Written evidence from Glasgow City Council
Glasgow City Council strongly supports the construction
of a UK High Speed Rail network, which is considered essential
both for the country's future economic prosperity and also to
reduce transport's contribution to carbon emissions. However,
GCC contends that the full economic and environmental benefits
of HSR will not be realised until a dedicated HSR line is constructed
over the entire route between London/HS1 and Scotland.
GCC considers the construction of a new HSR line
between London and Birmingham to be the optimum means of providing
the increased transport capacity urgently required in that corridor.
However new HSR infrastructure has the potential not only to
provide increased transport capacity but also to reduce end-to-end
rail journey times between Glasgow/Edinburgh and London to well
below three hours. So doing will encourage considerable modal
shift from air and road to rail, thereby reducing transport's
overall carbon emissions and generating new rail patronage to
maximise the return on investment in HSR.
Glasgow City Council is concerned that the construction
of dedicated HSR lines only as far north as Manchester and Leeds
could increase Scotland's peripherality and concentrate economic
development and regeneration in the southern half of Britain,
to the detriment of Scotland's economy and that of north east
England. Consequently, given the significantly greater journey-time
reductions and consequent modal shift from air that would be achieved
by providing a dedicated HSR line over the northern half of the
London - Scotland route, GCC believes that the UK Government should
commit to the early provision of a new HSR line over the entire
route between Edinburgh/Glasgow and London and construct this
line simultaneously from both ends.
1. What are the main arguments either
for or against HSR?
1.1 The main arguments for HSR are as follows:
1.1.1 Economic Growth - Capacity constraints
on much of the existing rail network are proving costly to business
and restricting economic growth. Most constrained at present
is the southern end of the West Coast Main Line (WCML) between
London and Birmingham with capacity on more northerly sections
of this line and parts of the East Coast (ECML) and Midland Main
Lines (MML) also constrained. With HSR the fastest-growing transport
mode in Europe, there is a danger of regional British cities losing
out to regional European cities in terms of economic growth, in
the absence of HSR connectivity.
1.1.2 Reduced Journey time - This is a more important
benefit for longer journeys such as those between Scotland and
London. Current rail journey times between Glasgow/Edinburgh
and London are too long for travel to morning business meetings
and same-day return trips by rail allow little time for activity
in the destination city.
1.1.3 Reduced Emissions - Increased capacity
and reduced journey times will encourage modal shift from air
and road to rail. The emission benefits from HSR will obviously
be highest where trains run with high load factors and utilise
electricity generated from renewable fuels. Again, the most significant
reductions will be for longer journeys (such as London - Glasgow)
where city centre - city centre journey times by rail will better
those by air and be considerably shorter than those by road.
1.1.4 Capacity on existing rail lines will be
released by the construction of a new HSR line, facilitating improved
freight and local passenger services on these lines. These services
will, in turn, encourage more modal shift from road thereby reducing
road congestion, benefitting both the economy and the environment.
1.2 The main arguments against HSR are as follows:
1.2.1 Affordability - Some claim that public
finance in the United Kingdom cannot afford HSR. However, by
the time that major expenditure is required, the country is likely
to be emerging from the current economic downturn. Without HSR
the economy is likely to be more (not less) vulnerable to future
1.2.2 Disruption - The construction of any major
engineering project will be disruptive to the landscape and communities
through which it passes. However, the disruption caused by construction
along a carefully chosen new alignment is likely to be much less
than that caused by widening an existing transport corridor, where
many residents and businesses located adjacent to the existing
corridor boundaries would require relocation. The use of an existing
corridor would also be much more disruptive to existing transport
services using the corridor than will be the case for a new alignment.
1.2.3 An upgrade of existing rail lines would
be preferable. Some argue that the provision of additional capacity
on the existing rail network would achieve the same objectives
(as HSR) but be cheaper and less disruptive. However, the actual
costs of adding capacity to the existing network are more difficult
to estimate than those for a new line on a new alignment. Widening
existing rail corridors to provide additional tracks is likely
to require the purchase of many parcels of land and will prove
extremely disruptive to some owners. While it may be argued that
lengthening trains or providing higher-capacity rolling stock
would be relatively inexpensive and easily implemented, the consequent
changes required to infrastructure may not be.
