Conclusions and recommendations
Government transport policy
1. The
absence of a transport strategy makes it hard to assess how HS2
relates to other major transport infrastructure schemes, regional
planning and wider objectives, such as bridging the north-south
divide. This seems to have deterred some groups, which might otherwise
have supported HS2, from doing so. The biggest single transport
investment proposed in this Parliament should be grounded in a
well thought-through strategic framework and we are disappointed
that the Government has not developed a strategy for transport,
particularly after it rejected our earlier recommendation to publish
a White Paper on transport and the economy. (Paragraph 20)
2. The Government
is due to publish several important policy documents soon, including
a White Paper on its proposals for controlling costs in the rail
industry; a 'sustainable framework' for aviation; a National Policy
Statement for road and rail networks; and a revised National Policy
Statement for Ports. The development of what could emerge as separate
strategies for rail and aviation again highlights the absence
of an overall transport strategy: this is a lacuna which must
be filled. We recommend that if the Government decides to proceed
with HS2 it should, in announcing that decision, set out in more
detail than is available in the DfT's business plan not only why
HS2 is desirable but also how it fits within an overall transport
strategy. We also recommend that the forthcoming White Paper on
rail and the sustainable framework for aviation fully reflect
the impact on both modes of the creation of a high-speed rail
network in the UK. This country has often failed to invest in
transport infrastructure because all party agreement could not
be reached. We have one of the lowest motorway densities in Western
Europe, insufficient airport capacity in the south east with inadequate
road and rail connections and our rail network is mainly a legacy
of Victorian investment. Having all-party support should be seen
as an advantage for this scheme. (Paragraph 21)
3. It would be unacceptable
and counterproductive if investment in HS2 led to a diminution
of investment in other parts of the rail network. The previous
Secretary of State for Transport has told us that, assuming the
costs are spread over some 17 years, HS2 is affordable and that
current levels of investment in the "classic" network
can be maintained into the future. We expect the Government to
uphold this statement. The Government has the opportunity to secure
future levels of rail spending in the next spending review period
by means of the commitments it makes in the forthcoming High Level
Output Specification and Statement of Funds Available for Control
Period 5 (2014-19). These are due by July 2012 and will be an
acid test of the Government's commitment to investment in today's
railway as well as in high-speed rail. (Paragraph 26)
4. We recommend that,
if the Government decides to go ahead with HS2, it should, in
announcing that decision, publish a summary of the financial case
including the assumptions which persuade Ministers that the scheme
will be affordable alongside sustained investment in the classic
network. We consider that this could usefully include details
of the projected capital and revenue expenditure profiles; how
these compare with assumed DfT spend profiles for the rest of
the rail network and for the rest of transport; and any underlying
assumptions about financial contributions to HS2 from non-DfT
sources. We further recommend that alongside the summary financial
case the Government should announce its priorities for funding
in Control Period 5 (2014-19) as part of its High Level Output
Specification and Statement of Funds Available in order to meet
anticipated passenger and freight capacity constraints on the
classic network up to the projected start of HS2 in 2026. (Paragraph
27)
Meeting future transport needs
5. Demand
management, such as peak and off peak pricing, is already an integral
element in the way that train services are planned and operated.
It is, however, in our view, largely a tactical approach and not
a long-term solution to serious mismatches of supply and demand.
If capacity is seriously constrained, growing demand can be managed
only by means of ever higher ticket prices or increasing restrictions
such as compulsory seat reservations, neither of which are acceptable
as a long-term approach to rail service provision. (Paragraph
43)
6. The debate on capacity
seems to us to reveal two contrasting views. On one view, rising
demand on the West Coast corridor is essentially a problem, to
be tackled by least-cost incremental improvements coupled with
measures to suppress demand. On the other view, rising demand
is, for strategic reasons, to be welcomed and indeed fostered.
