The work of the Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces - Defence Committee Contents


3  Future role of the Commissioner

Commissioner or Ombudsman?

50.  The role and powers of the Service Complaints Commissioner have long been a matter of debate (see Annex for the history of this debate). In her Annual Report for 2010, the Commissioner considered a number of options for strengthening her role.[85] The options she considered are set out in the box below.

Table 3: Options considered by the Service Complaints Commissioner for strengthening her role
OptionSummary of how the proposed model would work
Strengthened oversight model To better target problematic cases the SCC would be provided with powers to question the Services on the investigation of specific cases, make recommendations for further action and hold them to account through a Service response guaranteed by ultimate referral to ministers. To make the authority of the SCC clear, these new powers would be put on a statutory footing.
Supervisory modelThe SCC would be given additional powers to supervise the handling of certain types of complaint to ensure more robust quality control.
Independent investigation model The SCC would be given powers to investigate and decide certain types of complaint.
Armed Forces Ombudsman model The SCC is changed to a Ombudsman model where problem cases can be reviewed and investigated by the independent body during the Service complaints process. This system would retain the SCC's role as a direct channel for complaints and would retain the SCC's right to ask for case updates from the chain of command.

Source: Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces Annual Report 2010

51.  Of these options, the Commissioner recommended that her role be changed to that of an Armed Forces Ombudsman as outlined above. In her 2010 Annual Report she said:

The Law Commission emphasised that an Ombudsman's primary focus is on administrative processes, the maladministration of which may have led to an individual suffering injustice. Unlike judicial review, the Ombudsman is not concerned with legality, but with fairness and due process. Ombudsmen do investigate complaints made to them but do not make final case decisions. Their role is to review and to make recommendations. They are independent of the bodies they oversee and publicly accountable. Most Ombudsmen models require the internal complaints mechanisms to be exhausted first.[86]

52.  In the UK, the primary focus of public sector Ombudsmen is on maladministration. These Ombudsmen have common features such as the speedy resolution of complaints, usually after the internal complaint processes have been exhausted, and identifying lessons for the public body concerned to ensure continuous improvement in its services. Following completion of their investigations they make recommendations to the relevant public body based on their findings, which may include suggested sanctions, but the Ombudsmen themselves do not impose penalties or award compensation. However, in her 2010 Annual Report the Commissioner said that "bringing defence complaints within the standard national Ombudsman [was] not widely acknowledged to be particularly effective".[87] She thought that having a dedicated Armed Forces Ombudsman, focused on the specific issues of Service life, was of more value to the Services. It enabled "the Ombudsman to exercise final powers of review and hold the Services to account more effectively because the Ombudsman understands and respects the special position of, and demands on, Service personnel and the special relationships that exist between them and the chain of command".[88] The Commissioner thought that any Ombudsman model which excluded the oversight function until the conclusion of the internal process would not be effective, fair or be able to drive through the efficiencies that are required. She added:

The SCC is used across the Services to give Service personnel the confidence to speak when they feel mistreated. This is particularly valuable where there is alleged bullying or harassment. The key issue at present is delay. For these reasons, I recommend that a more flexible model be used; one that still encourages direct complaints to come through the SCC and that enables the SCC to intervene when clear procedural defects occur. Such a model in the UK should preserve the right of Service personnel to make a complaint through an Ombudsman and for the Ombudsman to have the right to ask for information from the Service, to set deadlines and ultimately to call the matter in for investigation, in the minority of cases where there is a failure to correct defects or unreasonable delay in handling. The Ombudsman would have discretion as to whether a case was accepted for review.[89]

53.  The Commissioner also noted that Armed Forces Ombudsmen existed in many countries in a range of different models. For example, although they oversee the handling of complaints from Service personnel, a number of these ombudsmen, such as those in Canada, Germany and Norway, have a wider duty to report independently of Government on the welfare of Service personnel.[90]

54.  Although she did not advocate a particular model for an Armed Forces Ombudsman, the Commissioner argued that an Ombudsman would enable the chain of command to retain the primary responsibility for investigating and deciding on Service complaints and also recognised that dealing efficiently with Service complaints was an integral element of command and exercise of the Commander's duty of care to those under his or her command.[91] Members of Service Boards and those with the highest operational responsibilities would no longer have to combine these primary responsibilities with judging individual cases. [92] Service Boards would still be required to consider the few cases that involved a change of policy but she thought it would be helpful, in many cases, for Service Complaint Panels with an independent member to consider the complaint and provide advice to the Board. Service Boards would be strategic, looking at the system to see it was working efficiently and supporting operational requirements. She argued this in itself would reduce delay. The Commissioner added:

