Securing the future of Afghanistan

Written Evidence from the Ministry Of Defence

This memorandum provides evidence on a range of topics related to the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan and requested by the House of Commons Defence Committee.

The information provided in the text is principally drawn from HM Government sources. Acknowledgment is made as appropriate for sections which draw significantly from ISAF or other sources.

1. BACKGROUND

1.1. Population

Located at the crossroads of Central Asia, Afghanistan shares borders with Pakistan, Iran, China and the central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.

Afghanistan has a population estimated at 28.7m [1] but also has a large number of refugees (as many as two million) living in Pakistan and Iran. The population comprises numerous ethnic groups, the largest being the Pashtuns (c.40%) who live predominantly in the south and the Tajiks (c.35%) who are found mostly in the north. The other main ethnic groups are the Hazaras, Uzbeks, Chahar, Aimaks, Turkmen and Balochs.

The overwhelming majority of Afghans (about 99%) are Muslims. Of these 84% are Sunnis and 15% Shiites (mostly the Hazaras and Tajiks). Small groups of Hindus, Sikhs, Parsis and Jews are scattered in the towns.

1.2. Overview

Over 30 years of conflict have left Afghanistan one of the poorest countries in the world. Afghanistan ranks 172 out of 187 countries and territories on the UN’s Human Development Index – the lowest outside of Africa [2] . A third of Afghans live below the poverty line; one in six children die before their fifth birthday; and average life expectancy is just 48. Only one in four Afghans are able to read and write. Afghanistan remains off-track on all the Millennium Development Goals and has agreed a five year extension until 2020. Corruption is a problem felt personally by many Afghans, fuelled by patronage politics and a war economy. Women and girls still face enormous challenges and huge disadvantages in the areas of political participation and decision-making.

A weak and politically unstable state fosters insecurity and holds back social and economic development. Afghanistan’s diverse cultural and ethnic mix, and resistance to change from external influences, are contributing factors. Poor governance and corruption undermine trust in the government, while weak public sector capacity hinders service delivery. The transition process is now well underway but it will likely be another decade before the Afghan Government is able to pay for its own security costs without external support.

From this low base, progress has been made over the last ten years. 5.8 million children now attend school, over a third of whom are girls, up from virtually none under the Taliban. 85% of Afghans are now covered by basic health services, compared to 9% in 2002. The economy has grown by an average of 11% per annum since 2002, and tax revenue has risen from $200m in 2004 to a preliminary estimate of $2bn in 2011/2012; progress is being made on strengthening public financial management, and local government is improving in some areas.

The Afghan government is increasingly taking the lead, in working for better security, governance, social and economic opportunities for Afghan people. Long term stability in Afghanistan will also be dependent on increased regional cooperation and integration, particularly on issues such as security, trade and economic infrastructure. While improvements have been made, considerable challenges still lie ahead.

1.3. Security

Violence levels in Afghanistan remain broadly commensurate with 2011 figures. In the three months from May-July 2012 ISAF reported an overall increase by 6% of enemy initiated attacks (EIAs) compared to the same quarter in 2011. The increase was principally in southern Afghanistan, where the ten most kinetic districts in the country generated 45% of nationwide EIAs. The rise in incidents was mainly attributed to a shortened poppy harvest [3] , an earlier seasonal pre-Ramadan rise in insurgents’ activity, improved reporting of attacks against the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the high operational tempo initiated and maintained by ANSF and ISAF forces.

Levels of violence largely follow seasonal patterns. The number of incidents are typically suppressed during the winter as harsh climatic conditions restrict insurgent freedom of movement leading many fighters to return to their homes. The onset of spring historically sees insurgents rejoin the fight until diverted by the annual poppy harvest. Insurgent activity typically peaks over the summer months, albeit with a slight dip over Ramadan, before dipping at the end of the year with the return of cold weather and the Afghan winter.

ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS: NATIONWIDE MONTHLY YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGE [4]

Regionally the security situation remains varied with the overwhelming majority of violent incidents taking place in the south, south west and east of the country [5] . In Regional Command (South West) (RC (SW)), which includes the UK’s area of operations, violence levels in 2012 remain broadly similar to 2011. Between January and July 2012 ISAF recorded a 3% decrease in EIAs compared to the same period in 2011. The insurgents’ operating environment continues to be disrupted by Combined Force (ANSF and ISAF) operations. This year we have seen growing evidence that violent incidents are being increasingly displaced to the rural fringes as the momentum generated by ISAF and an increasingly capable ANSF forces the insurgents to focus on protecting their safe havens away from the key population centres. Two factors will need to be closely monitored across RC(SW) over the coming months: the reduction of US surge forces (and the degree to which the ANSF are able to compensate for this reduction), and the impact of an early Ramadan which could be followed by a longer insurgent fighting season before the effects of winter reduce the scale of their operations. Though tangible progress has been made we must continue to expect challenges ahead. The insurgency is a resilient and determined force; as transition continues the Central Helmand River Valley will remain important to them and as such they are likely to continue to contest it both with ISAF and the ANSF.

ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS: MONTHLY YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGE REGIONAL COMMANDS SOUTH WEST AND CAPITAL (JAN 08-JUL 12)

Regional Command Capital (RC (C)) continues to receive less than 1% of EIAs despite being home to approximately 15% of the population and a large number of high-profile targets. As transition continues the insurgents are likely to make further attempts to attack Kabul due to the significant media and political attention such incidents receive. Linked to this is the insurgents’ continued focus on assassination attempts of Government and ANSF officials in order to discredit the Afghan Government (and Government institutions) and disrupt its ability to carry out effective governance. Afghan security agencies, supported where needed by ISAF, have and will continue to disrupt threat streams to the capital [6] . Afghan and coalition security forces will sustain a high tempo of operations, thereby maintaining pressure on the insurgency with the aim of minimising the threat they pose to long-term stability.

Despite continued insurgent intent to conduct a violent campaign in Afghanistan the majority of their attacks have been unable to achieve their strategic objectives. While significant media attention is generated by high profile ‘spectaculars’ ANSF reaction to them has generally been fast, professional and increasingly independent of ISAF.

In an attempt to avoid direct engagement with ANSF and ISAF forces, the insurgency continues to rely heavily on the use of asymmetric tactics, such as indirect fire and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), to execute their campaign. Indiscriminate use of IEDs represent a major threat to both the civil and military populations and continue to cause the greatest number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. Considerable effort has been invested in Counter-IED technology and ISAF reporting covering July records that more than half of IEDs and mines were found and cleared rather than exploded.

1.4. Transition

Transition is proceeding well. On 13 May, the Afghan Government announced those areas that would be part of the third tranche of transition. Once fully implemented, 75% of the Afghan population will live in areas where the ANSF have the lead responsibility for security.

The ANSF are steadily increasing their overall force size and remain on track to reach their approved ‘surge’ end strength of 352,000 by the end of October. The surge target is intended to provide Afghan-led security for all of Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and is designed to enable the consolidation of ISAF gains by maintaining a high tempo of operations throughout transition.