As noted in Chapter 2, we consider that the Government needs to
explain more clearly this strategic case and in particular why
such arguments do not apply to road and air transport. Provided
this is done, we support the step change that a high-speed rail
link between London, the Midlands, the North and Scotland could
bring to the capacity, quality, reliability and frequency of rail
services between our major cities, and to those served by the
existing WCML. Whilst the alternatives proposed by groups such
as 51m offer substantial additional passenger capacity, they are
not of the same scale as HS2. The rapid growth in passenger numbers
over the past 15 years shows the need to plan on a larger scale
and for the long term. We do not wish our successors to be faced
with a situation in ten years' time where demand has continued
to grow but insufficient time remains to provide the necessary
capacity. We call on the Government to set out a clear and comprehensive
long-term strategy for transport and the place of high-speed rail
within it. (Paragraph 44)
Economic impacts
7. The
evidence we have received and our visit to France and Germany
lead us to two conclusions about the potential of HS2 to stimulate
national and regional growth. First, it is obvious that the economic
impacts of high-speed rail can vary and are not easily predicted:
only time will tell whether or not HS2 will, for example, help
to rebalance the economy and reduce the north-south divide. Our
judgement is that HS2 could indeed be the catalyst for these economic
benefits. Our second conclusion, from the experience of France
and elsewhere, is that if high-speed rail is to realise its full
potential the Government's plans for HS2 must be accompanied by
complementary regional and local strategies for transport, housing,
skills and employment. Under current Government policies, the
responsibility for producing such plans rests with local economic
partnerships, integrated transport authorities and combinations
of such bodies. Support—not least with funding—will
be needed from the Government. We call upon the Government to
recognise this as a priority. (Paragraph 58)
8. The case for investing
in a high-speed line between London and the West Midlands depends
largely on the assumption that the full Y network will be completed.
Whilst we can see that the benefits of a more extensive high-speed
rail network, embracing Manchester and Leeds, are likely to be
greater than those of the London-West Midlands line alone, it
is disappointing that even basic information on the Y network,
such as the number and location of stations, was not available
during the public consultation or during our inquiry. We believe
that there should be an urgent strategic appraisal of phase II
before a final decision on phase I is taken. It is also disappointing
that as a major justification for HS2 phases I and II is the rebalancing
of the economy, a full assessment of the case for building north
to south has not been undertaken. This work should be carried
out as a priority. (Paragraph 63)
9. A high-speed line
offers potential economic and strategic benefits that a conventional
line does not. These include a dramatic shift in connectivity
between the UK's major cities and improved access from the regions
to Heathrow and continental Europe. These are in addition to the
time savings and crowding benefits outlined in the Government's
economic case. It seems clear, therefore, that if a new line is
to be built, it should be a high-speed line. It is possible however,
that very high speed (250 mph) may have been given an undue emphasis
as a result of the particular appraisal method used as part of
the economic case. It may be that a high-speed line operating
at less than 250 mph may offer greater opportunities for noise
and environmental impact mitigation, as well as an opportunity
to follow existing transport corridors. We are concerned that
the decision to build a 250 mph line has prematurely ruled out
other route options such as building HS2 alongside an existing
motorway corridor such as the M40 or M1/M6. (Paragraph 68)
10. The economic case
for HS2 has a double importance. Not only does it purport to assess
whether HS2 is a good investment, but it also significantly influences
the scheme design. The robustness of the methodology is therefore
critical. We note the debate over whether it is appropriate to
attach so much weight to travel time savings and whether other
approaches, including a higher valuation of reduced crowding or
impacts on Gross Value Added, should be used as well or instead.
We conclude that it is disappointing that a major strategic scheme,
with the potential to grow and rebalance the economy and to address
major capacity issues, is being designed and assessed to a large
extent on the basis of the value of travel time savings, which
are not universally accepted. When HS2 Ltd provides the updated
economic case to the Secretary of State for Transport later this
year, it should provide a comparative assessment on the basis
of reduced crowding, with a lower value attached to time savings.
The implications for the scheme design should be made explicit.