The Armed Forces Ombudsman model would focus on holding the Services to account for the proper administration of their processes and delivery of justice, ensuring that the system was functioning properly and that most complex delayed and problematic cases were being given priority and additional scrutiny. Having the backstop of an external appeal to the Ombudsman, albeit with a requirement to her criteria of a prima facie case of maladministration, should give Service personnel the confidence in appropriate cases to opt for appeal by the chain of command.[93]

55.  The Commissioner concluded that this system would allow her to judge whether access to the Service complaints system was being unfairly denied and to rule on vexatious complaints.[94] It would also provide a more efficient and simpler way of protecting Service personnel in exercising their rights on issues for which there is a special complaints system, for example education, medical treatment, housing and pay.[95] At present these special systems have to be exhausted before a Service complaint can be made. The Commissioner argued that the Ombudsman should cover all specialist complaints systems. This would save resources and increase the value of external oversight in an efficient and effective way.[96]

56.  Under this model, the Ombudsman would not make any final decision on a case that was accepted for investigation and review but would, however, be able to make recommendations to the Defence Council about any cases she had assessed to be dealt with improperly and had resulted in injustice.[97] These findings and any recommendations and the Defence Council response to them would then be published, suitably anonymised, as part of the Ombudsman's Annual Report to Ministers and Parliament. The Commissioner outlined to us the benefits and advantages of an Ombudsman model. She thought that it would fulfil the roles of an oversight body as envisaged by both the Defence Committee's Duty of Care Report and The Deepcut Review: to ensure that there was somebody independent to oversee and ensure the fair handling of complaints and to also identify wider patterns and trends which might be missed if a case was decided on the facts of the case.[98] The Commissioner also considered that an Ombudsman would address a "fairness gap" in the current system as complainants believed she was able to oversee and intervene to ensure complaints were dealt with in a timely and proper manner and "that it was not too late by the time their case [was] decided".[99] The Commissioner said that in her current role she could not guarantee this would happen even though she could raise questions and ask for issues to be addressed. She believed an Ombudsman would fulfil this function as they would be able to review the case and make a decision, on whether any maladministration had occurred, and make recommendations to the Services in respect of the case.[100] The Commissioner told us:

At the end of the case, if somebody came to me at the end of a process and said, "I want you to review this, I don't think I've been dealt with properly," I could review it and make the decision on that. What I wouldn't be able to do is to direct what should happen on the merits of that case. As an ombudsman, that would be a recommendation back to the services. But it would act as a final appeal. I believe that it would enable the service system to be simpler and would also enable complaints to be dealt with in a firmer, more effective and certainly cost-efficient way.[101]

57.  The Commissioner's recommendations were considered as part of the review of the Service complaints system which the Service Personnel Board (SPB) had established at the end of 2010 and recommended by the Commissioner in her Annual Report for 2010 (see paragraphs 44-49 above). On completion, the review did not support the change to an Ombudsman role "but accepted that greater benefit could be gained for the fairness, effectiveness and efficiency of the complaints system if the SCC offered views on the process whilst complaints were live".[102] The Commissioner outlined to us the reasons why she thought the SPB had rejected the Ombudsman model:

[...] I believe there was some resistance to having an external body as the final port of call or final route for appeal. [...] Some of the Service Chiefs said they didn't quite understand what an ombudsman did, but they were sure they didn't want one. Some other people have said to me that they would be very comfortable with my being the ombudsman, but, as you know, I shall be stepping down at the end of my second term, and when there was no longer "the good doctor", they weren't too sure what would happen. I think it is fear of what might happen, rather than the arguments that I have put forward now.[103]

58.  While the MoD acknowledges the value of the Service Complaints Commissioner, it has expressed reservations about the possible further evolution of the role. For example in December 2006, in response to a Defence Committee Report on the proposal for a Service Complaints Commissioner, the then Government cited the need to preserve of the role of the chain of command in investigating and resolving complaints as a reason for not extending the Commissioner's role to that of an investigatory body. It said:

