2 Preparing better for severe weather |
Weather forecasting and the impact
of climate change
10. The Met Office provides forecasts to Government
departments and to a number of transport infrastructure providers
and operators, but other transport firms and agencies depend on
private sector forecasters.
Witnesses were generally content with the quality of the short
term weather forecasts they received. Lincolnshire County Council,
for example, described forecasts as "accurate and timely"
and British Airways pointed out that the Met Office had predicted
exactly when the 18 December snowstorm would begin as well as
its intensity and how much snow would fall at Heathrow.
11. However, there was some criticism, for example
from the RAC, of the helpfulness of medium and longer term forecasts.
The Met Office told us that it had first warned the Cabinet Office
of "an increased risk of a cold and early start to winter
conditions" in October and that the public had been warned
of an early start to winter from early November.
We would question how useful this information was to policy-makers,
however, given that the Met Office advised that there was a 70%
chance that temperatures would be average or colder during the
winter and a 60% chance that they would be average or warmer.
12. Some witnesses suggested that the Met Office's
forecasts were biased towards warmer weather because the agency
had focused unduly on climate change and overlooked other important
factors, such as solar activity.
This issue is well beyond our remit, but the proponents of this
theory were unable to provide us with long-range forecasts from
other sources for December 2010 which did not themselves contain
13. On 8 December 2010 the Secretary of State for
Transport asked Professor Sir John Beddington, the Government's
Chief Scientific Adviser, for advice on whether the occurrence
of three severe winters in successive years made severe winters
more likely in future.
Sir John's advice was that "it is not currently possible
to quantify with any certainty the number of severe winters we
might expect over the coming few decades". Although the long
term prediction is for warmer average winter temperatures in the
UK because of climate change, Sir John pointed out that "contemporary
climate change models typically underestimate the observed frequencies
of blocking anticyclones" which tend to cause severe winters
in the UK. He also said better understanding and modelling of
other physical processes which are known to influence the UK's
climate, such as solar variability, would be a "significant
14. Sir John argued that the Met Office needed "additional
high-performance computing resource" to improve decadal forecasting,
although he noted that the Met Office was "optimistic"
about improving its seasonal predictions in time for next winter.
The Secretary of State put a £10 million price tag on the
additional computing power needed by the Met Office to provide
more accurate decadal forecasts.
He told us that he had established a cross-departmental working
group to "look at issues about weather forecasting and optimum
levels of investment".
15. Better medium-
and long-range weather forecasting would assist transport providers
and others in planning to deal with the effects of severe winter
weather. For example, it would give transport operators the opportunity
to warn passengers of when contingency timetables would be likely
to be needed and to get snow and ice clearing equipment into position.
The current seasonal predictionssuch as the forecast provided
to the Cabinet Office in Octoberdo not provide a firm basis
on which decision makers can act with confidence. £10 million
would be a small price to pay for improving the Met Office's long-range
forecasting capability, given the cost to the UK economy of transport
disruption due to severe winter weather. We recommend that the
Secretary of State press the Ministry of Defence to investigate
the case for providing the Met Office with additional funding
for enhanced computing power and to report back to us with the
16. Along with a number of other departments, the
Department for Transport has prepared a climate change adaptation
plan, which looks at how transport networks could be adapted to
deal with global warming during the rest of this century.
The Department's key climate risks include increased incidence
of extreme weather, but not extreme winter weather.
The Secretary of State told us that "consideration of severe
snow and ice were not included as they are weather variables that,
according to latest climate science, are not projected to increase
in frequency or severity as a result of long term climate change".
In oral evidence, however, he accepted that if winters became
milder and wetter "I take that to mean more precipitation
and, therefore, if we do get periods of extreme cold weather that
is likely to occur as snow".
17. The Highways Agency and Network Rail have also
published climate change adaptation reports, both of which refer
to risks associated with severe winter weather.
