Private Finance Initiative - Treasury Contents

Written evidence submitted by Barclays Infrastructure Funds Management Ltd


1.1  Barclays Infrastructure Funds Management Limited (Barclays Infrastructure Funds or BIF) is pleased to submit comments on the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) to the Treasury Select Committee to assist with its inquiry into PFI. In this submission, both PFI projects and other forms of Public Private Partnership are termed generically "PFI" projects.

1.2  Barclays Infrastructure Funds is a business unit of Barclays Capital (the Investment Banking division of Barclays Bank PLC) and has raised six funds from institutional investors since 1996 with total funds currently under management of approximately £1.2 billion. The investment objective of Barclays Infrastructure Funds is to generate significant long-term yield-based investment returns through its experience of investing in PFI and similarly financed social infrastructure projects in the UK and the Eurozone countries.

1.3  Barclays Infrastructure Funds has, in its role as manager of six infrastructure equity funds, invested in 142 PFI projects since 1997. In addition, BZW (Barclays de Zoete Wedd) was actively involved with one of the very first PFI projects—the second Severn Crossing, where it was advisor and underwriter of the junior capital.

1.4  Our submission will concentrate on the role that we have fulfilled in financing and managing PFI projects rather than the accounting treatment and public sector evaluation of these projects, as these are areas where we are not qualified to comment.


2.1  The public sector has developed several approaches to procurement, and subsequent management and maintenance, of capital assets. The various approaches can be characterised by different levels of transfer of risk including construction and maintenance over the working life of the asset.

2.2  There is a balance between the public sector taking and managing the risk and the price that is paid to have specific risks transferred. PFI has, for example, shown itself to enable construction costs and delay risks to be successfully transferred to the private sector.

2.3  Whilst PFI is a suitable means of procurement for a wide range of projects there are some (including where the capital asset has a relatively short useful life or where the cost and risk associated with project development will result in a high cost of capital for infrastructure finance) that are not suitable for PFI.

2.4  PFI has helped significantly with the creation of infrastructure as an asset class (particularly in social infrastructure) and also creating export opportunities for the UK financial services, construction and facilities management industries.

2.5  The capital required for the UK's future infrastructure investment will need to come from both public and private sector sources. The public and private sectors should work together on infrastructure projects contemporaneously with shared objectives—the improvement to the quality and quantity of infrastructure, promoting improved value for money in the long-term.

3.  What are the strengths and weaknesses of different public procurement methods?

3.1  The public sector has developed several approaches to procurement, and subsequent management and maintenance, of capital assets. The various approaches can be characterised by different levels of transfer of risk.

3.1.1  Traditional procurement involves the public sector developing a specification and, through use of internal resources or external consultancy, developing a detailed design of the asset to be procured. Construction of the asset is typically tendered in competition to the private sector construction industry. Commercially, construction risk and asset management risk are treated and procured independently and often many years apart.

3.1.2  The risk of operation and maintenance continues to lie with the public sector, even though these activities (or parts of these activities) may be subsequently outsourced to the private sector.

3.1.3  Traditional procurement does not appear to take into account the cost of the long-term maintenance post-commissioning, and the availability of capital to fund this essential maintenance is uncertain. This could lead to an undefined maintenance strategy resulting in assets neither lasting their design life nor fulfilling the requirements for service delivery expected at time of procurement.

3.1.4  The public sector is exposed to financial risks associated with changes to the specification or design of the project, and any delays in the process.

3.1.5  The public sector client is actively involved in the project during the construction period, which can lead to changes in specification, frequently resulting in cost increases and subsequent delays. Client derived variations are a significant factor in delays and cost increases to the construction process.

3.2  When PFI was first introduced in 1992 it included in its general objectives:

3.2.1  the aim of transferring risk to the party most appropriate for managing, pricing and financing such risk;

3.2.2  that projected maintenance costs should be included as part of the procurement to ensure that public sector assets are maintained in such a way as to maximise their design life;

3.2.3  that by aggregating design, construction and maintenance into one contract, whole life costing would be encouraged, asset value would be maximised and long-term maintenance provided for; and

3.2.4  that the aggregation of construction, maintenance and operations allowed for optimisation of space planning and utilisation, and greater efficiency of energy usage.

