Defence Committee - Future Maritime SurveillanceWritten evidence from the Ministry of Defence

Asterisks denote that part of the written evidence which, for security reasons, has not been reported at the request of the Ministry of Defence and with the agreement of the Committee.

Introduction

1. General description of the current position on maritime surveillance, including setting out the current primary strategic role(s) and secondary role(s)for UK Armed Forces’ maritime surveillance capabilities

1.1 Maritime Surveillance is defined by NATO Allied Joint Doctrine as “the systematic observation of surface and sub-surface sea areas by all available and practicable means primarily for the purpose of locating, identifying, and determining the movements of ships, submarines, and other vehicles, friendly and enemy, proceeding on or under the surface of the world’s seas and oceans”.1 Maritime Surveillance therefore refers to surveillance of the sea and from the sea and extends overland (eg in the littoral), and encompasses a spectrum of capabilities, including ships, submarines, aircraft and space and sea-bed based capabilities. Required characteristics of surveillance include timeliness, accuracy, survivability, reliability, suitability, standardisation, discrimination, covertness and continued coverage over wide areas

1.2 The UK MOD’s maritime surveillance capabilities are delivered by a wide range of platforms and assets; for example, every RN vessel at sea carries out maritime surveillance routinely and continually. For the purposes of this inquiry, we have chosen to focus mainly on those equipments and units for which surveillance is part of their primary role.

1.3 Many technical and operational details of these platforms are only available at a level of classification above secret, but we have sought to address the Committee’s questions as far as possible without relying on such information.

1.4 The role of British maritime power is to support the government in promoting and protecting the national interest. To focus military activity, the strategic objectives set out in the National Security Strategy were developed into seven military tasks in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. Britain’s maritime forces contribute directly to all seven of these military tasks—and by extension their role in maritime surveillance—including playing a key role in delivering the first three tasks which are nondiscretionary (see answer to question 2 below for more details on the seven military tasks). Maritime Surveillance, and the dissemination of the product of that surveillance, leads to shared situational awareness2 which is a core enabling function for Force Protection and for all operations, including Military Tasks, conducted on, from, or adjacent to the sea. There is an intrinsic link between maritime surveillance and force protection.

1.5 It should be noted that maritime surveillance of UK Maritime areas and Maritime Borders, the coastline, inland waterways, the Territorial Waters (TW) and Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ) (soon to be Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)) is primarily the responsibility of the Civil Authorities. However, Defence provides a contribution through MOD Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV), the Fleet Ready Escort (FRE), the Maritime Counter Terrorism (MCT) contingent and any other assets which may be at sea.

Decision Making Process

2. How does the MoD decide the strategic requirements for UK Armed Forces’ maritime surveillance capabilities?

Description of methodology and tools used to assess the strategic requirements for maritime surveillance capabilities, including role of National Security Council and other bodies and contribution of the National Security Strategy.

2.1 The strategic requirements for the UK’s military maritime surveillance capabilities are set out in Defence Strategic Direction. They are modified over time through analysis conducted against certain operational scenarios—called the “Future Force Development Process”—which may lead to changes to the agreed force structure . The capability branches of the MOD also complete a yearly “Capability Audit”, which results in a plan for how Defence Capabilities (including Maritime Surveillance) will be provided in the future as part of an agreed Capability Management Strategy. This process delivers a detailed understanding of the military war fighting capability for overseas operations and for the military dimension of the security of the UK and its dependent territories, including protection of the deterrent and the collection of strategic Intelligence.

2.2 In parallel to these defence-specific processes, and as a result of the annual update to the 2008 National Security Strategy, the Cabinet Office-led Maritime Security Review made two clear recommendations which were agreed in January 2010 by the Ministerial Cabinet Committee National Security, International Relations and Development (Protective Security and Resilience) (NSID (PSR)).

Strengthened strategic oversight of Maritime Security through a set of strategic objectives and changes to the central oversight of strategic policy mechanisms.

Improved Situational Awareness for Maritime Security through the establishment of a new national multi-agency National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) at Northwood to address current vulnerabilities.

Strengthened Strategic Oversight

2.3 The Maritime Security and Oversight Group (MSOG), established in 2010, is made up of key representatives of core departments, agencies and the Cabinet Office, and is the senior-level decision making group for maritime issues. The group provides strategic oversight and direction of all cross-cutting maritime security issues and programmes, including aspects of maritime surveillance. The group is responsible for the Maritime Security vision, strategic objectives and risks, reviewing them as circumstances require, and allocating priorities in order to use a framework to drive and coordinate day-to-day policy on cross government programmes of work.

2.4 In November 2011 MSOG directed the development of a cross government National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS).3 The strategy will set coherent, resource aware, and pragmatic objectives and actions, with maritime surveillance a key tenet. From a maritime surveillance perspective, the strategy aims to achieve greater coordination of homeland aerial maritime surveillance requirements; and fully utilise NMIC to co-ordinate an integrated maritime surveillance and interdiction capability through well-defined coordinated protocols between the key stakeholders in response to threats.

The National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC)

2.5 The SDSR acknowledged that no single department or body had the capacity or capability to deliver what is required to monitor the maritime environment and counter threats the UK faces both in territorial waters and internationally. The NMIC was established in Northwood on 1 April 2011 to ensure information was disseminated, analysed and acted upon in a coordinated manner. NMIC is staffed from the Maritime & Coastguard Agency (MCGA); MOD (Navy); DEFRA (Marine Management Organisation (MMO)); UK Border Force (UKBF); Law Enforcement and Security Agencies (SOCA, ACPO, MPS); and the FCO.

2.6 The NMIC has created a powerful multi-agency environment bringing together the key agencies responsible for maritime safety, security and environmental protection in one location and developing a single picture of maritime activity similar to that used by air traffic controllers. This means that threats and risks can be identified and countered at an earlier stage. Although still in its early stages of development, the NMIC has already achieved significant benefits for the UK by fostering greater co-ordination between Government agencies and departments on issues ranging from counter terrorism to the protection of critical energy supply chains; and Letters of Understandings (LOUs) signed with the USA, France and signatory to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Provision has been made for reporting directly to Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) in the event of crisis.

Risk Awareness in the Maritime Domain

2.7 A cross-government Maritime Risk Register (Secret) is maintained by the Cabinet Office and is subordinate to and coherent with the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA).

How do the strategic assessments of maritime surveillance requirements translate into decisions on capabilities, assets and platforms?

