2 Airport economic regulation|
7. The trend in the aviation industry, across the
UK and the EU, has long been towards market liberalisation. Aviation
facilities and services, such as airports and airlines, are now
predominantly provided by the private sector. In the UK, airlines
compete for more than 200 million passengers each year, flying
from more than 55 airports.
Public sector involvement in the industry is now primarily limited
to security, safety, environment and international airspace issues.
8. Despite the competition that exists between airlines
and airports, there are situations where competition is limited
and airports are deemed to have significant market power. This
is particularly the case in capacity-constrained south east England.
Heathrow Airport, which served 32% of UK air transport passengers
and 65% of cargo (by weight) in 2010,
is the UK's only international "hub" airport,
with over 30% of passengers using it for connections to other
destinations. It is more than double the size of all other UK
airports combined in terms of both passenger numbers and flights.
9. The DfT set out the rationale for economic regulation
of airports in the policy paper accompanying the draft bill,
noting that effective competition is a crucial enabler of growth
and that competitive markets are the best way in the long run
to deliver the goods and services that consumers want at minimum
cost. The DfT argues that in most sectors of the economy the degree
of competitive rivalry between firms and the threat of competition
law is sufficient to protect consumers from the risk of firms
exploiting their market power, for example by charging unreasonably
high prices or by providing unreasonably low levels of service
quality. However, in some sectors of the economytypically
those which used to be publically-owned monopolies and where circumstances
limit the prospect for effective competitioneconomic regulation
is needed to protect consumers and companies.
10. The CAA made clear that it believes consumers
are best served by competitive markets and that it had often found
itself in a position of arguing that regulation might not be necessary.
However, in cases where service providers have significant market
power, regulation is required.
Airlines also support continued economic regulation of major airports.
Dr Humphreys, from the British Air Transport Association (BATA),
argued that the three main London airports, Heathrow, Gatwick
and Stansted, still have significant levels of monopoly power
and should continue to be regulated.
Sian Foster, from Virgin Atlantic, explained further:
Gatwick is full at peak times, and Heathrow is
full throughout the day. If there was the competition, we would
have grown elsewhere in the UK, but the conditions at Gatwick
and Heathrow are not replicable elsewhere and we need them.
There seems to be little disagreement that Heathrow
has substantial market power but Gatwick Airport, now no longer
owned by BAA, has made a case to the CAA that it does not have
a level of market dominance which requires regulation.
The same might be said about Stansted Airport but, as with Gatwick
Airport, airlines might not agree.
11. Some commentators, such as the Adam Smith Institute,
have suggested that economic regulation of airports is unnecessary
and even harmful, and that the market should be allowed to find
its own level. However, these commentators also acknowledge that
government policy, planning restrictions and environmental factors
prevent the busiest airports from expanding and fully responding
to market forces.
Given these constraints on the operation of the aviation market,
we concur with our witnesses that some form of economic regulation
Existing regulatory framework
12. The existing framework for airport economic regulation
is governed principally by the Airports Act 1986, which stipulates
that airports with an annual turnover of over £1 million
in two of the last three years should be covered by the provisions
of economic regulation. Such airports require permission from
the CAA to levy airport charges and are subject to a number of
The CAA may also impose other conditions to remedy any anti-competitive
13. Under the Act the Secretary of State may "designate"
airports to be subject to mandatory conditions, including the
setting of "price caps" for the charges that they may
levy on airlines,
following a five-yearly (quinquennial) review by the CAA and reference
to the Competition Commission. At the time of the 1986 Act, four
airports were designated: Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted and Manchester.
Manchester Airport was de-designated in January 2008 and is no
longer subject to a price cap. The 1986 Act did not set out formal
criteria for airport designation. In May 2007 the DfT published
proposals for formal criteria: essentially, airports with substantial
market power should be designated.
These criteria have been carried forward into the draft Civil
Aviation Bill as the basis for assessing which airports should
be licensed and subject to economic regulation under the new regime.
Background to the proposed changes
CALLS FOR REGULATORY CHANGE
14. In 2006, in its report on the CAA, the previous
Transport Committee recommended that Government review the following
- CAA's price control and airport
- necessity of references to the Competition Commission
for airport price cap decisions; and
- the benefits to using a constructive engagement
process in price cap reviews for designated airports.