1.2.4 Any platform lengthening required to accommodate
longer trains will be disruptive, both to rail users and to those
with property required for the extended platforms. Platform lengthening
is likely to be particularly problematic adjacent to existing
bridges or tunnels and future services may require selective door
opening or the omission of some station stops. Similarly, there
are likely to be many locations on existing lines where increasing
the gauge clearance to accommodate double-deck trains is problematic.
However, the chief failing of any proposal to increase capacity
on the existing rail network is that it would not provide high
speed rail services. While this may be of little consequence
to those travelling between London and Birmingham, the benefits
for those travelling between London and Scotland are significantly
less than for HSR.
1.2.5 Environmental Damage - Any civil engineering
construction work has the potential to damage the environment
but this can be mitigated by sensitive design and ancillary works.
The most commonly cited environmental arguments against HSR are
damage to landscape and noise pollution. The insertion of a new
rail line into a landscape will certainly change it but not necessarily
damage it. The route currently identified for HSR between London
and Birmingham does not cross open moorland but a landscape already
bisected by numerous roads, tracks, pathways and even rail lines.
The new line will obviously be a feature in the future landscape
but, carefully designed, should not inflict lasting damage. In
fact many major structures on "classic" rail lines are
now listed in recognition of their positive contributions to the
1.2.6 The noise generated by HSR trains is likely
to be intrusive only in areas that are currently quiet. For much
of its route the HSR line will pass through built-up areas, where
there is already background noise from traffic, aircraft, industry
and farming operations. In these areas, HSR will add to the noise
but is unlikely to be particularly intrusive. In "wilderness"
areas, the introduction of noise where there is presently silence
will inevitably destroy the tranquillity. However, even in these
circumstances, the intermittent noise from passing trains is,
arguably, less intrusive than the constant drone of road traffic,
which emanates, night and day, from a motorway.
2. How does HSR fit with the Government's
transport policy objectives?
2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban
connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to
other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including
those for the strategic road network?
2.1.1 Improving inter-urban connectivity
is the most important transport policy objective for economic
development, although improving the sustainability of transport
is arguably the most important objective overall. HSR scores
highly on both counts. Inter-urban connectivity is improved through
the provision of additional capacity and reduced journey times.
Being electrically-powered, HSR is more sustainable than either
road or air transport due to the potential to generate electricity
from a variety of renewable sources and its non-reliance on depleting
reserves of increasingly expensive oil.
2.1.2 Additions and improvements to the
strategic road network can improve capacity locally but are also
likely to reinforce the perception that road is the preferred
mode of travel, leading to greater congestion elsewhere on the
network. By way of contrast, investment in HSR will create capacity
for an alternative travel mode. This will abstract some traffic
from the road network, thereby reducing road congestion, without
simultaneously encouraging additional road traffic. HSR will
also release capacity on the existing (classic) rail network for
additional freight and local passenger services, thereby further
reducing road traffic and congestion.
2.1.3 Over longer distances, such as those
between Scotland's Central Belt and London, HSR will also abstract
traffic from air services, since city-centre to city centre travel
times will be shorter by HSR. Assuming similar load factors for
air and HSR services, this transfer will significantly reduce
carbon emissions. It will also bring economic benefits in terms
of the ability to use HSR journey-time more productively than
is the case with air travel.
2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications
of expenditure on HSR on funding for the "classic" network,
for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling
stock capacity in and around major cities?
2.2.1 There is no reason to suppose that
spending on the construction of new HSR infrastructure will reduce
capital spending on the existing network. There are already
significant "high-cost" rail projects under construction,
in particular London Cross Rail (approx. £15 billion over
around seven years) and Thameslink (approx. £5.5 billion
over around eight years) and it does not appear than these schemes
have affected funding for the general "classic" network.
These two schemes will be close to completion by the time
construction is proposed to start on HSR between London and Birmingham
in around 2016. Spread over ten years, the £17 billion estimated
cost of HSR should generate annual expenditure no greater than
for Crossrail and certainly below the combined peak expenditure
of the two London projects.
