3 Consultation on the future of HM
Coastguard
11. The structure of Her Majesty's Coastguard is
currently based on 18 Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres around
the UK (Figure 2), which are grouped into nine pairs (Figure 3).
Watch-keeping staff in the MRCCs provide a 24-hour service to
mariners and coastal users by receiving incoming distress calls
and tasking appropriate resources to their rescue. The rescue
unit personnel are often volunteer coastguards, either the MCA's
own 3,500 volunteers (part of the Coastguard Rescue Service) or
members of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution or the National
Coastwatch Institution (4,800 and 2,000 volunteers respectively).[10]
Figure 2: Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres
by region
Region
| Centre
| Area Covered
|
Scotland and Northern Ireland
| Shetland MRCC | Shetland Islands, Fair Isle and the Orkney Islands
|
| Stornoway MRCC
| Arnamurchan Point to Cape Wrath, Barra Head to Butt of Lewis
|
| Aberdeen MRCC
| Cape Wrath to Doonies Point
|
| Clyde MRCC
| Mull of Galloway to Ardnamurchan Point, including the Islands of Jura, Gihga, Islay, Arran, Coll, Tiree, Mull, Bute and Cumbrae
|
| Forth MRCC
| Doonies Point to Anglo-Scottish border
|
| Belfast MRCC
| Between Northern Ireland/Irish Republic borders at Lough Foyle and Carlingford Lough
|
Wales and West of England Region
| Brixham MRCC | Topsham to Dodman Point
|
| Falmouth MRCC
| Dodman Point to Marshland Mouth, Devon/Cornwall border
|
| Swansea MRCC
| Marsland Mouth to River Towy, Carmathen
|
| Milford Haven MRCC
| River Towy to near Friog
|
| Holyhead MRCC
| Near Friog to Queensferry, River Dee
|
| Liverpool MRCC
| Queensferry to the Mull of Galloway
|
East of England Region |
Humber MRCC | Anglo-Scottish border to Haile Sand Fort
|
| Yarmouth MRCC
| Haile Sand Fort to Southwold
|
| Thames MRCC
| Southwold to Reculver towers, Herne Bay
|
| London Coastguard
| Shell Haven Point, Egypt Bay to Teddington
|
| Dover Coastguard
| Reculver Towers to Beachy Head, Belle Tout
|
| Solent MRCC
| Beachy Head to Hants/Dorset border including Isle of Wight
|
| Portland MRCC
| Hants/Dorest border to Topsham
|
Source: House of Commons Library
Figure 3: Current structure of HM Coastguard coordination

Source: Department for Transport
12. The DfT launched its consultation on modernising
the coordination of Her Majesty's Coastguard on 16 December 2010.[11]
The Government argued that the current system, based on 18 MRCCs
grouped into nine pairs, is not well placed to respond to current
challenges because it has limited resilience and an uneven distribution
of the workload, especially during busy periods.[12]
The MCA proposes to introduce a nationally networked system
based on two Maritime Operations Centres (MOCs) equipped to manage
all incidents wherever they might occur (Figure 4). These would
be located at Aberdeen and the Southampton/Portsmouth area,[13]
with a 24-hour centre at Dover looking over the Channel traffic
separation scheme. In addition, the proposals provide for five
other sub-centres operating during daylight hours, located at
Falmouth, Humber and Swansea, with a further two sub-centres at
either: Belfast or Liverpool; and Shetland or Stornoway. Were
these changes implemented, ten existing regional MRCCs would close.[14]
The MCA proposes to reduce staff numbers from 596 to 370 over
a four-year period.[15]
By the end of March, the consultation had received over 1,200
submissions.
Figure 4: MCA proposed structure for HM Coastguard
coordination

Source: Department for Transport
13. The proposed changes to the system of coordination,
job losses and cuts to the MCA's budget come at a time of increased
workload for HM Coastguard Service. The number of incidents to
which the Coastguard has responded has risen every year since
2000, from 12,016 to 21,195 incidents in 2009. The number of deaths
involved in such incidents increased from 236 to 403 over the
same period.[16]
14. In this chapter, we examine the various arguments
for and against the MCA's modernisation proposals, and we make
specific recommendations about how they can be improved. We conclude
the section by giving our overall opinion of the proposals, based
on the evidence we have received.
