Written evidence from Andrew Last of Minnerva
Ltd (BUS 49)
THE IMPACT OF FREE OFF-PEAK BUS TRAVEL FOR
OLDER AND DISABLED PEOPLE (CONCESSIONARY TRAVEL)
PERSONAL QUALIFICATIONS
1. I am a Transport Planning Professional and
have been a transport planning consultant for most of my career
since graduating in 1972. I have predominantly worked in local
public transport, mostly in connection with buses. In the last
ten years my work has been dominated by concessionary travel issues.
The majority of this activity has been for local authorities,
most regularly for the Passenger Transport Executives, but I have
occasionally worked for bus and train operators.
2. I have advised the Welsh Assembly Government
(and was responsible for a major study in Wales in 2003), and
I was appointed in 2004 to act on behalf of Scottish Ministers
to determine appeals by four Scottish bus operators (under very
similar legislation to that which applies in England and Wales).
I am one of a very few people to have had this rôle prior
to 2006. I was an advisor to the recently concluded research study
by the Institute for Transport Studies (ITS) at the University
of Leeds, and authored two (and co-authored a third) of the research
reports produced by ITS.
3. This Evidence has been prepared on my own
account and should not be regarded as reflecting the views of
any other individuals or organisations. However, I am grateful
to colleagues active in the concessionary travel area for their
comments on drafts of this Evidence.
STRUCTURE OF
EVIDENCE
4. The Committee has called for evidence on the
implementation and financial implications of free off-peak travel
for elderly and disabled people on local bus services in England
("concessionary travel").
5. This submission argues that:
— there
is a need to question the equity and effectiveness of the current
statutory free travel policy; and
— the
contribution of free travel to reducing social exclusion will
be even further reduced by the impact of cuts in local transport
arising from the Spending Review.
6. As a consequence, there is an urgent requirement
to obtain better information about who benefits from the current
statutory concession, as a precursor to an informed debate about
how to improve its cost-effectiveness, and to identify better
ways of achieving its objectives.
7. The arrangements for delivery of concessionary
travel are complex. A background Note (at the end of this document)
describes how the statutory concession is delivered, and provides
a commentary (representing the author's views) on some of the
difficulties created. However, it is understood that these will
not be the Committee's main concern.
DISTRIBUTION OF
BENEFITS FROM
FREE TRAVEL
8. There is no doubt that the policy of free
travel has increased the number of bus trips made by older and
disabled passengers, and will have improved accessibility to facilities,
and reduced social exclusion for many people. It is thought that
the universal free travel policy is amongst the most generous
of its sort in Europe or elsewhere.[31]
9. However, very little is known about the sorts
of individuals who are making these trips, why they are making
them and what benefits arise as a result.[32]
This lack of evidence does not in itself prove anything, although
it is surprising that DfT have not examined such a large amount
of public expenditure to confirm that it is meeting policy objectives.
However, a growing body of smartcard data is showing that the
usage of the free travel concession is highly skewed. A very small
proportion of passholders make a very substantial proportion of
concessionary trips overall, and a surprisingly large proportion
of passholders make virtually no use of the concession at all.
10. Analysis by the author of smartcard data
from four districts in Lancashire, undertaken as part of the ITS
research work for DfT,[33]
established that over a five week period, 56% of passholders made
no use of the concession. In contrast, a very small percentage
(2.4%) of passholders made more than 10 trips[34]
per week, which in total accounted for more than 25% of all trips
made. Similar patterns were found in analysis of smartcard data
from Nottingham for a much longer period.
11. Without further analysis and research, it
is not possible to be sure about the implications of these figures.
But one obvious conclusion is that although intended to be a universal
benefit, half the supposed beneficiaries make no use of the concession.
