Appendix 2: Keynote Address by the Commissioner:
"Lessons in Government" Oxford Seminar—Thursday
9 February 2012
1. Standards in public life. Let me begin by reading
to you brief extracts from another lecture, given just over a
year ago. Here's what the speaker, Lord Patten said:
"The greatest threats to peace and security
come not from states that are strong but from states that are
weak...What makes them especially dangerous to the rest of us
is that their sovereignty is often up for sale... Corruption buys
havens for organised international crime and terrorism... The
Yakuza have done that in Japan, the Mafia in Italy. ... A ball
and chain that China, India and Russia in particular drag behind
them is corruption...India has a corrective.... It is called democracy."
2. As we come today to discuss standards of conduct
in the United Kingdom Parliament, at least in as much as they
affect the House of Commons, it might be worth bearing in mind
Lord Patten's internationalist comments and some general lessons
which I suggest might be learnt from them.
3. First, political corruption and the corruption
of the state are worldwide concerns. Transparency International,
who sponsored Lord Patten's lecture, put the UK 16th
out of 183 countries in their latest corruption perceptions index.
4. Second, the degree of corruption is not solely
a function of the wealth or poverty of each nation state. Rather
it may be more a reflection of the strength of a country's democratic
structures.
5. So, if that is right, it follows that the nation's
health depends crucially on the strength, integrity and authority
of its democratic institutions. Institutions of which in this
country Parliament forms the apex. That is why, in my judgment,
the standards which Parliament adopts for itself, and its performance
in maintaining those standards, affect not just the reputation
of the House and not just its ability to set an example for others
to follow—important though these are—but high standards
are essential to the health and prosperity of the country as a
whole.
6. So, standards in Parliament are more than a matter
of administrative or technical process. They go to the state's
ability to uphold the rule of law and to maintain its economic
and social health. In short, parliamentary standards matter.
7. Now let me quote from another speech, this time
from the House of Commons. Here is what the speaker alleged:
"Even very recently, distinguished Members
of this House have, on account of the influence exercised by them
in Parliament...received remuneration in money for their services."
8. There are few more serious allegations to make
of Members of Parliament than that they take money in return for
their votes and it was made as long ago as 1858. Despite the problems
of parliamentary corruption which he identified, the speaker,
Sir James Graham, was arguing against having a specific parliamentary
rule outlawing paid advocacy—since he thought publicity
was sufficient punishment for anything short of a gross violation
of what he called the law of Parliament. His view won the day
but was to lose the battle. Just two months later, on 22 June
1858, the House agreed to outlaw paid advocacy in the terms of
a resolution which remains in force to this day.
9. So what lesson do I draw from that bit of history?
Well, concerns in the United Kingdom about parliamentary standards
are not new. They have been there - and rightly so - as long as
we have had a Parliament with power and authority.
10. So with that in mind, what have we in the United
Kingdom done in recent years to provide a framework of standards
within which Members of Parliament are expected to conduct their
affairs on our behalf?
11. I want to suggest to you that our structure for
parliamentary standards today is sustained by four main pillars.
The first pillar has carved on it the word clarity. The second,
openness. The third, accountability. And the fourth support.
12. Let me explain what I mean.
13. The first pillar: clarity. I don't believe you
can require standards of conduct from Members of Parliament unless
you have established first what those standards are to be. People
need to know what is expected of them with clarity and consistency.
That is all the more important as our society becomes more diverse
and less homogenous. Less can be left to presumption. More must
be captured in prose. So, clear standards require, in my view,
a written Code: a Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament.
14. I was asked the other day whether it would help
if corruption were more fully defined in the Code so that Members
of Parliament would better know how to conduct themselves.
15. My answer was that I would expect Members of
Parliament to know what corruption was when they saw it. They
did not need a technical definition or a detailed list. What they
needed in the Code was a clear and unequivocal statement of principle.
And the importance of this statement of principle should not be
obscured by masses of technical detail.
16. The more detailed the rules become, the more
conduct becomes a question of technical compliance rather than
ethical behaviour. It risks turning standards from an ethical
issue into a regulatory one.
17. I think Members of Parliament should be expected
to apply the principles to their own circumstances, and to make
their own judgements about their conduct. But, as I shall explain,
they should then be answerable for those judgements. It is important,
therefore, that there should be a principles-based framework within
which to work.
