Government response
The Government welcomes the House of Commons Defence
Committee's inquiry into 'Future Maritime Surveillance' and the
findings set out in the Committee's report published on 19 September
2012.
The Government recognises the detailed work the Committee
has undertaken and the Ministry of Defence was grateful for the
opportunity to brief the Committee in April and May. Our formal
response to its recommendations and conclusions is set out below.
Where appropriate, we have grouped together related conclusions
and recommendations to respond with a single coherent narrative
that addresses both the specific recommendation and the wider
underpinning arguments. The Committee's findings are highlighted
in bold, with the Government's response in plain text. For ease
of reference, paragraph numbering follows that in the 'Conclusions
and Recommendations' section of the Committee's Report.
The Government fully recognises the importance of
maritime surveillance to the UK. In the 2010 Strategic Defence
and Security Review (SDSR) we acknowledged that no single department
or body had the capacity or capability to deliver what is required
to monitor the maritime environment and counter threats the UK
faces both in territorial waters and internationally. The Ministry
of Defence's relationships with its Allies and the civilian authorities
are very important and we are pleased that the Committee has commended
the Government for the establishment of the Maritime Security
Oversight Group (MSOG) and the National Maritime Information Centre
(NMIC).
The inquiry examined the current and future contribution
of the MoD and UK Armed Forces to the provision of maritime surveillance
capabilities and at the outset the inquiry decided not to revisit
the Nimrod MRA4 decision, but instead to focus on how the MoD
manages its current portfolio of assets and planned future requirements.
The Government acknowledges the Committee's concerns about capability
gaps and we are pleased that the Committee acknowledged the work
we are undertaking to explore fully all options and alternatives
for providing maritime surveillance. The Air ISTAR Optimisation
Study (AIOS) will form part of that work.
Following the Government's evidence on the importance
of military capabilities such as Intelligence, Surveillance, Target
Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and the acknowledgement
that UK maritime capabilities will include ISTAR based on network-enabled
warships, submarines and aircraft, we are pleased that the Committee
welcomes the Government's decision to include an ISTAR work stream
for the next SDSR. Given the HCDC's stated intention to maintain
an enduring interest in Maritime Surveillance, we intend to provide
an update on the initial findings of the AIOS and other significant
developments in maritime surveillance in the summer of 2013, with
a further update in the summer of 2014 when the AIOS has completed
its work.
Strategy and threats
1. The UK has a strategic requirement for maritime
surveillance as an important enabler to operations to protect
UK home waters and UK global interests and commitments in both
the military and non-military arenas. This requirement has developed
to meet the evolution of greater non-military threats such as
counter-terrorism, border control and non-state threats. This
evolution is illustrated by events such as the terrorist attack
in Mumbai on 26 November 2008 which was launched from the sea.
We note witnesses' suggestions that the difficulty of restricting
movements at sea had not gone unnoticed by the UK's potential
enemies. The Government must ensure that the requirement for maritime
surveillance is an integral part of the assessment of progress
on the National Security Tasks in the National Security Strategy
and the Military Tasks in the Strategic Defence and Security Review.
This continuous assessment is essential as UK Armed Forces evolve
towards Future Force 2020. (Paragraph 19)
The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Strategic
Defence and Security Review (SDSR) come as a package. The NSS
describes the strategic context and confirms our policy objectives,
or 'ends', and the threats to them. The SDSR describes the 'ways
and means' which we will adopt to address them, and it is here
that the issue of maritime security is addressed.
2. We note that due to the broadness of the areas
covered by maritime surveillance there is currently no one individual
within the MoD who is responsible for this capability. We feel
that this is a weakness which should be rectified. The new Joint
Forces Command (JFC) has been established to strengthen the focus
on joint enablers and on joint warfare development with a key
role of being responsible for Information, Surveillance, Targeting,
Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and for Command, Control,
Communications and Computers which are key elements of maritime
surveillance. The JFC should play an important role in coordinating,
strengthening and delivering maritime surveillance capabilities.
