Written evidence submitted by Barclays
Infrastructure Funds Management Ltd
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Barclays Infrastructure Funds Management
Limited (Barclays Infrastructure Funds or BIF) is pleased to submit
comments on the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) to the Treasury
Select Committee to assist with its inquiry into PFI. In this
submission, both PFI projects and other forms of Public Private
Partnership are termed generically "PFI" projects.
1.2 Barclays Infrastructure Funds is a business
unit of Barclays Capital (the Investment Banking division of Barclays
Bank PLC) and has raised six funds from institutional investors
since 1996 with total funds currently under management of approximately
£1.2 billion. The investment objective of Barclays Infrastructure
Funds is to generate significant long-term yield-based investment
returns through its experience of investing in PFI and similarly
financed social infrastructure projects in the UK and the Eurozone
countries.
1.3 Barclays Infrastructure Funds has, in its
role as manager of six infrastructure equity funds, invested in
142 PFI projects since 1997. In addition, BZW (Barclays de Zoete
Wedd) was actively involved with one of the very first PFI projects—the
second Severn Crossing, where it was advisor and underwriter of
the junior capital.
1.4 Our submission will concentrate on the role
that we have fulfilled in financing and managing PFI projects
rather than the accounting treatment and public sector evaluation
of these projects, as these are areas where we are not qualified
to comment.
2. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
2.1 The public sector has developed several approaches
to procurement, and subsequent management and maintenance, of
capital assets. The various approaches can be characterised by
different levels of transfer of risk including construction and
maintenance over the working life of the asset.
2.2 There is a balance between the public sector
taking and managing the risk and the price that is paid to have
specific risks transferred. PFI has, for example, shown itself
to enable construction costs and delay risks to be successfully
transferred to the private sector.
2.3 Whilst PFI is a suitable means of procurement
for a wide range of projects there are some (including where the
capital asset has a relatively short useful life or where the
cost and risk associated with project development will result
in a high cost of capital for infrastructure finance) that are
not suitable for PFI.
2.4 PFI has helped significantly with the creation
of infrastructure as an asset class (particularly in social infrastructure)
and also creating export opportunities for the UK financial services,
construction and facilities management industries.
2.5 The capital required for the UK's future
infrastructure investment will need to come from both public and
private sector sources. The public and private sectors should
work together on infrastructure projects contemporaneously with
shared objectives—the improvement to the quality and quantity
of infrastructure, promoting improved value for money in the long-term.
3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of
different public procurement methods?
3.1 The public sector has developed several approaches
to procurement, and subsequent management and maintenance, of
capital assets. The various approaches can be characterised by
different levels of transfer of risk.
3.1.1 Traditional procurement involves the public
sector developing a specification and, through use of internal
resources or external consultancy, developing a detailed design
of the asset to be procured. Construction of the asset is typically
tendered in competition to the private sector construction industry.
Commercially, construction risk and asset management risk are
treated and procured independently and often many years apart.
3.1.2 The risk of operation and maintenance continues
to lie with the public sector, even though these activities (or
parts of these activities) may be subsequently outsourced to the
private sector.
3.1.3 Traditional procurement does not appear
to take into account the cost of the long-term maintenance post-commissioning,
and the availability of capital to fund this essential maintenance
is uncertain. This could lead to an undefined maintenance strategy
resulting in assets neither lasting their design life nor fulfilling
the requirements for service delivery expected at time of procurement.
3.1.4 The public sector is exposed to financial
risks associated with changes to the specification or design of
the project, and any delays in the process.
3.1.5 The public sector client is actively involved
in the project during the construction period, which can lead
to changes in specification, frequently resulting in cost increases
and subsequent delays. Client derived variations are a significant
factor in delays and cost increases to the construction process.
3.2 When PFI was first introduced in 1992 it
included in its general objectives:
3.2.1 the aim of transferring risk to the party
most appropriate for managing, pricing and financing such risk;
3.2.2 that projected maintenance costs should
be included as part of the procurement to ensure that public sector
assets are maintained in such a way as to maximise their design
life;
3.2.3 that by aggregating design, construction
and maintenance into one contract, whole life costing would be
encouraged, asset value would be maximised and long-term maintenance
provided for; and
3.2.4 that the aggregation of construction, maintenance
and operations allowed for optimisation of space planning and
utilisation, and greater efficiency of energy usage.
