Keeping the UK moving: The impact on transport of the winter weather in December 2010 - Transport Committee Contents

2  Preparing better for severe weather

Weather forecasting and the impact of climate change

10. The Met Office provides forecasts to Government departments and to a number of transport infrastructure providers and operators, but other transport firms and agencies depend on private sector forecasters.[30] Witnesses were generally content with the quality of the short term weather forecasts they received. Lincolnshire County Council, for example, described forecasts as "accurate and timely" and British Airways pointed out that the Met Office had predicted exactly when the 18 December snowstorm would begin as well as its intensity and how much snow would fall at Heathrow.[31]

11. However, there was some criticism, for example from the RAC, of the helpfulness of medium and longer term forecasts.[32] The Met Office told us that it had first warned the Cabinet Office of "an increased risk of a cold and early start to winter conditions" in October and that the public had been warned of an early start to winter from early November.[33] We would question how useful this information was to policy-makers, however, given that the Met Office advised that there was a 70% chance that temperatures would be average or colder during the winter and a 60% chance that they would be average or warmer.[34]

12. Some witnesses suggested that the Met Office's forecasts were biased towards warmer weather because the agency had focused unduly on climate change and overlooked other important factors, such as solar activity.[35] This issue is well beyond our remit, but the proponents of this theory were unable to provide us with long-range forecasts from other sources for December 2010 which did not themselves contain significant errors.[36]

13. On 8 December 2010 the Secretary of State for Transport asked Professor Sir John Beddington, the Government's Chief Scientific Adviser, for advice on whether the occurrence of three severe winters in successive years made severe winters more likely in future.[37] Sir John's advice was that "it is not currently possible to quantify with any certainty the number of severe winters we might expect over the coming few decades". Although the long term prediction is for warmer average winter temperatures in the UK because of climate change, Sir John pointed out that "contemporary climate change models typically underestimate the observed frequencies of blocking anticyclones" which tend to cause severe winters in the UK. He also said better understanding and modelling of other physical processes which are known to influence the UK's climate, such as solar variability, would be a "significant step forward".

14. Sir John argued that the Met Office needed "additional high-performance computing resource" to improve decadal forecasting, although he noted that the Met Office was "optimistic" about improving its seasonal predictions in time for next winter.[38] The Secretary of State put a £10 million price tag on the additional computing power needed by the Met Office to provide more accurate decadal forecasts.[39] He told us that he had established a cross-departmental working group to "look at issues about weather forecasting and optimum levels of investment".[40]

15. Better medium- and long-range weather forecasting would assist transport providers and others in planning to deal with the effects of severe winter weather. For example, it would give transport operators the opportunity to warn passengers of when contingency timetables would be likely to be needed and to get snow and ice clearing equipment into position. The current seasonal predictions—such as the forecast provided to the Cabinet Office in October—do not provide a firm basis on which decision makers can act with confidence. £10 million would be a small price to pay for improving the Met Office's long-range forecasting capability, given the cost to the UK economy of transport disruption due to severe winter weather. We recommend that the Secretary of State press the Ministry of Defence to investigate the case for providing the Met Office with additional funding for enhanced computing power and to report back to us with the outcome.

16. Along with a number of other departments, the Department for Transport has prepared a climate change adaptation plan, which looks at how transport networks could be adapted to deal with global warming during the rest of this century.[41] The Department's key climate risks include increased incidence of extreme weather, but not extreme winter weather.[42] The Secretary of State told us that "consideration of severe snow and ice were not included as they are weather variables that, according to latest climate science, are not projected to increase in frequency or severity as a result of long term climate change".[43] In oral evidence, however, he accepted that if winters became milder and wetter "I take that to mean more precipitation and, therefore, if we do get periods of extreme cold weather that is likely to occur as snow".[44]