We welcome the intent of this improved focus that the JFC is intended
to bring, but will seek assurance as the JFC develops that it
is delivering the necessary coordinated output and that appropriate
safeguards are in place. In response to our Report, the MoD should
set out how it will assess the progress of the JFC in delivering
the tasks set for it, particularly in terms of maritime surveillance.
(Paragraph 21)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation.
The nature of the maritime domain means that maritime surveillance
is spread over many different platforms and functional areas.
The Government does not consider this a weakness, however, and
welcomes the Committee's acknowledgment of the role that JFC will
play in coordinating, strengthening and delivering joint enablers,
including key ISTAR capabilities that will support surveillance
in the maritime domain. JFC's mission includes:
- Command, direct and prepare
assigned joint capabilities in readiness for use by the designated
Joint Force Commander, and in support of Defence Outputs.
- Act as the unifying Joint User for single Service
enabling capabilities in order to ensure their effective delivery
as part of a balanced and coherent joint operational capability.
- Inform and advise on joint operational capability
in order to shape future Joint Force design.
In so doing, JFC will take account of the evolving
character of conflict and the international context, working closely
in conjunction with other parts of Defence such as the Security
Policy area, and will lead on joint warfare development.
This does not mean, however, that JFC should be responsible
for overall maritime surveillance, or be seen as the home for
all activity that requires input from multiple parts of the MoD.
Although surveillance is part of the Command, Control, Communications,
Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
joint enabling capability for which JFC is now established as
the Defence Authority, the environmental domains remain the primary
concern of the individual services. JFC, being responsible for
C4ISR, should play an important role in strengthening and delivering
maritime surveillance capabilities but JFC is not responsible
for routine maritime surveillance, especially in UK home waters.
For those areas where Commander JFC has responsibility, as set
out in the Defence Plan, his progress will be measured as a Top
Level Budget holder in the normal manner.
For the Royal Navy, COMOPS exercises OPCOM/OPCON
on behalf of the Fleet Commander for all RN assets within UK waters
and is the global Maritime Component Commander for Commander Joint
Operations (CJO). Noting that the ability to perform maritime
surveillance is an inherent attribute of all RN platforms whatever
other roles they are performing, were JFC to exercise OPCOM/OPCON
for maritime surveillance this would introduce friction and potential
confusion over the control of maritime assets. However, as proven
on current operations with multiple surveillance assets, there
is a model for effective tasking via the use of a cooperation/deconfliction
cell staffed by subject matter experts from individual cadres.
Intelligence is now available to all surveillance assets from
the cross-Government NMIC which garners information from multiple
sources.
Capability gaps
3. The MoD has stated that it regrets cancelling
the Nimrod MRA4 programme and that in an ideal world it would
have preferred to acquire a maritime patrol aircraft. We repeat
the serious concerns raised in our Report on the National Security
Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)
regarding the capability gaps that the Nimrod MRA4 decision has
created in the UK's ability to undertake the military tasks envisaged
in the SDSR and remain unconvinced that UK Armed Forces can manage
this capability gap within existing resources. The MoD told us
that its intention was to mitigate the impact of the Nimrod cancellation
by the use of other military assets on a case by case basis, but
acknowledged that there was currently no single asset or collection
of assets that offset the resulting capability gap. We agree with
the National Audit Office's (NAO) assessment that using other
existing assets would provide a reduced capability and diverting
resources from other tasks would have wider implications for defence.
Indeed in the MoD's own assessment in the NAO Report there would
be significant shortfalls without significant investment, and
the coordination of such assets at the right place and the right
time might prove very risky. (Paragraph 31)
The Department has accepted a capability gap and
increased risk by deleting Nimrod. We assess that other assets,
used as part of a layered approach, can reduce this risk to some
degree, and it remains within tolerable levels. This situation
is kept under review in the light of emerging threats, and longer
term strategic risk assessment is a constant process between the
Capability area and Defence Intelligence, reviewed annually.