18. In the House of Commons, that framework is set
out in a written Code of Conduct. While standards are not a 21st
century invention - bribery of a Member has been prohibited since
as far back as 1695 - the first time that a set of principles
to guide a Member's conduct was brought together into a single
Code was in 1996. The Code was based on the recommendations of
a Committee established 2 years earlier by the then Prime Minister,
Sir John Major. The Committee was the Committee on Standards in
Public Life, and it remains in being to this day.
19. The genesis of the Committee is worth noting.
It did not arrive out of some altruistic or academic view that
it would be a good idea to have an independent committee of wise
people advising on standards in our public life. It was not a
far-sighted precautionary insight. It was instead a direct response
to a parliamentary scandal. Two Members were found to have asked
parliamentary questions of the Government of the day in return
for cash payments. In other words cash for questions. That brought
a response which has had a lasting and I believe positive effect
on conduct in our public life ever since. Some good therefore
came out of the bad.
20. The Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament
is comparatively short at just three pages. The specific rules
in relation to Members' conduct are set out in just about one
page. But they are backed up by more detailed rules and guidance
in relation to such matters as the registration and declaration
of interests, lobbying and the use of expenses and House facilities.
21. The current Code covers only a Member's public
life - their parliamentary and other public work. It does not
cover what Members do in their purely private and personal lives.
Perhaps reflecting the cash for questions legacy from which it
arose, the Code deals principally with financial matters. So it
provides rules about resolving conflicts between a Member's public
and personal interests at once and in favour of the public interest.
It outlaws paid advocacy - the 1858 provision - which prevents
a Member taking a payment to argue their paymaster's case in the
House. The Code prohibits Members taking bribes. It prohibits
Members exploiting for their own financial gain, information received
in confidence. It requires them to follow strictly the rules on
expenses, allowances, facilities and services. It requires them
to register financial interests and orally to declare their relevant
interests in the House, and in communications with Ministers and
others. Finally, it tells Members not to undertake any action
which would bring the House of Commons, or its Members generally,
into disrepute.
22. A breach of any of these rules can lead to disciplinary
action against the Member.
23. In addition to these rules, the Code reminds
Members of the seven general principles of conduct in public life
which were also established by the Committee on Standards in Public
Life in 1995. The seven principles are selflessness, integrity,
objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership.
The importance of these principles is that they apply to everyone
in public life, from Parliament downwards. They are therefore,
in my view, strong statements of principle which are the stronger
for having remained in place, unchanged, over the past 16 years.
24. The Code of Conduct itself, however, has been
reviewed from time to time. The Committee on Standards in Public
Life recommended in 2002 that it should be reviewed once in each
Parliament. And that is good advice. It suggests that the Code
should have some longevity. It is not meant to be rewritten in
perhaps an overhasty response to any particular incident. But
every few years it should be revisited: to be sure that it still
meets public expectations. And to provide Members of the Parliament
at the time with an opportunity to consider and commit to the
current Code. It is after all their Code. They need to understand
it. They need to commit to it. And above all, they need to own
it for themselves.
25. I undertook a review of the Members' Code of
Conduct last year. I consulted widely, including past and present
Members and the current Committee on Standards in Public Life.
I then submitted my conclusions to the House of Commons Committee
on Standards and Privileges, which oversees my work. They submitted
a report to the House in November.
26. In my proposed revisions, I have tried to make
the Code clearer and easier to read and to understand. That in
my view is important for Members and for the wider public. I
think it is equally important to make its operation and effect
as predictable as possible. I have proposed, therefore, that the
Code should distinguish clearly between its aspirational sections
which identify in general terms what is expected of Members, including
those seven principles of conduct, and the more specific rules
to which all Members must adhere. I have also suggested making
clearer in the Code how Members are to be held accountable for
any alleged breach of those specific rules.
27. More controversially, perhaps, I have recommended
that the Code should normally be confined to conduct which relates
in any way to membership of the House, and that it should not
continue to apply to all aspects of a Member's public life. This
is because I do not believe that a parliamentary code is the place
to regulate Members' other public activities, such as their work
as a barrister or on the board of a public company. There are
separate regulators for that.