2.8 The National Security Risk Assessment provided the basis for the National Security Council to take decisions about the relative importance of different national security capabilities, and choose where to focus new investment. The NSC produces a set of eight National Security Tasks and the contribution of the Armed Forces is then defined through the seven Military tasks (MT) which describe what the Government may ask the Armed Forces to undertake.

What Defence must do:

MT 1: Providing Strategic Intelligence.

MT 2: Providing Nuclear Deterrence.

MT 3: Defending the UK and Overseas Territories.

MT 4: Supporting civil emergency organisations in times of crisis.

MT 5: Providing a Defence contribution to UK influence.

What Defence must be prepared to do:

MT 6: Defending our interests by projecting power strategically and through expeditionary interventions.

MT 7: Providing security for stabilisation.

2.9 In order to devise a force structure, more detailed Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs) are applied relating to issues such as the size of operations we plan to undertake and how often we might undertake them. The assumptions serve as a planning tool to guide defence in the development of the armed forces and are not a set of fixed operational plans or a precise prediction of the precise operations that we are likely to plan to undertake. The DPAs serve to codify the outcomes of the SDSR for Defence planners and move towards achieving Future Force 2020 (FF20). FF20 has three broad elements:

The Committed Force4 comprises those force elements required to meet Defence’s standing commitments, focused primarily on MTs 1 to 4. This requirement is force driven by the non-discretionary, inescapable elements of our NSS. For maritime surveillance these include elements such as strategic intelligence and support to UK Counter Terrorism operations.

The Responsive Force5 comprises those force elements that are required to respond to the full range of demands for which the UK should be prepared. It provides a range of capabilities, across all environments, which allow us to: respond to non-enduring contingencies, mounting an enduring stabilisation operation at up to brigade level, and conduct enduring deterrence, coercion and containment, principally, but not exclusively, in the Air and Maritime environments.

The Adaptive Force6 comprises those elements of the force structure that are neither routinely attributed to the Committed nor Responsive Forces: it is the generating force for all maritime assets and for those land and air force elements (Regular and Non-Regular) required to service an enduring operation.

Details of all studies and strategy papers undertaken into maritime surveillance

2.10 Given the very broad Departmental interpretation of Maritime Surveillance, it would not be realistic to provide a comprehensive list of every study or strategy paper which might be within its scope. However, if, as the Committee pursues its inquiry, it is able to narrow the focus of its interest, then the Department will seek to provide further information.

Details of any planned future studies into maritime surveillance

2.11 Similarly, if the Committee identifies particular areas of interest in relation to future studies during its inquiry, we will seek to provide further information.

The Committee request a copy of the capability investigation in 2011 into the long term requirements for maritime surveillance capability

2.12 The Wide Area Maritime Underwater Search study sought to establish the nature and size of any “wide area” Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability risk, over time, and to identify and test options for mitigation. ***.

Current Threats

3. What are the current threats that require the UK Armed Forces to have maritime surveillance capabilities?

3.1 Our assessment of current and future threats is informed by past experience and the prevailing and anticipated environment. It is therefore not static. These threats in the maritime domain include but are not limited to:

Submarine Threat ***and the proliferation of modern submarines across the world. ***.

Surface-borne threat—Globally present (ranging from Homewaters, the Falklands, Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Aden and Far East) that require layered force protection of deployed Forces. ***and extends to such disciplines as Warfighting to Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Piracy and high-threat Counter Narcotics operations.

Air Threats—deployed maritime units contribute to the compilation of the air picture and complement shore-based aircraft both in detection and interception of air threat crossing maritime areas.

Threats to Resource & Energy supply—such as the risk of mining/attack in strategic choke points such as Straits of Hormuz or support to MMO for Fishery Protection.

Threats to UK Borders—counter drugs operations and preventing illegal immigration.

Threat of Pollution/Environmental disaster, including major weather events.

In relation to each of these threats, the purpose of maritime surveillance is to identify them and support effective decision-making at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Future Role and Requirements

4. What work has been undertaken to assess the future maritime surveillance capability requirements of UK Armed Forces?

4.1 The SDSR resulted in a plan to deliver Future Force 2020, including the required maritime surveillance capabilities. Subsequent planning rounds have made further adjustments based on a range of inputs in order to bring the defence budget into balance with resources whilst maintaining a path to Future Force 2020 (FF2020).

What are the future threats that require UK Armed Forces to have maritime surveillance capabilities?

4.2 Future Maritime Operational Concept (FMOC) lays out the strategic context and trends that the UK may face up to 2025. Although threats such as Fast Attack Craft; Improvised Explosive Devices; Submarines; and Mines are similar to those faced now, the new levels of capability and complexity of the threats bring increased risk to the UK. Understanding the “Pattern of Life” ie normalised activity in the maritime domain and new threats such as Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) and Electro-Magnetic Pulse devices may proliferate and have to be countered. Maritime surveillance will continue to play an important role in the key Military Tasks and is an important capability to link strategic intelligence to actions at the tactical level.

5. Description of the current maritime surveillance capabilities, assets and platforms of each Service, including numbers, their primary role and any other roles

5.1 The Committee should note that all current and planned capabilities are subject to consideration in the course of annual planning rounds. The current planning round is still ongoing and the outcome will be announced by the Secretary of State when decisions have been made.

5.2 Current maritime surveillance capabilities range from organic systems permanently fitted or allocated to platforms to provide intimate, immediate and assured support, to specific equipments that are fitted as required by more specific tasking. These capabilities can be operated in isolation, in collaboration with other units from all three services or with other nations.

5.3 Planning for contingency will always include an element of maritime surveillance and UK Joint and Allied assets can be included in such effort, probably as part of a Task Force. A recent example of such collaboration was the activation of the Response Force Task Group to provide options during the Arab Spring uprisings. This Task Group was the fulcrum of Maritime Surveillance activities, operating with land based and maritime air assets (RAF, Army and Allies), while being geographically widely dispersed (East and West of Suez) it provided the fullest picture and widest options to the UK Government and deployed military assets.

Submarine Fleet

Six Trafalgar Class SSNs—***

One Astute Class SSN—***

The Committee should note that primary warfighting role of SSNs is ASW and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), including protection of the Nuclear Deterrent. Their maritime surveillance roles include: the provision of Indications and Warnings (I&W) in high threat environments; the delivery of Special Forces (SF) to conduct covert surveillance; the delivery land attack in the form of precision Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM); ***.

Effectiveness

***. The UK’s SSNs are interoperable with Allied Fleets, especially the US and France. Coordination of submarine assets is highly evolved and ensures the very best in coordination of surveillance effort and safety.

