Written evidence from Maurice Hopper (HSR
196)
There are three topics that seem to be missing from
the (public) debate about High Speed 2. The debate lacks an international
dimension (1 below), the consideration of loading gauge (2) and
the lack of economy in working terminal stations (3).
(1) High Speed 2 seems to have been conceived as an isolated
piece of high-speed railway only serving the United Kingdom north
of London. Where is the planning that would integrate it into
the European rail network with a direct high-speed connection
to HS 1, the Channel Tunnel and Europe? This would link Birmingham
to the rail network of North West Europe allowing direct connections
to Lille, Brussels, Paris, Amsterdam and Cologne and beyond. Such
a connection could provide attractive through journey times from
Birmingham to Paris of about 3 hours or Birmingham to Cologne
of 4 hours 30 minutes, city centre to city centre. As HS 2 is
presently planned such journeys will require a taxi, a bus or
a walk down the Euston Road and another extended check-in at St
Pancras, putting the UK rail network at structural disadvantage
for years to come when competing for international traffic. No
air transport development would have such a restricted view of
the potential routes, operation and increased connectivity.
(2) It is a statement of the obvious that the new high-speed
line needs to be built to the Berne loading gauge to allow French
TGV and German ICE trains to make through journeys. Consideration
also needs to given to the requirement for larger loading gauge
freight traffic to help realize the full potential of the Channel
Tunnel and high-speed lines for night time freight movement, including
piggyback lorry trains and other long distance European traffic,
without the need for non-standard, smaller rolling stock. The
resulting removal of large numbers of lorries from the roads,
by opening up the UK rail network to such traffic, would make
a strong case for the new construction not yet articulated.
(3) It is well known that city terminal stations are operationally
less efficient than through stations. This is widely recognised
across Europe as indicated by station developments in Brussels
(1949-52), Antwerp (1998-2007) Berlin (2002-06) Leipzig (2004-09)
to name just a few. The concentration on Euston (or Old Oak Common)
as a terminal brings many problems of large numbers of people
changing trains at the same location. If there were a number of
stations on a through line under London, points of congestion
would be greatly reduced. Such a line could also be used as a
second Thameslink, say linking Euston to Victoria, Waterloo and
beyond, carrying both high speed and regional trains, thus integrating
HS2 into the wider UK rail network.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
The isolationist vision described by the media (both railway and
popular) and indeed the UK Government of High Speed 2 linking
London to the North is only part of the true economic potential
of this project. It would be sad to see initial investment being
overtaken by events (reduced availability of international air
travel) with a repeat of the financial waste and the poor image
of railway investment displayed by the Government and the rail
industry at Waterloo International (£130 million for a ten
year operational life). This mean-spirited substitute resulting
from the initial lack of HS 1 was hardly an indication of serious
strategic thinking in railway infrastructure development. It is
so typical that one of the finest modern railway buildings in
the country, Waterloo International, now stands unused.
Please do not allow this important project to repeat so many of
the mistakes made in railway planning and investment in the UK
since the earliest days of the industry, many associated with
poor routing,[468]
in-built high operating costs[469]
and ridiculous restrictions.[470]
25 July 2011
468 The historic lack of support by UK governments
for the construction of a coordinated railway network, when set
against vested interests and land ownership, often leading to
higher operating costs and long term inefficiency. Back
469
For example in the case of HS 2 the suggested route via London
Heathrow that would increase route length, and therefore both
building and operating costs while linking to a potentially declining
destination Back
470
The Royal Commission of 1846 decided that mainline stations should
not be allowed inside the ring of terminal stations around central
London, effectively closing down any thought of establishing proper
connectivity for the mainline rail network across London. Back
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