High Speed Rail - Transport Committee Contents

Written evidence from Heathrow Hub Ltd (HSR 150)


1.  This submission is made by Steven Costello, a Director of Heathrow Hub Ltd, the company that has developed and promoted the Heathrow Hub project to date.

2.  The Select Committee asks a specific question on the proposed HS2 strategic route that is directly relevant to Heathrow—"The Government proposes … a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Is that the right decision?"

3.  The Committee may consider that this raises a wider issue—whether the current HS2 proposal adopts a strategic, intermodal approach, that includes not only Heathrow but also the existing and proposed classic rail network, or if it takes too narrow a view of transport and economic issues.

4.  This is particularly important in the absence of the National Policy Statement on national networks, which HS2 Ltd. considered was required in order to allow their proposals to be assessed [115] and the lack of any aviation industry representation on HS2 Ltd's Challenge Groups.[116]


5.  Following their cancellation of support for a third runway at Heathrow, the Government's current consultation includes medium and long term options for an interchange between HS2 and Heathrow.

6.  Meanwhile, Heathrow faces short term challenges in surface access,[117] air quality,[118] and efficient airport operations,[119] as a result of forecast passenger growth from ca. 66mppa in 2009 to 90-95mppa by 2030,[120] (within the existing constraints of a two runway airport, segregated operations and the legal cap on ATM's).

7.  Historically, the UK has not adopted an integrated, intermodal approach to transport planning. HS2 Ltd. appears to have continued this approach, for example, by failing to address their remit[121] to consider wider transport issues outside of a narrow HS2 corridor between London and Birmingham.[122]

8.  There would appear to be clear benefits in an alternative approach, taking an integrated view of HS2, Heathrow, the classic rail network and Crossrail. Such an approach would also align with EC Transport Policy.

9.  For example, better surface access by rail is essential to accommodate Heathrow's growth without increasing road congestion and worsening air quality, (which already exceeds legal limits). It would also strengthen Heathrow's competitive position as an international hub against other, better connected, European airports with greater runway capacity. Securing Heathrow's future is of vital importance to the UK economy.

10.  HS2 and the classic rail network would in turn benefit from additional, and high value, demand from airport passengers.


11.  The Heathrow Hub proposal was developed prior to Government policy support for High Speed Rail, and proposes a different solution to connecting Heathrow and HS2.

12.  There appears to be a growing consensus that Old Oak Common, some 12km from Heathrow, does not provide a satisfactory solution to linking Heathrow, the world's busiest international airport and UK's only hub, to the UK and Europe's High Speed Rail network.

13.  Government therefore intends to consult at a later date on a spur to Heathrow as a second phase of HS2, (with the future possibility of extending the spur to form a loop). This would continue the legacy approach of diverting transport corridors into the airport, (for example the M4 spur and Heathrow Express/Connect).

14.  Heathrow Hub adopts a different approach. It provides a new airport entry point located directly on the existing road and rail network, with a major intermodal interchange on the Great Western Main Line (GWML), Crossrail and the M25, (a short distance north of its junction with the M4), on a readily developable, unconstrained site less than 4km from Heathrow Terminal 5—similar to the distance between T5 and the new T2.

15.  The proposed site was selected following analysis of a large number of alternatives, (including some within Heathrow's existing site boundary), as providing the optimum range of benefits at an affordable cost, allowing phased delivery and a significant private funding contribution.

16.  Heathrow Hub would provide seamless connections, within a single interchange, between;

Rail, with a new railway station directly located on the GWML, served by Crossrail, regional and inter-city rail services, and the potential to extend any future Airtrack-type scheme, and the Piccadilly Line, to connect with the interchange and GWML services.

High speed rail, directly connecting Heathrow with the UK and mainland Europe.

Road, with direct access to the interchange from the M25 motorway, just north of its junction with the M4.

Air, providing an airport processor, (passenger terminal), able to accommodate forecast passenger growth, and co-located with the railway station. Fast airside transit and baggage links between the processor and satellites, located within the existing airport campus, would allow the Hub to function as an "on-airport" terminal.

