Written evidence from Keith Rosling (HSR
58)
INTRODUCTION
My primary reason for opposing HS2 is that I do not
believe that there is a credible demand case, there are numerous
false and misleading assumptions behind the project and as a result,
the business case is fundamentally flawed. In addition, the project
will not have any positive impact on carbon emissions, and will
irretrievably damage areas of the country which are designated
as Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty.
I hope that the Transport Select Committee will recommend
that the project does not proceed.
1. What are the main arguments either for
or against HSR
I believe that the main arguments for HS2, as currently,
presented are invalid and fallacious. The key arguments are:
A. The UK needs HS2 to solve capacity problems
on the West Coast Main Line.
The Government say there is a major capacity issue
that only HS2 can solve. This is not so:
(a) The "best" option is to make incremental
changes against demand; make low cost rolling stock and capacity
changes first; address pinch-points when demand is strong enough.
(b) DfT's own option solves the WCML's capacity
issue through Rail Package 2(RP2) which provides more than the
required capacity at one tenth of the cost in a much shorter timeframe.
(c) Other alternatives have not been properly
considered eg Government's own initiative to reduce travel (by
faster connectivity with broadband, videoconferencing); rail pricing
option.
B. The London to Birmingham HS2 service along
with the extension of HS2 to Manchester will divert passengers
from aviation:
(a) It is highly unlikely that HS2 will produce
a significant shift in passenger journeys from domestic air services.
(b) HS2 can only replace domestic air journeys
served by its route. No one flies between London and Birmingham,
and rail already has 79% of the Manchester market.
(c) Overseas experience shows air could be decimated
if HSR delivers very big reductions in journey times and rail
gets below the 3hr journey threshold. Given the 2011 timetable
already shows Edinburgh can be reached in four hours, albeit by
just one train, the HS2 promise of about 3:30-40 minutes 21 years
later (in 2032), makes any impact on air look marginal, at best.
Please see my response to Question 2
C. HS2 will help to deliver a low carbon economy:
(a) The Government say HS2 will be "broadly
neutral" for carbon. But it is unlikely to even be that.
Please see my response to Question 6 below.
D. HS2 will deliver economic benefits and will
help to bridge the north/south divide:
(a) Government claims for transformational benefits
are based on belief, not evidence. The evidence on regeneration
(where HS2 acts as a catalyst) points to London winning therefore
producing entirely the opposite result to that intended.
(b) The evidence for the wider economic impacts
(of the HS2 investment itself) is also small.
Pleases see my responses to Question 5.
E. HS2 is a sound investment and provides value
for money:
(a) HS2 is not a sound investment providing poor
value for money and is supported by a business case that is flawed.
(b) There is no commercial case for spending
over £30 billion on HS2.
(c) The benefits are overstated.
(d) The demand forecasts are excessive.
(e) There are flaws in the models utilised.
(f) Phase 1, on the DfT own figures only returns
a CBR of 1.6 (well below the Treasury requirement of 2. They are
consulting only on Phase 1, Phase 2 may never happen, there is
little time benefit. They can therefore only take Phase 1 Benefits
in the Business Case otherwise they should consult on the whole
Route.
Please see my answers to Question 3.
F. UK does need to catch up with Europe—many
major European countries have high speed rail networks.
The UK—unlike Europe—has had a fast national
railway system for a long time. As Sir Rod Eddington said in 2006
"…. with [rail] journeys between London and other UK
major cities performing particularly well relative to journeys
from other European capitals." We also have routes capable
of 200km/h (125mph)—and still have quicker rail journey
times between the capital and the five largest cities than in
other major West European countries:
(a) Averaging 145 minutes in UK (or 148 mins
using the same 5 cities as Eddington).
(b) 151 minutes in Spain.
(c) 184 minutes in Italy.
(d) 221minutes in France.
(e) 244 minutes in Germany.
Even Frankfurt/Cologne, which is a comparable distance
and often quoted as a high speed rail success story, is in reality
more like an intercity railway: while it halved its journey time
it brought it down to little less than the fastest train we already
have from Birmingham to London.
2. How does HSR fit with the Government's
transport policy objectives
I believe that it is highly unlikely that HS2 will
produce a significant modal shift in passenger journeys from domestic
air services to HS2:
(a) HS2 can only replace domestic air journeys
served by its route. No one flies between London and Birmingham,
and rail already has 79% of the Manchester market.