3.3 PFI projects generally transfer substantially
all construction risk to the private sector as well as the risk
of maintaining an asset over a substantial part of its useful
life.
3.4 Many large scale capital projects, the construction
of which have been delivered through traditional public procurement,
have been subject to severe delay and cost overruns for which
the public sector has borne substantial cost and disruption. High
profile examples include the construction of the British Library
and the Scottish Parliament building.
3.5 In PFI projects the risk of construction
cost overruns and the financial cost of delays is effectively
transferred to the private sector. The construction of capital
assets through a PFI approach has a well-documented history of
completion to time and budget compared to traditional procurement.
In our experience, where difficulties have arisen in construction,
the private sector parties involved, particularly the independent
equity investors, have responded quickly to remedy the problems
arising with no additional cost being borne by the public sector
(see 4.2 for an example).
3.6 Traditional procurement requires the public
sector to fund the capital cost and, therefore, disburse funds
prior to commissioning of the asset and commencement of the service
for which the asset is required.
3.7 PFI procurement demonstrates the mirror image
of these problems:
3.7.1 The public sector is not exposed to the
incremental cost of overruns, although it will bear certain consequences
of delay. As noted above, however, the proportion of PFI projects
which encounter delay is much fewer than in traditional procurement.
3.7.2 Under PFI, the private sector is obliged
to reserve sufficient capital to ensure assets are maintained
to standards agreed with the public sector at the signing of the
agreements.
3.7.3 The public sector only pays when the service
it has specified is delivered.
3.8 There are other advantages offered by PFI
compared with traditional procurement:
3.8.1 PFI procurement encourages whole life costing,
whereas traditional procurement focuses mainly on the initial
construction costs.
3.8.2 PFI procurement involves considerable independent
scrutiny of both the feasibility of the project and costs relating
to the capital asset and its whole life maintenance as part of
the due diligence required by equity investors and lenders to
the project, from which the public sector benefits.
3.8.3 Under PFI project structures, the performance
of the asset and the related service delivery is actively managed
throughout the concession by the private sector parties involved
in the project. Asset performance is measured continuously as
part of the PFI project arrangements.
3.8.4 PFI contracts provide a high level of transparency
on the cost and performance of any particular asset over a long
period of time. Detailed performance measures for the project
are agreed by the public sector at the outset and updated asset
registers are maintained throughout the life of the project.
3.9 Some of the perceived criticisms of PFI are
discussed below:
3.9.1 PFI projects are often criticised for being
inflexible. The reality of the provision of complex capital assets
is that once designed and built, subsequent major changes to the
asset can be difficult to implement. This applies whether or not
the complex capital asset was procured by traditional means or
by PFI. The inflexibility of PFI is often attributed to the expense
and difficulty of changing aspects of the PFI transaction. These
problems are accentuated by the capital structure used in most
PFI transactions, where leverage is = 90% and hence all variations
require multi-party involvement and consent. Such leverage results
in a low cost of capital but is restrictive to future change as
there is little incentive on lenders (who are the dominant capital
providers) to facilitate change.
3.9.2 The procurement of PFI projects is more
complex than traditional procurement because, in addition to the
procurement of a capital asset, PFI projects involve provision
for whole life maintenance and other services, all procured at
the outset. This complexity leads to higher costs for bidding
consortia. With long procurement cycles abort costs can be very
high, increasing barriers to entry and long- term costs.
3.9.3 The divergence of procuring bodies in the
public sector does not facilitate the development of expertise
in what is a sophisticated and complex procurement methodology.
This further increases the cost of bidding, with a resulting increase
in the cost of PFI projects.
3.9.4 Techniques used to determine best value
for money by the public sector have been adapted to recognise
whole life costs and, in part, the risk transfer associated with
PFI procurement. Comparative evaluation works well where risks
can be evaluated by reference to a reliable body of data and relevant
experience, such as construction costs bid under traditional procurement
and the cost over-runs incurred by the public sector under such
procurement. The use of such evaluation is restricted where there
is limited reliable data, such as historical costs of long-term
maintenance of capital assets by the public sector. Historically,
the true costs and risks of maintaining capital assets have been
distorted by deferring such costs on a discretionary basis, even
though the useful life of the capital asset is compromised.
