3 Future
role of the Commissioner
Commissioner or Ombudsman?
50. The role and powers of the Service Complaints
Commissioner have long been a matter of debate (see Annex for
the history of this debate). In her Annual Report for 2010, the
Commissioner considered a number of options for strengthening
her role.[85] The options
she considered are set out in the box below.
Table 3: Options considered by the Service Complaints
Commissioner for strengthening her role
Option | Summary of how the proposed model would work
|
Strengthened oversight model
| To better target problematic cases the SCC would be provided with powers to question the Services on the investigation of specific cases, make recommendations for further action and hold them to account through a Service response guaranteed by ultimate referral to ministers. To make the authority of the SCC clear, these new powers would be put on a statutory footing.
|
Supervisory model | The SCC would be given additional powers to supervise the handling of certain types of complaint to ensure more robust quality control.
|
Independent investigation model
| The SCC would be given powers to investigate and decide certain types of complaint.
|
Armed Forces Ombudsman model
| The SCC is changed to a Ombudsman model where problem cases can be reviewed and investigated by the independent body during the Service complaints process. This system would retain the SCC's role as a direct channel for complaints and would retain the SCC's right to ask for case updates from the chain of command.
|
Source: Service Complaints Commissioner for the
Armed Forces Annual Report 2010
51. Of these options, the Commissioner recommended
that her role be changed to that of an Armed Forces Ombudsman
as outlined above. In her 2010 Annual Report she said:
The Law Commission emphasised that an Ombudsman's
primary focus is on administrative processes, the maladministration
of which may have led to an individual suffering injustice. Unlike
judicial review, the Ombudsman is not concerned with legality,
but with fairness and due process. Ombudsmen do investigate complaints
made to them but do not make final case decisions. Their role
is to review and to make recommendations. They are independent
of the bodies they oversee and publicly accountable. Most Ombudsmen
models require the internal complaints mechanisms to be exhausted
first.[86]
52. In the UK, the primary focus of public sector
Ombudsmen is on maladministration. These Ombudsmen have common
features such as the speedy resolution of complaints, usually
after the internal complaint processes have been exhausted, and
identifying lessons for the public body concerned to ensure continuous
improvement in its services. Following completion of their investigations
they make recommendations to the relevant public body based on
their findings, which may include suggested sanctions, but the
Ombudsmen themselves do not impose penalties or award compensation.
However, in her 2010 Annual Report the Commissioner said that
"bringing defence complaints within the standard national
Ombudsman [was] not widely acknowledged to be particularly effective".[87]
She thought that having a dedicated Armed Forces Ombudsman, focused
on the specific issues of Service life, was of more value to the
Services. It enabled "the Ombudsman to exercise final powers
of review and hold the Services to account more effectively because
the Ombudsman understands and respects the special position of,
and demands on, Service personnel and the special relationships
that exist between them and the chain of command".[88]
The Commissioner thought that any Ombudsman model which excluded
the oversight function until the conclusion of the internal process
would not be effective, fair or be able to drive through the efficiencies
that are required. She added:
The SCC is used across the Services to give Service
personnel the confidence to speak when they feel mistreated. This
is particularly valuable where there is alleged bullying or harassment.
The key issue at present is delay. For these reasons, I recommend
that a more flexible model be used; one that still encourages
direct complaints to come through the SCC and that enables the
SCC to intervene when clear procedural defects occur. Such a model
in the UK should preserve the right of Service personnel to make
a complaint through an Ombudsman and for the Ombudsman to have
the right to ask for information from the Service, to set deadlines
and ultimately to call the matter in for investigation, in the
minority of cases where there is a failure to correct defects
or unreasonable delay in handling. The Ombudsman would have discretion
as to whether a case was accepted for review.[89]
53. The Commissioner also noted that Armed Forces
Ombudsmen existed in many countries in a range of different models.
