High Speed Rail - Transport Committee Contents

Further written evidence from the Department of Transport (HSR 167A)


In response to your letter of 18 July to Sir Brian Briscoe of HS2 Ltd, the Department has agreed with HS2 Ltd to provide answers to your questions 5, 6 and 16. This letter provides the Department's responses.

In addition, I attach a paper with responses to a number of the questions raised by Oxera in its recent review of the Economic Case for HS2. These questions relate to wider issues for which DfT has responsibility; the remainder of Oxera's questions, which deal more directly with the details of the economic case, will be answered separately by HS2 Ltd.

It should be noted that the public consultation period on HS2 only recently closed. The answers below reflect the Government's current view, and the evidence which underpinned the consultation documents, but the Committee should recognise that no final decisions will be taken by Ministers until the analysis of consultation responses (which is still at an early stage) has been completed and any new evidence considered.

5.  We have received submissions (eg from 51M) that substantial extra capacity could be provided quickly and at relatively low cost by lengthening WCML trains to 12 car sets, and (especially relevant for commuters from Milton Keynes and Northampton) by operating additional trains enabled by a new grade separated flyover junction eg at Ledburn.  Do you have any comments on this?

The Government has not at this stage carried out a full analysis of the 51M Group's proposals, but at the strategic level, its current view is that no package of upgrades to existing lines could offer the same level or range of benefits as a new high speed line.

The capacity increase offered by the 51M proposal, although slightly higher than that offered by Atkins' Rail Package 2, is still comparatively low - only around 30% on long-distance services, for example, than the capacity available following completion of the committed Pendolino lengthening programme. Furthermore, to accommodate the 12-car sets needed to deliver even this capacity increase, significant investment in platform lengthening, plus track and/or signalling remodelling in some locations, would be required, which the 51M Group has neither scoped nor costed.

Similarly, their proposal provides no information on the costs of procuring and operating longer Pendolino trains or of modifying depots to accommodate them. It also does not include any assessment of the costs of procuring the 125mph-capable suburban rolling stock needed to deliver the proposed increase in the Northampton service.

As a result, they have not carried out any cost-benefit analysis of the case for incurring expenditure of this kind to deliver a relatively modest increase in capacity over committed plans and few of the journey time, connectivity or wider economic benefits provided through new high speed rail lines. However, Network Rail's recently published West Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Study, whose development included a process of wide industry involvement as well as a public consultation, concluded that the most effective way to create additional long term capacity on this corridor would not be through train lengthening or infrastructure enhancements, but through the construction of a new line.

There are also a number of deliverability concerns in respect of 51M Group's proposed service pattern. For example, Network Rail's Route Utilisation Strategy states that the performance impacts of using even one "firebreak" path out of Euston to accommodate an additional Northampton service would need careful consideration before implementing such a change. The 51M Group's proposal adds two such Northampton services and an additional long-distance service, but assumes no impact on performance.

Their proposal also states that it retains greater spare capacity in the peak than the Rail Package 2 proposal developed by Atkins and that this would contribute to improved reliability. In fact, the peak hour service specification that they have published shows the same 16 fast line services per hour. Furthermore, it assumes that this can be delivered not only without the additional platform capacity at Euston proposed by Atkins, but also with increased train lengths, which would further reduce operational flexibility.

The additional service proposed by the 51M Group on the Coventry-Birmingham section of the route is also unlikely to be deliverable, given that it has not proved possible to meet current aspirations to route an extra Cross Country service along this corridor.

6.  What assessment have you made of the costs and benefits of running Pendolinos at up to 140mph by further upgrading the existing line?

Atkins considered 140mph operations in a long list of potential interventions (see Appendix A of Atkins' March 2010 Rail Interventions Report).[262] It was not taken forward into the short list of interventions because of the likely adverse impact on overall route capacity (due to worsening the speed differentials between intercity and other services) and the high cost and disruption of resignalling (to provide in-cab signalling). Also, the journey time savings of 140 mph max speed compared with 125 mph max speed would be very small - of the order of three seconds per mile - and there are few sections of the WCML where 140mph would be possible because of issues such as track curvature, junction constraints and aerodynamic effects in tunnels.  

16.  What analysis have you made of business relocations between London, Birmingham and other major cities likely to arise from HS2?