In 2007 the CAA gave evidence to the House of Lords
Select Committee on Regulators that the Airports Act did not give
the Authority the necessary powers to regulate airports effectively.
Following these calls for change, the Government commissioned
a number of reviews and consultations on reforming the regulatory
framework. The key reports are briefly summarised below.
PILLING STRATEGIC REVIEW OF THE CAA
15. In 2008, the DfT commissioned Sir Joseph Pilling,
a former senior civil servant, to review the role and function
of the CAA. His report included two recommendations relating to
airport economic regulation:
[...] that the DfT review of the economic regulation
of airports should consider whether the CAA's current duty towards
users should be amended to give greater weight to passengers or
[...] that the Department propose amending the
existing legislation to remove the automatic statutory reference
to the Competition Commission in the setting of airport price
caps and establish this organisation as the appellate body.
In November 2008, the then Secretary of State for
Transport, Geoff Hoon, announced his broad acceptance of the recommendations
and his intention to work with the CAA to implement the necessary
COMPETITION COMMISSION'S BAA AIRPORTS
16. In 2006 the Competition Commission began an investigation
into BAA's market dominance. At this point, BAA owned the UK's
three largest airports (all in London), Scotland's three largest
airports (Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen) and a number of other
regional airports. The investigation has resulted in major changes
to BAA's airport ownership: BAA sold Gatwick Airport in 2008 and
announced in 2011 that it would sell Edinburgh Airport.
It continues to oppose the ruling by the Competition Commission
that it should also sell Stansted Airport.
17. Though the Competition Commission's inquiry was
primarily concerned with BAA's airport ownership, the Commission
also voiced concerns regarding the current framework for airport
economic regulation. It found that the existing system of economic
regulation distorted competition between airlines by adversely
affecting the level, specification and timing of investment and
the appropriate level and quality of service to passengers and
airlines as a result of:
- the absence of statutory duties
and economic licence provisions;
- the limited scope for the regulator to act between
quinquennial reviews, including by means of agreed changes to
licence provisions; and
- the narrow focus of the CAA's statutory duties
in economic regulation (which is to set maximum airport charges
at designated airports every five years) and the way in which
the CAA has given effect to its four statutory objectives [see
paragraph 23 below] in fulfilling these duties.
DFT CONSULTATION ON ECONOMIC REGULATION
18. In April 2008, the DfT embarked upon a review
of the economic regulation of airports, which included the establishment
of an expert panel, chaired by Professor Martin Cave of Warwick
University, and invited evidence from interested parties covering:
- What should be the objectives
of effective economic regulation of airports?
- What are the weaknesses in the current systems
- What lessons can be learned from alternative
19. In March 2009, the DfT published the findings
of the expert panel and consulted on proposals for reform of the
economic regulation regime for airports, which were based on the
findings of the review.
This consultation introduced the three key principles for future
regulation, namely putting the passenger experience first, providing
a flexible set of regulatory tools and adhering to the principles
of 'Better Regulation'. It also introduced the concept of a licence-based
20. In December 2009, the DfT announced its decision
on the future of airport economic regulation, which largely followed
the proposals in the consultation document. The proposals form
the basis of the draft bill now being considered, although there
have been a small number of significant changes following continued
dialogue with the industry since 2009, notably the granting of
a right of appeal against licence conditions to the airlines and
the removal of the role of Passenger Focus as representative of
WINTER WEATHER RESILIENCE
21. A compounding factor in recent years has been
the failure of some airport services to function during severe
winter weather events, with unacceptable consequences for passengers
and the economy. Heavy snow over the last three winters forced
a reconsideration of airport capabilities and services. In our
report, Keeping the UK moving: The impact on transport of the
winter weather in December 2010, we cautioned that the UK's
airports were not adequately equipped to deal with winter weather
events. We recommended that airports should develop passenger
welfare plans and that Government oversight of airports' snow
and major incident plans should be strengthened.
22. Concurrently with our inquiry, Professor David
Begg, non-executive director of BAA, undertook a review on behalf
of Heathrow Airport.