We must remember that maritime surveillance covers
a wide array of platforms and capabilities that work together
in a layered approach and we will continue to prioritise maritime
(and air and land) assets against perceived national priorities.
As previously mentioned, the National Security Strategy inherently
recognises the importance of the seas, and in the SDSR we confirmed
our commitment to the provision of future maritime surveillance
assets.
4. We note that no option appears to have been
considered for either a sponsored or a volunteer reserve element
within the crews for the new commercial arrangement [for search
and rescue provision], despite the fact, that at least initially,
it is widely expected that most of the pilots will be ex-Armed
Forces. (Paragraph 36)
5. We note the impact of the Nimrod MRA4 decision
on the UK search and rescue capability. While we accept that the
UK remains committed to the International Convention on Maritime
Search and Rescue and that no bilateral arrangements are required,
we are surprised that the Government has not discussed the impact
of the Nimrod MRA4 decision with European neighbours. It would
seem prudent to do so to ensure that cooperation is maximised.
(Paragraph 37)
6. We will monitor the planned changes in the
provision of UK search and rescue to a new civilian-led capability
and expect Ministers to play a central role in its delivery, settling
disputes and ensuring coordination between departments. The Government
should guard against the loss of the valuable experience that
exists within the Armed Forces and we request that the Government
detail the measures it has taken to prevent this. We believe that
this should include considering options for retaining expertise
through some form of reserve service for the pilots employed.
Another concern is the impact on the provision of search and rescue
for the Falkland Islands. We may wish to return to this in future
years. (Paragraph 38)
Use of Sponsored Reserves is strongly endorsed as
a generic concept within Defence and the environmental areas.
The provision of SAR in the Falklands after 2016 is currently
under consideration. This should include an analysis of the full
range of options including military capability, contracted service
or potential hybrids. This analysis should include the challenge
of maintaining sufficiently experienced crews.
In terms of discussions with allies and bilateral
arrangements, please see our response below to recommendation
20 which explains our AIOS will include investigating the potential
for collaborative and cooperative MPA/MMA projects within NATO
and we will continue to have representation at those NATO meetings
where maritime surveillance is on the agenda.
7. We repeat the concerns expressed in our Report
on Operations in Libya regarding the Royal Navy's ability to continue
to deliver the required high levels of standing maritime commitments
with fewer platforms. It is likely that risk taking will occur
more frequently as the outcomes of the SDSR are implemented and
the smaller number of available assets is stretched more thinly.
We note that the Minister asserted that the Royal Navy was not
abandoning any of its tasks. However he also accepted that the
Navy is undergoing a "lean period", being heavily used
and accepting a degree of risk. Maritime surveillance assets are
an essential component of maritime security and these additional
requirements such as Libya and the Olympics pose a potential risk
to maritime security due to this overstretch and possible competing
demands for those assets. This is illustrated by the UK not contributing
any vessels this year to the international counter-piracy missions
and the necessity to use assets and personnel between operations
in the Gulf or Afghanistan for the London Olympics. (Paragraph
46)
As covered above in our response to recommendation
3, we take a layered approach to maritime surveillance and prioritise
assets against national priorities. The Home Office is currently
leading a cross-government assessment of maritime risks, which
will inform the development of a National Strategy for Maritime
Security.
Future maritime surveillance and
regeneration
8. We note that the MoD asserted it has robust
risk assessment and management procedures in place to spot any
risk escalation in the maritime surveillance area. However, in
practice the robustness of these procedures cannot be proven until
such risks materialise and are identified and dealt with or are
missed with potentially disastrous consequences. We are also less
sanguine than the Minister that if an urgent need to regenerate
the maritime surveillance capability arose this could be achieved
quickly. We accept that regenerating the complex capabilities
of the Nimrod MRA4 would be more difficult and take longer than
purchasing a platform off the shelf or putting something together
that could perform an urgent maritime surveillance function. However,
as the MoD has admitted in evidence that it is not currently considering
the rapid regeneration of any maritime patrol aircraft platform
and that it is not in discussion with industry about the regeneration
of specific maritime surveillance capabilities, and given the
complexities and testing required of maritime patrol aircraft
platforms, we require further evidence that a sufficient level
of capability could be regenerated as quickly as the Minister
suggests. (Paragraph 49)
Defence contributes to maritime surveillance in order
to reduce national risk in the maritime domain. The Government
recognises this, and supports the ongoing work by the Home Office
(for MSOG) to understand maritime risk better, through the Maritime
Risk Assessment. This process builds on the risks identified in
the annual National Security Risk Assessment work conducted by
the Civil Contingencies Secretariat which shaped the SDSR in 2010.