2.2.2 As regards increasing track and
rolling stock capacity in and around major cities, HSR may constitute
the most cost effective means of doing just this. Transfer of
long distance inter-urban services to the HSR network will provide
seats on existing rolling stock for commuters and capacity on
classic tracks for additional commuter services.
2.3 What are the implications for domestic
2.3.1 There is likely to be little impact
on domestic aviation as a result of HSR services between London
and Birmingham, since most travel between these cities is currently
by road or rail and reductions in overall rail journey times between
London and cities north of Birmingham will be insufficient to
encourage significant modal shift from air.
2.3.2 Extension of the new HSR line to
Manchester and Leeds is likely to reduce journey times between
London and Scotland sufficiently to encourage some transfer of
cross-border domestic air travel to rail. It should also eliminate
the use of air services for travel between London and those cities
on the HSR network, except, perhaps for some interlining.
2.3.3 However, to achieve a significant modal
shift from air to HSR, it will be necessary to provide a new HSR
rail line over the entire route between London and Scotland, thereby
eliminating the current time penalty in using rail services for
these longer journeys. In 2009, some 20% of journeys between
Edinburgh/Glasgow and London were made by rail. If the rail journey
time were to be reduced to 2 hour 30 minutes (by providing a new
HSR line over the entire route), it is anticipated that around
80% of journeys would be made by rail - resulting in four or five
million fewer domestic air trips on these routes.
2.3.4 One implication of this reduction in domestic
air travel between cities served by HSR services could be the
release of capacity at British airports for additional domestic
flights to cities beyond the reach of HSR infrastructure (eg Aberdeen
and Inverness) and for additional international flights. These
additional flights could bring economic benefits in excess of
those already calculated to result from the construction of a
UK HSR network.
3. Business case
3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology
- for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels,
scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time)
and the impact of lost revenue on the "classic" network?
3.1.1 In addition to the work undertaken by HS2,
Atkins (on behalf of SRA, later updated for the Government in
2008), Network Rail (New Lines, 2009) and Greengauge21 (Fast Forward,
2009) have separately researched the business case for HSR. While
each of these studies considered a slightly different HSR network,
all produced a case for a north-south spine route linking the
major cities between London and Edinburgh/Glasgow, indicating
that the overall case is robust.
3.1.2 The methodology adopted by HS2 is based
on standard DfT and Treasury models and cannot, therefore, be
challenged in isolation. Moreover, the use of this methodology
allows the benefit:cost ratio for HSR to be compared directly
with those calculated for other transport schemes.
3.1.3 It has been argued recently that, in assuming
that time spent on trains is "un-productive", HS2 has
overestimated the benefits of HSR arising from reduced journey
times. On the other hand, Greengauge21 reported that regarding
time spent on HSR trains as productive "working-time"
marginally increases the overall benefit:cost ratio for HSR.
The basis for this finding is that the productive time gained
by passengers transferring from car and air outweighs the working
time lost by passengers transferring from classic train services
of longer duration. It might also be argued that HSR will create
a better working environment than current rail services, affording
greater en route productivity for passengers than by all other
modes, including classic rail.
3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving
capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West
Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?
3.2.1 The most recent upgrade of the West Coast
Main Line added significant capacity to the route but this capacity
is rapidly being filled as passenger numbers continue to rise
and is likely to be exhausted by 2020. To create significant
additional capacity on the existing tracks, it would be necessary
to lengthen the trains and/or provide higher-capacity rolling
stock (eg double-deck carriages). As set out in response to Question
1 above, provision of the infrastructure necessary to accommodate
either of these capacity enhancements is unlikely to be readily
achievable over the entire length of the existing route. Even
if additional capacity were to be created in this way, it would
be only a matter of time before this too was exhausted. Consequently,
Network Rail have concluded that the only realistic long-term
capacity solution for travel between London and West Midlands
is to provide an additional line.
3.2.2 Additional to the considerable engineering
costs of increasing the capacity of an existing rail line are
significant costs in terms of disruption to services and reduced
capacity during construction. These latter costs were further
increased in the case of the recently completed upgrade of the
WCML by delays to the project programme, due to the difficulties
of working alongside an operating railway. None of these additional
costs will arise with the construction of a rail line on a new
alignment and the capacity created will be considerably greater
that that achieved by upgrading an existing line.
