Greater London Authority Act 2007

Written submission from MayorWatch (GLA 02)

Please find enclosed my submission which I hope will be considered as part of the Committee’s post-legislative scrutiny of the Greater London Authority Act 2007.

I have limited my response to those areas covering the powers and effectiveness of the London Assembly.

I write in my capacity as journalist and editor of MayorWatch, a non-partisan and politically independent publication which has been following the Greater London Authority since 2000.

Are the Assembly’s powers and method of operation effective?

Is the Assembly effective in holding the Mayor to account? If not, what is the remedy?

I believe the Assembly is both an effective check on the Mayor and champion for Londoners in its own right.

In recent years it has made great progress in stepping out of the Mayor’s shadow and increasing public awareness of its work.

Some of this success has been achieved through investigations into issues affecting a diverse range of groups including cyclists, residents affected by airport noise and mobility impaired transport users.

Media coverage of these investigations appears to be higher than at any stage in the Assembly’s history.

It is increasingly common to see reports concerning the Assembly where there is no reference to the Mayor or where the narrative is driven by the Assembly’s work rather than its response to a Mayoral policy or announcement.

Coverage of a recent Assembly report on the level of service victims of crime receive from the Metropolitan Police Service is a good example of this.

The change in the Met’s governance arrangements, which saw the Metropolitan Police Authority replaced with the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime and the Assembly’s Police and Crime Committee, has also placed the Assembly more firmly in the public eye.

However while this greater profile enhances the Assembly’s ability to hold the Mayor to account, it remains disadvantaged by the ability of the executive and Greater London Authority’s functional bodies, such as Transport for London, to withhold information.

An all-party report (London Assembly response to the Mayor's draft 2013/14 budget, 23rd January 2013, http://www.london.gov.uk/publication/london-assembly-response-mayors-draft-201314-budget ) has raised concerns that TfL’s refusal to disclose advice which informed the Mayor’s decision to increase fares has hampered scrutiny of the GLA budget.

Since the May 2012 election the Assembly’s scrutiny of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) has taken place in the shadow of a row over access to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, his senior team and MPS information.

Assembly Members have repeatedly, and in my view correctly, argued that scrutiny of MOPAC requires access to MPS officers and information and that they should not have to request information via MOPAC in order to carry out that scrutiny.

To set the Assembly’s stance in context, in January 2012 they and Londoners were assured that AMs would have regular access to the Commissioner.

In an interview with myself (Kit Malthouse discusses police scrutiny changes, January 16, 2012, http://www.mayorwatch.co.uk/kit-malthouse-discusses-police-scrutiny-changes/201218423 ) Kit Malthouse AM, then Deputy Mayor for Policing, said:

"While I’m Deputy Mayor for Policing and Boris is Mayor it would be inconceivable that the commissioner will not accept an invitation to appear in front of the Assembly and answer questions."

However in June 2012 the Police and Crime Committee discovered just minutes before a meeting where they expected question him that Mr Malthouse’s successor had unilaterally instructed the Commissioner not to attend.

Despite the 2012 election returning the incumbent Mayor, MOPAC’s position had changed without any prior public discussion or announcement. More confusingly, this new position appeared out of step with the Mayor’s own stance, which in September he summarised as follows:

"when we embarked on the reforms and I effectively became the Commissioner for London, it was always going to be in my mind that the function of the Assembly was to provide the scrutiny function of the old Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) and I stick to that."

(Mayor Boris Johnson, Mayor’s Question Time, 19th September 2012, http://www.london.gov.uk/moderngov/documents/b6957/Minutes%20-%20Appendix%202%20-%20Questions%20to%20the%20.pdf?T=9 )

Following the June 2012 PCC meeting there was a marked souring in the relationship between the Committee and MOPAC over this issue.

The deadlock was finally broken after an intervention by the Mayor’s Chief of Staff who wrote to the Committee in November to confirm that AMs had the freedom to invite "relevant senior MPS officers to PCC meetings" and that in future it would be "a matter for the PCC to decide who to invite, whether this be the Commissioner or his representative at the monthly Q&A sessions, and for this to be settled between the PCC and the MPS".

While the intervention appears to have calmed the waters, it is undesirable that scrutiny of such an important area be dependent on a gentlemen’s agreement which does not bind future Mayors.