3.3  PFI projects generally transfer substantially all construction risk to the private sector as well as the risk of maintaining an asset over a substantial part of its useful life.

3.4  Many large scale capital projects, the construction of which have been delivered through traditional public procurement, have been subject to severe delay and cost overruns for which the public sector has borne substantial cost and disruption. High profile examples include the construction of the British Library and the Scottish Parliament building.

3.5  In PFI projects the risk of construction cost overruns and the financial cost of delays is effectively transferred to the private sector. The construction of capital assets through a PFI approach has a well-documented history of completion to time and budget compared to traditional procurement. In our experience, where difficulties have arisen in construction, the private sector parties involved, particularly the independent equity investors, have responded quickly to remedy the problems arising with no additional cost being borne by the public sector (see 4.2 for an example).

3.6  Traditional procurement requires the public sector to fund the capital cost and, therefore, disburse funds prior to commissioning of the asset and commencement of the service for which the asset is required.

3.7  PFI procurement demonstrates the mirror image of these problems:

3.7.1  The public sector is not exposed to the incremental cost of overruns, although it will bear certain consequences of delay. As noted above, however, the proportion of PFI projects which encounter delay is much fewer than in traditional procurement.

3.7.2  Under PFI, the private sector is obliged to reserve sufficient capital to ensure assets are maintained to standards agreed with the public sector at the signing of the agreements.

3.7.3  The public sector only pays when the service it has specified is delivered.

3.8  There are other advantages offered by PFI compared with traditional procurement:

3.8.1  PFI procurement encourages whole life costing, whereas traditional procurement focuses mainly on the initial construction costs.

3.8.2  PFI procurement involves considerable independent scrutiny of both the feasibility of the project and costs relating to the capital asset and its whole life maintenance as part of the due diligence required by equity investors and lenders to the project, from which the public sector benefits.

3.8.3  Under PFI project structures, the performance of the asset and the related service delivery is actively managed throughout the concession by the private sector parties involved in the project. Asset performance is measured continuously as part of the PFI project arrangements.

3.8.4  PFI contracts provide a high level of transparency on the cost and performance of any particular asset over a long period of time. Detailed performance measures for the project are agreed by the public sector at the outset and updated asset registers are maintained throughout the life of the project.

3.9  Some of the perceived criticisms of PFI are discussed below:

3.9.1  PFI projects are often criticised for being inflexible. The reality of the provision of complex capital assets is that once designed and built, subsequent major changes to the asset can be difficult to implement. This applies whether or not the complex capital asset was procured by traditional means or by PFI. The inflexibility of PFI is often attributed to the expense and difficulty of changing aspects of the PFI transaction. These problems are accentuated by the capital structure used in most PFI transactions, where leverage is = 90% and hence all variations require multi-party involvement and consent. Such leverage results in a low cost of capital but is restrictive to future change as there is little incentive on lenders (who are the dominant capital providers) to facilitate change.

3.9.2  The procurement of PFI projects is more complex than traditional procurement because, in addition to the procurement of a capital asset, PFI projects involve provision for whole life maintenance and other services, all procured at the outset. This complexity leads to higher costs for bidding consortia. With long procurement cycles abort costs can be very high, increasing barriers to entry and long- term costs.

3.9.3  The divergence of procuring bodies in the public sector does not facilitate the development of expertise in what is a sophisticated and complex procurement methodology. This further increases the cost of bidding, with a resulting increase in the cost of PFI projects.

3.9.4  Techniques used to determine best value for money by the public sector have been adapted to recognise whole life costs and, in part, the risk transfer associated with PFI procurement. Comparative evaluation works well where risks can be evaluated by reference to a reliable body of data and relevant experience, such as construction costs bid under traditional procurement and the cost over-runs incurred by the public sector under such procurement. The use of such evaluation is restricted where there is limited reliable data, such as historical costs of long-term maintenance of capital assets by the public sector. Historically, the true costs and risks of maintaining capital assets have been distorted by deferring such costs on a discretionary basis, even though the useful life of the capital asset is compromised.