The Highways Agency report specifically refers to the possibility
that "within long term general climate trends, extreme and
untypical weather events will occur. Increasing average temperatures
do not preclude cold spells."
We are surprised that the
Department for Transport's climate change adaptation plan does
not include reference to risks associated with severe winter weather,
unlike those produced by the Highways Agency and Network Rail.
Given that climate change does not preclude the occurrence of
severe winters in future, and bearing in mind the uncertainties
in modelling the UK's climate identified by Sir John Beddington,
we recommend that the final version of the Department's plan,
which is due to be signed off in spring 2012,
should include reference to the risk of severe winter weather
in future and how this should be planned for.
Influencing public expectations
18. Witnesses were united in arguing that severe
winter weather inevitably caused disruption to transport wherever
in the world it occurred.
The Office of Rail Regulation, for example, gave us examples of
disruption to rail networks in December 2010 in Germany, Denmark,
Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and Switzerland.
British Airways noted that December's snow caused airport closures
across the northern hemisphere.
David Quarmby said "on the whole, we do as well as, if not
in some respects better than, other European countries with similar
weather patterns to our own".
19. Nevertheless, the public expects public authorities
to do far more to keep transport systems operating in snow and
ice. For example, a survey by the AA in the week beginning 26
November 2010 reported that 75% of drivers thought local authorities
had not done very well in clearing snow and ice from minor roads
and 86% were critical of councils' efforts in clearing pavements.
Preliminary findings of research by the Institute of Transport
and Tourism showed that over 80% of respondents thought that clearing
pavements of snow and ice was as important as clearing roads,
although nearly 50% disagreed with the proposition that more tax
should be paid in order to achieve this.
Media reporting of adverse winter weather also adds to the sense
that the UK is unable to cope with snow and ice.
20. There is
undoubtedly more that could and should be done to ensure that
the UK's transport systems are more resilient to severe winter
weather, as this report will show. More realistic expectations
about what can be achieved during severe weather and the level
of winter resilience which is affordable are also necessary. A
level of immediate disruption in severe weather is likely but
transport providers should focus on planning to recover from periods
of severe weather disruption as quickly as practicable, bearing
in mind the trade-off between costs and benefits in investing
in winter resilience.
21. Another area for improvement concerns preparations
by motorists for winter weather. We were struck by the finding
from the AA's December 2010 survey that 44% of drivers had done
nothing to prepare for severe winter driving conditions. Of those
who had taken precautions, only 39% had followed basic advice
to put blankets, a shovel and other emergency equipment in their
We recommend that the Highways
Agency work with motoring organisations such as the AA and the
RAC to launch a high profile publicity campaign about winter preparedness
in autumn 2011. This campaign should aim to increase the proportion
of motorists taking precautions, such as keeping a shovel and
a blanket in the boot of their cars, next winter to at least 60%.
The Government should report back to us in early 2012 about whether
this has been achieved.
22. A third issue concerns the advice provided by
the Highways Agency and the police about when to travel in severe
winter weather. The Secretary of State said "the advice issued
by police, and reiterated by myself and other Ministers at the
height of the disruption, was simply not to use the roads unless
it was absolutely essential ... drivers were advised not to go
out unless they had to". It is not clear to us how many travellers
are deterred from making journeys by such advice or whether there
is sufficient understanding of what the police and the Government
mean by "essential" journeys. Simon Sheldon-Wilson of
the Highways Agency said research on driver behaviour in winter
2009-10 had shown that there had been little change in behaviour
despite the severity of the weather.
We recommend that the Government
and the police should work together to develop clearer 'travel
warnings' which specify more precisely which journeys should not
be undertaken in severe weather conditions. For example, a 'severe
weather travel warning' might indicate that only journeys necessitated
by a medical or other serious emergency should be undertaken,
while a lower-level travel warning should be used to deter journeys
undertaking for social reasons. We also recommend that the Government
sponsor research into how warning messages about travel influence
23. We also
recommend that the Department's current consideration of alternatives
to travel should acknowledge the importance of improving facilities
and arrangements for remote working and tele- and videoconferencing
in maintaining economic activity during periods of severe weather
disruption. Any proposals resulting from the Department's recent
call for evidence on this issue should include improvements to
the resilience and capacity of remote access networks, so that
more people can work at home during periods of disruption.