17. The Highways Agency and Network Rail have also published climate change adaptation reports, both of which refer to risks associated with severe winter weather.[45] The Highways Agency report specifically refers to the possibility that "within long term general climate trends, extreme and untypical weather events will occur. Increasing average temperatures do not preclude cold spells."[46] We are surprised that the Department for Transport's climate change adaptation plan does not include reference to risks associated with severe winter weather, unlike those produced by the Highways Agency and Network Rail. Given that climate change does not preclude the occurrence of severe winters in future, and bearing in mind the uncertainties in modelling the UK's climate identified by Sir John Beddington, we recommend that the final version of the Department's plan, which is due to be signed off in spring 2012,[47] should include reference to the risk of severe winter weather in future and how this should be planned for.

Influencing public expectations

18. Witnesses were united in arguing that severe winter weather inevitably caused disruption to transport wherever in the world it occurred.[48] The Office of Rail Regulation, for example, gave us examples of disruption to rail networks in December 2010 in Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and Switzerland.[49] British Airways noted that December's snow caused airport closures across the northern hemisphere.[50] David Quarmby said "on the whole, we do as well as, if not in some respects better than, other European countries with similar weather patterns to our own".[51]

19. Nevertheless, the public expects public authorities to do far more to keep transport systems operating in snow and ice. For example, a survey by the AA in the week beginning 26 November 2010 reported that 75% of drivers thought local authorities had not done very well in clearing snow and ice from minor roads and 86% were critical of councils' efforts in clearing pavements.[52] Preliminary findings of research by the Institute of Transport and Tourism showed that over 80% of respondents thought that clearing pavements of snow and ice was as important as clearing roads, although nearly 50% disagreed with the proposition that more tax should be paid in order to achieve this.[53] Media reporting of adverse winter weather also adds to the sense that the UK is unable to cope with snow and ice.[54]

20. There is undoubtedly more that could and should be done to ensure that the UK's transport systems are more resilient to severe winter weather, as this report will show. More realistic expectations about what can be achieved during severe weather and the level of winter resilience which is affordable are also necessary. A level of immediate disruption in severe weather is likely but transport providers should focus on planning to recover from periods of severe weather disruption as quickly as practicable, bearing in mind the trade-off between costs and benefits in investing in winter resilience.

21. Another area for improvement concerns preparations by motorists for winter weather. We were struck by the finding from the AA's December 2010 survey that 44% of drivers had done nothing to prepare for severe winter driving conditions. Of those who had taken precautions, only 39% had followed basic advice to put blankets, a shovel and other emergency equipment in their car. [55] We recommend that the Highways Agency work with motoring organisations such as the AA and the RAC to launch a high profile publicity campaign about winter preparedness in autumn 2011. This campaign should aim to increase the proportion of motorists taking precautions, such as keeping a shovel and a blanket in the boot of their cars, next winter to at least 60%. The Government should report back to us in early 2012 about whether this has been achieved.

22. A third issue concerns the advice provided by the Highways Agency and the police about when to travel in severe winter weather. The Secretary of State said "the advice issued by police, and reiterated by myself and other Ministers at the height of the disruption, was simply not to use the roads unless it was absolutely essential ... drivers were advised not to go out unless they had to". It is not clear to us how many travellers are deterred from making journeys by such advice or whether there is sufficient understanding of what the police and the Government mean by "essential" journeys. Simon Sheldon-Wilson of the Highways Agency said research on driver behaviour in winter 2009-10 had shown that there had been little change in behaviour despite the severity of the weather.[56] We recommend that the Government and the police should work together to develop clearer 'travel warnings' which specify more precisely which journeys should not be undertaken in severe weather conditions. For example, a 'severe weather travel warning' might indicate that only journeys necessitated by a medical or other serious emergency should be undertaken, while a lower-level travel warning should be used to deter journeys undertaking for social reasons. We also recommend that the Government sponsor research into how warning messages about travel influence behaviour.