ANSF quality and competence continue to improve steadily; however, there remain lags and significant enabler support from international forces is still required. The quality and lack of leaders within the ANSF, particularly at the tactical level, remains a challenging issue and efforts are being made to reduce these shortfalls.

In March the ANSF and ISAF completed and approved their joint Operational Plan: Operation Naweed ("Good News") 1391. This is the plan to synchronise ANSF and ISAF efforts over the course of the Afghan Year 1391 [7] and involves all elements of the Afghan security forces. Naweed 1391 is the first time that the ANSF have taken the leading role in campaign planning. The plan includes a detailed concept of operations for each geographic region, including local integration of Army, Police, National Directorate of Security and ISAF activities. The operation represents a further evolution in transition and the ANSF’s capability to manage the campaign in an increasingly independent manner. The planning cycle for the Afghan year 1392 is underway.

Whilst needing to meet the requirements of a gradual drawdown by the end of 2014 ISAF continues to work with the ANSF to improve Afghan enablers, prioritise the professionalisation of the forces and build an ANSF that is able to effectively manage Afghanistan’s security and prosecute any residual insurgent threat after 2014.

1.5. UK Casualties

As at 16 September 2012, a total of 430 British forces personnel have died while serving in Afghanistan since the start of operations in October 2001. This includes 33 fatalities in 2012 [8] .

The most recent, detailed casualty and fatality figures, which cover the period up to 31 August 2012 are provided below:

AFGHANISTAN: UK FATALITY FIGURES BY YEAR:

AFGHANISTAN: UK CASUALTIES BY YEAR

1.6. Civilian Casualties

On 8 August, the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) released its Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2012 Midyear Report. The report which covered the first six months of this year recorded a 15% decrease in overall civilian casualties compared with the same period in 2011. UNAMA reported that the insurgency were responsible for 80% of civilian casualties and ISAF/ANSF operations for 10%. A further 10% of civilian casualties could not be attributed to any party in the conflict. The protection of the Afghan civilian population remains at the core of ISAF’s strategy. We will continue to take considerable steps to prevent civilian casualties.

1.7. International Support

2012 has seen several strategically important conferences for Afghanistan. At the NATO Summit in Chicago in May, nations confirmed that the ISAF mission will complete at the end of 2014 but reaffirmed their close partnership with Afghanistan beyond the transition period, recalling the firm mutual commitments made between the broader International Community and Afghanistan at the Bonn Conference in December 2011. Significantly, firm financial commitments were pledged to support the ANSF in the years after transition completes.

The 8 July Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan was the next international meeting to deliver concrete commitments to the promise of the long-term partnership made at Bonn. At Tokyo the international community and the Afghan Government came together to agree on-going development support for Afghanistan for the next five years. $16bn was pledged for development until 2015, and there was also agreement to sustain support through to 2017, "at or near levels of the past decade". The UK announced that it would maintain our current development assistance of £178m a year until 2017. This support will help the Government of Afghanistan tackle extreme poverty, create jobs and achieve sustainable economic growth over the long term.

Importantly, our continued support will depend on the Government of Afghanistan’s progress towards key governance and economic reforms as set out in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, which all partners at Tokyo signed.

On 14 June, the Heart of Asia Ministerial Conference convened in Kabul. The conference was attended by 28 ministerial and high-level delegations from Heart of Asia and supporting countries, including eleven delegations from regional and international organisations. NATO was represented by the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Kabul and the UK by the Foreign Secretary. The conference was the first follow-up meeting to advance the Istanbul Process (2011), intended to strengthen regional dialogue on Afghanistan, develop confidence-building measures among Heart of Asia nations and coordinate various regional cooperation efforts on key economic, political, and security issues. In spite of significant threat streams, the ANSF, in close coordination with ISAF, ensured the proceedings concluded incident free.

1.8. Political Developments

On 4 July, Pakistan reopened the supply lines into Afghanistan. The agreement ends the seven month closure that forced ISAF nations to use alternative logistical routes albeit with minimal operational impact.

On 4 August, the Lower House of the Afghan National Assembly, the Wolesi Jirga, passed votes of no confidence in Abdul Rahim Wardak, the Minister of Defence, and Bismullah Khan Muhammedi, the Minister of the Interior. Both Ministers had been summoned to the Wolesi Jirga to account for their response to cross-border shelling from Pakistan in Konar Province. Wardak publicly resigned three days later before being appointed as a special advisor to President Karzai on defence matters.

On 15 September the Afghan Parliament ratified President Karzai’s nominations for new security ministers. Bismullah Khan former Interior Minister was duly appointed Minister of Defence. Ghulam Mujtaba Patang becomes Interior Minister and Assadullah Khalid head of the National Directorate of Security.

1.9. Governance

ISAF continues to provide support to Afghan-led governance efforts, particularly in key areas of transition, reintegration, counter-corruption and rule of law improvement. The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme is still encountering challenges, but has seen improvements in implementation capacity. As of 31 July 2012 the programme has officially reintegrated more than 5,000 former insurgents although the vast majority of these are from the less challenging parts of the country.

The NATO-led Building Integrity Initiative continues to develop the Afghan Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) capabilities to support the ANSF. For the period 2012-2014, priority will be given to the planning and management of financial and human resources. On 26 July, President Karzai issued a Presidential Decree that focuses on improving governance and tackling corruption. The Decree reflects the President’s stated determination to address these issues.

NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission continues to work with The Afghan Government to improve the provision of state justice with qualified personnel at the provincial and district levels.

1.10. Development/Human Rights

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are in the process of transferring their functions to the Afghan Government and channel enduring assistance through government or traditional development actors (International Organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations, private sector).

ISAF stays committed to its support of monitoring and reporting violations against children by armed actors, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1612. ISAF and UNAMA have jointly undertaken several practical steps to support Afghan institutions in implementing an action plan to stop and prevent grave child rights violations, including actions to prevent underage recruitment of ANSF, sexual abuse and killing and maiming of children.

As restated at the NATO summit at Chicago in May the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security remains a priority. ISAF continues to monitor and support the Afghan Government in creating a more gender sensitive environment. Although female political and social representation has increased, their effective participation in political processes and economic activities remain limited. Furthermore, women’s rights violations remain prevalent despite existing legislation, while female access to education and health services remain relatively low.

2. POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

2.1. State of the Political Process

The UK continues to support an Afghan-led, inclusive political process to help bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. President Karzai has made clear that reconciliation is open to those members of the insurgency who are willing to: renounce violence; break ties with al Qaeda and respect the Afghan constitution. In July this year the Prime Minister met President Karzai and Pakistani Prime Minister Ashraf in Kabul and reaffirmed his support for a "political solution to end the violence in Afghanistan" that was "owned by Afghans, facilitated by Pakistan and other regional countries, and supported by the UK and the wider international community."

