Written evidence from T N D Anderson (BUS
63)
SYNOPSIS
Successive governments have maintained a range of
subsidies to the bus industry, largely in pursuit of social inclusion
and modal shift objectives. The continuing low modal share for
buses, in whatever variant, and in many areas declining, suggests
that the industry requires rather more scrutiny than the current
inquiry will afford.
As Transport for London has demonstrated, there are
ways to increase bus ridership to some degree (albeit that many
users are captive to bus in London and elsewhere). This submission
contends that the unsatisfactory nature of the mode itself, especially
for urban commuting, will ensure that its modal share will remain
low, and that fares will continue to rise, subsidies will be required
for the foreseeable future, or both.
As Ministers are aware, there is an alternative.
Affordable British-made Light Rail is now available, and is capable
of attracting a modal share that would ensure profitable operations.
Cross-subsidies to feeder buses in an integrated network offer
the potential reduction or elimination of Government subsidies
to urban bus services in the medium-term.
There is good practice exhibited in rural bus services
in the Gower Peninsula and Bwcabus in Wales, for example. But
generally, bus services suffer from a lack of imagination and
innovation among profit-maximising providers, a fixation with
technology (eg alternative fuels) rather than the "soft engineering"
of passenger comfort factors, and pre-eminently, the provision
of free or low-cost urban centre parking.
1. INTRODUCTION
At least part of the problem undermining the widely
sought-after modal shift to public transport is the over-reliance
on buses. The bus mode is not popular, and is especially not an
attractive option for car-users. Inevitably in most locations,
it requires public subsidy.
The modal share for buses in OECD cities is
proportional to the size of the population. Larger cities tend
to have more routes and more complex networks, outlying bus interchanges
and P + R sites, all contributing towards a slightly higher modal
share for buses. Many also have suburban rail and metro services
available as well, limiting bus modal share.
For example, buses in Cardiff (0.4m population) have
about 8% modal share, in Dublin (1m) 10% and London (8m) 18%.
Figure 1 illustrates the approximate relationship—probably
affected by the prevailing economic climate to the extent of 1-3%.
Figure 1
APPROXIMATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUS MODAL
SHARE AND URBAN POPULATION
GRAPHIC HERE
2. RIDERSHIP
STRATEGIES FOR
BUSES AND
THEIR LIMITATIONS
Undoubtedly, improvements in what is typically poor
information design and provision, interchange and integration
with all other modes, and other passenger comfort factors could
increase bus modal share, probably by a total of 1-2%. These
could be achieved at relatively modest cost, though a more
holistic and critical analysis would be required than hitherto.
While growth in ridership will rise in with economic
growth, total transport volume will also grow, and the above
proportions are likely to be close to the maximum attainable
by the bus mode in the respective cities.
Further...
— bus
rapid transit (BRT) makes little impact on bus ridership. High-end
bus variants may cost up to 80% of the cost of Light Rail
(LR). Partly because the operating costs of LR are lower than
bus, over 30y LR is cheaper than BRT; and
— there
is an understandable reluctance to re-allocate roadspace away
from cars while the alternatives are so unattractive, and the
political consequences potentially severe. The re-allocation of
roadspace for bus lanes is typically uneconomic however, even
on many routes in London. Bus lanes are simply not justifiable
on the modal shifts that might occur (and invariably do not).
Any investment in bus and coach infrastructure should
initially be directed at...
— critically
reviewing their routes, interchanges and potential degree of integration;
— investigating
the conversion of mainline bus routes to LR; and
— reconfiguring
services as feeders to nodes, heavy rail (HR) and existing and
future Light Rail (LR) or Tram-Train (TT).
3. BUSES V
LIGHT RAIL
One of the implications of the above is that additional
investment in buses may never realise the ridership increases
that might justify conversion of routes to Light Rail. Their need
for subsidy will continue.
The utilisation of LR and/or TT, and the expansion
of HR services where possible would generate a modal shift of
a considerably greater magnitude. LR has been shown to attract
a 25-45% modal share along a corridor—and importantly,
mostly from car. Moreover, investment in LR has been shown
to generate additional bus, coach and taxi use, and more walking
and cycling.
While capital investment in these modes (LR, TT,
HR) may appear high, the cost would be less than continuing with
inefficient road-based modes (and their environmental costs and
other externalities) which are already highly over-capitalised
and largely unsustainable.
4. AFFORDABLE
LIGHT RAIL
Hitherto, LR has been considered unaffordable by
many cities and towns and dismissed without more than superficial
review. However, our Client, TramPower Ltd (www.trampower.co.uk),
produces state-of-the-art LR products which are half the cost
of those of their global competitors. Their lower capital
and operating costs mean that on "commercial" routes
(where a high modal share would be secured), there would be a
positive Internal Rate of Return that would attract private finance.
With one exception, so-called Light Rail in the UK
and in most of Europe has been based on scaled-down heavy rail.
It is therefore over-engineered, not light and expensive. TramPower's
products will revolutionise the business case for Light Rail globally.