23. We also recommend that the Department's current consideration of alternatives to travel should acknowledge the importance of improving facilities and arrangements for remote working and tele- and videoconferencing in maintaining economic activity during periods of severe weather disruption. Any proposals resulting from the Department's recent call for evidence on this issue should include improvements to the resilience and capacity of remote access networks, so that more people can work at home during periods of disruption.

Voluntary effort

24. The Department for Transport published a "Snow Code" in October 2010 to encourage people to clear their own paths and frontages of snow and ice, following suggestions that such activity could lead to people being liable for injuries sustained on cleared areas of road and pavement.[57] There were a number of other examples of voluntary effort to help overcome transport difficulties caused by the winter weather. For example, the Local Government Association told us about arrangements in some areas to enable local communities to apply salt and grit to their own roads and pavements as well as examples of voluntary effort to clear roads, deliver hot meals to elderly people and act as "snow wardens", looking out for problems caused by the severe weather.[58]

25. The Secretary of State argued that local authorities "need to look at ... how they could support community action with supplies of salt and grit" and pointed out that the Department had assisted local authorities in making arrangements with farmers to do snow-clearing work by confirming that red diesel could be used for that purpose. "There are some things we can do from the centre but I do not think they can be prescriptive" he concluded; "I think they can only be enabling".[59]

26. There is a clear responsibility on national and local government and other transport providers to ensure that transport systems are kept running during periods of severe weather. In addition, however, more could be done to facilitate voluntary action in certain circumstances, for example to help clear icy pavements and assist vulnerable people. The Government can do more to promote best practice so that local authorities, and local communities, are better placed to plan their own responses to severe weather. We recommend that, before next winter, the Government should publish online practical advice about how individuals and communities can overcome problems caused by severe winter weather. This information should also include guidance for local authorities on enabling and encouraging voluntary action, for example in relation to the recruitment of volunteer snow wardens.

Government co-ordination and expenditure

27. Expenditure on winter resilience is incurred by a number of organisations in both the public and private sector, including the Highways Agency, Network Rail, airport operators, airlines, and train operating companies. It is difficult to estimate with any accuracy how much these bodies spend each year on winter resilience, although the Quarmby review estimated that the Highways Agency and local highway authorities between them spend £160 million during an average winter.[60] The economic and social costs of winter disruption are also difficult to calculate. The Quarmby review suggested that the annual cost of disruption in an average winter was "about £1 billion" and, as we have seen, December's severe weather cost the UK economy some £1.6 billion.[61] Further research would be required to assess whether any of this "lost" output is in fact deferred to a later period when weather conditions have improved.

28. The Quarmby review looked at whether it was worthwhile to increase expenditure by highways authorities on winter resilience. Mr Quarmby said:[62]

The desk exercise we examined suggested that if local authorities were able to spend up to 50% more on winter resilience-that is, from about £200 million to about £300 million a year-possibly, benefits between £50 million and £400 million might result. In other words, on paper at least, there is a suggestion that at the local authority level you might get significant additional benefits by spending a bit more. This would be on treating a higher proportion of the networks, more treatment of footways, pedestrian areas and cycleways, maybe more attention to snow clearing resources and so on.

29. However, the Quarmby review also noted that there is "little appetite among the public to spend more on winter resilience, given the relative infrequency of severe winters, and the generally short duration of their impact".[63] This is borne out by research undertaken by the Local Government Association and the Institute of Transport and Tourism.[64]

30. Nevertheless, given the cost of transport disruption to the UK economy, we are sympathetic to the argument that it would be beneficial if more money were spent on winter resilience. Extra investment should be targeted on those parts of the travel network which have shown themselves to be least resilient in recent years and where the costs of disruption are highest. In some cases it will be for the private sector to fund enhanced resilience, overseen by the appropriate regulators. Modest extra expenditure on planning and co-ordination will often be the most effective means of ensuring that transport systems recover quickly from disruption. We set out below areas where extra investment could prove beneficial and the Government's role in achieving this.