For example, although they oversee the handling of complaints
from Service personnel, a number of these ombudsmen, such as those
in Canada, Germany and Norway, have a wider duty to report independently
of Government on the welfare of Service personnel.[90]
54. Although she did not advocate a particular
model for an Armed Forces Ombudsman, the Commissioner argued that
an Ombudsman would enable the chain of command to retain the primary
responsibility for investigating and deciding on Service complaints
and also recognised that dealing efficiently with Service complaints
was an integral element of command and exercise of the Commander's
duty of care to those under his or her command.[91]
Members of Service Boards and those with the highest operational
responsibilities would no longer have to combine these primary
responsibilities with judging individual cases. [92]
Service Boards would still be required to consider the few cases
that involved a change of policy but she thought it would be helpful,
in many cases, for Service Complaint Panels with an independent
member to consider the complaint and provide advice to the Board.
Service Boards would be strategic, looking at the system to see
it was working efficiently and supporting operational requirements.
She argued this in itself would reduce delay. The Commissioner
added:
The Armed Forces Ombudsman model would focus on holding
the Services to account for the proper administration of their
processes and delivery of justice, ensuring that the system was
functioning properly and that most complex delayed and problematic
cases were being given priority and additional scrutiny. Having
the backstop of an external appeal to the Ombudsman, albeit with
a requirement to her criteria of a prima facie case of maladministration,
should give Service personnel the confidence in appropriate cases
to opt for appeal by the chain of command.[93]
55. The Commissioner concluded that this system
would allow her to judge whether access to the Service complaints
system was being unfairly denied and to rule on vexatious complaints.[94]
It would also provide a more efficient and simpler way of protecting
Service personnel in exercising their rights on issues for which
there is a special complaints system, for example education, medical
treatment, housing and pay.[95]
At present these special systems have to be exhausted before a
Service complaint can be made. The Commissioner argued that the
Ombudsman should cover all specialist complaints systems. This
would save resources and increase the value of external oversight
in an efficient and effective way.[96]
56. Under this model, the Ombudsman would not
make any final decision on a case that was accepted for investigation
and review but would, however, be able to make recommendations
to the Defence Council about any cases she had assessed to be
dealt with improperly and had resulted in injustice.[97]
These findings and any recommendations and the Defence Council
response to them would then be published, suitably anonymised,
as part of the Ombudsman's Annual Report to Ministers and Parliament.
The Commissioner outlined to us the benefits and advantages of
an Ombudsman model. She thought that it would fulfil the roles
of an oversight body as envisaged by both the Defence Committee's
Duty of Care Report and The Deepcut Review: to ensure
that there was somebody independent to oversee and ensure the
fair handling of complaints and to also identify wider patterns
and trends which might be missed if a case was decided on the
facts of the case.[98]
The Commissioner also considered that an Ombudsman would address
a "fairness gap" in the current system as complainants
believed she was able to oversee and intervene to ensure complaints
were dealt with in a timely and proper manner and "that it
was not too late by the time their case [was] decided".[99]
The Commissioner said that in her current role she could not guarantee
this would happen even though she could raise questions and ask
for issues to be addressed. She believed an Ombudsman would fulfil
this function as they would be able to review the case and make
a decision, on whether any maladministration had occurred, and
make recommendations to the Services in respect of the case.[100]
The Commissioner told us:
At the end of the case, if somebody came to me at
the end of a process and said, "I want you to review this,
I don't think I've been dealt with properly," I could review
it and make the decision on that. What I wouldn't be able to do
is to direct what should happen on the merits of that case. As
an ombudsman, that would be a recommendation back to the services.