17.  The passenger experience would be transformed, with a high frequency "one seat" ride by GWML, Crossrail and HS2 services to the Hub, direct and seamless access to check-in facilities above the station platforms, and an airside transit journey time of only 3.5 minutes to T5A or six minutes to T2A.

18.  The Government's current consultation proposal includes the Hub as one of three alternative sites, for a Heathrow interchange on a spur from HS2,[123] (the other sites being west of T5, and north of the airport close to Bath Road). Of these, only the Hub provides the potential for seamless connectivity between HS2, Heathrow and classic rail, (and the UK motorway network).

19.  This connectivity would generate significant modal shift from road to rail, providing, for the first time, rail access to Heathrow from much of the UK. The resulting passenger demand would justify an airport terminal co-located with the railway station.[124]

20.  Heathrow would be served by all trains[125] on the GWML/Crossrail transport corridor, providing an incomparable service frequency to a wide range of destinations. This would generate greater modal shift from road to rail than, say, a Western Connection, which would continue the approach of diverting services from a limited range of destinations into the airport. This form of connection would have inherent interchange, service frequency and journey time penalties, providing significant disincentives to long distance passengers who, for example, would be required to change at, say, Reading or Maidenhead onto slow, all-station Crossrail services.

21.  The Government's commitment to a direct connection between HS2 and Heathrow is to be welcomed. However, a spur or loop also has inherent service frequency penalties. Although the consultation provides no detail on service frequency and calling pattern, (indeed making no allowance at all for Heathrow services), a spur would inevitably have far fewer and less frequent services compared to an interchange on a direct HS2 route via Heathrow.

22.  A spur also damages HS2's business case—every Heathrow service would take one[126] or more paths that would otherwise be used by a London train. The consultation proposes that Heathrow services would be split and joined, presumably at Birmingham Interchange. This recognises the challenge of providing high capacity services at a high enough frequency to attract passengers, whilst reliant solely on airport generated demand. Such services would also suffer a journey time penalty to allow trains to be split and joined, (and provide adequate timetabled resilience to ensure reliability and the most efficient use of HS2 train paths).

23.  As the consultation has no detail of the proposed spur or service pattern, it is not clear how demand and journey time analysis, in particular HS2 Ltd's monetised values of journey time savings,[127] might impact on the business case for a spur.

24.  The Government's proposal would also mean Heathrow being reliant on a sub-standard, remote interchange at Old Oak Common, (at a time when European hubs are competing on ease of access and intermodality with high speed rail), for at least 20 years—assuming that a spur is in fact eventually found to be viable, fundable and deliverable.

25.  European experience is clear in demonstrating the benefit of airports and High Speed Rail being seamlessly connected by interchanges located on through lines as Heathrow Hub proposes.

26.  Locating additional terminal capacity outside the existing congested, constrained airport boundary would also provide benefits to Heathrow's operational efficiency. By allowing space to be released within the airport for the larger aircraft that will generate growth in passenger numbers, it enables a better passenger experience, improved resilience and shorter taxiing distances, benefiting air quality.

27.  BAA and Arup's joint submission to HS2 Ltd.[128] noted the significant potential demand for an integrated Heathrow/HS2 interchange, as well as the need for the airport to be served by high speed services running directly to the airport, (or to an interchange located as close as possible to it). It also confirmed that the interchange should be located on a site that provided maximum opportunity for the phased development of air terminal facilities co-located with both high speed and conventional rail platforms. The submission also considered that it was essential for the interchange design and location to reduce rail journey times from the West in order to attract journeys that would otherwise be made by car or taxi.

28.  Having reviewed the HS2 consultation material, Heathrow Hub appears to provide a number of benefits compared to Government's current proposal:

—  Heathrow would be served by the first phase of HS2, rather than relying on a sub-standard remote interchange at Old Oak Common until at least 2033, and avoiding the risk that a spur or loop is not constructed.