This implies that overall, the policy is having no impact on the
majority of the targeted population.[35]
12. There are a number of reasons why eligible
people might not use the free travel concession, even if they
possess a bus pass,[36]
including:
— being
too infirm or frail to get to a bus stop or to travel independently
with confidence;
— real
or perceived lack of sufficiently conveniently bus services to
use;
— continued
availability and access to a car;
— objection
in principle to a free benefit; and
— other
reasons including dislike of buses, and lack of familiarity with
bus use.
13. Without further research, it is impossible
to judge which of these reasons account for the largest proportions
of non-users. However, it is possible to surmise something about
the characteristics of the frequent users, at the other end of
the spectrum, which are likely to be some combination of:
— living
in an area with relatively frequent bus services;
— sufficiently
agile to be comfortable with frequent bus use; and
— familiarity
with the local network from being a habitual bus user, although
potentially, frequent use could be a result of individuals switching
from car when the latter becomes too challenging.
14. Very frequent use could also be associated
with regular employment, which is available for the "younger"
sections of the older age group. It may well be that these frequent
users are obtaining substantial benefits from the concession.
But it also seems highly likely that many of the non-users suffer
from the problems of social exclusion that the free travel policy
is intended to address, yet in effect will be cross-subsidising
(through their tax contributions to local and central Government)
those who are making frequent use of the concession.
15. It is an open question whether one group
is more-or-less affluent than the other; but the very highly skewed
nature of the distribution of use of the concession raises serious
doubts about whether the generosity of the policy (in terms of
unlimited free travel) is either equitable or effective in terms
of addressing social exclusion issues.
IMPACT OF
THE SPENDING
REVIEW
16. These concerns potentially arise with any
universal benefit, although the fact that bus services are not
universally available everywhere must significantly increase the
danger that those who are most able to make use of it are unrepresentative
of the target population as a whole. However, the consequences
of the reductions in expenditure being forced on local Government
could be to significantly worsen this problem.
17. Statutory free travel was unaffected by the
Comprehensive Spending Review, which did not in itself change
the money allocated to fund this statutory service. However, the
November 2009 Pre-Budget Review of the previous Government had
already planned cuts of £120 million from the funding available
in 2012-13,[37]
attributed to "efficiency improvements" and reductions
in reimbursement levels. Moreover, the Spending Review substantially
reduced funding for local government as a whole and, by implication,
therefore reduced funding streams for local bus services applied
by local transport authorities (including funding for non-commercial
services, information and facilities for passengers).
18. Since all funding for concessionary travel
is now (for 2011-12 and beyond) bundled into Formula Grant, it
is difficult for many authorities to properly identify the quantum
made available to fund the statutory concession. But there is
no doubt that in combination, the effect of these changes is to
significantly reduce the money available to support local bus
services.
19. The Impact Assessment of the recent changes
in reimbursement arrangements[38]
indicated that substantial savings (for example, of between £56
million and £102 million in 2011-12) would result from the
changes. However, it is misleading to classify these as "efficiency
improvements". A modest proportion of these savings may be
true administrative efficiencies, but the majority will arise
from a reduction in financial support to operators. While the
inference is that operators had previously been over-reimbursed,
the DfT research study did not, and could not, come to a definitive
view as to the correct level of reimbursement. Thus the end result
is that support for bus services will be reduced, leading to reductions
in services or increases in bus fares or, more likely, a combination
of the two.
20. The impact on services will be shared by
all passengers, but the impact on fares will be experienced only
by non-disabled passengers under 60. These direct impacts of reduced
funding may, in themselves, have significant social exclusion
effects.
21. In this context, the fact that Travel Concession
Authorities (TCAs) have legal obligations to reimburse bus operators
puts a substantial part of the budget available for bus services
outside local control. TCA expenditure on reimbursement is dictated
by the number of concessionary journeys made, the average fare
charged by bus operators, and by the "reimbursement rules"
which allow for generation and additional costs.
22. TCAs have no control over the first two of
these, and in principle the reimbursement rules should be dictated
by the "no better, no worse off" principle - although
the uncertainties associated with putting these principles into
practice provide a need for judgement in their interpretation
that is potentially the source of much dispute with bus operators.