Description of any decisions to extend their service, replace them or remove them from service up to 2020

The T-Class are currently being replaced by Astute but are being extended in service to align with the delivery of the ASTUTE Programme.

Surface Fleet & Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA)

For the surface fleet, we would highlight the distinction between Destroyers and Frigates (Type 45 and Type 23) and Capital Ships, whose primary roles are warfighting and maritime security, to which maritime surveillance is integral, and all other major surface ships, including RFAs, Mine Countermeasure Vessels (MCM), an Ice Patrol Ship (IPS) and Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs)/P2000, which provide maritime surveillance, but only as part of their secondary roles.

19 Frigates and Destroyers (FF/DD)/three Capital Ships: Primary roles are Warfighting, Maritime Security and International Engagement. They provide persistent presence in international waters enabling Command and Control, Surface, Air and Sub-Surface Surveillance, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition & Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and Search and Rescue (SAR).

   Key capabilities are enabled by Advanced Radar, Active & Passive Sonars, Passive Electronic Surveillance fits (Comms and Radar), Comprehensive Radio Fits (Including Bowman) and Comprehensive Command systems linking and sharing Information, AIS (for identification of shipping). Flight Decks permit extended range maritime surveillance through use of maritime patrol helicopters.

13 RFA Vessels: Primary roles are Afloat Reach and Sustainability. Secondary roles include Maritime Security (Maritime Surveillance inherent to Maritime Security). RFA vessels provide persistent presence in international waters enabling Limited Command and Control, Air and Surface Surveillance, ISTAR, SAR, Humanitarian Aid (HA)/Disaster Relief (DR). Flight Decks permit extended range maritime surveillance through use of maritime patrol helicopters.

14 Mine Countermeasure Vessel (MCM): Primary role is the deployment of Mine Countermeasures. Secondary roles include Maritime Security (Maritime Surveillance inherent to Maritime Security)—provides persistent presence in international waters enabling Limited Command and Control, Sub-Surface and Surface Surveillance, ISTAR, and SAR.

One Ice Patrol Ship: Primary role is the support of Scientific Research in the Antarctic. Secondary roles include Maritime Security (Maritime Surveillance inherent to Maritime Security)—provides persistent presence in international waters enabling Limited Command and Control and Surface Surveillance, ISTAR, and SAR.

Offshore Patrol Vessels/P2000: Primary roles are Offshore Patrol (in support of Marine Management Organisation) and Overseas Territories (OTs). Secondary roles include Maritime Security (Maritime Surveillance inherent to Maritime Security)—provides persistent presence in national/international waters enabling limited Command and Control, Surface Surveillance, ISTAR, and SAR.

Effectiveness

The surface Fleet and RFA provide 24/7 Maritime Surveillance. Globally deployable, they can be present in those areas of the world so that over a period of months a pattern of life and maritime picture is established. Using their organic radars, sensors and aircraft they can provide a significant contribution to the surveillance picture, understanding the pattern of life, inter-operating with other nation’s ships and aircraft in order to compile the fullest of picture understanding.

Fleet Air Arm

Sea King (SKASaC) 13 Aircraft, of which 10 are in the forward fleet: Entering service in 1982 solely as a maritime Airborne Early Warning platform, this helicopter now has primary roles of Wide Area Surveillance and Battlespace management across Land, Air and Maritime domains.

   Key capabilities are enabled by an advanced radar which uniquely provides wide area surveillance of land sea and air contacts with battlespace management. The aircraft exploits comprehensive radio fits, Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and Link 16 for information sharing. It can operate from most RN, RFA and coalition warships of FF/DD size or greater.

Effectiveness

SKASaC has demonstrated its wide ranging surveillance utility in being able to support Operation HERRICK (Afghanistan) with dedicated Ground Moving Target Indication Support while primarily still being an Organic maritime surveillance capability deployed in support of Task Group Force Protection (eg Libya). *** SKASaC maintained concurrent and unbroken support to Operation HERRICK and Operation ELLAMY (Libya).

Description of any decisions to extend their service, replace them or remove them from service up to 2020

SKASaC will be retired from service in 2016; thereafter the SKASaC is planned to be replaced by CROWSNEST, which will see the capability hosted by the Merlin:

Merlin HM Mk1- 38 Aircraft, of which 30 are in Forward Fleet: Primary roles are Anti-Submarine (Underwater Surveillance), Anti Surface Unit Warfare (including Maritime Surveillance, Counter Piracy/Narcotics) and Maritime Counter Terrorism. Secondary Roles include Force Protection, SAR, Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC), Load Lifting, and Troop movement.

   Key capabilities are enabled by Active Sonar, Deployable Sonarbuoys, Radar, Infrared/Television (IR/TV) HD Camera, Comprehensive Radio Fits (including Bowman) Link for information sharing, and Maritime Sniper Teams.

Effectiveness

Merlin HM Mk1 has evolved organic Anti Submarine Surveillance to a Maritime Patrol Helicopter multi-role capability deployed globally and in support of the strategic deterrent. Its organic utility in support of Task Group Operations both for Anti-Submarine Warfare, Anti-Surface Unit Warfare and secondary roles is critical. Also deployable in Type 23 Frigate and RFAs its broader utility to support counter narcotic, counter piracy, lift, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) and troop lift/casualty evacuation operations demonstrate its value.

Description of any decisions to extend their service, replace them or remove them from service up to 2020.

The conversion of Merlin Mk1 to Mk2 standard will provide 20 helicopters available for global tasks. The Merlin Capability Sustainment Programme is planned to complete in December 2014, ***.

Lynx Mk8 HMA, 44 Aircraft, 30 of which are in Forward Fleet—Primary roles are Anti Surface Unit Warfare (Maritime Surveillance and Strike including Counter Piracy/Narcotics), Maritime Counter Terrorism and Anti-Submarine Warfare, Force Protection. Secondary roles include SAR, Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC), Load Lifting/(Vertical replenishment (VERTREP), and Limited Troop movement.

   Key capabilities are enabled by Radar, Infrared/Television (IR/TV) HD Camera, Comprehensive Radio Fits, and Maritime Sniper Team.

Effectiveness

Lynx MK8 is an integral element of frigate and destroyer capability providing long range maritime surveillance and maritime strike both in support of Task Groups and single unit deployed operations. Its multi-role utility in support of counter piracy, boarding operations and Maritime Counter Terrorism demonstrate its wider value.

