a nebulous fear or perception of impartiality is insufficient
reason to condemn police in-sourcing of forensics, although the
perception of impartiality is crucial to the courts and public
confidence in the criminal justice system. However, given that
so few police forensic laboratories have been accredited to ISO
17025, a standard that demands a level of impartiality, we must
express concerns about the risks to impartiality of forensic evidence
produced by non-accredited police laboratories. We reiterate our
previous recommendation that if the FSS closes, transfer of work
from the FSS to a non-accredited police environment would be highly
undesirable. (Paragraph 124)
18. The introduction
of bias based on selective forensic examination of exhibits, arising
from the need to make savings is a different risk. We are concerned
that the risk may be exacerbated by recent cuts to police budgets
and we urge the Government to monitor the situation. Police forces
must work closely with forensic science providers to ensure that
any selectivity is scientifically justified. (Paragraph 125)
The Forensic Science Regulator
19. The
Forensic Science Regulator (FSR) has a crucial role in ensuring
high quality standards are maintained, and this role will become
more important during the transition period. It is time for the
Forensic Science Regulator to have statutory powers to enforce
compliance with the quality standards and Codes of Conduct that
he has developed through what appears to be a robust process.
The Government should bring forward proposals to provide the FSR
with statutory powers immediately. (Paragraph 129)
20. It is unacceptable
that the Home Office failed to consult with the Forensic Science
Regulator when considering the future of the FSS, as he was a
key stakeholder who could have offered a useful, independent perspective.
(Paragraph 131)
FSS work, staff and archives
21. We
are deeply concerned about the practicalities of transferring
the FSS's work and staff to other FSPs by the transition deadline
of March 2012. The FSS Transition Board must ensure that, whatever
the outcome, forensic scientists employed by the FSS are retained
within the profession and within the UK to the benefit of the
criminal justice system. Transfer of staff to other forensic science
providers must be conducted under TUPE regulations and in addition,
care is needed to ensure that pension provision is adequately
protected. (Paragraph 146)
22. We cannot see
any benefits to breaking up the FSS's archives, including case
files, retained materials, research and validation papers and
the intellectual capability supporting the archive. Whatever the
future of the FSS, the existing archives must physically remain
as a single, accessible resource, supported by suitably qualified
and experienced experts. This would be in the interests of the
criminal justice system. (Paragraph 159)
23. There may be benefits
in developing the FSS's archives further into a comprehensive
national resource. The custodianship of the archives should be
agreed in the context of the NPIA's wind-down as well as the FSS
transition. We recommend that private FSPs contribute suitable
documents and materials to what we would term the "National
Forensic Archives". (Paragraph 160)
24. Section 17 of
the Criminal Appeal Act in 1995 may have been sufficient to enable
the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) to obtain materials
when the FSS, as a public body, was the main provider of forensic
services to police forces. Although this appears not to have been
a problem to date, the increasing penetration of private FSPs
into the forensics marketplace means the CCRC's statutory powers
are becoming increasingly ineffectual. Whatever the future of
the FSS, we recommend the Government consider extending the powers
of the CCRC to obtain materials from private forensic science
providers. (Paragraph 165)
Forensic science research and development
25. A
Departmental Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) has unique independence
and is therefore, rightly, expected to provide a crucial challenge
function to the Department. It may not be within the CSA's remit
to advise on legal and commercial matters, but it is certainly
within his remit to advise on scientific matters relating to the
closure of the FSS, a Home Office-funded centre of scientific
excellence. We consider the CSA's satisfaction with his exclusion
from the decision-making process and his failure to challenge
the decision to be unacceptable. This is a further demonstration
of the ongoing weak scientific culture in the Home Office. (Paragraph 171)
26. We are concerned
that no formal assessment was made of the impact of closing down
the FSS on forensic science R&D before the decision was made
and announced. We have not seen any evidence of an informal assessment.
We are very concerned and disappointed that the Chief Scientific
Adviser to the Home Office was not consulted prior to the decision
to wind down the FSS. (Paragraph 175)
27. We were given
various reasons for the timing of the Home Office Review of R&D.