3.9.5 The evaluation of PFI tenders is undertaken
assuming a static business, whereas most PFI projects have been
implemented in areas which are subject to significant potential
change during the life of the asset. No account is taken in comparative
evaluation of PFI bids of the value of flexibility during the
operating period.
4. How far can risk really be transferred
from public to private sector?
4.1 We comment below on the transfer of risk
to the private sector in each phase of a typical PFI project.
During construction:
4.1.1 the risk of cost overruns is successfully
transferred to the private sector;
4.1.2 the financial risk of delays can be passed
to the private sector. The consequential costs of delay in utilisation
of the asset cannot be transferred completely but, in many cases,
are mitigated by the private sector providing alternative assets
and services during the delay period and/or contributing to the
public sector's costs through the payment of liquidated damages;
4.1.3 design risk can be transferred to the private
sector to the extent that the detailed design and asset construction
has to meet the public sector's output specification. The private
sector cannot easily take the risk of future design changes required
to meet changes in the public sector's requirements which are
not anticipated at the construction stage.
4.2 One example evidencing transfer of construction
risk to the private sector in PFI projects involved several schools
and other local authority buildings being built by Jarvis, where
BIF was an investor in these projects. Jarvis Group experienced
financial difficulties in late 2004 which resulted in the construction
on several projects (including schools at Rhondda, Croydon and
Kirklees, and fire stations at Tyne & Wear) stalling. To remedy
this problem, BIF and other third party shareholders committed
significant human resources to restructure the finance, identify
and negotiate with contractors to fulfil the role of Jarvis on
the failing projects and to commit more capital to meet the incremental
costs to ensure that contract obligations were fulfilled and facilities
were completed to specification. The public sector incurred no
additional direct costs, although completion of construction was
delayed. Under traditional procurement, the public sector would
have met the incremental construction cost in full and would have
incurred additional costs for consultants and advisers.
4.3 There is proven risk transfer to the private
sector during the operational phase of PFI projects as follows:
4.3.1 Building maintenance and compliance with
building regulations is integral to the whole life approach implicit
in PFI procurement and is successfully transferred to the private
sector under these arrangements.
4.3.2 Through financial incentives included in
the payment mechanisms of PFI projects, risk of asset performance
is successfully transferred to the private sector together with
the risk of continuity of performance to the standard demanded
by the public sector at the start of the project.
4.4 Insurance risk can be transferred to the
private sector, which provides for the adequacy of capital to
remedy problems that are insurable. Government self-insuring does
not necessarily provide the adequacy of capital in a timely manner.
4.5 Force majeure risk cannot be transferred
effectively.
5. Are there particular kinds of risk which
are particularly appropriate for transfer through PFI deals or
particular projects which are riskier to PFI?
5.1 The risks described in the previous section
can appropriately be transferred to the private sector: cost overruns,
asset construction and commissioning, continuity of asset performance,
asset based service delivery and maintenance of asset condition
throughout concession life.
5.2 Projects which require the construction or
renovation, and subsequent maintenance of specific assets are
applicable to PFI deals.
5.3 Other types of project where there is a high
degree of certainty of usage over time are also suitable for PFI.
5.4 Projects and risks that are not suited to
PFI procurement include:
5.4.1 where the capital asset has a relatively
short useful life, and/or where there is a considerable risk of
technological obsolescence;
5.4.2 where there is a high cost and risk associated
with project development—bearing such risks will not result
in a low cost of capital for infrastructure finance.
5.5 Small capital projects which are let on an
individual basis are unlikely to be procured cost effectively
as PFI projects. However, bundling small projects of a similar
type can be successfully procured using PFI.
5.6 Very large complex capital projects can be
procured successfully through a PFI approach, but the procurement
needs to address the capacity constraints that arise from time
to time in the private sector capital markets if good value for
money is to be secured. Very large projects tend not to attract
independent investors, so much of the due diligence and independence
of management which benefits most of PFI is lost. Alternative
procurement strategies utilising private sector capital may be
more appropriate for these projects (the recent auction for HS1
is a good example).
6. What state guarantees are applicable or
implicit in PFI deals?