Several government departments, including the DfT, also undertook
a wide-ranging review of the case for further investment in resilience
of the road, rail and aviation infrastructure. Its conclusions
placed considerable weight on the role that the bill would play
in mitigating the impacts of severe weather events on airports.
Proposed regulatory framework
PRIMARY DUTY TO AIR TRANSPORT USERS
23. One of the primary objectives of the draft bill
is to reorient the CAA's economic regulation duties towards protecting
the interests of air transport users. Under current law, the CAA
has an overall duty to "further the reasonable interests
of users of air transport services."
However, with respect to economic regulation, it has four duties
of equal weight:
- to "further the reasonable
interests of users of airports within the United Kingdom."
- to promote the efficient, economic and profitable
operation of airports;
- to encourage investment; and
- to impose minimum restrictions consistent with
the performance by the CAA of its other functions under this part
of the Act.
It has been often been argued that there is some
tension between these objectives, particularly in terms of encouraging
investment whilst protecting the interests of air transport users
and promoting efficiency. This was made clear by the DfT in its
decision on its review of Economic Regulation:
document noted that some stakeholders were unclear about how the
CAA balances its current duties and others were concerned it placed
undue prominence on specific duties (for example the Competition
Commission raised concerns that the CAA may place undue prominence
on its duty to impose minimum restrictions).
24. The draft bill would elevate the interests of
air transport users by giving the CAA one primary duty to "further
the interests of users of air transport services regarding the
range, availability, continuity, cost and quality of airport operation
this single primary duty, the bill also requires the CAA to have
regard, where appropriate, to promoting competition in the provision
of airport services and to a number of other secondary duties,
- the ability of the airport
operator to finance its activities;
- securing that all reasonable demands for air
transport services are met;
- the need to promote economy and efficiency in
the provision of airport operation services by each airport licence
- guidance issued by the Secretary of State;
- international obligations; and
- the principles of good regulation.
25. Although it is made clear that the CAA must always
give priority to the air transport user, the Authority is still
able to interpret its full range of duties with a high degree
of discretion and judgement, particularly where there may be differences
between various classes of user or between requirements in terms
of the range, availability, continuity, cost and quality of airport
26. The Government argues that this new overarching
duty and other measures included in the bill would benefit passengers
and shippers of cargo. Aviation minister, Rt Hon Theresa Villiers
MP, told us that the new regulatory regime has been designed to
give the CAA the tools it needs to ensure that passengers' needs
are met. A flexible licensing scheme, she said, would "give
the CAA much more effective powers to intervene where the airport
is not providing the quality of service that passengers want."
27. These changes would bring the CAA in line with
the UK's other economic regulators that share a common primary
duty to protect the interests of the end users of the service.
This duty would also enable the CAA to comply with the Government's
Principles for Economic Regulation.
The CAA welcomed this clarification of its duties in respect of
airport economic regulation. Airport and airline industry witnesses
were also broadly supportive of the change to the CAA's primary
duty, albeit with certain reservations which we address below.
DEFINITION OF AIR TRANSPORT USERS
28. In its policy paper, the Government defines the
consumer as "passengers and owners of cargo both present
and future" but this definition is omitted from the draft
bill. We heard
concerns that the draft bill does not clearly define who
constitutes an air transport user. The Airport Operators Association,
for example, said that a clearer definition was needed in the
legislation, to avoid confusion and disagreement in the future.
29. Manchester Airports Group was particularly concerned
that the bill or explanatory material should make clear that airlines
were excluded from the definition of users of air transport services.
The airlines, however, took the opposite view, pointing out that,
although not the end users of air transport services for which
they are often the providers, airlines are the primary customers
of the airports. Dr Barry Humphreys of the British Air Transport
Association told us:
We would like to see the role of the airlines
more formally recognised in the duties given to the CAA. Ideally,
we would like to see it done in the primary duty, but if that
is not possible, there should be at least a recognition of it
in the secondary duties given to the CAA. We understand that the
CAA is required to consult airlines and other stakeholders, but
in our view that is not sufficient. There needs to be a legal
basis for taking account of the views of what, after all, are
the principal customers of the airports.
30. Some stakeholders have suggested that there is
a risk that airports would be allowed to upgrade facilities in
the interests of future passengers but at the expense of current
passengers. In other words, if airports invest too much in their
capital stock to benefit future passengers, it may cause prices
to rise to the detriment of current and prospective passengers.