The Government has made no specific analysis of that kind. However we believe that high speed rail would offer significant opportunities to support long-term and sustainable economic growth that would be spread across the country. In particular, we estimate economic benefits from the Y network totaling £44 billion for the UK, of which more than 50% relates to journeys beginning outside London and the South East. The cities of the North and the Midlands would benefit from improved inter-connectivity, allowing them to act as a coherent economic whole, and from improved connections with London, allowing them to benefit more directly from, and complement, the economic strength and diversity of the capital.

European and wider international experience demonstrates that the introduction of high speed rail can help boost the performance of regional economies.

—  HS1 - the town of Ashford has seen valuable new investment and development since the arrival of high speed services.  Analysis carried out by Volterra and Colin Buchanan has estimated that the value of the regeneration benefits of HS1 could be as high as £10 billion.

—  Lyon, France - high speed rail has helped service sector firms to thrive by providing enhanced access to the Paris market. The Part-Dieu area where the Lyon station is situated has become one of the largest commercial developments in France.

—  Ciudad Real, Spain - high speed rail has enabled the town to develop into an important regional business centre and its university to expand its student population.

—  The Government is considering a significant amount of evidence, submitted as part of the consultation, on the potential positive economic impacts of high speed rail in the North and the Midlands.  We understand that much of this analysis has also been submitted as evidence to the Committee by relevant local and regional organisations.

To maximise the economic potential that high speed rail brings to an area it is also vital that it is developed in an integrated way with other economic and transport planning initiatives. If a decision is made to go ahead with plans for a national high speed network, the Government would work with the regions concerned to secure the maximum possible benefits from HS2.


Question 1.  To what extent would demand management on the conventional network delay the need for extra rail capacity?

Whilst there may be a case for employing demand management as a tactical response to managing demand on the railways, it is unlikely to significantly alter the case over the medium-to-long term for the provision of additional capacity. It is also important to recognise that fares are already substantially higher on peak services than in the off-peak, which makes a significant contribution to managing peak demand, and that the effects of more sophisticated demand management techniques are likely to be complex. The best way of illustrating this is to look at each of the potential measures in turn:

Ticket pricing: The most obvious tool to manage demand on the railway is to increase fares. The fares increase required to achieve a significant demand reduction would however be unacceptable, and would not provide a sensible or sustainable solution to managing demand. The Government does believe that there is a strong case for reducing the costs of the railways, but the associated savings should be returned equitably to both the taxpayer and the fare-payer.

"Peak spreading": Significant price differentials are already in place between the peak and off-peak periods. There may be some additional scope to make more effective use of capacity through more sophisticated peak pricing measures, but research carried out for the Department by Aecom has indicated that, in practice, any such gains are likely to be limited. To achieve any more significant change in this area would require wider social changes: the "9-5" working day is unlikely to disappear overnight. Furthermore, given the high all day crowding levels forecast over coming decades, measures of this kind would clearly not provide a long-term solution to predicted capacity constraints.

Crowding in the shoulder peak: The Government recognises that the current approach to ticket pricing on the railways can lead to some artificial peaks and troughs in demand, and the Secretary of State has indicated his intention to address this issue. However, this would require changes to long-established systems for regulating ticket prices, and would need to be handled carefully given the implications for the income of train operators. It would also have at best a limited effect in reducing long-term crowding levels, given the level of demand growth forecast. Considering that over-crowding on certain services is likely to be dampening demand currently, it could in practice have the opposite effect of encouraging further demand.

Compulsory seat reservation: Existing demand management techniques already incentivise travel on reserved seats and specific services through low prices for advance purchase tickets. More widespread introduction of compulsory seat reservation, however, could have profound implications for the value that many attach to travelling by train. Constraining passengers' freedom to travel at the time that their often uncertain daily schedule dictates, could discourage rail travel or make it prohibitively expensive if associated with a premium ticket to retain existing flexibility. For these reasons, the Secretary of State has ruled out ending the "turn up and go" railway.

Question 2.  What is the latest estimate of WEIs for the conventional strategic alternatives to HS2?

In the March 2010 report (Strategic Outline Case page 52), Atkins state that wider economic impacts are estimated as:

—  agglomeration £190-299 million;

—  imperfect competition £238-412 million; and

—  labour markets - negligible.

They also state that the wider benefits are consistent across all four rail packages.

