Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. We
welcome the Minister's decision to extend the consultation on
the modernisation of the Coastguard until after this Committee
has reported. It is encouraging that the Department for Transport
recognises that proper parliamentary scrutiny can improve the
quality of ministerial decision-making. For something as important
as the reorganisation of the Coastguard—where lives are
potentially at risk—it is imperative that any proposals
are thoroughly scrutinised before implementation. (Paragraph
4)
2. We were extremely
disappointed that the Minister invoked rules which normally relate
to senior civil servants to stop us from taking oral evidence
from some of the serving and volunteer coastguards who had sent
us written evidence. Regular coastguards have unique operational
expertise and we wanted to hear their views on the record. The
Minister's action was justified on the basis that "a formal
public hearing, in the full glare of the media spotlight, risks
encouraging individuals to express personal views in a way that
may be at odds with their personal obligations under their terms
and conditions of employment". In our view, the Minister
should have shown more faith in the professionalism of the coastguards
and stuck by his original commitment to the House to let them
give evidence to the Committee. (Paragraph 7)
Consultation on the future of HM Coastguard
3. We
recommend that any revised proposals on the future of the Coastguard
should be subject to a further short period of consultation. Decisions
with such significant implications for maritime safety should
not be made in haste. We do not consider this decision to be sufficiently
time-critical to prevent further consultation on what we expect
to be substantially revised proposals from those initially put
forward. (Paragraph 15)
4. We have been impressed
with the quality and comprehensiveness of the alternative proposals
put forward by coastguards across the country. The willingness
of coastguards to engage thoughtfully and constructively with
both the consultation process and our inquiry is welcomed. We
expect the Government to demonstrate that the alternative proposals
put forward by coastguards have been properly considered when
revising its own plans for the future of the Coastguard. (Paragraph
16)
5. By failing to involve
serving coastguard officers, unions, volunteers, stakeholders
or the devolved administrations in the drafting of the current
proposals for the future of the Coastguard, and by failing to
publish a risk assessment of the current plans or an impact assessment
of the previous round of closures until prompted, the MCA management
has badly miscalculated. It has mishandled the consultation and
made it appear opaque rather than clear and open-minded. It has
appeared arrogant, and reluctant to open itself to proper scrutiny
in the process. The atmosphere of disquiet and suspicion generated
by this consultation process is of the MCA's own making. (Paragraph
19)
6. The strength of
opposition against the proposals we have encountered is such that,
if, as the Minister has said, this is a genuine consultation,
the proposals cannot be given approval in their current form.
Decisions on the future of the Coastguard must acknowledge and
draw on the wealth of expertise of frontline officers as well
as others whose contributions could and should have strengthened
the original consultation document. (Paragraph 20)
7. A geographic information
system available to all watch-keepers across the UK network would
be desirable, but we are not convinced that a database could replace
the local knowledge of those coastguards who live and work in
the communities in which they serve. The variety of place names,
colloquialisms and local anomalies of the UK coast appear to us
well nigh impossible to collate. We have serious concerns that
insufficient local knowledge held by coastguards based in an MOC,
perhaps hundreds of miles from an incident, will, in some cases,
lead to the loss of crucial seconds and minutes during a rescue
attempt. (Paragraph 25)
8. It is clear from
our inquiry that 'local knowledge' has a much broader meaning
than simply possessing knowledge of local coastlines, topography
and geographical features. It also encompasses a Maritime Rescue
Co-ordination Centre's (MRCC) intimate community ties, relationship
with local emergency services and detailed knowledge of the appropriate
voluntary teams to task to an incident. The current proposals
would mean that operations room staff would largely lose situational
awareness of this kind. We have not been persuaded that this loss
would not diminish the speed and effectiveness of the Coastguard's
response to some emergencies. (Paragraph 26)
9. We conclude that
the MCA's current restructuring proposals, by significantly reducing
the number of operations centres, risk placing too great a burden
of responsibility on volunteers. It would be unreasonable to draw
too heavily on volunteer coastguards for the kind of local knowledge
that is currently held by operations room staff, but which would
be largely lost under these proposals. There is a risk that excessive
demands could diminish the willingness of people to volunteer
as a rescue coastguard. (Paragraph 29)
10. We also conclude
that the current proposals to close MRCCs have not adequately
taken into consideration the role of the coastguard station as
a recruiter and trainer of the network of local voluntary teams.
The MCA should set out how this important function of the current
MRCC structure will be maintained following any reorganisation.
(Paragraph 30)
11. We are concerned
that the MCA proposals regarding station closures and opening
hours may be based on statistics that do not tell the whole story.
