3 The capability gap
Current capabilities
22. UK Armed Forces' current maritime surveillance
capabilities are provided by a wide variety of platforms and assets,
including:
· the Submarine Fleet;
· the Surface Fleet and the Royal Fleet
Auxiliary (RFA);
· the Fleet Air Arm rotary assets;
· Fixed Wing aircraft; and
· ISTAR assets.[31]
23. These capabilities range from those which are
systems permanently fitted or allocated to platforms to provide
intimate, immediate and assured support, to specific equipments
that are fitted as required dependent on the specific task being
undertaken. They can be operated individually or in collaboration
with other units from all three Services or with other nations.[32]
24. The MoD told us that "planning for contingency
[operations] will always include an element of maritime surveillance
and UK Joint and Allied assets can be included in such effort,
probably as part of a Task Force. A recent example of such collaboration
was the activation of the Response Force Task Group to provide
options during the Arab Spring uprisings".[33]
Maritime surveillance would not necessarily be the primary role
of each of these platforms and assets. For example, in respect
of the surface fleet, there is a distinction between Destroyers
and Frigates (Type 45 and Type 23) and Capital Ships, whose primary
roles are warfighting and maritime security, to which maritime
surveillance is integral, and other ships, such as RFAs and Mine
Countermeasure Vessels, which would provide maritime surveillance
but as part of their secondary roles.[34]
Capability gaps
25. Capability gaps in maritime surveillance are
widely acknowledged and this was reflected in the evidence we
received, most of which suggested the gap was serious. These concerns
were not only about the lack of a maritime patrol aircraft capability
although this was the most prominent and regular concern expressed.
Dr Willett told us the capability gap was wider than that caused
by the cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4: "the critical capability
gaps [...] are persistent wide area surveillance and numbers of
assets. The persistent wide area surveillance gap exists because
of the withdrawal of Nimrod: other assets are being used to plug
this gap, yet none provide the same coverage".[35]
He also highlighted that the 2010 SDSR decision to withdraw the
four Broadsword-class Type 22 Frigates had implications for maritime
surveillance given their role in anti-submarine warfare, and the
sensor equipment they possessed.[36]
26. The MoD accepted that there were capability gaps
in maritime surveillance, resulting most notably from the withdrawal
of the Type 22 Frigate and the cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4.[37]
The MoD also acknowledged that the need for a "so-called
"persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR)" capability had been identified by a number of recent
operational lessons identified exercises". While
this requirement may not in practice translate into a single system
or platform, the MoD judged that a "significant improvement
in maritime surveillance capability (both wide area and targeted)
might be provided through the use of an unmanned aerial system
(UAS) deployable from the Maritime Force".[38]
TYPE 22 FRIGATE
27. The Type 22 Frigate was originally designed as
a specialist anti-submarine platform. It evolved into a powerful
surface combatant with substantial anti-surface, anti-submarine
and anti-aircraft weapons systems. In addition to their armaments
the vessels also possessed command and control and communications
facilities and useful sensor equipment. The MoD explained that
the Type 22 Frigates provided the Royal Navy's only combination
of systems enabling wide ranging monitoring of the frequencies
and wavelengths of the Electromagnetic Spectrum from the sea.
The MoD added that "this capability supported Indicators
and Warnings, Force Protection and Situational Awareness".
[39] Dr Willett
told us "with the four Broadsword-class Type 22 Frigates
being withdrawn [...] the UK would lose the full spectrum Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) installed on these ships as well as four
towed-array sonar platforms".[40]
When we asked Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, about
a replacement for the Type 22 Frigates, he confirmed that there
would be no funding before 2015.[41]
MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT
28. Most of the concern expressed to us related to
the capability gaps caused by the lack of a maritime patrol aircraft
capability.[42] We have
already expressed our worries about the deletion of the MRA4 programme
in our Report on the SDSR and the NSS.[43]
These were acknowledged by the Government in its response:
We regret that we had to cancel the Nimrod MRA4
programme. It was a capability that we would, in an ideal world,
have preferred to acquire.
[...]