We remain absolutely convinced that our proposals for the SCC, coupled with the inclusion of an independent member on Service Complaints Panels considering certain types of complaints including bullying, harassment and other forms of improper behaviour, will provide a package of improvements to the Service complaints process that are right for the way our Armed Forces operate, and which meet the overall objective underpinning the recommendations made in The Deepcut Review. We listened carefully to what the Committee has said and to the debates that took place as the Armed Forces Bill progressed through Parliament and these proposals have evolved accordingly. They will strike the right balance between ensuring that Service personnel can have confidence in a system that is fair, effective and transparent, whilst preserving the fundamental responsibility of the chain of command to investigate wrongs and remedy them. Any move to enable a Commissioner to be able to supervise the handling or investigation of a Service complaint would undermine this responsibility. It would also risk undermining the system under which a Service Complaint Panel with an independent member would be responsible for dealing with complaints that have not already been resolved by the chain of command to the complainant's satisfaction.[104]

59.   Another example of the MoD's reservations was given in the 2012 Annual Report on the Armed Forces Covenant. The Government said that it thought that there was more benefit to be gained for improving timeliness and tackling undue delay if the Commissioner was engaged whilst complaints were still live rather than her post becoming an ombudsman acting after the event.[105]

60.  In view of the Commissioner's evidence that "some of the Service Chiefs said they didn't quite understand what an ombudsman did, but they were sure they didn't want one", it is clear that discussions between the Service Chiefs and the Commissioner have not been as productive as they should have been. The MoD's wish to preserve the role of the chain of command in investigating and resolving complaints has been accepted by the Commissioner. The 2012 Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report said that there was more benefit to be gained for improving timeliness and tackling undue delay if the Commissioner were engaged whilst complaints were still live rather than her post becoming an ombudsman acting after the event. This contrasted with the Commissioner's view that any Ombudsman model which excluded the oversight function until the conclusion of the internal process would not be effective, fair or be able to drive through the efficiencies that are required. While the involvement of an Ombudsman in cases that have not completed the internal complaints process would not be normal practice in the UK, we see no reason why the MoD and the Commissioner cannot agree a model for an Armed Forces Ombudsman that satisfies both their aspirations and concerns.

61.  Following the MoD's rejection of the Ombudsman role, the Commissioner put forward an alternative non-Ombudsman model for her role.[106] This was intended to make the best use of all resources and enable her to focus more on tackling undue delay. Detailed consideration of the proposal was undertaken by the MoD and the Commissioner and in September 2012 the Service Personnel Board agreed a phased introduction of the new model from January 2013. The MoD told us that:

As it is difficult to predict exactly how the new system will operate, to quantify its impact on resources or to determine whether it will indeed bring the benefits anticipated, we will closely monitor the operation of the new system from the outset so that we can adapt and refine it based on experience.[107]

62.  The MoD regarded the new system as aiming to ensure that maximum value is delivered by the Commissioner's involvement in and oversight of the complaints process, and that she would be able to act more effectively than at present to tackle delay, all within current legislative powers.[108] Given the current pressure on resources, the new process sought to reduce bureaucracy which would benefit the office of the Commissioner and the single Services. It was also intended to hold the Services to account for a fair, effective and efficient handling of complaints in a way that would enable improved and effective performance management of the complaints process. The changes to the Commissioner's role are intended to complement the changes agreed by the Service Personnel Board (SPB) to the complaints process (see paragraphs 44-49 above).[109]

63.  The Commissioner has retained her powers to refer cases and oversight of referred cases in line with current legislation. However the changes set out in the box below have been made to the process for allegations she refers to the chain of command.[110]

Table 4: Changes to the Service Complaints Commissioner's role
ChangeMoD analysis of benefits of the change
Discontinuation of SCC 30-Day Updates The current policy requirement for the SCC to be updated on the progress of complaints every 30 working days that they remain live has been seen by some as bureaucratic and time consuming for all to administer, often adding little to understanding of the reasons behind delay or the action being taken to mitigate it. It will therefore cease, and be replaced by updates that are triggered by specified events (e.g. withdrawal or conclusion of a complaint, or referral to a further level).
Involvement in Live Complaints Recognising the value that the SCC can add when complaints are still active, a mechanism will be introduced by which the SCC can offer views on process, for consideration by the relevant single Service, whilst a complaint is live. The presumption is that, at this stage, no further correspondence would be entered into, but when the complaint is concluded, the SCC would review the case, including seeing what consideration was taken of her earlier comments. The SCC may subsequently seek a further response from the Service on any process matters about which she remains concerned. Depending on the response received, the SCC would then have the option of submitting to higher levels including, ultimately, reporting to the Secretary of State in line with powers in existing legislation.

