Written evidence from Stuart Porter (HSR
12)
1. Since retiring as a Transport Planner seven
years ago, I have retained a professional interest in transportation
planning.
2. I welcome HS2 as long as its promoters are
more forthcoming about
(a) what other rail schemes are needed in the
same time frame,
(b) mitigation measures for the economic losers
from the HS2 scheme and;
(c) evidence that
HS2 is an affordable part of a competent rail network, which can
be completed within a reasonable 30 year period. That rail network
needs to cover the whole of Britain with,
(i) Some lines at 100mph and others at higher
speed.
(ii) HS2 services to Heathrow being brought forward
by at least two years.
(iii) The CrossRail 1 extensions advocated by
Network Rail in the recent Route Utilization Study being completed
before HS2 Phase 1 starts disrupting services at Euston.
(iv) CrossRail 2 being developed so that its
first phase could open at the same time as HS2 Phase 2.
3. I suspect the above shortfalls can only be
addressed if HS2 opens a little later than 2026—now that
the recession has reduced the money available for road and
rail projects. A short delay would however
(i) increase HS2's Benefit to Cost Ratio (BCR),
(ii) increase the proportion of costs covered
by fare revenue—a four year delay would change that ratio
from 57% to 66% for HS2 Phase 1 and;
(iii) allow headroom within budgets for other
complementary projects.
4. We as a nation have so far built too little
transport infrastructure, too late using too piecemeal approaches.
To avoid repeating that history we need to develop an optimised
combined programme with arrangements to accelerate the programme
if long distance rail patronage growth is higher than expected
at key decision points. The detailed arguments which have led
me to the above conclusions are set out later in this letter.
MAIN ISSUE—WHAT
ARE THE
MAIN ARGUMENTS
EITHER FOR
OR AGAINST
HSR
5. I see
the key policy benefit of HS2 as being that it helps bridge the
North-South divide that has limited growth outside London and
the South East for almost a century. I want that to be delivered
as soon as possible—but only after the disadvantaged areas
in the South East have been identified and considered.
6. As part of the justification for HS2 there
needs to be a debate about:
(i) Whether we can justify keeping on building
free motorways once we have exploited the spare capacity of hard
shoulder running?—or
(ii) Are we prepared to supplement the existing
motorway network with tolled motorways whenever a new alignment
is justified—or
(iii) Is a major investment in the whole of our
rail network an affordable alternative to both i) & ii),
(iv) How are we going to solve the Heathrow problems?
and
(v) Is it a case of building
extra runways or HS2?
The Department for Transport (DfT) in the next
round of reports needs to debate those issues.
7. HS2 or
an independent consultant should be asked to produce a phased
composite programme and identify which competing projects should
be brought to the preferred route stage to the same timescale
as HS2. If that analysis is commissioned now, the justification
for HS2 would be stronger and there would be fewer objections
at the parliamentary proceedings. If the analysis is not done
design staff risk concentrating on the wrong aspects, while decision
makers reconsider matters, as happened with CrossRail 1.
8. We have time to do those studies because of
the hiccup in long distance rail patronage growth caused by the
recession. A phased programme would need to be costed, but would
be much more preferable than the unconvincing arguments in HS2's
Economic Case report (paragraphs 3.3.18/19) which say:
"As a result of HS2, the number of passengers
per day using Euston Mainline Station is expected to increase
by 32,000…this would mean 5,500 additional passengers using
Euston Underground Station in the morning peak period". "Both
the Northern and Victoria lines which stop at Euston are likely
to be heavily crowded by 2043 even without HS2. Although....HS2
will add to this pressure, the number of passengers added by HS2
is likely to be relatively small (around 2% compared to the number
of passengers already forecast to be on London Underground services
passing through Euston."
9. As DfT has shown in Figure 2 of the Economic
Case for HS2:
(i) the rail and air market share of the domestic
long distance travel market has increased markedly since 1995;
and
(ii) something—possibly the West Coast
Main Line upgrade has reversed the growth trajectory for domestic
air travel.
If there hadn't been the deep recession, those trends
would have been more likely to continue and money would have been
available both for HS2 and other justifiable projects to cater
for that growth.
