Further written evidence from the Department
of Transport (HSR 167A)
RESPONSES TO
QUESTIONS FROM
THE TRANSPORT
SELECT COMMITTEE
In response to your letter of 18 July to Sir Brian
Briscoe of HS2 Ltd, the Department has agreed with HS2 Ltd to
provide answers to your questions 5, 6 and 16. This letter provides
the Department's responses.
In addition, I attach a paper with responses to a
number of the questions raised by Oxera in its recent review of
the Economic Case for HS2. These questions relate to wider
issues for which DfT has responsibility; the remainder of Oxera's
questions, which deal more directly with the details of the economic
case, will be answered separately by HS2 Ltd.
It should be noted that the public consultation period
on HS2 only recently closed. The answers below reflect the Government's
current view, and the evidence which underpinned the consultation
documents, but the Committee should recognise that no final decisions
will be taken by Ministers until the analysis of consultation
responses (which is still at an early stage) has been completed
and any new evidence considered.
5. We have received submissions (eg from 51M)
that substantial extra capacity could be provided quickly
and at relatively low cost by lengthening WCML trains to 12 car
sets, and (especially relevant for commuters from Milton Keynes
and Northampton) by operating additional trains enabled by a
new grade separated flyover junction eg at Ledburn. Do you
have any comments on this?
The Government has not at this stage carried out
a full analysis of the 51M Group's proposals, but at the strategic
level, its current view is that no package of upgrades to existing
lines could offer the same level or range of benefits as a new
high speed line.
The capacity increase offered by the 51M proposal,
although slightly higher than that offered by Atkins' Rail Package
2, is still comparatively low - only around 30% on long-distance
services, for example, than the capacity available following completion
of the committed Pendolino lengthening programme. Furthermore,
to accommodate the 12-car sets needed to deliver even this capacity
increase, significant investment in platform lengthening, plus
track and/or signalling remodelling in some locations, would be
required, which the 51M Group has neither scoped nor costed.
Similarly, their proposal provides no information
on the costs of procuring and operating longer Pendolino trains
or of modifying depots to accommodate them. It also does not include
any assessment of the costs of procuring the 125mph-capable suburban
rolling stock needed to deliver the proposed increase in the Northampton
service.
As a result, they have not carried out any cost-benefit
analysis of the case for incurring expenditure of this kind to
deliver a relatively modest increase in capacity over committed
plans and few of the journey time, connectivity or wider economic
benefits provided through new high speed rail lines. However,
Network Rail's recently published West Coast Main Line Route
Utilisation Study, whose development included a process of
wide industry involvement as well as a public consultation, concluded
that the most effective way to create additional long term capacity
on this corridor would not be through train lengthening or infrastructure
enhancements, but through the construction of a new line.
There are also a number of deliverability concerns
in respect of 51M Group's proposed service pattern. For example,
Network Rail's Route Utilisation Strategy states that the performance
impacts of using even one "firebreak" path out of Euston
to accommodate an additional Northampton service would need careful
consideration before implementing such a change. The 51M Group's
proposal adds two such Northampton services and an additional
long-distance service, but assumes no impact on performance.
Their proposal also states that it retains greater
spare capacity in the peak than the Rail Package 2 proposal developed
by Atkins and that this would contribute to improved reliability.
In fact, the peak hour service specification that they have published
shows the same 16 fast line services per hour. Furthermore, it
assumes that this can be delivered not only without the additional
platform capacity at Euston proposed by Atkins, but also with
increased train lengths, which would further reduce operational
flexibility.
The additional service proposed by the 51M Group
on the Coventry-Birmingham section of the route is also unlikely
to be deliverable, given that it has not proved possible to meet
current aspirations to route an extra Cross Country service along
this corridor.
6. What assessment have you made of the costs
and benefits of running Pendolinos at up to 140mph by further
upgrading the existing line?