The High Peace Council (HPC), chaired by Salahuddin Rabbani, leads the peace and reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan. This includes high-level outreach to senior Taleban leaders as well as reintegration of low and mid-level fighters through the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP). The difficult nature of the HPCs work is highlighted by the assassination of two of its membership in the last year, including its venerated former Chairman. Notwithstanding, the HPC has undertaken some encouraging outreach to Pakistan. Nationwide 5,000 former insurgents have entered the APRP since its inception, though the majority of these have been from the north and west of Afghanistan where the security environment is typically less challenging than in the south and east. Helmand, where the majority of UK Forces are based, accounts for around 1% of the number reintegrated nationally. The Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team continues to support Governor Mangal, the Provincial Peace Council and the ANSF in promoting reintegration. At the national level, we work closely with the HPC to support its outreach programme.

The international community has also played a broader role in support of Afghan efforts. At the start of the year the Taleban issued a statement on its website expressing a willingness to participate in a political office in Qatar. Both President Karzai and the Pakistani Prime Minister issued statements in support of the proposed office. However, on 15 March the Taleban announced the suspension of talks over the office until they had clarity about the US’ position. We judge that this is a tactical pause in negotiations.

In addition to reconciliation with the insurgency, it is important that any political settlement takes account of the needs of all Afghan constituencies including women, the different ethnicities and minority groups, and religious minorities. All Afghans must have confidence that the process will, over time, lead to more representative and inclusive politics. In order to secure and maintain the widest possible support for the Government, and address some of potential challenges of the period up to and beyond 2014, some improvements to governance will be required. This is likely to include reforms which will set up a better balance of power between the centre in Kabul and the provinces. Improvements to the electoral system which result in fairer and more transparent elections will also help to ensure that future elections are credible and inclusive. But these changes, if they are to stick, are for the Afghans themselves to lead and own. We can and do support them in this, as evidenced in the work we do to encourage political parties and parliament to promote inclusive politics.

A key step towards political reform was made in July 2012 at the Tokyo Conference, where, along with the international community’s pledge of $16bn of development aid until 2015 and agreement to sustain support through 2017, the Afghan Government committed to economic and governance reforms, including tackling corruption and promoting human rights, especially those of women. The commitments are captured in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), which will be used to track progress and ensure accountability to both the international community and the Afghan people. It will also hold donors to their promises to channel funding more effectively and predictably.

2.2. Challenges to a Political Settlement

There remain several significant challenges to a political settlement in Afghanistan. We see signs that there is debate within the Taleban about their political outreach and role in Afghanistan’s future. Some senior Taleban figures realise that Afghanistan has changed enormously since 2001 and that they have no hope of re-establishing the Emirate. But the insurgency is a complex and disparate entity, and many continue to reject engagement with the West and/or the Afghan Government. Disagreement within the leadership about their direction, and the potential for spoilers to destabilise any progress pose a major risk to a political process.

The Presidential election due to take place in 2014 will not be without risk. A credible and transparent Afghan-led election leading to a legitimate result is a key component of the enduring aim for a secure and stable Afghanistan. The Government welcomes President Karzai’s reiteration that he will step down at the end of his current term and support a constitutional transfer of power in 2014. The 2014 election will need to be inclusive, taking into account the needs of all Afghan constituencies, including the different ethnicities, minorities and women, and its result must be also supported by the losing parties. An election that is heavily flawed, or delivers a strongly disputed result that does not reflect the ethnic balance of Afghanistan, or the lack of an election at all could cause significant divisions, destabilise the country and lead to widespread protest and disruption, making progress towards a final inclusive political settlement more challenging.

The UK, working with international partners, continues to support projects designed to build the capability of the Afghan Independent Elections Commission to oversee the elections through funding the UNDP’s ELECT II programme for electoral reform and capacity building, as well as financially supporting civil society groups to input into the electoral reform process and strengthen the system. The UK supports the Afghan Government to take the lead on the elections process, whilst making clear the need to adhere to the principles of a credible and broadly inclusive process.

The success of any political process will depend also on the participation and support of Afghanistan’s neighbours. Pakistan has a key role to play and a political settlement in Afghanistan would reinforce stability and security in Pakistan. We welcome former Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani’s statement calling on the Taleban to participate in a political process, and we continue to encourage the Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan to work together constructively on this agenda. However, we recognise that there remain obstacles to Afghanistan-Pakistan co-operation, and these form another of the key challenges to a political settlement in Afghanistan.

2.3. Regional Position

Security and stability in Afghanistan is in the mutual interest of all its neighbours. Afghanistan’s neighbours have a political as well as an economic stake in co-operation and the major ethnic groups such as Hazaras, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Pashtuns all have ties to neighbouring countries. None of Afghanistan’s neighbours have an interest in either a return to Taleban rule or civil war in Afghanistan. They have all, in different ways, suffered as a result of Afghanistan’s varying levels of instability during the past 20 years and the related problems of narcotics trafficking, refugees and disrupted trade routes.

At the Istanbul Conference in November 2011 Afghanistan and its neighbours agreed the regionally-owned Process on security and co-operation. Participants also gave their collective backing to the Afghan Government’s efforts to promote an inclusive reconciliation process. The follow-up ministerial conference, which the Foreign Secretary attended, in Kabul in June 2012 endorsed the implementation of seven Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in security, economic and cultural fields. The UK has supporter status within this regional process and has offered to provide assistance for the Chambers of Commerce, Counter-Narcotics, Counter-Terrorism and Disaster Management CBMs. We will continue to engage with the process and will work closely with the regional countries selected to coordinate the implementation of each CBM.

In addition, Afghanistan is now a member of several regional organisations, including the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), the Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO) and Central Asia Regional Economic Co-operation (CAREC). Most recently, Afghanistan was granted observer status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). These fora can also make a positive contribution to Afghanistan’s development and its participation is an important indication of its increasing relations with the wider region.

Many of Afghanistan’s neighbours, such as Iran, are sensitive to any long-term Western military presence in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, Russia and China do not want the ISAF mission to fail, and Russia has called for troops to remain beyond 2014. Russia in particular, alongside many of the Central Asian states, has provided logistical support to the ISAF mission by allowing access to transit routes.

Foreign direct investment from Afghanistan’s neighbours is increasing, particularly in the extractive industries. China and India have both won large mining contracts, including the $3.2bn Aynak copper mine and Hajigak iron ore concession. In addition, both countries have signed Strategic Partnerships with Afghanistan, pledging to increase bilateral cooperation across a broad range of fields. India is Afghanistan’s largest regional donor, pledging $2bn in development aid since 2001, and has agreed to lead on two regional commercial CBMs under the auspices of the Istanbul Process.

2.4. Pakistan

Of all Afghanistan’s neighbours, Pakistan arguably has the most to lose from instability in Afghanistan. It suffers more casualties from terrorism than any other country in the world. Pakistan and Afghanistan need to work together to root out violent extremists from either side of their border, who continue to undermine the sovereignty of both democratic governments. There must be an end to safe havens for militants in Pakistan. We recognise Pakistan does not have complete control over the situation and cannot take on every militant group at once, but it needs to acknowledge that part of the problem is its legacy of dealing with these groups.