Description of any decisions to extend their service, replace them or remove them from service up to 2020.

Lynx Mk8 will be withdrawn from service from 2017, to be replaced by the Wildcat Maritime Surveillance/Strike platform. ***.

Fixed Wing

Maritime surveillance from fixed wing aircraft benefits from their strategic reach, speed of response, speed of search, elevation and discrimination. Following the removal of Nimrod, the current inventory of fixed wing assets are not fully optimised for the maritime environment.

SENTINEL—an all-weather, day/night, airborne wide area surveillance and imaging radar system capable of detecting fixed or stationary and moving ground targets in near real time. This system is scheduled to be removed from service after the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2015. ***. In terms of capability it would be aligned with a detect capability similar to that provided by the E-3D SENTRY as opposed to the former Nimrod MR2 detect and identification capability. SENTINEL does not currently have an endorsed maritime surveillance role.7

   SDSR planned to retire SENTINEL from Service in Apr 2015 subject to Op HERRICK conditions. Following operations in Libya, the Department was asked to consider how it might retain SENTINEL beyond 2015, but no decision has yet been taken to do so.

SENTRY—The UK E3D Sentry force comprises six aircraft which will be retired from service in 2025 under current planning assumptions. Sentry is the UK’s prime airborne early warning and control platform which can conduct long range detections and intercepts of air contacts; two Sentry aircraft and three crews deployed to Operation ELLAMY where they flew one sortie per day providing air surveillance and battlespace management over land and sea. The aircraft’s radar has been modified to include a Maritime Scan to Scan Processing (MSSP) capability, which allows it to detect surface contacts in low sea states.

ISTAR assets

***

   The ability for warships to loiter unseen over the horizon and conduct surveillance of adjacent waters, the littoral, and penetrate inland of a target country has long been used to national advantage. ***.

   Similar systems are already fitted in, and are in development for, submarines which can provide a similar range of collection and surveillance options, but with added covertness and with the ability to be deployed well in advance of an operation being declared. Their endurance and tactical mobility brings an agility that continues to be used across the full gamut of surveillance requirements in the maritime domain both militarily and by OGDs.

   In addition to ISTAR collection platforms, there is a requirement to analyse and disseminate intelligence products. There are several service based systems that do this:

Recognised Maritime Pictures are displayed on various systems and at various classification levels depending on the source of the data. At the unclassified level full use is made of information made available from open sources such as the globally recognised Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) via the TELESTO system. ***.

Surveillance imagery (both still and video) is provided from:

Project PICASSO provides a national capability for the provision of strategic imagery intelligence (IMINT) and Geospatial Information (GEOINF) to the MOD, to deployed forces and to OGD through the exploitation of data gathered from national and multi-national collection assets.

Project MAINMAST. Lessons Identified from Op KIPION (follow-on from Operation TELIC in the Persian Gulf) and Op ELLAMY articulated the requirement for increased access to imagery intelligence in the contingent maritime domain. The Imagery Exploitation Programme will take this work forward as Maritime Imagery Manipulation and Storage.

Maritime IPA. Navy Command Headquarters (NCHQ) required a Relational Database for maritime environment specific activity.

Remote Viewing Terminals (RVT). Up to eight ROVER RVTs are currently fitted to destroyers or frigates deploying on out of area operations east of Suez, originally as part of the TELIC UOR but most recently as part of Op KIPION allowing them to draw information from US controlled Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) in the Northern Gulf (or anywhere else that US UAS are deployed).

What are the current gaps and deficiencies in maritime surveillance capabilities?

5.4 During the SDSR, a wide-ranging assessment was undertaken of future defence outputs and the options available to deliver them within the resources available. Our resulting plans for Future Force 2020 reflect the force structure and capabilities that we intend to deliver. Across the armed forces, there are understandable aspirations to do more, and instances where certain decisions to defer or delete equipment programmes have caused concern and led to practical consequences which have had to be managed; for example the run-on of in-service equipment. But the Department has had to deal with changed economic circumstances and the serious over-commitment of the forward defence programme. It does not make sense in many cases to talk about capability gaps against what may have been previously unfunded aspirations.

5.5 However, the Department has acknowledged that the decision not to bring the Nimrod MRA4 into service has had a number of capability implications. These have been set out in Part 3 of the National Audit Office’s Major Projects Report 2011 (See Annex C).8 In summary, it has reduced our ability to conduct Strategic Intelligence gathering tasks, long range Anti Submarine warfare, provide support to Search and Rescue, Maritime Security and power projection tasks.

5.6 The Type 22 Frigates, in addition to their broader platform capabilities, also provided the RN’s only composite capability to deliver wide ranging surveillance of the Electromagnetic Spectrum from the sea. This capability supported Indicators and Warnings, Force Protection and Situational Awareness; ***.

5.7 As acknowledged in relation to question 7 below, the need for so-called “persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)” capability has been identified by a number of recent operational lessons identified exercises. While this requirement may not in practice translate into a single system or platform, we judge that a significant improvement in maritime surveillance capability (both wide area and targeted) might be provided through the use of an UAS deployable from the Maritime Force.

5.8 The Department has stated its intention to mitigate the impact of Nimrod cancellation by the use of other military assets on a case by case basis. In relation to ASW operations, these assets include Type 23 Frigates and Merlin Mk1 helicopters. Additionally, Hercules C-130 and Sentry could offer a limited element of the maritime patrol capability that MRA4 would have provided. There is currently no single asset or collection of assets that offsets the resulting capability gap.

What comparative analyses have been undertaken of the effectiveness of different platforms in undertaking the same maritime surveillance task? (For example how many ships are required to cover the equivalent range of an aircraft?)

5.9 In the specific example given above, ships and aircraft provide very different capabilities. An aircraft, in particular Fixed Wing Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), provides reach, speed and height, while a ship provides sustained reach, versatility, poise (persistence), resilience and leverage. The three defining characteristics of air power (from Air Publication 3000) are speed, height and reach. The defining characteristics of maritime power (from Joint Doctrine Publication 0–10) are Access, Mobility, Lift Capacity, Sustained Reach, Versatility, Poise, Resilience, and Leverage).