Furthermore, the MoD's own Force Development process is structured
specifically to support the 4-5 yearly SDSR cycle and, in the
nearer term, its Annual Budgetary Cycle and Capability audits.
It identifies risks and capability gaps across all environments
and considers how these might be mitigated, including by a cross-environmental
approach. Its Future Force Development develops, tests and analyses
the Force Structure provided by SDSR out to 10-15 years and identifies
how it can be used to meet the demands placed on Defence by the
National Security Strategy. By the next SDSR, the MoD will have
a comprehensive evidence base to support a maritime surveillance
work stream.
As previously stated, the Department currently has
no defined requirement for an MPA capability. The study into Wide
Area Maritime Underwater Search (WAMUS) concluded that in the
near term the most appropriate solution to a potential underwater
surveillance requirement was a manned aircraft, but the Department's
longer term objective is to merge as many surveillance requirements
as possible into single equipment builds (e.g. radars that can
operate in multiple modes and in all environments) and to further
refine platform types, capabilities and numbers to achieve maximum
effect at minimum cost. As such, those requirements previously
covered by the Nimrod MR2/MRA4 capability are now integrated in
the Air ISTAR portfolio and work is underway in the form of the
AIOS to understand how these requirements can be best covered
from the current and planned Air ISTAR Fleet.
The initial findings of the study will be reported
to the Military Capability Board (MCB) in April 2013. Those options
that appear to merit further investigation will then be developed
to inform a MCB Genesis Option Decision Point prior to CSR15/SDSR15.
As set out above, we will keep the Committee informed of our work
in this area. In the meantime, we have investigated what military
off-the-shelf capabilities exist. For comparison, generation of
the AIRSEEKER airborne signals intelligence capability, replacing
Nimrod R1 through an extension to the US RIVET JOINT aircraft
production line, will have taken just under five years from the
identification of the requirement to reaching Initial Operating
Capability. Should the situation warrant it, adoption of off-the-shelf
platforms, coupled with the Seedcorn personnel, could establish
a capability in significantly less time.
9. The provision of maritime surveillance should
be considered as a whole taking into account the different, competing
requirements and the risks associated with gaps and non-provision
in the capability. Capability and platform decisions must be coherent
and informed. We are aware that the capability gaps that exist
in maritime surveillance are not limited to a maritime patrol
aircraft, and include, for example, the withdrawal of Sentinel
and the loss of the four Broadsword-class Type 22 Frigates' information
and intelligence gathering capabilities and towed array sonar.
We also note that there is the potential for other capability
gaps to occur, such as when the Sea King (SKASaC) helicopter is
withdrawn in 2016 to be replaced by Project CROWSNEST operating
from the Merlin Mk 2. In response to our Report, the MoD should
set out how it intends to deal with the increased risk caused
by these emerging capability gaps. (Paragraph 53)
10. We remain concerned about the MoD's capacity
to manage the risk created by the capability gap in maritime surveillance
and about its ability to react to demand in the short and medium
term. (Paragraph 54)
The responsibility for Long Range Maritime Surveillance
is now included in the Air ISTAR portfolio. These capabilities
are included in the AIOS to understand how these requirements
can be best covered from the current and planned Air ISTAR Fleet.
