Retail Distribution Review - Treasury Contents


7  European and international issues

Introduction

84.  Some of the regulatory decisions affecting the UK financial system are now being taken at an EU level, rather than being the sole preserve of the UK authorities. As Mr Richard Saunders, Chief Executive, Investment Management Association, told us in October 2010, "A large part of the regulation which the industry now has to deal with comes from Europe, and that is simply a fact".[117] This point was also reiterated to us by Mr Sants, who noted that:

Rulemaking authority is broadly gradually moving to the European architecture, as you know, and also that consumer issues are rising to the fore of that European agenda over the coming years. Both are statements of truth.[118]

85.  As well as the European dimension, not all those customers of advisers within the UK are necessarily firmly fixed here. High Net Worth individuals can look across a range of potential domiciles for both investment opportunities and where they may wish to buy financial advice. The measures in the RDR must be considered both from the context of ongoing work in Europe, and with internationally mobile High Net Worth consumers in mind.

Ongoing work

86.  One fear of those who wrote to us was that current pieces of legislation now working their way through Europe would unravel parts of the RDR, leading to uncertainty, and unnecessary costs for firms, both large and small, should further changes then be needed. In their evidence, Killik & Co requested that "The Government should defer implementation of the RDR, whilst a fundamental review is undertaken, particularly in the light of the European Commission's PRIPs [Packaged Retail Investment Products] project, which has the same objectives as RDR, but is seeking to achieve them by different means".[119] They provided more detail of their concerns as follows:

A serious weakness of the RDR is that the FSA is "front running" Brussels, with no guarantee that Brussels will follow. This is particularly in the area of PRIPs, which are central to the RDR, but which have yet to be defined by the European Commission, and which it may never define.

Indeed the Commission published a consultation paper on 26 November 2010 that stated it favoured merging the PRIPs project into the on-going work taking place on the reform of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and the Insurance Mediation Directive.

Therefore, at the very least, the PRIPS project will be subject to some delay and yet the FSA is carrying on regardless. Indeed one possible consequence of this is that it will be theoretically possible that a financial services business registered in another European country could be passported into the UK and be outside the RDR.

Moreover, the Commission's consultation paper went on to say that a new disclosure instrument was necessary but that further consultation would be needed to determine how charges and performance history should be presented. It added that the responsibility for disclosure should rest with the product provider rather than the distributor.

This, on top of RDR will make for a complex and burdensome regime with consumers receiving information about charges from both the product provider and the adviser. This seems likely to add to consumers' confusion rather than improve clarity.

PRIPs and RDR are ostensibly seeking to achieve similar outcomes for consumers in terms of removing product provider bias and increasing transparency over charges, but are approaching these aims in totally different ways. This should be reason alone for RDR to be delayed and reconsidered in light of the PRIPs' consultation.[120]

87.  When we tackled Mr Sants on the potential mismatch of the EU and RDR processes, he outlined the problem the FSA faced as follows:

There is evidence—in our judgment, very good evidence—of significant current consumer detriment. So, yes, we have to make a judgment between seeking to address that problem now and the possibility—I take your point that we are not responsible for the final determination that Europe makes, that is absolutely correct—that at some point in the future, a number of years hence, the European regime might come out with an outcome that is somewhat different to our proposal. That is possible. The question is what if we make the judgment in the round, and we judge on the basis of the data we have, that that is a reasonable judgment to make?[121]

Mr Sants also emphasised that the FSA was engaged with the European agenda, and was attempting to ensure alignment between the UK model as outlined in the RDR, and what may eventually appear in Europe. He told us that:

I am saying that we are, as you would expect, in dialogue with the Commission, which I believe is our role to try to influence the European agenda, and I know it is very important to you that we do seek to influence the European agenda. We are comfortable with the model we are introducing here in the UK and we are proposing that as a way forward in Europe, and that is what you would expect us to do. I am certainly not saying that I know what the Commission is going to do.[122]

Ms Nicoll also felt that the European legislation would not take effect until some time after the RDR implementation date in January 2013. She told us that "We don't yet have legislation in the context of PRIPS and we are not expecting that until the end of this year. [...] most European legislation then has a lead-in period and a transitional period. We think that would take us well beyond the RDR deadline date".[123]

88.  In written evidence to the Committee, the FSA provided further assurances on how forthcoming EU legislation would dovetail with the FSA's proposals under the RDR. It stated that:

The Committee also asked whether our new rules should take account of the timing of proposed draft EU legislation. We support the European Commission's Packaged Retail Investment Products (PRIPs) initiative, which has the potential to be an important step forward in delivering consistent consumer protection. We believe our rules will be compatible with the outcome of the Commission's recent consultation, and we keep closely in touch with the Commission on both our developments and theirs.[124]

We are confident that, rather than waiting for any new EU rules to come into force, we should move to strengthen protection for UK consumers now. It is worth noting that rules about specific professional standards, including qualification levels, are not covered by the PRIPs initiative and our rules on professional standards would not be affected by the current Commission consultations.[125]

89.  The FSA and its successor bodies will always be faced with difficult decisions over whether to proceed with UK specific legislation quickly, or wait until things have cleared at a European level. The FSA though should act wherever possible to remove consumer detriment in financial services, as it has in this case.

