Written evidence from Heathrow Hub Ltd
(HSR 150)
INTRODUCTION
1. This submission is made by Steven Costello,
a Director of Heathrow Hub Ltd, the company that has developed
and promoted the Heathrow Hub project to date.
2. The Select Committee asks a specific question
on the proposed HS2 strategic route that is directly relevant
to Heathrow"The Government proposes
a direct
link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Is that the right decision?"
3. The Committee may consider that this raises
a wider issuewhether the current HS2 proposal adopts a
strategic, intermodal approach, that includes not only Heathrow
but also the existing and proposed classic rail network, or if
it takes too narrow a view of transport and economic issues.
4. This is particularly important in the absence
of the National Policy Statement on national networks, which HS2
Ltd. considered was required in order to allow their proposals
to be assessed [115]
and the lack of any aviation industry representation on HS2 Ltd's
Challenge Groups.[116]
HS2 AND HEATHROW
5. Following their cancellation of support for
a third runway at Heathrow, the Government's current consultation
includes medium and long term options for an interchange between
HS2 and Heathrow.
6. Meanwhile, Heathrow faces short term challenges
in surface access,[117]
air quality,[118]
and efficient airport operations,[119]
as a result of forecast passenger growth from ca. 66mppa in 2009
to 90-95mppa by 2030,[120]
(within the existing constraints of a two runway airport, segregated
operations and the legal cap on ATM's).
7. Historically, the UK has not adopted an integrated,
intermodal approach to transport planning. HS2 Ltd. appears to
have continued this approach, for example, by failing to address
their remit[121]
to consider wider transport issues outside of a narrow HS2 corridor
between London and Birmingham.[122]
8. There would appear to be clear benefits in
an alternative approach, taking an integrated view of HS2, Heathrow,
the classic rail network and Crossrail. Such an approach would
also align with EC Transport Policy.
9. For example, better surface access by rail
is essential to accommodate Heathrow's growth without increasing
road congestion and worsening air quality, (which already exceeds
legal limits). It would also strengthen Heathrow's competitive
position as an international hub against other, better connected,
European airports with greater runway capacity. Securing Heathrow's
future is of vital importance to the UK economy.
10. HS2 and the classic rail network would in
turn benefit from additional, and high value, demand from airport
passengers.
HEATHROW HUB
11. The Heathrow Hub proposal was developed prior
to Government policy support for High Speed Rail, and proposes
a different solution to connecting Heathrow and HS2.
12. There appears to be a growing consensus that
Old Oak Common, some 12km from Heathrow, does not provide a satisfactory
solution to linking Heathrow, the world's busiest international
airport and UK's only hub, to the UK and Europe's High Speed Rail
network.
13. Government therefore intends to consult at
a later date on a spur to Heathrow as a second phase of HS2, (with
the future possibility of extending the spur to form a loop).
This would continue the legacy approach of diverting transport
corridors into the airport, (for example the M4 spur and Heathrow
Express/Connect).
14. Heathrow Hub adopts a different approach.
It provides a new airport entry point located directly on the
existing road and rail network, with a major intermodal interchange
on the Great Western Main Line (GWML), Crossrail and the M25,
(a short distance north of its junction with the M4), on a readily
developable, unconstrained site less than 4km from Heathrow Terminal
5similar to the distance between T5 and the new T2.
15. The proposed site was selected following
analysis of a large number of alternatives, (including some within
Heathrow's existing site boundary), as providing the optimum range
of benefits at an affordable cost, allowing phased delivery and
a significant private funding contribution.
16. Heathrow Hub would provide seamless connections,
within a single interchange, between;
Rail, with a new railway
station directly located on the GWML, served by Crossrail, regional
and inter-city rail services, and the potential to extend any
future Airtrack-type scheme, and the Piccadilly Line, to connect
with the interchange and GWML services.
High speed rail, directly
connecting Heathrow with the UK and mainland Europe.
Road, with direct access
to the interchange from the M25 motorway, just north of its junction
with the M4.
Air, providing an airport
processor, (passenger terminal), able to accommodate forecast
passenger growth, and co-located with the railway station. Fast
airside transit and baggage links between the processor and satellites,
located within the existing airport campus, would allow the Hub
to function as an "on-airport" terminal.