The current tone of government-to-government relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan is positive, with successful visits by Foreign Minister Khar to Kabul and President Karzai to Islamabad earlier this year. Former Prime Minister Gilani’s statement calling on the Taleban to engage in the peace process is a crucial step. It is important that Pakistan continues follow up with practical actions, including co-operating with the Afghan Government’s requests for assistance, and providing safe access for those members of the Taleban who want to enter into the political process. The UK is committed to strengthening trust between the two countries by promoting transparency and identifying opportunities for dialogue. We welcome Pakistan’s active participation in regional initiatives such as the Istanbul Process and its leadership of the Disaster Management CBM. In particular, we are keen to encourage greater economic ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan, both to support long term fiscal self-sustainability and as a means of underpinning the ongoing political negotiations.

3. TRANSITION

Transition is the process by which security responsibility for Afghanistan is gradually transferred from ISAF to Afghan leadership.

At the Kabul Conference in July 2010, President Karzai publicly expressed his ambition that Afghan security forces would have full security responsibility across Afghanistan by the end of 2014. This objective, an Afghan ambition fully supported by NATO, is aligned with the strategy of phased transition of security responsibility from ISAF to the ANSF that was agreed at the NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010.

Transition is a carefully planned, joint endeavour. It is a conditions-based process and is designed to lead to a sustainable hand-over. The assessments of these conditions are made by the Joint Afghan NATO Inteqal [1] Board (JANIB). The decision to start transition in any given area is based on a thorough and regular assessment of the security, governance and development situation on the ground. The following elements are taken into consideration as part of the decision making process:

· the capability of the ANSF to shoulder additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF;

· the level of security allowing the population to pursue routine daily activities;

· the degree of development of local governance, so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced; and

· whether ISAF is postured properly to reduce the coalition footprint as ANSF capabilities increase.

Formal announcement of individual tranches for transition are made by the Afghan Government.

Successful transition of security responsibility requires that Afghan security forces, under effective Afghan civilian control, will be capable of tackling security challenges on a sustainable and irreversible basis – with NATO support coming through training, advising and institutional development

Transition will take place in five tranches, with the third tranche currently underway. We expect the final set of provinces and districts, tranche 5, to commence in mid-2013. This will be an important milestone marking the point where the Afghans have lead security responsibility across Afghanistan. Transition to full Afghan leadership will be complete by end of 2014 as set out at Lisbon.

As a district commences its transition process and ISAF conducts transfer of lead security responsibility to the ANSF, that area then enters the first of four transitional stages with ISAF moving from a partnering, to mentoring, to enabling, to sustaining role, (Support-Mentor-Enable-Sustain), each of which delineates changing responsibilities between ISAF and the ANSF which then determines the role of ISAF forces. Transition from one stage to the next is a conditions based activity. As the stages progress, ISAF/ANSF partnering reduces with a commensurately increased emphasis on advising and mentoring the ANSF, and on ANSF ownership of security for the area. As the transition process continues, the ANSF become increasingly independent, ISAF forces in turn gradually step back and the level of command at which the Afghans are advised, lifts.

According to the process agreed at Lisbon, ISAF forces should be able to step back to an operational overwatch role after 12 to 18 months, at the conclusion of stage four. This is why the Prime Minister has able to confirm that by the middle of next year British forces will have shifted their focus from primarily combat to principally support in all three of the districts of Helmand for which we have been responsible. The Afghans will therefore have lead responsibility for security a year before the transition process completes and our troops leave their combat role at the end of 2014.

3.1. Transition Tranches

Tranche 1 transition was announced by President Karzai in March 2011 and commenced in July of that year. Tranche one covered 32 districts (8%) across seven provinces. It included Kabul and, within Task Force Helmand, Lashkar Gah.

Tranche 2 was announced by the Afghan Government in November 2011 and commenced in December. The second tranche included 106 districts (26%) across 18 provinces. Tranche two included three Helmand districts (Marjah, Nawah-ye-Barakazai and, within Task Force Helmand, Nad-e Ali).

Tranche 3 was announced by the Afghan Government in May 2012 and implementation began from July. Tranche three covers 122 districts (30%) across 25 provinces. The tranche 3 announcement will see all 34 provinces in Afghanistan have districts within the transition process. While this is a notable sign of increasing ANSF capability it is anticipated that Tranche 3 which includes some of the more kinetic areas, may be more challenging operationally than Tranches 1 and 2. Tranche 3 includes five Helmand districts (Dishu, Garmer Ser, Reg-e-Khan Neshin, Washer and Nahr-e Saraj). The inclusion of Nahr-e Saraj by the end of October 2012 will see all three central Helmand districts within the Task Force Helmand area of operations within the transition process.

Tranche one and two districts cover areas home to roughly half of the Afghan population. Once implementation of tranche three areas is complete, 75% of the population will live in areas where the ANSF have the security lead.

There are still 143 districts (35%) yet to enter the transition process. The remaining Helmand districts are all in the north of the Province (Baghran, Kajaki, Musa Qal’ah, Now Zad and Sangin). Further transition announcements (tranches 4 and 5) will be at the discretion of the Afghan Government but we anticipate future announcements later this year.

TRANSITION TRANCHES 1-3 [1]

TRANSITION IN HELMAND

3.2. Security Force Assistance

Security Forces Assistance is a conceptual approach to the nature of the ISAF campaign, as it shifts from an ISAF led counterinsurgency campaign to an ANSF one . This defines the evolution of coalition support to the ANSF through transition. ISAF force elements will shift from being a partner unit, to a transition support unit. The provision of advisory teams will reinforce the existing advisor construct provided by the Brigade Advisory Group. Each of these levels has a progressively lighter relationship with the ANSF, will be generally smaller, and will enable greater flexibility, generating gains for troop-contributing nations. The construct was implemented this year and will be fully operational by 2013, when the final Afghan districts enter transition.

THE SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE MODEL

3.3. Security Assessment

National Picture

Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 districts continue to make progress, thereby building public confidence. Afghan capabilities to secure, govern and develop Tranche 1 areas continue to improve at a steady pace as the transition process moves forward. There is optimism over the continued success and progress in Tranche 1 areas, and while there will inevitably continue to be insurgent attacks and criminally-based violence in transitioning areas, the ANSF has the capability (with ISAF support) to manage these incidents.

It is our assessment that all of the Tranche 2 areas are challenging but manageable.

Task Force Helmand

Lashkar Gah District divided into eight precincts entered transition in July 2011 as part of Tranche 1. With effect from March 2012 security for all these precincts and Route 601 (the main arterial route into Lashkar Gah) had transferred to the ANSF. Security for the entire district is now an Afghan lead (‘stage 3’). A police presence is evident in all precincts with security in the District Centre entirely ANSF led. Along route 601 the Afghan National Army provides freedom of movement for local nationals supported by the Afghan Uniformed Police who man a number of checkpoints along the route. Additional support is provided by the Afghan National Army Quick Reactive Force that has been used on several occasions to provide an entirely Afghan solution to security incidents. The Afghan focus is now increasingly on developing their ability to police in-depth and to expand the security bubble along the route.