3.9.5  The evaluation of PFI tenders is undertaken assuming a static business, whereas most PFI projects have been implemented in areas which are subject to significant potential change during the life of the asset. No account is taken in comparative evaluation of PFI bids of the value of flexibility during the operating period.

4.  How far can risk really be transferred from public to private sector?

4.1  We comment below on the transfer of risk to the private sector in each phase of a typical PFI project. During construction:

4.1.1  the risk of cost overruns is successfully transferred to the private sector;

4.1.2  the financial risk of delays can be passed to the private sector. The consequential costs of delay in utilisation of the asset cannot be transferred completely but, in many cases, are mitigated by the private sector providing alternative assets and services during the delay period and/or contributing to the public sector's costs through the payment of liquidated damages;

4.1.3  design risk can be transferred to the private sector to the extent that the detailed design and asset construction has to meet the public sector's output specification. The private sector cannot easily take the risk of future design changes required to meet changes in the public sector's requirements which are not anticipated at the construction stage.

4.2  One example evidencing transfer of construction risk to the private sector in PFI projects involved several schools and other local authority buildings being built by Jarvis, where BIF was an investor in these projects. Jarvis Group experienced financial difficulties in late 2004 which resulted in the construction on several projects (including schools at Rhondda, Croydon and Kirklees, and fire stations at Tyne & Wear) stalling. To remedy this problem, BIF and other third party shareholders committed significant human resources to restructure the finance, identify and negotiate with contractors to fulfil the role of Jarvis on the failing projects and to commit more capital to meet the incremental costs to ensure that contract obligations were fulfilled and facilities were completed to specification. The public sector incurred no additional direct costs, although completion of construction was delayed. Under traditional procurement, the public sector would have met the incremental construction cost in full and would have incurred additional costs for consultants and advisers.

4.3  There is proven risk transfer to the private sector during the operational phase of PFI projects as follows:

4.3.1  Building maintenance and compliance with building regulations is integral to the whole life approach implicit in PFI procurement and is successfully transferred to the private sector under these arrangements.

4.3.2  Through financial incentives included in the payment mechanisms of PFI projects, risk of asset performance is successfully transferred to the private sector together with the risk of continuity of performance to the standard demanded by the public sector at the start of the project.

4.4  Insurance risk can be transferred to the private sector, which provides for the adequacy of capital to remedy problems that are insurable. Government self-insuring does not necessarily provide the adequacy of capital in a timely manner.

4.5  Force majeure risk cannot be transferred effectively.

5.  Are there particular kinds of risk which are particularly appropriate for transfer through PFI deals or particular projects which are riskier to PFI?

5.1  The risks described in the previous section can appropriately be transferred to the private sector: cost overruns, asset construction and commissioning, continuity of asset performance, asset based service delivery and maintenance of asset condition throughout concession life.

5.2  Projects which require the construction or renovation, and subsequent maintenance of specific assets are applicable to PFI deals.

5.3  Other types of project where there is a high degree of certainty of usage over time are also suitable for PFI.

5.4  Projects and risks that are not suited to PFI procurement include:

5.4.1  where the capital asset has a relatively short useful life, and/or where there is a considerable risk of technological obsolescence;

5.4.2  where there is a high cost and risk associated with project development—bearing such risks will not result in a low cost of capital for infrastructure finance.

5.5  Small capital projects which are let on an individual basis are unlikely to be procured cost effectively as PFI projects. However, bundling small projects of a similar type can be successfully procured using PFI.

5.6  Very large complex capital projects can be procured successfully through a PFI approach, but the procurement needs to address the capacity constraints that arise from time to time in the private sector capital markets if good value for money is to be secured. Very large projects tend not to attract independent investors, so much of the due diligence and independence of management which benefits most of PFI is lost. Alternative procurement strategies utilising private sector capital may be more appropriate for these projects (the recent auction for HS1 is a good example).