For example Sian Foster of Virgin Atlantic Airways told us in
[...] this Bill will provide a shift away from
fixed five-year terms, where you are negotiating charges seven
years in advance of when they will actually be paid by the passengers.
That means, in our case, that passenger charges have gone up by
50% in the last three years, at a time when the rest of the industry
has been massively driving down on the cost of doing business,
becoming more efficient and focusing on affordability for our
31. We recommend greater clarity in the wording
of the bill's definition of users of air transport services. We
suggest that users be defined as "passengers and shippers
of cargo both present and future". There should also be more
specificity in the CAA guidance regarding the relative weight
that should be put on current versus future air transport users'
interests. We further recommend that the special position of airlines
be recognised by way of a secondary duty in the bill.
32. Although not strictly relevant to the drafting
of the bill, a further concern relates to how the views of passengers
and, in particular, of users of air cargo services will be captured.
This is pertinent to proposal to give the CAA a duty to require
air transport service providers to publish information to inform
consumer choice. (See Chapter 3.) The CAA proposes to establish
an Aviation Consumer Advocacy Panel but the CAA's answers to our
questions were unclear as to how the panel will operate and whether
it will represent the full range of users' interests.
It is not immediately apparent in what way this panel will be
an improvement over the previous Air Transport Users Council which
was disbanded in March 2011.
33. We recommend that the CAA clarify how it intends
to ascertain the interests of transport users and how the proposed
Aviation Consumer Advocacy Panel will relate to the regulatory
34. The previous Government's list of proposed secondary
duties for the CAA, in respect of economic regulation, included:
"to have regard to the airport operator's legal
obligations to comply with applicable environmental and planning
This duty was omitted from the draft bill. Mrs Villiers
said this was because it was unnecessary as there was "absolutely
no doubt" that costs incurred by airports in respect compliance
with environmental law and regulations could be included in an
airports regulatory asset base (see footnote 19).
The Minister also suggested that a supplementary duty on the environment
was unnecessary because airports voluntarily invest in improving
their environmental performance because it is in their commercial
35. The aviation industry is generally opposed to
the inclusion of a specific environmental duty, fearing that it
may lead to additional costs. BA stated that it would be misguided
to include environmental provisions in legislation on economic
regulation. It was concerned that if environmental objectives
were pursued through this route by the CAA, the impacts would
fall disproportionately on the regulated airportssuch as
Heathrowwhere BA's operations are concentrated.
36. Brian Ross, representing the umbrella organisation
AirportWatch, argued that omitting an environmental duty from
the bill could result in decreased environmental performance by
airports. He said of the Government's decision not to include
the environmental duty:
This is contrary to earlier Government promises
and gives rise to serious concerns amongst those who live close
to the UK's major airports that the CAA will in future be powerless
to prevent airport operators from cutting back on measures which
reduce or mitigate the effects of their operations upon local
communities and the environment.
37. Responding to questions about the absence of
an environmental duty, Dame Deirdre Hutton, Chair of the CAA,
noted that the Secretary of State for Transport had included reference
to environmental duties in a letter about the CAA's objectives
and concluded that "we do have environmental duties and powers
coming at us from a range of different directions".
The letter calls on the CAA, amongst other things, to
develop its capability to be able to consider
and advise the Department on future policy challenges which require
policy solutions, with particular reference to the environmental
impacts of the aviation industry;
This seems to be a limited remit and not connected
with the scope of the draft bill.
38. Without giving the CAA a supplementary duty
on the environment in relation to its economic regulation role,
there is some risk that airports may be reluctant to invest in
improving environmental performance. Whilst, as the Minister says,
there may be "absolutely no doubt" about measures taken
to comply with statutory environmental obligations, there remains
a doubt about whether the costs of discretionary measures, such
as improved public transport access, can be recovered by airports
in charges to airlines.