17. The passenger experience would be transformed,
with a high frequency "one seat" ride by GWML, Crossrail
and HS2 services to the Hub, direct and seamless access to check-in
facilities above the station platforms, and an airside transit
journey time of only 3.5 minutes to T5A or six minutes to T2A.
18. The Government's current consultation proposal
includes the Hub as one of three alternative sites, for a Heathrow
interchange on a spur from HS2,[123]
(the other sites being west of T5, and north of the airport close
to Bath Road). Of these, only the Hub provides the potential for
seamless connectivity between HS2, Heathrow and classic rail,
(and the UK motorway network).
19. This connectivity would generate significant
modal shift from road to rail, providing, for the first time,
rail access to Heathrow from much of the UK. The resulting passenger
demand would justify an airport terminal co-located with the railway
station.[124]
20. Heathrow would be served by all trains[125]
on the GWML/Crossrail transport corridor, providing an incomparable
service frequency to a wide range of destinations. This would
generate greater modal shift from road to rail than, say, a Western
Connection, which would continue the approach of diverting services
from a limited range of destinations into the airport. This form
of connection would have inherent interchange, service frequency
and journey time penalties, providing significant disincentives
to long distance passengers who, for example, would be required
to change at, say, Reading or Maidenhead onto slow, all-station
Crossrail services.
21. The Government's commitment to a direct connection
between HS2 and Heathrow is to be welcomed. However, a spur or
loop also has inherent service frequency penalties. Although the
consultation provides no detail on service frequency and calling
pattern, (indeed making no allowance at all for Heathrow services),
a spur would inevitably have far fewer and less frequent services
compared to an interchange on a direct HS2 route via Heathrow.
22. A spur also damages HS2's business caseevery
Heathrow service would take one[126]
or more paths that would otherwise be used by a London train.
The consultation proposes that Heathrow services would be split
and joined, presumably at Birmingham Interchange. This recognises
the challenge of providing high capacity services at a high enough
frequency to attract passengers, whilst reliant solely on airport
generated demand. Such services would also suffer a journey time
penalty to allow trains to be split and joined, (and provide adequate
timetabled resilience to ensure reliability and the most efficient
use of HS2 train paths).
23. As the consultation has no detail of the
proposed spur or service pattern, it is not clear how demand and
journey time analysis, in particular HS2 Ltd's monetised values
of journey time savings,[127]
might impact on the business case for a spur.
24. The Government's proposal would also mean
Heathrow being reliant on a sub-standard, remote interchange at
Old Oak Common, (at a time when European hubs are competing on
ease of access and intermodality with high speed rail), for at
least 20 yearsassuming that a spur is in fact eventually
found to be viable, fundable and deliverable.
25. European experience is clear in demonstrating
the benefit of airports and High Speed Rail being seamlessly connected
by interchanges located on through lines as Heathrow Hub proposes.
26. Locating additional terminal capacity outside
the existing congested, constrained airport boundary would also
provide benefits to Heathrow's operational efficiency. By allowing
space to be released within the airport for the larger aircraft
that will generate growth in passenger numbers, it enables a better
passenger experience, improved resilience and shorter taxiing
distances, benefiting air quality.
27. BAA and Arup's joint submission to HS2 Ltd.[128]
noted the significant potential demand for an integrated Heathrow/HS2
interchange, as well as the need for the airport to be served
by high speed services running directly to the airport, (or to
an interchange located as close as possible to it). It also confirmed
that the interchange should be located on a site that provided
maximum opportunity for the phased development of air terminal
facilities co-located with both high speed and conventional rail
platforms. The submission also considered that it was essential
for the interchange design and location to reduce rail journey
times from the West in order to attract journeys that would otherwise
be made by car or taxi.
28. Having reviewed the HS2 consultation material,
Heathrow Hub appears to provide a number of benefits compared
to Government's current proposal:
Heathrow
would be served by the first phase of HS2, rather than relying
on a sub-standard remote interchange at Old Oak Common until at
least 2033, and avoiding the risk that a spur or loop is not constructed.
Heathrow
would have more space for aircraft, allowing a more efficient
layout for operations, reducing the airport's environmental impacts
and improving the passenger experience.
HS2's
business case is improved by connecting to Heathrow, the UK's
single largest traffic generator.