But it would act as a final appeal. I believe that it would enable
the service system to be simpler and would also enable complaints
to be dealt with in a firmer, more effective and certainly cost-efficient
way.[101]
57. The Commissioner's recommendations were considered
as part of the review of the Service complaints system which the
Service Personnel Board (SPB) had established at the end of 2010
and recommended by the Commissioner in her Annual Report for 2010
(see paragraphs 44-49 above). On completion, the review did not
support the change to an Ombudsman role "but accepted that
greater benefit could be gained for the fairness, effectiveness
and efficiency of the complaints system if the SCC offered views
on the process whilst complaints were live".[102]
The Commissioner outlined to us the reasons why she thought the
SPB had rejected the Ombudsman model:
[...] I believe there was some resistance to having
an external body as the final port of call or final route for
appeal. [...] Some of the Service Chiefs said they didn't quite
understand what an ombudsman did, but they were sure they didn't
want one. Some other people have said to me that they would be
very comfortable with my being the ombudsman, but, as you know,
I shall be stepping down at the end of my second term, and when
there was no longer "the good doctor", they weren't
too sure what would happen. I think it is fear of what might happen,
rather than the arguments that I have put forward now.[103]
58. While the MoD acknowledges the value of the
Service Complaints Commissioner, it has expressed reservations
about the possible further evolution of the role. For example
in December 2006, in response to a Defence Committee Report on
the proposal for a Service Complaints Commissioner, the then Government
cited the need to preserve of the role of the chain of command
in investigating and resolving complaints as a reason for not
extending the Commissioner's role to that of an investigatory
body. It said:
We remain absolutely convinced that our proposals
for the SCC, coupled with the inclusion of an independent member
on Service Complaints Panels considering certain types of complaints
including bullying, harassment and other forms of improper behaviour,
will provide a package of improvements to the Service complaints
process that are right for the way our Armed Forces operate, and
which meet the overall objective underpinning the recommendations
made in The Deepcut Review. We listened carefully to what
the Committee has said and to the debates that took place as the
Armed Forces Bill progressed through Parliament and these proposals
have evolved accordingly. They will strike the right balance between
ensuring that Service personnel can have confidence in a system
that is fair, effective and transparent, whilst preserving the
fundamental responsibility of the chain of command to investigate
wrongs and remedy them. Any move to enable a Commissioner to be
able to supervise the handling or investigation of a Service complaint
would undermine this responsibility. It would also risk undermining
the system under which a Service Complaint Panel with an independent
member would be responsible for dealing with complaints that have
not already been resolved by the chain of command to the complainant's
satisfaction.[104]
59. Another example of the MoD's reservations
was given in the 2012 Annual Report on the Armed Forces Covenant.
The Government said that it thought that there was more benefit
to be gained for improving timeliness and tackling undue delay
if the Commissioner was engaged whilst complaints were still live
rather than her post becoming an ombudsman acting after the event.[105]
60. In view of the Commissioner's
evidence that "some of the Service Chiefs said they didn't
quite understand what an ombudsman did, but they were sure they
didn't want one", it is clear that discussions between the
Service Chiefs and the Commissioner have not been as productive
as they should have been. The MoD's wish to preserve the role
of the chain of command in investigating and resolving complaints
has been accepted by the Commissioner. The 2012 Armed Forces Covenant
Annual Report said that there was more benefit to be gained for
improving timeliness and tackling undue delay if the Commissioner
were engaged whilst complaints were still live rather than her
post becoming an ombudsman acting after the event. This contrasted
with the Commissioner's view that any Ombudsman model which excluded
the oversight function until the conclusion of the internal process
would not be effective, fair or be able to drive through the efficiencies
that are required. While the involvement of an Ombudsman in cases
that have not completed the internal complaints process would
not be normal practice in the UK, we see no reason why the MoD
and the Commissioner cannot agree a model for an Armed Forces
Ombudsman that satisfies both their aspirations and concerns.
