Greater London Authority Act 2007

Written submission from Emeritus Professor George Jones and Emeritus Professor John Stewart (GLA 06)

1. Our evidence focuses on the relationship between the Mayor and the Assembly. It is fundamentally flawed, since the structure laid down in the Government of London Act 1999 and reinforced in the Greater London Authority Act 2007 gives the Assembly few significant powers. There is an imbalance in the powers of the Mayor and the Assembly. The Select Committee has pointed out in its request for evidence that one of the objectives of the 2007 Act was to strengthen the Assembly, but in practice it did nothing significant to achieve that aim because it made no significant change in the relationship between Mayor and Assembly.

2. Our starting point is that the Greater London Authority has two separate elected institutions - Mayor and Assembly. Each has its own elected authority which requires a balance of power between them in the working of the Authority.

3. The powers given to the Mayor in relation to the powers of the Assembly represent an undue concentration of power in the hands of the Mayor, making the Mayor virtually unaccountable within the four-year period of office. There are no adequate means of accountability of the Mayor to the Assembly, or to the electorate, apart from the four-yearly election. A vote of no confidence by the Assembly in the Mayor could and would be ignored. The electorate have no powers of recall even if there were widespread disapproval of the Mayor’s policies and decisions.

4. The concentration of powers in a single individual as Mayor has been unique in our system of government, although it has recently been extended through the election of police and crime commissioners. It is a development in our system of government whose implications require review. One of these implications is the lack of means of accountability

Experience abroad

5. It should not be assumed that directly-elected mayors in other countries have equivalent powers to those of the London Mayor. There is great variation in those powers in other countries. Where directly-elected mayors have executive powers, they often do not have the concentration of powers that applies in London. Directly-elected mayors may not even have executive powers, as has been the case in New Zealand. Nor are mayors with executive powers necessarily directly-elected, though they are often described as directly-elected in discussions about elected mayors in the UK. In France and Spain the executive mayor is appointed by the council, and in the Netherlands by the government or formally by the Queen.

6. In the UK there has been a focus on the mayor’s role and powers and relative neglect of the role and powers of the council. To understand the balance between them the powers of the mayor and of the council have to be analysed together. In an INLOGOV [University of Birmingham Institute of Local Government Studies] study Executive Mayors for Britain? (1996), it was argued that veto powers over council decisions were "a feature found not in European models" [page 28]. In Germany for example it concluded: "While the balance in the relationship between the burgermeister [the German equivalent of mayor] and the council varies, the council retains important functions – approving the budget and the accompanying policy framework, developing policy proposals, agreeing executive action and undertaking scrutiny. The appearances are of a system, which for all its variations, rests heavily on discussion and negotiation between burgermeister and council…" [page 28.

7. In the much quoted United States, The Municipal Yearbook 1998 published by ICMA (The International City/County Management Association) showed that mayors had veto powers in only 28.1% of aall municipalities, and the percentage was declining. [page 36] Even where there were such powers they did not necessarily cover all council decisions on the budget and on policy as in London. Even in New York, where the mayor has veto powers over increases in the budget, he has no vetoes over decreases. Policy is often given expression in council legislation which can be vetoed by the mayor but he cannot impose his own legislation.

8. Much discussion of US political structures has ignored the role of the council in mayoral authorities. Its importance can be shown in authorities of 250,000 plus where the majority of councils meet at least weekly, and where 69% meet fortnightly, because of their functions and the procedures that have been developed to consider budgets and legislation. They can encompass First and Second Readings, public hearings and Committee stages, showing the importance given to the council’s role.

9. The need for accountability has led many countries to accompany directly-elected mayors with at least some means by which the mayor can be removed from office and forced to stand for election again. There can be provision for recall by a petition signed by a specified number of councillors or a specified percentage of electors. In other countries it can be achieved by a vote of no confidence by the council, normally by a special majority. In both instances provisions are set at levels to discourage their use except in serious circumstances, but their existence has an impact on the mayor even when in practice they are not used. They act as a deterrent on the mayor going beyond what is acceptable to the council and citizens.

10. The other approach to provide a counter balance to the powers of the mayor is to make the budget and/or policies subject to decision by the council. In many American authorities there is provision for legislation to be adopted by the council which can embody the council’s policies and involve procedures for two readings and a committee stage or a series of public hearings. Similar procedures are adopted for the budget. There may be provision for mayoral vetoes, but in New York the mayor cannot impose legislation, which can give expression to policy, and has no veto on reductions in the budget voted by the council. Although provisions vary from state to state and from local authority to local authority in the United States and in other countries, in most countries the need for mayoral accountability has been accepted and appropriate provisions have been adopted.