—  Heathrow would have more space for aircraft, allowing a more efficient layout for operations, reducing the airport's environmental impacts and improving the passenger experience.

—  HS2's business case is improved by connecting to Heathrow, the UK's single largest traffic generator.

—  Heathrow Hub provides both GWML/Crossrail and Heathrow interchange on a single site, reducing costs compared to the separate interchanges required under Government's proposals.

—  The cost of constructing Heathrow Hub, on an unconstrained Greenfield site, is likely to be lower than an Old Oak Common interchange, which requires a sub-surface station to be constructed around the operational railway and proposed Crossrail depot, assumes relocation of the existing Heathrow Express depot and is likely to need local road improvement and/or environmental measures to mitigate impacts on the local community.

—  The cost of a direct route via Heathrow, using Government's own figures, is likely to be no more, and may be significantly less, than the combined cost of a spur and the first phase of HS2 when all costs associated with a spur are included.

—  The environmental impacts of a through route are likely to be lower than a spur route, and its associated land-hungry, delta junction with the main HS2 route. Both the spur and junction would be located within the Green Belt and Colne Valley Regional Park. (An indication of the visual impact is provided by the images in the HS2 Engineering Study).[129] Tunnelling part of the spur would mitigate some impacts, albeit with implications for cost, although it is likely that the junction itself would be either at grade or elevated to meet the main HS2 route at that point.

—  Omitting Old Oak Common allows faster (non-stop) journey times between London and Birmingham.

—  The consultation proposes a route that crosses the widest part of the Chilterns AONB.[130] In contrast, an alignment via Heathrow allows the option of a more southerly alignment for HS2, across the narrowest part of the Chilterns AONB, possibly following the M40 motorway corridor, (assuming some compromise on design speed over this part of the route), reducing HS2's environmental impact and the need for very costly mitigation measures.

—  A connection between HS2 and Brunel's GWML high speed alignment allows possible through running, bringing early benefits to Wales, the west and south west.

—  The cost to the public purse would be reduced by significant private sector funding.


29.  There appear to be a number of flaws in the way HS2 Ltd. have carried out their demand modelling and route option analysis in relation to Heathrow.

30.  Referring to demand modelling, HS2 Ltd. note that Heathrow's catchment is limited to London and part of the South East. However, this appears not to recognise that this is simply a consequence of the airport currently lacking rail access from anywhere other than central London. Hence, HS2 Ltd. have mistakenly assumed that, contrary to European experience, Heathrow's market would remain unchanged with HS2[131]—even if HS2 provided direct rail services, and very attractive journey times, from areas currently outside Heathrow's catchment,[132] (eg Birmingham).[133]

31.  This flawed assumption has been compounded by a significant error in HS2 Ltd's journey time calculations—the original assumption that an HS2 route via Heathrow would incur a nine minute penalty was, subsequently and apparently at a very late stage, corrected to a three minute penalty. This assumes particular significance in view of the importance of journey time savings to HS2 Ltd's business case.

32.  These early assumptions appear to have been fundamental in the decision to adopt an HS2 route that bypassed Heathrow.

33.  Whilst the Coalition Government's revised remit for HS2 to connect with Heathrow is welcome, it is not clear whether HS2 Ltd's original fundamental assumptions have been revisited in order to develop the current proposal for a spur or loop, or whether the current proposal has simply been retrofitted to an otherwise unchanged HS2 alignment.

34.  Whilst there have been recent amendments to HS2 Ltd's modelling following cancellation of a third runway,[134] it is not clear whether the full implications of this for HS2 demand have been modelled.[135]


35.  In addition to these general concerns, there appear to be a number of specific issues, concerning the way in which Heathrow Hub has been appraised in the decision making process.


36.  In their description of Heathrow Hub,[136] HS2 Ltd. correctly state that "the Eastern edge of the site is in the River Colne floodplain." (Much of the area to the north and west of Heathrow lies in the Colne Valley floodplain, including land to the west of T5).