ISAF are moving from partnering the ANSF to an advisory role whilst providing continued support to the Afghans by focussing their efforts outside the protected communities.

ISAF forces currently represent less than 20% of security forces in Lashkar Gah.

Nad-e Ali District entered transition in December 2011 as part of Tranche 2. Since then, and in line with a conditions based assessment, lead security responsibility has been handed from ISAF to the ANSF in seven out of ten precincts. The remainder are set to transfer responsibility later this year and ISAF forces will enter stage 2 (tactical support) by the end of 2012. In those precincts where the Afghan security forces have the lead, they are delivering effective security allowing the local population to go about their day-to-day business within a protected community. ISAF no longer provide security in these areas, purely advice and mentoring support to their Afghan partners.

ISAF forces currently represent less than 50% of security forces in Nad-e Ali.

Nar-e Saraj District was announced in May as one of the districts in Tranche 3 of transition. While, at the time of writing, no date has been set for when Nar–e Saraj will formally enter this process, it is expected that implementation will take place before the end of October 2012.

For those districts in Helmand which have entered transition, there has been a marked decrease in enemy initiated attacks. Within Helmand Tranche 1 (Lashkar Gah) there has been a 57% year on year decrease in attacks, and in Tranche 2 (Nad-e Ali, Marjah and Nawa) a 15% reduction.

4. COUNTER NARCOTICS

The UK recognises that the drugs trade poses a critical threat to the stability of Afghanistan. It undermines security and has a corrosive effect on governance. The drugs trade and the insurgency benefit one another through funding and protection, and the trade fuels institutional corruption at every level, eroding governance and public confidence.

The UK supports the comprehensive approach set out in the Government of Afghanistan’s National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). This strategy balances law enforcement action with capacity-building and the development of sustainable alternative livelihoods, and we offer both policy and practical support in a number of dimensions. The Afghan Government has renewed its commitment to delivery of the NDCS which has recently been subject to a comprehensive review.

In 2011, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Afghan Opium Survey reported that opium poppy cultivation rose nationally by 7% compared to 2010. This follows two successive years of declining cultivation (reductions of 19% in 2008 and a further 22% in 2009) and a flat figure in 2010. It is still about 1/3 down on the 2007 high. UNODC does not make national level predictions ahead of the release of its annual survey in September/October. Our current assumptions are that we do not expect there to be significant increases or decreases this year on a national basis.

The US and the UK are longstanding partners on Afghan counter-narcotics (CN), with a shared view that this trade represents a threat to security. We work together on a variety of projects ranging from law enforcement/interdiction to diplomatic negotiation to alternative livelihoods, all to tackle directly the drugs trade. For example, the joint UK/US Counter Narcotics Justice Centre, which includes the UK-mentored Criminal Justice Taskforce (CJTF), is a multi-departmental Afghan detention, investigation, prosecution and judicial centre targeting high level narcotics crimes. The CJTF has secured over 1000 convictions for narcotics offences since it was established in 2005. In 2010-11, the CJTF convicted 621 people of drugs trafficking offences (a significant increase from the 440 convictions in 2009-10).

5. AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Developing the ANSF is a key part of the ISAF strategy in Afghanistan: they have an essential role to play in providing long-term security and governance for the country. We continue to make steady progress in developing the ANSF.

5.1. ANSF Size

	Oct 09 [1]	Dec 10	Dec 11	Jul 12
ANA [1]	97,011	149,553	179,610	183,392
AAF 12	-	-	-	6,057
ANP [1]	94,958	116,856	143,797	147,912
AUP [1]	78,145	86,122	99,214	105,685
ABP	13,382	18,755	21,203	22,006
ANCOP	3,431	7,077	15,540	14,586

Targets for the ANSF were agreed by the Security Standing Committee of the NATO/Afghan Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) in January 2010 and supported by the international community at the London Conference in the same month. These set out targets for an ANA of 171,000 and an ANP of 134,000 by October 2011. These targets were met on time and an uplift in this total to a "surge" force of 352,000 (target date of 31 Oct 2012) was subsequently agreed by the JCMB. The growth of the ANSF to a total force of 352,000 has always been regarded as a temporary surge in order to ensure that a high operational tempo is maintained as lead security responsibility transitions to the Afghans. The enduring size of the ANSF is envisaged to be 228,500. This was agreed by the Afghan Government and the international community earlier this year and will be reviewed regularly against the developing security environment. The pace of a gradual managed force reduction from the ANSF surge peak to its sustainable level will be conditions-based and decided by the Afghan Government in consultation with the international community.

5.2. Current State

There has been real progress since the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan was established in 2009. The capacity and capability of the ANSF has improved significantly. They are deploying in formed units and carrying out their own operations. Their growing strength and capability will allow them to assume full security responsibility across the country by the end of 2014. They are on schedule to meet their ‘surge’ target of 352,000 later this year.

Currently, 92% of advised ANA units are assessed as 'effective with partners' or higher which is broadly in line with targets and is a positive indicator that with a further two years for the Security Force Assistance model to continue the development of the fielded ANA is on track.

 

The Afghan Air Force (AAF) is still very much in the development stage. The challenges of training, equipment maintenance and infrastructure result in an expected Full Operating Capability of 2017, although seven Mi-35 Hind attack helicopters are already operating in the central areas of the country.

At the tactical level one of the long-term challenges facing the ANSF is the recruitment, training and development of leaders. Human capital is the limiting factor with a combination of experience in a rapidly expanding security force, basic education and literacy all proving to be issues. Programmes to address this gap are all in train such as; literacy, NCO training, promotion of experienced and committed soldiers and patrolmen and direct recruitment of educated Afghans

87% of ANP units are rated 'effective with advisors' or higher which is ahead of targets. There are more long-term development issues with turning the ANP into a sustainable model for Afghanistan. The renewed international community effort to support the International Police Coordination Board and the 'transformation' of blue policing in Afghanistan intends to deliver this effect. This transformation programme will become enduring post-ISAF supported by the international community.

 

Security Ministries

Whilst fielded units are capable of delivering security, and are on track to do so independently by 2014, there are a number of longer term development issues. Firstly the Afghan MOD is currently rated as, 'requiring some coalition assistance to complete its mission'. This is in line with expectation but there is still significant progress to be made before it can run independently. It is likely that it will still require a degree of senior engagement beyond 2014, classed as 'coalition oversight' with full transition to independence not expected before 2015. The MOI lags behind the MOD and is classed as 'still requiring significant coalition assistance' and is likely to require substantial coalition assistance beyond 2014.

5.3. Future State

ANSF Funding

Following the NATO Chicago Summit there is now a credible funding plan in place to sustain the ANSF post-2014. The international community (excluding the US) has so far made pledges totalling around $1 billion a year towards a US request of $1.3 billion for the funding of the security forces. The UK has pledged £70 million [1] . The level of our funding will be contingent on ongoing agreement between the international community and the Afghans on their security requirements. UK funding will come from the cross-government Conflict Pool and will be reviewed each year.