Atkins considered 140mph operations in a long list
of potential interventions (see Appendix A of Atkins' March 2010
Rail Interventions Report).[262]
It was not taken forward into the short list of interventions
because of the likely adverse impact on overall route capacity
(due to worsening the speed differentials between intercity and
other services) and the high cost and disruption of resignalling
(to provide in-cab signalling). Also, the journey time savings
of 140 mph max speed compared with 125 mph max speed would be
very small - of the order of three seconds per mile - and there
are few sections of the WCML where 140mph would be possible because
of issues such as track curvature, junction constraints and aerodynamic
effects in tunnels.
16. What analysis have you made of business
relocations between London, Birmingham and other major cities
likely to arise from HS2?
The Government has made no specific analysis of that
kind. However we believe that high speed rail would offer significant
opportunities to support long-term and sustainable economic growth
that would be spread across the country. In particular, we estimate
economic benefits from the Y network totaling £44 billion
for the UK, of which more than 50% relates to journeys beginning
outside London and the South East. The cities of the North and
the Midlands would benefit from improved inter-connectivity, allowing
them to act as a coherent economic whole, and from improved connections
with London, allowing them to benefit more directly from, and
complement, the economic strength and diversity of the capital.
European and wider international experience demonstrates
that the introduction of high speed rail can help boost the performance
of regional economies.
HS1
- the town of Ashford has seen valuable new investment and development
since the arrival of high speed services. Analysis carried
out by Volterra and Colin Buchanan has estimated that the value
of the regeneration benefits of HS1 could be as high as £10
billion.
Lyon,
France - high speed rail has helped service sector firms to thrive
by providing enhanced access to the Paris market. The Part-Dieu
area where the Lyon station is situated has become one of the
largest commercial developments in France.
Ciudad
Real, Spain - high speed rail has enabled the town to develop
into an important regional business centre and its university
to expand its student population.
The
Government is considering a significant amount of evidence, submitted
as part of the consultation, on the potential positive economic
impacts of high speed rail in the North and the Midlands. We
understand that much of this analysis has also been submitted
as evidence to the Committee by relevant local and regional organisations.
To maximise the economic potential that high speed
rail brings to an area it is also vital that it is developed in
an integrated way with other economic and transport planning initiatives.
If a decision is made to go ahead with plans for a national high
speed network, the Government would work with the regions concerned
to secure the maximum possible benefits from HS2.
RESPONSES FROM
THE DEPARTMENT
FOR TRANSPORT
TO QUESTIONS
RAISED IN
OXERA'S
REVIEW OF
THE HS2 ECONOMIC
CASE
Question 1. To what extent would demand management
on the conventional network delay the need for extra rail capacity?
Whilst there may be a case for employing demand management
as a tactical response to managing demand on the railways, it
is unlikely to significantly alter the case over the medium-to-long
term for the provision of additional capacity. It is also important
to recognise that fares are already substantially higher on peak
services than in the off-peak, which makes a significant contribution
to managing peak demand, and that the effects of more sophisticated
demand management techniques are likely to be complex. The best
way of illustrating this is to look at each of the potential measures
in turn:
Ticket pricing: The most
obvious tool to manage demand on the railway is to increase fares.
The fares increase required to achieve a significant demand reduction
would however be unacceptable, and would not provide a sensible
or sustainable solution to managing demand. The Government does
believe that there is a strong case for reducing the costs of
the railways, but the associated savings should be returned equitably
to both the taxpayer and the fare-payer.
"Peak spreading":
Significant price differentials are already in place between the
peak and off-peak periods. There may be some additional scope
to make more effective use of capacity through more sophisticated
peak pricing measures, but research carried out for the Department
by Aecom has indicated that, in practice, any such gains are likely
to be limited. To achieve any more significant change in this
area would require wider social changes: the "9-5" working
day is unlikely to disappear overnight. Furthermore, given the
high all day crowding levels forecast over coming decades, measures
of this kind would clearly not provide a long-term solution to
predicted capacity constraints.