39. The draft bill aims to improve airport services
for current and future passengers and shippers of cargo. It would
do this principally through a new licence system for designated
airports, by means of which the CAA would be allowed to set price
caps and certain conditions. Only the small number of designated
airports would be subject to licensing. The criteria for deciding
if an airport should be designated would not change under the
proposals in the draft bill. Similarly, price caps are likely
to be calculated in the same way as they are at presenton
the airport's regulatory asset base. Since November 2011, all
airports with over five million passengers a year have been subjected
to the European Airport Charges Directive and this will also continue.
40. Licences may include financial requirements,
such as standards for minimum credit worthiness and continuity
of service plans that would protect consumers against bankruptcy
of airport operators.
Licences could also require airports to plan more effectively
for winter weather events, such as snow. The CAA has published
a first draft of what such licence conditions might include. In
our report, Keeping the UK Moving: The impact on transport
of the winter weather in December 2010, we recommended that
airports be required to develop passenger welfare plans and to
provide support to stranded passengers during periods of disruption.
We are disappointed that these conditions were not included in
the CAA's draft licence and expect them to be taken into account
when the CAA sets licence conditions.
41. BAA highlighted the risk that the draft licence
conditions could add significant regulatory burden and costs to
The draft licence as it stands is extremely vague,
obliging the licensee to operate an "efficient and reliable
airport". While unobjectionable as an idea, it is not useful
as a legal obligation because it is unclear what, specifically,
it means and so is open to wide interpretation and thus uncertainty...
Gatwick Airport shares BAA's concerns:
The operational resilience licence condition
could be taken to imply that the regulator should have oversight
of all parties at an airport, using the vehicle of the airport
operator's licence to do so. We believe that care needs to be
taken to ensure that it is properly drafted.
42. Iain Osborne, Group Director of Regulatory Policy
at the CAA, responded to these concerns:
Our role is very much to make clear what is expected
of the airport in a situation where the market is not going to
provide that discipline. Quality and resilience is a very good
area. We discovered, last winter, that there was widespread confusion
about who was supposed to do what. The result was that people
did not do what was needful. Regulation can provide a useful discipline
in making clear what the responsibilities of the different parties
are and, indeed, of providing sanctions where people fail to deliver
43. We welcome the intention to improve the financial
and operational performance of airports. There is a risk, however,
that licence conditions, and their associated costs to airports,
may not be proportionate to the benefits delivered to the users
of air transport services. We recommend that the bill be amended
to require the CAA to provide impact assessments for the licence
conditions imposed on airports.
44. Survey evidence suggests that the areas of greatest
passenger dissatisfaction at airports are not within the control
of airports and would thus not be affected by licensing requirements.
An ONS Omnibus Survey, conducted in February 2010, revealed that
passengers were largely satisfied with their experiences at airports
but were not equally satisfied with all aspects of service. The
areas of least satisfaction (less than 75% satisfied) concerned
information provided on bringing goods into the UK (64% satisfied),
destinations served by nearest airport (65% satisfied), baggage
collection (73% satisfied), and cost of flights (74% satisfied).
The highest levels of satisfaction were for provision of flight
information (91% satisfied), timeliness of flights (88% satisfied),
and experiences at check-in (85% satisfied).
45. In its own survey of passenger satisfaction with
airports, the CAA discovered that immigration waiting times were
also an area of concern. Fewer than 70% of passengers at London's
three major airports were satisfied with immigration services,
with 8% of surveyed passengers waiting more than 20 minutes.
The UK Border Agency (UKBA) manages immigration at airports. The
draft bill does not include provisions regarding immigration standards,
which are a matter for the Home Secretary. The CAA also found
passenger dissatisfaction at points where disparate service providers
interact, particularly in times of disruption.
46. Where possible, airport licences should be
structured so that they address key areas of passenger dissatisfaction.
Immigration and baggage handling are two services which are not
within the remit of airports but strongly impact on passengers'
satisfaction with airports. If the Government is serious about
improving the passenger experience at airports, it should consider,
in parallel, how to address improving service standards by other
airport service providers, such as UKBA and private baggage handling
47. In an effort to improve regulatory accountability,
the bill proposes a symmetrical appeals mechanism that would allow
airports and airlines to appeal, to the Competition Commission,
the licence conditions set by the CAA. It would also allow the
Secretary of State and persons "whose interests are materially
affected" to appeal airport designation decisions by the
CAA to the Competition Commission.