Capital Traffic's research has suggested that, pending
pre-feasibility studies and by utilising TramPower products, towns
and cities in the UK with more than 60 000 residents could support
one or two Light Rail lines. Preliminary work suggests that there
may even be a viable scheme for Aberystwyth (28,000 including
students).
Rapid construction is a key feature of TramPower
products. Subject to planning approvals, privately funded Light
Rail could be operating within 3-4y.
TramPower have recently received permission for a
demonstration line in Preston, and are developing a planning application
for a new line from the city centre to the northeast to a business
park and a P + R facility adjacent to the M6.
If deployed widely, Light Rail would contribute to
air quality objectives, reduce traffic noise, fumes and congestion,
and improve journey times and public transport modal share. Light
Rail may also carry freight, which would create a secondary revenue
stream for the operator (as well as reducing truck deliveries
in central areas).
5. THE BUS
INDUSTRY IN
THE UK
Because the revenue per passenger-kilometre is so
low, few bus operators have been prepared to invest in route and
service reviews, or better information design and marketing with
other than profitability in mind.
There is probably a case for a more detailed inquiry
into the bus industry not hidebound by the ideology of "competition",
which has caused so much damage to services out of London. Now
that monopolies are largely in control, stability has returned
to a marked degree, though at the cost of continually higher fares
and restricted services (nights, weekends).
"Showcase" routes and Quality Partnerships
are just another way for (local) government to subsidise bus services,
with negligible impact on modal share though increased profitability
for the private sector operator in most cases. The service ethic
that public transport is supposed to exhibit is lacking in many
areas of the UK.
Despite a sometimes indifferent public, bus drivers
nevertheless offer a dedicated and courteous service under almost
any management regime. There is a strong element of professionalism
there which ought to be built upon. With no disrespect intended,
the tier above (eg service delivery managers) appears to require
a more sophisticated level of training in service design and marketing.
6. FACTORS MILITATING
AGAINST INCREASING
BUS MODAL
SHARE
The major competitor for buses (and for all other
modes) is the private motor vehicle—the least efficient
tool that has ever been put into mass production. Future resource
constraints will ensure that the more sustainable mass transit
modes (ie. not electric vehicles) will dominate the market.
Public transport modal share is most seriously undermined
by policies that have allowed free or low-cost parking in urban
centres and at workplaces. Attempts to change this have been tentative
to date, and ineffectual.
While in some areas there is adequate cooperation
between the local authority and bus service providers, other than
in London the former are hamstrung by a regulatory and purportedly
"competitive" regime that has empowered private sector
providers to the detriment of the public interest. The adoption
of a London-style model of bus regulation in all areas is recommended.
7. EXPANDING
PUBLIC TRANSPORT
PROVISION
There is a conceptual blindness within many local
authorities which does not allow them to look beyond the traditional
answer of 'more roads' to any question about traffic management.
For example...
— In
Weymouth, there is a serviceable rail line that could have been
redeveloped at low cost for LR for the Olympics, and beyond, as
the spine of a small network (the opportunity remains). No doubt
such a scheme would have been considered unaffordable.
— Instead
a "relief" road has been built at a large cost, but
undoubtedly deemed to be affordable. It remains to be seen as
to what benefits, if any, this road will bring.
— In
South Wales, the M4 Corridor Enhancement Measures Programme (M4
CEM) focuses not on the corridor (defined as the South Wales East-West
Corridor in the National Transport Plan), but only the
road. The name of the programme is a misnomer.
Yet the most cost-effective methods for increasing
the capacity of the Corridor (as defined) would be...
— to
provide for more home-working using ICT and reduce full-week commuting;
— to
enhance HR passenger and freight services between South Wales
and Bristol; and
— to
provide Light Rail between Cardiff and Newport.
Local authorities and Integrated Transport Authorities
should be encouraged to develop more expertise in rail and Light
Rail planning to overcome what appears to be a serious skills
deficit and a policy vacuum. They should also institute appropriate
parking controls in off-street locations.
8. CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Reliance on buses to provide efficient and frequent
services in many areas will be negatively affected by the reduction
in Bus Service Operator Grants or other forms of public sector
support (fuel duty rebate etc). This would have a serious impact
on access to employment and on social inclusion.
The continuing use of government funds to subsidise
private sector businesses that seek to maximise profits rather
than public utility ought to require a commensurate quid pro
quo, which the London model does reasonably well. However,
bus routes in London have never been systematically scrutinised,
and rationalisation would lead to savings.
Passenger information needs to be radically enhanced,
but it is predicated upon near non-existent locational information
and often vague or ambiguous directional information. Serious
consideration needs to be given to comprehensive information design
if the efficiency of movement by any mode in the UK is to be significantly
improved.
With respect, the Committee is invited to recommend
— a thorough
inquiry into current and future urban and rural public transport
provision;
— application
of the London model of bus regulation throughout the UK in the
short-term; and
— positive
consideration of Light Rail for mainline routes in larger towns
and cities.
February 2011
| 