Crowding in the shoulder peak: The
Government recognises that the current approach to ticket pricing
on the railways can lead to some artificial peaks and troughs
in demand, and the Secretary of State has indicated his intention
to address this issue. However, this would require changes to
long-established systems for regulating ticket prices, and would
need to be handled carefully given the implications for the income
of train operators. It would also have at best a limited effect
in reducing long-term crowding levels, given the level of demand
growth forecast. Considering that over-crowding on certain services
is likely to be dampening demand currently, it could in practice
have the opposite effect of encouraging further demand.
Compulsory seat reservation:
Existing demand management techniques already incentivise travel
on reserved seats and specific services through low prices for
advance purchase tickets. More widespread introduction of compulsory
seat reservation, however, could have profound implications for
the value that many attach to travelling by train. Constraining
passengers' freedom to travel at the time that their often uncertain
daily schedule dictates, could discourage rail travel or make
it prohibitively expensive if associated with a premium ticket
to retain existing flexibility. For these reasons, the Secretary
of State has ruled out ending the "turn up and go" railway.
Question 2. What is the latest estimate of
WEIs for the conventional strategic alternatives to HS2?
In the March 2010 report (Strategic Outline Case
page 52), Atkins state that wider economic impacts are estimated
as:
agglomeration
£190-299 million;
imperfect
competition £238-412 million; and
labour
markets - negligible.
They also state that the wider benefits are consistent
across all four rail packages.
This work was not updated in the refresh by Atkins
in February 2011.
Question 3. Is further work progressing to
estimate the impact on the reliability of conventional services
for both the high speed rail options and for the strategic alternatives?
No work is currently underway on this issue. As the
Oxera report notes, however, Rail Package 2 could potentially
have a negative impact on West Coast Main Line reliability. This
is because the current WCML public timetable includes additional
journey time for recovery from delays and incidents to underpin
train service reliability, which is strongly valued by passengers.
In contrast, in the modelling of Rail Package 2, this additional
journey time element was removed from the timetable to improve
journey times for services on the WCML.
Given concerns about the potential impact on reliability
of this approach, especially when the more intensive WCML service
pattern in RP2 was taken into account, a variation on RP2, called
Rail Package 2a, was also modelled in which no journey time savings
from this source were assumed. The Government considers this variation
to be a more feasible option than the "standard" Rail
Package 2, given its potential reliability impacts, but when these
additional journey time savings are removed, the benefit cost
ratio of upgrading existing lines drops significantly.
We do not consider that HS2 would have the same impacts
on reliability on the classic network. The illustrative service
pattern developed by HS2 Ltd for the use of released capacity
on the WCML does not increase the number of services from the
current level, and reductions in crowding should minimise any
performance issues relating to dwell times at stations. See also
HS2 Ltd's answer to the Transport Committee's question 8, which
looks specifically at the West Coast Main Line north of Lichfield.
Question 4. Is it appropriate to focus on
the benefits of the Y network given that its case has been assessed
in less detail?
Yes. The Government's proposed strategy for high
speed rail is to construct a Y-shaped high speed rail network
so this focus is entirely appropriate. The appraisal of the Y
that we have conducted to date has been undertaken on the basis
of conservative assumptions in those areas where, at this stage,
there is less certainty and available detail. We have also run
sensitivity testing to provide further information about the case.
We have published the clear basis on which the appraisal
of the Y has been undertaken, and are committed to producing further
appraisal in due course on the basis of the more detailed technical
work which is currently underway. However, given the deliberately
cautious approach adopted in the current appraisal, we do not
anticipate that this more detailed work will materially alter
the strength of the case for the Y.
