1 Introduction
My Government will [...] enable the construction
of a high-speed railway network.[1]
High-speed policy development
1. UK policy on high-speed rail has come a long way
in four years. The Rail White Paper 2007 made no proposals for
new high-speed rail lines:
[... ] it would not be prudent to commit now to 'all-or-nothing'
projects, such as network-wide electrification or a high-speed
line, for which the longer-term benefits are currently uncertain
and which could delay tackling the current strategic priorities
such as capacity.[2]
The view of the then Government was that high-speed
rail was a solution looking for a problem.[3]
Our predecessor Committee expressed its deep disappointment with
this policy but noted some subsequent signs of movement in the
then Government's position.[4]
2. Less than two years later, in January 2009, a
new Secretary of State for Transport[5]
announced an investigation into a high-speed line between London
and the West Midlands and potentially beyond the West Midlands.
This formed part of a statement on major transport infrastructure
measures, including a third runway at London Heathrow Airport
and a £6bn programme of managed motorways. The rail policy
shift was justified on the basis that medium-term priorities were
being addressed and that long-term planning for expansion needed
to begin.[6] The high-speed
rail policy was supported by all three major parties; the only
significant policy differences seemed to be over how soon it could
be built, the extent of the network and how Heathrow should be
served.[7] In March 2010,
shortly before the General Election, the Government published
its conclusions, based on the feasibility study by High Speed
2 (HS2) Ltd, [8]
in the White Paper High Speed Rail.[9]
This found a good case for high-speed rail and identified
its preferred route for a line between London and the West Midlands.
The case for direct links to Heathrow and to the existing high-speed
line to the Continent (now known as HS1) were not clear cut and
further studies were commissioned.[10]
3. The Coalition Government of May 2010 has pursued
this proposal with equal vigour. Its Programme for Government
included a commitment to developing a high-speed rail network
(though not necessarily HS2), highlighting the low-carbon
benefits:
We will establish a high speed rail network as part
of our programme of measures to fulfil our joint ambitions for
creating a low carbon economy. Our vision is of a truly national
high speed rail network for the whole of Britain. Given financial
constraints, we will have to achieve this in phases.[11]
The Department for Transport (DfT) subsequently made
delivery of this commitment the first priority within its departmental
business plan.[12] Following
further detailed work, in February 2011 the then Secretary of
State for Transport, Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP,[13]
launched a major public consultation exercise on this Government's
proposal for HS2.[14]
Remit for HS2 Ltd
4. HS2 Ltd was established as a Government company
to examine the case and develop proposals for a new high-speed
railway line between London and the West Midlands, and potentially
beyond. Its remit was to identify a route between London and the
West Midlands with the primary aims of increasing passenger capacity
on the corridor and optimising journey times. It was a requirement
of the remit that the route should include an interchange between
HS2, the Great Western Main Line and Crossrail, with convenient
access to Heathrow. The nature and scope of the interchange were
for HS2 Ltd to advise on. A further requirement was that there
should be no intermediate stations between this interchange station
and the West Midlands. It was for HS2 Ltd to advise on whether
stations should be city centre or parkway or both. The remit also
invited HS2 Ltd to consider how transport and land use planning
could be properly integrated in respect of the new line, particularly
in relation to housing and economic regeneration in the West Midlands.
The remit required the company to "pay close attention"
to the environmental impacts of the new line.[15]
The HS2 proposal
5. The proposal is for a new, dedicated "Y"-shaped
high-speed rail network, initially between London and the West
Midlands (Phase I) and then with "legs" to Manchester
and Leeds (Phase II). The London-West Midlands line would run
to the west of the current West Coast Main Line (WCML), bisecting
the Chiltern Hills, with a connection to the WCML north of Birmingham.
New stations serving HS2 Phase I would be constructed at:
- London Eustonrequiring
a complete rebuild of the existing station;
- Old Oak Common, four miles west of Eustonto
provide an interchange with Crossrail, the Heathrow Express and
the Great Western Main Line;
- Birmingham International interchangefor
the National Exhibition Centre, Birmingham International Airport,
the existing rail station and the M42 catchment, and
- Birmingham City Centrein Birmingham's
Eastside district, on the site of the old Curzon Street station.