Under the current regulatory regime, both the Secretary of State's
decisions on airport designation and any price caps or conditions
set by the CAA can only be challenged by judicial review, which
limits the ability of stakeholders to contest regulatory decisions.
48. The appeals provisions have thus been welcomed
by the airlines and airports. Both groups, however, expressed
concern in written and oral evidence that the draft bill does
not adequately prevent frivolous or vexatious appeals (appeals
made to delay penalties or charges with little factual or legal
basis). Such appeals, they claim, would slow down the regulatory
process and could negate any efficiency improvements that the
draft bill tries to achieve.
49. The Government acknowledges that the number of
appeals made in this new regime would likely be greater than in
the past. However, it suggests that "the design of the system
should deter speculative appeals and help to reduce the level
of regulatory risk."
50. Witnesses raised concerns that unclear definitions
in the appeals mechanism could also contribute to the risk of
frivolous appeals. Clauses 24 and 25 state that appeals against
licence conditions may only be made by licence holders and "providers
of air transport services whose interests are materially affected
by the decision."
Gatwick Airport says that without a more comprehensive definition
of when an air transport service provider can be considered "materially
affected", there is a risk that appeals would be made frivolously.
BAA concurred that under the current wording of the bill, airlines
would have the incentive to appeal every price-related decision,
which would slow down the regulatory process and increase costs.
Airline representatives said that, based on past experience, appeals
from airports were equally likely.
51. The same potential lack of clarity also arises
with the definition of "materially affected" persons
in respect of an appeal over designation to the Competition Appeals
Tribunal as set out in Schedule 1 to the bill. Here, the scope
for parties to appeal decisions is potentially wider and could
lead to appeals from a wide variety of parties who could claim
to have their interests materially affected by the activities
of an airport.
52. We are concerned that airports and airlines
might use frivolous or vexatious appeals to delay licence conditions
to which they are opposed, to the detriment of users of air transport
services. We recommend that the Government ensures that the Competition
Commission and other relevant appeals bodies have the power to
strike out frivolous or vexatious appeals. We further recommend
that the Government specifies more clearly what constitutes a
"materially affected" provider of air transport services
in the bill, to prevent frivolous appeals by airports and airlines
and in respect of "materially affected" persons in relation
to appeals on designation.
53. Both Gatwick Airport Ltd
and Manchester Airports Group,
supported by the Airport Operators Association,
expressed concerns about the provisions permitting inter-terminal
competition to be introduced at airports.
These enabling provisions have been included in the draft bill
as a response to a recommendation from the Competition Commission
that inter-terminal competition should not be precluded under
any new regulatory regime. The clauses in the bill simply provide
for the circumstance where there might be different operators
of parts of an airport with different regulatory treatment. These
circumstances could only arise if imposed through a market investigation
or as a result of a decision by the airport operator itself. The
bill does not mandate that inter-terminal competition should take
place but merely ensures that the regulatory framework can accommodate
it should the eventuality arise.
In view of the lack of experience of inter-terminal competition
in the UK to date, we think this is a reasonable provision to
include in the bill.
6 CAA, UK Airport Statistics, 2011-2010, http://www.caa.co.uk Back
Draft Civil Aviation Bill: An effective regulatory framework
for UK aviation: Policy Paper, Cm 8234-I, November 2011 Back
Q109 [Mr Haines] Back
Q 86 [Mr Haines] Back
Q 74 Back
Q 75 Back
Q 3 [Mr Hanks] and Ev 57 Back
Qq 96 and 109 Back
Karthik Reddy, Think Piece on airline regulation, Adam
Smith Institute, 2010, http://www.adamsmith.org Back
The Coalition Government has ruled out additional runways at Heathrow,
Gatwick and Stansted Airports. It is due to publish a Sustainable
Framework for Aviation for consultation in March 2012. The CAA
has recently published a policy paper which identifies the need
for additional airport capacity and calls for National Policy
Statement for Airports, CAA, Aviation Policy for the Future,
January 2012. Back
In this context, airport charges cover those levied directly on
airlines or air passengers. Back
The charges are based on an airport's regulatory asset base (RAB),
which is the value of its regulated capital and operational assets,
and the rate of return required to encourage investment in new
facilities and infrastructure, taking into account the operating
costs of the airport and its anticipated non-regulated revenues. Back
Department for Transport, Consultation on proposed designation
and de-designation criteria for airports, 26 February 2007.