24. The Department for Transport published a "Snow
Code" in October 2010 to encourage people to clear their
own paths and frontages of snow and ice, following suggestions
that such activity could lead to people being liable for injuries
sustained on cleared areas of road and pavement.
There were a number of other examples of voluntary effort to help
overcome transport difficulties caused by the winter weather.
For example, the Local Government Association told us about arrangements
in some areas to enable local communities to apply salt and grit
to their own roads and pavements as well as examples of voluntary
effort to clear roads, deliver hot meals to elderly people and
act as "snow wardens", looking out for problems caused
by the severe weather.
25. The Secretary of State argued that local authorities
"need to look at ... how they could support community action
with supplies of salt and grit" and pointed out that the
Department had assisted local authorities in making arrangements
with farmers to do snow-clearing work by confirming that red diesel
could be used for that purpose. "There are some things we
can do from the centre but I do not think they can be prescriptive"
he concluded; "I think they can only be enabling".
26. There is a clear responsibility on national and
local government and other transport providers to ensure that
transport systems are kept running during periods of severe weather.
In addition, however, more could be done to facilitate voluntary
action in certain circumstances, for example to help clear icy
pavements and assist vulnerable people. The Government can do
more to promote best practice so that local authorities, and local
communities, are better placed to plan their own responses to
severe weather. We recommend
that, before next winter, the Government should publish online
practical advice about how individuals and communities can overcome
problems caused by severe winter weather. This information should
also include guidance for local authorities on enabling and encouraging
voluntary action, for example in relation to the recruitment of
volunteer snow wardens.
Government co-ordination and expenditure
27. Expenditure on winter resilience is incurred
by a number of organisations in both the public and private sector,
including the Highways Agency, Network Rail, airport operators,
airlines, and train operating companies. It is difficult to estimate
with any accuracy how much these bodies spend each year on winter
resilience, although the Quarmby review estimated that the Highways
Agency and local highway authorities between them spend £160
million during an average winter.
The economic and social costs of winter disruption are also difficult
to calculate. The Quarmby review suggested that the annual cost
of disruption in an average winter was "about £1 billion"
and, as we have seen, December's severe weather cost the UK economy
some £1.6 billion.
Further research would be required to assess whether any of this
"lost" output is in fact deferred to a later period
when weather conditions have improved.
28. The Quarmby review looked at whether it was worthwhile
to increase expenditure by highways authorities on winter resilience.
Mr Quarmby said:
The desk exercise we examined suggested that if local
authorities were able to spend up to 50% more on winter resilience-that
is, from about £200 million to about £300 million a
year-possibly, benefits between £50 million and £400
million might result. In other words, on paper at least, there
is a suggestion that at the local authority level you might get
significant additional benefits by spending a bit more. This would
be on treating a higher proportion of the networks, more treatment
of footways, pedestrian areas and cycleways, maybe more attention
to snow clearing resources and so on.
29. However, the Quarmby review also noted that there
is "little appetite among the public to spend more on winter
resilience, given the relative infrequency of severe winters,
and the generally short duration of their impact".
This is borne out by research undertaken by the Local Government
Association and the Institute of Transport and Tourism.
30. Nevertheless, given
the cost of transport disruption to the UK economy, we are sympathetic
to the argument that it would be beneficial if more money were
spent on winter resilience. Extra investment should be targeted
on those parts of the travel network which have shown themselves
to be least resilient in recent years and where the costs of disruption
are highest. In some cases it will be
for the private sector to fund enhanced resilience, overseen by
the appropriate regulators. Modest extra expenditure on planning
and co-ordination will often be the most effective means of ensuring
that transport systems recover quickly from disruption. We set
out below areas where extra investment could prove beneficial
and the Government's role in achieving this.