61. Following the MoD's rejection of the Ombudsman
role, the Commissioner put forward an alternative non-Ombudsman
model for her role.[106]
This was intended to make the best use of all resources and enable
her to focus more on tackling undue delay. Detailed consideration
of the proposal was undertaken by the MoD and the Commissioner
and in September 2012 the Service Personnel Board agreed a phased
introduction of the new model from January 2013. The MoD told
us that:
As it is difficult to predict exactly how the new
system will operate, to quantify its impact on resources or to
determine whether it will indeed bring the benefits anticipated,
we will closely monitor the operation of the new system from the
outset so that we can adapt and refine it based on experience.[107]
62. The MoD regarded the new system as aiming
to ensure that maximum value is delivered by the Commissioner's
involvement in and oversight of the complaints process, and that
she would be able to act more effectively than at present to tackle
delay, all within current legislative powers.[108]
Given the current pressure on resources, the new process sought
to reduce bureaucracy which would benefit the office of the Commissioner
and the single Services. It was also intended to hold the Services
to account for a fair, effective and efficient handling of complaints
in a way that would enable improved and effective performance
management of the complaints process. The changes to the Commissioner's
role are intended to complement the changes agreed by the Service
Personnel Board (SPB) to the complaints process (see paragraphs
44-49 above).[109]
63. The Commissioner has retained her powers
to refer cases and oversight of referred cases in line with current
legislation. However the changes set out in the box below have
been made to the process for allegations she refers to the chain
of command.[110]
Table 4: Changes to the Service Complaints Commissioner's
role
Change | MoD analysis of benefits of the change
|
Discontinuation of SCC 30-Day Updates
| The current policy requirement for the SCC to be updated on the progress of complaints every 30 working days that they remain live has been seen by some as bureaucratic and time consuming for all to administer, often adding little to understanding of the reasons behind delay or the action being taken to mitigate it. It will therefore cease, and be replaced by updates that are triggered by specified events (e.g. withdrawal or conclusion of a complaint, or referral to a further level).
|
Involvement in Live Complaints
| Recognising the value that the SCC can add when complaints are still active, a mechanism will be introduced by which the SCC can offer views on process, for consideration by the relevant single Service, whilst a complaint is live. The presumption is that, at this stage, no further correspondence would be entered into, but when the complaint is concluded, the SCC would review the case, including seeing what consideration was taken of her earlier comments. The SCC may subsequently seek a further response from the Service on any process matters about which she remains concerned. Depending on the response received, the SCC would then have the option of submitting to higher levels including, ultimately, reporting to the Secretary of State in line with powers in existing legislation.
|
Source: Ministry of Defence Written Evidence,
Ev 14
64. The MoD told us that there would also be
a new system for all service complaints, not just those referred
by the Commissioner, which was aimed at giving assurances to her
"that the Services have in place an effective process for
monitoring the progress of individual complaints and can identify
and remedy undue delay".[111]
The system would be phased in, with the Services setting interim
markers at appropriate intervals for a complaint, within the timelines
for complaints to be resolved. These markers would also be used
by the Services to monitor progress on a complaint and judge whether
the timeline would be exceeded. The Commissioner would be notified
of complaints expected to exceed the time limits, and later in
the process of those that had exceeded the timeline with a short
explanation of the reasons for the delay. The Commissioner would
be able to seek a further response if she had concerns about the
level of action taken to remedy undue delay and for referral to
a higher level including ultimately a report to the Secretary
of State. The MoD told us that this was aimed, as with the Commissioner's
involvement in live complaints, to provide her with an insight
into the causes of undue delay, the effectiveness of the Services'
monitoring of cases and to acquire evidence for learning lessons.
From 2013, these reports would be produced bi-monthly, for the
first six months for Commissioner referred cases only and then
for all cases.
65. The Commissioner saw the new developments
in her role as a "valuable step" and progress on closing
what she described as the "fairness gap" because if
the 24 weeks target for new Service complaints to be resolved
or finally decided was overrun and there were no reasonable grounds
for that, she could make a report to the Secretary of State.[112]
She added:
I will be able to give a much more open, honest,
understandable offer to complainants, which is, "I will refer
your case and, even if you don't come to me, I will get a report
once your case is going to go beyond 24 weeks or has gone beyond
24 weeks and then there is something I can do." Then it is
over to the Secretary of State to read my report, accept or amend
my recommendations, and come back to me on what action has been
taken. So it gives Ministers visibility, it gives Service Chiefs
visibility, it gives Parliament visibilitybecause I shall
be reporting on that in the annual reportand it gives this
Committee visibility.[113]
66. While we support the changes
to the role of the Commissioner which she has agreed with the
MoD, we are disappointed that the MoD and the Services continue
to be opposed to changing her role to that of an Armed Forces
Ombudsman. We repeat the findings of previous Defence Committees
that the Service Complaints Commissioner's role falls far short
of that envisaged by them. We recommend that the Service Complaints
Commissioner's role should be changed to that of an Armed Forces
Ombudsman. In response to our Report the MoD should set out in
full its reasons for opposing the establishment of an Armed Forces
Ombudsman. The Commissioner has regularly reported that the Service
complaints system was not efficient, effective or fair and that
the current system was not sustainable and needed simplification
and redesign. An important first step to rectifying this would
be to resolve the continuing debate on the role of the Commissioner.