6.1 Most PFI projects are structured in such
a way that the revenue is received from a contractual relationship
with a government entity based upon the delivery of a pre-determined
service or the availability of a particular asset. Although such
arrangements, being contractual, present a very strong covenant
supporting a PFI project, there are no explicit guarantees from
government and none are assumed by the private sector.
6.2 In some cases, there are obligations on the
government to facilitate transfer of the payment obligation of
a failing public sector counterparty to a financially sound alternative.
These arrangements support the very strong covenant behind PFI
projects but are not, of themselves, a guarantee of a payment
regardless of performance of obligations by the private sector.
6.3 There are no general implicit guarantees
in PFI projects. If the private sector counterparty fails, the
project will be allowed to fail (on terms that are generally favourable
to the public sector). If the public sector counterparty fails,
the project could also fail if the government wishes it to.
6.4 The contractual nature of PFI and its acceptance
by international investors is dependant upon the acceptance of
the government covenant of payment, and may in the minds of some
infer that there is a form of guarantee.
7. In what circumstances are PFI deals suitable
for delivery of services?
7.1 Services that are associated with maintaining
the capital asset over its useful life, and hence part of the
optimisation of whole life cost are integral to a PFI arrangement.
7.2 Services that are capable of objective measurement
and are quantifiable are suitable for transfer in PFI contracts.
7.3 Services that can be priced over a long period
of time are, within the current structure of PFI, suitable for
transfer.
7.4 A wide range of support services not associated
with the capital asset has historically been procured as part
of certain PFI projects. This can be achieved successfully but
there may be other procurement strategies for such services that
offer the public sector more flexibility and/or better value for
money.
8. Other aspects of PFI
8.1 PFI has been referred to as "being like
a mortgage." This is misleading as the mortgage provider
does not have any ongoing obligations for the long-term maintenance
of assets nor for the delivery of any related services.
8.2 PFI structures have been successfully implemented
by a number of countries, creating potential for export opportunities
for participants from the construction, facilities management
and financial services industries.
8.3 The introduction of PFI has led to the creation
of infrastructure as an asset class—particularly the social
infrastructure asset class. This is an attractive asset class
for pension funds and both institutional and private financial
investors, together with international Sovereign Wealth Funds
seeking long-term low-volatility investment opportunities. This
increases inward investment into the UK.
8.4 Successful PFI encourages the public and
private sectors to work together with common objectives for long
periods of time which breaks down barriers and, given the capital
requirement for new and refurbished infrastructure, it appears
that both parties will need to work together in the future.
8.5 Greater flexibility could be created in PFI
structures if financial structures, performance and public sector
requirements were reviewed during operations and less focus was
put on the lowest cost of capital at financial close. If more
focus was placed on the long-term operation of the asset and the
management of outcomes between the public and private partners,
greater flexibility would follow.
8.6 Service delivery under PFI can be and is
frequently characterised as a zero-sum business. The construction
and long-term management of infrastructure should be seen as a
non-zero sum business with the shared objective of improving the
quality and quantity of infrastructure.
8.7 Most PFI projects are financed using project
finance techniques. Project finance was primarily developed to
finance assets with reducing value over time—for example
oil and mineral reserves. This structure allows very high leverage
but does not encourage active management of the asset for incremental
value post construction. Within PFI the main focus is on construction
and it is the cost of construction that dominates evaluation,
yet it is arguably the operation of assets that is far more important
and valuable to the public sector in the long-term.
8.8 The efficiency and incremental value added
by of different methods of capital procurement can be enhanced
by the public and private sectors working together on infrastructure
projects from inception through to operation with the same objectives—the
improvement of the quality and quantity of infrastructure. In
structures such as NHS LIFT, the public and private sectors worked
together on the development, construction and operation of infrastructure
with shared objectives and rewards.
8.9 The Infrastructure Plan for the UK presented
by Infrastructure UK recently indicated that capital expenditure
on infrastructure for the next five years will be in the region
of £200 billion. To fulfil this objective, capital and management
input from both the public and private sectors will be required.