5.10 In terms of surveillance from the air, the significant factor is height. Fixed Wing MPA fly at greater heights typically 35,000 feet which extends detection ranges while helicopters are limited to 10,000 feet in height which reduces the radar horizon on the earths surface to circa 124nm. In comparison to Fixed Wing assets, helicopters have a limited payload and endurance but this can be offset to a degree through being refuelled and supported from a forward deployed ship. In comparing the numbers of aircraft required against the number of ships to do the same task then there is some breadth to the answer. One ship and its helicopter (or future UAV) can stay on task for months at a time whereas an MPA would be continually cycled from a suitable airfield and probably use circa three a/c and five crews. An MPA would be able to cover significantly more surface area than a single ship and more quickly, but a similar rotation in a/c and crews would be required in order to achieve a persistent picture. This highlights the importance of having air capability deployed in maritime units in order to complement other airborne surveillance capability and mitigate the impact on operations of any absence or reduction of Fixed Wing assets.

5.11 Comparative analyses have been covered by:

The Wide Area Maritime Underwater Search (WAMUS) Capability Investigation, provided separately.

***

***

Helix—“Innovative Viable Alternatives to Nimrod and Potential Cost Savings”—a Paper by DG S&T Strategy from November 2008.

Maritime Unmanned Air System (UAS) comparisons were addressed in:

Maritime Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) Capability and Cost Comparison study report, DSTL/TR06694/1.0, June 2003.

Maritime UXV cost capability review—UAV report, QinetiQ/D&TS/Sea/TR057143/1.0, 23 January 2006.

Description of the current use of unmanned aerial vehicles, space technology and other technology assets for maritime surveillance

5.12 The UK has no UAS employed specifically for maritime surveillance. US satellite products are exploited via a number of imagery and signals processes to support wider maritime surveillance operations; exact capabilities are naturally highly classified. ***. Some commercial satellite services can be purchased and are unclassified in nature—typical capabilities include high-definition imagery and Automatic Identification Service (AIS), which provides data on commercial shipping over 300 tonnes.

Statistics

6. Information on the number of operations undertaken by maritime surveillance capabilities, platforms and assets in the last 10 years for (a) anti-submarine detection, (b) shipping surveillance, (c) fleet protection, (d) ISTAR, (e) ELINT data gathering, (f) counter-terrorism (g) weapons deployment, (h) search and rescue, (i) counter-piracy operations (j) overseas maritime patrol and (k) protection of Trident submarines.

6.1 The information requested by the Committee is not held centrally by the Department, nor in the form specified. In practice, this would cover all operations conducted by the Royal Navy over the past ten years. ***. Should the committee wish to ask questions about the operations, there is a risk that the answers would entail access to Top Secret information, which the Department would be unable to provide, though we can provide more detail at the Secret level.

Future Maritime Surveillance Capabilities

7. Assessment of the future maritime surveillance capabilities, assets and platforms needed by the MoD and UK Armed Forces and description of measures being taken to address these.

What lessons have been learned from recent operations and how are these incorporated into decisions on future requirements?

7.1 A common theme from recent operations is the need for persistent ISR. This is the requirement to deploy an enduring collection capability (available 24 hours per day for the duration of the operation) that is capable of gathering intelligence and conducting surveillance and reconnaissance. In practice, the persistent capability can be made up of several different platforms with differing capabilities operating in unison. Situational awareness is generated and maintained through the synthesis of several maritime surveillance collection capabilities—overhead satellites, manned and unmanned platforms and ships and submarines. The lessons are absorbed into Defence planning and serve to inform Balance of Investment decisions for equipment capability. The following operations have identified this requirement:

***

***

***

7.2 The Gulf Stocktake is a contingency study aimed to ensure maritime Forces are adequately prepared for potential operations in the Arabian Gulf area. Risks identified included the need for a capability to mitigate both wide and narrow area surveillance.

7.3 Specific future maritime surveillance projects are *** and CROWSNEST. Both planned capabilities *** and should be in-service in the latter part of the decade. *** the CROWSNEST radar has long-range and battle-space management capability.

What are the priorities for maritime surveillance capabilities between now and the next SDSR?

7.4 The priorities for Maritime Surveillance are delivery of non-discretionary activity (MT 1–4) and the enabling of our discretionary activity (MT 5–7)

What will be the challenges in the next SDSR for maritime surveillance capabilities?

7.5 The challenges in the next SDSR for maritime surveillance capabilities include:

the identification and assessment of future risk across the Department’s primary and secondary roles;

planning for an ever increasing need for timely surveillance and targeted information through technological advancement; and

in consultation with the UK Civil Authorities, provision for the increased responsibility of the forthcoming Exclusive Economic Zone.

Description of the future use of unmanned aerial vehicles, space technology and other technology assets for maritime surveillance

7.6 The Flexibly Deployable UAS Capability Concept Demonstration (CCD) aims to investigate the utility of an air vehicle with sufficient precision and persistence to provide a high quality ISTAR feed to deployed commanders where airfield support is not available/cannot be assured; the most demanding scenario envisaged being launch and recovery from an FF/DD sized vessel at sea.

Costs

8. What are the costs of current maritime surveillance capabilities, assets and platforms of UK Armed Forces (including capital costs and total running costs) in the last 10 years?

8.1 The cost of maritime surveillance capabilities are not held centrally in the form requested by the Committee. Running costs include maintenance, base support provided by contractors and consumables such as fuel and food. It is not possible to apportion these costs to individual platforms on a reliable and consistent basis. Nor do we hold records of the capital costs of platforms originally approved more than ten years ago (such as T22 Frigates and T-class submarines).

8.2 In order to provide indicative costs of capability, the following have been chosen to highlight the diversity of platforms capable of surveillance. It must be reiterated that for larger platforms such as the T45 and Astute, surveillance is only one of many roles being undertaken, either exclusively or simultaneously. They will, however, be conducting surveillance continuously.

Astute Class Submarines

The Astute costs below are based on the equipment project costs; manpower costs are presented further on in the paper.9

 Costs to Date

Forecast/Actual Cost

£ million

Cost of Assessment Phase

£29

Cost of Demonstration & Manufacture Phase Boats 1–3

£3,480

Cost of Demonstration & Manufacture Phase Boat 4

£1,404

Cost of Demonstration & Manufacture Phase Boat 5

£586

Cost of Demonstration & Manufacture Phase Boat 6

£253

Cost of Support Phase—Initial Support Solution

£272

Cost of Support Phase—Astute Class Training Service Boats 1–3

£648

Type 45 Destroyer

The T45 Destroyer costs below are based on the equipment project costs; manpower costs are presented further on in the paper.10

Costs to Date

Full cost (£M)

Assessment Phase

232

Demonstration and Manufacture

5,664

Support Costs/PFI

742

Total for six ships

6,638

River Class Offshore Patrol Vessels11

Annual Costs

Full cost (£M)

Total manpower

9

Total Consumables & Depreciation 

1

Total DE&S costs

11

Total for three ships

21

Sea King Mk 7 Area Surveillance and Control (SKASaC)12

Annual Running Costs

Full cost (£M)

Total manpower on SK Mk7 Force (assume 150)

8

Total Sea King Mk 7 airframe support costs 

30

Total Mission System Support Costs

10

Total for 13 aircraft

48

E-3D Sentry (Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

Annual Running Costs

Full cost (£M)

Total manpower on SENTRY Squadron (assume 308)

15

Total SENTRY airframe and Mission System support costs

84

Total for six aircraft

99

***

***

 ***

***

 ***

***

 ***

***

 ***

***

The number of UK Armed Forces personnel, including support staff, required to provide these capabilities at optimum level of operations?