31. The Secretary of State said that, in his view, the rail network had operated "quite well given the extreme conditions" in December 2010, except for some localised problems. These included disruption to the electric lines in Kent and Sussex which Mr Hammond described as "unacceptably vulnerable to disruption".[65] Commuters from those counties will be well aware that ice and snow on the additional rail which conveys electricity to trains can paralyse the network. The rail industry's National Task Force said that on some days fewer than 70% of services which Southeastern, Southern and First Capital Connect planned to operate ran on time: on 2 December hardly any trains ran to timetable south of the Thames.[66] During the worst of the weather there were instances of trains stranded overnight in Kent and Sussex.[67] Meanwhile, the high speed line through Kent was barely affected by the weather conditions.[68]

32. David Quarmby said that two factors explain the vulnerability of the 3,000 mile third rail network south of the Thames: it runs through deep rural areas which are susceptible to heavy snowfall and electric current is transmitted from the top of the third rail, rather than the side of the rail as with some light rail systems, such as the Docklands Light Railway (DLR).[69] David Ward, Network Rail's route director for Kent, downplayed comparisons to light rail systems which are smaller and less complex than main line rail networks.[70] The National Task Force has described the numerous mitigating measures being worked on to improve the resilience of the third rail network, ranging from changing traction control systems on rolling stock to heating the third rail at key points. "Longer term options to replace the [third rail] system with overhead electrification are also being considered".[71]

33. The early start to the 2010-11 winter took the rail industry by surprise. The National Task Force said:

Network Rail did not have all its equipment in proper working order … this situation was exacerbated by the fact that not all trains were initially operating in ice mode and there were some units that had yet to be modified with the latest software. With hindsight, some basic operating mistakes were also made in implementing the key route strategies.[72]

Mr Ward explained that Network Rail's anti-icing strategy was timed to coincide with the December timetable changeover and that, although some anti-icing work had been brought forward because of the forecast bad weather, three specialist vehicles were unavailable during the first period of disruption. Robin Gisby of Network Rail said: "If we had got going 48 hours earlier, probably that first week would have been a little better … in the second period [of disruption] we were a bit better".[73] However, there were continued problems with some equipment, such as points heaters, which was not designed to work in the extremely low temperatures experienced throughout December.[74]

34. The third rail network south of the Thames dates back over 100 years and is often prone to disruption due to poor weather. In our view, improving the resilience of this part of the rail network, which carries thousands of commuters into London each day, should be a priority for investment. In the long-run, the rail network south of the Thames would be more resilient and safer if it made use of overhead wires. In the meantime, however, there would appear to be scope to introduce a number of technical 'quick fixes' to help overcome the problems caused by ice and snow, particularly on more vulnerable parts of the network. Priority should be given to the most cost effective improvements which can help keep the main commuting lines open. We recommend that the Secretary of State convene a third rail working group, bringing together Network Rail, the train operators, and other interested parties, including passenger groups, to assess how the network south of the Thames can be made more resilient, focusing in the first instance on quick fixes for next winter and then devising costed options for more extensive work for the next Network Rail control period. We also recommend that the Secretary of State should commit the Government to the long-term aim of replacing the existing third rail network with a more resilient form of electrification. The working group should consider how this can be achieved and report to Government with an estimate of timescale and cost. We recommend that this report should be published in due course.


35. Although several UK airports closed at times during December 2010 most attention focused on the closure of Heathrow on 18 December and its slow recovery thereafter. The Begg report, arising from the inquiry into Heathrow's closure initiated by BAA, includes a detailed timeline and study of what happened at Heathrow. It identified several factors which contributed to the problems at Heathrow, including a low state of preparedness for the snow, slow clearance of snow from aircraft stands, failures in communication and co-ordination, confused and conflicting messages for passengers, and slow mobilisation of crisis management teams. The Begg report's main recommendation was that Heathrow should adopt "an improved resilience target that the airport never closes as a result of circumstances beyond its control, except for immediate safety or other emergency threats".[75] We have not chosen to duplicate the detailed analysis of the Begg report and we focus instead on the Government's role in relation to significant disruption at major airports. We consider passenger welfare and information provision in the next chapter.