Source: Ministry of Defence Written Evidence, Ev 14

64.  The MoD told us that there would also be a new system for all service complaints, not just those referred by the Commissioner, which was aimed at giving assurances to her "that the Services have in place an effective process for monitoring the progress of individual complaints and can identify and remedy undue delay".[111] The system would be phased in, with the Services setting interim markers at appropriate intervals for a complaint, within the timelines for complaints to be resolved. These markers would also be used by the Services to monitor progress on a complaint and judge whether the timeline would be exceeded. The Commissioner would be notified of complaints expected to exceed the time limits, and later in the process of those that had exceeded the timeline with a short explanation of the reasons for the delay. The Commissioner would be able to seek a further response if she had concerns about the level of action taken to remedy undue delay and for referral to a higher level including ultimately a report to the Secretary of State. The MoD told us that this was aimed, as with the Commissioner's involvement in live complaints, to provide her with an insight into the causes of undue delay, the effectiveness of the Services' monitoring of cases and to acquire evidence for learning lessons. From 2013, these reports would be produced bi-monthly, for the first six months for Commissioner referred cases only and then for all cases.

65.  The Commissioner saw the new developments in her role as a "valuable step" and progress on closing what she described as the "fairness gap" because if the 24 weeks target for new Service complaints to be resolved or finally decided was overrun and there were no reasonable grounds for that, she could make a report to the Secretary of State.[112] She added:

I will be able to give a much more open, honest, understandable offer to complainants, which is, "I will refer your case and, even if you don't come to me, I will get a report once your case is going to go beyond 24 weeks or has gone beyond 24 weeks and then there is something I can do." Then it is over to the Secretary of State to read my report, accept or amend my recommendations, and come back to me on what action has been taken. So it gives Ministers visibility, it gives Service Chiefs visibility, it gives Parliament visibility—because I shall be reporting on that in the annual report—and it gives this Committee visibility.[113]

66.  While we support the changes to the role of the Commissioner which she has agreed with the MoD, we are disappointed that the MoD and the Services continue to be opposed to changing her role to that of an Armed Forces Ombudsman. We repeat the findings of previous Defence Committees that the Service Complaints Commissioner's role falls far short of that envisaged by them. We recommend that the Service Complaints Commissioner's role should be changed to that of an Armed Forces Ombudsman. In response to our Report the MoD should set out in full its reasons for opposing the establishment of an Armed Forces Ombudsman. The Commissioner has regularly reported that the Service complaints system was not efficient, effective or fair and that the current system was not sustainable and needed simplification and redesign. An important first step to rectifying this would be to resolve the continuing debate on the role of the Commissioner. The MoD, Services and Commissioner should increase their efforts to resolve the differences between them on the Commissioner's role.

Thematic studies

67.  Under Section 339 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 the Commissioner reports annually to Ministers and Parliament on the exercise of her referral function in respect of Service complaints and the working of the complaints system and any other matter that she may think appropriate. The Commissioner told the Select Committee on the 2010 Armed Forces Bill that:

Ministers may ask the SCC to provide a special report on any aspect of her work within these parameters, but not, it would appear on welfare issues more widely. It is unclear as to the exact scope of the SCC's powers to provide reports, say on matters such as housing, medical treatment or other issues that affect service personnel. A clarification in the Bill that it is open to Ministers to ask the SCC to report on a particular area or areas of concern, and that any such report should be laid before Parliament, may be helpful. If it was felt helpful for the Commissioner to prepare any such report, of her own volition or in response say to the House of Commons Defence Committee, the provisions of s.339 may need to be amended. There would also of course be resource implications.[114]

68.  We understand that the Commissioner has never been asked by the Secretary of State for Defence to report on a particular area of concern she may have outside her normal annual reporting cycle. The Commissioner told us that, if she did, she would look at "cases of bullying, which include assault, and the issues to do with mental health, access to services, race [...] and the handling of those cases".[115] During visits to units, she had been informed of issues that would not come to her as complaints and thought some work needed to be done on them. She added:

That is what I would do, and that is I think what ombudsmen do. They have this broader view, whether they be the health service ombudsman, parliamentary ombudsman or the Children's Commissioner, who today has powers to do research and inquiries. They can pull together in an informed and responsible way evidence across the piece and put it forward in a way that is very valuable to the organisation that they oversee.[116]

69.   We believe there would be value in the Commissioner being able to undertake research and report on thematic issues in addition to her Annual Reports. We appreciate that this would require additional resources but the Commissioner's experience on these issues should be utilised. The MoD should examine whether any legislative changes are required to enable this to occur.