The MoD, Services and Commissioner should increase their efforts
to resolve the differences between them on the Commissioner's
role.
Thematic studies
67. Under Section 339 of the Armed Forces Act
2006 the Commissioner reports annually to Ministers and Parliament
on the exercise of her referral function in respect of Service
complaints and the working of the complaints system and any other
matter that she may think appropriate. The Commissioner told the
Select Committee on the 2010 Armed Forces Bill that:
Ministers may ask the SCC to provide a special report
on any aspect of her work within these parameters, but not, it
would appear on welfare issues more widely. It is unclear as to
the exact scope of the SCC's powers to provide reports, say on
matters such as housing, medical treatment or other issues that
affect service personnel. A
clarification in the Bill that it is open
to Ministers to
ask the SCC to report on a particular area or areas of concern,
and that any such report should be laid before Parliament, may
be helpful. If it was felt helpful for the Commissioner to prepare
any such report, of her own volition or in response say to the
House of Commons Defence Committee, the provisions of s.339 may
need to be amended.
There would also of course be resource implications.[114]
68. We understand that the Commissioner has never
been asked by the Secretary of State for Defence to report on
a particular area of concern she may have outside her normal annual
reporting cycle. The Commissioner told us that, if she did, she
would look at "cases of bullying, which include assault,
and the issues to do with mental health, access to services, race
[...] and the handling of those cases".[115]
During visits to units, she had been informed of issues that would
not come to her as complaints and thought some work needed to
be done on them. She added:
That is what I would do, and that is I think what
ombudsmen do. They have this broader view, whether they be the
health service ombudsman, parliamentary ombudsman or the Children's
Commissioner, who today has powers to do research and inquiries.
They can pull together in an informed and responsible way evidence
across the piece and put it forward in a way that is very valuable
to the organisation that they oversee.[116]
69. We
believe there would be value in the Commissioner being able to
undertake research and report on thematic issues in addition to
her Annual Reports. We appreciate that this would require additional
resources but the Commissioner's experience on these issues should
be utilised. The MoD should examine whether any legislative changes
are required to enable this to occur.
The
Commissioner's resources
70. The Commissioner's office is located in non-MoD
premises in London. In 2008, her office had a team of two people.
Currently her personnel consists of four caseworkers, a Communications
Officer, an Audit Manager, an Executive Assistant and a Head of
Office.[117] In 2011,
the Commissioner's office cost £478,800 (excluding VAT).
The vast majority of this was spent on the salaries of the Commissioner
(£82,200) and her support staff (£259,900). Other significant
amounts were spent on accommodation and security (£83,200)
and external communications and media support (£24,500).[118]
In its evidence to us the MoD stated that it had "met all
of the SCC's requests for funded posts and additional resource".[119]
The Commissioner accepted that "technically" this was
correct with one exception but told us that she had been "dissuaded
from making bids for resources" and the resources she had
were those she bid for in 2008.[120]
She did not think she had sufficient resources. She told us:
[...] at the end of the review, the MOD's conclusion
was that the solution was actually to keep the status quo, but
to formalise what I had already been doing in practice, which
was intervene, ask questions and spot where things were going
wrong. At that point, we predicted that we would have 1,000 open
cases. As of today, it is just slightly less than that, but the
MOD accepted at the time that in order to deal effectively with
the model that they were putting forward, I would need 15 caseworkers.