The Chief Scientific Adviser implied that one reason may have
been a preservation of confidentiality and that the Review may
have been prompted by the attention drawn by the closure of the
FSS. The Minister told us that a lack of time was the driver.
The reasons for the timing should be clarified. (Paragraph 176)
28. The relationship
between recommendations made by the Home Office Review of R&D
and the work of the FSS Transition Board, set up to oversee the
wind-down of the FSS, must be made clear. (Paragraph 177)
29. Although private
FSPs invest in R&D, it is probably unreasonable to expect
private companies to increase their investment in some areas of
forensic science research, particularly in fundamental research,
at a time of market uncertainty. Private companies do, however,
have a key role to play in development and application of research
and ongoing validation of methods. (Paragraph 194)
30. Although we are
hesitant to call for increased research funding in the current
economic climate, the case for increased public funding specifically
for forensic science research is compelling. We consider that
the Home Office and Research Councils have an interest in the
health of the forensic science research base and should develop
a new national research budget for forensic science. The views
of the forensic science community should be sought when determining
the size and scope of the budget and details of its administration.
(Paragraph 195)
31. The FSS appears
to have worked in a manner that was not conducive to collaboration
and coordination of research efforts. The pressure to act as a
commercial organisation appears to have been a key factor. (Paragraph
200)
32. Coordination and
collaborations leading to exchange of knowledge are vital to the
health of any scientific discipline. We expect that the Home Office
Review of R&D will examine this matter in more detail and
that it will bring forward detailed recommendations on this. (Paragraph
201)
33. Although we acknowledge
the difficulties in tracking the movements of scientists in the
UK and abroad, it is important that the impact of the FSS's closure
on its forensic scientists is monitored. The FSS and Government
should ensure that the first destination of all forensic scientists
that are made redundant or leave the FSS as a result of the proposed
wind down are recorded. We request an update on this matter by
June 2012. (Paragraph 207)
The decision to close the FSS
34. We
must state our disappointment at the historical inadequacies in
government decision-making that brought the FSS to its current
dire financial situation. While we have been critical of the current
Government's actions, it must be put on record that we consider
much of the responsibility for the current problems facing the
FSS to lie with previous administrations. The changes made to
the FSS since it became an Executive Agency in 1991, coupled with
a subsequent lack of Government understanding of the nature of
the growing forensics market, meant that problems inevitably arose.
(Paragraph 208)
35. It appears that
the Attorney General was first engaged only through the clearance
processes, that is, the process by which Government-wide confirmation
was obtained, after the initial decision had been made by the
Home Office to wind down the FSS. We are surprised that the Director
of Public Prosecutions, the head of the CPS, was not directly
consulted. The Criminal Cases Review Commission does not appear
to have been involved at all. This is unsatisfactory and unjustifiable
given the impact the closure of the FSS could have on the work
of the criminal justice system. It should not need to be stated
that forensic science is a service for criminal justice, not just
policing. (Paragraph 215)
36. We are pleased
that the FSS appears to have had ongoing engagement with the new
Government, but concerned that these discussions were limited
to senior management and did not involve less senior staff and
the trade unions. It is disappointing that the staff of the FSS
should have been so disempowered and disengaged from the process.