6.  What state guarantees are applicable or implicit in PFI deals?

6.1  Most PFI projects are structured in such a way that the revenue is received from a contractual relationship with a government entity based upon the delivery of a pre-determined service or the availability of a particular asset. Although such arrangements, being contractual, present a very strong covenant supporting a PFI project, there are no explicit guarantees from government and none are assumed by the private sector.

6.2  In some cases, there are obligations on the government to facilitate transfer of the payment obligation of a failing public sector counterparty to a financially sound alternative. These arrangements support the very strong covenant behind PFI projects but are not, of themselves, a guarantee of a payment regardless of performance of obligations by the private sector.

6.3  There are no general implicit guarantees in PFI projects. If the private sector counterparty fails, the project will be allowed to fail (on terms that are generally favourable to the public sector). If the public sector counterparty fails, the project could also fail if the government wishes it to.

6.4  The contractual nature of PFI and its acceptance by international investors is dependant upon the acceptance of the government covenant of payment, and may in the minds of some infer that there is a form of guarantee.

7.  In what circumstances are PFI deals suitable for delivery of services?

7.1  Services that are associated with maintaining the capital asset over its useful life, and hence part of the optimisation of whole life cost are integral to a PFI arrangement.

7.2  Services that are capable of objective measurement and are quantifiable are suitable for transfer in PFI contracts.

7.3  Services that can be priced over a long period of time are, within the current structure of PFI, suitable for transfer.

7.4  A wide range of support services not associated with the capital asset has historically been procured as part of certain PFI projects. This can be achieved successfully but there may be other procurement strategies for such services that offer the public sector more flexibility and/or better value for money.

8.  Other aspects of PFI

8.1  PFI has been referred to as "being like a mortgage." This is misleading as the mortgage provider does not have any ongoing obligations for the long-term maintenance of assets nor for the delivery of any related services.

8.2  PFI structures have been successfully implemented by a number of countries, creating potential for export opportunities for participants from the construction, facilities management and financial services industries.

8.3  The introduction of PFI has led to the creation of infrastructure as an asset class—particularly the social infrastructure asset class. This is an attractive asset class for pension funds and both institutional and private financial investors, together with international Sovereign Wealth Funds seeking long-term low-volatility investment opportunities. This increases inward investment into the UK.

8.4  Successful PFI encourages the public and private sectors to work together with common objectives for long periods of time which breaks down barriers and, given the capital requirement for new and refurbished infrastructure, it appears that both parties will need to work together in the future.

8.5  Greater flexibility could be created in PFI structures if financial structures, performance and public sector requirements were reviewed during operations and less focus was put on the lowest cost of capital at financial close. If more focus was placed on the long-term operation of the asset and the management of outcomes between the public and private partners, greater flexibility would follow.

8.6  Service delivery under PFI can be and is frequently characterised as a zero-sum business. The construction and long-term management of infrastructure should be seen as a non-zero sum business with the shared objective of improving the quality and quantity of infrastructure.

8.7  Most PFI projects are financed using project finance techniques. Project finance was primarily developed to finance assets with reducing value over time—for example oil and mineral reserves. This structure allows very high leverage but does not encourage active management of the asset for incremental value post construction. Within PFI the main focus is on construction and it is the cost of construction that dominates evaluation, yet it is arguably the operation of assets that is far more important and valuable to the public sector in the long-term.

8.8  The efficiency and incremental value added by of different methods of capital procurement can be enhanced by the public and private sectors working together on infrastructure projects from inception through to operation with the same objectives—the improvement of the quality and quantity of infrastructure. In structures such as NHS LIFT, the public and private sectors worked together on the development, construction and operation of infrastructure with shared objectives and rewards.

8.9  The Infrastructure Plan for the UK presented by Infrastructure UK recently indicated that capital expenditure on infrastructure for the next five years will be in the region of £200 billion. To fulfil this objective, capital and management input from both the public and private sectors will be required.