37.  HS2 Ltd. concludes that "any station at Iver would have a major adverse environmental impact with over 50% being within the Colne floodplain with potential to disturb riparian habitat. There would be serious floodplain impacts which would be difficult to mitigate."[137]

38.  In fact, the proposed Heathrow Hub site is largely outside the floodplain, and extensive technical work has been carried out on an engineered solution to ensure that the proposals would have no adverse impact on the functional floodplain.

39.  This form of engineered solution is confirmed as being acceptable to HS2's environmental consultants with respect to HS2's own preferred route, where it is stated that "in total the HS2 preferred route passes across 17km of the highest risk flood areas. Scheme design here would be critical to ensuring that impacts are effectively managed and avoided."[138]

40.  In addition, HS2's route design assumes that "surface routes across flood plain or other land at highest risk of flooding (Flood zone 3) are on viaduct to ensure their protection and to minimise loss of flood storage and impacts on flood water flows",[139] as also proposed for the relatively small area of the Heathrow Hub station platforms, adjoining, and at the same level as, the existing GWML, which runs at high level across the flood plain in this location.


41.  In their description of Heathrow Hub,[140] HS2 Ltd. correctly state that "the proposal envisages that an airport terminal would be integrated with the Hub station, (initially illustrated with a capacity for 30 million passengers per annum). The station and air terminal would be linked to the rest of the airport with a fast and frequent, automated people mover and baggage systems. Arup estimates that the journey time from the Hub to T5 would be 3.5 minutes and six minutes to the Central Terminal Area."

42.  However, HS2 Ltd. elsewhere give various, conflicting descriptions that appear to omit any consideration of the proposed "on-airport" interchange location, airside passenger transit and baggage links with the existing airport campus and the connectivity provided between the GWML, Crossrail and—potentially—the Piccadilly Line. References variously note, for example "a site close to the airport, near Iver, from which all terminals could be served by a people mover,"[141] and "an Iver station … eight to nine minutes off-airport whichever terminal was being used."[142]

43.  Clearly these assumptions fundamentally differ from, and lack the benefits of, an "on-airport" interchange, with HS2 Ltd instead assuming that "a station at Iver would have connections to GWML and potentially to a parkway. However—whilst a link to the airport could be established—it is unlikely to have any connectivity equivalent to a station on the airport. Similarly this is unlikely to have connections to the Piccadilly line or Heathrow Express, and only limited Crossrail services."[143]

44.  These assumptions are critical to the modelling carried out by HS2 Ltd, since "the (Heathrow) station is designed as a modelling construct. It assumes the station is located at Heathrow CTA with cross platform connections to Crossrail and Piccadilly Lines. In practice a Heathrow station is unlikely to deliver all of these connections."[144]

45.  The Government's March 2010 Command Paper on High Speed Rail adds that "a proposal has been made, which HS2 has considered, for a station outside the current airport boundary at Iver"[145] and that the site is "divided from the airport by a "heavily built up area." There is, in fact, no such heavily built up area, or indeed any significant existing development, between the proposed Hub site and Heathrow's boundary.

46.  In the debate that followed the Governments statement on the Command Paper, Lord Adonis responded to the Opposition's support for "a new integrated Heathrow rail hub along the lines of the plan put forward by engineering firm, Arup" by stating that "it is vital to understand that the proposal put forward by Arup is not for a station at Heathrow but at Iver, well outside the boundaries of Heathrow, some two and a half miles away on green belt and in a flood plain. If they do not even understand that their own proposal for what they call an at-airport station is not at Heathrow but two and a half miles away involving a transit journey for every passenger to get to any terminal, and on green belt in a flood plain, then they have not even begun to engage with the reality of the issues. I am not even sure that the noble Baroness understands that that is the policy of her own party.[146]

47.  The current consultation describes "an interchange near Iver in Buckinghamshire with a light rail link to Heathrow. Routing the line via this site shared many of the disadvantages of a direct Heathrow route without offering the benefits of an on-airport station"[147]

48.  In view of the inaccurate nature of these statements, it is of concern that the Heathrow Hub proposal, and in particular the proposal for a co-located airport terminal and railway station, which together provide an "on-airport" station and interchange, has not been properly evaluated. There must be doubt as to whether the "Iver" site that appears to form the basis for HS2's evaluation is, or has similar characteristics to, the Heathrow Hub proposal.