The consultation process
15. A theme throughout our inquiry has been the conspicuous
absence of any prior consultation about the proposals with coastguards,
unions, volunteers, stakeholders or the devolved administrations.[17]
No-one we spoke to formally or informally had been consulted on
the detail of the plans. Murdo Macaulay, PCS Stornoway Branch,
said: "[The consultation] has been done the wrong way round.
We should have had this process as a service before we moved to
a plan, not issue a plan and then move to this process in public
as a service."[18]
We found that the majority of coastguard officers do not object
to modernisation per se, but they take issue with aspects
of the current proposals and the manner in which the MCA has conducted
the consultation. In oral evidence the Minister acknowledged that
the proposals are "not perfect" nor "set in stone"
and told us that he will "come out with different proposals"
when the consultation closed.[19]
The Government has committed to make an announcement about the
modernisation of the Coastguard before 19 July.[20]
We
recommend that any revised proposals on the future of the Coastguard
should be subject to a further short period of consultation. Decisions
with such significant implications for maritime safety should
not be made in haste. We do not consider this decision to be sufficiently
time-critical to prevent further consultation on what we expect
to be substantially revised proposals from those initially put
forward.
16. The Minister has, on several occasions, publicly
encouraged coastguards to submit alternative proposals for the
future structure of the Coastguard to the MCA consultation. We
also received several detailed alternative proposals as evidence
to our inquiry. Although we are not in a position to analyse in
detail all the alternative proposals we received, we
have been impressed with the quality and comprehensiveness of
the alternative proposals put forward by coastguards across the
country. The willingness of coastguards to engage thoughtfully
and constructively with both the consultation process and our
inquiry is welcomed. We expect the Government to demonstrate that
the alternative proposals put forward by coastguards have been
properly considered when revising its own plans for the future
of the Coastguard.
17. The consultation document was not accompanied
by a published risk assessment. Sir Alan Massey, Chief Executive
of the MCA, explained to us in February that risk assessments
had been carried out at every stage of the preparation of the
consultation document, but he had chosen not to publish them as
there was no explicit requirement to do so.[21]
The MCA later published a risk assessment spanning several documents
on 10 February. We received detailed critiques of the risk assessment
documents from several witnesses.[22]
18. Regrettably, the MCA also chose not to publish
an impact assessment of the closures of Oban, Pentland and Tyne
Tees stations in 2000 and 2001, as recommended by our predecessor
Committee.[23] It took
a further request from us before the MCA produced an assessment
of these closures. This found no evidence that the closures of
the stations had affected the conduct of coastguard operations,
although two fatal accident inquiries examining the actions of
HM Coastguard were underway at the time of writing.[24]
Though the previous round of closures were of a different scale,
it should have been obvious that an assessment of its impact would
be essential information for evaluating the current scheme.
19. By failing
to involve serving coastguard officers, unions, volunteers, stakeholders
or the devolved administrations in the drafting of the current
proposals for the future of the Coastguard, and by failing to
publish a risk assessment of the current plans or an impact assessment
of the previous round of closures until prompted, the MCA management
has badly miscalculated. It has mishandled the consultation and
made it appear opaque rather than clear and open-minded. It has
appeared arrogant, and reluctant to open itself to proper scrutiny
in the process. The atmosphere of disquiet and suspicion generated
by this consultation process is of the MCA's own making.
20. The strength
of opposition against the proposals we have encountered is such
that, if, as the Minister has said, this is a genuine consultation,
the proposals cannot be given approval in their current form.
Decisions on the future of the Coastguard must acknowledge and
draw on the wealth of expertise of frontline officers as well
as others whose contributions could and should have strengthened
the original consultation document.
Savings
21. The Coastguard Service currently costs £35m
a year to run with a further annual £6m of capital expenditure.[25]
The MCA calculated that to maintain the current structure with
essential upgrades and compliance would cost £173m over the
next four years (or £639m over 25 years) at net present value.[26]
By contrast, it calculates that its proposals would cost £153m
over four years (or £516m over 25 years) at net present value.