The effect is that since the absolute amount of money that a TCA
will need to pay to reimburse operators for the statutory concession
is in effect ring-fenced, any economies required to reduce expenditure
on local buses will have to come from supported services.
23. The evidence from the smartcard analysis
is that the majority of older people do not use the free concession,
and a very small minority use it a great deal. But there is a
sizeable proportion of passholders whose use of the concession
is between these two extremes. We know nothing about the characteristics
of these individuals, but we can infer that they have some access
to bus services, and use them to a limited degree. It is probable
that the quality of the bus service available to these individuals
(in terms of route density and frequency) is not as great as for
those passholders who use the bus very frequently, and it follows
that these bus services are likely to be more dependent upon local
bus subsidy.
24. The Spending Review has led many local authorities
to consider major cuts in supported bus services.[39]
Exactly what services are cut and who will be affected will depend
upon local circumstances, but it seems inevitable that there will
be a disproportionate impact on the large proportion of passholders
who make some use of the concession but are not its most frequent
users. Although they will still be able to travel for free, there
will be far fewer buses available to use. The net effect is that
accessibility for this section of the elderly and disabled population
will be reduced, and problems of social exclusion for them will
be increased.
25. The author's view is that while there are
good arguments for maintaining a concessionary fare for older
and disabled people, it is highly likely that the current statutory
free concession is inequitable and delivers minimal benefits to
the majority of the older and disabled population. Moreover, because
reimbursement expenditure by TCAs is in effect protected by statute,
the effect of Spending Review reductions will have a disproportionate
impact on supported services.
26. There is a strong danger that the consequent
reductions in accessibility for the older and disabled people
dependent upon these services will have a far greater impact on
many more people than the benefits derived from being able to
travel for free.
27. There is therefore an urgent need to review
the effectiveness of the current statutory concession and consider
alternatives that satisfy its objectives more cost effectively.
28. The first priority is to obtain a better
understanding of what benefits the current concession delivers,
to whom, and why so many older and disabled people make so little
use of it. In particular, a key question is the extent to which
low use of the concession is correlated with poor bus accessibility.
It would be very easy to use existing smartcard data for this
purpose at minimal cost. But more substantial research is required
to identify how concessionary use is related to car ownership,
income and other personal characteristics, which can then lead
to a better appreciation of the contribution that free off-peak
bus travel makes to reducing social exclusion amongst older and
disabled people.
29. The author's hypothesis is that a full appraisal
would show that the current concession provides poor value for
money. Its effectiveness in public expenditure terms might be
significantly improved by changes such as the reintroduction of
a small standard charge per trip, or setting a cap on use. However,
such conclusions would need to be informed by research on the
impact on travel patterns of such changes, and their social consequences
for the individuals most affected.
30. However, while a reduction in the generosity
of the concession could reduce public expenditure and allow resources
to be redirected to other areas which provide greater public benefits
relative to the costs, it would do nothing to address the social
exclusion objectives of the concession. Consequently a second
priority is to seek to identify other ways in which local transport
policy can do more to maximise accessibility to the older and
disabled sections of the community.
31. It is conceivable that greater levels of
support for the non-commercial bus network would achieve that
objective more cost effectively than free concessionary travel,
especially if wider benefits to the community were taken into
account. But since funding for local public transport is wrapped
up in formula grant, delivery of such a policy is entirely a matter
of local spending priorities and not subject to central Government
direction. Ironically, since in other respects spending on the
free concession is effectively outside the control of local authorities,
there is an added incentive to reduce supported services because
this will also save expenditure on concessionary travel reimbursement.
This will further damage the accessibility provided by the local
bus network for concessionary passengers and other passengers
alike.