It is true that there is currently no single
asset or collection of assets that fully mitigate the resulting
capability gap. This is an unwelcome consequence of the Nation's
financial position and the Department's obligations to contribute
to deficit reduction, but we continue to maximise the use of other
assets such as Type 23 Frigates, Merlin Helicopters, Sentry and
C-130 to contribute to Anti-Submarine Warfare, Search and Rescue
and Maritime Counter-Terrorism where possible. In the longer term,
if the Government were to conclude that it needed to close the
gaps completely because future threats were to mature in a way
that we can no longer manage this risk in the way we are today,
some additional funding or reprioritisation would be required.[44]
29. The National Audit Office's (NAO) Ministry of
Defence Major Projects Report 2011 considered the capability gaps
left by the Nimrod MRA4 decision. The NAO Report said that according
to the MoD, the Nimrod contributed to eight out of the 15 security
priority risks set out in the National Security Strategy. It added
that the Nimrod was uniquely able to rapidly search large maritime
areas, a capability relevant to long range search and rescue,
maritime counter-terrorism, gathering strategic intelligence and
protecting the nuclear deterrent. The NAO Report further said
that the MoD had carried out studies in the lead up to the SDSR
to assess the capability gap from cancelling the Nimrod MRA4 and
the MoD "assessed that cancelling Nimrod would have consequences
for the military tasks that the aircraft was expected to undertake,
some of them severe".[45]
The Report also outlined the capability gaps resulting from the
cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 and some possible mitigation strategies
for covering these. The NAO Report said:
Some limited analysis was carried out on how
specific military tasks could be covered by a combination of Sentry
surveillance aircraft, Hercules transport aircraft and the Merlin
maritime helicopters. However, the Department noted that there
would be 'significant shortfalls without significant investment,
and the co-ordination of such assets at the right place and the
right time might prove to be very risky'. [Figure 1 below] summarises
the military tasks, the capability gap and an explanation of the
possible mitigation strategies currently being assessed by the
Department.[46]
The Report also asserted that there were risks in
diverting other assets to cover the gaps:
Using other existing assets would provide a reduced
capability compared with Nimrod, and diverting resources from
existing tasks would have wider implications for defence. The
Sentry surveillance aircraft is already at minimum crew and aircraft
numbers to cover NATO commitments. Using helicopters, such as
the Merlin or Lynx, would affect national commitments or training
of crews for other tasks. Other alternatives are fully committed
to current operations.[47] Figure
1
Source: National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence:
Major Projects Report 2011, HC 1520-I
30. The MoD acknowledged in its evidence that due
to cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 the UK had "reduced our
ability to conduct Strategic Intelligence gathering tasks, long
range Anti-Submarine warfare [ASW], provide support to Search
and Rescue, Maritime Security and power projection tasks".[48]
It was their intention "to mitigate the impact of Nimrod
cancellation by the use of other military assets on a case by
case basis. In relation to ASW operations, these assets include
Type 23 Frigates and Merlin Mk1 helicopters. Additionally, Hercules
C-130 and Sentry could offer a limited element of the maritime
patrol capability that MRA4 would have provided. There is currently
no single asset or collection of assets that offsets the resulting
capability gap".[49]
31. The MoD has stated that it regrets cancelling
the Nimrod MRA4 programme and that in an ideal world it would
have preferred to acquire a maritime patrol aircraft. We repeat
the serious concerns raised in our Report on the National Security
Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)
regarding the capability gaps that the Nimrod MRA4 decision has
created in the UK's ability to undertake the military tasks envisaged
in the SDSR and remain unconvinced that UK Armed Forces can manage
this capability gap within existing resources. The MoD told us
that its intention was to mitigate the impact of the Nimrod cancellation
by the use of other military assets on a case by case basis, but
acknowledged that there was currently no single asset or collection
of assets that offset the resulting capability gap. We agree with
the National Audit Office's (NAO) assessment that using other
existing assets would provide a reduced capability and diverting
resources from other tasks would have wider implications for defence.
Indeed in the MoD's own assessment in the NAO Report there would
be significant shortfalls without significant investment, and
the coordination of such assets at the right place and the right
time might prove very risky.
LONG-RANGE SEARCH AND RESCUE
32. The NAO's assessment of a capability gap in respect
of long-range search and rescue (see Figure 1 above) was reinforced
by the evidence we received. This is a major area of cross-departmental
cooperation. Rod Johnson, the Chief Coastguard, outlined to us
the extent of the UK's search and rescue region and his assessment
of "home waters":
[It] extends out to 30° west. It is approximately
1 million square miles of the eastern Atlantic. It is a very interesting
question that you asked about our home waters. I think that it
is probably easier to consider that concept in terms of time.