This represents a saving of £20m over the four years of the
spending review period (or £123m over 25 years) at net present
value.[27] The Minister
admitted that the savings represent a "tiny amount of money".[28]
The MCA argued that it is the inefficiency of the current system,
not the prospect of a reduced budget that is driving change. Sir
Alan Massey told the Committee this is shown by the fact that
the modernisation project started well before the current Government
took office.[29]
Local knowledge in coastguard
stations
22. Watch-keeping staff in the existing 18 MRCCs
receive incoming distress calls (via the monitoring of emergency
radio frequencies or by 999 calls) and task appropriate resources
to their rescue. Coastguards currently have to sit an exam in
local knowledge in order to make an effective response. Some MRCCs,
such as Milford Haven, test their officers on a yearly basis.[30]
The current DfT Target is that appropriate rescue units, who are
often volunteers, should be tasked within five minutes in 98%
of incidents.
23. The consultation document rests on the assumption
that local knowledge is best stored and shared in Geographic Information
System (GIS) based format made available to all watch-keepers
across the UK network as opposed to holding knowledge in local
MRCCs.[31] Sir Alan Massey
told the Committee: "[Lord Donaldson] put some very strong
arguments against local knowledge being held in people's minds
and that this needs to be better used across databases using modern
geographic information systems because it is just too unreliable
to leave it in people's heads."[32]
Philip Naylor, Director of Maritime Services at the MCA, admitted
that though there will be a requirement for coastguard officers
to have a degree of coastal knowledge and knowledge of the maritime
domain, it is unlikely that it will extend to the level of detail
that is currently set out. He also confirmed that the current
DfT target that appropriate rescue units should be tasked within
five minutes in 98% of incidents will still apply.[33]
While admitting that the MCA's public meetings have for the greater
part failed to convince the maritime public that the proposals
properly address the issue of local knowledge, the Royal Yachting
Association agreed that "it is more important for the 'dispatched'
to have a good working knowledge of their areas of responsibility;
the dispatcher only needs what is necessary to manage incidents."[34]
24. This position was disputed by all of the coastguard
officers we spoke to, who felt that their role had been devalued
by the proposals. Murdo Macaulay, of the PCS Stornoway Branch,
told us: "We are responsible for the coordination of an incident;
we are not simply call takers who take a call, put it on the map.
We are responsible from the infancy of that incident until, essentially,
it is closed."[35]
Carol Collins argued that, "being a part of the community,
being a team where you can draw on each other's local knowledge
is the key to it".[36]
Some argued that databases cannot replace human local knowledge,
or 'situational awareness', of tidal anomalies and currents,[37]
technology black spots,[38]
or local geographical and logistical knowledge in relation to
the types of rescues local teams attend, such as mud rescues and
cliff edge falls.[39]
Databases, Google Earth and other GIS Systems will have difficulty
recognising nicknames, colloquial place names and Gaelic spelling.[40]
In written evidence, Eric Greenough argued that the depth and
familiarity of local knowledge hastens the tasking of the local
coastguard team thus reducing their response time.[41]
Paul Kirby, of the PCS Liverpool Branch, argued that the new system
created several "dog legs" in the system, which increases
the possibility of losing contact with the person reporting the
situation.[42] Many doubt
that local knowledge will effectively be migrated to the MOCs.[43]
We also heard concerns that on the west coast of Scotland, the
widespread use of Gaelic would be a particular problem for staff
at MOCs, a point which Sir Alan Massey conceded.[44]
25. A geographic
information system available to all watch-keepers across the UK
network would be desirable, but we are not convinced that a database
could replace the local knowledge of those coastguards who live
and work in the communities in which they serve. The variety of
place names, colloquialisms and local anomalies of the UK coast
appear to us well nigh impossible to collate. We have serious
concerns that insufficient local knowledge held by coastguards
based in an MOC, perhaps hundreds of miles from an incident, will,
in some cases, lead to the loss of crucial seconds and minutes
during a rescue attempt.