36. Several witnesses contrasted winter resilience at the UK's two biggest airports, Heathrow and Gatwick. British Airways said Gatwick Airport had shown "continual improvement" in its winter resilience after a "poor" response to the winter weather in December 2009.[76] David Quarmby described Gatwick's closure at the start of December 2010 as "a well-managed incident".[77] There was considerable criticism of how the disruption at Heathrow from 18 December was handled, however. British Airways said there was "little evidence of forward planning and a lack of experience about how to return to regular operations effectively and efficiently when the airport re-opened".[78] Virgin Atlantic said "key elements of Heathrow airport's snow plan were not implemented" and "the information flow from Heathrow to airlines [was] slow, limited and at times contradictory".[79] BALPA, the pilots' association, blamed much of the disruption on the absence of off-stand de-icing facilities, which meant aircraft blocked stands while waiting for de-icing.[80] The Board of Airlines Representatives criticised inadequate investment in snow-clearing vehicles at Heathrow.[81] Criticism that major airports under-invested in winter resilience equipment would appear to be borne out by the substantial investments by the owners of both Gatwick and Heathrow Airports in such equipment after December's disruption.[82]

37. The Begg report's conclusions about the disruption at Heathrow all concerned planning and crisis management.[83] The confusion over the opening of the second runway on 21 December, which we probed in detail, exemplified the lack of grip BAA's senior managers had over the crisis. British Airways and Virgin Atlantic both complained that they found out about the re-opening of the second runway when it was announced in the House by the Prime Minister.[84] In addition, we received conflicting accounts from the Secretary of State and Colin Matthews, the Chief Executive of BAA, about why the Government's offer of military assistance to clear the runway on the morning of 21 December had been refused.[85] We accept Mr Matthews' point that trained labour was required to clear the runway safely and efficiently but it would seem to us that this work was only prioritised once the Government began to make clear that continuing delay in the airport's recovery was unacceptable. All in all, the Begg report and the evidence we received from the aviation sector give the impression that Heathrow was totally unprepared to recover from any major incident which necessitated its closure.

38. The Association of British Travel Agents and British Airways noted that winter resilience at Heathrow was affected by the fact that the airport operates at close to full capacity.[86] This is an important constraint on Heathrow's ability to recover from periods of closure and also points to Heathrow's status as an international hub airport. Heathrow makes a significant contribution to the UK economy and the Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that it remains competitive as an international hub, particularly as its status is threatened by airports in Paris, Amsterdam and Frankfurt. Although it is for the private sector to provide the additional investment in winter resilience recommended by the Begg report, we consider that the Department for Transport should play an active role in ensuring that this investment is delivered. Consequently we recommend that the Secretary of State should designate a senior official within his department as having oversight of snow plans and other incident recovery plans at Heathrow and the UK's other main airports. This role should have responsibility for signing off airport snow plans and other major incident plans, contributing the Government's view to discussions about investment in equipment for dealing with snow and ice and other sources of disruption and participating, on behalf of the Secretary of State, in "Gold" command teams providing strategic leadership during crises. Government oversight of incident recovery plans is particularly important in relation to Heathrow, to help maintain its status as an international hub airport.


39. Several witnesses described how the resilience of one transport mode to winter weather depended to some extent on the resilience of other modes. For example, Gatwick Airport observed that disruption to the rail network in Sussex had affected its operations because passengers and staff had found it difficult to get to the airport, even though the airport itself was clear of snow.[87] Heathrow Airport pointed out that its difficulties during the second period of snow in December were compounded by the closure of local roads which trapped people at the airport.[88] Virgin Trains called for planning for situations in which train operators and other forms of public transport were expected to carry more passengers because of airport closures.[89] The Department told us that some ports had been badly affected by the winter weather because of untreated access roads.[90] Inter-relationships between modes was also covered in the report arising from the Quarmby review.[91] The Secretary of State told us that problems experienced in 2009-10 in ensuring that roads to stations were gritted had been less significant in 2010-11.[92]