Passporting

90.  One of the concerns raised by those giving evidence to us was that EU firms outside the UK would able to passport their operations into the UK, and by doing so, would circumvent the requirements of the RDR. The FSA noted that:

The activity of providing services on a cross-border basis is usually described as "passporting". Firms can passport into the UK either by:

—setting up an establishment here, usually described as a branch; or

—by providing services with no physical presence in the UK, such as by telephone or internet.[126]

In additional evidence provided by Simon Mansell, of Temple Bar, he raised the following concerns about passporting, and the implementation of the RDR:

The FSA have confirmed that passporting is possible and EU firms will only be subject to certain rules. In response to my letter the European Commission confirms passporting firms will not subject to the RDR. An FSA spokesperson also confirmed this.

EU advisers will only have to comply with the FSA's Conduct of Business rules, which cover adviser remuneration, but will not have to comply with the RDR's rules in relation to qualifications.

The revelation could leave the market open for European adviser firms, wishing to take advantage of more lax rules in their home countries, to enter the UK market. It is also possible that some UK-based firms may wish to move jurisdiction in a bid to avoid some of the harsher rules due to be implemented with the RDR in January 2013.[127]

91.  The FSA however provided the following evidence on passporting, and noted several requirements and restrictions of those that may wish to passport their operations into the United Kingdom:

There are currently 2,030 firms authorised to passport into the UK. Between them, these firms have 195 establishments around the UK. The precise requirements vary between different EU directives, but in general for the investment advice sector the following additional points are relevant:

—the UK's conduct of business requirements (including the RDR rules on describing services and adviser charging) would apply to branches set up in the UK for business conducted with UK clients. The FSA would have responsibility for supervising the conduct of business, including, for example, assessing whether advice given was suitable;

—if a firm passports into the UK without having a branch here (ie, provides cross-border services), then it will have to comply with its home member state conduct of business rules;

—a firm may not conduct its business on a cross-border basis if it is doing so to evade the host state standards. An indicator of this might be where a disproportionate volume of business is being conducted in the host state compared to the home state, particularly if the firm had previously been authorised in the host state; and

—the competence of individuals is the home state regulator's responsibility. Firms passporting into the UK are not subject to the FSA's training and competence requirements, which includes requirements for individuals to hold a relevant qualification or carry out continuing professional development. Individuals operating in branches established in the UK will need to be approved by the FSA, if, for example, they are advising retail customers.[128]

As well as this, the FSA also told us that:

It is important to note that EU directives do not currently include all investment products. For example, UK personal pensions are outside the scope of these directives. This means that if a firm passports into the UK and wants to advise on pensions the firm will typically require an additional permission from the FSA (a "topup"). Under the top-up permission, the firm will be subject to the host state requirements, so in this example the firm would be subject to the RDR requirements for their advice on pensions. [129]

92.  We recognise that passporting (where firms from other countries within the EU conduct business in the UK) may seem to present an opportunity to some advisers to counter the implementation of the RDR. However the evidence provided to us by the FSA repays careful study. It makes it clear that passporting will only be possible in some areas, and cannot be used by UK operators as a device: "a firm may not conduct its business on a cross-border basis if it is doing so to evade the host state standards". We recommend that the FSA (and its successor the FCA) undertake regular scrutiny of operations passporting into the UK within the area of activity covered by the RDR, and report on action it has taken to limit this type of activity.

High Net Worth individuals

93.  Several firms who provided written evidence suggested that the implementation of the RDR might particularly impact those who provide advice to High Net Worth individuals, especially those such individuals who are internationally mobile. The British Bankers Association outlined for us just how mobile the market actually was, both in terms of customers, and the firms servicing them:

High Net Worth clients of the UK wealth management sector are commonly internationally mobile and can just as easily access services in Switzerland or other offshore jurisdictions as they can in the UK. Further, offshore firms are generally able to come to the UK and carry on business with High Net Worth clients without having to comply with the FSA's rules, whether under an EU financial services passport or in reliance on exemptions under the UK regulatory regime.[130]