This work was not updated in the refresh by Atkins in February 2011.

Question 3.  Is further work progressing to estimate the impact on the reliability of conventional services for both the high speed rail options and for the strategic alternatives?

No work is currently underway on this issue. As the Oxera report notes, however, Rail Package 2 could potentially have a negative impact on West Coast Main Line reliability. This is because the current WCML public timetable includes additional journey time for recovery from delays and incidents to underpin train service reliability, which is strongly valued by passengers. In contrast, in the modelling of Rail Package 2, this additional journey time element was removed from the timetable to improve journey times for services on the WCML.

Given concerns about the potential impact on reliability of this approach, especially when the more intensive WCML service pattern in RP2 was taken into account, a variation on RP2, called Rail Package 2a, was also modelled in which no journey time savings from this source were assumed. The Government considers this variation to be a more feasible option than the "standard" Rail Package 2, given its potential reliability impacts, but when these additional journey time savings are removed, the benefit cost ratio of upgrading existing lines drops significantly.

We do not consider that HS2 would have the same impacts on reliability on the classic network. The illustrative service pattern developed by HS2 Ltd for the use of released capacity on the WCML does not increase the number of services from the current level, and reductions in crowding should minimise any performance issues relating to dwell times at stations. See also HS2 Ltd's answer to the Transport Committee's question 8, which looks specifically at the West Coast Main Line north of Lichfield.

Question 4.  Is it appropriate to focus on the benefits of the Y network given that its case has been assessed in less detail?

Yes. The Government's proposed strategy for high speed rail is to construct a Y-shaped high speed rail network so this focus is entirely appropriate. The appraisal of the Y that we have conducted to date has been undertaken on the basis of conservative assumptions in those areas where, at this stage, there is less certainty and available detail. We have also run sensitivity testing to provide further information about the case.

We have published the clear basis on which the appraisal of the Y has been undertaken, and are committed to producing further appraisal in due course on the basis of the more detailed technical work which is currently underway. However, given the deliberately cautious approach adopted in the current appraisal, we do not anticipate that this more detailed work will materially alter the strength of the case for the Y.

It is also important to bear in mind that the case for the Y rests not only on the strength of its economic case (the benefit:cost ratio) but also on the strength of its strategic case. Whilst the availability of detailed engineering and other appraisal is useful in developing the economic case, the wider strategic case has been appraised in considerable detail even at this stage. The strategic case relates to the fit with wider Government policies and objectives - such as shifting to a low-carbon economy, improving inter-urban and international connectivity and supporting growth in the major urban economies of the Midlands and the North.

Question 6.  Has the prospect of benefits from further extensions to the Y network been considered and analysed?

Yes. Chapter 6 of HS2 Ltd's report, High Speed Rail: London to the West Midlands and Beyond,[263] reviewed the case for a number of strategic options for a national high speed rail network including indicative costs and benefits.

Working from a recognition that the phasing of any high speed rail network is crucial to its affordability and deliverability, this work indicated that the strongest case for the initial phases of a network existed along the lines currently proposed.

If a decision were taken to proceed with high speed rail proposals, the Government would be prepared in future to consider evidence from HS2 Ltd, the Scottish Government and any other organisations, to extend the network to serve further regions across Britain. For this reason, the Y network is being specifically designed to enable extensions further north in the future.

Question 7.  To what extent do you consider that travel time should be considered productive? How realistic is the sensitivity test in Chapter 7 of the Economic Case?

As noted in the Economic Case for HS2 (Feb 2011) we recognise that some travel time may be used productively and, as a consequence, acknowledge that the standard assumptions underpinning the values of time attributable to journeys made during the course of work are open to debate.

The degree of productive use of travel time, however, should not be over-estimated. The Oxera Review of the Government's case for a High Speed Rail programme (Jun 2011) quotes studies that suggest around 10-20% of rail travel time may be productive.[264] More recent evidence prepared by the University of the West of England found that around half (54%) of business travellers may spend some of their time working, but only a third (34%) work for a majority of their journey.[265] In fact, more business travellers spent most of their travel time reading for leisure, gazing out of the window or "people-watching" than spent it working. The report also found that there was negligible change between 2004 and 2010 in the proportion of business travellers who spent the majority of travel time working despite technological improvements. Therefore while rail passengers may report a similar level of productivity when working as can be achieved in the office, it may be that in most cases only a relatively small proportion of travel time is used productively.