Heathrow
Hub provides both GWML/Crossrail and Heathrow interchange on a
single site, reducing costs compared to the separate interchanges
required under Government's proposals.
The
cost of constructing Heathrow Hub, on an unconstrained Greenfield
site, is likely to be lower than an Old Oak Common interchange,
which requires a sub-surface station to be constructed around
the operational railway and proposed Crossrail depot, assumes
relocation of the existing Heathrow Express depot and is likely
to need local road improvement and/or environmental measures to
mitigate impacts on the local community.
The
cost of a direct route via Heathrow, using Government's own figures,
is likely to be no more, and may be significantly less, than the
combined cost of a spur and the first phase of HS2 when all costs
associated with a spur are included.
The
environmental impacts of a through route are likely to be lower
than a spur route, and its associated land-hungry, delta junction
with the main HS2 route. Both the spur and junction would be located
within the Green Belt and Colne Valley Regional Park. (An indication
of the visual impact is provided by the images in the HS2 Engineering
Study).[129]
Tunnelling part of the spur would mitigate some impacts, albeit
with implications for cost, although it is likely that the junction
itself would be either at grade or elevated to meet the main HS2
route at that point.
Omitting
Old Oak Common allows faster (non-stop) journey times between
London and Birmingham.
The
consultation proposes a route that crosses the widest part of
the Chilterns AONB.[130]
In contrast, an alignment via Heathrow allows the option of a
more southerly alignment for HS2, across the narrowest part of
the Chilterns AONB, possibly following the M40 motorway corridor,
(assuming some compromise on design speed over this part of the
route), reducing HS2's environmental impact and the need for very
costly mitigation measures.
A connection
between HS2 and Brunel's GWML high speed alignment allows possible
through running, bringing early benefits to Wales, the west and
south west.
The
cost to the public purse would be reduced by significant private
sector funding.
HS2 LTD'S
ANALYSIS OF
HEATHROW
29. There appear to be a number of flaws in the
way HS2 Ltd. have carried out their demand modelling and route
option analysis in relation to Heathrow.
30. Referring to demand modelling, HS2 Ltd. note
that Heathrow's catchment is limited to London and part of the
South East. However, this appears not to recognise that this is
simply a consequence of the airport currently lacking rail access
from anywhere other than central London. Hence, HS2 Ltd. have
mistakenly assumed that, contrary to European experience, Heathrow's
market would remain unchanged with HS2[131]even
if HS2 provided direct rail services, and very attractive journey
times, from areas currently outside Heathrow's catchment,[132]
(eg Birmingham).[133]
31. This flawed assumption has been compounded
by a significant error in HS2 Ltd's journey time calculationsthe
original assumption that an HS2 route via Heathrow would incur
a nine minute penalty was, subsequently and apparently at a very
late stage, corrected to a three minute penalty. This assumes
particular significance in view of the importance of journey time
savings to HS2 Ltd's business case.
32. These early assumptions appear to have been
fundamental in the decision to adopt an HS2 route that bypassed
Heathrow.
33. Whilst the Coalition Government's revised
remit for HS2 to connect with Heathrow is welcome, it is not clear
whether HS2 Ltd's original fundamental assumptions have been revisited
in order to develop the current proposal for a spur or loop, or
whether the current proposal has simply been retrofitted to an
otherwise unchanged HS2 alignment.
34. Whilst there have been recent amendments
to HS2 Ltd's modelling following cancellation of a third runway,[134]
it is not clear whether the full implications of this for HS2
demand have been modelled.[135]
HS2 LTD'S
ANALYSIS OF
HEATHROW HUB
35. In addition to these general concerns, there
appear to be a number of specific issues, concerning the way in
which Heathrow Hub has been appraised in the decision making process.
HEATHROW HUB
SITE CONSTRAINTS
36. In their description of Heathrow Hub,[136]
HS2 Ltd. correctly state that "the Eastern edge of the
site is in the River Colne floodplain." (Much of the
area to the north and west of Heathrow lies in the Colne Valley
floodplain, including land to the west of T5).
37. HS2 Ltd. concludes that "any station
at Iver would have a major adverse environmental impact with over
50% being within the Colne floodplain with potential to
disturb riparian habitat. There would be serious floodplain impacts
which would be difficult to mitigate."[137]
38. In fact, the proposed Heathrow Hub site is
largely outside the floodplain, and extensive technical work has
been carried out on an engineered solution to ensure that the
proposals would have no adverse impact on the functional floodplain.