PFI ProjectsLocation Financial close dateBuild cost (£m)
1Aberdeenshire Schools Scotland01-Feb-0114.3
2Addenbrookes Hospital London & SE27-Oct-04 70.9
3A249South East 04-Jun-0479.0
4A92Scotland 01-Oct-0353.5
5Alert Communications N/a01-Jun-0053.0
6Argyll & Bute Schools Scotland01-Dec-06120.0
7Bangor SchoolsNorthern Ireland 01-Sep-0634.7
8Bannockburn Homes (MoD) Scotland01-Jul-9937.0
9Barking & Dagenham Schools London & SE30-Mar-04 47.0
10Bexley LeisureLondon & SE 05-Jul-0221.0
11Bodmin HospitalSouth West 08-Jan-0116.4
12Boldon SchoolNorth East 13-Apr-0518.0
13Bolton SchoolsNorth West 12-Apr-029.2
14Bournemouth Library South West30-Nov-0010.0
15Bridlington Schools North East31-Dec-0018.0
16Brighton SchoolsSouth East 08-Mar-0221.0
17Bromley HospitalLondon & SE 30-Nov-98114.0
18Bury HospitalSouth East 24-Jan-015.8
19Caerphilly Schools Wales01-Apr-0126.9
20Calderdale Hospital North West31-Jul-9876.0
21Castlehill Hospital Midlands01-Jul-008.9
22Catchment Highland Waste Water Scotland01-Aug-9734.7
23Catchment Moray Waste Water Scotland01-Mar-0163.4
24Catchment Tay Waste Water Scotland01-Dec-9986.1
25CGL RailLondon & SE 11-Oct-96202.0
26Chepstow Community Hospital Wales01-Jan-989.0
27Cheshire PoliceNorth West 24-Nov-0416.9
28Chester-le-Street Hospital North East30-May-02 8.3
29Clarendon CollegeMidlands 15-Jan-9811.7
30Connect A30/A35South West 01-Oct-96120.0
31Connect A50South West 01-Jul-9635.0
32Connect M1/A1North East 01-Mar-96250.0
33Connect M77Scotland 30-Apr-03138.0
34Covesea Homes (MoD) Scotland18-Jun-9828.0
35Croydon SchoolsLondon & SE 20-May-0420.5
36Dartford & Gravesham Hospital London & SE31-Jul-97 92.0
37Debden SchoolSouth East 31-Mar-0014.0
38Doncaster Mental Health North East11-Aug-03 15.0
39Doncaster SchoolsNorth East 14-May-0748.5
40Dorset Fire and Rescue South West04-Jul-0752.0
41Dudley SchoolsMidlands 01-Jan-0221.4
42Dumfries HospitalScotland 01-May-009.2
43Ealing Care HomesLondon & SE 31-Mar-0522.0
44East Anglia Courts London & SE31-Oct-02 26.0
45East Ayrshire Schools Scotland01-Jun-0678.3
46East Lothian Schools Scotland01-Dec-0254.5
47Eastbrook Accommodation (DEFRA) South East01-Mar-02 25.0
48Edinburgh Royal Infirmary Hospital Scotland01-Aug-98208.0
49Edinburgh SchoolsScotland 01-Jan-01132.0
50Exchequer Partnership 1 London & SE17-Jul-00 14.1
51Exchequer Partnership 2 London & SE20-Dec-02 143.0
52Fasttrax (HET)South West 14-Dec-0165.0
53Fife SchoolsScotland 01-Nov-0563.4
54Forfar Community Hospital Scotland02-Sep-0311.7
55FPMS Marine Services South West14-Dec-07143.0
56Genistics Power (FEPS) North West20-Jun-0273.0
57New Victoria & Stobhill Hospitals (Glasgow ACAD) Scotland22-Aug-06178.0
58Grannag SchoolSouth West 05-Mar-9911.7
59Guildhouse—Nottingham Police Midlands19-Dec-085.3
60Guildhouse—Willesden Community Hospital London & SE31-Jul-08 25.9
61Haringey SchoolsLondon & SE 31-Oct-0035.0
62HMP Belmarsh WestLondon & SE 29-Jun-1097.4
63Humberside CourtsLondon & SE 31-Mar-0018.8
64Ingleby SchoolsNorth East 23-Apr-029.4
65James Watt College Scotland31-Mar-997.7
66JSCSC Training College South West05-Jun-9888.9
67Kenton SchoolNorth East 30-Jan-0133.0
68King's College Hospital London & SE16-Dec-99 104.0
69Kirklees SchoolsNorth East 30-Mar-0145.0
70Larkfield Hospital Scotland25-May-99103.0
71Leeds BSFNorth East 03-Apr-07132.8