It is also important to bear in mind that the case
for the Y rests not only on the strength of its economic case
(the benefit:cost ratio) but also on the strength of its strategic
case. Whilst the availability of detailed engineering and other
appraisal is useful in developing the economic case, the wider
strategic case has been appraised in considerable detail even
at this stage. The strategic case relates to the fit with wider
Government policies and objectives - such as shifting to a low-carbon
economy, improving inter-urban and international connectivity
and supporting growth in the major urban economies of the Midlands
and the North.
Question 6. Has the prospect of benefits from
further extensions to the Y network been considered and analysed?
Yes. Chapter 6 of HS2 Ltd's report, High Speed Rail:
London to the West Midlands and Beyond,[263]
reviewed the case for a number of strategic options for a national
high speed rail network including indicative costs and benefits.
Working from a recognition that the phasing of any
high speed rail network is crucial to its affordability and deliverability,
this work indicated that the strongest case for the initial phases
of a network existed along the lines currently proposed.
If a decision were taken to proceed with high speed
rail proposals, the Government would be prepared in future to
consider evidence from HS2 Ltd, the Scottish Government and any
other organisations, to extend the network to serve further regions
across Britain. For this reason, the Y network is being specifically
designed to enable extensions further north in the future.
Question 7. To what extent do you consider
that travel time should be considered productive? How realistic
is the sensitivity test in Chapter 7 of the Economic Case?
As noted in the Economic Case for HS2 (Feb 2011)
we recognise that some travel time may be used productively and,
as a consequence, acknowledge that the standard assumptions underpinning
the values of time attributable to journeys made during the course
of work are open to debate.
The degree of productive use of travel time, however,
should not be over-estimated. The Oxera Review of the Government's
case for a High Speed Rail programme (Jun 2011) quotes studies
that suggest around 10-20% of rail travel time may be productive.[264]
More recent evidence prepared by the University of the West of
England found that around half (54%) of business travellers may
spend some of their time working, but only a third (34%) work
for a majority of their journey.[265]
In fact, more business travellers spent most of their travel time
reading for leisure, gazing out of the window or "people-watching"
than spent it working. The report also found that there was negligible
change between 2004 and 2010 in the proportion of business travellers
who spent the majority of travel time working despite technological
improvements. Therefore while rail passengers may report a similar
level of productivity when working as can be achieved in the office,
it may be that in most cases only a relatively small proportion
of travel time is used productively.
In any case, as with all assumptions of this kind,
the approach to valuing travel time savings is a necessary simplification
to enable a broad assessment of benefits and not a complete representation
of all the effects of altering journey times. And whilst the
inclusion of some additional factors may reduce the benefits,
such as accounting for time spent working productively on trains,
other factors may increase it, for example considering the impact
on productivity of crowding reduction or modal shift. As another
example, reductions in journey time might enable some business
travellers to schedule additional appointments in the course of
a single trip which are of more value than other forms of work,
whether carried out on a train, in the office or somewhere else.
Furthermore, the evidence provided to the Transport
Select Committee by the Guild of Travel Management Companies indicates
that business travellers attach a high degree of value to the
speed of travel (and that they tend to favour investment in high
speed rail).
The sensitivity test in Chapter 7 of the Economic
Case for HS2 provides a stylised example to show that there would
be a range of potential effects of including productive use of
travel time in appraisal, particularly when looked at on a network-wide
basis, including the impacts not only for travellers on the proposed
new line but also for those benefiting from the reuse of released
capacity on the conventional network.
In this test, HS2 Ltd reduced the value of time savings
for business travellers in recognition of the fact that some travel
time can be used productively, but also increased the value associated
with reducing crowding for business travellers, as this would
enable more productive use of travel time. The result of this
test was a small uplift to the benefit:cost ratio.
In the absence of better evidence on the very complex
choices made by individual travellers, these adjustments indicate
that the impact of incorporating a more detailed representation
of passenger behaviour would not significantly affect the economic
case for High Speed 2.
Question 8. How confident are you in the estimated
values of time?