Details of current levels of UK Armed Forces personnel trained, including support staff, in providing these capabilities broken down by Service and platform?

8.3 The figures below provide manpower numbers for indicative Maritime platforms and for a squadron of three Sea King Mk 7 Helicopters (as compared to total force numbers provided above).13 Full support staff based across the wider MOD has not been included.

Annual Manpower Costs for Indicative Platforms

Personnel

T45 Destroyer Manpower

222

T23 Frigate Total Manpower

172

SSN Manpower Total

167

Sea King Mk7 Squadron & Support Personnel

55

Minor War Vessel Total Manpower

43

Sentry Squadron Personnel

308

What measures are in place to ensure UK Armed Forces personnel maintain the necessary skills to provide these capabilities?

8.4 Skills are maintained through individual and collective training across all of the environments ie air, surface and sub-surface. Individually, Maritime Surveillance and associated systems are covered within professional career courses at the Officer and Rating level. Collectively, Maritime Surveillance and associated systems are covered, and exercised, during Flag Officer Sea Training (FOST) and Joint Warrior collective training serials.

Description of the Seedcorn initiative and other similar initiatives, including number of UK Armed Forces personnel involved and costs

8.5 The RAF Seedcorn programme is one of three pillars of activity designed to preserve the perishable skills in the event that a decision were to be taken to regenerate UK MPA capability, supported by UK ISTAR flying and maritime staff appointments. Seedcorn personnel represent a blend of experience, qualification and time to serve to populate any future capability while providing our Allies with instructional, trials and MRA4 experience. Incumbents are embedded in frontline squadrons, instructional units and operational test and evaluation organisations all of which will provide critical skill sets in a future force. In addition to the existing exchange programme, 34 personnel have been assigned to the Seedcorn programme: Six to Canada; two to Australia; six to New Zealand and 20 to USA.

8.6 With respect to the RN, there is an unmanned aviation element where the RN maintains a number of posts on US Reaper Squadrons at Creech Air Force Base to provide seed corn UAS expertise.

8.7 The RN also has a number of personnel embedded with US combatant commands and agencies in order to maintain a global signals intelligence (SIGINT) analysis capability.

9. What are the estimated costs of future maritime surveillance capabilities, assets and platforms of UK Armed Forces?

9.1 The UK MOD’s maritime surveillance capabilities are delivered by a wide range of platforms and assets; for example, every RN vessel at sea carries out maritime surveillance routinely and continually. For these reasons, we cannot provide a comprehensive estimate of future maritime surveillance costs. The following programmes will, however, potentially be the major providers of our future maritime surveillance capability: the TYPE 26 Global Combat Ship, the WILDCAT helicopter, the Crowsnest airborne radar and ***. We should be happy to provide the Committee with the estimated costs for each of these programmes once we have concluded the process of bringing the Defence Budget into balance with the resources available.14

Regeneration of Capabilities

10. What plans are in place to ensure that maritime surveillance capabilities are maintained?

10.1 The Department’s plans to achieve Future Force 2020 include investment in programmes that provide flexibility and advanced capabilities, including the maintenance of maritime surveillance capabilities.

11. What assessment has been made of the capability of the MOD and UK Armed Forces to regenerate maritime surveillance capabilities, including costs?

11.1 Although there has been no formal assessment, the SDSR15 made a commitment to maintain the ability to regenerate capabilities that we plan not to hold for the immediate future. This will require plans to maintain technical expertise, keep skills and training going, and work with allies and partners who do hold such capabilities and with whom we can, for example, exchange personnel such as the Seedcorn activity discussed (Question 8).

11.2 ***

12. What plans are in place to regenerate these capabilities especially at short notice?

12.1 There are currently no plans to regenerate specific capabilities, but, as with any military capability, if current assumptions about the Strategic environment and threats change significantly then consideration will be given to enhancement options.

What is the role of industry in the maintenance and regeneration of these capabilities?

12.2 Industry has a key role in the delivery and support of maritime surveillance equipment but there has been no discussion with them about the regeneration of specific capabilities.

What discussions has there been with industry regarding the regeneration of maritime surveillance capabilities?

12.3 There has been no discussion with industry about the regeneration of specific Maritime Surveillance capabilities.

What is MoD policy on whether maritime surveillance should be a sovereign or “off the shelf”?

12.4 The Government’s overarching policy was set out in the White Paper called “National Security through Technology: Technology Equipment, and Support for UK Defence and Security” (Cm 8278) as well as an accompanying Consultation Summary Paper. This White Paper sets out how the Government will procure technology, equipment, and support to meet the UK’s defence and security needs, at a cost which is affordable and represents value for money for the UK taxpayer.

12.5 It also considered the UK defence and security industry’s contribution to wider economic growth. The White Paper addresses the Government’s role in supporting defence and security exports from UK-based suppliers and encouraging Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs), to fulfil their potential when responding to defence and security requirements. This is the MOD’s high-level policy until the next strategic review, which is expected to be held in about 2015. It supersedes the Defence Industrial Strategy 2005 and the Defence Technology Strategy 2006.

12.6 The starting point for defence and security procurement is the open procurement principle. This is that, wherever possible, the MOD will seek to fulfil the UK’s defence and security requirements through open competition in the global market, seeking to buy off-the-shelf where we can. We will also take action to protect the UK’s operational advantages and freedom of action where this is essential for our national security. As with all acquisition choices, this is subject to affordability and value-for-money. Any investment will be carefully prioritised against needs such as immediate operations, longer term future capability, infrastructure, retention of intelligent customer ability and maintaining credibility with allies.