49.  The Command Paper also notes that "the dispersed nature of Heathrow's terminal facilities means that there is no clearly optimal location for a high speed rail station"[148] This assumes that the current dispersed terminal layout represents an optimal situation. In fact, the current situation is a historic legacy and there would be significant benefits, recognised by the airport operator and airlines, in an integrated approach to HS2 and Heathrow, providing the catalyst for fewer terminal facilities and enabling a more efficient airport with reduced environmental impacts.


50.  HS2 Ltd's analysis, which led to fundamental decisions being made on the HS2 route, concluded that "an interchange station would add nine minutes at Heathrow. (The main HS2 report states the penalty for stopping trains at Heathrow is seven minutes. This difference is due to late engineering work which has suggested that our early estimates of the journey were overstated by two minutes. We have not in the time available re-run the model with this revised journey time and the results presented in this chapter are on the basis of a 9 minute journey time"[149]

51.  The current consultation reiterates that "longer journey times would reduce the benefits of an alternative route via Heathrow,"[150] reflecting the emphasis on journey time savings in HS2's business case.

52.  However, the journey time penalty is clarified in the same document as being marginal, "estimated to be around three to four minutes slower than the recommended Route 3, depending on the location of the interchange at Heathrow,"[151] and "the additional route length would entail a longer journey time between London and the West Midlands of three minutes for non-stopping services."[152]


53.  The consultation claims that "this route ("Route 1.5 via Heathrow") … is similar in concept to the route identified by Arup for its "Heathrow Hub" proposal."[153] However, there are very significant differences between the route proposed in connection with the Hub and that assumed by HS2 Ltd, which might be expected to seriously affect its assessment.

54.  For example, the consultation refers to the route "passing close to Fulmer on a low viaduct across the river valley",[154] and which "would pass through"—by implication, on the surface—"the Grade II Langley Park and Black Park Country Park". [155] The route associated with Heathrow Hub did not include such environmentally damaging proposals, but these assumptions presumably contributed to the conclusion that this route, "although it would have less impact on the Chilterns AONB, would adversely affect other sensitive areas."[156]

55.  However, there is conflicting reference to a tunnelled alignment west of the M25, which would presumably avoid these impacts, (albeit at an increased cost). There is also stated to be a speed constraint due to a sharp curve west of the Heathrow interchange. This presumably affects journey time assumptions, but does not accurately reflect the route design associated with Heathrow Hub.[157]

56.  Route 1.5 appears not to have been assessed in the same way, or to the same level of detail, as other options.[158]


57.  HS2 Ltd's assumptions do not accurately represent the connectivity that the Hub would provide.

58.  Examples include placing the "Iver" station on a loop or spur, rather than on the main high speed route,[159] assuming no platforms for international services,[160] and a far more limited service pattern—in particular, omitting the regional and international services and some long distance domestic services, and including a more limited interchange with Crossrail services, than actually proposed.[161]


59.  HS2 Ltd. appears to have assumed an underground station,[162] specifically noted as "not the "Arup Hub" but a below ground box with tracks at—10m (below ground level)"[163]

60.  This has very significant cost implications, as Heathrow Hub proposes a surface station, at the same level as the existing GWML.