As noted in the response to the previous question,
we recognise that the cost-savings approach to valuing travel
time in the course of business is not a perfect proxy for the
value of time-savings. However, we also recognise that valuing
journey time savings is difficult and needs to take into account
a great deal of complexity. It is inappropriate to exploit and
exaggerate specific areas of uncertainty in isolation, without
considering the wider issues and implications of doing so.
As Oxera note in their report, the net impact of
including the productive use of travel time into the appraisal
process for HS2 is ambiguous. While it would reduce the benefits
attributable to reductions in travel time, benefits for existing
rail passengers from reduced crowding (which has a negative correlation
with productivity) would increase, as would those for passengers
that switch to rail from less productive modes. As described
above, the sensitivity testing carried out by HS2 Ltd, indicated
that the overall result could be an uplift in the benefit:cost
ratio once all relevant factors have been taken into account.
The aforementioned University of the West of England study (Lyons
et al 2011) also noted that simply reducing the value attached
to rail journey time savings in isolation would risk "paradoxical"
conclusions, by reducing the case for investment in those modes
which enable greatest productivity.
At present, we are not aware of any evidence that
provides alternative values that are preferable to our central
assumptions regarding the value of time. Only once a credible
alternative approach to measuring the value of time-savings for
business travellers across all modes has gained sufficient support
would we be in a position to substitute the current values.
We are able to draw additional confidence in the
current value of time by comparing it with the most suitable comparator
available, which is the value derived through the HS2 Ltd model
calibration process and based on the willingness-to-pay evidence.
As noted in the Economic Case for HS2, when the two are
compared they are found to be very similar. As previously noted,
the evidence provided to the Transport Select Committee by the
Guild of Travel Management Companies also indicates that business
travellers attach a high degree of value to the speed of travel
(and that they tend to favour investment in high speed rail).
Question 14. Has there been an assessment
of the relative degree of planned disruption between the high-speed
and strategic alternative options?
The strategic alternatives are high level counterfactual
constructs. As such, the estimated total costs of the works for
each package include an additional 10% to account for the disruption
that would occur as a result of the works. This broad figure of
10% excludes optimism bias. Further detailed engineering work
would be required for the disruption impacts to be quantified
more precisely.
The Economic Case for HS2 includes the costs of possession
management and compensation for operational disruption in its
assessment. The estimated cost is £195 million, excluding
optimism bias.
It should be noted that no costs were assumed for
unplanned disruption resulting from the strategic alternatives,
although experience with the WCML Modernisation project and other
schemes shows that this represents a significant risk. The WCML
Modernisation took a decade to complete and involved a huge number
of lengthy and disruptive line closures, forcing passengers repeatedly
onto rail replacement bus services or off the rail network altogether.
The inevitable disruption and inconvenience of upgrades
to the existing network, in addition to the risk of delays and
cost overruns, is further exacerbated by the increasing intensity
of usage on existing lines. The number of passenger journeys
on the West Coast Main Line is twice as high now as in 2004. As
a result, this line - like other major routes - sees high levels
of usage on all seven days of the week, meaning that the impact
of any works would be still greater.
Question 19. Are there some WEI factors that
are not in standard guidance that could have been included?
Yes. The sheer scale of the HS2 proposal means that
it is unlikely that every impact of the scheme is captured through
strict adherence to standard DfT appraisal guidance. In their
report, Oxera point out a range of factors that have not been
monetised within the Economic Case for HS2. However, appraisals
that are produced following WebTAG guidance do not necessarily
monetise all costs and benefits of a transport intervention.
Therefore, the Department also considers a wider value for money
assessment, which takes into account quantitative and qualitative
assessments of impacts that cannot be monetised. Even then, some
impacts remain beyond the scope of current guidance although these
may be considered through the strategic case.
The Department for Transport uses a narrow definition
of Wider Economic Impacts (WEIs), as described in our response
to the SACTRA (2000) Transport and the Economy report[266].