40. These issues are primarily for transport operators and infrastructure providers to resolve. We would expect all major transport operators and infrastructure providers to ensure that their contingency planning took account of the impact of their winter resilience operations on other modes. Where conflicting priorities cannot be resolved, particularly, for example, in relation to access to airports, the Government should step in. We recommend that the Department for Transport should develop and publish criteria setting out when it will ensure that the impact of winter resilience planning by one part of the transport system takes due account of other modes.

41. The Freight Transport Association and the Institute of Highway Engineers were amongst witnesses arguing for more transparency in the preparation and dissemination of local authority winter resilience plans, so that, for example, transport operators could use information about which roads would be gritted in making their own winter preparations.[93] The Quarmby report also made recommendations on this issue.[94] We agree that this would be helpful and we recommend that the Government provide guidance to local authorities about publishing their plans for transport networks' winter resilience in draft so that all interested parties can comment and ensure consistency with their own plans.


42. Laying salt on roads and pavements helps prevent ice forming and snow lying but is largely ineffective against deep snow and does not work at temperatures below -8?C.[95] The UK is reliant on salt imports (to supplement limited domestic supply) to get through a severe winter and problems with supply and distribution in winter 2009-10 were the main focus of the Quarmby review. The Highways Agency managed a strategic stock of salt, to distribute to local authorities who were running short, and recommendations were made about reducing salt spreading rates, although the Local Government Association said these came too late to affect planning by local authorities and would require investment in more modern equipment.[96]

43. The AA and the RAC expressed concerns about the resilience of the UK's salt supply arrangements.[97] The Institute of Highway Engineers said the strategic salt supply had not been adequate and:

Local authorities would be at near critical/emergency levels before any supplies could be released. It was clear that the location of the stock also affected the possible release of emergency supplies. There were no supplies north of Humberside for example. Local authorities were also unable to determine from DfT the amount of salt being released under this process.[98]

The Institution of Civil Engineers described the strategic salt arrangements as a "work in progress"[99] and Durham County Council complained about a "lack of transparency", arguing:

In reality, all that has been achieved is that the reserve salt stocks have transferred from the mine head to local authorities … it is essential that headroom is provided by the suppliers importing more salt during the summer periods.[100]

44. The Secretary of State said "the bottom line is that we have ended the winter with about 800,000 tonnes more salt left in February than we had in the previous year".[101] He referred to follow-up work, including in ensuring that local authorities use lower salt spreading rates.[102] The strategic salt arrangements introduced in 2010 helped ensure that local authorities had sufficient salt to keep main roads open during a particularly severe winter. To this extent it was a considerable success. The criticisms we heard of this year's arrangements were largely points of detail which we expect the Government to consider in reviewing the arrangements ahead of next winter. In particular, we recommend that the Government consider ways of ensuring that strategic salt supply arrangements are more transparent to local authorities and that new guidance on salt spreading rates is followed. We call on the Government to publish a written statement on the outcome of its review of the strategic salt arrangements before next winter.

30   For example, see Q174, Ev 89 and Ev w25. Back

31   Ev w1, paragraph 1 and Ev 89, paragraph 3.5. Back

32   Ev w52, paragraph 2.2. Back

33   Ev w11, paragraph 12. Back

34   HC Deb, 27 Jan 2011, c454w. Back

35   Ev w4, paragraph 9 and Ev w54 (Piers Corbyn). Back

36   For example, material from Piers Corbyn which has been deposited in the Parliamentary Archives. Back

37   Q224. Back

38   Letter to the Secretary of State for Transport from Sir John Beddington, dated 15 December 2010, Back

39   Q229. Back

40   Q235. Back

41   Climate Change Adaptation Plan for Transport 2010-12: Enhancing resilience to climate change, DfT, March 2010 (hereafter DfT adaptation plan). Back