72Leeds SchoolsNorth East 01-Jan-0136.6
73Lewisham HospitalLondon & SE 07-Jul-0457.8
74Liverpool SchoolsNorth West 05-Oct-0160.0
75Lochgilphead Hospital Scotland02-Feb-0417.0
76Luton HospitalLondon & SE 21-Nov-0010.0
77Manchester Schools North West01-Aug-0529.1
78Midlothian Schools Scotland01-Jul-0641.2
79Newham HospitalLondon & SE 05-Sep-0016.0
80Newton Abbot Hospital South West12-Apr-0719.7
81Norfolk & Norwich Hospital South East30-Jan-98 187.0
82North Ayrshire Schools Scotland01-Mar-0683.5
83North Durham Hospital North East01-Jan-9870.3
84Nuffield HospitalLondon & SE 19-Apr-0235.8
85Oldham LibraryNorth West 28-May-0414.8
86Oxford Churchill Oncology South West13-Dec-05 124.3
87PCF Kilmarnock Prison Scotland10-Nov-9732.4
88PCF Lowdham Grange Prison Midlands07-Nov-9626.6
89PCF Medomsley Training Centre North East12-Nov-98 10.3
90PCF Moreton Prison Wales27-Sep-9969.6
91PCF Pucklechurch Prison South West01-Jul-98 32.0
92Penweddig SchoolWales 16-Sep-9910.0
93Perth Council Offices Scotland30-Jun-9916.2
94Plymouth SchoolsSouth West 27-Feb-0737.3
95Rhondda Cynon Taf Schools Wales31-Mar-0429.9
96Richmond SchoolsLondon & SE 06-Jun-0229.0
97RMG A1(M)London & SE 08-Feb-96128.0
98RMG A417/419South West 08-Feb-96110.0
99RMS D2D (A1 Ferrybridge/Wetherby) North East07-May-03 245.0
100Ryhurst Avon & Wilts South West01-Mar-04 64.0
101Ryhurst BexleyLondon & SE 23-Apr-0213.0
102Ryhurst Black Country Midlands23-Apr-025.0
103Ryhurst Epping Forest London & SE05-Apr-05 14.0
104Ryhurst Essex & Herts South East23-Apr-02 10.0
105Ryhurst HertfordLondon & SE 12-May-039.0
106Ryhurst LiskeardSouth West 17-Jul-027.0
107Ryhurst Lymington South West18-Nov-0429.0
108Ryhurst Redbridge London & SE23-Apr-02 9.0
109Ryhurst South Essex London & SE28-Jul-03 6.0
110Ryhurst West Mendip South West21-Oct-037.0
111Salford SchoolsNorth West 20-Nov-0637.0
112Salford Schools—Eccles North West18-Mar-03 20.0
113Salisbury Hospital South West31-Mar-0422.4
114Sandwell BSFMidlands 31-Jul-09177.0
115Sedgefield Hospital North East19-Jul-017.7
116South Tees Hospital North East31-Aug-99122.0
117St Georges Hospital London & SE20-Mar-00 61.8
118St Helens BSFNorth West 02-Dec-1035.5
119Staffordshire Street Lighting Midlands01-Mar-0331.1
120Stirling (Gateway) Schools Scotland01-Apr-06102.0
121Stirling Centre College Scotland20-Jan-972.9
122Stobhill Hospital Scotland01-Jun-0516.5
123Sunderland Schools North East17-Aug-0116.0
124Swindon HospitalSouth West 31-Oct-9992.0
125Tiverton Hospital South West04-Jul-0211.1
126Torbay SchoolsSouth West 31-Mar-0014.0
127Traffic Information Services (TiS) North West27-Mar-01 81.8
128Tyne & Wear Fire Stations North East28-Mar-03 24.0
129Vinci Derby Schools Midlands23-Dec-0438.9
130Vinci Dorset Police South West16-Mar-0016.2
131Vinci Medway Police South East08-Jul-0419.8
132Vinci Newport Schools Wales14-Mar-0815.7
133Vinci Swindon Police South West20-Dec-0319.8
134Walsall Street Lighting Midlands28-Mar-0217.0
135Wansbeck Hospital North East01-Nov-0014.4
136West Cumbria Police HQ North West30-Jun-00 3.9
137West Lothian Schools Scotland31-Aug-0127.0
138Wirral SchoolsNorth West 27-Mar-0156.0
139Wishaw HospitalScotland 26-Jun-98148.4
140Worcester Hospital Midlands22-Mar-99108.0
141Workington Community Hospital North West01-Aug-03 7.0
142York Primary Schools North East12-Jan-0514.9