39. This form of engineered solution is confirmed
as being acceptable to HS2's environmental consultants with respect
to HS2's own preferred route, where it is stated that "in
total the HS2 preferred route passes across 17km of the highest
risk flood areas. Scheme design here would be critical to ensuring
that impacts are effectively managed and avoided."[138]
40. In addition, HS2's route design assumes that
"surface routes across flood plain or other land at highest
risk of flooding (Flood zone 3) are on viaduct to ensure their
protection and to minimise loss of flood storage and impacts on
flood water flows",[139]
as also proposed for the relatively small area of the Heathrow
Hub station platforms, adjoining, and at the same level as, the
existing GWML, which runs at high level across the flood plain
in this location.
HEATHROW HUB
AND HEATHROW
AIRPORT
41. In their description of Heathrow Hub,[140]
HS2 Ltd. correctly state that "the proposal envisages that
an airport terminal would be integrated with the Hub station,
(initially illustrated with a capacity for 30 million passengers
per annum). The station and air terminal would be linked to the
rest of the airport with a fast and frequent, automated people
mover and baggage systems. Arup estimates that the journey time
from the Hub to T5 would be 3.5 minutes and six minutes to the
Central Terminal Area."
42. However, HS2 Ltd. elsewhere give various,
conflicting descriptions that appear to omit any consideration
of the proposed "on-airport" interchange location, airside
passenger transit and baggage links with the existing airport
campus and the connectivity provided between the GWML, Crossrail
andpotentiallythe Piccadilly Line. References variously
note, for example "a site close to the airport, near Iver,
from which all terminals could be served by a people mover,"[141]
and "an Iver station
eight to nine minutes off-airport
whichever terminal was being used."[142]
43. Clearly these assumptions fundamentally differ
from, and lack the benefits of, an "on-airport" interchange,
with HS2 Ltd instead assuming that "a station at Iver would
have connections to GWML and potentially to a parkway. Howeverwhilst
a link to the airport could be establishedit is unlikely
to have any connectivity equivalent to a station on the airport.
Similarly this is unlikely to have connections to the Piccadilly
line or Heathrow Express, and only limited Crossrail services."[143]
44. These assumptions are critical to the modelling
carried out by HS2 Ltd, since "the (Heathrow) station is
designed as a modelling construct. It assumes the station is located
at Heathrow CTA with cross platform connections to Crossrail and
Piccadilly Lines. In practice a Heathrow station is unlikely to
deliver all of these connections."[144]
45. The Government's March 2010 Command Paper
on High Speed Rail adds that "a proposal has been made, which
HS2 has considered, for a station outside the current airport
boundary at Iver"[145]
and that the site is "divided from the airport by a "heavily
built up area." There is, in fact, no such heavily built
up area, or indeed any significant existing development, between
the proposed Hub site and Heathrow's boundary.
46. In the debate that followed the Governments
statement on the Command Paper, Lord Adonis responded to the Opposition's
support for "a new integrated Heathrow rail hub along the
lines of the plan put forward by engineering firm, Arup"
by stating that "it is vital to understand that the proposal
put forward by Arup is not for a station at Heathrow but at Iver,
well outside the boundaries of Heathrow, some two and a half miles
away on green belt and in a flood plain. If they do not even understand
that their own proposal for what they call an at-airport station
is not at Heathrow but two and a half miles away involving a transit
journey for every passenger to get to any terminal, and on green
belt in a flood plain, then they have not even begun to engage
with the reality of the issues. I am not even sure that the noble
Baroness understands that that is the policy of her own party.[146]
47. The current consultation describes "an
interchange near Iver in Buckinghamshire with a light rail link
to Heathrow. Routing the line via this site shared many of the
disadvantages of a direct Heathrow route without offering the
benefits of an on-airport station"[147]
48. In view of the inaccurate nature of these
statements, it is of concern that the Heathrow Hub proposal, and
in particular the proposal for a co-located airport terminal and
railway station, which together provide an "on-airport"
station and interchange, has not been properly evaluated. There
must be doubt as to whether the "Iver" site that
appears to form the basis for HS2's evaluation is, or has similar
characteristics to, the Heathrow Hub proposal.