32. The author is conscious that the maintenance
of free concessionary travel was one of the very few areas of
policy on which all three major political parties were united
in the run up to the 2010 General Election. But in the author's
view this provides a much stronger testament to the perceived
political power of the "grey vote" than it does about
the case for the policy itself. It would be very unfortunate if
the consequence of the Spending Review is to significantly worsen
the accessibility of a great many older and disabled people, because
of cuts in supported services, leaving free concessionary travel
as a flagship policy that achieves very little for the vast majority
of the people at whom it is directed.
January 2011
BACKGROUND NOTE: CURRENT CONCESSIONARY TRAVEL
ARRANGEMENTS
STATUTORY BASIS
33. The statutory basis for concessionary travel
policy and delivery is provided by the 1985 and 2000 Transport
Acts, and some subsequent legislation. The 1985 Act established
that the key players in the delivery of concessionary travel arrangements
are:
— Travel
Concession Authorities (TCAs) - designated local authorities[40]
which are responsible for local concessionary travel policy, administration
of concessionary travel schemes, and issuing of passes to local
residents;
— bus
operators, who are obliged to carry concessionary passengers and
are reimbursed on the basis of the local schemes set up by each
TCA; and
— the
Secretary of State for Transport, to whom bus operators can apply
for an independent determination ("appeal") if they
believe that a TCA's reimbursement arrangements are unfair.
34. The 1985 Act enabled TCAs to offer travel
concessions to residents, if they wished, but did not create a
universal concession. The 2000 Act retained the previous administrative
structure, but created a universal benefit in the form of a statutory
right to a half-fare concession on local off-peak buses for older
and disabled people. TCAs were able to offer a concession with
a more generous benefit (eg free travel) but all TCAs were required
to establish schemes to deliver at least the minimum statutory
half-fare concession.
35. The generosity of the statutory concession
was subsequently increased,[41]
and in England became free from April 2006 (on local buses, off-peak,
but within the TCA area of residents), and from April 2008 allowed
free off-peak bus travel anywhere in England.
36. TCAs retain the right from the 1985 Act to
enhance the statutory concession, for example by offering an earlier
weekday start time, or extending the concession to wider range
of residents. The exact share of TCA expenditure associated with
these discretionary concessions is not known, but for buses is
probably a relatively small proportion - most expenditure is associated
with delivery of the statutory concession.
SCALE OF
CONCESSIONARY TRAVEL
USE AND
EXPENDITURE
37. Payments to bus operators for providing concessionary
travel represent the largest single component of local public
transport spending by local government. Of £2,185 million
revenue spending in England in 2007-08, a third of the total was
for concessionary fares.[42]
This proportion is almost certain to have risen over the last
couple of years and is probably higher for the UK as a whole,
since reimbursement arrangements in the devolved administrations
tend to be more generous than those in England.
38. Over a third of the bus passengers currently
carried by bus operators are concessionary passengers.[43]
Payments for concessionary travel account for 18% of estimated
bus operator revenue (including BSOG and net payment for tendered
services). These proportions will vary between operators and types
of route. In some areas, and with some types of service (such
as coastal services in recreational areas) concessionary travel
is the dominant market and these proportions are much higher.
39. It should be noted that there is considerable
variation in the scale of expenditure of TCAs, the number of bus
operators that they deal with, the nature of the services operated,
and the technical resources available to the TCA to administer
the scheme (in terms of expertise and data). Although the move
to County administration from second tier authorities will increase
the average scale of individual schemes, local circumstances will
still vary considerably, and may place significant strain on a
TCA's ability to fairly administer reimbursement arrangements.
FUNDING
40. The change from an entirely discretionary
concession to a largely statutory concession has been reflected
in increases in grant paid by central Government to local Government.
Between 2008-9 and 2010-11, special grant was provided to reflect
the increase in spending associated with the move to the national
concession, but from 2011-12 funding for concessionary travel
is entirely subsumed within Formula Grant. There is therefore
no direct relationship between what a TCA needs to spend to deliver
the statutory concession, and the amount of funding that it will
receive to pay for it, nor is there any transparency that allows
the adequacy of funding to be determined.[44]
This is an important consideration as the minimum standard is
costly, defined in statute and the methodology for operator reimbursement
is fairly tightly constrained.