The Commissioner's resources

70.  The Commissioner's office is located in non-MoD premises in London. In 2008, her office had a team of two people. Currently her personnel consists of four caseworkers, a Communications Officer, an Audit Manager, an Executive Assistant and a Head of Office.[117] In 2011, the Commissioner's office cost £478,800 (excluding VAT). The vast majority of this was spent on the salaries of the Commissioner (£82,200) and her support staff (£259,900). Other significant amounts were spent on accommodation and security (£83,200) and external communications and media support (£24,500).[118] In its evidence to us the MoD stated that it had "met all of the SCC's requests for funded posts and additional resource".[119] The Commissioner accepted that "technically" this was correct with one exception but told us that she had been "dissuaded from making bids for resources" and the resources she had were those she bid for in 2008.[120] She did not think she had sufficient resources. She told us:

[...] at the end of the review, the MOD's conclusion was that the solution was actually to keep the status quo, but to formalise what I had already been doing in practice, which was intervene, ask questions and spot where things were going wrong. At that point, we predicted that we would have 1,000 open cases. As of today, it is just slightly less than that, but the MOD accepted at the time that in order to deal effectively with the model that they were putting forward, I would need 15 caseworkers. In July this year, I got my fourth. That was one reason why I refused to accept the model that they put forward. They had made it quite clear that resources of that scale were not available.[121]

71.  The Commissioner also warned that the new Service complaints system would require additional resources and that she had already submitted a request for an additional senior caseworker to ensure that it worked efficiently.[122] Part of the transition to the new system would be to review what resources were available and what were required.[123] She also told us that she had made a formal request to the MoD Permanent Secretary to be able to recruit her staff automatically from across the civil service rather than from the MoD alone.[124] This request was refused and she was told that each request would have to be looked at individually. Each request she had made had, in the event, been acceded to, but the Commissioner was concerned about the amount of resource it took to prepare a business case on each occasion. We note that the MoD and the Commissioner are in discussion on future resources.[125]

72.  We note the Commissioner's assessment she does not have sufficient resources and that in fact the resources she has are those that she requested in 2008. A sufficiently resourced Commissioner and Service complaints secretariats are essential to an effective and efficient complaints system and raising confidence in it. It is also vital that current resources are used in the most efficient manner. While we accept that in the current economic climate it is not easy to provide additional resources, it is not appropriate that the Commissioner feels "dissuaded" from making bids for resources. She should submit her requests for additional resources and a decision should be made on a case by case basis. In response to our Report, the MoD should inform us of the outcome of the discussions on future resources and the Commissioner should confirm that the additional resources are adequate to allow her to fulfil her tasks.

Role of the Commissioner and the Armed Forces Covenant

73.  The Government published the Armed Forces Covenant in May 2011.[126] The Covenant sets out the relationship between the nation, the state and the Armed Forces. It is intended to make clear that the whole nation has a moral obligation to the members of the Armed Forces and their families and establishes how they should expect to be treated. The Covenant exists to redress the disadvantages that the Armed Forces community face in comparison to other citizens and to recognise sacrifices made. The Covenant identified 15 areas to be addressed.[127] The Commissioner is specifically mentioned under the Recourse section of the Covenant:

Members of the Armed Forces Community should have means of recourse open to them, if they believe that they are not being treated in a fair and appropriate way. Established routes of recourse such as complaints processes or Ombudsmen should be sensitive to the particular circumstances of the Armed Forces Community. In addition, for Serving personnel and those who have recently left service, there should be a responsive system for handling complaints relating to their service in the Armed Forces, overseen by the Service Complaints Commissioner.[128]

74.   The Government also published The Armed Forces Covenant: Today and Tomorrow, which outlined in more detail specific pledges and the measures that the Government would take to fulfil its responsibilities.[129] This document outlined the role of the Service Complaints Commissioner in respect of fulfilling the Covenant's commitment to recourse for Armed Forces personnel if they believe they are not being treated in a fair and appropriate manner.[130] Additionally the Commissioner was also mentioned under the responsibility of care commitment, particularly her recommendations in her Annual Reports and the Single Services initiatives to build confidence in the system for dealing with complaints of bullying and harassment.[131]