49. The Command Paper also notes that "the
dispersed nature of Heathrow's terminal facilities means that
there is no clearly optimal location for a high speed rail station"[148]
This assumes that the current dispersed terminal layout represents
an optimal situation. In fact, the current situation is a historic
legacy and there would be significant benefits, recognised by
the airport operator and airlines, in an integrated approach to
HS2 and Heathrow, providing the catalyst for fewer terminal facilities
and enabling a more efficient airport with reduced environmental
impacts.
HEATHROW HUB
AND HS2 JOURNEY
TIME
50. HS2 Ltd's analysis, which led to fundamental
decisions being made on the HS2 route, concluded that "an
interchange station would add nine minutes at Heathrow. (The main
HS2 report states the penalty for stopping trains at Heathrow
is seven minutes. This difference is due to late engineering work
which has suggested that our early estimates of the journey were
overstated by two minutes. We have not in the time available re-run
the model with this revised journey time and the results presented
in this chapter are on the basis of a 9 minute journey time"[149]
51. The current consultation reiterates that
"longer journey times would reduce the benefits of an alternative
route via Heathrow,"[150]
reflecting the emphasis on journey time savings in HS2's business
case.
52. However, the journey time penalty is clarified
in the same document as being marginal, "estimated to be
around three to four minutes slower than the recommended Route
3, depending on the location of the interchange at Heathrow,"[151]
and "the additional route length would entail a longer journey
time between London and the West Midlands of three minutes for
non-stopping services."[152]
HEATHROW HUB
AND HS2 ROUTE
53. The consultation claims that "this
route ("Route 1.5 via Heathrow")
is similar
in concept to the route identified by Arup for its "Heathrow
Hub" proposal."[153]
However, there are very significant differences between the route
proposed in connection with the Hub and that assumed by HS2 Ltd,
which might be expected to seriously affect its assessment.
54. For example, the consultation refers to the
route "passing close to Fulmer on a low viaduct across
the river valley",[154]
and which "would pass through"by implication,
on the surface"the Grade II Langley Park and Black
Park Country Park". [155]
The route associated with Heathrow Hub did not include such environmentally
damaging proposals, but these assumptions presumably contributed
to the conclusion that this route, "although it would
have less impact on the Chilterns AONB, would adversely affect
other sensitive areas."[156]
55. However, there is conflicting reference to
a tunnelled alignment west of the M25, which would presumably
avoid these impacts, (albeit at an increased cost). There is also
stated to be a speed constraint due to a sharp curve west of the
Heathrow interchange. This presumably affects journey time assumptions,
but does not accurately reflect the route design associated with
Heathrow Hub.[157]
56. Route 1.5 appears not to have been assessed
in the same way, or to the same level of detail, as other options.[158]
HEATHROW HUB
CONNECTIVITY
57. HS2 Ltd's assumptions do not accurately represent
the connectivity that the Hub would provide.
58. Examples include placing the "Iver"
station on a loop or spur, rather than on the main high speed
route,[159]
assuming no platforms for international services,[160]
and a far more limited service patternin particular, omitting
the regional and international services and some long distance
domestic services, and including a more limited interchange with
Crossrail services, than actually proposed.[161]
HEATHROW HUB
AND HS2 COST
59. HS2 Ltd. appears to have assumed an underground
station,[162]
specifically noted as "not the "Arup Hub" but
a below ground box with tracks at10m (below ground level)"[163]
60. This has very significant cost implications,
as Heathrow Hub proposes a surface station, at the same level
as the existing GWML.
HEATHROW HUB
AND HS2 COST
BENEFIT ANALYSIS
61. HS2 Ltd's analysis of the costs and benefits
of connecting to Heathrow appears to consider the full incremental
cost of connecting the preferred HS2 route with a spur or loop
to the Iver Interchange (or other Heathrow locations). However,
their analysis only credits the Iver Interchange with some of
the benefits it would generate. It omits those passengers on the
Great Western corridor who would want to access Heathrow itself.