At the time of the Government's consultation and
our inquiry, route proposals for and evaluation of the new lines
to Manchester and Leeds had not been published.[16]
A link to HS1 (from Old Oak Common, via the North London Line)
would be constructed in Phase I; a spur or loop to Heathrow is
proposed as part of Phase II but no route or station details have
been made public.
6. Up to 18 trains per hour, each carrying up to
1,100 passengers[17]
and operating at speeds of up to 250 mph, are planned to run between
these cities and serve other destinations via links to the existing
"classic" rail network. HS2 would reduce journey times
between London Euston and central Birmingham from 84 to 49 minutes.
Phase II would bring Manchester and Leeds within 80 minutes of
London; times to Glasgow and Edinburgh would be reduced by one
hour.[18] The Government
has estimated the total cost of the scheme at £32bn (2009
prices). £750m was allocated for preparatory work in the
Spending Review 2010. The construction cost for Phase I (London-West
Midlands) alone is estimated at £16.8bn.[19]
Timetable
7. The Government hopes to open the line between
London and the West Midlands in 2026, with lines to Manchester
and Leeds opening in 2032-2033.[20]
This requires legislation in the form of a hybrid bill. For reasons
of practicality, the Government is proposing to seek approval
for only the London-Birmingham phase initially. It has set the
following provisional timetable for Phase I, subject to the outcome
of the consultation:
- February-July 2011: Public
consultation on the strategic case for high-speed rail and the
details of the London-West Midlands route;
- December 2011: Decision by Secretary of State
for Transport on the outcome of the consultation;
- December 2011-September 2013: Completion of outline
engineering design, Environmental Impact Assessment and Environmental
Statement, and
- October 2013-May 2015: Take hybrid bill through
Parliament.
The DfT would propose to start formal public consultation
on Phase II in January 2014 and engineering design, environmental
impact assessment and preparation of the second hybrid bill in
January 2015.[21]
Public opinion
8. The Government's proposal for HS2 has generated
strong reactions, both for and against.[22]
The rail industry has increasingly backed HS2, albeit with some
reservations about the possible implications for other rail investment.
National business organisations have also generally backed the
proposal.[23] Local authorities
and business organisations in the West Midlands, the north of
England[24] and Scotland
have, on the whole, enthusiastically backed the scheme, with some
of them joining the Yes to HS2 campaign.[25]
9. Further south, 18 local authorities, including
Staffordshire, Coventry, Warwickshire, Leicestershire and Hillingdon,
have opposed the scheme under the "51m" coalition led
by Buckinghamshire County Council.[26]
Many local "stop HS2" residents groups have sprung up
along the line the route, forming the Action Groups Against High
Speed Two (AGAHST) federation.[27]
Most environmental groups are supportive of high-speed rail in
principle but have raised concerns about, if not outright objections
to, HS2.
10. The position of local authorities in London is
more ambivalent. The Mayor of London supports HS2 "in principle"
but believes that, once Phase II is operational, London Underground
will be unable to accommodate the additional passengers using
Euston station without the construction of a new underground line.[28]
The London Borough of Camden opposes HS2 due to the impact on
the Euston area.[29]
By contrast, the boroughs of Hammersmith and Fulham and Newham
are strong supporters due to the regeneration potential of stations
at Old Oak Common and Stratford International.[30]
11. Professional and academic commentators are divided
in their views on HS2 but many have questioned the Government's
appraisal techniques and the claims regarding economic rebalancing.[31]
Although there is cross-party support for HS2, it is not universally
supported by Members of Parliament. Unusually for a select committee
inquiry, we have received correspondence and evidence from members
of the Government, including evidence from one Member of the Cabinet
drawing our attention to correspondence opposing HS2.[32]
The Government's case for HS2
12. In launching the consultation[33]
on HS2, Mr Hammond said:
I believe that a national high-speed rail network
from London to Birmingham, with onward legs to Leeds and Manchester,
could transform Britain's competitiveness as profoundly as the
coming of the railways in the 19th century. It would reshape Britain's
economic geography, helping bridge the north-south divide through
massive improvements in journey times and better connections between
cities - slashing almost an hour off the trip from London to Manchester.