APPENDIX
PROJECT LIST
| PFI Projects | Location
| Financial close date | Build cost (£m)
|
| 1 | Aberdeenshire Schools |
Scotland | 01-Feb-01 | 14.3
|
| 2 | Addenbrookes Hospital |
London & SE | 27-Oct-04 |
70.9 |
| 3 | A249 | South East
| 04-Jun-04 | 79.0 |
| 4 | A92 | Scotland
| 01-Oct-03 | 53.5 |
| 5 | Alert Communications |
N/a | 01-Jun-00 | 53.0
|
| 6 | Argyll & Bute Schools
| Scotland | 01-Dec-06 | 120.0
|
| 7 | Bangor Schools | Northern Ireland
| 01-Sep-06 | 34.7 |
| 8 | Bannockburn Homes (MoD) |
Scotland | 01-Jul-99 | 37.0
|
| 9 | Barking & Dagenham Schools
| London & SE | 30-Mar-04
| 47.0 |
| 10 | Bexley Leisure | London & SE
| 05-Jul-02 | 21.0 |
| 11 | Bodmin Hospital | South West
| 08-Jan-01 | 16.4 |
| 12 | Boldon School | North East
| 13-Apr-05 | 18.0 |
| 13 | Bolton Schools | North West
| 12-Apr-02 | 9.2 |
| 14 | Bournemouth Library |
South West | 30-Nov-00 | 10.0
|
| 15 | Bridlington Schools |
North East | 31-Dec-00 | 18.0
|
| 16 | Brighton Schools | South East
| 08-Mar-02 | 21.0 |
| 17 | Bromley Hospital | London & SE
| 30-Nov-98 | 114.0 |
| 18 | Bury Hospital | South East
| 24-Jan-01 | 5.8 |
| 19 | Caerphilly Schools |
Wales | 01-Apr-01 | 26.9
|
| 20 | Calderdale Hospital |
North West | 31-Jul-98 | 76.0
|
| 21 | Castlehill Hospital |
Midlands | 01-Jul-00 | 8.9
|
| 22 | Catchment Highland Waste Water
| Scotland | 01-Aug-97 | 34.7
|
| 23 | Catchment Moray Waste Water
| Scotland | 01-Mar-01 | 63.4
|
| 24 | Catchment Tay Waste Water
| Scotland | 01-Dec-99 | 86.1
|
| 25 | CGL Rail | London & SE
| 11-Oct-96 | 202.0 |
| 26 | Chepstow Community Hospital
| Wales | 01-Jan-98 | 9.0
|
| 27 | Cheshire Police | North West
| 24-Nov-04 | 16.9 |
| 28 | Chester-le-Street Hospital
| North East | 30-May-02 |
8.3 |
| 29 | Clarendon College | Midlands
| 15-Jan-98 | 11.7 |
| 30 | Connect A30/A35 | South West
| 01-Oct-96 | 120.0 |
| 31 | Connect A50 | South West
| 01-Jul-96 | 35.0 |
| 32 | Connect M1/A1 | North East
| 01-Mar-96 | 250.0 |
| 33 | Connect M77 | Scotland
| 30-Apr-03 | 138.0 |
| 34 | Covesea Homes (MoD) |
Scotland | 18-Jun-98 | 28.0
|
| 35 | Croydon Schools | London & SE
| 20-May-04 | 20.5 |
| 36 | Dartford & Gravesham Hospital
| London & SE | 31-Jul-97
| 92.0 |
| 37 | Debden School | South East
| 31-Mar-00 | 14.0 |
| 38 | Doncaster Mental Health
| North East | 11-Aug-03 |
15.0 |
| 39 | Doncaster Schools | North East
| 14-May-07 | 48.5 |
| 40 | Dorset Fire and Rescue |
South West | 04-Jul-07 | 52.0
|
| 41 | Dudley Schools | Midlands
| 01-Jan-02 | 21.4 |
| 42 | Dumfries Hospital | Scotland
| 01-May-00 | 9.2 |
| 43 | Ealing Care Homes | London & SE
| 31-Mar-05 | 22.0 |
| 44 | East Anglia Courts |
London & SE | 31-Oct-02 |
26.0 |
| 45 | East Ayrshire Schools |
Scotland | 01-Jun-06 | 78.3
|
| 46 | East Lothian Schools |
Scotland | 01-Dec-02 | 54.5