At an average steaming speed of 15 knots per surface ship, where
is home waters? Our area of operation extends out to 30°
west to just short of the Arctic circle in the north, and down
to an area just north of Cape Finisterre and then down the North
Sea, English Channel meridian line.[50]
However although this was the UK's area of responsibility,
he added:
We do not have situational awareness out to 30°
west. In other words, we do not know what is there all the time,
right now—only the compliant targets [ships which readily
identify themselves]. But it is an area that we look at and, of
course, from a search and rescue point of view any British interests
anywhere can be involved or can involve us. Some examples of that
would be the searches that we do routinely in the Red Sea/Gulf
of Aden area. If we get the distress alert through our satellite-based
technology, we will deal with it [...].[51]
33. The Chief Coastguard said that in the absence
of the Nimrod MRA4 operations in respect of civil maritime search
and rescue, counter-pollution and traffic monitoring would have
to be "simply restructured around not having it".[52]
The Scottish National Party, however, expressed concerns about
the UK's adherence to the International Convention on Maritime
Search and Rescue:
Included in those obligations is to provide a
list of assets available to undertake certain missions and also
where the various co-ordination centres are located. However PQs
that since the retirement of Nimrod [MR2] show that only shorter
range helicopters and light aircraft are listed as being available
now. They do not list the C130 Hercules—which means that
the UK has no long range military fixed wing SAR aircraft listed
under section 2.1.11.4 of the International Convention on Maritime
Search and Rescue, raising serious questions about the UK's ability
to effectively meet this obligation. Indeed from 2005 until the
retirement of the MR2 in early 2010 the aircraft provided help
to neighbouring countries 23 times. It
appears that since its retirement the UK has not provided fixed
wing RAF top cover to any neighbouring states.[53]
34. The Chief Coastguard did not share these concerns.
Although he accepted that the UK inventory once included Nimrod
MR2 as a maritime patrol aircraft, which, in the context of search
and rescue, was capable of providing a systematic search over
a wide area and locating a potentially non-compliant target, there
were other means at his disposal to provide that capability if
it was required. The existing long-standing arrangements regarding
the obtaining of assets from other Atlantic region states would
continue.[54] Air Vice-Marshal
Green added:
when the Chief Coastguard gave evidence, he wrapped
this sort of issue up very well. When something happens, it is
effectively within his authority—the coastguard's authority—to
start to react to that incident, and he will use whatever assets
are available at the time and are nearest to the point of the
concern in order to alleviate the situation or the risk. In that
example, those assets were available. There is no reason to suspect
that if a Nimrod had been available, it would have been able to
react any faster to [a particular incident] than those that were
actually closer to the incident in question.[55]
35. There does not appear to have been any discussion
of the impact of the Nimrod MRA4 decision on search and rescue
provision with European neighbours. Nor has there been any attempt
to negotiate with France or with Luxembourg (a small landlocked
country which has three MPAs) to provide support for the UK search
and rescue capability. Tom McKane, Director General for Security
Policy, MoD, said "there is no specific new agreement under
the UK-France defence treaty that addresses search and rescue
[...]" and he was unaware of any discussions with Luxembourg.[56]
When we tried to establish why no such negotiations or discussions
had taken place, Air Vice-Marshal Green told us "long-range
search and rescue is a responsibility that we have all signed
up to through previous conventions. Consequently, it is the standard
protocol that if you are in that region, you will react to that
particular incident. There does not need to be a bilateral arrangement
with a particularly nation to satisfy a search and rescue need;
the arrangements are already in place within a broader arrangement".[57]
36. In addition to the Nimrod MRA4 decision another
major change to the provision of search and rescue was announced
to the House of Commons on 28 November 2011.[58]
The then Secretary of State for Transport announced that a new
civilian-led UK-wide search and rescue capability would be established
and that military involvement in search and rescue would cease
once that capability was fully operational. We note that no
option appears to have been considered for either a sponsored
or a volunteer reserve element within the crews for the new commercial
arrangement, despite the fact, that at least initially, it is
widely expected that most of the pilots will be ex-Armed Forces.
37. We note the impact of the Nimrod MRA4 decision
on the UK search and rescue capability. While we accept that the
UK remains committed to the International Convention on Maritime
Search and Rescue and that no bilateral arrangements are required,
we are surprised that the Government has not discussed the impact
of the Nimrod MRA4 decision with European neighbours. It would
seem prudent to do so to ensure that cooperation is maximised.
38. We will monitor the planned changes in the
provision of UK search and rescue to a new civilian-led capability
and expect Ministers to play a central role in its delivery, settling
disputes and ensuring coordination between departments. The Government
should guard against the loss of the valuable experience that
exists within the Armed Forces and we request that the Government
detail the measures it has taken to prevent this. We believe that
this should include considering options for retaining expertise
through some form of reserve service for the pilots employed.
Another concern is the impact on the provision of search and rescue
for the Falkland Islands. We may wish to return to this in future
years.