28. But I have recognised also that being a Member
of Parliament is not a 9-5 job but more a way of life. As a Member
of Parliament, you are never off-duty. So, I have argued that
in extreme circumstances, a Member's conduct, even if it is unrelated
to their membership of the House, could in practice cause significant
damage to the reputation and integrity of the House as a whole
or of its Members generally. To protect Parliament, the House
should not be powerless to respond. Instead, I have advised that
in such extreme circumstances, the House of Commons should be
able to take action, including disciplining the Member. I have
no doubt that this recommendation will be a matter of considerable
interest to the House. Some Members will fear that it could justify
invasion into their private lives. And, they may fear that it
could drag the Commissioner and the House into acting as some
sort of moral arbiter. We shall see.[23]
29. Meanwhile, I have just published a consultation
paper on the more detailed Guide to the Rules relating to the
registration and declaration of Members' financial interests and
to lobbying. My aim is to make the Guide a clearer and more straightforward
document. More controversially I am consulting on the possibility
of tightening the rules on lobbying in relation to both present
and past Members.
30. So, there is our first pillar which is there
to uphold standards in the House of Commons. Clarity on what the
standards are. A clear but principles-based Code of Conduct. Clear
and accessible rules.
31. The second pillar is openness. During the expenses
scandal, the House of Commons Commission—which is a group
of senior Members of Parliament chaired by the Speaker of the
House—rewrote the rules on Members' allowances and expenses.
This was before the responsibility was given to an independent
authority. The Commission drafted a number of questions which
they suggested all Members should ask of themselves before making
an expenses claim. One of the questions the Member was to ask
him or herself was this: "How comfortable do I feel with
the knowledge that my claim will be available to the public under
Freedom of Information?"
32. Put more colloquially, how would you feel about
reading of your claim in the Sunday press?
33. It has been argued, not least by a previous contributor
to this seminar series, Rt Hon David Cameron MP, that transparency
is the best disinfectant. I agree. Although I would suggest it
is best to apply the disinfectant before rather than after the
event. Properly applied, transparency and openness help prevent
scandals and misbehaviour, before either has even started. But
I know as well as anyone the downside. Openness provides a ready
quarry for critics, apparently eager to think the worst of our
parliamentarians. It is difficult objectively and dispassionately
to explain a decision in response to a public frenzy. The internet,
Twitter and such like has made the building of these campaigns
all the more easy. And everyone has a right to a private life,
even a Member of Parliament.
34. But my view is that we all live now in a much
more open society. Facebook and Twitter are a reflection of that
- many people are prepared and apparently keen to be much more
open about their own activities. And so we need to recognise people's
expectations now of much greater openness too from their elected
representatives. It is better to build a constructive response
to those expectations than to try to mount an ultimately doomed
rear-guard action. It is commonplace that the House of Commons
got this wrong on expenses. But elsewhere, I believe the House
should be given credit for supporting a high degree of transparency,
not least in requiring Members to identify their financial interests.
Again, this is not a recent development. Members were first required
to register their financial interests as far back as 1974 - and
long before that they were expected to declare them orally
in debate.
35. Now, every fortnight when Parliament is sitting,
and a little less frequently when the House is in recess, my office
publishes an up to date Register of Members' Financial Interests.
It is broken down into 12 registration categories. I won't go
through all the categories, but they cover Members' outside employment;
the donations or sponsorship they receive in cash or in kind;
any gifts or hospitality they receive from here or from overseas;
any land or properties other than their own homes which they hold
or let out; significant shareholdings; overseas visits paid for
or supported by others; and any preferential loans or credit agreements
which they may have. They must also register any family members
whom they employ and pay for through parliamentary expenses.
36. In addition, Members are required to declare
any relevant financial interest when initiating or taking part
in proceedings of the House of Commons and in their dealings with
others, including Ministers and officials. The test for registration
and declaration is the same. It is not whether the Member in receipt
of the benefit thinks it will influence him or her. Rather, it
is whether someone else might reasonably think it influences a
Member's actions, speeches or votes. In other words, it is the
perception that counts.
37. The result is that people following debates will
know when a Member has a financial interest in something they
are debating. They can also check online the financial interests
of all Members. And in my experience, the press as well as constituents
regularly do so.
38. Of course, the results of these registrations
and declarations do impinge on the Member's privacy and, in some
respects, that of their family. But I agree with those who argue
that openness is a strong protection, as well as a strong disinfectant.