The UK’s contribution will form part of a wider pool of some $4.1bn that the international community and the Afghans are putting together. As the Afghan economy and the revenues of the Afghan government grow, Afghanistan’s yearly funding share of the ANSF will increase progressively from at least $500m in 2015, with the aim that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces. In light of this, during the ‘transformation decade’ [2] we expect international donors will gradually reduce their financial contributions commensurate with the assumption by the Afghan Government of increasing financial responsibility.

We expect other countries to finalise their contributions over the coming months. We will continue to work with our Afghan, NATO and US partners to ensure the ANSF are sustainable.

ANSF Future Force

The ANSF are expected to remain at their 'surge' target of 352,000 until the end of 2015 before a conditions based reduction to an envisaged size of 228,500 (123,500 ANA, 97,000 ANP and 8,000 AAF). The reduction in size is based on a continuing degradation of the insurgent's capability and the financial realities of supporting the ANSF into the future. It will be increasingly an Afghan lead to structure the force within the available funding envelope and the quoted force figures are a guide only. The ISAF/NATO effort will increasingly shift from generating the force to refining ministerial capacity and developing its enablers such as logistic capability, air support and medical care.

There will need to be a managed drawdown to reach the enduring level agreed between the Afghan Government and the international community at some point after 2014. The pace of that drawdown will be based on conditions on the ground. The costs of the enduring size of the ANSF are envisaged at $4.1 billion per annum.

6. ANSF TRAINING

6.1. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan

Established on 21 November 2009, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) brings together national training efforts under one single umbrella. It works in close partnership with the Afghan Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, as well as in collaboration with the European Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF).

NTMA’s key tasks include the provision of training and mentoring to the ANSF, support to the ANA’s institutional training base, and ANP reform at the district level and below. It also aims at addressing the ANA enabling capability shortfalls (including close air support, medevac, and intelligence) through ‘train the trainer’-modeled programmes.

NTM-A was established in parallel with ISAF’s Joint Command (IJC), which is focused on operations. Whilst NTM-A focuses on training the initial recruits and building the institutional training capability of the Afghan national security forces, development of the Afghan army and police continues in the field. The IJC is responsible for developing fielded ANSF units through advising and assisting.

There are now 38 nations contributing to NTM-A. The role of NTM-A after 2014 is currently unclear.

6.2. Afghan Trainers & Instructors

The ANP require 1,822 instructors by the completion of transition but currently only have 963 trained and assigned (52.5%). Across the force the ANA require 3,371 and have 3,083 trained and assigned (91.5%). Significant emphasis on ‘Train the Trainer’ and ‘Train the Instructor’ programmes continue with the intention of transitioning the remaining ANSF training centres which are not yet Afghan-led by 2014. The UK will expect to continue to have a training role beyond 2014 specifically at the Afghan National Army Office Academy.

6.3. Institutional Development

In terms of training and institutional development, NTM-A continues to mentor and advise at the ministerial and directorate level in the MOI and MOD. Sustainment and enablers are an area of specific focus; logistics, medical, procurement and human resources are all areas which will be supported to ensure the ANSF is sustainable.

 

UK personnel from the Military Assistance Group are also working across RC(SW) in the CJ-10 (ANSF development) directorate and in a direct mentoring role with senior ANSF figures in Helmand. 

6.4. Adviser Units

Specific responsibility for the development of the fielded ANSF is primarily provided by the Brigade Advisory Group (BAG) and the Police Mentoring and Advisory Group (PMAG), with some additional mentoring of key ANSF individuals to push institutional development at senior levels.

6.5. Helmand

The UK Brigade Advisor Group delivers advisory support (and training) through the ISAF Security Force Assistance Model to the ANA in 3rd Brigade, 215 Corps in Central Helmand. It does so across the full range of capabilities, from Brigade level, down through the battalion (Kandak) and infantry company (Tolay) levels, as well as to ANA combat support (Engineer, Artillery) and combat service support (logistics) Kandaks. The UK also provides support to the 3rd Brigade training centre in Camp Shorobak, which is next to Camp Bastion; although training is increasingly delivered by the ANA.

 The UK Police Mentoring and Advisory Group (PMAG) provides a similar function to the police in the three districts of Nad-e Ali, Nar-e-Saraj and Lashkar Gah. They embed at district police HQs, precinct HQs and also support the Lashkar Gah Provincial Police Centre (alongside the PRT and EUPOL police advisors) and the Lashkar Gah Police Training Centre.

 

Embedded within the military are 17 MOD and UK Home Office Police, 6 EUPOL and 6 Danish civilian police who deliver traditional civilian policing advice to senior police leaders at district level. There are also a number of US contractor civilian police advisers, funded by NTM-A, working at the district level.

In addition to this dedicated mentoring and advisory effort, the ANSF are partnered by the UK manoeuvre or combat support unit that it is collocated with, or in close proximity to. UK troops within these organisations perform three functions: develop the professionalism of ANSF in their area through planning and conducting operations with their partnered unit; provide practical and operational assistance; and task Army and Police Advisory Teams in their area in support of district security priorities. As a district enters transition, the local ISAF unit changes its role both seeking to transfer as many of the responsibilities for security lead as conditions allow to the ANSF and switching its focus, as quickly as the situation permits, from partnering to that of synchronising, resourcing, and supporting the efforts of the Advisory Teams from the BAG and PMAG., The lead advisors for the Kandak commander and the Deputy Chief of Police will be delivered by the respective BAG and PMAG advisors.

7. LITERACY TRAINING

The nationwide literacy rate is low in Afghanistan at only about 28%.

On entry into the ANSF only about 13% of recruits have already passed the initial literacy test and all ANSF training includes a literacy component. During ANA/ANP basic training, recruits receive 64 hours of literacy and arithmetic instruction designed to bring them to the first of three literacy levels. At the end of this portion of their literacy instruction, soldiers/police will know the alphabet, will be able to write their own name and read a few words. They will be able to count to 1,000 and add and subtract triple-digit numbers. An additional 248 hours of training to Level 3 [3] , functional literacy, is provided in pre-branch training or in the fielded force.

Mandatory literacy for the ANSF began in March 2010. Today, more than 3,000 instructors deliver training in more than 5,700 classes across the nation.

Raising the literacy and numeracy rate among Afghan soldiers, air force personnel and police is a crucial stage in the development of a modern, professional force capable of handling Afghanistan’s security needs. Literacy training also has wider, long-term benefits for the country as a whole.