These effects have since been encapsulated in WebTAG (Transport
Appraisal Guidance) advice on regeneration and wider impacts[267].
The wider impacts appraisal advice incorporates agglomeration
effects, changes to output in imperfectly competitive markets
and labour market impacts (access to jobs and the move to more/less
productive jobs). This approach is in line with our response
to the recent Transport Select Committee report into transport
and the economy which stated that "we will continue to keep
developments in all aspects of appraising economic impacts, conventional
and wider, regeneration and additional, under review and develop
our guidance accordingly."[268]
As described above, however, this narrow definition of monetised
WEIs does not imply that no other factors would be taken into
account in decision making.
Question 20. Is it possible to suggest a likely
order of magnitude for these omitted benefits?
In the absence of more sophisticated modelling techniques
to capture the full effects of transport interventions (in a less
than perfectly competitive economy), the Department for Transport's
guidance does not allow any assessment of the order of magnitude
for these omitted benefits.
However, other organisations who have employed alternative,
and in some cases comparatively untested, appraisal methodologies
to assess the WEIs of HS2, have concluded that there are potentially
very large benefits not covered in the current appraisal of HS2:
The
Core Cities Group believes that 400,000 new jobs in the Core Cities
and a total 1 million in their wider urban areas will be underpinned
by HS2.
Analysis
by KPMG suggests that HSR could deliver 25,000-42,000 new jobs,
contributing £17 billion-£24 billion per annum to the
UK economy by 2040, generating £6 billion-£10 billion
per annum in tax revenues, or £87 billion-£150 billion
NPV to the Exchequer.
Centro
found that in the West Midlands HS2, together with local transport
improvements, could increase GVA by £1.5 billion, provide
22,000 additional jobs and increase average wages by £300
per worker per annum.
Work
undertaken by KPMG for Greengauge21 concluded that a national
high speed rail network reaching to Scotland could boost the economy
by between £17 billion and £29 billion by 2040, and
increase national economic output by 2.1%.
It should be noted however that these benefits have
been derived from alternative approaches to those used by the
Department and therefore should not be simply added to those set
out in the economic case for HS2 as there may be significant overlaps
between the methodologies.
In terms of the WEIs incorporated in the Department's
standard guidance, the only factors included in the Economic Case
for HS2 are the effects of agglomeration and imperfect competition.
This does not mean that the other factors would not apply. For
example, no assessment has been made by HS2 Ltd of the benefits
that could be derived from people moving to more productive jobs,
as there is not currently a detailed Land-Use Transport Interaction
model available. A high level analysis carried out by Volterra
for the Core Cities Group,[269]
however, has indicated that the value of such benefits could be
as high as £5.9 billion over 60 years on the WCML corridor
alone.
Question 31. Do the generally favourable ex
post assessments of major rail projects (eg The Jubilee Line Extension)
suggest that the bottom-up BCRs are conservative estimates?
The Department for Transport recognises that there
are valuable lessons to be drawn from ex-post assessments of other
transport investment schemes, including high-speed rail projects.
For example, we have recently concluded an ex-post assessment
of the forty new stations opened across Great Britain in the last
ten years[270].
This assessment found a majority of cases where outturn demand
had exceeded or was very close to that predicted before station
opening. In most cases (including those examples where demand
fell short of expectations) we found that it was not an inappropriate
or misguided forecasting technique which had led to the discrepancy,
but rather that key developments outside the control of the scheme
promoter had affected the outturn level of demand. Unforeseen
events of this kind cannot be captured within our forecasting
methodology, but sensitivity testing as carried out by HS2 Ltd
can help to assess the resilience of the analysis to such external
influences - both positive and negative.
Due to the scale of the High Speed Two proposal it
is imperative that the economic case is built on robust forecasts
of future rail patronage and revenue and we are comfortable that
this is the case. We are also confident that all relevant developments
will be taken into account as the economic case for High Speed
Two is updated on a regular basis.