REIMBURSEMENT
41. 1986 Regulations set out the principles which
should be used by a TCA in calculating reimbursement to bus operators.
In particular, TCAs should have the objective to reimburse operators
so that both individually and in aggregate operators are financially
no better off and no worse off. European legislation (in particular
Regulation 1370/2007) provides an over-arching framework governing
the compensation that an operator may receive for providing a
public service obligation such as requiring certain groups of
passengers to be carried at a concessionary fare.
42. Reimbursement payments are typically calculated
from:
— the
number of concessionary journeys made;
— the
average commercial fare charged by the operator; and
— the
reimbursement rules, which determine how the "no better off,
no worse off" objective is interpreted.
43. Of these, both the number of concessionary
journeys, and the average commercial fare charged are entirely
outside the control of the TCA. The TCA is responsible for setting
the reimbursement rules. But in principle, these should comply
with the "no better off, no worse off" objective, and
in particular should not be set to enable the TCA to match expenditure
with a given amount of funding.
44. Consequently, TCAs are in the position of
having to pay for a statutory service over which they have no
control, and for which they will receive grant that may bear little
relationship to actual expenditure. In the context of significantly
reduced grant to local government, it is inevitable that operators
will be suspicious that TCAs will seek to minimise reimburse payments
in order to respond to wider budgetary pressures.
DFT'S
GUIDANCE
45. It is impossible to know for sure whether
any given quantum of reimbursement payment is "correct",
and genuinely satisfies the "no better off and no worse off"
objective. The best that can be done is to assemble a logical
framework for calculating reimbursement on a consistent basis,
drawing on evidence (from the fields of transport planning and
transport economics) of how passengers and transport operators
behave. The reimbursement rules actually applied to calculate
reimbursement should implement this logical framework.
46. DfT publishes Guidance which seeks to advise
TCAs on the reimbursement rules. The latest, published in late
November 2010 for implementation from April 2011, represents DfT's
interpretation of the results from the large study carried out
on its behalf by the Institute for Transport Studies at the University
of Leeds.
47. The Guidance has two functions:
— it
provides advice to TCAs on how they should satisfy their objectives;
and
— it
also provides the methodology which will be used by DfT in advising
the Secretary of State on appeals.
48. This dual role provides a dilemma for TCAs
which have doubts about the correctness of DfT Guidance, because
of the potential vulnerability to appeals by bus operators. Variation
from Guidance enhances the risk of appeal on grounds of non-compliance
with DfT advice (and a presumption that the outcome will favour
DfT's views as set out in the Guidance). On the other hand, the
TCA will be knowingly in breach of its statutory objectives if
it can be demonstrated that Guidance is not consistent with "no
better off, no worse off" principles. In the author's opinion,
there is at least one feature of the latest Guidance for which
this is the case.[45]
APPEALS
49. Since statutory free travel was introduced
in England over 300 appeals have been received, on widely varying
grounds. DfT have chosen to progress each appeal in isolation,
using an independent adjudicator advised by DfT economists. Determinations
have not been published, even in redacted form, and only the barest
of summaries of outcomes have been made available to other than
the interested parties in each appeal.
50. Because of this lack of information, it is
not possible to assess the effectiveness of the process, and criticism
will have been muted because of a reluctance amongst interested
parties to antagonise those responsible for advising on the outcomes
of future appeals. Even so, dissatisfaction with the appeal process
has led to a number of applications for judicial review, some
of which remain outstanding.
51. In the author's opinion, based on personal
knowledge and some anecdotal evidence, there is ample room for
improvement. In particular, lack of any emerging case-law or precedents,
combined with apparent arbitrary decisions and inconsistencies
in the judgements made, makes it impossible for interested parties
to form a proper view of the likely outcomes of a potential appeal.