3.2.3 A new conventional line (restricted to
125 mph) could deliver increased capacity equally as well as an
HSR line but would not reduce journey-times and would therefore
be of more limited benefit for longer journeys (eg between London
and the North of England and Scotland) where overall travel times
are a major consideration. Without the journey-time savings,
there will be less modal shift to rail from road and air and consequently
reduced environmental benefits in terms of pollutant and carbon
emissions. However, proposals for a new conventional line are
likely to generate the same opposition from those on the line
of route as proposals for a HSR line. The construction of a new
conventional line would therefore appear to be a non-starter.
3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative
means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price?
3.3.1 Managing demand by higher fares or by not
providing more capacity would encourage passengers to travel by
less sustainable modes (ie car or air) and, in the case of car
travel, would increase road congestion. Alternatively, some journeys
may not be undertaken at all which, while more sustainable, would
be detrimental in overall socio-economic terms.
3.3.2 To some extent, demand is already managed
by price and, except where travel is free of charge at the point
of delivery, this will continue to be the case. If it is accepted
that rail travel is more sustainable and environmentally acceptable
than air or road travel, the aim should be to provide the capacity
that will enable rail services to be available at the lowest possible
cost. To do otherwise would adversely impact on both the environment
and business and the economy in general.
3.3.3 It is likely that there will be a continuing
role for price in maximising the efficient use of the rail network.
Differential pricing according to time of travel and speed of
journey could assist in maximising train load factors on both
the classic and high speed networks.
3.4 What lessons should the Government learn
from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high
speed lines are built on time and to budget?
3.4.1 The construction of new rail lines (as
opposed to rail upgrades) in this country has a reasonably good
track record in terms of time and budget (eg HS1 and the recent
Airdrie-Bathgate project). Competitive procurement on a design-and-build
basis is probably the best means of reducing cost overruns.
4. The strategic route
4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands
has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International
and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations?
What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer)
4.1.1 For the benefits of HSR in terms of reduced
journey times to be maximised, there should be few, if any, intermediate
stops on routes between any two city centre stations. Consequently,
the HSR network should be designed in a similar fashion to the
UK's motorway network with the route by-passing all towns and
cities en route. In general, intermediate cities would be served
not by through stations on the main line but by terminal stations
reached via spurs off the main line. Such a terminal station
is currently planned for Curzon Street in Birmingham.
4.1.2 In certain situations, it may be appropriate
to provide through stations on the main line, such as that currently
proposed at Birmingham International. However, only trains commencing
or terminating their journeys a few miles distant (in this case
at Curzon Street) should slow down and stop at these stations;
other services should continue non-stop at high speed on a parallel
bypass line, thereby avoiding any increase in their end-to-end
4.1.3 The proposed station at Old Oak Common
(OOC) is supported, in the short term at least, as a useful interchange
for London Crossrail and services to Heathrow airport. Given
its proximity to the proposed Euston terminal, the increases in
end-to-end journey times for HSR services resulting from stops
here should be smaller than would be the case for intermediate
stops elsewhere on the network. Stopping HSR services at OOC
for interchange to London suburban services could also reduce
congestion on connecting services at Euston. In addition, directly
connecting the West Coast Main Line into London Crossrail at OOC,
could reduce the number of platforms required at Euston to accommodate
classic services (see also comment at 6.4.2 below).
4.1.4 Additional stations should be provided
only in cities where passenger demand for travel to a single destination
served by HSR is sufficient to entirely fill high speed trains.
If it becomes necessary for trains to collect passengers from
several stations to achieve the loading required for viable operation,
the benefits of high speed travel will be seriously eroded by
repeated station stops. Where a city cannot generate sufficient
patronage to justify a HSR station, feeder services should be
provided on classic lines to a convenient HSR station for interchange.
To minimise the potential for feeder journeys to be undertaken
by private car, interchange with HSR services should take place
at city centre stations wherever possible.
4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual
high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right
4.2.1 As stated above, only those cities generating
sufficient patronage to fill trains destined for a single location
should be directly served by the eventual high speed network.