As of 1 August 116,245 ANSF are in literacy training (70,760 ANA; 45,485 ANP). Split between the ANA and the ANP literacy figures are as follows:

Afghan National Army:

ANA Totals	Through Oct 09	Nov 09 – 1 Aug 12		Total Grads	Percentage Increase
		Tested	Graduated
ANA Literacy	7,596	151,193	144,842	152,438	>2000%
ANA 1st Grade	298	107,036	101,871	102,169	>5000%
ANA 2nd Grade	-	25,615	24,982	24,982	NA
ANA 3rd Grade	29	18,542	17,989	18,018	>12000%

Afghan National Police

ANP Totals	Through Oct 09	Nov 09 – 1 Aug 12		Total Grads	Percentage Increase
		Tested	Graduated
ANP Literacy	6,345	128,401	114,285	120,630	1901%
ANP 1st Grade	575	65,614	58,720	59,295	10312%
ANP 2nd Grade	-	38,932	34,997	34,997	NA
ANP 3rd Grade	-	23,855	20,568	20,568	NA

The current level 1 literacy (basic) target is ahead of schedule, however, greater emphasis on accelerating literacy training is being discussed as part of the Enabler Acceleration Plan [4] with programmes proposed to ensure that the continued improvements in ANSF literacy and education training is sustainable in the long term. Literacy improvement is vital for future NCOs, Train the Trainer capacity, and maintaining complex enablers like the AAF, logistics and artillery capability.

8. ETHNICITY

The ethnic split of the ANA and ANP are shown in the table below:

	Pashtun	Tajik	Hazara	Uzbek	Others [1]
ANA	46	35	9	7	3
ANP	42	42	5	6	5

These figures represent an improvement to overall Pashtun recruitment in the ANA, and no change in the ANP.

Pashtuns are the largest single ethnic group in Afghanistan and comprise roughly 40% of the population. The Afghan MOD is maintaining its effort to recruit Southern Pashtuns into the ANA by encouraging the recruiting centres and provincial councils to identify suitable recruits. ANA recruited 756 Southern Pashtun in Q1 of 2012, 3.7% of the total against a target of 4%. ANP recruited 674 Southern Pashtun patrolmen in Q1 of 2012, some 13% of the total. Challenges remain, however, to recruit or train these personnel as NCOs as the literacy and education rate in Southern Afghanistan is below the national average.

9. ATTRTITION

The 12 month average monthly attrition rates for the ANA, AAF and ANP are 2.3%, 1.3% and 1.3% respectively against a target of 1.4% for each group.

Attrition rates within the ANSF:

	12 Month Attrition Average [1]	Oct 12 Target
ANA	2.3%	1.4%
AAF	1.3%	1.4%
ANP [1]	1.3%	1.4%
AUP	1.1%	1.4%
ABP	1.6%	1.4%
ANCOP	1.8%	1.4%

A number of mechanisms have been implemented to improve the attrition rates. To counter corruption and reduce the scope for underpayment or non-payment of ANSF, 96% of the ANA and 87.7% of ANP are now paid by electronic funds transfers. Leave rotations are enforced by the ANSF chain of command and sustained infrastructure spending aims to improve the living conditions of the ANSF in their enduring bases.

At the national level, and in an effort to mitigate the problem, a Joint Attrition Working Group meets weekly to monitor attrition rates. Afghan led, but supported by ISAF, this has identified six contributing factors that hinder retention within the force and has made a series of recommendations to tackle them. In addition, and acknowledging the link between good leadership and lower attrition levels, the ANA is adopting an "Army Values Framework". This is a joint ISAF/ANA effort and ties together many longstanding Afghan and Islamic values to service in the ANA. This will focus on leadership at the unit level and build on a range of work intended to promote further professionalisation of the force.

In Regional Command (South West), which includes the UK’s Area of Operations, we have been working to lower levels of attrition in Helmand by implementing the NATO Special Afghan Leave Transport Program, which has helped the ANSF develop capabilities to fly troops from and to their Regional Command for leave cycles.

10. Afghan Enablers

10.1. Logistics

Improving logistics capability is a priority for 2012. The ANA still relies heavily on ISAF and contractors for some aspects of logistic support but work is in progress for the attachment of a Combat Service Support (CSS) Kandak to each ANA Brigade. The sourcing and distribution of stores and equipment from national level depots to the regional logistic support commands remains the most significant challenge, and is therefore the focus of coalition efforts.

Deputy Commander (Army) within NTM-A provides the technical training for the ANA logisticians. This training will enable them to organise and run their own logistics within the fielded force. The training is undertaken at the ANA CSS School in Kabul, which is mentored by German and French advisors. The CSS School is currently rated as still requiring embedded mentors. However, progress is good and it is projected to transition to Afghan control on 1 June 2014. Current work includes: improving training quality, reviewing the programme of instruction, developing the structure of the school, introducing new courses and providing oversight of the construction project to build a new facility in Pol-e Charki, Kabul.

10.2. Medical

Reconstruction and development of the ANSF healthcare system has long been an objective of both the Afghans and ISAF. Following 30 years of war, Afghanistan’s medical infrastructure had been largely destroyed, and its medical education and training resources largely non-existent. An ANSF healthcare system development support plan was published in November 2011. This concentrates on the essential medical functions needed to support the ANSF providing the blueprint for the reconstruction and development of the healthcare system and transition to self autonomy. This plan is on track to deliver an Afghan-appropriate, proficient, but realistically equipped and capable healthcare system that can sustain the ANSF from 2015 onwards.

In addition to central oversight and direction, an ISAF medical team carries out regular validation visits to the National Military hospital, the four regional ANA hospitals, and the central ANP hospital. All have confirmed steady progress. The regional hospitals are now capable of damage control resuscitation, and surgery and, at the national military hospital, of secondary care. Some regional hospitals are now capable of receiving Cat A [5] casualties direct from the battlefield, and ground MEDEVAC of evermore severely wounded casualties within the required timeframes is achievable. The Afghan Air Force is not yet able to deliver sustainable rotary wing MEDEVAC support.

10.3. Air/Aviation Support

There are no plans for the Afghan Air Force (AAF) to develop what we would consider a ‘close air support’ (CAS) capability.

The Mi-35 attack helicopter can provide limited kinetic support now, but there are only seven aircraft available and with restricted range, endurance and speed coupled to poor hot and high performance. The aircraft have limited life remaining and will be retired from service without a rotary wing replacement around 2015.

At full operating capability the AAF is planned to have a total of 56 late generation Mi-17 support helicopter aircraft, 10 of which are currently on loan to the Special Mission Wing with a further 12 on contract and yet to be delivered. The oldest aircraft will be retired as the fleet receives larger numbers of more modern aircraft. At present, the only pilots operationally available to the AAF are legacy Soviet-trained pilots. Bringing these pilots to an operational state has been a long process and lapses of skill remain common. Of note, when Afghan airspace transitions to International Civil Aviation Organisation standards in 2015, all pilots operating in Afghanistan will have to have technical English language skills. At present the AAF can mount about 20 limited combat ready crews; full manning with a mix of legacy and newly trained pilots is not likely until December 2014 at the earliest.