THE CAPABILITY GAP AND STANDING
MARITIME TASKS
39. The Royal Navy has a number of standing maritime
tasks. These include the Response Force Task Group (the core of
the UK's maritime contingent capability held at high readiness
to respond to unexpected global events), the Fleet Ready Escort,
maintained at high readiness around the UK for short-notice global
deployment), a nuclear ballistic submarine (to provide the UK's
continuous at sea nuclear deterrent), geographical deployments,
Task Forces, Mine Countermeasures Forces and the Fishery Protection
Squadron. In our report on the operation in Libya, we noted that
important tasks, such as the Fleet Ready Escort and counter-drugs
operations, were not able to be carried out due to meeting the
Libya commitment, and concluded that:
Given the continued high levels of standing maritime
commitments it is likely that this type of risk taking will occur
more frequently as the outcomes of the SDSR are implemented. This
will be a significant challenge for the Royal Navy and the MoD
who should outline their plans to meet this challenge in response
to our Report.[59]
40. In its response to our Report, the MoD said that
although it recognised that UK Armed Forces were only able to
undertake so many tasks at the same time, it did not expect "that
after 2015 our Armed Forces will be operating routinely at the
level of intensity they have sustained in recent years".
It assured us that if UK Armed Forces were required to undertake
specific operations rigorous planning procedures were in place
to generate the capabilities required and identify risks and that
careful examination would take place on the prioritisation of
other tasks depending on the strategic context and priorities
at the time.[60]
41. Concerns regarding the UK's ability to meet its
standing maritime tasks were also expressed to us during this
inquiry. Dr Willett thought that the Libya operation provided
examples of the challenges that would be faced in the future in
meeting these tasks as, although the operation had been in the
UK's national interest, the Royal Navy had been required to withdraw
assets from other tasks, such the South Atlantic patrols and counter-piracy
activities. He suggested that gaps were appearing in the UK's
maritime surveillance capability:
You have a web of a number of capabilities—a
number of systems—doing different things that come together,
but as you are stretching that capability ever tighter, you are
drawing out holes that are gaps. You can fill some of those with
new systems, and some with alliance contributions, but the question
is: from a policy level, do we understand the importance of maritime
surveillance for maritime security as a whole, and are we prepared
to underwrite the capabilities required to ensure that we have
sufficient coverage for what we want to do?[61]
42. When we asked Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the
Armed Forces, whether he was prepared to underwrite the capabilities
required to ensure that there was sufficient coverage for what
the UK wanted to do, he did not do so. He assured us, however,
that the MoD took the entire maritime situation very seriously
and recognised "the importance of maritime surveillance for
maritime security as a whole". He asserted that the national
financial situation had caused difficulties for the SDSR and that
with limited resources there would be an element of risk and that
in respect of maritime surveillance the decision taken was "what
we thought to be the least bad option [..] and that it was a tolerable
level of risk to carry".[62]
However the Minister acknowledged:
in the wider sense [...] the Navy is going through
a very difficult patch while older platforms are working their
way out and until newer ones work their way in. I think that we
recognised from the outset that the Navy would go through a lean
period before the up-curve came back through. That is what we
have seen, but so far, despite the tests presented, for example
by Libya last year, it has managed, and we believe that the risk
we are carrying is acceptable, if regrettable.[63]
43. Despite the end of the Libya operation concerns
were still being raised about the effects on the standing maritime
tasks of events such as the London Olympic Games. On 9 May 2012,
The Telegraph reported that the "Royal Navy no longer had
enough warships to dedicate one to fighting piracy off the coast
of Somalia all year round".[64]
It added that the "difficulties had been compounded by the
need to commit ships and personnel to the Olympic security effort".
We put these concerns to the Minister, who did not accept that
the Royal Navy had in any way abandoned any of its tasks. He told
us:
Although I acknowledge and do not shy away from
the fact that the Navy's assets are being heavily used at the
moment and that we are taking a degree of risk, I do not think
that I accept the proposition that you were putting to me that
they have actually had to abandon any of their tasks altogether.
They have just had to find other ways of completing them.[65]
44. Despite this denial, when we asked the Minister
whether counter-piracy operations had been affected by the 2012
London Olympics he confirmed that:
during the course of this year the UK is not
contributing any vessels to the various international counter-piracy
missions. We continue, of course, to exercise command of the EU
operation from Northwood, but I do not see why we would, in principle,
at all times contribute vessels to those missions. We certainly
expect to do so again as time progresses, in rotation with the
other partner nations involved.[66]
45. Following our evidence session with the Minister,
we requested further information from the MoD regarding the pressures
on maritime surveillance assets due to other demands on the Royal
Navy such as the Olympics. The MoD told us that maritime surveillance
assets were currently undertaking standing commitments:
· Sea King helicopters in Afghanistan (Operation
HERRICK);
· Merlin Mk 1 helicopters in Oman (Operation
CHOBDAHAR);
· assets undertaking a range of the Military
Tasks listed in the SDSR;
MT2, providing nuclear deterrence;
MT3, defending the UK and overseas territories; and
MT4, supporting civil emergency organisations in
times of crisis.[67]
This was in addition to maintaining a requirement
for contingency through the Ready Force Task group (RFTG), part
of which is forward deployed to the Gulf under Operation KIPION.