Usually it is a protection for the public, and that is clearly
a priority. But it is also a protection for the Member. It is
hard to accuse a Member of some shady financial dealing when it
is published for all to see in the Members' Register. It may also
be some help in a Member deciding whether to accept some financial
gift or benefit to know that it will need to go in the Register
and be open to public inspection.
39. An area of perhaps lesser transparency until
recently was the conduct of my complaint inquiries. In 2003, the
House of Commons agreed that the Commissioner should publish an
annual report. And that Report contained statistics about the
Commissioner's work and summarised the cases which the Commissioner
had submitted to the House of Commons Committee on Standards and
Privileges, and they to the House. But it was impossible to know
on a more frequent basis what was happening to the Commissioner's
case load; and it was impossible to know how the Commissioner
resolved cases which did not come to the Committee, for example
because he had dismissed them. The Commissioner's work became
a matter for haphazard speculation, with confidence-sapping suggestions
of leaks and off the record briefings.
40. I judged that more transparency was needed about
my work if it was to keep public confidence at a time, including
during the expenses crisis, when that confidence was, to put it
mildly, in very short supply.
41. I was glad, therefore, that the House of Commons
agreed in December 2010 to a much more open policy in respect
of my complaints work. Now I put on my webpages each month the
statistics in relation to the complaints I receive and resolve,
and I identify the name of the Member in respect of any cases
I am inquiring into. Where I resolve an inquiry without it going
to the Committee, then my resolution statement, in the form of
a letter, and the evidence on which it is based, are published
on my web pages. My reports to the Committee with all the relevant
evidence are also published. People can see the judgements I
form, the evidence on which I base those judgements, and can come
to their own conclusions.
42. My experience has been that this greater openness
has led to less damaging speculation about complaints against
Members and about my processes and decisions. Secrecy breeds suspicion
and my processes are now a matter of public record. Any criticisms
now should at least be well-informed. Which brings me to the third
pillar, accountability.
43. In my view, proper accountability is a necessary
and essential part of the structure which supports the House's
standards system. Put simply, you can have a set of rules; you
can have the disclosure of sufficient information to know if those
rules are being broken; but, without a means by which Members
can be held to account for abiding by those Rules, the system
would be fatally flawed. Flawed because there would be no means
of redress. A Code without consequences is in my view only halfway
there.
44. I think the Committee on Standards in Public
Life in 1995 well recognised that. So its report which established
the seven principles of conduct in public life, and which proposed
a Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament, also recommended
the appointment of a Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards.
45. The first Commissioner was appointed in November
1995. I am now the fourth such Commissioner. The terms and conditions
for the Commissioner have developed over those years, principally
to ensure the independence of my post, which I hold very dear.
Indeed, I see that this seminar series is called "Lessons
in Government". Well, the first lesson I would hope you take
away from this afternoon is that the Parliamentary Commissioner
for Standards has nothing to do with the Government. The Government
has no say in my appointment, my terms and conditions, or my work.
46. The position is that the Commissioner is appointed
by the House of Commons, now for a single term contract of 5 years.
It is not renewable. That means, of course, that no one should
have any suspicion that the Commissioner's decisions and actions
are in any way influenced by his or her hope of a further term.
Because it cannot happen.
47. I was appointed in January 2008. So my 5 year
period of office comes to an end at the end of this year. Nothing
- or almost nothing - I say or do will affect that either way.
48. I say "almost nothing" because, as
well as a fixed term contract, I am appointed on a Motion of the
whole House of Commons. I can only be sacked by a Motion debated
and agreed on the floor of the House where it can be shown that
I am either unfit or unable to do the job.
49. So while I am an official of the House, I do
not report up the management chain. My work is overseen by the
Committee on Standards and Privileges. But they have no say in
the decisions I make about complaints, including decisions about
whether or not to institute an inquiry, how that inquiry should
be conducted, or the conclusions which I reach. Nor can the Committee
amend, delete or redact, the conclusions which I submit to them.
The Committee forms its own view, but my view must be published
at the same time and in full.
50. And unlike other Commissions, I am a sole trader.
I do not have a body of Commissioners advising me. I do not have
investigative teams conducting their own investigations which
I supervise. I have one assistant to support me on complaints
work. Most of the work of the rest of my office is on registration
matters, for Members, their staff, for lobby journalists and All-Party
Groups. The full complement of my office is currently the equivalent
of a little over 5 full-time staff.