|
| 47 | Eastbrook Accommodation (DEFRA)
| South East | 01-Mar-02 |
25.0 |
| 48 | Edinburgh Royal Infirmary Hospital
| Scotland | 01-Aug-98 | 208.0
|
| 49 | Edinburgh Schools | Scotland
| 01-Jan-01 | 132.0 |
| 50 | Exchequer Partnership 1
| London & SE | 17-Jul-00
| 14.1 |
| 51 | Exchequer Partnership 2
| London & SE | 20-Dec-02
| 143.0 |
| 52 | Fasttrax (HET) | South West
| 14-Dec-01 | 65.0 |
| 53 | Fife Schools | Scotland
| 01-Nov-05 | 63.4 |
| 54 | Forfar Community Hospital
| Scotland | 02-Sep-03 | 11.7
|
| 55 | FPMS Marine Services |
South West | 14-Dec-07 | 143.0
|
| 56 | Genistics Power (FEPS) |
North West | 20-Jun-02 | 73.0
|
| 57 | New Victoria & Stobhill Hospitals (Glasgow ACAD)
| Scotland | 22-Aug-06 | 178.0
|
| 58 | Grannag School | South West
| 05-Mar-99 | 11.7 |
| 59 | Guildhouse—Nottingham Police
| Midlands | 19-Dec-08 | 5.3
|
| 60 | Guildhouse—Willesden Community Hospital
| London & SE | 31-Jul-08
| 25.9 |
| 61 | Haringey Schools | London & SE
| 31-Oct-00 | 35.0 |
| 62 | HMP Belmarsh West | London & SE
| 29-Jun-10 | 97.4 |
| 63 | Humberside Courts | London & SE
| 31-Mar-00 | 18.8 |
| 64 | Ingleby Schools | North East
| 23-Apr-02 | 9.4 |
| 65 | James Watt College |
Scotland | 31-Mar-99 | 7.7
|
| 66 | JSCSC Training College |
South West | 05-Jun-98 | 88.9
|
| 67 | Kenton School | North East
| 30-Jan-01 | 33.0 |
| 68 | King's College Hospital
| London & SE | 16-Dec-99
| 104.0 |
| 69 | Kirklees Schools | North East
| 30-Mar-01 | 45.0 |
| 70 | Larkfield Hospital |
Scotland | 25-May-99 | 103.0
|
| 71 | Leeds BSF | North East
| 03-Apr-07 | 132.8 |
| 72 | Leeds Schools | North East
| 01-Jan-01 | 36.6 |
| 73 | Lewisham Hospital | London & SE
| 07-Jul-04 | 57.8 |
| 74 | Liverpool Schools | North West
| 05-Oct-01 | 60.0 |
| 75 | Lochgilphead Hospital |
Scotland | 02-Feb-04 | 17.0
|
| 76 | Luton Hospital | London & SE
| 21-Nov-00 | 10.0 |
| 77 | Manchester Schools |
North West | 01-Aug-05 | 29.1
|
| 78 | Midlothian Schools |
Scotland | 01-Jul-06 | 41.2
|
| 79 | Newham Hospital | London & SE
| 05-Sep-00 | 16.0 |
| 80 | Newton Abbot Hospital |
South West | 12-Apr-07 | 19.7
|
| 81 | Norfolk & Norwich Hospital
| South East | 30-Jan-98 |
187.0 |
| 82 | North Ayrshire Schools |
Scotland | 01-Mar-06 | 83.5
|
| 83 | North Durham Hospital |
North East | 01-Jan-98 | 70.3
|
| 84 | Nuffield Hospital | London & SE
| 19-Apr-02 | 35.8 |
| 85 | Oldham Library | North West
| 28-May-04 | 14.8 |
| 86 | Oxford Churchill Oncology
| South West | 13-Dec-05 |
124.3 |
| 87 | PCF Kilmarnock Prison |
Scotland | 10-Nov-97 | 32.4
|
| 88 | PCF Lowdham Grange Prison
| Midlands | 07-Nov-96 | 26.6
|
| 89 | PCF Medomsley Training Centre
| North East | 12-Nov-98 |
10.3 |
| 90 | PCF Moreton Prison |
Wales | 27-Sep-99 | 69.6
|
| 91 | PCF Pucklechurch Prison