Operation OLYMPICS was an added responsibility which was being
undertaken using assets in their regeneration (training and maintenance)
periods, between either Gulf or Operation HERRICK tasks, prior
to deployment on roles related to maritime surveillance, and this
reduced the ability to utilise assets flexibly to mitigate capability
gaps in other areas. There were also implications for the defence
of the UK home base or any of its Permanent Joint Operating Bases
overseas as it was necessary to "make greater use of surface
platforms such as the River Class patrol vessels and frigates
/ destroyers for short notice tasking, often to deploy at range
to locate and track any incursions". In addition to all this,
the Merlin helicopter force was being upgraded from Mk1 to Mk
2 which would see a dip in the number of craft available until
the middle of 2013 when only 9 would be available of a force of
28.[68]
46. We repeat the concerns expressed in our Report
on Operations in Libya regarding the Royal Navy's ability to continue
to deliver the required high levels of standing maritime commitments
with fewer platforms. It is likely that risk taking will occur
more frequently as the outcomes of the SDSR are implemented and
the smaller number of available assets is stretched more thinly.
We note that the Minister asserted that the Royal Navy was not
abandoning any of its tasks. However he also accepted that the
Navy is undergoing a "lean period", being heavily used
and accepting a degree of risk. Maritime surveillance assets are
an essential component of maritime security and these additional
requirements such as Libya and the Olympics pose a potential risk
to maritime security due to this overstretch and possible competing
demands for those assets. This is illustrated by the UK not contributing
any vessels this year to the international counter-piracy missions
and the necessity to use assets and personnel between operations
in the Gulf or Afghanistan for the London Olympics.
31 See Ev 37-40 for a description of the UK's current
maritime surveillance capabilities, assets and platforms of each
Service, including numbers, their primary and any other roles;
the MoD's assessment of their effectiveness; and any decisions
to extend their service, replace them or remove them from service
up to 2020. Back
32
Ev 37 Back
33
Ev 37 Back
34
Ev 37; Wide area surveillance is an enabling capability that
translates strategic intelligence into tactically exploitable
outcomes. The effectiveness of wide area surveillance is a function
of a range of factors, including environment, asset endurance,
range and speed, and sensor capability, matched against the characteristics
and behaviours of the target. Back
35
Ev 57 Back
36
Ev 57 Back
37
Ev 40 Back
38
Ev 40 Back
39
Ev 40 Back
40
Ev 57 Back
41
Q 162 Back
42
For example see Q 8 and Q 11 [Dr Willett], Ev w2 [Rear Admiral
Japp], Ev w18-19 [Air Vice-Marshal Roberts], Ev w35 [Dr Robertson]
and Ev w43-44 [Airbus Military] Back
43
Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2010-12, The Strategic
Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy,
HC 761, para 137 Back
44
Defence Committee, Ninth Special Report of Session 2010-12, The
Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security
Strategy: Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report
of Session 2010-12, HC 1639, p 19 Back
45
National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects
Report 2011, HC (2010-12) 1520-I, paras 3.21-3.22 Back
46
Ibid., para 3.23
Back
47
Ibid., para 3.24 Back
48
Ev 40 Back
49
Ev 40 Back
50
Q 6 Back
51
Q 6 Back
52
Q 10 Back
53
Ev w26 Back
54
Q 12 Back
55
Q 146 Back
56
Qq 147-148 Back
57
Q 149 Back
58
HC Deb, 28 November 2011, cols 52-53WS Back
59
Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, Operations
in Libya, HC 950, para 114 Back
60
Defence Committee, Eleventh Special Report of Session 2010-12,
Operations in Libya: Government Response to the Committee's
Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1952, p 12 Back
61
Q 16 [Dr Willett] Back
62
Q 132 Back
63
Q 132 Back
64
The Telegraph, 9 May 2012, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9253764/Navy-forced-to-drop-year-round-Somalia-piracy-patrols.html
(accessed 11 September 2012) Back
65
Q 133 Back
66
Q 134 Back
67
Ev 49 Back
68
Ev 49 Back
|