RAIL: THE THIRD RAIL SYSTEM SOUTH
OF THE THAMES
31. The Secretary of State said that, in his view,
the rail network had operated "quite well given the extreme
conditions" in December 2010, except for some localised problems.
These included disruption to the electric lines in Kent and Sussex
which Mr Hammond described as "unacceptably vulnerable to
Commuters from those counties will be well aware that ice and
snow on the additional rail which conveys electricity to trains
can paralyse the network. The rail industry's National Task Force
said that on some days fewer than 70% of services which Southeastern,
Southern and First Capital Connect planned to operate ran on time:
on 2 December hardly any trains ran to timetable south of the
Thames. During the
worst of the weather there were instances of trains stranded overnight
in Kent and Sussex.
Meanwhile, the high speed line through Kent was barely affected
by the weather conditions.
32. David Quarmby said that two factors explain the
vulnerability of the 3,000 mile third rail network south of the
Thames: it runs through deep rural areas which are susceptible
to heavy snowfall and electric current is transmitted from the
top of the third rail, rather than the side of the rail as with
some light rail systems, such as the Docklands Light Railway (DLR).
David Ward, Network Rail's route director for Kent, downplayed
comparisons to light rail systems which are smaller and less complex
than main line rail networks.
The National Task Force has described the numerous mitigating
measures being worked on to improve the resilience of the third
rail network, ranging from changing traction control systems on
rolling stock to heating the third rail at key points. "Longer
term options to replace the [third rail] system with overhead
electrification are also being considered".
33. The early start to the 2010-11 winter took the
rail industry by surprise. The National Task Force said:
Network Rail did not have all its equipment in proper
this situation was exacerbated by the fact
that not all trains were initially operating in ice mode and there
were some units that had yet to be modified with the latest software.
With hindsight, some basic operating mistakes were also made in
implementing the key route strategies.
Mr Ward explained that Network Rail's anti-icing
strategy was timed to coincide with the December timetable changeover
and that, although some anti-icing work had been brought forward
because of the forecast bad weather, three specialist vehicles
were unavailable during the first period of disruption. Robin
Gisby of Network Rail said: "If we had got going 48 hours
earlier, probably that first week would have been a little better
in the second period [of disruption] we were a bit better".
However, there were continued problems with some equipment, such
as points heaters, which was not designed to work in the extremely
low temperatures experienced throughout December.
34. The third rail network south of the Thames dates
back over 100 years and is often prone to disruption due to poor
weather. In our view, improving the resilience of this part of
the rail network, which carries thousands of commuters into London
each day, should be a priority for investment. In the long-run,
the rail network south of the Thames would be more resilient and
safer if it made use of overhead wires. In the meantime, however,
there would appear to be scope to introduce a number of technical
'quick fixes' to help overcome the problems caused by ice and
snow, particularly on more vulnerable parts of the network. Priority
should be given to the most cost effective improvements which
can help keep the main commuting lines open. We
recommend that the Secretary of State convene a third rail working
group, bringing together Network Rail, the train operators, and
other interested parties, including passenger groups, to assess
how the network south of the Thames can be made more resilient,
focusing in the first instance on quick fixes for next winter
and then devising costed options for more extensive work for the
next Network Rail control period. We also recommend that the Secretary
of State should commit the Government to the long-term aim of
replacing the existing third rail network with a more resilient
form of electrification. The working group should consider how
this can be achieved and report to Government with an estimate
of timescale and cost. We recommend that this report should be
published in due course.
HELPING AIRPORTS RECOVER FROM SEVERE
35. Although several UK airports closed at times
during December 2010 most attention focused on the closure of
Heathrow on 18 December and its slow recovery thereafter. The
Begg report, arising from the inquiry into Heathrow's closure
initiated by BAA, includes a detailed timeline and study of what
happened at Heathrow. It identified several factors which contributed
to the problems at Heathrow, including a low state of preparedness
for the snow, slow clearance of snow from aircraft stands, failures
in communication and co-ordination, confused and conflicting messages
for passengers, and slow mobilisation of crisis management teams.