The demand analysis also omits any demand from, for example, GWML
passengers who might interchange at Heathrow onto international
services to Europe.[164]
62. These omissions are specifically noted. For
example, "we have not sought to model and analyse the
benefits of improved connectivity to Heathrow generally through,
for instance, improved western access"[165]
and "it is important to note that the model does not analyse
the potential market to Heathrow from areas to the west. This
means for instance that the model does not forecast the demand
to Heathrow from, for example, Reading using a London Interchange
station connected to the GWML"[166]
63. HS2 Ltd. acknowledges that "a Heathrow
station does improve journey times for passengers travelling to
Heathrow and transferring to/from HS2 to/from locations to the
west and south west of London. Our model will understate some
of the benefits (of a Heathrow station) since it is designed to
focus on HS2 passengers"[167]
64. However, HS2's analysis of demand for an
"Iver station" explicitly confirms its exclusion
of any potential demand for access to the airport or HS1 from
cities including; Bristol, Cardiff, Reading, Oxford, Slough, Southampton
and others.[168]
65. This appears contrary to Lord Adonis's remit
to HS2 Ltd, which stressed the importance of co-ordinating work
to address Western access to Heathrow and proposals for high speed
rail.[169]
HEATHROW HUB
AND HS2 DISPERSAL
66. HS2 Ltd's report to Government concludes
that "few, if any, London-bound passengers would interchange
onto Crossrail at Heathrow since it is too distant from London
and the frequency would not be attractive"[170]
67. However, this appears to disregard the potential,
most recently proposed in Network Rail's draft London and South
East Route Utilisation Study,[171]
to recast GWML services, potentially incorporating Heathrow Express
services into Crossrail, Such initiatives, as part of what appears
to be a desirable integrated approach to HS2 and the classic network,
could allow a much higher frequency of Crossrail trains serving
the Hub, with limited stop services reducing journey times to
central London destinations.
CONCLUSION
68. In view of the above, it is apparent that
the Heathrow Hub proposal has not been fully and properly assessed
in HS2 Ltd's option appraisals that determined the proposed route.
It is also clear that "this option (a route directly serving
Heathrow) was developed later than the other alternatives,"[172]
and "after the submission of HS2 Ltd's report, published
in March 2010, to provide a route option for serving Heathrow
via a through route."[173]
69. Heathrow Hub provides the direct four way
connection between Heathrow, HS2, the GWML and Crossrail that
was originally specified by Government,[174]
and provides far greater benefits, at less cost and with less
environmental impact compared to the current consultation proposals.
70. Although we believe this proposal provides
greater benefits than any other option of which we are aware,
our primary concern is to ensure that the UK makes the right choices
in these criticaland costlystrategic transport decisions.
71. The decisions made to date by HS2 Ltd. and
Government appear fundamentally flawed in their narrow focus on
questionable demand and appraisal methodology, rather than a wider
consideration of national transport and economic issues drawing
on European experience of connections between high speed rail
and airports.
72. In particular, any proposal that HS2 should
bypass Heathrow, one of the UK's most important economic assets,
and which provides the country with a critical competitive advantage
that should not be taken for granted, must be rigorously tested.
73. Similarly, whilst the current proposal for
an HS1/2 link is to be welcomed, it appears short sighted to downgrade
what will undoubtedly become a vital umbilical link between the
UK and Europe to a single track, slow speed connection.
74. Arup's promotion, during the late 1980s and
early 1990s, of an alternative alignment to British Rail's Channel
Tunnel Rail Link, now HS1, always envisaged that this link would
be the first stage of an eventual UK high speed network, with
a London station designed to allow later extension north and west.
It is unfortunate that political issues did not allow this foresight
to be carried through to implementation, (although Arup were successful
in at least securing a connection from St Pancras to the North
London line). St. Pancras provides a splendid gateway, but if,
as originally envisaged, London's HS1 station had been designed
to allow HS2 to be easily connected to the rest of the UK, many
of the current difficulties in linking HS1 and HS2 could be avoided.
75. Strategic foresight is as important in considering
the link between HS1 and HS2 as the interchange between HS2 and
Heathrow. It will be a lost opportunity if flawed strategic decisions
are made at this critical stage of HS2's planning.
76. It is hoped that the Select Committee will
find this contribution helpful in their important and timely Inquiry.
16 May 2011
115 "The National Policy Statement on national
networks
will set the context in which HS2 will be considered"-para.