(b) For Phase 1 the relevant air market is the
3m per annum who fly the NW/Scottish lowlands route using Heathrow
(just 15% of all passengers), and 6m/a for all London airports
(30% of total).
(c) The full "Y" adds Leeds and Newcastle,
but scheduled flights to Leeds ended in March 2011, and HS2 in
2032 only matches the current fastest train from Newcastle to
London.
The Feb 2011 business case has fewer people switching
from air to HS2:
(a) DfT say 6% of HS2 trips (8,166/day or 2.9
million per annum for Phase 1 switch from air—25% less than
before (11,000/day)—and 6 million per annum for the full
"Y" ie twice the relevant Heathrow route traffic.
(b) To generate even 6% modal shift DfT have
to assume the domestic air market will grow—they say by
128% by 2043 (last year DfT said 178% by 2033)—and their
forecast is no longer constrained by supply, meaning it's not
even real air journeys that switch to HS2. That much real growth
could not occur without extra runway capacity for London.
(c) The NW/Scottish lowlands air route has been
shrinking (by 32% from its 2004 peak), not growing. Some domestic
air routes have grown (where surface transport links are poor,
eg Aberdeen to Exeter), but overall domestic passengers have fallen
by 22% from 2005 peak.
(d) Overseas experience shows air can be decimated
if HSR delivers very big reductions in journey times and rail
gets below the 3 hour journey threshold. Given the 2011 timetable
already shows Edinburgh can be reached in 4 hours, albeit by just
one train, the HS2 promise of about 3:30-40 minutes 21 years later.
3. Business case
I believe the business case is flawed for the following
reasons:
(a) Benefits are overstated by about 60%—they
total more like £19 billion not £44 billion for the
full "Y". The largest benefit (time savings) is based
on all time spent on trains being wasted, with DfT disregarding
this fundamental error on spurious grounds.
(b) Demand forecasts are excessive, they misuse
(through projecting growth for too long—35years) an out
of date forecasting model (with discredited forecasting factors).
This gives a doubling in background demand to 2043—47% higher
than it should be.
(c) Appraisal uses an unrealistic "do minimum"
comparator with virtually no improvements for 35 years and so
inflating the benefits such as reduced crowding and shorter waiting
times between trains. They disregard valid alternatives to improve
the existing railway.
The overall effect of this
is to greatly worsen HS2's value for money. So HS2 in fact delivers
just 30pence to 60pence benefit for every £1 of subsidy spent!
The economic case for HS2 also:
(a) Fails to learn the lessons of HS1 on demand
forecasting and competition.
(b) Takes no account of new technology or Government's
own initiative to reduce travel.
(c) Fails to develop the "best" alternatives,
and repeatedly misrepresents the alternatives it does develop
(including in the March 2010 Command Paper).
(d) Fails to properly explore the uncertainties
in the long term forecasts, despite HS2's sensitivity to the level
of demand forecast.
There is no commercial case for spending over £30
billion on HS2 or justification for its subsidy:
(a) The extra fares (£27 billion) don't
cover the capital (£30.4 billion) and operating costs (£13.9
billion), even for the full "Y" network, so it needs
a subsidy—£17 billion.
(b) The subsidy actually encourages travel (10
million per annum new journeys for Phase 1 alone) despite DfT's
other initiatives to reduce travel, and in particular business
travel.
(c) Existing rail services will worsen—this
is proven in Government's own case for HS2.
(d) It benefits the affluent—47% of long
distance rail travel is by the top 20% earning families.
The Government say there is a major capacity issue
that only HS2 can solve.
This is not so:
— The
"best" option is to make incremental changes against
demand; make low cost rolling stock and capacity changes first;
address pinch-points when demand is strong enough. Rail experts
say the "best" WCML option is:
(a) Rebalance first and standard class; add more
carriages (ultimately to 12 car except for Liverpool). Just this
delivers 67% more capacity (112% in standard class), need not
wait to 2026 and may be possible without any subsidy.
(b) Eliminate the acute crowding problem on the
Northampton/Milton Keynes to Euston commuting services by modifying
Ledburn Jcn without delay.
(c) Do other low cost infrastructure changes
as needed, with the potential for a total of 177% extra standard
class capacity providing an increased train frequency from 9 to
11/hr. This is against DfT's forecast background demand increase
to 2043 of 102%, and delivered at greatly less cost than HS2.
— Rail
experts also say there are low cost 'best' solutions for ECML
and Midland Main Line too.