51. So the Commissioner has considerable independence
in the way he or she carries out the work. And, in respect of
complaints, it is very much a personal commission.
52. So how are Members held to account? My role in
this respect is principally that of a complaints investigator.
I am not an inspector. I am not an auditor. I am a complaints
investigator. The trigger for most of my inquiries therefore is
a complaint either from a Member of Parliament or from a member
of the public. But since December 2010 I have also been able to
initiate an inquiry, on my own account without having received
a formal complaint, where I consider that sufficient evidence
has come to my attention to justify an investigation. This new
provision was principally to enable me to receive referrals from
the new statutory expenses body, the Independent Parliamentary
Standards Authority (IPSA). While that authority deals with alleged
breaches of its expenses rules, it can subsequently refer serious
matters to me to consider whether to initiate a disciplinary inquiry.
I would then report my conclusions, not to IPSA, but to the Standards
and Privileges Committee of the House.
53. And finally, Members can refer themselves to
me, in which case, if I think that exceptionally an investigation
is justified, I need to seek the agreement of the Committee on
Standards and Privileges. Before 2008, a self-referral had only
been made and accepted in one case. At the height of the expenses
crisis - in 2009-10 - I accepted 12 self-referrals. They were
exceptional times. In contrast, in this Parliament, I have accepted
only two.
54. When I receive an allegation, I have two questions
to answer. First, does this matter come within my remit? If it
falls outside the Code, it falls outside my remit. If it relates
to the Code of Conduct for Ministers or to Members of the House
of Lords, it is not for me. If it relates to the way a Member
has handled a particular case, including constituency cases, then
the House has decided that this is for the electorate to judge
and not for me. Equally, if it is about a Member's views or opinions,
however expressed, again that is for the electorate.
55. But, if the matter does come within my remit,
then the second question I must answer is whether the allegation
has come with sufficient evidence to justify my instigating an
inquiry. And that inquiry is into whether the Code of Conduct
and its associated rules have been breached. So I do not go after
seeing if I can substantiate some unsupported allegation, however
colourful, however eye-catching. I do not trawl through a Member's
business in the hope of finding something untoward. I read the
evidence. And then I decide whether or not to start an inquiry.
And that is a decision which I alone take.
56. The conduct of any inquiry again is entirely
a matter for me. I always identify to the Member the allegation
which is against them as briefly and clearly as I can; I identify
the rules which it is alleged they have breached; and I look to
the Member to provide me with the information I need to resolve
the issue. It is an inquisitorial and not an adversarial process.
The Member is required and expected to cooperate as I try to establish
what the factual position is and then whether, in the light of
those facts, the conduct complained of was or was not within the
rules of the House. Members may seek legal advice, but I always
ask to hear direct from Members themselves. I do not conduct inquiries
through third parties. I will follow up with other witnesses where
relevant, and seek the views of officials in the House of Commons.
On occasions, I will conduct interviews with the Member or with
other witnesses. I then identify all the evidence I have received
and provide a statement of the facts which I seek to agree with
the Member concerned. I then come to my own conclusion on whether,
on the basis of those facts, the rules have been breached, and,
if so, how serious I consider that breach to have been.
57. At any stage in my inquiry, I can come to the
conclusion that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the
allegation. If so, at that point I will bring the matter to an
end by telling any complainant that I do not uphold their complaint.
The matter is then closed. It is a decision for me. I do not need
to get separate authorisation from the Committee.
58. In cases where there has been a breach, but it
is at the less serious end of the spectrum, I can resolve the
case myself with the agreement of the Member. In such cases, I
do not submit a formal memorandum to the Committee. Usually the
matter can be rectified by the Member apologising and taking some
appropriate action - for example correcting their entry in the
Register, or apologising for a non-declaration, or paying back
the cost of facilities they should not have used.
59. Where I submit a memorandum to the Committee,
usually on more serious matters or where there is a wider point
of interpretation or policy, it is for the Committee to come to
its own conclusions and to decide if necessary on any sanctions
it wants to recommend to the House. I have no say in that decision.
I make no recommendation or indication to the Committee of any
possible sanction. That is solely a matter for the Committee and
the House.