In July this year, I got my fourth. That was one reason why I
refused to accept the model that they put forward. They had made
it quite clear that resources of that scale were not available.[121]
71. The Commissioner also warned that the new
Service complaints system would require additional resources and
that she had already submitted a request for an additional senior
caseworker to ensure that it worked efficiently.[122]
Part of the transition to the new system would be to review what
resources were available and what were required.[123]
She also told us that she had made a formal request to the MoD
Permanent Secretary to be able to recruit her staff automatically
from across the civil service rather than from the MoD alone.[124]
This request was refused and she was told that each request would
have to be looked at individually. Each request she had made had,
in the event, been acceded to, but the Commissioner was concerned
about the amount of resource it took to prepare a business case
on each occasion. We note that the MoD and the Commissioner are
in discussion on future resources.[125]
72. We note the Commissioner's
assessment she does not have sufficient resources and that in
fact the resources she has are those that she requested in 2008.
A sufficiently resourced Commissioner and Service complaints secretariats
are essential to an effective and efficient complaints system
and raising confidence in it. It is also vital that current resources
are used in the most efficient manner. While we accept that in
the current economic climate it is not easy to provide additional
resources, it is not appropriate that the Commissioner feels "dissuaded"
from making bids for resources. She should submit her requests
for additional resources and a decision should be made on a case
by case basis. In response to our Report, the MoD should inform
us of the outcome of the discussions on future resources and the
Commissioner should confirm that the additional resources are
adequate to allow her to fulfil her tasks.
Role
of the Commissioner and the Armed Forces Covenant
73. The Government published the Armed Forces
Covenant in May 2011.[126]
The Covenant sets out the relationship between the nation, the
state and the Armed Forces. It is intended to make clear that
the whole nation has a moral obligation to the members of the
Armed Forces and their families and establishes how they should
expect to be treated. The Covenant exists to redress the disadvantages
that the Armed Forces community face in comparison to other citizens
and to recognise sacrifices made. The Covenant identified 15 areas
to be addressed.[127]
The Commissioner is specifically mentioned under the Recourse
section of the Covenant:
Members of the Armed Forces Community should have
means of recourse open to them, if they believe that they are
not being treated in a fair and appropriate way. Established routes
of recourse such as complaints processes or Ombudsmen should be
sensitive to the particular circumstances of the Armed Forces
Community. In addition, for Serving personnel and those who have
recently left service, there should be a responsive system for
handling complaints relating to their service in the Armed Forces,
overseen by the Service Complaints Commissioner.[128]
74. The Government also published The Armed
Forces Covenant: Today and Tomorrow, which outlined in more
detail specific pledges and the measures that the Government would
take to fulfil its responsibilities.[129]
This document outlined the role of the Service Complaints Commissioner
in respect of fulfilling the Covenant's commitment to recourse
for Armed Forces personnel if they believe they are not being
treated in a fair and appropriate manner.[130]
Additionally the Commissioner was also mentioned under the responsibility
of care commitment, particularly her recommendations in her Annual
Reports and the Single Services initiatives to build confidence
in the system for dealing with complaints of bullying and harassment.[131]
75. The Armed Forces Act 2011, which received
Royal Assent in November 2011, placed on the Government a statutory
responsibility to report annually on the Covenant, particularly
in four areas: healthcare, education, housing and the operation
of inquests.[132] A
Covenant Reference Group, previously known as the External Reference
Group, which includes representatives from other Government departments,
charities and the Service Families Federations, exists to monitor
the performance of the Government in meeting the commitments of
the Covenant and liaise with key stakeholders on issues relating
to it. The group is consulted on the Annual Report on the Covenant
and unedited observations by its external members are published
as part of the report itself.[133]
The Government published an interim report on the Covenant in
December 2011[134]
and the first statutory report was published in December 2012.[135]
Both reports contained analyses of progress to date and specific
pledges for further action. These included commentary on the MoD's
response to the Commissioner's three year goals and recommendations
listed in her Annual Reports and the review of the complaints
process and the future role of the Commissioner. The Armed Forces
Covenant Annual Report 2012 commented on the outcome of the review
of the Service complaints process and included the following commitment:
A new way of working with the SCC will be implemented
from January 2013, aimed at giving the SCC greater insight into
the causes of undue delay and the effectiveness of the Services'