1.2.10, High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond,
A Report to Government by High Speed Two Ltd. December 2009 Back
116
page 34, ibid. Back
117
"Even without a third runway, absolute numbers requiring
surface access to Heathrow will increase dramatically over the
next 20 years. In 2001-02, around 27mppa used cars and taxis to
access Heathrow. By 2015-20, and assuming a 40% sustainable surface
access target has been achieved, this figure will be around 40mppa"-Heathrow
Expansion, The London Assembly's response to BAA's consultation
on the Interim Masterplan for Heathrow, London Assembly 2003. Back
118
"Compliance
with EU air quality limits
. will
require measures to reduce emissions from aviation and other sources,
including road traffic, which is a significant contributor"-Adding
Capacity at Heathrow, Mayor of London 2008. Back
119
"Heathrow remains constrained by runway capacity. Only larger
airplanes using the same finite number of slots
represent
potential increased pax until a third runway is built"-Airports
UK Pre-sale Report, BAA Funding, Fitch Ratings, Global Infrastructure
and Private Finance 2008. Back
120
"Heathrow Airport could reach a passenger throughput that
exceeds 90 million passengers per annum with Terminal 5 (paragraph
8.6.3 of the Terminal 5 Main Report)"-Heathrow Airport Interim
Masterplan, BAA 2005. Back
121
"The key car modal shift gain is likely to be in respect
of access to Heathrow from London, the west and Thames Valley,
facilitated by the Heathrow interchange (and local rail enhancements)"-Letter
from Sir David Rowlands to Lord Adonis, 13 February 2009. Back
122
"It is important to note that the model does not analyse
the potential market to Heathrow from areas to the west. This
means for instance that the model does not forecast the demand
to Heathrow from (for example) Reading using a London Interchange
Station connected to the GWML"-p.25 HS2 Demand
Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back
123
Connecting to Heathrow, DfT Factsheet 2011. Back
124
"Overall, by 2030 the presently untapped market from which
the interchange could induce traffic to shift to rail contains
up to 36m road journeys and 10m air journeys per year"-Improving
Rail Connectivity to Heathrow-Implications for the Development
of the Heathrow International Interchange, BAA/Arup October 2009. Back
125
The provision of through lines would however allow non-stopping
services to pass through the station at line speed if required. Back
126
"In the case of a spur solution, one complete train path
into London would be lost by every train serving and terminating
at Heathrow via the spur"-p 49 HS2 Demand Model Analysis,
HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back
127
"Early tests suggested that reducing journey times by
one minute would provide benefits of around £300-600 million
on a fully utilised high speed line"-p 17, HS2 Demand
Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back
128
"Overall, by 2030 the presently untapped market from which
the interchange could induce traffic to shift to rail contains
up to 36m road journeys and 10m air journeys per year"-Improving
Rail Connectivity to Heathrow-Implications for the Development
of the Heathrow International Interchange, BAA/Arup October 2009. Back
129
p 112-121, Delta junction visualisation, Route Engineering Study
Final Report: A Report for HS2, Arup December 2009. Back
130
para 3.5.17 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond,
A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back
131
"Catchment areas for HS2 rail trips contain less than10%
of the air passengers accessing Heathrow"-p 8, HS2 Airport
Demand Model, SKM February 2010. Back
132
"This model assumes that HS2 will not increase the total
number of passengers accessing Heathrow"- p 52 HS2 Demand
Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back
133
"The market for access to Heathrow declines rapidly with
distance. Journeys to and from Birmingham account for just 270,000
trips each year" para 3.3.8 High Speed Rail, London to
the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd,
December 2009. Back
134
Modelling and Appraisal Updates and their impact on the HS2 Business
Case, A Report for HS2 Ltd, Atkins April 2011. Back
135
"A third runway at Heathrow is included in our central
case. If this were not constructed, there might be additional
demand for long distance rail trips as pricing and capacity constraints
reduce the number of domestic air trips"-para. 4.4.12
High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report
to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back
136
p 87 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond,
A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back
137
para 3.3.30 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond,
A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back
138
p 14 Booz & Temple, Appraisal of Sustainability: A report
for HS2, Non technical Summary, December 2009. Back
139
p 8 Booz & Temple, Appraisal of Sustainability: A report for
HS2, Non technical Summary, December 2009. Back
140
p 87 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond,
A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back
141
para 3.3.13 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond,
A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back
142
para 3.3.37 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond,
A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back
143
p 48, HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back
144
p 57 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back