60. Let me give you some idea of volume. At the height
of the expenses scandal, in 2009-10, I received over 300 formal
complaints and I accepted 72 for inquiry. Last year the number
of formal complaints I received had dropped to 115, and I accepted
12 for inquiry. In that year I concluded 33 inquiries—the
majority from the previous year. I upheld 24 of the complaints;
I did not uphold 7; and the other 2 went to court.
61. So, in common with other complaint investigators,
I receive many more complaints than I conduct inquiries. Most
complaints fall outside my remit because they relate to the Member's
handling of a constituency matter. But in considering whether
I should initiate an inquiry on a matter that is within my remit,
I recognise how important that decision is for the Member concerned.
Members are very dependent on their reputation, not least for
integrity and financial probity. They are under constant surveillance
by their political opponents. Even the fact that I am inquiring
into a Member's conduct can adversely affect their reputation.
Under those circumstances, I believe it is right that I should
only initiate inquiries when the evidence justifies it. And I
am certainly very conscious in conducting my inquiries and in
drawing my conclusions that not only the outcome but the words
with which I choose to express that outcome can have a very serious
effect on a Member's reputation, and future political career.
62. So I attach some importance to the fourth pillar
which sustains our standards structure in the House of Commons.
That is support for Members. Such support is an integral part
of the work of my office. It comes in the form of the confidential
advice my office gives to Members about the application of the
Code and questions of propriety. Whenever I give a presentation
to Members about my role, I always emphasise that I would much
prefer to spend time advising them on how to keep the rules than
on investigating allegations that they have not done so. If the
stable door needs to be closed, then it is best done when the
horse is still inside.
63. So I, and my colleague the Registrar of Members'
Financial Interests, are always available to help Members on the
interpretation of the rules, their obligations under the rules,
and any wider questions of propriety. I recognise that there is
a risk that I may be thought to be conflicted if I advise a Member
and then they are subject to a complaint. But that risk seems
to me preferable to refusing to advise a Member and then investigating
them for a breach which could easily have been avoided.
64. And I would not wish to over-emphasise the risk
of a conflict in my functions. After all, I advise Members. I
don't authorise them. I don't instruct them. I think it very important
that Members should be responsible for their own decisions in
abiding by the Code. I can discuss the interpretation of the rules.
I can identify precedents. I can talk through the issue with them.
But ultimately, no Code of Conduct will work if it is imposed
on those who are required to keep to it. This is true of any code.
It is particularly true of the Code of Conduct for Members of
Parliament since Parliament is sovereign and I would be deeply
against any suggestion that a Commissioner should usurp, or should
be thought to be usurping, the sovereignty of Parliament. Members
must decide for themselves. They should be able to ask for advice.
Then they should expect their decisions to be public and to be
held to account for them.
65. I also give more general support to the House
on standards and propriety. At present, the Government has brought
out proposals for the recall of Members of Parliament. Late last
month, at the end of January, I gave evidence to the Constitutional
and Political Reform Committee in the House which is considering
the Government's proposals. The role of the Commissioner in such
matters is not to peddle their own views on Government policy,
but to set out how Government policy might affect the work of
the Commissioner and the operation of standards in the House.
66. I am also advising a joint working group of Members
from the House of Commons and House of Lords on the options for
closer regulation of All-Party Groups. There are some 500 such
groups in Parliament at present, taking an interest in other countries
and in a wide range of policy issues. My office registers these
groups. There is a potential concern that lobbyists and others
may be thought to have undue influence through the support they
give them.
67. So the structure of standards in the House of
Commons is upheld by these four pillars: clarity in a Code of
Conduct, openness in the publication of interests and complaints,
accountability through the investigation of allegations against
Members, and support in giving Members and House Committees advice
on the rules and wider questions of propriety.
68. This is, in my view, a robust structure, capable
of serving the House of Commons, its Members and the public. It
is an essential part of ensuring the effectiveness of Parliament
in keeping corruption at bay and so in maintaining the strength
and effectiveness of our parliamentary democracy on which our
well-being depends. The Commissioner is there to provide an independent
element in that structure. But ultimately it is for the House,
its Members, and for those who elect its Members, to ensure that
high standards are expected of our elected representatives and
that those standards are consistently met.
John Lyon CB 9
February 2012
Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards
23 The new Code was considered on a motion of the House
on 12 March 2012 (see paragraphs 1.5 to 1.13). Back
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