monitoring of cases, and enabling us to gain evidence for learning
lessons.[136]
76. The Commissioner said that she sees her work
and the Service complaints system as an integral part of the Armed
Forces Covenant. In her 2010 Annual Report she said:
The Service complaints system plays a central
role in ensuring the fair and just treatment of members of the
Armed Forces: Action
by the chain of command to resolve workplace grievances as speedily
and effectively as they can is an integral part of their duty
of care to Servicemen and Servicewomen and thus to the Armed Forces
covenant.[137]
77. She also made the same point in evidence
to us.[138] The Covenant
explicitly mentions the Commissioner and the Annual Reports on
the Covenant commented on developments in the Service complaints
system and the Commissioner's role. However she had not been involved
in the development of the Covenant and had not been asked to input
into the Annual Report on the Covenant although she had been invited
to one meeting of the Armed Forces Covenant Steering Group. Following
her appearance before us, the Commissioner told us that the MoD
had told her that she should have the opportunity to comment on
statements made about the Service complaints system in future
Annual Reports and that she had received an apology for the oversight.
The Commissioner believes that there may be scope for her to be
more widely involved in the production of the Annual Report on
the Covenant:
[...] the information we receive from Service personnel
and their families also often includes information about the experience
of Service life, wider than treatment by the chain of command.
There may also be value in the Service Complaints Commissioner
being consulted on the draft report as a whole and joining the
Reference Group.[139]
78. The Service Complaints Commissioner's
work is an integral part in delivering the Armed Forces Covenant.
We are surprised and concerned that the MoD did not consult the
Commissioner during the development of the Armed Forces Covenant
or on the Annual Reports on the Covenant. We welcome the MoD's
intention to give the Commissioner an opportunity to comment on
statements made about the Service complaints system in future
Annual Reports. Given the insight and information the Commissioner
receives about the experience of Service life which is often wider
than that of Service personnels' treatment by the chain of command,
we believe that there would be value in the Commissioner being
consulted on the draft Annual Report as a whole and in her joining
the Covenant Reference Group.
New
Commissioner
79. Dr Susan Atkins, the current Commissioner,
was appointed on 1 December 2007 for a three year fixed term appointment
which was later extended by four months to the end of March 2011
to reflect the timetable for publishing the Commissioner's Annual
Report. Dr Atkins was reappointed for a second and final three
year term to 31 March 2014.[140]
The Commissioner is one of those posts that is subject to a pre-appointment
hearing by the relevant Departmental Select Committee as agreed
by the House of Commons Liaison Committee and the Government in
2007-08. It is our intention to hold such a hearing for the appointment
of the new Commissioner. To assist us with this we asked Dr Atkins
for her views on the appointment process and the qualities the
new Commissioner would require. Dr Atkins described three factors
to us. The first of these was that the post should be filled by
someone without a military background. Although the Armed Forces
Act 2006 says that the Commissioner should not currently be in
the military or the civil service, Dr Atkins told us:
First, the military is quite a closed world, and
the real value to the services and the MOD is in having somebody
who comes with an outside perspective. The Service Chiefs have
actually said that that is what they value, because I can look
at their perspective on things, and I can say, "Yes, you've
got that absolutely right," or I can say, "Actually,
there is a different way of looking at that." They find that
very valuable. The second reason is the confidence of service
personnel and the number of people who come to me, or whom I meet
on training sessions or when I am out and about, and say that
if I was from a military background, they and their families would
not have used my services. I feel very, very strongly that that
is what is required, predominantly.[141]
80. Secondly, she told us that an understanding
and a good grasp of both justice and fairness and cultural and
organisational change was very important because there was a need
to be able to understand, respect and value the services you are
working with and work with them to improve.[142]
Finally Dr Atkins told us that she worked three days a week but
in her opinion the post should be full time.[143]
She also hoped to be consulted on her successor but thought it
would be inappropriate for her to be part of the process.[144]
81. We would like to thank Dr
Atkins for her work as the Commissioner. She has worked ceaselessly
to improve the Service complaints system and to make her post
a success. We agree with Dr Atkins that the new Commissioner should
not come from a military background. It is vital that the Commissioner
should bring an outside perspective to the Service complaints
system and that Service personnel should have confidence in using
the Commissioner's services. We expect the MoD in their response
to this Report to give us their reaction to the Commissioner's
view that the post should be full time.