The initial findings of the study will be reported to the Military
Capability Board (MCB) in April 2013 after which those options
that appear to merit further investigation will be developed with
sufficient detail to inform a MCB Genesis Option Decision Point
prior to CSR15/SDSR15.
Sentinel does not have an endorsed maritime role
and was procured and is optimised for wide area surveillance over
land. Overall, although we are carrying increased risk, we believe
we have sufficient coverage for what we need to do, using a wide
range of platforms: surface ships and submarines as well as allied
MPA and other aircraft (Merlin, Sentry and Hercules). We have
also changed tactics and procedures as necessary.
11. While we commend the MoD for undertaking studies
that will help inform future decisions on the provision of maritime
surveillance, we believe it would have been beneficial if these
studies had been undertaken before or as part of the SDSR especially
given that the MoD has admitted that the Nimrod MRA4 decision
was primarily financially driven and in the short to medium term
a maritime patrol aircraft would be the solution for maritime
surveillance requirements. (Paragraph 58)
The MoD completed some 40 individual policy and capability
studies for the SDSR, each led by a senior officer or official.
A separate review was conducted of force structure and capability
implications for each of the three single Service environments:
maritime, land and air. Maritime Surveillance capabilities were
reviewed as part of the Maritime and ISTAR environmental studies
rather than as a separate study in its own right. Capability studies
drawing on existing analysis were conducted prior to SDSR; the
analysis at the time showed that the deletion of Nimrod was the
'least worst' option. Capability studies undertaken since then
are looking at ways to address the capability gap, should it be
decided that it is necessary to do so.
12. Given that the MoD described the Nimrod MRA4
decision as the most difficult in the SDSR, it is unacceptable
that the MoD did not think it appropriate to inform us that it
was undertaking long term capability investigations into areas
directly related to the UK's maritime surveillance capabilities
whilst we were undertaking our inquiry into the National Security
Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review. Our concerns
were not limited to what the MoD was currently doing to mitigate
the capability gap as we asked the Government to outline its plans
for the regeneration of this capability. These studies would have
been relevant to that. Indeed, the MoD told us in evidence that
when responding to the concerns on Nimrod in our SDSR and NSS
Report it would have been helpful if it had thought more broadly
about that particular topic. Parliamentary scrutiny is not an
optional extra. We are concerned that had parliamentary questions
not revealed the existence of the Wide Area Maritime Underwater
Search (WAMUS) study we could have remained in ignorance of it.
We expect the MoD to be more proactive and forthcoming in its
provision of information to us. (Paragraph 61)
The Department takes Parliamentary scrutiny very
seriously. The MoD undertakes a multitude of studies, often at
quite a low level with the Department, and these are not always
visible throughout the organisation to enable seamless information
flow. In this case, a study of a capability such as surveillance
was not explicitly linked to a HCDC enquiry into the previous
SDSR. As stated above, given the Committee's intent to maintain
an enduring interest in this area, we will provide updates in
2013 and 2014.
13. We note the 2010 SDSR's acknowledgement of
the importance of military capabilities such as Intelligence,
Surveillance, Targeting, Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)
and that UK maritime capabilities will include ISTAR based on
network-enabled warships, submarines and aircraft. The capability
studies already undertaken by the MoD are a good starting point
and we welcome the commitment to an ISTAR work stream for the
next SDSR. However, given the Secretary of State for Defence's
statement that there will be a decision to be made in the next
SDSR about the capability gap in maritime patrol aircraft, we
recommend that work on the next SDSR should include a specific
maritime surveillance work stream, involving all those, military
and non-military, who make use of these assets. (Paragraph 64)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation,
which will be taken into account in preparations for the next
SDSR in 2015, which includes the Air ISTAR Optimisation study
(AIOS) into future equipment decisions.
14. We are encouraged by the rigour expected to
be applied to the spending of the £8 billion unallocated
reserve that was announced by the Secretary of State on 14 May
2012. However, we are disappointed by the MoD's assertion that
there is no requirement to buy maritime patrol aircraft (MPA)
at present and that it is not currently funded in the programme.