Likely candidates are London, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds,
Newcastle, Bristol, Edinburgh and Glasgow. These cities should
be considered core cities for the network and could be joined
by Sheffield and an East Midlands station if patronage there is
4.2.2 The proposed Y configuration serves only
four of the suggested core cities but the eastern branch of the
Y could readily be extended northwards to also serve Newcastle,
Glasgow and Edinburgh, suggesting that it forms a good basis for
the eventual HSR network. Two further extensions should be considered
to complete the network of dedicated HSR lines - one from Birmingham
International to Bristol and the other from the East Midlands
4.2.3 Given that hybrid HSR/classic trains are
proposed to provide initial HSR services to destinations north
of Birmingham, it is suggested that, network capacity permitting,
these trains could be used subsequently to provide through-running
HSR/classic services westwards to Cardiff via Heathrow and Bristol,
southwards to Southampton via Heathrow and northwards to Aberdeen
4.3 Is the Government correct to build the
network in stages, moving from London northwards?
4.3.1 Pragmatically it makes perfect sense to
start the HSR network with the London-Birmingham section, which
is the most capacity-restrained section on the West Coast Main
Line. Furthermore, the link to London and HS1 is an essential
element of any national HSR network so, should the London - Birmingham
section be rejected, it is unlikely that a truly national network
could ever materialise.
4.3.2 However, future phases do not necessarily
have to be constructed in a consecutive northwards order. The
most speed restricted sections of the network are typically across
the English-Scottish border so serious consideration should be
given to starting construction of these sections at an earlier
stage rather as the last legs. In particular, the Government
should show greater commitment to plan the future network beyond
Manchester and Leeds so that the longer term benefits of a national
network become clearer.
4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1
as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part
of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?
4.4.1 While it is understood that construction
of the link to HS1 has been proposed as part of phase 1 for technical
reasons, it is welcomed as essential to enable direct services
between Europe and UK cities north of London. It is suggested
that, as soon as this link is operational (possibly prior to the
opening of HS2) consideration is given to extending the UK's existing
sleeper services to European destinations. Caledonian sleeper
services currently arrive in London at around 6.00am and, given
the procurement of suitable rolling stock could reach Brussels
and Paris in time for morning meetings. Similarly, evening departures
from these cities would reach London prior to midnight to utilise
the existing WCML train paths to Scotland.
4.4.2 The Heathrow market will to a large extent
be catered for through the Old Oak Common interchange as part
of phase 1 so it is reasonable that further expenditure on this
link should come later. However, the Heathrow link should be
built in a way that enables High Speed Trains for Heathrow from
the north to continue on the classic network to Southampton and
those from London to continue to Bristol and Cardiff (see 4.2.3
5. Economic rebalancing and equity
5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote
economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic
5.1.1 While not all European cities directly
connected to the high speed network have benefitted economically,
those that have co-ordinated their social, economic and planning
policies and projects to capitalise on HSR have experienced increases
in their economic growth. The only experience of HSR in the UK
to date is HS1 and Greengauge21 reported an upsurge in business
activity in parts of Kent following its construction.
5.1.2 A study undertaken by Halcrow for the Glasgow-Edinburgh
Collaboration Initiative has specifically identified the policy
approach and action necessary to ensure that the construction
of HSR lines to Edinburgh and Glasgow will promote economic regeneration
throughout Scotland. The location of HSR stations in Edinburgh
and Glasgow City Centres will, in particular, facilitate urban
regeneration rather than the development of "Greenfield"
5.2 To what extent should the shape of the
network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local
and regional regeneration?
5.2.1 The most important role of a High Speed
Network is to improve connectivity both between the main centres
of population in the UK and also with Europe, where HSR is fastest
growing mode of travel. Currently London and the South East are
both better connected to Europe than other UK cities and also
experiencing the greatest economic growth. By directly linking
regional city centres to London and Europe, HSR will bring agglomeration
benefits to UK plc and will also promote regional regeneration.
5.2.2 The network should certainly be shaped
to serve those areas of the UK most in need of regeneration.
In this respect, it is particularly important that the North East
of England and Scotland are included in the network from the outset
and that their regeneration does not stall as a result of HSR's
initial connection only to Birmingham and the WCML. Scotland
is already at a disadvantage due to its geographic peripherality
in both the UK and Europe. The UK's HSR network should aim to
reduce this peripherality and not increase it.