This is bound to increase the scale and number of disputes between
TCAs and bus operators rather than reduce it.
SUMMARY OF
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
52. The principal problems created by these various
arrangements can be summarised as follows:
— the
local authorities designated as Travel Concession Authorities
are very largely the agents of central government implementing
central government policy (statutory free off-peak bus travel).
But they have very limited control over what they have to spend,
and in any case there is little direct link between the expenditure
incurred and the funding that they get from central Government.
There is consequently at best an arbitrary degree of over- and
under-funding of the concession between authorities, and at worst
the possibility of underfunding overall;
— of
the things that determine expenditure, TCAs have most influence
over the reimbursement rules. But TCAs are set the objective of
leaving operators no better off and no worse off (and explicitly
should not constrain reimbursement to match available budgets).
Independently, they should also take account of DfT Guidance,
both as a source of advice, and also in the knowledge that DfT
Guidance will be used by operators to argue for higher reimbursement
if possible. So in deciding on arrangements, careful judgements
are required about the weight to be given to DfT Guidance as opposed
to other considerations. In principle, affordability should not
be a consideration, but inevitably in practice will be, to some
degree; and
— there
is a strong incentive for operators to appeal if there is a reasonable
chance that it will increase reimbursement.[46]
But uncertainties about interpretation of the Guidance, and the
difficulty of predicting the likely outcomes from appeal processes,
encourages parties to take divergent views and hence increases
the likelihood of appeals.
53. For practitioners, and especially TCAs faced
with deciding on reimbursement arrangements for 2011-12, existing
institutional arrangements have to be accepted as fixed, despite
their imperfections. There is inevitable conflict between operators
wanting to get paid more, and TCAs seeking both to satisfy the
"no better off, no worse off" objective while managing
their budgets. Explicitly or implicitly, the threat of appeal
will therefore influence TCA formulation of proposed reimbursement
arrangements, and the consultation/negotiation process with operators
that lead to their implementation.
NEED FOR
IMPROVEMENT TO
THE APPEAL
PROCESS
54. Appeals are a necessary part of the overall
delivery mechanism for free travel. But the way in which appeals
are operated has a key role in magnifying, or diminishing, the
tensions created by the institutional structures. In the author's
view, improvement in the operation of the appeal process could
significantly reduce the impact of these tensions, and hence reduce
the destabilising effects of the threat of appeal. This view reflects
the author's experience as an independent adjudicator appointed
on behalf of Scottish Ministers to determine appeals by Scottish
operators.
55. Although grounds for appeal vary, and include
challenges regarding legal and process issues, it is thought that
the underlying subject of most appeals is the question of what
"no better off and no worse off" reimbursement means
in money terms. Despite the ITS work, many uncertainties remain
about the practical interpretation of these principles, requiring
judgements that are potentially subject to dispute. The appeal
process should be providing a mechanism for accumulating evidence
and experience about such judgements, thus reducing uncertainties
and the scope for argument. But the appeal process as operated
by DfT has not permitted this to happen.
56. The fact that DfT has chosen not to publish
appeal determinations has shielded them from scrutiny and means
there is no possibility of an informed outside review of the appeal
process. However, the author is aware of strong criticisms of
the process used for individual determinations, on a variety of
grounds,[47]
some of which have led to joint letters of complaint from both
the TCA and operators involved.
57. An independent review of the appeal process
is therefore an urgent and high priority. It should:
— explicitly
seek the views of TCAs and bus operators on their experience of
the effectiveness of the process as operated by DfT;
— have
access to the Determinations made on behalf of the Secretary of
State, including associated correspondence with interested parties,
to provide an informed view of the practice of appeals as conducted
by DfT;
— examine
the role of the appeal process within the overall arrangements
for delivery of concessionary travel;
— consider
the best way in which the technical judgements implicit in reimbursement
calculations should be brought into the quasi-judicial framework
provided by the current Regulations; and
— seek
to identify best practice from how analogous appeal processes
are dealt with in other sectors.
