1 Introduction
Maritime surveillance
1. The UK is an island state and maritime surveillance—being
aware at all times of what is happening over, on and under the
surface of surrounding seas and coastal areas—is essential
to its continued safety, prosperity and environment. There are
many characteristics to surveillance, such as timeliness, accuracy,
survivability, reliability, suitability, standardisation, discrimination,
covertness and continued coverage over wide areas.[1]
This is a broad and important capability which contributes to
military areas such as anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare
and counter-piracy, while also having a non-military focus including
search and rescue, border control and environmental protection.
These differing tasks require the deployment of many different
assets such as ships, submarines, aircraft, helicopters, communications,
unmanned aerial vehicles and space and sea-bed based capabilities.[2]
Maritime surveillance is a layered capability collecting information
at a variety of levels: over a very wide domain using assets such
as satellites; at a more precise theatre level using assets such
as maritime patrol aircraft and ships; or in a specific area using
assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters. Assets
can operate in more than one layer, depending on the task in hand.
2. Several Government Departments and agencies, including
the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Home Office, the Department for
Transport, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs,
the Security Services, the Coastguard and the Border Agency have
a stake in securing the use of these assets.[3]
There are also economic considerations with the UK having a large
commercial maritime fleet and conducting a high level of trade
by sea which contributes considerable sums to the UK's GDP. The
Government acknowledged this wide range of interests by establishing
the Maritime Security Oversight Group, bringing together officials
from interested government departments and agencies to provide
strengthened strategic oversight of maritime security.[4]
The Government has also established the multi-agency National
Maritime Information Centre based in Northwood to provide improved
situational awareness for maritime security.[5]
The MoD and UK Armed Forces play a crucial and pivotal role in
the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities to meet the
various maritime surveillance requirements of UK Government Departments
and agencies, NATO and other international partners.
3. The UK's maritime surveillance capability became
a high profile issue following the decision in the 2010 Strategic
Defence and Security Review (SDSR) to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 maritime
patrol aircraft (MPA) programme.[6]
The MRA4 was intended as a replacement for its predecessor, the
Nimrod MR2, and would have provided: enhanced anti-submarine and
anti-surface warfare; maritime reconnaissance and strategic intelligence
collection; search and rescue; and an attack capability.[7]
4. When the decision was taken, the Nimrod MRA4 had
not yet entered service and the programme had suffered several
delays. Nevertheless, the decision to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 meant
that the UK had no current or planned sovereign MPA capability
(i.e. a capability that could be operated independently) and the
MoD acknowledged that the resultant capability gap could not be
completely covered by an existing single asset or collection of
assets.[8] Despite the
Nimrod MRA4 decision the SDSR asserted that the security environment
the UK would face would "place a premium on particular military
capabilities, including intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition
and reconnaissance (ISTAR). It will demand sophisticated and resilient
communications and protected mobility by land, sea and air".[9]
5. In our August 2011 Report on the Strategic Defence
and Security Review and the National Security Strategy, we expressed
serious concerns about the capability gaps that this decision
created in the UK's ability to undertake the Military Tasks envisaged
in the SDSR. We were not convinced that UK Armed Forces could
manage these capability gaps within existing resources and called
on the Government to outline its plans to manage them and to outline
its plans for the regeneration of the capability, including the
maintenance of the necessary skills and knowledge.[10]
Our inquiry
6. Given the importance of maritime surveillance
to the UK and our concerns about the impact of some of the SDSR
decisions, on 9 February 2012 we announced an inquiry into maritime
surveillance. The inquiry would examine the current and future
contribution of the MoD and UK Armed Forces to the provision of
maritime surveillance capabilities in an ever-changing global
situation. In particular, we were interested in establishing:
· how the MoD had determined the future
strategic requirements for the UK Armed Forces' maritime surveillance
capabilities, including current and evolving threats;
· what current maritime surveillance capabilities
and assets would remain in service by 2020, including their specific
roles, effectiveness, deployability, coordination, and interoperability;
and the likely gaps and deficiencies;
· what future capabilities were needed by
the MoD and UK Armed Forces for maritime surveillance and what
measures were being taken to address these, including applying
lessons learned from recent operations;
· the costs of current and future maritime
surveillance assets of UK Armed Forces;
· how the MoD intended in future to coordinate
its work with other Government departments and agencies, including
its effectiveness, their interaction, the lines of demarcation
and the consequences for, and impact on, UK Armed Forces;
· to what extent the UK should collaborate
and was collaborating with allies, including through NATO, in
the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities; and
· what provision the MoD was making for
the possibility that maritime surveillance forces might have to
be regenerated at relatively short notice.
7. At the outset of our inquiry, we decided not to
revisit the Nimrod MRA4 decision, but to look at how the resultant
capability gap would be managed given that other assets were being
withdrawn. We also wanted to investigate the UK's future requirements
for maritime surveillance and how these would be decided and delivered
in the context of the gap. We considered the capability investigations
the MoD was carrying out in this area, including the study into
Wide Area Maritime Underwater Search (WAMUS). Our Report examines
these issues and also looks at cross-Government cooperation in
the delivery of maritime surveillance.
8. We held two oral evidence sessions and our witnesses
included the Minister for the Armed Forces, senior Service personnel
and officials from the MoD, the Chief Coastguard and external
commentators. We received 17 pieces of written evidence from individuals
and organisations. A list of our witnesses and those who submitted
written evidence can be found on page 57. In March 2012, we visited
the National Maritime Information Centre at Northwood. We are
grateful to all our witnesses, all those who submitted written
evidence and those who facilitated our visit. We are also grateful
for the assistance of our Specialist Advisers and the staff of
the Committee during this inquiry.[11]
During our inquiry we held part of our first oral evidence session
in private to allow witnesses from the MoD to be as open as possible
on classified and sensitive matters. We also received classified
written evidence from the MoD. We have published as much of this
evidence as possible, but, after discussion with the Department,
have redacted it where necessary to exclude classified and sensitive
information.
1 Ev 34 Back
2
Ev 34 Back
3
Ev 45 Back
4
Ev 35 Back
5
Ev 35 Back
6
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: Strategic
Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010, p 27 Back
7
National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects
Report 2011, HC (2010-12) 1520-I, para 3.10 Back
8
Defence Committee, Ninth Special Report of Session 2010-12, The
Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security
Strategy: Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report
of Session 2010-12, HC 1639, p 19 Back
9
HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: Strategic
Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010, p 16;
The SDSR went on to say that maritime capabilities would include
"maritime intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition
and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities based on network enabled
warships, submarines and aircraft", p 22. Back
10
Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2010-12, The Strategic
Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy,
HC 761, para 137. See also: Defence Committee, Ninth Special Report
of Session 2010-12, The Strategic Defence and Security Review
and the National Security Strategy: Government Response to the
Committee's Sixth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1639, p 19. Back
11
The Specialist Advisers' declarations of relevant interests are
recorded in the Committee's Formal Minutes which are available
on the Committee's website. Mr Paul Beaver did not assist with
this inquiry due to a potential relevant interest. Back
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