We are concerned that the MoD has not decided whether to fill
the capability gap especially as the Chief of the Defence Staff
has stated it was a capability that MoD wanted to have and it
is still its view that a MPA is the solution for the next 20 years.
(Paragraph 72)
We cover in our responses to recommendations 8 and
15 the work that is currently underway to examine future requirements,
in relation to both the next SDSR and beyond.
15. We are worried about how ISTAR capabilities
will be funded after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, in particular
ISTAR provided under Urgent Operational Requirements, and how
this will be incorporated into the core programme. We recommend
that the MoD consider this matter urgently and, in response to
our Report, provide details of the investment decisions on the
unallocated £8 billion announced by the Secretary of State
for Defence that were due to be made in July. (Paragraph 73)
Where an enduring requirement for a UOR is identified
and the funding is available, MoD will bring that capability into
core; work is underway to cost and prioritise the implications
of doing so, for all equipment brought under the UOR process,
against existing and future capabilities as part of Annual Budgetary
Cycle 13.
In terms of investments decisions following the PR12
outcome the Department's primary focus, so far, has been on the
delivery of the core programme and current operations. Therefore,
in July 12, a number of decisions affecting in-year spending were
taken. The Department has yet to make any decisions on investment
from the unallocated £8 billion which predominantly lies
in the latter years of the planning period.
16. We note that the Minister does not think it
is an essential prerequisite for maritime surveillance and the
attack prosecution capability to be delivered by the same asset.
In response to our Report the MoD should set out the supporting
evidence and likely costs of this split assets approach. (Paragraph
79)
The statement given was not intended to imply that
any detailed assessment of costs has been conducted, or a decision
taken to follow this approach, but simply that there is the potential
for the attack capability to be delivered either from the same
platform or from an alternate.
17. We support the principle of the MoD's Seedcorn
initiative as an attempt to maintain the ability to sustain both
the capability to operate high level fixed-winged maritime patrol
aircraft and the skills of its crews. This is an important initiative
given the MoD's statement that in the medium term another model
of maritime patrol aircraft will be required to fill the capability
gap left by the Nimrod MRA4. However, we doubt that the Seedcorn
initiative is sustainable as far as 2019, let alone to 2030, given
the continued uncertainty over the long term plans for a fixed-wing
MPA. The MoD should explain what work it has done to identify
the point at which this initiative will no longer be effective
in sustaining the ability to regenerate the capability. We recommend
that the MoD undertake a lessons learned exercise for sustaining
the ability to regenerate other capabilities in the future. (Paragraph
83)
The ISTAR Force Commander within Air Command has
taken responsibility for the Seedcorn initiative on behalf of
the MoD. Representatives from the ISTAR Force HQ, MoD Air Staff
and Air Manning meet regularly to highlight issues with the sustainability
of the programme. The point at which the initiative will no longer
be useful has not been identified, but Seedcorn should be sustainable
until a decision on a future MPA replacement is decided, at which
point the initiative will be re-focused in light of the decision
that is made at that time. Therefore, long term sustainability
of the initiative (until 2019) is less of a concern as the programme
is unlikely to endure in its current form. Lessons can be identified
in the longer term, but the Seedcorn initiative is at an early
stage and could only provide limited lessons at the moment.
18. We welcome the Minister's statement that the
MoD intends to explore fully all options and alternatives for
providing maritime surveillance. We agree that in the longer term
unmanned systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and lighter-than-air
vehicles may well be a way forward, but also note the reported
concerns regarding the limitations of using satellite technology.
There are several obstacles to overcome and the MoD should keep
us informed of progress on this. (Paragraph 90)
The Department will consider this issue as part of
the updates to the Committee proposed for 2013 and 2014.