12.7 Specific judgements on specific maritime surveillance capabilities will be made on a case by case basis in due course.

What research and development projects have been undertaken in the last 10 years and are planned for the next 10 years?

12.8 Given the very broad Departmental interpretation of Maritime Surveillance, it would not be realistic to provide a comprehensive list of every research and development (R+D) project undertaken or planned over this very wide timeframe. However, if, as the Committee pursues its inquiry, it is able to narrow the focus of its interest, then the Department will seek to provide further information.

13. What priority is given to being able to use maritime surveillance kit in various platforms?

13.1 In relation to the Nimrod MRA4 programme, wherever possible, its specialist equipment was removed and stored pending its possible redeployment to other platforms. However, there is no more general initiative to make specialist maritime surveillance equipment capable of deployment on multi platforms.

13.2 Priority is given to units that are deployed on operation, closely followed by those preparing to deploy on operations to allow training on the equipment need in theatre. There are insufficient equipment fits available for every RN platform (Ship/SM/Aircraft), therefore it is fitted in line with the Maritime Capability Framework requirement.

Co-Ordination With Other Government Departments

14. Description of the role of other Government Departments and agencies in maritime surveillance

14.1 Maritime surveillance is a cross-government activity involving several departments and agencies. Maritime Surveillance of the UK maritime border and Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ) is primarily a civil issue (Home Office and DEFRA and devolved administrations through their agencies UKBA, MCGA, Police, MMO and Marine Scotland Compliance etc). The MOD assists OGDs through the provision of assets/capability either on an agreed basis (ie MOU) or through urgent response for Military Aid to the Civilian Authorities (MACA).

15. How does the MoD coordinate its work and interact with other Departments and agencies and plans for the future?

15.1 As referred to above, MOD coordinates its work and interacts with OGD and agencies through a series of agreements to share information and provide support as required.

How effective is the MoD’s coordination and interaction with other Departments and agencies and how is this assessed?

15.2 The NSD decided in Jan 2010 to strengthen strategic oversight of maritime security and improve situational awareness of the maritime domain through establishment of the multi-agency NMIC.

15.3 The work of the Maritime Security Oversight Group (MSOG) is still developing but strategic oversight/direction of cross-government work on maritime security has improved significantly and for the first time the UK has a comprehensive picture of threats and risks to the maritime border. We expect the effectiveness of cross-government working to increase. Current work includes more effective coordination of coastal/offshore assets (MOD Offshore Patrol Vessels and UKBA cutters) and provision of a single more efficient and cost effective single air surveillance contract to cover the UK economic zone.

What are the lines of demarcation between the MoD and other Departments and agencies and how are these determined?

15.4 Lines of demarcation between the MOD and other Departments and agencies are established by agreements and through close cross Government working. For example, a formal arrangement is in place between the MOD and the MMO for the provision of Fishery Protection and with the DfT for the provision of Search and Rescue. Other Military Aid to the Civil Authority is determined through close dialogue and results in the issue of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Directives for specific operations which cover how the MOD interacts with OGD/agencies.

What arrangements are in place for the MoD to recover costs from other Government Departments and agencies when MoD and UK Armed Forces assets are used for purposes that are the prime responsibility of other departments and agencies?

15.5 Formal arrangements are in place to recover costs where appropriate. For example, the MOD provides assets to Marine Management Organisation (MMO) to assist in the enforcement of the UK Fishery Surveillance Zone for which the MMO provides a contribution to MOD.

What input do UK Armed Forces have into the coordination, interaction and demarcation between MoD and other Government Departments and agencies?

15.6 MOD interaction with OGDs on Maritime Security is now coordinated through the MOD Strategy Unit who represent MOD in Maritime Security Oversight Group (MSOG) assisted by Subject Matter Experts. Single Services are empowered to coordinate with OGD/agencies as appropriate.

How is the impact on, and consequences for, UK Armed Forces of the arrangements between MoD and other Government Departments and agencies monitored and assessed?

15.7 The Maritime Strategy Oversight Group (MSOG) is the forum for co-ordinating Departmental activity. It is for the Department to judge its capacity to support non-defence tasks, and to assess the impact of doing so, but currently no formal reporting arrangements exist.

What is the role of the National Maritime Information Centre (including contribution of UK Armed Forces)?

15.8 The NMIC is cross-government body located at the Northwood Headquarters in Middlesex. The Centre works in close cooperation with the main Government departments, under the auspices of Minister James Brockenshire’s portfolio, and is accountable to the Maritime Security Oversight Group (MSOG). The NMIC brings together, existing functions to provide improved maritime situation awareness and support to lead agencies in the event of emergency or crisis. This develops a much better understanding of maritime safety and security risks and opportunities; information is shared across Government, and to Industry, regional and international partners, and the public as appropriate.

15.9 The Role of the NMIC is to:

Actively monitor maritime activity around the UK and areas of national interest.

Enable better understanding of maritime safety & security.

Provide a “single voice” for maritime issues.

Learn from maritime safety and security exercises.

15.10 The NMIC provides coordinated representation of maritime situational awareness as the foundation for UK Government and business to use in support of crisis management and decision making and sustainable development to assist designated organisations in their leadership role. The NMIC will facilitate a cross-Government approach to gathering information on maritime activity, de-conflicting and sharing departmental resources and ensuring the UK is able to take advantage of other global information sharing networks and frameworks.

15.11 The contributions by the Armed Forces to the NMIC are:

Provision of host location at Northwood.

Three members of staff.

Financial contribution to annual running costs.

Provision of defence capabilities as the backbone of a national maritime data sharing architecture.

Collaboration With, and Reliance on, Allies

16. Description of current and planned future collaboration with allies

16.1 The SDSR was aimed at an affordable and balanced framework to provide an adaptable force structure. This resulted in reductions to the overall size of our Armed Forces and the cutting back of some capabilities. Strengthening our key defence alliances and partnerships has been critical in managing these changes.

16.2 From a maritime perspective, single service bilateral engagement since the SDSR has focused on strengthening partnerships with other nations who can assist with the provision of maritime surveillance capacity and establishing links to enable exchange of information either on a military to military basis or via NMIC.