26. It is clear
from our inquiry that 'local knowledge' has a much broader meaning
than simply possessing knowledge of local coastlines, topography
and geographical features. It also encompasses a Maritime Rescue
Co-ordination Centre's (MRCC) intimate community ties, relationship
with local emergency services and detailed knowledge of the appropriate
voluntary teams to task to an incident. The current proposals
would mean that operations room staff would largely lose situational
awareness of this kind. We have not been persuaded that this loss
would not diminish the speed and effectiveness of the Coastguard's
response to some emergencies.
Volunteers
27. Under the MCA's proposals, the regular Coastguard
will draw more heavily on the local knowledge provided by the
volunteer Coastguard Rescue Service and increased liaison with
partner search and rescue organisations.[45]
Michael Vlasto, Operations Director of the Royal National Lifeboat
Institution (RNLI) told the Committee that he did not see the
proposals as an increased burden on his organisation. Mr Vlasto
added that only five out of 201 lifeboat stations around the country
responded to the RNLI's own consultation.[46]
However,
the National Coastwatch
Institution (NCI) argued that local knowledge will not cease as
a result of the changes. Coastguard auxiliaries and NCI watch
keepers are regularly assessed on their local knowledge.[47]
28. Others argued that it would be unfair for an
MOC to place the burden of responsibility for local knowledge
onto volunteers or expect them to do any of the work that is currently
done in operations rooms.[48]
A volunteer coastguard was concerned that he would receive a greater
number of telephone calls under the proposals than at present,
including at night-time, perhaps only because coastguard officers
based in the MOC required local information to locate an incident.
This could deter volunteers from joining the service.[49]
We were also warned of the impact that station closures might
have on volunteer recruitment and retention. Brian George, of
the PCS Liverpool Branch, argued that the interaction between
volunteers and the MRCC, which might involve school and community
visits, is a vital relationship.[50]
In written evidence, the Northern Ireland Executive expressed
its conviction that the existence of a staffed coastguard centre
acts as a major factor in attracting and maintaining volunteers
for the Coastguard Rescue teams, and that areas that lose their
MRCC are in danger of losing many of their volunteers.[51]
Others warned that the previous round of station closures had
damaged the relationship with volunteer groups. Alex Dodge, of
PCS Shetland, told us of the feelings of mistrust towards her
station among volunteers in Orkney following the closure of Pentland,
while Murdo Macaulay, PCS Stornoway, told us that it had taken
ten years to build a good working relationship with the volunteer
teams on Oban following the closure of their local station.[52]
29. We conclude
that the MCA's current restructuring proposals, by significantly
reducing the number of operations centres, risk placing too great
a burden of responsibility on volunteers. It would be unreasonable
to draw too heavily on volunteer coastguards for the kind of local
knowledge that is currently held by operations room staff, but
which would be largely lost under these proposals. There is a
risk that excessive demands could diminish the willingness of
people to volunteer as a rescue coastguard.
30. We also
conclude that the current proposals to close MRCCs have not adequately
taken into consideration the role of the coastguard station as
a recruiter and trainer of the network of local voluntary teams.
The MCA should set out how this important function of the current
MRCC structure will be maintained following any reorganisation.
Daylight hours
31. If the current proposals are implemented three
Coastguard centres would be open 24 hours a day, in contrast to
the 18 that are currently open on that basis. Five sub-centres
would be open during daylight hours only. Sir Alan Massey said
that "[B]roadly speaking, we are looking at early morning
to mid-evening as opening hours because that covers the maximum
spread of load".[53]
According to figures presented in the consultation, 70% of incidents
occur between 0900-1900hrs (peaking at 1500hrs with 2,500 incidents).
32. Many witnesses argued that the consultation document
is based on flawed or misleading statistics. The figures
are simply an incident count; there is no weighting as
to the nature or severity or duration of the incident.[54]
The Royal Yachting Association told us that from these statistics,
"it is not apparent, for example, what the distribution of
incidents that require the deployment of assets and a high level
of management might be and whether in fact these incidents show
a different demand trend that is not addressed by these proposals".[55]
Others argued that though there are fewer incidents at night on
the south coast of England, the same is not true for Scotland.[56]
Bob Skinley said: "Some of our severest incidents will happen
precisely during the hours when the MCA thinks it is safe to close
coastguard stations: at night, during the winter months, in the
severest of weather conditions".[57]
Matthew Mace argued that night-time incidents are more likely
to last longer and be more complex because they are more likely
to involve commercial vessels that only request assistance when
they really need it.[58]
33. Philip Naylor, MCA, denied that the statistics
did not represent a national picture or that night-time incidents
tend to be longer-lasting and more complex.[59]
He said: "While it might be accurate to say that an incident,
for example, in Scotland might remain open for a number of hours,
in fact the absolute level of activity is concentrated into, typically,
three quite short bursts. In terms of the overall workload, the
duration of such an incident is not an accurate reflection of
the amount of work that would go into it."[60]
34. We are concerned
that the MCA proposals regarding station closures and opening
hours may be based on statistics that do not tell the whole story.