19. We note the MoD's confirmation that the requirements
for unmanned aerial systems were taken into account prior to the
decision to revert to a STOVL system on the new carriers and that
the capability to undertake maritime surveillance using unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) launched from carriers would not be affected
by this decision. We also note the concerns expressed to us on
the limited number of UAVs that can operate in a STOVL manner
and expect the MoD to keep this under review particularly if it
becomes a requirement for future carrier launched UAVs undertaking
maritime surveillance to have a weapons capability. We expect
the MoD to keep us informed on progress of the possible use of
carrier based UAVs for maritime surveillance. (Paragraph 94)
The Department notes the concerns about the limited
number of UAV that can operate in a STOVL manner, however, flying
UAVs from a carrier without catapults does not necessarily mean
they have to be STOVL; they are generally lighter than manned
aircraft and are therefore less constrained by performance in
the launch and recovery phase than their manned counterparts.
This area will be included in our updates to the Committee as
stated above.
20. We note the MoD's acceptance that since the
SDSR the Department's reliance on allies to provide maritime surveillance
has increased, though because of the range of capabilities and
sources of information still available to the Department it had
not done so markedly, and that the withdrawal of Nimrod had required
greater reliance on other nations to provide maritime patrol aircraft
(MPA) cover. We are concerned that the Government has not thought
it necessary to try to secure any additional agreements to ensure
the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities. Part of the
MoD's examination of future maritime surveillance requirements
should include an examination of those areas where a sovereign
capability would be desirable and this should feed into the Department's
consideration of a new MPA and the investigation of other options
such as UAVs. We support the UK's participation in the NATO Tier
Two proposal for maritime surveillance and expect to be regularly
updated on its progress. (Paragraph 99)
The Government notes the Committee's concerns but
would emphasise that Defence's collaboration with its allies and
partners is enduring. We rarely act alone and work hard to ensure
that initiatives such as NATO Smart Defence or the European Union's
pooling and sharing initiatives maximise collective capability.
In addition to these initiatives, Defence seeks to improve bilateral
cooperation, where appropriate, in order to provide additional
capabilities. A good example of this is the Memorandum of Understanding
signed on 6 March 2012 between our Secretary of State for Defence
and the Norwegian Minister for Defence. Specifically this MOU
calls for increased cooperation in air surveillance, including
Maritime Patrol.
The desirability of a purely sovereign maritime surveillance
capability will be considered within the scope of the AIOS. The
work will include investigating the potential for collaborative
and cooperative MPA/MMA projects within NATO and we will continue
to have representation at those NATO meetings where maritime surveillance
is on the agenda. We will provide the Committee with updates on
progress when appropriate.
Cross-Government cooperation
21. We commend the Government for the establishment
of the Maritime Security Oversight Group (MSOG) and the National
Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) which have improved cross-government
cooperation on maritime surveillance issues. The MSOG's work on
the development of a National Strategy for Maritime Security is
an important piece of work that should be prioritised across Government.
In response to our Report the Government should provide us with
an update on this work and its planned timetable for it being
brought to a conclusion. It must not become a stop-start endeavour.
We endorse the work of NMIC as a valuable element in enhancing
the national security of the UK. We will take a close interest
in its work and how it develops in the future. We are not currently
persuaded by the suggestion that NMIC could evolve to become a
decision making centre. This would represent a considerable change
in the way Government undertakes maritime security and safety
operations particularly at a time of major change in the defence
arena. (Paragraph 115)
The Home Office, on behalf of the membership of the
MSOG, is currently leading a cross-government assessment of maritime
risks. This risk assessment is expected to be completed in December
2012. The findings and conclusions will need to be considered
by MSOG and will, on current plans, be used to inform the development
of a National Strategy for Maritime Security by next summer.
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation.
The role and remit of the NMIC is currently subject to a review
within the Home Office as an integral part of a wider review,
of 'border intelligence'. The review will seek to learn lessons
from NMIC's operational role to date before proposing options
for its long term strategic role and remit, and outline implications
for future oversight and governance. We propose no changes should
be made to NMIC's role and remit in advance of the conclusion
of this work.
22. We believe that there is room for further
improvement in cross-government cooperation in maritime matters.