In any case, as with all assumptions of this kind, the approach to valuing travel time savings is a necessary simplification to enable a broad assessment of benefits and not a complete representation of all the effects of altering journey times. And whilst the inclusion of some additional factors may reduce the benefits, such as accounting for time spent working productively on trains, other factors may increase it, for example considering the impact on productivity of crowding reduction or modal shift. As another example, reductions in journey time might enable some business travellers to schedule additional appointments in the course of a single trip which are of more value than other forms of work, whether carried out on a train, in the office or somewhere else.

Furthermore, the evidence provided to the Transport Select Committee by the Guild of Travel Management Companies indicates that business travellers attach a high degree of value to the speed of travel (and that they tend to favour investment in high speed rail).

The sensitivity test in Chapter 7 of the Economic Case for HS2 provides a stylised example to show that there would be a range of potential effects of including productive use of travel time in appraisal, particularly when looked at on a network-wide basis, including the impacts not only for travellers on the proposed new line but also for those benefiting from the reuse of released capacity on the conventional network.

In this test, HS2 Ltd reduced the value of time savings for business travellers in recognition of the fact that some travel time can be used productively, but also increased the value associated with reducing crowding for business travellers, as this would enable more productive use of travel time. The result of this test was a small uplift to the benefit:cost ratio.

In the absence of better evidence on the very complex choices made by individual travellers, these adjustments indicate that the impact of incorporating a more detailed representation of passenger behaviour would not significantly affect the economic case for High Speed 2.

Question 8.  How confident are you in the estimated values of time?

As noted in the response to the previous question, we recognise that the cost-savings approach to valuing travel time in the course of business is not a perfect proxy for the value of time-savings. However, we also recognise that valuing journey time savings is difficult and needs to take into account a great deal of complexity. It is inappropriate to exploit and exaggerate specific areas of uncertainty in isolation, without considering the wider issues and implications of doing so.

As Oxera note in their report, the net impact of including the productive use of travel time into the appraisal process for HS2 is ambiguous. While it would reduce the benefits attributable to reductions in travel time, benefits for existing rail passengers from reduced crowding (which has a negative correlation with productivity) would increase, as would those for passengers that switch to rail from less productive modes. As described above, the sensitivity testing carried out by HS2 Ltd, indicated that the overall result could be an uplift in the benefit:cost ratio once all relevant factors have been taken into account. The aforementioned University of the West of England study (Lyons et al 2011) also noted that simply reducing the value attached to rail journey time savings in isolation would risk "paradoxical" conclusions, by reducing the case for investment in those modes which enable greatest productivity.

At present, we are not aware of any evidence that provides alternative values that are preferable to our central assumptions regarding the value of time. Only once a credible alternative approach to measuring the value of time-savings for business travellers across all modes has gained sufficient support would we be in a position to substitute the current values.

We are able to draw additional confidence in the current value of time by comparing it with the most suitable comparator available, which is the value derived through the HS2 Ltd model calibration process and based on the willingness-to-pay evidence. As noted in the Economic Case for HS2, when the two are compared they are found to be very similar. As previously noted, the evidence provided to the Transport Select Committee by the Guild of Travel Management Companies also indicates that business travellers attach a high degree of value to the speed of travel (and that they tend to favour investment in high speed rail).

Question 14.  Has there been an assessment of the relative degree of planned disruption between the high-speed and strategic alternative options?

The strategic alternatives are high level counterfactual constructs. As such, the estimated total costs of the works for each package include an additional 10% to account for the disruption that would occur as a result of the works. This broad figure of 10% excludes optimism bias. Further detailed engineering work would be required for the disruption impacts to be quantified more precisely.

The Economic Case for HS2 includes the costs of possession management and compensation for operational disruption in its assessment. The estimated cost is £195 million, excluding optimism bias.

It should be noted that no costs were assumed for unplanned disruption resulting from the strategic alternatives, although experience with the WCML Modernisation project and other schemes shows that this represents a significant risk. The WCML Modernisation took a decade to complete and involved a huge number of lengthy and disruptive line closures, forcing passengers repeatedly onto rail replacement bus services or off the rail network altogether.