61.  HS2 Ltd's analysis of the costs and benefits of connecting to Heathrow appears to consider the full incremental cost of connecting the preferred HS2 route with a spur or loop to the Iver Interchange (or other Heathrow locations). However, their analysis only credits the Iver Interchange with some of the benefits it would generate. It omits those passengers on the Great Western corridor who would want to access Heathrow itself. The demand analysis also omits any demand from, for example, GWML passengers who might interchange at Heathrow onto international services to Europe.[164]

62.  These omissions are specifically noted. For example, "we have not sought to model and analyse the benefits of improved connectivity to Heathrow generally through, for instance, improved western access"[165] and "it is important to note that the model does not analyse the potential market to Heathrow from areas to the west. This means for instance that the model does not forecast the demand to Heathrow from, for example, Reading using a London Interchange station connected to the GWML"[166]

63.  HS2 Ltd. acknowledges that "a Heathrow station does improve journey times for passengers travelling to Heathrow and transferring to/from HS2 to/from locations to the west and south west of London. Our model will understate some of the benefits (of a Heathrow station) since it is designed to focus on HS2 passengers"[167]

64.  However, HS2's analysis of demand for an "Iver station" explicitly confirms its exclusion of any potential demand for access to the airport or HS1 from cities including; Bristol, Cardiff, Reading, Oxford, Slough, Southampton and others.[168]

65.  This appears contrary to Lord Adonis's remit to HS2 Ltd, which stressed the importance of co-ordinating work to address Western access to Heathrow and proposals for high speed rail.[169]


66.  HS2 Ltd's report to Government concludes that "few, if any, London-bound passengers would interchange onto Crossrail at Heathrow since it is too distant from London and the frequency would not be attractive"[170]

67.  However, this appears to disregard the potential, most recently proposed in Network Rail's draft London and South East Route Utilisation Study,[171] to recast GWML services, potentially incorporating Heathrow Express services into Crossrail, Such initiatives, as part of what appears to be a desirable integrated approach to HS2 and the classic network, could allow a much higher frequency of Crossrail trains serving the Hub, with limited stop services reducing journey times to central London destinations.


68.  In view of the above, it is apparent that the Heathrow Hub proposal has not been fully and properly assessed in HS2 Ltd's option appraisals that determined the proposed route. It is also clear that "this option (a route directly serving Heathrow) was developed later than the other alternatives,"[172] and "after the submission of HS2 Ltd's report, published in March 2010, to provide a route option for serving Heathrow via a through route."[173]

69.  Heathrow Hub provides the direct four way connection between Heathrow, HS2, the GWML and Crossrail that was originally specified by Government,[174] and provides far greater benefits, at less cost and with less environmental impact compared to the current consultation proposals.

70.  Although we believe this proposal provides greater benefits than any other option of which we are aware, our primary concern is to ensure that the UK makes the right choices in these critical—and costly—strategic transport decisions.

71.  The decisions made to date by HS2 Ltd. and Government appear fundamentally flawed in their narrow focus on questionable demand and appraisal methodology, rather than a wider consideration of national transport and economic issues drawing on European experience of connections between high speed rail and airports.

72.  In particular, any proposal that HS2 should bypass Heathrow, one of the UK's most important economic assets, and which provides the country with a critical competitive advantage that should not be taken for granted, must be rigorously tested.

73.  Similarly, whilst the current proposal for an HS1/2 link is to be welcomed, it appears short sighted to downgrade what will undoubtedly become a vital umbilical link between the UK and Europe to a single track, slow speed connection.

74.  Arup's promotion, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, of an alternative alignment to British Rail's Channel Tunnel Rail Link, now HS1, always envisaged that this link would be the first stage of an eventual UK high speed network, with a London station designed to allow later extension north and west. It is unfortunate that political issues did not allow this foresight to be carried through to implementation, (although Arup were successful in at least securing a connection from St Pancras to the North London line). St. Pancras provides a splendid gateway, but if, as originally envisaged, London's HS1 station had been designed to allow HS2 to be easily connected to the rest of the UK, many of the current difficulties in linking HS1 and HS2 could be avoided.

75.  Strategic foresight is as important in considering the link between HS1 and HS2 as the interchange between HS2 and Heathrow. It will be a lost opportunity if flawed strategic decisions are made at this critical stage of HS2's planning.