The published figures show neither the seriousness nor duration
of incidents. Any decision that is based on aggregated statistics
may also fail to address regional differences. Robust empirical
evidence should be the starting-point for any proposed restructure
of an emergency service such as HM Coastguard. For the revised
proposals to have greater integrity, we recommend that the MCA
publish data for the number of staff hours per incident, disaggregated
by region.
35. Another major concern with the daylight hours
sub-centre model is the risk of information being lost or missed
during the handover period between the sub-centre and MOC. Capt.
Kevin Richardson said: "Any person that has been involved
in an emergency response to an emergency incident will tell you
that a real point of weakness is when there is a transfer of either
command and control or a transfer from the marine aspect of that
incident to the land side aspect of that incident. That is the
point at which things can go very wrong".[61]
A recent Maritime Accident Investigation Branch report into the
sinking of the fishing vessel Aquina found that the decision
to hand over control of the incident between MRCC Clyde and MRCC
Stornoway "caused a delay of 23 minutes in a rescue helicopter
reaching the accident site", although in this instance the
MAIB considered it unlikely that the delay affected the three
fatalities.[62] Murdo
Macaulay told us that, as a result of this incident, the MCA issued
an operational advice note "which essentially said that,
if at all possible, incidents should not be handed over because
it was too dangerous".[63]
Robert Paterson, Director of Health & Safety, Oil & Gas
UK, added: "The key point for [the oil industry] is that
offshore emergencies do not happen very often, but when they do
they can be quite protracted. One of the things we would fear
is the process of handing things over from a centre like Shetland
to Aberdeen and back again, because that is when you lose information
and things start to go wrong".[64]
Jon Gifford, Honorary President of the NCI, said that the NCI
would never allow an incident to be handed over between its own
staff.[65]
36. Sir Alan Massey assured us that: "There
is absolutely no question that we would do exactly as we do at
the moment. Where there is an incident ongoing that is engaging
a particular station in an intense way, we would not let them
change watch; we would not try and take the incident off them.
We would let that go to a logical position at which you could
safely hand it off". He added that it would be for the MOC
to decide when the hand over would take place.[66]
But we heard evidence that coastguards, unlike other emergency
service personnel, are not contractually obliged to remain behind
to facilitate a handover.[67]
37. The period
of hand over between the sub-centre and MOC has been identified
as a potential weakness in the MCA's proposals. If the MCA remains
committed to the concept of daylight hour-only stations, it must
demonstrate how the handover could be achieved safely.
Communications technology
38. The consultation document states that modern
communications and information technology, including electronic
mapping systems and satellite data, have the potential to gather
information from many sources and locations to produce an integrated
picture of what is happening and speed up decision making. It
highlights the Automatic Identification System (AIS), which provides
real-time data about a ship's location, cargo and destination
up to 30 miles from the coast, and the development of Long Range
Identification and Tracking, which allows ships to be tracked
over much longer distances.[68]
We learned that the proposals are based on systems that are already
set up in MRCCs.[69]
The technology used now will be upgraded, but not replaced by
newer systems.[70]
39. Several submissions expressed concern that the
proposals are aimed at the merchant maritime fleet, but do not
adequately address the increase in leisure users or small-scale
day boat fisherman around the shoreline who do not generally use
systems such as AIS.[71]
Coastguards in Stornoway told us that only 4% of the casualties
they dealt with related to commercial vessels.[72]
Appearing before us in Falmouth, the Royal Yachting Association
argued that the boating community is in transition between longstanding
analogue communication systems and digital systems, and that the
majority of leisure craft are dependent on VHF radio.[73]
Smaller vessels are not required to carry all the systems on which
the proposals are based.[74]
Rob Grose, Chairman, Truro & Penryn Harbour Forum, concluded,
"We felt the actual report did not engage or mention the
leisure industry at all".[75]
We were told that "calling in" or traffic reports are
a significant part of a coastguard's daily interaction with marine
users. Brian George of the PCS Liverpool Branch, told us: "The
reporting-in of yachts, boats and small fishing vessels is a voluntary
thing. They do not have to do it, but obviously we encourage it.