42   Ibid, p18. Back

43   Ev 61. Back

44   Q225. Back

45   Interim Climate Change Risk Assessment, Highways Agency, Dec 2010 and Network Rail Interim Climate Change Adaptation Report, 30 Sep 2010. Back

46   Interim Climate Change Risk Assessment, Highways Agency, Dec 2010, p6. Back

47   DfT adaptation plan, p6. Back

48   Eg Qq 3, 218. Back

49   Ev w38, paragraph 3. Back

50   Ev 86-87, paragraphs 1.3 and 1.4 (and see Ev 93, paragraph 3.4). Back

51   Q3. Back

52   Ev w15-16, paragraphs 4.2.1 and 4.3.4. Back

53   Ev w44-45, section 6. Back

54   For example, "Why can't we handle snow?", Daily Express, 1 Dec 2010, p14; "Here we (don't) go again: Britain freezes to a halt", Independent, 2 Dec 2010, pp2-4; "A bad day for the nation as failure takes hold", Daily Express, 3 Dec 2010, p12; "Why Britain has been brought to a standstill again", Daily Express, 3 Dec 2010, p12. Back

55   Ev w16, paragraph 4.3.3. Back

56   Q97. Back

57   Ev 59, paragraph 52. Back

58   Ev 84-85, Annex A and Qq 75 and 92. Back

59   Qq264-65. Back

60   Quarmby Audit, paragraph 3.37. Back

61   Quarmby final report, paragraph 12.12 and see paragraph 4. Back

62   Q4. Back

63   Quarmby final report, paragraph 12.1. Back

64   Ev w44-45, section 6 and Weathering the Storm II, Local Government Association, July 2010, p9. Back

65   Qq 218, 238-39. Back

66   Ev 66, paragraph 5.2 and Ev 71, appendix 2. These statistics measure performance against a pre-announced timetable, including, in some cases, contingency timetables and therefore do not fully capture the level of disruption experienced by passengers. Back

67   Q68. Back

68   Rail Magazine, issue 660, p6. Back

69   Q28. Back

70   Q67. Back

71   Ev 68, paragraph 7.1. Back

72   Ev 67, paragraph 6.3. Back

73   Qq68-69. Back

74   Q67. Back

75   Begg Report, paragraph 9. Back

76   Ev 88, paragraphs 2.2.1 and 2.2.3. Back

77   Q30. Back

78   Ev 87, paragraph 2.1.7. Back

79   Ev 74-75, paragraphs 15 and 20. Back

80   Ev w58-59, paragraphs 7 and 8 to 20. Back

81   Ev w24, paragraph 11 and see Ev w22, paragraph 11. Back

82   Ev 80, paragraph 6.1 and Ev 93, section 4. Back

83   Begg Report, paragraph 14. Back

84   Q150 and see Begg Report, paragraph 138 and Ev 95. Back

85   Ev 61, 94 and 95 and Qq 212, 259 and 261-62. Back

86   Ev w49, paragraph 15 and Ev 86, paragraph 1.2 and see Ev 93, paragraph 3.4. Back

87   Ev 80, paragraph 6.7. Back

88   Ev 92-93, paragraph 3.3.1. Back

89   Ev w63, paragraph 46. Back

90   Ev 60, paragraph 58. Back

91   Q12 and Quarmby final report, sections 15 and 16. Back

92   Q269. Back

93   Ev w31, p2 and Ev w48, paragraph 20. Back

94   Begg Report, recommendations 5 and 6. Back

95   Q276. Back

96   Ev w63, paragraph 20. Back

97   Ev w15, paragraph 3.3 and Ev w51, paragraph 1.7. Back

98   Ev w30. Back

99   Ev w67, paragraph 18. Back

100   Ev w26. Back

101   Q275 and see Ev 62. Back

102   Q275. Back

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