These criteria were used in 2007 to confirm the designated status
of Stansted Airport and to de-designate Manchester Airport. Back
Transport Committee, The work of the Civil Aviation Authority
(thirteenth report of session 2005-2006), HC 809, 8 November 2006,
paragraphs 31-36. Back
House of Lords Select Committee on the Regulators, First Report
of Session 2006-07, UK Economic Regulators, Vol II: Evidence,
13 November 2007, pp 51-67 Back
Department for Transport, Report of the strategic review of
the CAA, June 2008, paragraphs 272 and 274 Back
HC Deb 26 November 2008, cc106-107WS Back
BAA announced in October 2011 that it plans to sell Edinburgh
Airport by summer 2012 ("BAA to sell Edinburgh Airport,"
BAA, 19 Oct 2011) Back
Competition Commission, BAA airports market investigation:
A report on the supply of airport services by BAA in the UK,
19 March 2009, p 270 Back
Department for Transport, Report of the independent panel on
airport regulation, March 2009 Back
Transport Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2010-2012, Keeping
the UK moving: The impact on transport of the winter weather in
December 2010, HC 794 Back
Heathrow Winter Resilience Enquiry, Report of the Heathrow Winter
Resilience Enquiry, March 2011 Back
Department for Transport, Department for Energy and Climate Chance
and Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Winter
Resilience in Transport: an assessment of the case for additional
investment, December 2011 Back
Civil Aviation Act1982, Part I, Clause 4, Subsection (1) Back
Airports Act1986, Part IV, Clause 39, Section (2) Back
Department for Transport, Reforming the Framework for the Economic
Regulation of Airports: Decision Document, December 2009,
Paragraph 3.13 Back
Draft Civil Aviation Bill, cl. 1, subsection (1) Back
Q 147 Back
See, for example, Ofgem, About Us, http://www.ofgem.gov.uk Back
Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Principles of
Economic Regulation, April 2011 Back
Draft Civil Aviation Bill: An effective regulatory framework for
UK aviation: Policy Paper, Cm 8234-I, November 2011, p 12 Back
Ev 60 and Ev w5 [Manchester Airport Group] Back
Ev w5 Back
Q 54 Back
Q 64 Back
Qq 126-136 Back
Ev 33 Back
Qq 167-177 Back
Q 164 Back
Ev 60 Back
Ev 33 Back
Q 106 Back
Letter from Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, Secretary of State for Transport,
to Dame Deidre Hutton CBE, Chair of the CAA, 2 February 2011 Back
The CAA has recently published a consultation paper on its environmental
programme, CAA, CAA and the Environment, January 2012. Back
The main aim of the Directive is to establish a common EU framework
regulating the essential features of airport charges, based on
the ICAO principles of non-discrimination, transparency and consultation
with users, European Airport Charges Directive 2009/12/EC. Back
Department for Transport, Reforming the Framework for the Economic
Regulation of Airports: Decision Document, December 2009 Back
Ev 40 Back
Q 41 [Mr Hanks] Back
Q 93 Back
Security is managed by airports and falls under the Service Quality
Rebate scheme, which requires airports to meet security waiting
time standards or compensate airlines if they fail to meet these
Office of National Statistics, Omnibus Survey , February
2010, p 9 Back
CAA Consumer Protection Group, The Through Airport Passenger
Experience: An assessment of the passenger experience and airport
operations at Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted and Manchester airports,
9 March 2009 Back
Draft Civil Aviation Bill: An effective regulatory framework
for UK aviation: Policy Paper, Cm 8234-I, November 2011, p
Draft Civil Aviation Bill: An effective regulatory framework
for UK aviation: Impact Assessment, Cm 8234-III, November
2011, p 10 Back
Draft Civil Aviation Bill, cl. 24, subsection (2) Back
Ev 58 Back
Ev 39 Back
Q 62 [Dr Humpreys] Back
Ev 55 Back
Ev w5 Back
Ev 60 Back
Inter alia at clauses 4, 5 and 6 of the draft bill. Back
Qq 101-102 Back