We then have that information. If somebody goes missing, we have
already got the information to hand".[76]
Philip Naylor assured us that: "Our ability to hear the people
that currently call us will be unchanged. Anybody that can currently
contact us on a leisure craft or by telephoning us nationally
will be able to do the same in the future as they do now".[77]
But we heard concerns that leisure users, yachtsmen and fishermen
may feel less inclined to report to a remote MOC.[78]
40. It appears
to us that the current proposals pay more attention to the MCA's
statutory obligations towards the commercial shipping industry
and far less to its obligations towards leisure craft and small
boat users. Accidents involving commercial vessels represent only
a small proportion of all those that the Coastguard manage. Revised
proposals must show how the level of protection afforded to leisure
users, small fishing vessels and the like will not be reduced
as a result of any reorganisation of the Coastguard.
41. The MCA's
proposals rely heavily on the use of upgraded technology in the
operations rooms. In its revised proposals, the MCA must be much
clearer about the nature and benefits of technology being proposed
and how it differs from the existing technology that is installed
in the current MRCCs.
Resilience
42. The MCA consultation document argued that while
some resilience is provided by the current system of coordination
because the MRCCs in each pair are interoperable (apart from Shetland
and Stornoway, where current telecommunications provide only a
limited capability), there is no interoperability between pairs
or nationally.[79] We
were told that the Integrated Coastguard Communications System
is currently being updated to enable each station to 'dial into'
three stations north and two south or vice versa, thus significantly
strengthening resilience.[80]
Murdo Macaulay, of the PCS Stornoway Branch, said: "To now
imply that we should take this bought-and-paid-for technology
out of current stations, throw it in the bin, and move to another
system or move to a system with less stations using exactly the
same equipment we have just bought and paid for, does not seem
to be a sensible use of money that has been spent on the project".[81]
43. The MCA
has not satisfactorily explained why creating interoperability
across more of the current centres is not a better way of increasing
resilience in the current system than the wholesale change it
has put forward. We recommend that its future revised proposals
demonstrate how improvements in interoperability will add to the
improvements already being made with the updating of the Integrated
Coastguard Communication System.
Conclusion
44. The
MCA's current proposals to modernise the Coastguard, as they stand,
do not provide reassurance that the ability of the Coastguard
to respond to emergencies at sea will be maintained at current
levels, let alone improved. The evidence we have received raises
serious concerns that safety will be jeopardised if the proposals
proceed in their current form. We welcome the Minister's assurances
that the final proposals will be substantially different to those
that were consulted on.
45. Our main
concern about safety is the loss of local knowledge amongst coastguard
officers that will inevitably occur under these proposals. Rationalising
the number of MRCCs so drastically, in our view, will reduce the
quality and rate of exchange of information, particularly at key
points when information needs to be passed swiftly in order to
save lives. We are not satisfied that this issue has been adequately
addressed in the MCA's proposals.
46. In particular,
we are not convinced that the concept of daylight-hour stations
should be proceeded with. Whilst there is general acceptance that
there is scope to rationalise the number of MRCCs, there is a
strong case for any future re-organisation of the Coastguard to
be based on 24-hour centres in order to provide swift and expert
assistance to people on local coastlines and in local waters,
whatever the time of day.
47. We are concerned about the potential implications
of these proposals on volunteers and for the level of protection
provided for leisure users. The nature and benefits of the upgraded
technology proposed also requires clarification. The
Government should withdraw its modernisation proposals for the
Coastguard and consult on revised plans that satisfactorily address
the key issues we have identified.
