Written evidence from Tony Bristow (HSR
24)
THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST HIGH SPEED
RAIL (HSR) AS PROPOSED FOR HS2
1. INTRODUCTION
AND BASIS
FOR SUBMISSION
I believe that the case as presented in Ref A is
weak in the first place, unsubstantiated by the evidence adduced
and fraught with too much risk for the country to contemplate
this huge financial investment. The evaluation of alternatives
is superficial and dismissive, especially since the DfT's Rail
Package Two (RP2) has been suppressed by omission. At £32
billion, the capital cost is enormous for a project which could
not even start to deliver any benefits at all for half a generation.
My work has given me considerable experience of European rail
travel, high-speed and "classic", and I make my submission
with that in mind. HSR/HS2 is a fiendishly expensive project that
does nothing for the overwhelming majority of UK rail passengers,
other than the inevitability of investment starvation on all other
lines.
2. THE STRATEGIC
CASE AS
PRESENTED IN
REF A[30]
2.1 The summary strategic case (p12 col 2 of
Ref A) merely claims "could benefit thousands of businesses
by improving access to the .... markets of London and the South
East.." and that "HSR would act as a catalyst for regeneration..."
The identified beneficiaries are stated to be businesses although
the productivity claims are based on unrealistic thinking on the
value of communications technology on the move. The example of
regeneration is given of 40000 jobs for Phase 1, yet most of these
are in the retail sector in London, thus reinforcing not reducing
the North-South divide.
2.2 Business cases relying on traffic increases
have a history of error, notably for the Channel Tunnel, for HS1
and especially for Eurostar links North of London, even resulting
in the disposal of some Eurostar train sets early in the concession!
2.3 Unquantified regional prosperity is claimed
for modest journey time reductions to/from London (never improved
by more than 60 minutes per Fig 2) or to/from Birmingham (mostly
34-47 minutes, Leeds 55 minutes, per Fig 2.1), whereas the quoted
example of Lyon gained a benefit of 2 hours to/from Paris so cannot
be validly used as a comparator. If businesses were really convinced,
they would be clamouring to fund HS2; the silence is deafening.
3. ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT
3.1 Ref A as good as admits that there is no
carbon or environmental benefit whatever from building HS2; in
fact there is every likelihood of carbon increase. Ref A admits
"..without any overall increase in carbon emissions.."
(para 2.52), "..carbon impacts...broadly neutral.."
(para 2.55) and, extraordinarily, "..carbon emissions associated
with the construction of the new line totalling around 1.2 million
tonnes...many of [which] would be offset by reductions elsewhere
under the EU Emissions Trading System."
3.2 Experts agree that energy use by a train
at 225 mph is more than double that at 125 or 140 mph. The greenest
way to increase capacity is to add additional coaches to classic
trains at conventional speeds. As for any projected modal shift
from domestic air to rail, HSR is not proven to be more carbon
efficient than air, and any airport slots released by discontinued
domestic flights would be seized for use by longer distance services
using heavier aircraft at great carbon penalty.
3.3 Ref A fails to present environmental realities
to the public, yet asks a question about sustainability the facts
of which have been omitted. The construction period of eight years
for Phase 1 alone would cause immense intrusion, disruption, nuisance
and delay to millions of people, irrespective of the route selected;
the extent of this has again been cynically hidden from the consultation
document.
4. Alternatives
4.1 The case presented for HSR in Ref A dismisses
new conventional-speed lines as saving little cost (just over
£3 billion) for lower calculated benefit; I do not disagree
with this. However, enhancements to existing networks are discounted
in just three pages of unsubstantiated assertions that manage
to bury RP2 for the WCML, despite that package being capable of
providing the 135% capacity increase by tackling seven infrastructure
pinch points and providing 11-car Pendolino trains at a fraction
of HS2's net cost (or +165% capacity if all trains 12-car).
4.2 Table 1 of Ref A lists the works that could
be considered to improve the Midland and East Coast main lines
as well; this combination should be evaluated to the same depth
as HS2 for anyone to make informed decisions. RP2 and/or the projects
in Table 1 represent value-for-money viable alternatives which
can be implemented earlier, separately and in a phased programme
to provide progressive relief for a wider travelling community;
each of the 15 listed works provides benefit without waiting half
a generation for an all-or-nothing project such as HS2.
4.3 If we actually have £32 billion to
spend on our railways (HMG's fiscal pronouncements very much suggest
otherwise), we the taxpayers should be presented with the alternative
of investing as much of that as we can actually afford on the
whole railway network, not just on a prestige project on
one Y-shaped route which will only carry just 4% of the UK's current
annual passenger journeys (50.8 million out of 1.3 billion). The
strategic case should address the alternative of spreading investment
to relieve the lot of all rail passengers, not just a small business
minority.
4.4 It is widely stated (evidently driven more
by pride than hard economics) that we need to catch up continental
Europe in the field of HSR. The dominant industrial player in
the EU, Germany, has significantly chosen to adopt HSR selectively
for isolated stretches to bypass pinchpoints or slow alignments
in their network, some at line speeds lower than 300 kph which
"classic" trains can share at their own speed, typically
200 kph; this strategy should be looked at as a progressive alternative,
applicable to any main line in the UK. France has far greater
distances to deal with and a largely empty country in which to
build HSR.
4.5 Finally, we have Pendolino and Mark 4 coaches
originally designed for 140 mph operation, but limited to 125mph
by signalling under-investment; we should have a national ambition
for 140 mph conventional lines across the country. Interestingly,
the South-East High Speed services on HS1 have a maximum service
speed of 140mph yet are hailed as a breakthrough.
5. CONCLUSIONS
5.1 The business case presented in Ref A relies
on the timely achievement of unrealistic high-end forecasts, an
all-or-nothing project to improve just 4% of annual passenger
journeys by rail, all with a brazen acceptance that modal shift
from air would be limited to just 8% of HS2 traffic and that no
carbon savings would be achieved in operation after a massive
carbon-producing and environmentally-damaging construction phase
lasting half a generation.
5.2 For all the commitment of £32 billion,
there will be no benefits before 2026 whatsoever, the Y-shaped
network will not come into use until 21-22 years from now and
projections have been needed to 2043 to manipulate optimistic
BCRs.
5.3 Alternatives are available which overcome
all such shortcomings and the consultation should be totally revised
to present a balanced picture. Moreover, the DfT consultations
are only being offered at locations on-route, cynically leaving
the rest of the population completely in the dark. Our railway
infrastructure needs continuous improvement for the benefit of
all rail travellers over the whole of the UK not just for a selected
few. Nowhere has the essential commitment that all necessary rail
infrastructure investments outside HS2 will be maintained intact.
There are far more standing passengers off the WCML than on it;
capacity is the problem on many other lines.
5.4 Each family in the land is effectively being
asked to contribute £1,000 from their taxation for the benefit
of a small minority of rail users a long time in the future despite
environmental damage for so many. The Select Committee will doubtless
consider the unenviable task facing the vast majority of MPs in
explaining to their constituents why rail improvements in their
area will have been denied because of the prestige project of
HS2.
5.5 Finally, the fundamental and unforgiveable
weakness of the HS2 proposals is the absence of any credible risk
assessment for such a costly project. I hope that the Select Committee
will be able to delve deeply into the strategic case, its costs
and risks in a balanced scrutiny of an unbalanced proposal.
9 May 2011
30 Reference A: HSR: Investing in Britain's Future-Consultation
February 2011 (DfT) Back
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