The Begg report's main recommendation was that Heathrow should
adopt "an improved resilience target that the airport never
closes as a result of circumstances beyond its control, except
for immediate safety or other emergency threats".
We have not chosen to duplicate the detailed analysis of the Begg
report and we focus instead on the Government's role in relation
to significant disruption at major airports. We consider passenger
welfare and information provision in the next chapter.
36. Several witnesses contrasted winter resilience
at the UK's two biggest airports, Heathrow and Gatwick. British
Airways said Gatwick Airport had shown "continual improvement"
in its winter resilience after a "poor" response to
the winter weather in December 2009.
David Quarmby described Gatwick's closure at the start of December
2010 as "a well-managed incident".
There was considerable criticism of how the disruption at Heathrow
from 18 December was handled, however. British Airways said there
was "little evidence of forward planning and a lack of experience
about how to return to regular operations effectively and efficiently
when the airport re-opened".
Virgin Atlantic said "key elements of Heathrow airport's
snow plan were not implemented" and "the information
flow from Heathrow to airlines [was] slow, limited and at times
BALPA, the pilots' association, blamed much of the disruption
on the absence of off-stand de-icing facilities, which meant aircraft
blocked stands while waiting for de-icing.
The Board of Airlines Representatives criticised inadequate investment
in snow-clearing vehicles at Heathrow.
Criticism that major airports
under-invested in winter resilience equipment would appear to
be borne out by the substantial investments by the owners of both
Gatwick and Heathrow Airports in such equipment after December's
37. The Begg report's conclusions about the disruption
at Heathrow all concerned planning and crisis management.
The confusion over the opening of the second runway on 21 December,
which we probed in detail, exemplified the lack of grip BAA's
senior managers had over the crisis. British Airways and Virgin
Atlantic both complained that they found out about the re-opening
of the second runway when it was announced in the House by the
Prime Minister. In
addition, we received conflicting accounts from the Secretary
of State and Colin Matthews, the Chief Executive of BAA, about
why the Government's offer of military assistance to clear the
runway on the morning of 21 December had been refused.
We accept Mr Matthews' point that trained labour was required
to clear the runway safely and efficiently but it would seem to
us that this work was only prioritised once the Government began
to make clear that continuing delay in the airport's recovery
was unacceptable. All in
all, the Begg report and the evidence we received from the aviation
sector give the impression that Heathrow was totally unprepared
to recover from any major incident which necessitated its closure.
38. The Association of British Travel Agents and
British Airways noted that winter resilience at Heathrow was affected
by the fact that the airport operates at close to full capacity.
This is an important constraint on Heathrow's ability to recover
from periods of closure and also points to Heathrow's status as
an international hub airport. Heathrow makes a significant contribution
to the UK economy and the Government has a legitimate interest
in ensuring that it remains competitive as an international hub,
particularly as its status is threatened by airports in Paris,
Amsterdam and Frankfurt. Although
it is for the private sector to provide the additional investment
in winter resilience recommended by the Begg report, we consider
that the Department for Transport should play an active role in
ensuring that this investment is delivered. Consequently we recommend
that the Secretary of State should designate a senior official
within his department as having oversight of snow plans and other
incident recovery plans at Heathrow and the UK's other main airports.
This role should have responsibility for signing off airport snow
plans and other major incident plans, contributing the Government's
view to discussions about investment in equipment for dealing
with snow and ice and other sources of disruption and participating,
on behalf of the Secretary of State, in "Gold" command
teams providing strategic leadership during crises. Government
oversight of incident recovery plans is particularly important
in relation to Heathrow, to help maintain its status as an international
CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN MODES
39. Several witnesses described how the resilience
of one transport mode to winter weather depended to some extent
on the resilience of other modes. For example, Gatwick Airport
observed that disruption to the rail network in Sussex had affected
its operations because passengers and staff had found it difficult
to get to the airport, even though the airport itself was clear
of snow. Heathrow
Airport pointed out that its difficulties during the second period
of snow in December were compounded by the closure of local roads
which trapped people at the airport.