We are not convinced that an "informal group of Ministers"
is the appropriate forum for taking forward the debate on maritime
surveillance issues. Although decisions may ultimately be made
in Cabinet or the National Security Council, we recommend that
there should be a greater level of ministerial involvement in
maritime surveillance as an issue particularly given the number
of cross-government interests involved and as a way of arbitrating
disputes between departments and ensuring that the differing interests
are focusing on the right areas at the appropriate time. In response
to our Report the Government should also provide us with an update
on progress on the Maritime Security Oversight Group's work towards
a single air surveillance contract. This should include the alternative
options that the Government is considering as a potential model
for the UK in this area. (Paragraph 116)
The maritime domain spans the interests of a number
of government departments and agencies. The MSOG comes together
to consider cross cutting issues including aerial and surface
surveillance. The Home Office is in the process of determining
an appropriate ministerial oversight and governance framework
to ensure that maritime security issues are prioritised and considered
appropriately. These oversight and governance arrangements will
need to be informed by the maritime risk assessment, the balance
of interests across the maritime domain and related maritime threat
levels, and border intelligence review as noted above.
A sub-group of the MSOG is working to progress a
single air surveillance contract. Scoping work has been undertaken
to consider market intelligence, business requirements and technical
specification. Further work is now being started on considering
potential models for procurement, and cross-government command
and control, planning, tasking, prioritisation and data sharing.
Conclusions
23. We agree with our witnesses that there is
a risk associated with the capability gap in maritime surveillance.
We acknowledge that the Government accept this and we welcome
the work being undertaken to investigate how to mitigate the risks
inherent in the gap and ensure the longer term provision of maritime
surveillance. The MoD asserts that it has robust risk assessment
and management procedures in place to spot any risk escalation
in the maritime surveillance arena, but we remain unconvinced
it has the capacity to respond to any sudden escalation in that
risk. Furthermore we believe the risk is likely to worsen in the
medium term as further maritime surveillance capabilities are
withdrawn or not yet filled. The UK's maritime flank is likely
to be increasingly exposed: this risk must be kept under close
and continuous review, and we will continue to take a close interest
in the MoD's work in this area. (Paragraph 117)
24. The MoD has acknowledged that there is a strategic
and national security requirement for maritime surveillance. We
are concerned that the MoD is sending mixed messages in respect
of the need for a maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). On one hand
it says that there is no requirement for such an aircraft and
that it is not funded or in the programme but on the other hand
it acknowledges that its absence is a risk and something may need
to be done. The MoD must explain why it is satisfactory to wait
until 2015 or beyond before deciding how to close the capability
gap in maritime surveillance particularly as the MoD acknowledge
that a MPA is the solution in the short to medium term. We commend
the work that the MoD is undertaking to explore the wide range
of possibilities such as unmanned aerial vehicles, lighter-than-air
vehicles and space technology, for the future long term provision
of maritime surveillance capabilities. This work must not be allowed
to lose momentum, particularly as no one individual is responsible
for maritime surveillance in the MoD. (Paragraph 118)
25. There is a wide demand across Government departments
and agencies for maritime surveillance capabilities. The establishment
of the Maritime Security Oversight Group and the National Maritime
Information Centre are welcome first steps towards a more strategic
and coordinated output and as a way of mitigating some of the
capability gaps. The challenge is to develop these further and
we are keen to see a more prominent ministerial role particularly
given the number of cross-government interests involved and as
a way of arbitrating disputes between departments and ensuring
that the differing interests are focusing on the right areas at
the appropriate time. (Paragraph 119)
The Government fully recognises the importance of
maritime surveillance to the UK. The Department has accepted a
capability gap and increased risk by deleting Nimrod and we assess
that other assets used as part of a layered approach can reduce
this risk to some degree, and it remains within tolerable levels.
This situation is kept under review and our steps to manage the
risk are discussed in the above response. As previously discussed,
the AIOS will inform future capability decisions and we will be
giving an update to the Committee in 2013 as initial findings
from the AIOS and other developments are considered.
|