Non-PFI ProjectsLocation Financial close dateBuild cost (£m)
143AMP Medway LIFT South East24-May-05 15.5
144AMP Redbridge LIFT London & SE04-Aug-04 15.1
145CSPC Barnsley LIFT North East30-Jan-04 23.0
146CSPC Bury LIFT North West29-Jun-07 29.8
147CSPC Camden & Islington LIFT London & SE16-Jul-04 19.9
148CSPC Doncaster LIFT North East01-Oct-05 26.4
149CSPC East Hampshire & Gosport LIFT South East10-Feb-05 12.4
150CSPC Plymouth LIFT South West30-Sep-08 4.1
151CSPC PMP N/A01-Sep-06 38.8
152ELIL Cumbria LIFT North West15-Dec-10 2.6
153Guildhouse—Beswick Healthcare North West13-Jul-08 2.6
154Guildhouse—Norfolk LIFT South East31-Jul-08 23.9
155Guildhouse—South East Midlands LIFT Midlands19-Dec-08 6.6
156London Luton Airport London & SE31-Aug-98 80.0
157Manchester Student Village North West31-Dec-99 22.0
158Primaria Barking & Havering LIFT London & SE04-Dec-03 20.5
159Primaria Leeds LIFT North East15-Mar-04 58.8
160Primaria Tees LIFT North East09-Dec-10 10.1
161Prime Birmingham and Solihull LIFT (BaSS) Midlands31-Dec-04 33.5
162Prime North Staffs LIFT Midlands03-Feb-05 12.7
163Ryhurst Medway LIFT N/A24-May-05 16.0
164Ryhurst Redbridge LIFT N/A04-Aug-04 15.0
165Tricomm Bath Bristol & Portsmouth South West30-Nov-01 82.0
166Tricomm Portsmouth South East28-Oct-05 28.3
167UPP Duncreggan Northern Ireland22-May-02 9.0
168UPP Exeter South West24-Sep-09 77.0
169UPP Greenwich London & SE04-Dec-02 29.0
170UPP Kent South East26-Oct-07 25.0
171UPP Lancaster North West27-Feb-03 9.9
172UPP Loughborough Midlands06-Jun-07 43.0
173UPP NTU Clifton Midlands17-May-10 32.0
174UPP Nottingham Broadgate Park Midlands04-Jun-03 80.0
175UPP Plymouth South West31-Oct-98 12.0
176UPP Plymouth II South West30-Jun-04 N/a
177UPP Reading South West31-Oct-00 9.0
178UPP Reading St Georges South West04-Jun-03 7.0
179UPP RNCM North West30-Nov-00 16.0
180UPP York North East28-Feb-01 42.2

May 2011

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© Parliamentary copyright 2011
Prepared 10 August 2011