(Paragraph 219)
37. The Government
should clarify whether the NPIA was consulted on the decision
to close the FSS before the decision was made, and when. (Paragraph
221)
38. We are disappointed
that the Home Office carried out minimal consultation before making
its decision on the future of the FSS. There is a tangible difference
between consulting before a decision has been made and consulting
on transition arrangements after the decision has been made. It
should not have been difficult for the Government to seek the
views of key parties other than ACPO. With such limited consultation,
and particularly the lack of scientific input, it is difficult
for us to have confidence that the Government fully considered
all available options for the future of the FSS and the likely
impacts of its closure. (Paragraph 222)
39. We have serious
concerns about the role of the Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA)
at the Home Office and the limited information on which the decision
to close the FSS was based. We do not consider that the Government's
decision fully took into account the best evidence available and
we are concerned that the CSA was disengaged from the decision-making
process. We recommend that the Government Office for Science review
whether there is a systemic problem with the Home Office's use
of scientific evidence in policy-making. (Paragraph 223)
Costs of closing the FSS
40. The
Government should clarify how costs associated with the FSS's
transition were originally calculated, particularly given that
the transition process was, and remains, not fully known. If it
emerges through the transition process that additional public
money is required for the wind-down of the FSS, including from
sources other than the Home Office, this information should be
published with an explanation. (Paragraph 230)
41. The Government's
explanations of the £70 million increase in provisions for
the Crime and Policing Group lacked detail. We request a full
financial breakdown of the £70 million provisions as well
as an update at the end of the financial year on how much the
wind-down has actually cost the Government in total. (Paragraph 231)
Alternatives to closure
42. We
agree with the Government that allowing the FSS to go into administration
would have been undesirable, not only for the criminal justice
system, but the employees of the FSS too. (Paragraph 233)
Final conclusions
43. There
are many factors to take into consideration when determining what
has caused the dire financial position of the FSS. We consider
the most significant factor to be the shrinking forensics market,
driven by increasing police in-sourcing of forensic science and
a forensic procurement framework that drove down prices and did
not adequately recognise the value of complex forensic services.
(Paragraph 239)
44. The stabilisation
of the external forensics market is now of crucial importance.
For this to be achieved, the Government must do two things. First,
further police in-sourcing of forensic science must be curbed.
Second, the National Forensic Framework Agreement, and any successor
framework, must be revised to reflect that some forensic science
services cannot be commoditised easily into products and ensure
that the true costs of forensic services are reimbursed to providers.
Without stability through regulation, a properly competitive market
cannot be realised. A shrinking market provides no incentive for
further investment or growth from any forensic science provider.
The success of forensic science providers and their willingness
to invest further in forensic science will be threatened if action
is not taken to stabilise the market. (Paragraph 240)
45. The process whereby
the Government reached a decision on the future of the FSS was
taken on legal and commercial bases. If legal and commercial grounds
were the only relevant considerations, the Government's decision
to close the FSS would be reasonable. However, it is clear that
such a decision should not be taken on purely legal and commercial
grounds. (Paragraph 241)
46. The Government
did not consider enough evidence in its decision-making. The impacts
on research and development, on the capacity of private providers
to absorb the FSS's market share, on the future of the archives
and on the wider impacts to the criminal justice system appear
to have been hastily overlooked in favour of the financial bottom
line. Examining the possible impacts of a decision after the decision
has been made contradicts the concept of evidence informing policy.
(Paragraph 242)
47. Proper consideration
should now be given to what resources might be irretrievably lost
to the UK with the closure of the FSS, including the FSS's archives
and the intellectual wealth residing within its scientists. We
have seen no detailed plan outlining the transition and the future
of the FSS's staff, archives, work and assets. (Paragraph 243)
48. While there would
be merits in retaining the FSS as a completely public agency of
the Home Office that focuses on R&D, training of forensic
scientists, establishing quality standards and maintaining archives,
we are not convinced that the separation of forensic science research
and provision would necessarily be the ideal solution, because
research efforts should feed into and improve service provision.
In response to this report we ask for the views of the Government
and Transition Board on this matter. (Paragraph 244)
49. The transition
deadline of March 2012 is extremely challenging and we are not
confident that an orderly transition can be achieved by this date.
The Government should extend this deadline by at least six months.
Extending the transition deadline would enable the Government
to consult on, and determine, what its wider strategy for forensic
science should be. The FSS should be supported during this period.
The FSS transition should be carefully monitored to ensure that
it does not further contribute to market instability or lead to
a diminution of service to the criminal justice system. Continuing
to support the FSS during this period may add additional costs
to the public purse, but we consider that it should be seen as
a price worth paying. (Paragraph 245)
| 