58. Appeals provide the release mechanism through
which the conflicts that are endemic in current arrangements for
delivering concessionary travel can be resolved. With little likelihood
of major change in these arrangements for the foreseeable future,
the potential for conflict will be a continuing fact of life for
TCAs and operators for some years to come. However, if the appeal
process is used to accumulate and disseminate experience of how
conflicts are resolved, then fewer potential disputes will turn
into actual appeals, and negotiations between TCAs and operators
will take place in a context of much greater certainty on both
sides. This in turn should lead to more positive relationships
between local authorities and bus operators, which is essential
if they are to work in partnership to deliver better local bus
services in the current economic climate.
January 2011
31 There is a free national and multi-modal concession
available for those aged 66 or more in Ireland. Otherwise, although
free travel is often provided by individual city authorities,
it is understood that this is rarely imposed as a statutory duty
by central Governments outside the UK. Back
32
This question is considered in more detail in "The Grey Escape:
How and Why are Older People Using Their Free Bus Pass",
Andrews, Parkhurst, Shaw and Susilo, UTSG, Open University Milton
Keynes, January 2011. Back
33
Reported as Paper 4 in "Concessionary Travel: The Research
Papers", University of Leeds Institute for Transport Studies,
November 2010. Back
34
That is, a single bus leg from boarding stop to alighting stop
without change of bus or service. So a journey involving a change
of buses would count as two such trips. Back
35
Take-up rates of the pass remain less than 100%. Pass take-up
in the analysis data set was about 70% of the eligible population,
implying that non-users of the concession represented almost 80%
of the eligible population. Back
36
There is also anecdotal evidence of bus passes being acquired
as a "proof of age card" (eg to obtain discounts in
shops) rather than with the intention of using it for free bus
travel. Back
37
Together with £60 million associated with increasing the
age of entitlement of men to match the state pension age. Back
38
DfT published new Guidance on reimbursement of bus operators for
carrying concessionary passengers in late November 2010. These
have the affect of significantly reducing the payments that Travel
Concession Authorities should make to bus operators, if they follow
the new Guidance closely. Back
39
As reported in Local Transport Today Issue 559, 26 November
2010 ("Somerset Councillors approve swingeing cuts to transport
spend"; "Herts cuts tendered bus services"). Back
40
Under the 1985 Act, Travel Concession Authorities in County areas
were designated as the second tier authorities (i.e. District
Councils), alongside unitary authorities and metropolitan councils.
Counties take over TCA responsibilities from the second tier authorities
from April 2011. Back
41
A free concession was introduced in Northern Ireland in 2002 and
in Wales and Scotland in 2003. Back
42
Table 2, Local Bus Service Support - Options for Reform Consultation
paper, Department for Transport, March 2008. Back
43
DfT Public Transport Statistics Table 105 October 2010. Back
44
There are indications in some data published by the Department
for Communities and Local Government that appears to identify
the grant that individual local authorities receive for concessionary
travel, but its transparency is obscured by the floor-damping
mechanism and other issues. Back
45
The most significant concern is that the Guidance currently recommends
that the same allowance is made for generation irrespective of
the fare charged, but with variation depending on the rate of
change from 2005-6. So if two operators charge widely varying
fares, but happened to have changed them at an identical rate,
it will be assumed that the same proportion of passengers are
generated, irrespective of whether in the absence of the free
concession passengers would be charged 50 pence or £5. Back
46
DfT proposes to change Regulations to allow appeal outcomes to
reduce levels of payment as well as increase them, thus reducing
incentives to appeal on a purely speculative basis. However, it
is not clear that current Regulations preclude this, and examples
are known of Determinations which have reduced operator payments. Back
47
These include: inclusion in determinations of simple errors of
fact; contradictory directions to a TCA from different determinations
for different operators; ambiguities in directions that have required
clarification letters which have then required further clarification. Back
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