145
para 7.6 High Speed Rail, Command Paper March 2010. Back
146
Column 355 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldhansrd/text/100311-0003.htm Back
147
p 25 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future, Consultation,
DfT February 2011. Back
148
para 7.5 High Speed Rail, Command Paper March 2010. Back
149
p 56 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back
150
para 5.9 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future, Consultation,
DfT February 2011. Back
151
para 68, p137 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future,
Consultation, DfT February 2011. Back
152
p 66 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future, Consultation,
DfT February 2011. Back
153
p 136 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future" DfT
February 2011. Back
154
p 136 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future"-DfT
February 2011. Back
155
p 137 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future"-DfT
February 2011. Back
156
p 86 and 131 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future"-DfT
February 2011. Back
157
"West of the M25 and the station throat, the alignments
would dip down to a tunnel portal. On the approach to the tunnel
portal,
the horizontal alignment would restrict speeds
to 130kph"-page 216 Route Engineering Study Final Report-A
Report for HS2, Arup December 2009. Back
158
"This route has not been the subject of a detailed Appraisal
of Sustainability as it was decided not to pursue it on the basis
of additional cost and journey times. A high level assessment
of this route indicated that while it would have a lesser impact
on the landscape of the Chilterns, it would affect other sensitive
areas"-para 39, p 131 "High Speed Rail: Investing
in Britain's Future"-DfT February 2011. Back
159
A through route via Iver is dismissed primarily on grounds of
cost, and analysis showing that "the majority of HS2 passengers
would want to go to central London rather than to Heathrow"
para 3.3.4 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond,
A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back
160
"Iver-it would comprise 10 platforms (4 high speed platforms,
4 GWML platforms on the fast lines and 2 GWML platforms on the
relief lines "-para, 3.3.30 High Speed Rail, London to
the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2
Ltd, December 2009. Back
161
"We assume that one train in three would stop at Heathrow.
This allows around an hourly service from Heathrow to most destinations"-para
3.3.23 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond,
A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back
162
"Iver-cut and cover box"-para 3.3.30 High Speed
Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government
by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back
163
"It would be a below ground box, with tracks at -10m probably
beneath green field site. It would not be the "Arup Hub"
which would offer a much wider range of connectional opportunities
at a much greater cost"-p 316, Route Engineering Study
Final Report-A Report for HS2, Arup December 2009. Back
164
para 9.3.6 of HS2 Demand Model Analysis, March 2010 sets out market
segments not considered for the HS1 connection. It also omits
any reference to the potential for high speed rail services to
compete with flights from international airports on the Great
Western corridor (eg Bristol, Southampton, Exeter and Cardiff).
Para 9.2.5 indicates that HS2 Ltd's base case for modelling demand
for international services includes a 40 minute interchange penalty
for transferring between Euston and St. Pancras in London, assuming
no direct connection between HS2 and HS1. Back
165
para 3.3.46 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond,
A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back
166
p 25 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back
167
p 57 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010. Back
168
Page 58 of HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010 states
"this suggests that a through station at Heathrow is not
attractive for the purposes of HS2. Our model does not, though,
have the capability to investigate the benefits of improved connectivity
between the airport and passengers in the South East and South
West through, for instance, improved connections to the GWML and
other rail links such as Airtrack which could be delivered without
the need for HS2 to serve a Heathrow station." Back
169
"As you will be aware, the Department is working with
BAA and Network Rail to consider conventional rail access to Heathrow,
including schemes to improve connections from Heathrow to Reading
and other stations on the Great Western Main Line. It will be
important to ensure appropriate coordination between this work
and the development of proposals by HS2-Letter from Lord Adonis
to Sir David Rowlands, 9 March 2009. Back
170
para 3.3.33 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond,
A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009. Back
171
London and South East Route Utilisation Study, Draft for Consultation,
Network Rail December 2010. Back
172
Alternative Routes Considered, Route 1.5 via Heathrow, DfT Factsheet
2011. Back
173 p
136 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future" DfT February
2011. Back
174
"A Heathrow International Hub station on the Great Western
line to provide a direct four way interchange between the airport,
the new north-south line, existing Great Western rail services
and Crossrail, into the heart of London"-Secretary of
State for Transport, 15 January 2009. Back
|