10 MCA website; RLNI website; Ev 145
Back
11
Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Protecting our seas and shores
in the 21st Century: Consultation on proposals for modernising
the Coastguard, December 2010 Back
12
HC Deb, 16 December 2010, c133WS Back
13
According to the consultation document, there is no existing
Coastguard facility on the south coast suitable for conversion
into a MOC, but the MCA has land at the Daedalus site at Lee-on-Solent
which would be suitable for a new-build centre. Back
14
The proposals do not affect the small centre operated by the
coastguard alongside the Port of London Authority on the Thames
in London. Back
15
Coastguards stationed in the centres would fall by 243 from 491
to 248, but the number of regular Coastguards supporting the volunteers
in the Coastguard Rescue Service would increase from 80 to 105.
Headquarters staff would fall from 25 to 17. Back
16
Department for Transport, Transport Statistics, November
2010. Back
17
Q 408 Back
18
Q 407 Back
19
Qq 548, 581 Back
20
HC Deb, 7 June 2011, col 190W Back
21
Q32 Back
22
Ev w12, w81; MCA 161 [Don't Sink the Coastguards] Back
23
The Committee warned: "Until such an assessment has been
undertaken the MCA's claims that safety has not been jeopardised
will be impossible to verify"(Fourteenth Report of Session
2003-04, The work of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency,
HC 500, para 13). Back
24
Ev 122, Annex Back
25
Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Protecting our seas and shores
in the 21st Century: Consultation on proposals for modernising
the Coastguard, December, 2010, p 37 Back
26
The net present value
is the value of a stream of future costs or benefits discounted
at current prices. The term is used to describe the difference
between the present value of a stream of costs and a stream of
benefits. HM Treasury's recommended discount rate for impacts
up to 30 years is 3.5%. Back
27
The MCA expect to reduce
their programme costs by £7.4m from 2014-15 onwards, and
avoid excess capital costs of some £12.6m across the spending
review period, hence a total saving of £20m over four years. Back
28
HC Deb, 24 March 2011, col 380WH Back
29
Q68 Back
30
Ev w116 Back
31
Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Risk analysis: Risk commentary,
February 2011. Back
32
Q 570 Back
33
Qq 85-6 Back
34
MCA 62 Back
35
Q 415 Back
36
Q 414 Back
37
MCA 46 [Bob Paul] Back
38
Ev 155 Back
39
Ev w62 Back
40
Ev w65 Back
41
Ev w62 Back
42
Ev w25 Back
43
Qq 219, 520 Back
44
Q 591 Back
45
Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Protecting our seas and shores
in the 21st Century: Consultation on proposals for modernising
the Coastguard, December, 2010, p 34 Back
46
Qq 492-93, 501 Back
47
Ev 145 Back
48
MCA 49 [Simon Rabett] Back
49
Informal discussion with volunteer coastguard during our visit Back
50
Q 522 Back
51
Ev w71 Back
52
Q 403 Back
53
Q 50 Back
54
Q 410 Back
55
MCA 62 Back
56
Ev w60 Back
57
Q 413 Back
58
Ev w85 Back
59
Qq 553, 555 Back
60
Q 551 Back
61
Q 372 Back
62
Maritime Accident Investigation Branch, Report on the investigation
of the capsize of the fishing vessel Aquila with the loss of three
lives Bo Faskadale Reef, Ardnamurchan on 20 July 2009, April
2010, p 1 Back
63
Q 426 Back
64
Q 458 Back
65
Q 372 Back
66
Qq 621, 626 Back
67
Ev w224 Back
68
Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Protecting our seas and shores
in the 21st Century: Consultation on proposals for modernising
the Coastguard, December 2010, p 13 Back
69
Q 395 Back
70
Ev w47; MCA 49 [Simon Rabett] Back
71
Ev w72 Back
72
Q 420 Back
73
Q 358 Back
74
Ev w93 Back
75
Q 328 Back
76
Q 524 Back
77
Q 611 Back
78
Q 524 Back
79
Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Protecting our seas and shores
in the 21st Century: Consultation on proposals for modernising
the Coastguard, December 2010, p 16 Back
80
Ev w79 Back
81
Q 396 Back
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