— DfT's
own option: even the rail options developed for DfT solve WCML's
capacity issue:
(a) Rail Package 2 (RP2) involves more rolling
stock and removing seven pinch-points. This delivers 151% more
capacity against DfT's background demand growth of 102%, not the
54% as Government misleadingly claim .in addition RP2 has less
crowding.
(b) RP2 looks like being over twice the value
for money of HS2 for just one sixth the net cost, and this is
despite Government latest attempts to distort and bury RP2.
(c) RP2 won't be disruption-free but neither
is it comparable with the wholesale replacement of WCML under
the last upgrade, or the 8-year rebuild of Euston that HS2 requires—described
as like "open heart surgery on a conscious patient".
(d) Other alternatives: these are not properly
considered eg Government's own initiative to reduce travel (by
faster connectivity with broadband, videoconferencing); rail pricing
option.
4. The strategic route
The question of the stations along the proposed route
is a secondary consideration in the opinion of our group, as this
pre-supposes that the scheme in its entirety has any merit, which
we believe it does not.
Similarly, considerations of the cities to be served
by HS2 is a question that cannot be answered in the context of:
(a) The lack of need for a new railway.
(b) The fact that unlike the majority of our
European neighbours whom we seem desperate to emulate with high
speed rail, this country already has an extensive and effective
rail network in place.
Government money on the railways would be better
spent on improving local services for commuters and to create
new links using classic rail technology (for example, to provide
a link between Oxford and Cambridge).
Government decisions on linking HS1 to either HS1
or Heathrow are flawed: There is no evidence to substantiate this
level of investment based on either modal shift or expected levels
of European travel.
The experience of HS1, where traffic levels are at
a fraction of those forecasted, and which resulted in a very critical
report to the DfT insisting that more realistic forecasting was
undertaken in future (it has ignored this entirely in the development
of the HS2 case), should provide a salutary lesson that nobody
seems to want to learn.
5. Economic rebalancing and equity
— Evidence
on regeneration (where HS2 acts as a catalyst) in fact points
to London winning
(a) DfT say more than seven out of 10 of the
30,000 jobs created by HS2 around stations will be in London ie
not the Midlands or the North. (Old Oak Common, with 20,000 jobs
wins most).
(b) Most of the jobs claimed will not be genuinely
new jobs but ones that have moved from other areas in the region.
HS2 Ltd concluded this, after consulting respected academics.
(c) DfT say 59% of extra HS2 trips are for leisure;
given DfT assume trips to London grow at twice the rate of those
from London, so more people and more money will go to London.
(d) HS2 impacts on the service sector, in which
London is dominant. So work is more likely to move to London,
not away from it—therefore it is more likely to re-enforce
the North/South divide and not help to bridge it.
— The
evidence for the wider economic impacts (of the HS2 investment
itself) is also small:
(a) The productivity benefit from shorter journey
times is the key benefit, but it's already in the business case
(and is overstated now DfT admit that time-on-board is not wasted).
(b) The Wider Economic Impacts of better connectivity
are relatively small, £4-£6 billion, and are mainly
driven by use of freed-up capacity, which will need a new further
subsidy to realise.
(c) HS2 Ltd asked Imperial College if faster
connectivity had any further direct benefits - they said "very
little" (max £8 million per annum)—but their conclusion
was left out of the White Paper and not even referred to in the
consultation materials.
6. Impact
— The
Government say HS2 will be "broadly neutral" for carbon.
But it is unlikely to even be that:
(a) Trains that travel at 360km/hr use three
times the energy of 200kmph trains.
(b) 87% of journeys on HS2 indisputably create
more emissions—all the brand new journeys (22%) and all
those switching from existing rail services (65%).
(c) DfT say just 6 in every 100 travellers on
HS2 switch from flying. But this assumes the decline in relevant
air routes reverses, and satisfying "suppressed" not
real air demand.
(d) The air emissions savings depend on the freed-up
slots not being used for long haul, which BAA say they will, and
the use of out of date numbers on the modal switch from air.
(e) HS2 Ltd's "Carbon neutral" assertion
requires electricity generation to be significantly "cleaner"
than at present and will rely heavily on alternative sources of
electricity, such a nuclear, wind or wave power. There are no
clear plans in place to achieve the low-carbon electricity generation
required, and recent events with Fukushima in Japan will have
a severe limiting effect on nuclear adoption.
May 2011
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