But the proposed high-speed rail network would do
more. It would address Britain's future transport capacity challenge-providing
a huge uplift in long-distance capacity and relieving pressure
on overstretched conventional lines. It would bring around £44
billion of net monetised benefits and support the creation of
thousands of new jobs, as well as delivering unquantifiable strategic
benefits. And it would help us to build a sustainable economy-by
encouraging millions of people out of cars and off planes onto
trains. Our competitors already recognise the huge benefits of
high-speed rail and are pressing ahead with ambitious plans. Britain
cannot afford to be left behind.[34]
In essence, the Government believes that substantial
additional rail capacity is required, that a new high-speed rail
network is the best way to provide it and that this will bring
substantial economic and environmental benefits. Of all the justifications
for HS2 advanced by the Government (transport, economic and environmental),
Mr Hammond said that he "start[s] with capacity."[35]
The Government's case is set out at length in the consultation
documents[36] and its
written evidence.[37]
We have examined key aspects of it in the course of our inquiry.
The case against
13. The major critics of the HS2 proposal claim that:
- the lack of context and the
absence of cohesive plans for transport strategy generally (and
the rail network more specifically), mean that there can be no
certainty that high-speed rail is the most pressing transport
need facing the country;
- the opportunity cost is high: other schemes offering
better value for money will be passed over;
- a new line is not needed: sufficient passenger
capacity can be provided by lengthening trains and improving existing
lines;
- the economic case is flawed and the benefits
are overstated;
- the claims for economic regeneration and rebalancing
are unfounded;
- the new line will damage local environments and
has little or no carbon reduction benefit;
- the proposal to operate 18 trains per hour is
technically unproven, and
- the proposal is rushed and alternative routes
should be considered.
The arguments are explored in more detail later in
this report.
Our inquiry
14. The decision on whether and how to proceed with
the HS2 proposal is of major economic, social and environmental
long-term import to Britain. We recognise that there are valid,
strongly held views and technical expertise on both sides of the
debate. We have received over 200 submissions, most of which we
have published, as well as petitions, letters and emails, expressing
views or questioning HS2. In addition, we have taken oral evidence
from many experts and representatives of interest groups. In order
to observe the impacts of established high-speed rail systems,
we visited Lille, Paris and Frankfurt, travelling by high-speed
rail, and met with business people, politicians, rail industry
professionals and economic development practitioners. We were
assisted throughout the inquiry by our specialist rail advisers
Bob Linnard, a former Director of Rail Strategy at DfT, and Richard
Goldson, a former non-executive board member at the Office of
Rail Regulation.[38]
Because of the technical nature of some of the material, we commissioned
consultants Oxera to assess the business case for HS2 and to advise
us. [39] We
published this assessment before the first oral evidence session,
in order to assist the public debate, and include their report
as Annex 1 to our Report. We are grateful to all those who assisted
us in this inquiry.
15. Our inquiry has dealt with the strategic case
for high-speed rail. If the Government decides to proceed with
HS2, it would seek the necessary powers through the hybrid bill
process, as happened with HS1 and Crossrail. A hybrid bill would
allow those affected by the proposals to petition Parliament directly
to seek amendments or assurances and undertaking. It would provide
the opportunity for detailed matters, including those of environmental
impact and mitigation, to be addressed.