75.  The Armed Forces Act 2011, which received Royal Assent in November 2011, placed on the Government a statutory responsibility to report annually on the Covenant, particularly in four areas: healthcare, education, housing and the operation of inquests.[132] A Covenant Reference Group, previously known as the External Reference Group, which includes representatives from other Government departments, charities and the Service Families Federations, exists to monitor the performance of the Government in meeting the commitments of the Covenant and liaise with key stakeholders on issues relating to it. The group is consulted on the Annual Report on the Covenant and unedited observations by its external members are published as part of the report itself.[133] The Government published an interim report on the Covenant in December 2011[134] and the first statutory report was published in December 2012.[135] Both reports contained analyses of progress to date and specific pledges for further action. These included commentary on the MoD's response to the Commissioner's three year goals and recommendations listed in her Annual Reports and the review of the complaints process and the future role of the Commissioner. The Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report 2012 commented on the outcome of the review of the Service complaints process and included the following commitment:

A new way of working with the SCC will be implemented from January 2013, aimed at giving the SCC greater insight into the causes of undue delay and the effectiveness of the Services' monitoring of cases, and enabling us to gain evidence for learning lessons.[136]

76.  The Commissioner said that she sees her work and the Service complaints system as an integral part of the Armed Forces Covenant. In her 2010 Annual Report she said:

The Service complaints system plays a central role in ensuring the fair and just treatment of members of the Armed Forces: Action by the chain of command to resolve workplace grievances as speedily and effectively as they can is an integral part of their duty of care to Servicemen and Servicewomen and thus to the Armed Forces covenant.[137]

77.  She also made the same point in evidence to us.[138] The Covenant explicitly mentions the Commissioner and the Annual Reports on the Covenant commented on developments in the Service complaints system and the Commissioner's role. However she had not been involved in the development of the Covenant and had not been asked to input into the Annual Report on the Covenant although she had been invited to one meeting of the Armed Forces Covenant Steering Group. Following her appearance before us, the Commissioner told us that the MoD had told her that she should have the opportunity to comment on statements made about the Service complaints system in future Annual Reports and that she had received an apology for the oversight. The Commissioner believes that there may be scope for her to be more widely involved in the production of the Annual Report on the Covenant:

[...] the information we receive from Service personnel and their families also often includes information about the experience of Service life, wider than treatment by the chain of command. There may also be value in the Service Complaints Commissioner being consulted on the draft report as a whole and joining the Reference Group.[139]

78.  The Service Complaints Commissioner's work is an integral part in delivering the Armed Forces Covenant. We are surprised and concerned that the MoD did not consult the Commissioner during the development of the Armed Forces Covenant or on the Annual Reports on the Covenant. We welcome the MoD's intention to give the Commissioner an opportunity to comment on statements made about the Service complaints system in future Annual Reports. Given the insight and information the Commissioner receives about the experience of Service life which is often wider than that of Service personnels' treatment by the chain of command, we believe that there would be value in the Commissioner being consulted on the draft Annual Report as a whole and in her joining the Covenant Reference Group.

New Commissioner

79.  Dr Susan Atkins, the current Commissioner, was appointed on 1 December 2007 for a three year fixed term appointment which was later extended by four months to the end of March 2011 to reflect the timetable for publishing the Commissioner's Annual Report. Dr Atkins was reappointed for a second and final three year term to 31 March 2014.[140] The Commissioner is one of those posts that is subject to a pre-appointment hearing by the relevant Departmental Select Committee as agreed by the House of Commons Liaison Committee and the Government in 2007-08. It is our intention to hold such a hearing for the appointment of the new Commissioner. To assist us with this we asked Dr Atkins for her views on the appointment process and the qualities the new Commissioner would require. Dr Atkins described three factors to us. The first of these was that the post should be filled by someone without a military background. Although the Armed Forces Act 2006 says that the Commissioner should not currently be in the military or the civil service, Dr Atkins told us:

First, the military is quite a closed world, and the real value to the services and the MOD is in having somebody who comes with an outside perspective. The Service Chiefs have actually said that that is what they value, because I can look at their perspective on things, and I can say, "Yes, you've got that absolutely right," or I can say, "Actually, there is a different way of looking at that." They find that very valuable. The second reason is the confidence of service personnel and the number of people who come to me, or whom I meet on training sessions or when I am out and about, and say that if I was from a military background, they and their families would not have used my services. I feel very, very strongly that that is what is required, predominantly.[141]