76.  It is hoped that the Select Committee will find this contribution helpful in their important and timely Inquiry.

16 May 2011

115   "The National Policy Statement on national networks … will set the context in which HS2 will be considered"-para. 1.2.10, High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by High Speed Two Ltd. December 2009 Back

116   page 34, ibid. Back

117   "Even without a third runway, absolute numbers requiring surface access to Heathrow will increase dramatically over the next 20 years. In 2001-02, around 27mppa used cars and taxis to access Heathrow. By 2015-20, and assuming a 40% sustainable surface access target has been achieved, this figure will be around 40mppa"-Heathrow Expansion, The London Assembly's response to BAA's consultation on the Interim Masterplan for Heathrow, London Assembly 2003. Back

118   "Compliance … with EU air quality limits…. will require measures to reduce emissions from aviation and other sources, including road traffic, which is a significant contributor"-Adding Capacity at Heathrow, Mayor of London 2008. Back

119   "Heathrow remains constrained by runway capacity. Only larger airplanes using the same finite number of slots … represent potential increased pax until a third runway is built"-Airports UK Pre-sale Report, BAA Funding, Fitch Ratings, Global Infrastructure and Private Finance 2008. Back

120   "Heathrow Airport could reach a passenger throughput that exceeds 90 million passengers per annum with Terminal 5 (paragraph 8.6.3 of the Terminal 5 Main Report)"-Heathrow Airport Interim Masterplan, BAA 2005. Back

121   "The key car modal shift gain is likely to be in respect of access to Heathrow from London, the west and Thames Valley, facilitated by the Heathrow interchange (and local rail enhancements)"-Letter from Sir David Rowlands to Lord Adonis, 13 February 2009. Back

122   "It is important to note that the model does not analyse the potential market to Heathrow from areas to the west. This means for instance that the model does not forecast the demand to Heathrow from (for example) Reading using a London Interchange Station connected to the GWML"-p.25 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back

123   Connecting to Heathrow, DfT Factsheet 2011. Back

124   "Overall, by 2030 the presently untapped market from which the interchange could induce traffic to shift to rail contains up to 36m road journeys and 10m air journeys per year"-Improving Rail Connectivity to Heathrow-Implications for the Development of the Heathrow International Interchange, BAA/Arup October 2009. Back

125   The provision of through lines would however allow non-stopping services to pass through the station at line speed if required. Back

126   "In the case of a spur solution, one complete train path into London would be lost by every train serving and terminating at Heathrow via the spur"-p 49 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back

127   "Early tests suggested that reducing journey times by one minute would provide benefits of around £300-600 million on a fully utilised high speed line"-p 17, HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back

128   "Overall, by 2030 the presently untapped market from which the interchange could induce traffic to shift to rail contains up to 36m road journeys and 10m air journeys per year"-Improving Rail Connectivity to Heathrow-Implications for the Development of the Heathrow International Interchange, BAA/Arup October 2009. Back

129   p 112-121, Delta junction visualisation, Route Engineering Study Final Report: A Report for HS2, Arup December 2009. Back

130   para 3.5.17 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back

131   "Catchment areas for HS2 rail trips contain less than10% of the air passengers accessing Heathrow"-p 8, HS2 Airport Demand Model, SKM February 2010. Back

132   "This model assumes that HS2 will not increase the total number of passengers accessing Heathrow"- p 52 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back

133   "The market for access to Heathrow declines rapidly with distance. Journeys to and from Birmingham account for just 270,000 trips each year" para 3.3.8 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back

134   Modelling and Appraisal Updates and their impact on the HS2 Business Case, A Report for HS2 Ltd, Atkins April 2011. Back

135   "A third runway at Heathrow is included in our central case. If this were not constructed, there might be additional demand for long distance rail trips as pricing and capacity constraints reduce the number of domestic air trips"-para. 4.4.12 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back

136   p 87 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back

137   para 3.3.30 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back

138   p 14 Booz & Temple, Appraisal of Sustainability: A report for HS2, Non technical Summary, December 2009. Back

139   p 8 Booz & Temple, Appraisal of Sustainability: A report for HS2, Non technical Summary, December 2009. Back