Conflicting mandates

11. It is often argued that the Mayor has a unique mandate from the electorate of London and must have the right to impose his views even when opposed by the Assembly, but the Assembly has its own mandate since its members have collectively been elected by the whole of London. While the Mayor represents one view, the Assembly is representative of a much wider range of views. Its representativeness is enhanced by the electoral system that is in part based on proportional representation. The present structure in London virtually ignores the Assembly’s mandate by giving precedence to the Mayor’s views.

12. The London Assembly has no power in practice to determine the budget or the policies of the authority, or to call in for discussion executive decisions, as can be done in British local authorities without elected mayors, making the Assembly weak and ineffective. The Assembly has in effect only the power to overturn the Mayor’s budget by passing its own alternative budget and amend his strategies with a two-thirds majority. This hurdle is too high. The powers of the authority are concentrated in the Mayor with no means of accountability until the next election. The CLG Committee’s review of the government of the GLA should provide greater power for the Assembly.

Possible changes

13. The requirement of a two-thirds majority for the Assembly to overrule the Mayor is difficult to defend. It should be reduced or removed. There have been other examples in recent legislation to introduce special majorities which act as a constraint on elected assemblies, and that has been a two- thirds majority. It is not clear on what basis two-thirds is adopted for special majorities. There is no clear rationale for that particular figure. Whereas a simple majority has its own logic, a two-thirds majority requires a justification that is not readily available. Above all it means that a minority view always wins.

14. The experience of the GLA shows the defects of the present provisions for a two-thirds majority.

The results of the four GLA elections are set out below:-

2000 2004 2008 2012

Mayor

Mayor’s party Ind Lab Con Con

Assembly numbers

Conservative 9 9 11 9

Labour 9 7 8 12

Lib Dem 4 5 3 2

Green 3 2 2 2

UKIP 0 2 0 0

BNP 0 0 1 0

Mayor’s Party 0 7 11 9

Other parties 25 18 14 16

A two-thirds majority requires 17 votes since the Assembly has 25 members and two-thirds of 25 is 16.67.

15. In 2008 and 2012 a two-thirds majority could not be achieved as long as the Mayor had the full support of his party. In 2004 the other parties could achieve a two-thirds majority, but only if the four parties involved could reach agreement to vote against the Mayor’s budget and for a specified alternative, including, for example both the party and UKIP members. In 2000 the position was unique with the election of an Independent Mayor and unlikely to occur again, and a two-thirds majority could possibly have been attained, although that possibility lasted only until Livingstone was accepted back in the Labour Party, and the other parties could reach only 16 votes.

16. While a two-thirds majority is theoretically possible, this analysis suggests it is unlikely to be achieved except in very exceptional circumstances.

17. In the Greater London Authority a judgment about the size of a majority must be considered in the context of the need for a balance of power. A balance of power that makes one institution powerless cannot be defended. Both Mayor and Assembly should have significant powers reflecting their elected authority.

18. We recommend that the CLG Select Committee should consider three options for replacing the two-thirds provisions:

-giving the Assembly the right to determine the budget and policy framework without any mayoral veto, but with the mayor retaining the initiative in putting forward proposals for the budget and strategies of the authority;

-specifying that the budget and policy framework require approval by both the Mayor and the Assembly as elected institutions;

- retaining the Mayor’s veto but with the percentage for over-ruling Assembly decisions reduced to 55% or 60%, but not so great as to reduce to insignificance the powers of the Assembly.

The Committee’s Questions

19. Our answers to the questions posed by the Committee on "the powers and operation of the Assembly" are:

3A. The Assembly’s powers and method of operation are far from effective;

3B. The solution lies in enhancing the powers of the Assembly on the determination of the budget and the strategies of the authority, as suggested above, and the adoption of procedures by the Assembly appropriate for those powers. The right of the public to hold the Mayor to account should be enhanced by the power of recall. At a minimum the Committee should call for a review by the Government of the provisions for the determination of the budget and strategies of the Greater London Authority.

3C. The Assembly does not have significant powers to influence the Mayor’s decisions, and call-in powers should be introduced.

3D. The budget and strategies of the authority should be determined by the Assembly, removing or modifying the right of the Mayor to determine them unless secured by a two-thirds majority in the Assembly.

3E. There is a conflict of interest if members of the Assembly who are themselves chairs and members of the GLA’s functional bodies carry out scrutiny of those bodies over which the Assembly is supposed to exercise scrutiny. They should be excluded from membership of any scrutiny committee or any scrutiny exercise on behalf of the Assembly.

20 The Assembly should review its procedures to determine both budgets and policies, considering the introduction of First and Second readings, Committee stages and/or public hearings, drawing on the experiences of Parliament and of the devolved assemblies.

February 2013