Virgin Trains called for planning for situations in which train
operators and other forms of public transport were expected to
carry more passengers because of airport closures.
The Department told us that some ports had been badly affected
by the winter weather because of untreated access roads.
Inter-relationships between modes was also covered in the report
arising from the Quarmby review.
The Secretary of State told us that problems experienced in 2009-10
in ensuring that roads to stations were gritted had been less
significant in 2010-11.
40. These issues are primarily for transport operators
and infrastructure providers to resolve. We
would expect all major transport operators and infrastructure
providers to ensure that their contingency planning took account
of the impact of their winter resilience operations on other modes.
Where conflicting priorities cannot be resolved, particularly,
for example, in relation to access to airports, the Government
should step in. We
recommend that the Department for Transport should develop and
publish criteria setting out when it will ensure that the impact
of winter resilience planning by one part of the transport system
takes due account of other modes.
41. The Freight Transport Association and the Institute
of Highway Engineers were amongst witnesses arguing for more transparency
in the preparation and dissemination of local authority winter
resilience plans, so that, for example, transport operators could
use information about which roads would be gritted in making their
own winter preparations.
The Quarmby report also made recommendations on this issue.
We agree that this would be helpful and we
recommend that the Government provide guidance to local authorities
about publishing their plans for transport networks' winter resilience
in draft so that all interested parties can comment and ensure
consistency with their own plans.
42. Laying salt on roads and pavements helps prevent
ice forming and snow lying but is largely ineffective against
deep snow and does not work at temperatures below -8?C.
The UK is reliant on salt imports (to supplement limited domestic
supply) to get through a severe winter and problems with supply
and distribution in winter 2009-10 were the main focus of the
Quarmby review. The Highways Agency managed a strategic stock
of salt, to distribute to local authorities who were running short,
and recommendations were made about reducing salt spreading rates,
although the Local Government Association said these came too
late to affect planning by local authorities and would require
investment in more modern equipment.
43. The AA and the RAC expressed concerns about the
resilience of the UK's salt supply arrangements.
The Institute of Highway Engineers said the strategic salt supply
had not been adequate and:
Local authorities would be at near critical/emergency
levels before any supplies could be released. It was clear that
the location of the stock also affected the possible release of
emergency supplies. There were no supplies north of Humberside
for example. Local authorities were also unable to determine from
DfT the amount of salt being released under this process.
The Institution of Civil Engineers described the
strategic salt arrangements as a "work in progress"
and Durham County Council complained about a "lack of transparency",
In reality, all that has been achieved is that the
reserve salt stocks have transferred from the mine head to local
it is essential that headroom is provided by
the suppliers importing more salt during the summer periods.
44. The Secretary of State said "the bottom
line is that we have ended the winter with about 800,000 tonnes
more salt left in February than we had in the previous year".
He referred to follow-up work, including in ensuring that local
authorities use lower salt spreading rates.
salt arrangements introduced in 2010 helped ensure that local
authorities had sufficient salt to keep main roads open during
a particularly severe winter. To this extent it was a considerable
success. The criticisms we heard of this year's arrangements were
largely points of detail which we expect the Government to consider
in reviewing the arrangements ahead of next winter. In particular,
we recommend that the Government consider ways of ensuring that
strategic salt supply arrangements are more transparent to local
authorities and that new guidance on salt spreading rates is followed.