140   p 87 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back

141   para 3.3.13 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back

142   para 3.3.37 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back

143   p 48, HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back

144   p 57 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back

145   para 7.6 High Speed Rail, Command Paper March 2010. Back

146   Column 355 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldhansrd/text/100311-0003.htm Back

147   p 25 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future, Consultation, DfT February 2011. Back

148   para 7.5 High Speed Rail, Command Paper March 2010. Back

149   p 56 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back

150   para 5.9 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future, Consultation, DfT February 2011. Back

151   para 68, p137 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future, Consultation, DfT February 2011. Back

152   p 66 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future, Consultation, DfT February 2011. Back

153   p 136 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future" DfT February 2011. Back

154   p 136 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future"-DfT February 2011. Back

155   p 137 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future"-DfT February 2011. Back

156   p 86 and 131 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future"-DfT February 2011. Back

157   "West of the M25 and the station throat, the alignments would dip down to a tunnel portal. On the approach to the tunnel portal, … the horizontal alignment would restrict speeds to 130kph"-page 216 Route Engineering Study Final Report-A Report for HS2, Arup December 2009. Back

158   "This route has not been the subject of a detailed Appraisal of Sustainability as it was decided not to pursue it on the basis of additional cost and journey times. A high level assessment of this route indicated that while it would have a lesser impact on the landscape of the Chilterns, it would affect other sensitive areas"-para 39, p 131 "High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future"-DfT February 2011. Back

159   A through route via Iver is dismissed primarily on grounds of cost, and analysis showing that "the majority of HS2 passengers would want to go to central London rather than to Heathrow" para 3.3.4 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back

160   "Iver-it would comprise 10 platforms (4 high speed platforms, 4 GWML platforms on the fast lines and 2 GWML platforms on the relief lines "-para, 3.3.30 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back

161   "We assume that one train in three would stop at Heathrow. This allows around an hourly service from Heathrow to most destinations"-para 3.3.23 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back

162   "Iver-cut and cover box"-para 3.3.30 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back

163   "It would be a below ground box, with tracks at -10m probably beneath green field site. It would not be the "Arup Hub" which would offer a much wider range of connectional opportunities at a much greater cost"-p 316, Route Engineering Study Final Report-A Report for HS2, Arup December 2009. Back

164   para 9.3.6 of HS2 Demand Model Analysis, March 2010 sets out market segments not considered for the HS1 connection. It also omits any reference to the potential for high speed rail services to compete with flights from international airports on the Great Western corridor (eg Bristol, Southampton, Exeter and Cardiff). Para 9.2.5 indicates that HS2 Ltd's base case for modelling demand for international services includes a 40 minute interchange penalty for transferring between Euston and St. Pancras in London, assuming no direct connection between HS2 and HS1. Back

165   para 3.3.46 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back

166   p 25 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back

167   p 57 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back

168   Page 58 of HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010 states "this suggests that a through station at Heathrow is not attractive for the purposes of HS2. Our model does not, though, have the capability to investigate the benefits of improved connectivity between the airport and passengers in the South East and South West through, for instance, improved connections to the GWML and other rail links such as Airtrack which could be delivered without the need for HS2 to serve a Heathrow station." Back

169   "As you will be aware, the Department is working with BAA and Network Rail to consider conventional rail access to Heathrow, including schemes to improve connections from Heathrow to Reading and other stations on the Great Western Main Line. It will be important to ensure appropriate coordination between this work and the development of proposals by HS2-Letter from Lord Adonis to Sir David Rowlands, 9 March 2009. Back

170   para 3.3.33 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back

171   London and South East Route Utilisation Study, Draft for Consultation, Network Rail December 2010. Back

172   Alternative Routes Considered, Route 1.5 via Heathrow, DfT Factsheet 2011. Back

173  p 136 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future" DfT February 2011. Back

174   "A Heathrow International Hub station on the Great Western line to provide a direct four way interchange between the airport, the new north-south line, existing Great Western rail services and Crossrail, into the heart of London"-Secretary of State for Transport, 15 January 2009. Back

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© Parliamentary copyright 2011
Prepared 8 November 2011