10. Since the recession rail patronage growth
will be less, but will still be enough for the peak capacity on
all 3 main north-south rail routes out of London to be fully used
over the coming decades. HS2 can solve the capacity problems of
those three main rail lines, as HS2 Phase 1 relieves the West
Coast Main Line (WCML), while HS2 Phase 2 relieves the Midland
Main Line and East Coast Main Line (MML & ECML). However,
the comparative stress on those and other lines needs to be reported
clearly and concisely in a single document.
11. Figure 6 of the Economic Case for HS2 report
(shown here) reflects the reasonable assumption used by DfT and
HS2 that long distance rail demand will grow at a slower pace
to reach their previously assumed design demand in 2043 rather
than 2033. Using that assumption it shows 50% higher benefits
if HS2 phase 1 opens in 2033 rather than 2026.
12. Any delay would also improve the ratio
of discounted revenues to total discounted costs and I have
calculated that a four year delay would change that ratio from
57% to 66% for HS2 Phase 1. A 10 year delay might be sufficient
for discounted revenues and discounted costs to be brought into
balance - if the government underwrites the HS2 planning costs.
The government already does that when building and upgrading roads.
13. That ratio and other information from Table
10 of HS2's Economic Case Report is shown below. They have all
been calculated in the normal standardised way and I have only
one query—why have the carbon benefits not been calculated?
| (a) | Business User Transport Benefits
| £11.1 billion |
| (b) | Other User Transport Benefits
| £6.4 billion |
| (c) | Other Quantifiable Benefits (excl Carbon)
| £0.4 billion—WHY Excl Carbon? |
| (d) | Loss to Government of Indirect Taxes
| -£1.3 billion |
| (e) | Wider Economic Impacts (WEIs)
| £4.0 billion |
| (f) | Net Benefits including WEIs
| £20.6 billion |
| (g) | Discounted Capital Costs
| £17.8 billion |
| (h) | Discounted Operating Costs
| £6.2 billion (total costs £24 billion)
|
| (i) | Discounted Revenues |
£13.7 billion (2.25 times operating costs or 57% of total costs)
|
| (j) | Benefit to Cost Ratio (BCR)
| £2.0 (or 1.6 excl WEIs—as used in Figure 6.1 above)
|
14. Professor Glaister at his 24 February presentation[11]
explained that most of the costs are incurred before the scheme
opens, whereas revenues arise later and depend upon the forecast
usage materializing—an inevitable "characteristic of
big infrastructure investments". Professor Glaister argued
that before starting a new project the government ought to set
out
(i) its understanding of the nation's transport needs for
the forthcoming decades;
(ii) how it intends to meet them; and
(iii) how High Speed Rail can contribute to this broader picture.
As that hasn't been done "High Speed Rail [is little more
than] an article of faith with insufficient evidence to support
it."
15. The government needs to answer those arguments by initiating
the debate advocated in paragraph 6 above.
Issue 1.2—What would be the implications of expenditure
on HSR on funding for the "classic" network..
Issue 3.4—The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part
of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase
2. Are those the right decisions?
16. The benefits of HS2 depend upon growth in long distance
rail travel continuing. Some early enhancements of the "classic"
network are needed to avoid discouraging that growth, perhaps
by deploying HS2 classic compatible rolling stock while HS2 is
still being built.
17. Extra benefits could also be available if more through
rail journeys via London can be encouraged. A study of
within the South East connectivity problems (including inter-airport
connectivity) is needed to identify those opportunities and provide
a full answer to question 1.2. Any such study should examine the
opportunities presented by the HS1-HS2 link to improve domestic
rail connectivity. It would complement Network Rail's Route Utilization
Studies (RUS) for London and the South East, which concentrates
on the capacity enhancements needed in addition to HS2, to relieve
the predicted over-crowding, but gives only limited consideration
to within region connectivity.
18. To partly fill the above voids I have suggested
in my Appendix, ways of sub-dividing the HS2 phases to coordinate
HS2 better with other rail improvements. By sub-dividing both
HS2 Phases 1 & 2 the gap between the HS1-HS2 link opening
and the HS2-Heathrow spur opening can and should be minimised.
19. Both the link and spur reduce the need for some air travel
and will bring some respite if Heathrow is disrupted—important
policy considerations. The spur in particular would make Birmingham
Airport only 33 minutes distant from Heathrow and could provide
opportunities for integrated rail/air timetables to/from some
destinations. Those opportunities must not be thwarted by inappropriate
penny pinching.
Issue 5.3—Which locations and socio-economic groups will
benefit from HSR?