The inevitable disruption and inconvenience of upgrades to the existing network, in addition to the risk of delays and cost overruns, is further exacerbated by the increasing intensity of usage on existing lines. The number of passenger journeys on the West Coast Main Line is twice as high now as in 2004. As a result, this line - like other major routes - sees high levels of usage on all seven days of the week, meaning that the impact of any works would be still greater.

Question 19.  Are there some WEI factors that are not in standard guidance that could have been included?

Yes. The sheer scale of the HS2 proposal means that it is unlikely that every impact of the scheme is captured through strict adherence to standard DfT appraisal guidance. In their report, Oxera point out a range of factors that have not been monetised within the Economic Case for HS2. However, appraisals that are produced following WebTAG guidance do not necessarily monetise all costs and benefits of a transport intervention. Therefore, the Department also considers a wider value for money assessment, which takes into account quantitative and qualitative assessments of impacts that cannot be monetised. Even then, some impacts remain beyond the scope of current guidance although these may be considered through the strategic case.

The Department for Transport uses a narrow definition of Wider Economic Impacts (WEIs), as described in our response to the SACTRA (2000) Transport and the Economy report[266]. These effects have since been encapsulated in WebTAG (Transport Appraisal Guidance) advice on regeneration and wider impacts[267]. The wider impacts appraisal advice incorporates agglomeration effects, changes to output in imperfectly competitive markets and labour market impacts (access to jobs and the move to more/less productive jobs). This approach is in line with our response to the recent Transport Select Committee report into transport and the economy which stated that "we will continue to keep developments in all aspects of appraising economic impacts, conventional and wider, regeneration and additional, under review and develop our guidance accordingly."[268] As described above, however, this narrow definition of monetised WEIs does not imply that no other factors would be taken into account in decision making.

Question 20.  Is it possible to suggest a likely order of magnitude for these omitted benefits?

In the absence of more sophisticated modelling techniques to capture the full effects of transport interventions (in a less than perfectly competitive economy), the Department for Transport's guidance does not allow any assessment of the order of magnitude for these omitted benefits.

However, other organisations who have employed alternative, and in some cases comparatively untested, appraisal methodologies to assess the WEIs of HS2, have concluded that there are potentially very large benefits not covered in the current appraisal of HS2:

—  The Core Cities Group believes that 400,000 new jobs in the Core Cities and a total 1 million in their wider urban areas will be underpinned by HS2.

—  Analysis by KPMG suggests that HSR could deliver 25,000-42,000 new jobs, contributing £17 billion-£24 billion per annum to the UK economy by 2040, generating £6 billion-£10 billion per annum in tax revenues, or £87 billion-£150 billion NPV to the Exchequer.

—  Centro found that in the West Midlands HS2, together with local transport improvements, could increase GVA by £1.5 billion, provide 22,000 additional jobs and increase average wages by £300 per worker per annum.

—  Work undertaken by KPMG for Greengauge21 concluded that a national high speed rail network reaching to Scotland could boost the economy by between £17 billion and £29 billion by 2040, and increase national economic output by 2.1%.

It should be noted however that these benefits have been derived from alternative approaches to those used by the Department and therefore should not be simply added to those set out in the economic case for HS2 as there may be significant overlaps between the methodologies.

In terms of the WEIs incorporated in the Department's standard guidance, the only factors included in the Economic Case for HS2 are the effects of agglomeration and imperfect competition. This does not mean that the other factors would not apply. For example, no assessment has been made by HS2 Ltd of the benefits that could be derived from people moving to more productive jobs, as there is not currently a detailed Land-Use Transport Interaction model available. A high level analysis carried out by Volterra for the Core Cities Group,[269] however, has indicated that the value of such benefits could be as high as £5.9 billion over 60 years on the WCML corridor alone.

Question 31.  Do the generally favourable ex post assessments of major rail projects (eg The Jubilee Line Extension) suggest that the bottom-up BCRs are conservative estimates?

The Department for Transport recognises that there are valuable lessons to be drawn from ex-post assessments of other transport investment schemes, including high-speed rail projects. For example, we have recently concluded an ex-post assessment of the forty new stations opened across Great Britain in the last ten years[270]. This assessment found a majority of cases where outturn demand had exceeded or was very close to that predicted before station opening. In most cases (including those examples where demand fell short of expectations) we found that it was not an inappropriate or misguided forecasting technique which had led to the discrepancy, but rather that key developments outside the control of the scheme promoter had affected the outturn level of demand. Unforeseen events of this kind cannot be captured within our forecasting methodology, but sensitivity testing as carried out by HS2 Ltd can help to assess the resilience of the analysis to such external influences - both positive and negative.