To address this issue and prevent repeats in this and other policy areas, I believe the Assembly’s right to summons witnesses should be enhanced to ensure it always has access to senior staff and executives within all Greater London Authority functional bodies and Mayoral agencies.

This power should also cover all agencies and public services funded, overseen or working in partnership with the GLA and commercial operators who play a key role in delivering services under its branding, for example transport operators delivering services on behalf of Transport for London.

The Localism Act 2011 introduced a power for the Assembly to reject Mayoral strategies on a two-thirds majority, but, we understand, that it has not been used; neither has the equivalent power over the budget introduced in the 1999 Act. Do these powers serve any purpose and could they ever be used?

The system presumes that Mayoral budgets and strategies will pass in their original form unless two-thirds of Assembly Members can agree a common amendment.

While ordinarily Londoners would expect the will of their directly elected Mayor to prevail, it’s important that an office-holder who enjoys few sanctions between elections knows they can be ‘reigned in’ by a body with an equally legitimate electoral mandate.

For this reason retaining the Assembly’s power to amend Mayoral budgets and strategies is an essential tool in protecting Londoners against a Mayor adopting a risky or extreme fiscal or policy position.

However the two-thirds requirement is likely to be achieved only in the most extreme circumstances.

In June 2010, then Deputy Mayor of London Richard Barnes AM told me:

"...we knew at the May 2008 election that every one of the current Mayor’s budgets would get through, full stop, simply because of the number [of Tory AMs] that were there and the inability of anybody to create or manufacture a coalition to overturn it."

http://www.mayorwatch.co.uk/gla-at-10-richard-barnes-interview/201011668

While retaining the presumption of Mayoral will prevailing is important in ensuring a Mayor has the freedom to deliver manifesto commitments and priorities, consideration should be given to reducing the majority from two-thirds to a simple numerical majority for both budgets and strategies.

This would make it more likely that the Assembly could act to curtail unreasonable or extreme behaviour without making it easier for opposition groups to cause mischief as all foreseeable Assembly configurations suggest that a successful amendment would still require at least two, more likely three, seperate parties to agree a common position.

Is there a conflict of interest because of the requirement to appoint Assembly members to the boards of Transport for London and the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority when part of the job of the Assembly is to hold these bodies to account?

The rules governing appointments to Transport for London allow, but do not mandate, the appointment of Assembly Members. There are currently no AMs serving on the TfL board.

My perception is that Assembly scrutiny of the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA) is most often focussed around its budget and the impact this has on the London Fire Brigade’s ability to protect Londoners.

Assembly Members are therefore more often seeking information, education and clarification from the Fire Commissioner and senior LFB officers to inform their scrutiny of the Mayor’s budget.

As it is often the City Hall executive which is being scrutinised, rather than the Brigade itself, the potential for conflict is minimal.

There have been occasions, such as the Assembly’s report into the July 7th bombings, where the Brigade’s operational performance comes under scrutiny, but with operational matters being the concern of the Brigade’s Commissioner rather than the LFEPA board there remains little scope for conflict.

However there are questions about the need to retain LFEPA in its current shape and form.

Under section 328A (1) of the Greater London Authority Act 1999, the Mayor has the power to direct LFEPA to discharge his instructions.

In recent weeks this power has been used (MD1140 Mayoral Direction to LFEPA http://www.london.gov.uk/who-runs-london/mayor/mayoral-decisions/md1140 ) to approve a consultation on a new Draft London Safety Plan.

The Mayor’s Direction was issued after a majority of LFEPA members amended a motion approving the consultation to remove any mention of station closures and appliance reductions which derive from a need to meet a reduced funding settlement from CIty Hall and the UK Government.

By amending the motion, Authority members sought to pause the closures in order to pressure the Mayor to increase his funding.

Given that the Mayor holds the power to overrule such a vote, it is debatable to what extent LFEPA can be said to be an independent, cross-party body merely reliant on the Mayor for some of its funding, rather than a body under his direct control.

I suggest that the governance arrangements for LFEPA should be reformed along the lines of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, with a new statutory Deputy Mayor heading a Mayor’s Office for Fire and Public Safety which is then scrutinised by a committee of the Assembly.

February 2013