This should also be applied to any assessment of alternatives
to HS2. (Paragraph 69)
Environmental impacts
11. The
Government needs to make clear how HS2 fits into its wider aviation
strategy. It is not clear that even the Y-network will substantially
reduce demand for domestic aviation. We note that Lord Mawhinney's
report into whether Heathrow should be on the high-speed network
only found against the idea when assessing it on the basis of
it ceasing at Birmingham: "… a direct high-speed link
to Heathrow fully funded from public expenditure, in the context
of a high-speed rail network extending only to the Midlands, is
not likely to provide a good return on the public expenditure
entailed." We would encourage the Government to reassess
this proposal based upon the assumption that the network will
extend to Manchester and Leeds. (Paragraph 76)
12. Some supporters
of HS2 have argued that it would have substantial carbon-reduction
benefits. These claims do not stand up to scrutiny. At best, HS2
has the potential to make a small contribution to the Government's
carbon-reduction targets. Given the scale of the expenditure and
the official assessment, HS2 should not be promoted as a carbon-reduction
scheme. However, if the Government's primary aim is to meet and
reinforce demand for inter-urban travel, HS2 will produce less
carbon than an expanded motorway network or a reliance on domestic
aviation. It is important that the Government makes rapid progress
with reducing carbon emissions from UK electricity generation.
(Paragraph 77)
13. We recognise that
HS2 is likely to have substantial impacts on the countryside,
communities and people along its route. It is unfortunate that
a direct route between a station to the west of London and the
West Midlands crosses the Chilterns AONB—a national asset.
Because detailed assessments have not been undertaken, it is difficult
to be clear about the precise scale of the impacts or the effectiveness
of mitigation measures. Our visit to the Arup sound laboratory
suggests to us that noise impacts may be less than feared but
for other factors it is impossible to tell. We recommend that
the revised business plan for HS2 should take account of the Government's
new approach to economic appraisal, which places a monetary value
on natural capital. It should also make explicit whether this
approach would suggest changes to the alignment or design of the
route proposed by HS2 Ltd. We would encourage the Government to
place greater emphasis on following existing transport corridors.
(Paragraph 83)
14. It is disappointing
but perhaps unsurprising that DfT and HS2 Ltd have not been able
to reach agreement on technical issues with major objectors such
as 51m and those with statutory roles such as the Chilterns Conservation
Board and National Trust. We do not pretend that any consultation
process could have led to opposition melting away but some factual
issues might have been resolved and areas of disagreement narrowed.
It is also of concern that the Government intends to reach a decision
on whether to proceed with Phase I before information on the Y
network is published and before many of the environmental impacts
for both phases are clear. We recommend that no decision is taken
until such strategic information on Phase II is published, appraised
and consulted upon. (Paragraph 87)
15. What should have
been a serious and factually-based debate about how best to address
the transport, economic and environmental challenges of HS2 has
too often been reduced to name-calling and caricature: Luddites,
NIMBYs and white elephants fought out a battle of "jobs versus
lawns". We urge the Government to desist from disparaging
opponents of HS2 as NIMBYs and for both sides in the debate to
show respect for each other and to focus on the facts. (Paragraph
89)
The strategic route
16. The
Government should engage with Network Rail to identify whether
there are affordable options, including rolling stock, infrastructure
or timetable improvements, which would enable more peak-time capacity
to be provided for Milton Keynes and Northampton commuters in
the interim period. (Paragraph 94)
17. The implications
for the development of the classic rail network and service patterns
on it once HS2 is in operation have not been made sufficiently
clear. HS2 offers potential for many additional local and regional
services on the classic network. However, a lack of information
has caused concerns in cities such as Coventry and Stoke that
they will lose out. We recommend that the Government, in announcing
its decision on the HS2 consultation, provides a more explicit
and comprehensive statement of the likely patterns of services
on the classic network once HS2 is operational. (Paragraph 95)
18. We are concerned
that a Heathrow spur or loop, in addition to a main HS2 line,
may prove more costly than a single line via Heathrow and that
the proposed 2 trains per hour would not provide Heathrow with
a sufficiently frequent service. Moreover, no direct HS2 Heathrow
connection is planned until 2032 at earliest and the route was
not part of the public consultation. We note elsewhere the questions
that have been raised about the need for a HS2 station at Old
Oak Common. We recommend that the Government set out more clearly
for comparison the costs and benefits of routing HS2 via Heathrow
(and of making it the principal interchange to the west of London)
so that there can be a better understanding of the pros and cons
of different options. We also recommend that the Government makes
a clear statement about the status of possible complementary schemes
such as those which would link Heathrow to GWML from the west
or to Gatwick. It is unacceptable for debate on such major decisions
to be conducted through a series of nods and winks in the press.