16.3 Our approach and engagement with key defence partners has enabled us to broadly retain a full spectrum of capabilities. However, incoherent and uncoordinated US and European defence cuts could accentuate existing capability gaps; this is likely to be a key issue at the forthcoming NATO Summit in Chicago. Notwithstanding this, NATO continues to form the bedrock of our defence with the EU and bilateral agreements such as the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force providing additional collaboration. Moreover, since the SDSR we have established the UK/French Defence Cooperation Treaty (November 2010) that has put in place senior level of co-operation between Chiefs of Defence (CHOD) focusing on: Operations and Training, a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) integrating Maritime Surveillance, capabilities and equipment encompassing submarine technologies and systems, Mine Counter Measures, and Satellite Communications; and Unmanned Air Systems. The UK is a partner nation in the NATO Naval Armaments Working Group to look at the feasibility of developing a NATO MPA Force.

16.4 There is an also an ongoing European Defence Agency (EDA) project, Maritime Surveillance Network, between the UK, Finland, France, Italy, Sweden and Spain which aims to increase interoperability and harmonize requirements.

17. Information on maritime surveillance capabilities, platforms and assets of other countries (including allies and NATO)

17.1 The attached document gives examples of airborne surveillance systems. To list the capabilities of all NATO’s surface unit and submarine capabilities would be a very significant task.

See Annex D16

18. To what extent is the UK relying on allies, including US, NATO and EU, to provide maritime surveillance capabilities?

18.1 Post-SDSR, the Department’s reliance on allies to provide maritime surveillance has increased, but not markedly owing to the range of capabilities and sources of information still available to the Department. The withdrawal of Nimrod has required greater reliance on other nations to provide MPA cover (Norway/France in particular) but other mitigation may be put in place on a case by case basis when not available. Prior to its withdrawal, Nimrod was sometimes committed to tasking in other operational areas so even then we were at times reliant on other nations. The deletion has meant that the risks and mitigation required are now enduring factors.

What are the criteria for deciding to use the maritime surveillance capabilities of allies?

18.2 There are no formal, agreed criteria. For training, allies will bid into the planning of an exercise in order that surveillance capabilities from that nation can be considered and used. There are several international agreements that allow Allies to contribute directly to UK surveillance tasks in support of deterrent protection and intelligence gathering.

18.3 During the planning of an operation there are a number of factors that will be considered, including the capability itself; timeliness; and our ability to use the product of that capability. This interoperability and ability to use the surveillance capability of allies may be governed by MOUs.

Details [or examples] of the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities by allies over the last 10 years

18.4 Examples of the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities by Allies over the last 10 years include the provision of Maritime Patrol Aircraft from the USA, Canada and France during operations.

19. Have there been any incidences when allies have declined to provide these assets?

19.1 There are no known instances where assets have been declined but there have been occasions when these assets are not available.

20. What contingency plans are in place if the UK was unable to secure the maritime surveillance capabilities of an ally?

20.1 Depending on the nature of the operation in question, it might be the case that different UK assets could instead be tasked to address the operational requirement, or at least to mitigate the absence of the preferred asset. If there was still judged to be material risk to an asset on an operation, then choices may also exist for commanders to manage the risk at a tactical level, perhaps by changing operating procedures.

21. What are the command and control structures when maritime surveillance capabilities are provided by allies?

21.1 Command and Control (C2) for surveillance would fall under the relevant pre-existing C2 structure depending on whether the tasking is taking place under NATO, EU NAVAL FORCE or National Command. These C2 structures can be used in many different circumstances provided equipment is compatible. (For example, there may be unique bilateral or Partnership for Peace exercises that include non-NATO or non EU nations). There are several Operational Agreements that allow UK control of allied assets for certain operations.

22. What are the costs to the UK of using allies’ maritime surveillance capabilities?

22.1 The UK is not usually charged for the use of allied maritime surveillance capabilities. However, there will be an expectation that reciprocal or equivalent benefit will be provided on the basis of UK assets provided as part of multinational or bilateral arrangements. In all cases, being a member of such sharing communities provides significant value for money and benefits geared greatly in the UK’s favour.

23. Details and copies of any analyses undertaken by NATO on maritime surveillance capabilities (including interoperability between members)

23.1 NATO published the NATO Council of National Armament Directors (CNAD) document AC/141 D(2012)0002 outlining proposals for studies which lie within the scope of maritime surveillance. ***.

Tier 1 Multinational Approaches (MNA) are those being worked/developed, Tier 2 MNA are those being actively considered, and Tier 3 MNA are proposals. The NATO Naval Armaments Group (NNAG) will report progress in the autumn.

There are two NATO Smart Defence Initiatives concerning Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA):

A Tier One proposal led by the Germans to pool and share MPA assets that could be offset or recompensed by the UK providing C130, C17 and tanker hours. The UK is not interested in this proposal because we do not have MPA assets to pool; the nations involved (Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) that are able provide MPA will offer aging aircraft such as the P3 Orion that does not have the requisite level of avionics or reliability to support our Deterrent and would not offer value for money in exchange for the pooling of higher grade UK capabilities. Additionally there are concerns over sovereignty (related to the Deterrent in particular) and guaranteed assurance—***.

A Tier 2 proposal—The NNAG investigation, led by the Canadians, to provide a long term solution by means of MPA procurement; this would provide a NATO capability akin to the AWACS model. The UK supports this proposal because it overcomes the sovereignty and assurance issues whilst providing a multi-national procurement option based on economy of scale.

By way of background, the HCDC will be aware of the EDA Maritime Surveillance (MAR SUR) project, which aims to create a network using existing naval and maritime information exchange systems to avoid duplication of effort, to enhance cooperation in a simple, efficient and low-cost solution for civil-military cooperation, and to support safety and security.

March 2012

1 AAP 06 – NATO Glossary of Terms

2 Situational Awareness is the understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander’s mission. Shared Situational Awareness is the ability to convey this to other commanders, platforms and allies.

3 Hd Defence Strategy and Priorities has the lead on the development of the strategy.

4 Referred to in CM 7948 as the “Deployed Force”.

5 Referred to in CM 7948 as the “High Readiness Force”

6 Referred to in CM 7948 as the “Low Readiness Force”

7 The only SDSR endorsed operational role for SENTINEL is OP HERRICK

8 Not printed

9 Costs to date have been extracted from the NAO Major Projects Review of the MoD, 2011

10 Costs to date have been extracted from the NAO Major Projects Review of the MoD, 2011

11 These figures have been extracted from the full running costs of the River Class OPV provided by NCHQ

12 Figures have been provided by the Sea King Delivery Team in DE&S.  Manpower assumptions based on 3 squadrons of 50 personnel each.

13 Provided by Fleet Resource & Programmes Manpower

14 Ev 51

15 SDSR page 20

16 Not printed

Prepared 19th September 2012