1 HM Queen, 25 May 2010 http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/queens-speech-high-speed-rail/ Back
2
DfT, Rail White Paper, Delivering a Sustainable Railway,
Cm 7176, July 2007, p 9 Back
3
Oral evidence to the Transport Committee: Delivering a Sustainable
Railway: a 30-year strategy for the railway? Tenth Report
of Session 2007-08, HC 219, Qq 810-814 Back
4
Transport Committee, Delivering a Sustainable Railway: a 30-year
strategy for the railway? Tenth Report of Session 2007-08,
HC 219, para 28 Back
5
Rt Hon Geoff Hoon MP Back
6
DfT, Britain's Transport Infrastructure: High Speed Two,
January 2009, p 11 Back
7
For example, speeches by Lord Adonis, Teresa Villiers and Norman
Baker at the Transport Times "Time for High Speed
Rail" conference, London, 25 March 2009. See also HC Deb,
11 March 2010, c450. Back
8
High Speed 2 (HS2) Ltd is a company set up by the DfT to advise
the Government on high-speed rail. It was incorporated on 14 January
2009 and was subsequently classified as an Executive Non-Departmental
Body. Back
9
DfT, Rail White Paper, High Speed Rail, Cm 7827, March
2010 Back
10
DfT, High Speed Rail Access to Heathrow: A Report to the Secretary
of State for Transport by Rt Hon the Lord Mawhinney Kt,
July 2010 Back
11
HM Government: The Coalition: our programme for government,
20 May 2010, p 31 Back
12
DfT, Business Plan 2010-11, November 2010, (updated May
2011) http://transparency.number10.gov.uk/transparency/srp/view-srp/39 Back
13
On 17 October 2011 Rt Hon Justine Greening MP replaced Rt Hon
Philip Hammond MP as Secretary of State for Transport. Back
14
DfT and HS2 Ltd, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future,
Consultation, February 2011 Back
15
Letter from Sir David Rowlands, Chairman, HS2 Ltd to Lord Adonis,
Minister of State for Transport, 13 February 2009 Back
16
HS2 Ltd is due to provide these to the Secretary of State before
the decision in December 2011. See letter from Philip Hammond
to HS2 Ltd 26 July 2011. Back
17
HS2 trains would be up to 400 metres long, comprising one or two
units each of 550 seats. Classic compatible trains would be shorter.
By comparison, a 9-car Virgin Trains Pendolino is approximately
225 metres in length. Back
18
DfT and HS2 Ltd, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future,
Consultation, February 2011, pp 19-20 Back
19
DfT, Economic Case for HS2, February 2011, p 37 Back
20
The overall construction timescale would be determined by the
Euston station works which would take seven to eight years. The
prospective opening dates are given in HS2 Consultation,
February 2011, pp 16 and 106. Mr Hammond said that the target
date for completion of the Y network was 2032 and he confirmed
that the legs to Manchester and Leeds would be built simultaneously.
See Q 535. Back
21
DfT, Business Plan 2010-11, November 2010, (updated May
2011) http://transparency.number10.gov.uk/transparency/srp/view-srp/39 Back
22
Qq 102-111. David Begg, Director of Yes to HS2, said that
he was concerned about the level of opposition and that he did
not believe it was inevitable that HS2 would go ahead. Back
23
David Frost, Director General of British Chambers of Commerce
is a strong supporter of HS2. The CBI, however, was unable to
provide written evidence or a witness for our inquiry. Back
24
Mr Hammond said that some of the strongest supporters of HS2 were
in Manchester, Q 540. Back
25
Ev 296 Back
26
Ev 154 Back
27
Ev 165 Back
28
Qq 164 and 172 Back
29
Ev 185 Back
30
Ev 119 and Ev w448 Back
31
See, for example, Professor Nash (Ev 115) and Professor Tomaney
(Ev 106). Ian Davidson, an expert on transport modelling, concluded
that the DfT's modelling was unsuitable for decision-making on
HS2. See Local Transport Today, 12 August 2011, p 1. Back
32
Ev w260, Rt Hon Cheryl Gillan MP, Secretary of State for Wales Back
33
The consultation was undertaken jointly by the DfT and HS2 Ltd.
Back
34
HC Deb, 28 February 2011, c15WS Back
35
Q 511-512 Back
36
http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/library/documents Back
37
Ev 249 Back
38
Bob Linnard and Richard Goldson made declarations of interests
which can be found in the formal minutes of the Transport Committee,
Session 2010-2012, Appendix B. Back
39
Annex 1: Oxera, Review of the Government's case for a High
Speed rail programme, Report prepared for the Transport Select
Committee, 20 June 2011. See also letter from HS2 Action Alliance
to Oxera, Ev 220. Back
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