(Paragraph 104)
19. The London end
of the HS2 network is the most complex and expensive part of the
scheme. Various options were suggested during the earlier stages
of project development and we note that significantly different
arrangements are still being proposed, including from members
of the HS2 strategic challenge panel. Some of these involve a
lesser role for Old Oak Common, a new role for the redundant Stratford
International and alternative ways of linking HS2 to HS1. Another
option could be to terminate HS2 at Old Oak Common, with passengers
transferring to central London via Crossrail, thus avoiding significant
capital costs of building the line between Old Oak Common and
Euston, and tube capacity improvements at Euston. The Government's
principal rail consultant, Atkins, has also made suggestions for
improving integration with the classic network. If the Government
decides to proceed with HS2, it must explain in detail not just
why it favours a particular scheme but why that scheme is better
than alternative solutions, including those put forward by the
Government's own advisers. There must be a greater degree of consensus
on these issues—many of which are technical—before
Parliament is asked to consider a hybrid bill. (Paragraph 107)
20. For reasons of
cost, financing and management, the HS2 network should be built
in phases. Despite pleas from some in Scotland and the north of
England to build southwards from the north, it seems clear that
construction should start with the London-West Midlands phase
as this is where capacity needs are greatest. There is no reason,
in principle, however, why the Scottish Government should not
start preparatory work on a Scottish high-speed line, if it so
wishes. We are concerned, however, about capacity to the north
of Lichfield, in the interim period between Phases I and II, and
about the lack of HS2 services to Leeds and beyond until 2032.
We recommend that these aspects be considered further, including
the possibility of a connection between HS2 and the Birmingham-Derby
line and Midland Main Line in Phase I to provide access from the
north east. (Paragraph 111)
21. Operating 18 trains
per hour on a high-speed rail line has not been attempted elsewhere.
This frequency and train speeds of 225 mph or more are risk factors
for the project. Failure to deliver this frequency would also
affect the business case. We recommend that the Government publishes
full details of the technical basis for its assertion that 18
trains per hour, or more, are feasible. (Paragraph 116)
22. We also question
whether the system is being designed with sufficient margin for
expansion. If 18 trains per hour are required from the opening
of Phase II, it is surely conceivable that further services may
be desirable at some point after that. Apart from the ability
to increase the number of trains formed of double sets, the current
proposal does not appear to provide for this possibility. The
Government argues that there are no circumstances in which four
tracks would be needed and it is not providing for that eventuality.
It appears that, should additional capacity be required, a new
high-speed line, probably linking London, Stansted, Yorkshire
and the north east, would be its preferred option. (Paragraph
117)
Conclusions and way ahead
23. We
believe Lord Adonis's view has merit and, as a minimum, the Government
must firmly commit to the Y network before seeking Parliamentary
approval for HS2. It should also clarify those works that will
be included in Phase I to enable Phase II to proceed, including
any works to facilitate interim arrangements. We further recommend
that the Government should include a purpose clause in the hybrid
bill authorising the construction of the HS2 line from London
to the West Midlands, which provides statutory force to its commitment
to continue the high-speed rail network at least as far as Manchester
and Leeds. We recognise that this would not bind a future Government
but it might provide greater clarity and momentum. Our suggested
wording is as follows: "This Act provides for the first phase
of the construction of a national high-speed railway network,
the second phase of which will involve the construction of lines
from the northern end of the HS2 line to Manchester and Leeds
by 2032." Work on a second bill should commence now so that,
if necessary, the bills could be combined at the start of a new
Parliament. (Paragraph 122)
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