| South West | 01-Jul-98 |
32.0 |
| 92 | Penweddig School | Wales
| 16-Sep-99 | 10.0 |
| 93 | Perth Council Offices |
Scotland | 30-Jun-99 | 16.2
|
| 94 | Plymouth Schools | South West
| 27-Feb-07 | 37.3 |
| 95 | Rhondda Cynon Taf Schools
| Wales | 31-Mar-04 | 29.9
|
| 96 | Richmond Schools | London & SE
| 06-Jun-02 | 29.0 |
| 97 | RMG A1(M) | London & SE
| 08-Feb-96 | 128.0 |
| 98 | RMG A417/419 | South West
| 08-Feb-96 | 110.0 |
| 99 | RMS D2D (A1 Ferrybridge/Wetherby)
| North East | 07-May-03 |
245.0 |
| 100 | Ryhurst Avon & Wilts
| South West | 01-Mar-04 |
64.0 |
| 101 | Ryhurst Bexley | London & SE
| 23-Apr-02 | 13.0 |
| 102 | Ryhurst Black Country |
Midlands | 23-Apr-02 | 5.0
|
| 103 | Ryhurst Epping Forest |
London & SE | 05-Apr-05 |
14.0 |
| 104 | Ryhurst Essex & Herts
| South East | 23-Apr-02 |
10.0 |
| 105 | Ryhurst Hertford | London & SE
| 12-May-03 | 9.0 |
| 106 | Ryhurst Liskeard | South West
| 17-Jul-02 | 7.0 |
| 107 | Ryhurst Lymington |
South West | 18-Nov-04 | 29.0
|
| 108 | Ryhurst Redbridge |
London & SE | 23-Apr-02 |
9.0 |
| 109 | Ryhurst South Essex |
London & SE | 28-Jul-03 |
6.0 |
| 110 | Ryhurst West Mendip |
South West | 21-Oct-03 | 7.0
|
| 111 | Salford Schools | North West
| 20-Nov-06 | 37.0 |
| 112 | Salford Schools—Eccles
| North West | 18-Mar-03 |
20.0 |
| 113 | Salisbury Hospital |
South West | 31-Mar-04 | 22.4
|
| 114 | Sandwell BSF | Midlands
| 31-Jul-09 | 177.0 |
| 115 | Sedgefield Hospital |
North East | 19-Jul-01 | 7.7
|
| 116 | South Tees Hospital |
North East | 31-Aug-99 | 122.0
|
| 117 | St Georges Hospital |
London & SE | 20-Mar-00 |
61.8 |
| 118 | St Helens BSF | North West
| 02-Dec-10 | 35.5 |
| 119 | Staffordshire Street Lighting
| Midlands | 01-Mar-03 | 31.1
|
| 120 | Stirling (Gateway) Schools
| Scotland | 01-Apr-06 | 102.0
|
| 121 | Stirling Centre College
| Scotland | 20-Jan-97 | 2.9
|
| 122 | Stobhill Hospital |
Scotland | 01-Jun-05 | 16.5
|
| 123 | Sunderland Schools |
North East | 17-Aug-01 | 16.0
|
| 124 | Swindon Hospital | South West
| 31-Oct-99 | 92.0 |
| 125 | Tiverton Hospital |
South West | 04-Jul-02 | 11.1
|
| 126 | Torbay Schools | South West
| 31-Mar-00 | 14.0 |
| 127 | Traffic Information Services (TiS)
| North West | 27-Mar-01 |
81.8 |
| 128 | Tyne & Wear Fire Stations
| North East | 28-Mar-03 |
24.0 |
| 129 | Vinci Derby Schools |
Midlands | 23-Dec-04 | 38.9
|
| 130 | Vinci Dorset Police |
South West | 16-Mar-00 | 16.2
|
| 131 | Vinci Medway Police |
South East | 08-Jul-04 | 19.8
|
| 132 | Vinci Newport Schools |
Wales | 14-Mar-08 | 15.7
|
| 133 | Vinci Swindon Police |
South West | 20-Dec-03 | 19.8
|
| 134 | Walsall Street Lighting
| Midlands | 28-Mar-02 | 17.0
|
| 135 | Wansbeck Hospital |
North East | 01-Nov-00 | 14.4
|
| 136 | West Cumbria Police HQ
| North West | 30-Jun-00 |
3.9 |