Given the international mobility of their High Net Worth customers, JP Morgan then highlighted the problem London based banks may now face given the implementation of the rules governing adviser charging under the RDR, including potentially either higher costs for UK based customers, or a restriction of the products available. JP Morgan suggested that:

Under the proposed changes to the adviser charging rules, regulated firms will no longer be able to accept trail fees from funds, even if they are appropriately disclosed to clients. If RDR has the effect that the global funds industry moves to develop RDR compliant products, then we can see that a key step forward will have been achieved in terms of fees transparency. However, we believe that there is a considerable risk that the majority of non-UK funds will not restructure their products in line with RDR and clients are unable to invest in such funds. This will have the effect of limiting the range of products available to UK-based investors. Alternatively, the funds could retain such fees in relation to UK clients, thus making the funds more expensive for a UK client than a non-UK client. As this regulation will affect UK clients only, UK based private banks will need to apply different fee charging schedules to UK clients to those outside the UK.[131]

94.  One of the suggested remedies was to exclude High Net Worth individuals from the requirements of the RDR. Barclays made the following point:

We have not seen convincing evidence of the FSA's claim that "the landscape of retail investment advice is broken" applying to our HNW individuals, despite the FSA extending these rules to cover private wealth management; nor do we believe some of the measures being introduced via the RDR are appropriate for the specificities of the HNW market which is highly competitive, and involves internationally mobile clients who are often more financially sophisticated than retail clients.[132]

JP Morgan also had a similar recommendation, and provided further evidence on how the FSA were dealing with this issue:

As a potential solution, an exemption from the adviser charging elements of RDR should be applied in relation to HNW clients as those clients are able to understand more complex products and charging structures. These clients should be given the freedom to elect to stand outside the new regulations.

The RDR is designed to protect UK consumers. The HNW client base that we service wants a full range of products and therefore should be permitted to opt out of the RDR protections in order have these available to them. We have attached a letter from Freshfields to the FSA on this point. We note that the FSA responded with the view that firms could "Opt Up" such clients to "Professional" status, thus eliminating the need to apply the RDR standards. However, this is not always possible, as the MiFID standards require a number of quantitative tests to be passed that do not necessarily apply even to extremely wealthy clients, for example, the requirement to transact more than 10 trades in a specific product per quarter, which is extremely rare in the case of Private Equity and Hedge Funds. The FSA is free, if it chooses, to apply a different standard, as RDR does not derive from EU regulation.[133]

95.  However, when asked whether the RDR might lead to such customers leaving London, Ms Nicoll replied:

I would be very surprised by that because I think in many ways the RDR is going in the direction of the sort of ways that high net worth individuals expect to interact with their advisers in the sense that I think you would find that the high net worth individuals—there is more fee business, for example, and, therefore, I think it would be going with the grain of the way that high net worth individuals already operate in the market.[134]

When we asked what research the FSA had done in this area, Ms Nicoll noted that "The research that we have done has covered the whole area. The consumer research that we have undertaken has been across a cross-section of types of consumer".[135] Following on from Ms Nicoll's comments, Mr Sants however told us that:

It is not obvious to us—and again when you come to make your report if you want to spell something out here we can take a look at it—how the high net worth model would be adversely affected by the RDR. There are various different types of models, but they don't seem to be particularly at variance to the RDR. So no, we haven't specifically done research in that area, being absolutely open about it. If there were grounds for so doing again, we could take a look at that.[136]

96.  We note the concerns of certain firms that the RDR may have a deleterious impact on their ability to provide a full service to High Net Worth individuals from their London offices. The FSA has not done specific research on the RDR's impact on this specialised area of business. We ask that the FSA as a matter of urgency review the evidence we have received related to these matters, and the proposed remedies, and report back to us on both the potential scale of the issue, and whether modification of the RDR might be possible to mitigate those concerns. We recommend that the FSA examines how to allow High Net Worth individuals, as determined by the FSA, the opportunity to opt out of the requirements of the RDR should they wish. This should also mean they opt-out of most or all protections that retail customers receive.


117   Treasury Committee, Financial Regulation: a preliminary consideration of the Government's proposals, Seventh Report of Session 2010-11, Volume II, HC 430,, Q243 Back

118   Q 68 Back

119   Ev w24 Back

120   Ev w26 Back

121   Q 70 Back

122   Q 69 Back

123   Q 70 Back

124   Ev 36 Back

125   Ibid. Back

126   Ev 35 Back

127   Ev w295 Back

128   Ev 35 Back

129   Ibid. Back

130   Ev w232 Back

131   Ev w344 Back

132   Ev w316 Back

133   Ev w345 Back

134   Q 49 Back

135   Q 50 Back

136   Ibid. Back


 
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© Parliamentary copyright 2011
Prepared 16 July 2011