20. Business Users in London, Manchester and
the West Midlands would be the main beneficiary of HS2 as shown
in paragraph 13 above and Table 5 of HS2's economic case report.
Their gain would more than offset the relative disadvantages suffered
by Leicester, Coventry and smaller towns nearer London. Those
communities will become less attractive to inward mobile investment,
because Birmingham is currently 84 minutes distant from Euston,
whereas Leicester is 15 minutes quicker from St Pancras. With
HS2 that hierarchy is reversed. Similarly affected places include
Kettering where I live, Cardiff and Bristol.
21. Those relative disadvantages could be rectified
by upgrading existing lines, building CrossRail 2 and the Inter-City
Express proposals for Cardiff and Bristol planned by DfT. Some
of those measures could be promoted as HS2 mitigation measures.
If CrossRail 2 services were extended to Milton Keynes, some CrossRail
1 services could be diverted to serve Aylesbury instead. That
would save around 10 minutes in journeys to Canary Wharf etc.
from communities through which HS2 passes—an important policy
consideration.
22. This type of blue sky thinking is needed
before HS2 advance works and design decisions are finalised, to
make sure reasonable longer term developments aren't thwarted
by the lack of flexibility inherent in the preferred options.
In particular the length of single track provided for the HS1-HS2
link should be critically examined to see what flexibility limited
dualing would offer. Operating plans during disruption at key
stations also need to be produced to help evaluate other flexibility
provisions.
Issue 6.1—What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK
carbon emissions?
23. The BCRs reported in Table 10 above exclude
Carbon disbenefits—which are likely to be substantial if
the electricity consumed is not from carbon neutral sources. The
major benefits are reportedly for business users, which implies
that different maximum speeds at different times of day may be
justified—to optimise carbon emissions. Business use outside
7am-8pm on weekdays (65 hours per week) is likely to be minimal,
whereas HS2 services are expected to operate 130 hours per week.
Thus significant extra carbon benefits may well be justified by
using lower maximum speeds for half the operating hours.
24. Air replacement services using HS2 and better
airport connections can also help reduce UK carbon emissions and
should be a key focus of the design process.
CONCLUSION
25. HS2 is capable of becoming a justifiable project on both
policy and economic grounds if it opens a little later than
2026. One way forward could be to set
up a further company to consider the above and to produce proposals
competing with HS2 Phase 2 for the available cash and help convince
decision makers that the necessary checks and balances are in
place.
26. Pending such a study the suggestions in my
Appendix reflect what I see as the relative priorities. They:
(i) bring forward HS2 services to Heathrow by at least two
years—possibly at the expense of HS2 Phase 2 services to
Manchester and Scotland (item 10)—which benefit from Phase
1,
(ii) relieve some crowding on WCML earlier than HS2 plan,
(iii) build the CrossRail 1 extensions before HS2 Phase 1
starts disrupting services at Euston,
(iv) open part of CrossRail 2 at the same time as HS2 Phase
2,
(v) increase the BCR of HS2 Phase 1 from 1.6 to 2.0 by completing
it in 2030,[12] and
(vi) recognise the Great Western Main Line (GWML) long term
capacity problem approaching London Paddington identified in Network
Rail's London & SE RUS.
26 April 2011
APPENDIX
SUGGESTED COORDINATED PHASING INCORPORATING RUS SUGGESTIONS
ON CROSSRAIL 1 AND CROSSRAIL 2
A1 The following suggested coordinated phasing is based on Network
Rail's RUS ideas and my local knowledge—as a former commuter
via St Pancras and reflect the relative priorities set out in
paragraph 26.
| Item No. | Year
|
| 1. | 2018—CrossRail 1 opens as planned—and civil engineering resources become available.
|
| 2. | 2022—Ideal target date for prototype running of Classic Compatible rolling stock as peak hour extra capacity between Ashford & St Pancras—potentially freeing some Javelin units for use elsewhere.
|
| 3. | 2024—Ideal date for Network Rail's suggested CrossRail 1 northern extensions to open to facilitate Euston rebuilding. (Network Rail's South East Route Utilization Study Figure 8.1 shows the details).
|
| 4. | 2024—Classic Compatible rolling stock introduced on West Coast Main Line (WCML) replacing shorter rolling stock and/or as extra shoulder peak services—bringing overcrowding relief.