82. We confirm our intention
to hold a pre-appointment hearing with the proposed new Commissioner.
We expect to be fully involved at every stage and for the MoD
to consult us on the process and the job description from the
beginning to ensure sufficient time for the recruitment process,
the pre-appointment hearing and a smooth transition to the new
Commissioner. Most importantly we expect the MoD to take full
account of our views on the suitability of the proposed new Commissioner
for the post.
85 Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces,
Annual Report 2010, March 2011, pp 68-78 Back
86
Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Annual
Report 2010, March 2011, p 76 Back
87
Ibid, p 74 Back
88
Ibid Back
89
Ibid Back
90
Ibid Back
91
Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Annual
Report 2010, March 2011, p 74 Back
92
Ibid Back
93
Ibid Back
94
Ibid, p 78 Back
95
Ibid Back
96
Ibid Back
97
Ibid Back
98
Q 4 Back
99
Qq 4-5 Back
100
Q 5 Back
101
Q 5 Back
102
Ev 13 Back
103
Q 3 Back
104
Defence Committee, Second Special Report of Session 2006-07, Armed
Forces Bill: proposal for a Service Complaints Commissioner: Government
Response to the Committee's Fourteenth Report of Session 2005-06,
HC 180 Back
105
Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report 2012,
December 2012, p 23; available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/armed-forces-covenant-annual-report-2012
Back
106
Ev 13 Back
107
Ev 13 Back
108
Ev 13-14 Back
109
Ev 14 Back
110
Ev 14 Back
111
Ev 14 Back
112
Q 6 Back
113
Q 6 Back
114
Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill, Special Report of Session
2010-11, HC 779, Ev 93 Back
115
Q 45 Back
116
Q 45 Back
117
Ev 16 Back
118
Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Annual
Report 2011, March 2012, p 59 Back
119
Ev 16 Back
120
Qq 47-48 Back
121
Q 46 Back
122
Q 46 Back
123
Q 46 Back
124
Q 48 Back
125
HC Deb, 31 January 2013, col 363WH Back
126
Ministry of Defence, The Armed Forces Covenant, May 2011,
available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-armed-forces-covenant
Back
127
These are: terms and conditions of service; healthcare; education;
housing; benefits and tax; responsibility of care; deployment;
family life; commercial products and services; transition; support
after service; recognition; participation as citizens; changes
in defence; and recourse. Back
128
Ministry of Defence, The Armed Forces Covenant, May 2011,
p 9, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-armed-forces-covenant
Back
129
Ministry of Defence, The Armed Forces Covenant: Today and Tomorrow,
May 2011, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-armed-forces-covenant Back
130
Ibid, pp 66-67 Back
131
Ibid, p 36 Back
132
Armed Forces Act 2011, Sections 343A and 343B Back
133
External members of the Covenant Reference Group are Naval Families
Federation, Army Families Federation, RAF Families Federation,
COBSEO-the Confederation of Service Charities, Royal British Legion,
SSAFA (Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Families Association), War
Widows Association (WWA) and Professor Hew Strachan. Back
134
Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces Covenant Interim Report (2011),
December 2011, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/armed-forces-covenant-interim-report-2011
Back
135
Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report 2012,
December 2012, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/armed-forces-covenant-annual-report-2012
Back
136
Ibid, p 23 Back
137
Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Annual
Report 2010, March 2011, p 9, para 1 Back
138
Qq 10-11 Back
139
Ev 19 Back
140
Ev 16 Back
141
Q 50 Back
142
Q 50 Back
143
Q 51 Back
144
Q 53 Back
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