80.  Secondly, she told us that an understanding and a good grasp of both justice and fairness and cultural and organisational change was very important because there was a need to be able to understand, respect and value the services you are working with and work with them to improve.[142] Finally Dr Atkins told us that she worked three days a week but in her opinion the post should be full time.[143] She also hoped to be consulted on her successor but thought it would be inappropriate for her to be part of the process.[144]

81.  We would like to thank Dr Atkins for her work as the Commissioner. She has worked ceaselessly to improve the Service complaints system and to make her post a success. We agree with Dr Atkins that the new Commissioner should not come from a military background. It is vital that the Commissioner should bring an outside perspective to the Service complaints system and that Service personnel should have confidence in using the Commissioner's services. We expect the MoD in their response to this Report to give us their reaction to the Commissioner's view that the post should be full time.

82.  We confirm our intention to hold a pre-appointment hearing with the proposed new Commissioner. We expect to be fully involved at every stage and for the MoD to consult us on the process and the job description from the beginning to ensure sufficient time for the recruitment process, the pre-appointment hearing and a smooth transition to the new Commissioner. Most importantly we expect the MoD to take full account of our views on the suitability of the proposed new Commissioner for the post.


85   Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Annual Report 2010, March 2011, pp 68-78 Back

86   Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Annual Report 2010, March 2011, p 76 Back

87   Ibid, p 74 Back

88   Ibid Back

89   Ibid Back

90   Ibid Back

91   Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Annual Report 2010, March 2011, p 74 Back

92   Ibid Back

93   Ibid Back

94   Ibid, p 78 Back

95   Ibid Back

96   Ibid Back

97   Ibid Back

98   Q 4 Back

99   Qq 4-5 Back

100   Q 5 Back

101   Q 5 Back

102   Ev 13 Back

103   Q 3 Back

104   Defence Committee, Second Special Report of Session 2006-07, Armed Forces Bill: proposal for a Service Complaints Commissioner: Government Response to the Committee's Fourteenth Report of Session 2005-06, HC 180 Back

105   Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report 2012, December 2012, p 23; available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/armed-forces-covenant-annual-report-2012  Back

106   Ev 13 Back

107   Ev 13 Back

108   Ev 13-14 Back

109   Ev 14 Back

110   Ev 14 Back

111   Ev 14 Back

112   Q 6 Back

113   Q 6 Back

114   Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill, Special Report of Session 2010-11, HC 779, Ev 93 Back

115   Q 45 Back

116   Q 45 Back

117   Ev 16 Back

118   Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Annual Report 2011, March 2012, p 59 Back

119   Ev 16 Back

120   Qq 47-48 Back

121   Q 46 Back

122   Q 46 Back

123   Q 46 Back

124   Q 48 Back

125   HC Deb, 31 January 2013, col 363WH Back

126   Ministry of Defence, The Armed Forces Covenant, May 2011, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-armed-forces-covenant  Back

127   These are: terms and conditions of service; healthcare; education; housing; benefits and tax; responsibility of care; deployment; family life; commercial products and services; transition; support after service; recognition; participation as citizens; changes in defence; and recourse.  Back

128   Ministry of Defence, The Armed Forces Covenant, May 2011, p 9, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-armed-forces-covenant  Back

129   Ministry of Defence, The Armed Forces Covenant: Today and Tomorrow, May 2011, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-armed-forces-covenant Back

130   Ibid, pp 66-67 Back

131   Ibid, p 36 Back

132   Armed Forces Act 2011, Sections 343A and 343B Back

133   External members of the Covenant Reference Group are Naval Families Federation, Army Families Federation, RAF Families Federation, COBSEO-the Confederation of Service Charities, Royal British Legion, SSAFA (Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Families Association), War Widows Association (WWA) and Professor Hew Strachan. Back

134   Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces Covenant Interim Report (2011), December 2011, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/armed-forces-covenant-interim-report-2011  Back

135   Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report 2012, December 2012, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/armed-forces-covenant-annual-report-2012  Back

136   Ibid, p 23  Back

137   Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Annual Report 2010, March 2011, p 9, para 1 Back

138   Qq 10-11 Back

139   Ev 19 Back

140   Ev 16 Back

141   Q 50 Back

142   Q 50 Back

143   Q 51 Back

144   Q 53 Back


 
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Prepared 26 February 2013