Question 32. Are the bottom-up estimates for
the High Speed Rail programme consistent with the top-down estimates
from other high speed rail examples?
The case for HS2 has been developed using DfT and
HMT guidance, best industry practice, and the best available demand
forecasts and high speed rail comparators to create robust estimates.
These estimates are iteratively reassessed to take account of
wider changes to transport and the economy to ensure that our
estimates remain as accurate as possible.
As outlined in the Oxera report, the case for HS2
shows a BCR of 2.0 for the London to West Midlands line, including
Wider Economic Benefits (WEI). Due to the limited evaluation of
existing high speed rail schemes across the world, it is impossible
to perform a direct comparison of the expected HS2 BCR and the
actual economic output of high speed lines. However, some recent
research[271]
has sought to identify the factors which are most likely to see
high speed rail projects deliver good value for money, which include
focusing on routes seeing high levels of demand growth and on
links between main population and business centres. On this basis,
HS2 appears to deliver the key elements needed to create a high
speed railway that is likely to deliver strong economic benefits.
What are not accounted for as part of the BCR are
the non-monetised benefits (such as regeneration and employment
growth) that HS2 would bring, which could be very significant.
The evidence from areas such as Lyon, which hosts around 20,000
jobs around the TGV station, Lille, where the arrival of high
speed trains drove the development of the major Euralille development,
and Ashford, which is now one of Kent's fastest growing areas,
demonstrates the potential scale of non-monetised benefits that
could be delivered.
Question 34. Are declining real air fares
realistic given the prospect of increased environmental taxation
on aviation?
The base case of declining domestic air fares is
consistent with our last set of published forecasts "UK Air
Passenger Demand and CO2 Forecasts" (2009). However
since then we have gone through an extensive model development
programme including an update of all our input assumptions. Air
fares are now split between business and leisure passengers; the
trend in domestic leisure fares is assumed to increase until 2050,
while the trend in domestic business fares shows a continuing
fall until 2030, after which this reverses and the business fares'
trend begins to increase up to 2050. The reasons for the difference
in domestic air fare trends between our 2009 and 2011 forecasts
are threefold:
(1) APD was treated as part of the carbon tax
in our 2009 forecasts; in our 2011 forecasts we treated APD as
separate to the carbon tax.
(2) Fuel efficiency improvements were greater
in our 2009 forecasts than in our 2011 forecasts.
(3) Oil and carbon prices are higher in our 2011
forecasts.
We have recently published our 2011 forecasts.
It should be noted that impact of higher than expected
air fares on the business case for HS2 would be likely to be positive,
although small.
30 August 2011
262 Accessible at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/alternativestudy/
Back
263
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/hs2report/ Back
264
See, for example, Fowkes, AS (2001) Principles of valuing business
time savings Back
265
Lyons et al (2011) How do rail travellers use their time? Back
266
See Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (2000)
Transport and the Economy: Full Report and DfT (2000) The Government's
Response to SACTRA's recommendations Back
267
See WebTAG (www.dft.gov.uk/webtag) units 3.5.8 (Regeneration)
and 3.5.14 (Wider Impacts) Back
268
House of Commons Transport Committee (2011) Transport and the
economy: Government response to the Committee's Third Report of
Session 2010-12 Back
269
Volterra (2011), Understanding the transport infrastructure requirements
to deliver growth in England's Core Cities, Section 3.5.2 (pgs
49-51). Available at: http://www.corecities.com/sites/default/files/images/publications/Volterra-understanding-the-transport-infrastructure-requirements1_0.pdf
Back
270
SDG (2010) Station Usage and Demand Forecasts for Newly Opened
Railway Lines and Stations. Final Report, August 2010 is due to
be published shortly Back
271
For example, de Rus and Nash (2007) In what circumstances is investment
in HSR worthwhile?; available at: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8044/1/MPRA_paper_8044.pdf
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