5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups
will benefit from HSR?
5.3.1 It is anticipated that any city-region
directly served by the HSR network will benefit from its development.
While HSR services will be long-distance and used mainly for
business and leisure (tourist) travel, the capacity released on
the classic network will facilitate improvements to local passenger,
commuter and freight services. Consequently, all socio-economic
groups will benefit from HSR. The cascading of hybrid HSR/classic
rolling stock to lines running on from the dedicated HSR network
(see 4.2.3 above) will ensure that the benefits of HSR are also
felt beyond the network itself.
5.4 How should the Government ensure that
all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and
business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution
and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support
from the EU's TEN-T programme?
5.4.1 Government procurement of a HSR network
will be funded by all UK taxpayers and businesses. Provided that
the network is developed to benefit all regions of the UK, this
appears an appropriate means of sharing costs and risks. Given
that the UK HSR Network is likely to "replace" classic
rail lines that currently form part of TEN, it would appear sensible
to seek support from any relevant EU budgets.
6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR
on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and
roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?
6.1.1 Assessment of the overall impact HSR on
carbon emissions is complex due to the number of variables involved.
While emissions resulting from initial construction of the track
and rolling stock can be calculated with a fair degree of accuracy,
those resulting from HSR operation will be highly dependent on
the mix of fuels used for electricity generation and train loadings.
However, under almost all scenarios, the emissions due to HSR
travel will be lower than those for the equivalent journey by
air. It therefore follows that most favourable impact on emissions
will result where HSR encourages a significant transfer of air
passengers. This significant transfer is unlikely to materialise
for domestic passengers until Scotland and London are connected
by HSR (see 2.3.3 above).
6.1.2 The impact of HSR on carbon emissions as
regards modal shift from roads is likely to result more from the
capacity relief that HSR brings to the classic rail network than
from the HSR services themselves. In particular, the provision
of additional freight paths on the classic network will enable
a transfer of container traffic from road to rail. This will
not only directly reduce the carbon emissions generated by the
transport of that freight; it will also reduce congestion on the
road network, thereby reducing the emissions per tonne-kilometre
for freight that remains on the road network. Similarly for passenger
traffic, additional commuter and local rail services will reduce
emissions both directly, in terms of those who shift from road
to rail, and also indirectly, in terms of a reduction in road
6.1.3 Overall, GCC would expect carbon emissions
to be lower with HSR in place than would be the case if an HSR
network were not constructed. This will certainly be the case
if the primary energy source is renewable, when the carbon footprint
from HSR operations (after construction) should be negligible.
6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including
in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business
6.2.1 HS2 appear to have taken a very cautious
(pessimistic) approach in their assessment of overall environmental
benefits. With the exception of noise, the effect of which is
difficult to analyse on a cost:benefit basis (see 1.2.6 above),
it is likely that HS2 have underestimated the environmental benefits
6.3 What would be the impact on freight services
on the "classic" network?
6.3.1 The release of capacity on the classic
network, in particular on the West Coast Main Line (the busiest
rail freight corridor in the UK)) should in part be utilised by
rail freight services. Consequently, HSR's impact on freight
services on the classic network is expected to be entirely positive.
6.4 How much disruption will be there to services
on the "classic" network during construction, particularly
during the rebuilding of Euston?
6.4.1 Provided that the HSR network is constructed
on a new alignment, there should be no disruption to services
on the classic network other than at locations where the two networks
cross each other. Even here, disruption should be minimal. However,
there is obviously potential for significant disruption at Euston
and some during construction of the HS1-HS2 link.
6.4.2 Experience of the St Pancras redevelopment
indicates that it is possible to minimise disruption to existing
services, while redeveloping a station to accommodate HSR, but
the scale of reconstruction proposed at Euston is greater than
at St Pancras, as is the scale of existing rail operations. It
is suggested that potential disruption to classic services at
Euston could be reduced by connecting the West Coast Main Line
to Crossrail at Willesden/Old Oak Common and diverting services
running between London and towns south of Birmingham on to the
Crossrail network, prior to works commencing at Euston.