|
| 5. | 2028—HS2 Phase 1 opens using only Classic Compatible rolling stock during Euston station rebuilding—using rolling stock run-in via item 2 and perhaps interim journey times.
|
| 6. | 2030—HS2 Phase 1 and Euston station rebuild completed—potentially increasing its BCR from 1.6 to 2.0.[13]
|
| 7. | 2032 or earlier—HS2 services to Heathrow start using Classic Compatible rolling stock cascaded from the Euston to Birmingham services which hereafter use Continental Gauge stock. Eurostar services start alternating between Birmingham Interchange and Heathrow - both services calling at Old Oak Common.
|
| 8. | 2034—HS2 services to Leeds start using Continental Gauge stock.
|
| 9. | 2034—CrossRail 2 Phase 1 opens between Euston & Victoria/Clapham Junction to relieve Euston Underground services and improve connectivity.
|
| 10. | 2036—HS2 Phase 2 completed and Manchester services start using Continental Gauge stock. Eurostar services start alternating between Manchester (via Birmingham Interchange) and Heathrow—calling at Old Oak Common to provide high frequency connectivity between more of the country and Europe.
|
| 11. | 2036—Aylesbury to Old Oak Common connection provided and electrified leading to either CrossRail 1 or HS1-HS2 link—ideally using compatible (perhaps Kent to St Pancras Javelin) rolling stock.
|
| 12. | 2038—HS1-HS2 link extended to Heathrow and Slough and perhaps dualled east of Old Oak Common.
|
A2 Network Rail's latest Route Utilization Study (RUS) acknowledges
the potential need for a CrossRail 2 station serving Euston and
suggests extensions of CrossRail 2—to main lines north of
Kings Cross/St Pancras and south of Victoria. Those suggestions
(reproduced here) could spread the benefits of HS2 more widely
across the South East of England and could imply through services
from South of Clapham Junction, to the Midland Main Line and
Northampton line. That would enhance regional connectivity and
network resilience substantially.
A3 The core of CrossRail 2 could be limited to Euston/Kings Cross
to Victoria/Clapham Junction via a single station at Tottenham
Court Road. The rest could follow, with eventually half the envisaged
24 trains per hour being assigned to a) the within and b) out
of London services. The first phase:
(1) would deal effectively with the crowding at Euston arising
from HS2 Phase 2;
(2) bring central London closer to areas which don't gain
from HS2; and
(3) could benefit Chiltern residents by allowing some CrossRail
1 services to be extended to Aylesbury, saving around 10 minutes
in their journeys to Canary Wharf etc.
Without CrossRail 2 or other mitigation measures Northamptonshire,
Leicestershire and the area served by the southern end of the
West Coast Main Line (WCML) are economic losers from HS2, but
they, Aylesbury and a swathe of the South Midlands could benefit
from the following potentially 'HS2 branded' mitigation measures.[14]
A4 Item 12 tries to recognise the opportunity to improve connectivity
within the South East region (and network resilience) by providing
through services reversing at St Pancras - by diverting some Bristol
and Cardiff Inter-City Express services to St Pancras which then
continue instead of Kent Javelin services. Regular services would
allow Ebbsfleet to become a park & ride facility for Heathrow,
but may require some Midland Main Line (MML) services to continue
south of St Pancras via Thameslink or CrossRail 2 to increase
platform availability at St Pancras.
11
presentation to the Chartered Institute of Highways and Transportation
published on http://www.racfoundation.org/assets/rac_foundation/content/downloadables/glaister%20on%20high%20speed%20rail%20-%20ciht%20cardiff%20-%20240211.pdf Back
12
A similar increase in BCR could be possible if private finance
for rebuilding Euston can be found - funded by future rental income
from extra shops etc at Euston. The BCRs quoted exclude Wider
Economic Impacts. Back
13
A similar increase in BCR could be possible if private finance
for rebuilding Euston can be found - funded by future rental income
from extra shops etc at Euston. The BCRs quoted exclude Wider
Economic Impacts. Back
14
A combined Euston/St Pancras CrossRail 2 station might be cheaper
and better if detailed design justifies that. Ways of funding
CrossRail 2 Phase 1 could involve delaying the Euston rebuilding
to an early part of HS2 Phase 2 to increase its benefit to cost
ratio and gain economies of scale in procurement by buying only
classic compatible rolling stock for HS2 Phase 1 and only continental
gauge stock for HS2 Phase 2. Back
| 