Due to the scale of the High Speed Two proposal it is imperative that the economic case is built on robust forecasts of future rail patronage and revenue and we are comfortable that this is the case. We are also confident that all relevant developments will be taken into account as the economic case for High Speed Two is updated on a regular basis.

Question 32.  Are the bottom-up estimates for the High Speed Rail programme consistent with the top-down estimates from other high speed rail examples?

The case for HS2 has been developed using DfT and HMT guidance, best industry practice, and the best available demand forecasts and high speed rail comparators to create robust estimates. These estimates are iteratively reassessed to take account of wider changes to transport and the economy to ensure that our estimates remain as accurate as possible.

As outlined in the Oxera report, the case for HS2 shows a BCR of 2.0 for the London to West Midlands line, including Wider Economic Benefits (WEI). Due to the limited evaluation of existing high speed rail schemes across the world, it is impossible to perform a direct comparison of the expected HS2 BCR and the actual economic output of high speed lines. However, some recent research[271] has sought to identify the factors which are most likely to see high speed rail projects deliver good value for money, which include focusing on routes seeing high levels of demand growth and on links between main population and business centres. On this basis, HS2 appears to deliver the key elements needed to create a high speed railway that is likely to deliver strong economic benefits.

What are not accounted for as part of the BCR are the non-monetised benefits (such as regeneration and employment growth) that HS2 would bring, which could be very significant. The evidence from areas such as Lyon, which hosts around 20,000 jobs around the TGV station, Lille, where the arrival of high speed trains drove the development of the major Euralille development, and Ashford, which is now one of Kent's fastest growing areas, demonstrates the potential scale of non-monetised benefits that could be delivered.

Question 34.  Are declining real air fares realistic given the prospect of increased environmental taxation on aviation?

The base case of declining domestic air fares is consistent with our last set of published forecasts "UK Air Passenger Demand and CO2 Forecasts" (2009). However since then we have gone through an extensive model development programme including an update of all our input assumptions. Air fares are now split between business and leisure passengers; the trend in domestic leisure fares is assumed to increase until 2050, while the trend in domestic business fares shows a continuing fall until 2030, after which this reverses and the business fares' trend begins to increase up to 2050. The reasons for the difference in domestic air fare trends between our 2009 and 2011 forecasts are threefold:

(1)  APD was treated as part of the carbon tax in our 2009 forecasts; in our 2011 forecasts we treated APD as separate to the carbon tax.

(2)  Fuel efficiency improvements were greater in our 2009 forecasts than in our 2011 forecasts.

(3)  Oil and carbon prices are higher in our 2011 forecasts.

We have recently published our 2011 forecasts.

It should be noted that impact of higher than expected air fares on the business case for HS2 would be likely to be positive, although small.

30 August 2011

262   Accessible at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/alternativestudy/  Back

263   http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/hs2report/ Back

264   See, for example, Fowkes, AS (2001) Principles of valuing business time savings Back

265   Lyons et al (2011) How do rail travellers use their time? Back

266   See Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (2000) Transport and the Economy: Full Report and DfT (2000) The Government's Response to SACTRA's recommendations Back

267   See WebTAG (www.dft.gov.uk/webtag) units 3.5.8 (Regeneration) and 3.5.14 (Wider Impacts) Back

268   House of Commons Transport Committee (2011) Transport and the economy: Government response to the Committee's Third Report of Session 2010-12 Back

269   Volterra (2011), Understanding the transport infrastructure requirements to deliver growth in England's Core Cities, Section 3.5.2 (pgs 49-51). Available at: http://www.corecities.com/sites/default/files/images/publications/Volterra-understanding-the-transport-infrastructure-requirements1_0.pdf  Back

270   SDG (2010) Station Usage and Demand Forecasts for Newly Opened Railway Lines and Stations. Final Report, August 2010 is due to be published shortly Back

271   For example, de Rus and Nash (2007) In what circumstances is investment in HSR worthwhile?; available at: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8044/1/MPRA_paper_8044.pdf  Back

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