| 137 | West Lothian Schools |
Scotland | 31-Aug-01 | 27.0
|
| 138 | Wirral Schools | North West
| 27-Mar-01 | 56.0 |
| 139 | Wishaw Hospital | Scotland
| 26-Jun-98 | 148.4 |
| 140 | Worcester Hospital |
Midlands | 22-Mar-99 | 108.0
|
| 141 | Workington Community Hospital
| North West | 01-Aug-03 |
7.0 |
| 142 | York Primary Schools |
North East | 12-Jan-05 | 14.9
|
| Non-PFI Projects | Location
| Financial close date | Build cost (£m)
|
| 143 | AMP Medway LIFT
| South East | 24-May-05
| 15.5 |
| 144 | AMP Redbridge LIFT
| London & SE | 04-Aug-04
| 15.1 |
| 145 | CSPC Barnsley LIFT
| North East | 30-Jan-04
| 23.0 |
| 146 | CSPC Bury LIFT
| North West | 29-Jun-07
| 29.8 |
| 147 | CSPC Camden & Islington LIFT
| London & SE | 16-Jul-04
| 19.9 |
| 148 | CSPC Doncaster LIFT
| North East | 01-Oct-05
| 26.4 |
| 149 | CSPC East Hampshire & Gosport LIFT
| South East | 10-Feb-05
| 12.4 |
| 150 | CSPC Plymouth LIFT
| South West | 30-Sep-08
| 4.1 |
| 151 | CSPC PMP
| N/A | 01-Sep-06
| 38.8 |
| 152 | ELIL Cumbria LIFT
| North West | 15-Dec-10
| 2.6 |
| 153 | Guildhouse—Beswick Healthcare
| North West | 13-Jul-08
| 2.6 |
| 154 | Guildhouse—Norfolk LIFT
| South East | 31-Jul-08
| 23.9 |
| 155 | Guildhouse—South East Midlands LIFT
| Midlands | 19-Dec-08
| 6.6 |
| 156 | London Luton Airport
| London & SE | 31-Aug-98
| 80.0 |
| 157 | Manchester Student Village
| North West | 31-Dec-99
| 22.0 |
| 158 | Primaria Barking & Havering LIFT
| London & SE | 04-Dec-03
| 20.5 |
| 159 | Primaria Leeds LIFT
| North East | 15-Mar-04
| 58.8 |
| 160 | Primaria Tees LIFT
| North East | 09-Dec-10
| 10.1 |
| 161 | Prime Birmingham and Solihull LIFT (BaSS)
| Midlands | 31-Dec-04
| 33.5 |
| 162 | Prime North Staffs LIFT
| Midlands | 03-Feb-05
| 12.7 |
| 163 | Ryhurst Medway LIFT
| N/A | 24-May-05
| 16.0 |
| 164 | Ryhurst Redbridge LIFT
| N/A | 04-Aug-04
| 15.0 |
| 165 | Tricomm Bath Bristol & Portsmouth
| South West | 30-Nov-01
| 82.0 |
| 166 | Tricomm Portsmouth
| South East | 28-Oct-05
| 28.3 |
| 167 | UPP Duncreggan
| Northern Ireland | 22-May-02
| 9.0 |
| 168 | UPP Exeter
| South West | 24-Sep-09
| 77.0 |
| 169 | UPP Greenwich
| London & SE | 04-Dec-02
| 29.0 |
| 170 | UPP Kent
| South East | 26-Oct-07
| 25.0 |
| 171 | UPP Lancaster
| North West | 27-Feb-03
| 9.9 |
| 172 | UPP Loughborough
| Midlands | 06-Jun-07
| 43.0 |
| 173 | UPP NTU Clifton
| Midlands | 17-May-10
| 32.0 |
| 174 | UPP Nottingham Broadgate Park
| Midlands | 04-Jun-03
| 80.0 |
| 175 | UPP Plymouth
| South West | 31-Oct-98
| 12.0 |
| 176 | UPP Plymouth II
| South West | 30-Jun-04
| N/a |
| 177 | UPP Reading
| South West | 31-Oct-00
| 9.0 |
| 178 | UPP Reading St Georges
| South West | 04-Jun-03
| 7.0 |
| 179 | UPP RNCM
| North West | 30-Nov-00
| 16.0 |
| 180 | UPP York
| North East | 28-Feb-01
| 42.2 |
May 2011
| 