We call on the Government to publish a written statement on the
outcome of its review of the strategic salt arrangements before
30 For example, see Q174, Ev 89 and Ev w25. Back
Ev w1, paragraph 1 and Ev 89, paragraph 3.5. Back
Ev w52, paragraph 2.2. Back
Ev w11, paragraph 12. Back
HC Deb, 27 Jan 2011, c454w. Back
Ev w4, paragraph 9 and Ev w54 (Piers Corbyn). Back
For example, material from Piers Corbyn which has been deposited
in the Parliamentary Archives. Back
Letter to the Secretary of State for Transport from Sir John Beddington,
dated 15 December 2010, http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/resilience/letter/pdf/beddington.pdf. Back
Climate Change Adaptation Plan for Transport 2010-12:
Enhancing resilience to climate change, DfT, March 2010 (hereafter
DfT adaptation plan). Back
Ibid, p18. Back
Ev 61. Back
Interim Climate Change Risk Assessment, Highways Agency,
Dec 2010 and Network Rail Interim Climate Change Adaptation
Report, 30 Sep 2010. Back
Interim Climate Change Risk Assessment, Highways Agency,
Dec 2010, p6. Back
DfT adaptation plan, p6. Back
Eg Qq 3, 218. Back
Ev w38, paragraph 3. Back
Ev 86-87, paragraphs 1.3 and 1.4 (and see Ev 93, paragraph 3.4). Back
Ev w15-16, paragraphs 4.2.1 and 4.3.4. Back
Ev w44-45, section 6. Back
For example, "Why can't we handle snow?", Daily Express,
1 Dec 2010, p14; "Here we (don't) go again: Britain freezes
to a halt", Independent, 2 Dec 2010, pp2-4; "A
bad day for the nation as failure takes hold", Daily Express,
3 Dec 2010, p12; "Why Britain has been brought to a standstill
again", Daily Express, 3 Dec 2010, p12. Back
Ev w16, paragraph 4.3.3. Back
Ev 59, paragraph 52. Back
Ev 84-85, Annex A and Qq 75 and 92. Back
Quarmby Audit, paragraph 3.37. Back
Quarmby final report, paragraph 12.12 and see paragraph
Quarmby final report, paragraph 12.1. Back
Ev w44-45, section 6 and Weathering the Storm II, Local
Government Association, July 2010, p9. Back
Qq 218, 238-39. Back
Ev 66, paragraph 5.2 and Ev 71, appendix 2. These statistics measure
performance against a pre-announced timetable, including, in some
cases, contingency timetables and therefore do not fully capture
the level of disruption experienced by passengers. Back
Rail Magazine, issue 660, p6. Back
Ev 68, paragraph 7.1. Back
Ev 67, paragraph 6.3. Back
Begg Report, paragraph 9. Back
Ev 88, paragraphs 2.2.1 and 2.2.3. Back
Ev 87, paragraph 2.1.7. Back
Ev 74-75, paragraphs 15 and 20. Back
Ev w58-59, paragraphs 7 and 8 to 20. Back
Ev w24, paragraph 11 and see Ev w22, paragraph 11. Back
Ev 80, paragraph 6.1 and Ev 93, section 4. Back
Begg Report, paragraph 14. Back
Q150 and see Begg Report, paragraph 138 and Ev 95. Back
Ev 61, 94 and 95 and Qq 212, 259 and 261-62. Back
Ev w49, paragraph 15 and Ev 86, paragraph 1.2 and see Ev 93, paragraph
Ev 80, paragraph 6.7. Back
Ev 92-93, paragraph 3.3.1. Back
Ev w63, paragraph 46. Back
Ev 60, paragraph 58. Back
Q12 and Quarmby final report, sections 15 and 16. Back
Ev w31, p2 and Ev w48, paragraph 20. Back
Begg Report, recommendations 5 and 6. Back
Ev w63, paragraph 20. Back
Ev w15, paragraph 3.3 and Ev w51, paragraph 1.7. Back
Ev w30. Back
Ev w67, paragraph 18. Back
Ev w26. Back
Q275 and see Ev 62. Back