The published figures show neither the seriousness nor duration
of incidents. Any decision that is based on aggregated statistics
may also fail to address regional differences. Robust empirical
evidence should be the starting-point for any proposed restructure
of an emergency service such as HM Coastguard. For the revised
proposals to have greater integrity, we recommend that the MCA
publish data for the number of staff hours per incident, disaggregated
by region. (Paragraph 34)
12. The period of
hand over between the sub-centre and MOC has been identified as
a potential weakness in the MCA's proposals. If the MCA remains
committed to the concept of daylight hour-only stations, it must
demonstrate how the handover could be achieved safely. (Paragraph
37)
13. It appears to
us that the current proposals pay more attention to the MCA's
statutory obligations towards the commercial shipping industry
and far less to its obligations towards leisure craft and small
boat users. Accidents involving commercial vessels represent only
a small proportion of all those that the Coastguard manage. Revised
proposals must show how the level of protection afforded to leisure
users, small fishing vessels and the like will not be reduced
as a result of any reorganisation of the Coastguard. (Paragraph
40)
14. The MCA's proposals
rely heavily on the use of upgraded technology in the operations
rooms. In its revised proposals, the MCA must be much clearer
about the nature and benefits of technology being proposed and
how it differs from the existing technology that is installed
in the current MRCCs. (Paragraph 41)
15. The MCA has not
satisfactorily explained why creating interoperability across
more of the current centres is not a better way of increasing
resilience in the current system than the wholesale change it
has put forward. We recommend that its future revised proposals
demonstrate how improvements in interoperability will add to the
improvements already being made with the updating of the Integrated
Coastguard Communication System. (Paragraph 43)
16. The MCA's current
proposals to modernise the Coastguard, as they stand, do not provide
reassurance that the ability of the Coastguard to respond to emergencies
at sea will be maintained at current levels, let alone improved.
The evidence we have received raises serious concerns that safety
will be jeopardised if the proposals proceed in their current
form. We welcome the Minister's assurances that the final proposals
will be substantially different to those that were consulted on.
(Paragraph 44)
17. Our main concern
about safety is the loss of local knowledge amongst coastguard
officers that will inevitably occur under these proposals. Rationalising
the number of MRCCs so drastically, in our view, will reduce the
quality and rate of exchange of information, particularly at key
points when information needs to be passed swiftly in order to
save lives. We are not satisfied that this issue has been adequately
addressed in the MCA's proposals. (Paragraph 45)
18. In particular,
we are not convinced that the concept of daylight-hour stations
should be proceeded with. Whilst there is general acceptance that
there is scope to rationalise the number of MRCCs, there is a
strong case for any future re-organisation of the Coastguard to
be based on 24-hour centres in order to provide swift and expert
assistance to people on local coastlines and in local waters,
whatever the time of day. (Paragraph 46)
19. The Government
should withdraw its modernisation proposals for the Coastguard
and consult on revised plans that satisfactorily address the key
issues we have identified. (Paragraph 47)
Emergency towing vessels
20. The
decision to cease the MCA's provision of the Emergency Towing
Vessels, which was made without consultation and against the findings
of an independent risk assessment, is unwise and short-sighted.
It is, quite literally, inviting disaster. We are not convinced
that anything has happened since Lord Donaldson's report to lead
to the conclusion that ETVs are no longer required. On the contrary,
we have heard of several occasions on which the intervention of
an ETV has averted a major incident. ETVs represent a prudent,
and seemingly cost-effective, insurance policy for the British
taxpayer. It would take just one major accident and any savings
that had been made by the decision to cease the contract would
be wiped out in a stroke. We urge the Government to reverse its
decision to terminate the provision of ETVs through the MCA. (Paragraph
58)
21. Our evidence strongly
suggests that there is no suitable commercial alternative to the
Emergency Towing Vessels. A harbour tug has neither the ocean
towage capacity nor the bollard pull that an ETV possesses. Unless
the Government can provide a persuasive case that such capacity
exists in appropriate form and at appropriate locations, it should
recognise that the solution it has proposed is unviable and potentially
reckless. (Paragraph 62)
22. The Government
is the guarantor of last resort for the protection of our marine
and shoreline environment, and for the lives of those in peril
on our seas. That duty, we conclude, would be best discharged
by responsibility for the provision of Emergency Towing Vessels
resting with the state. However, we recognise that there is a
strong case for finding other sources of income to help cover
their costs. We note that the Government is brokering discussions
with the ETV working group in pursuit of a solution to this problem.
But the indications we have received are that these discussions
may take some time. It would be unacceptable for the UK shoreline
to lie unprotected if no agreement has been reached by 30 September.
In such a scenario, the Government should make exceptional provision
by extending the ETV contract over the winter, giving the ETV
working group a further six months in which to resolve the issue.
(Paragraph 65)
Maritime Incident Response Group
23. Though
the Maritime Incident Response Group (MIRG) has been involved
in only seven incidents, its intervention has been significant.
Our evidence suggests that while ships' crews have some training
their skills do not match the expertise of the MIRG. It is equally
clear that without MCA funding, the MIRG will cease to operate.
The operations of the MIRG are a matter of national resilience
and responsibility to fund them should not be left to the local
taxpayer. We are concerned that, as with the Emergency Towing
Vessels, the Government has again taken a decision driven by the
impetus to reduce expenditure that runs against an independent
risk assessment. We recommend that the Government adopt a rationalised
MIRG model which is better calibrated to the risk and more cost-effective
than the present arrangement. (Paragraph 77)
Conclusion
24. It
is regrettable that the Department for Transport announced all
three sets of maritime proposals with no prior consultation whatsoever
and did not consider their combined impact. (Paragraph 79)
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