The Mi-17 support helicopters mount M240 machine guns for self-protection and the more recent versions can fit forward-firing rocket pods, (although these would be used for enemy suppression during troop insertion rather than airborne support to troops in contact). The Afghans are some years away from having the skill base to adopt these weapons and training is not scheduled to begin until around 2016.

The Light Air Support (LAS) platform will be a single-engine fixed wing turboprop similar to the RAF Tucano. The buy will be for 20 aircraft with deliveries commencing in summer 2014. The intent is for this aircraft to provide a limited kinetic support capability, replacing the Mi-35s with a faster, more flexible aircraft that is cheaper and easier to support. LAS will be based at Shindand and Kandahar and will provide nationwide kinetic support. However, it will still fall short of a full close air support capability, and with no trained Forward Air Controllers, interaction between the pilots and troops in contact is likely to be rudimentary. A fixed wing platform will also be ill-suited to operations in mountainous terrain and it is likely that operational support will concentrate upon the plains to the west and south of the country.

10.4. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)

The Special Mission Wing have plans to procure 18 fixed wing turboprop aircraft fitted with a Full Motion Video (FMV) system such as the MX-15. Final approval of aircraft type has not been agreed. Aircraft delivery is planned to start around July 2013 with full manning achieved around May 2015.

11. AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was established by decree by President Karzai in 2010. It is an Afghan-owned community focussed programme, which provides locally based security in areas with little or no ANSF presence. The ALP initiative is executed by the MOI to secure local villages and deny insurgents access and support. ALP forces are requested by Afghan District Governors and Provincial Governors.

The UK supports the ALP at 11 sites in Helmand province, providing assistance with recruitment, training and mentoring to approximately 625 ALP. Nationally, the ALP approved force level (or Tashkiel) stands at 30,000, with the number of ALP recruited currently at about 16,300.

The ALP has made a very valuable contribution to improving security and governance in many areas in Afghanistan, including Central Helmand.

The main objectives of the ALP are to empower local Afghans to provide security while giving the ANSF time to grow in numbers and capacity, prevent insurgent freedom of movement and to link communities with the Afghan government. The ALP are also a useful security tool in communities who are beginning to engage with the Afghan Government and are ready for local security solutions. Currently there are insufficient numbers of Afghan Police in Helmand to provide local security across the whole province. The ALP are helping to fill in the gaps by enabling locals to take more responsibility for their own security. The ALP complement and do not undermine the mainstream Afghan Police. They are overseen by the local District Chief of Police. They are subject to the same rules and regulations as the Afghan Uniformed Police and have detention but not arrest capabilities. In recognition of the fact that they are not required to deploy nationally, they are paid only 60% of the wage that a member of the ANP receives.

ALP recruits are subject to a rigorous vetting process, including biometric testing and approval by local shuras (committees) and district police chiefs. ALP sites are monitored by the local shura, the District Chief of Police, District and Provincial Governors and the Ministry of the Interior.

There are several measures within the ALP programme that are designed to promote respect for human rights, in addition to the practices set out above. The ALP receive training on techniques and procedures that are human rights compliant. ALP training also includes lessons specifically on the appropriate use of force, values and ethics, professional development, fundamental standards of human rights and the Afghan constitution. There are specific handling procedures in place for UK forces and MOD civilians to follow in the event that they witness, or receive allegation of, acts of misconduct committed by the ANSF or the ALP against local nationals.

On 2 September, the US military announced that it had temporarily halted the training of 1,000 new recruits for the Afghan Local Police to introduce tougher screening and vetting procedures. NATO’s training mission is not affected by this temporary pause. The UK has not initiated a similar suspension in ALP training at the sites we mentor, as we have already increased screening and vetting in the recruiting process. We continue to do all we can to reduce the risk posed by insider threat attacks.

12. COUNTER INSURGENCY STRATEGY

With the improved force densities that resulted from the US surge in 2010, the UK has developed and evolved a clear counterinsurgency model for central Helmand which has increasingly placed the ANSF in the lead. The first phase was to establish force concentrations within the most populated areas, in order to set the conditions within which Afghan governance and development activity could begin to have an effect. Throughout Herrick 12 and Herrick 13 (April 2010 to April 2011), 4 Mechanised and 16 Air Assault Brigade sought to establish security zones around the key population centres, particularly Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and the green zone around the river Helmand. These were then gradually but aggressively expanded, increasing the proportion of the central Helmand population under the ISAF and Afghan security footprint and, consequently, Afghan governance. This activity also had the effect of disrupting insurgent attempts to concentrate its activity, providing space within which the ANA and AUP could develop in both capability and confidence.

This model was sufficiently advanced by July 2011 that the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah and its surrounding environs was included in tranche 1 of transition. During Herrick 15, there were no requests for ISAF to support the ANSF in delivering security within the transitioned areas. During 3 Commando Brigade’s tour on Herrick 14, there was also a clear focus on consolidating the gains that had been made, as well as on developing ANSF operational and planning capability. The Operation ‘Omid’ (Hope) series in Herrick 13 and 14 saw, for the first time, large scale operations planned and led by the ANSF, with ISAF providing support with an increasingly lighter touch.

In September/October 2011, the Nad-e Ali South and North Battlegroup Headquarters merged to simplify engagement with the district authorities, reflecting the shifting focus to governance and transition, as well as the significant improvements in security that had been achieved. In December 2011 Nad-e Ali formally entered transition. By that point, a model which saw the AUP providing security in the centre, with ANA disrupting activity in the periphery areas and ISAF providing support throughout, as well as the ability to conduct and enable disruption operations in the peripheral areas, was well established.

By March 2012 security responsibility for the entire Lashkar Gah district had been transferred to the Afghans. ANSF capability was such that they were now capable of planning and executing operations independently of ISAF support, and frequently did so during the Herrick 15. In early 2012 an ANSF operational design for central Helmand emerged. This plan, written and owned by the Afghans, mapped for the first time security activity against the Provincial Governor’s security priorities. This outlined a succession of complementary operations, planned and led by the Afghans with UK forces providing a supporting and advisory role, to further expand the ANSF security footprint, dominate contested areas and target insurgent supply routes. In the early operations the insurgent resistance was often light, suggesting that they were aware in advance of these operations; but the operations nevertheless demonstrated publicly that the ANSF were capable of delivering security in a coordinated way.

In May 2012 Nahr-e Saraj was announced as entering tranche 3 of transition, which is due to begin before the end of October. This is the final district for which the UK has responsibility. There are still areas within the three districts where the insurgent has relative freedom of movement, and he will remain capable of launching attacks into the protected communities. However, he is unable to concentrate his forces in a meaningful way. The ANSF operational design has exposed operational-level Afghan thinking which emphasises the importance of the main population centres and transport routes between them. As a result, it has identified those areas which are of less significance to the ANSF and has allowed UK forces to realign themselves to better reflect Afghan priorities. Increasingly, operations will be Afghan run with UK adviser or mentoring support and enablers, which will themselves gradually decrease over time. The focus of the UK counterinsurgency campaign in central Helmand is now on delivering a capable, confident ANSF which is able to protect the gains that have been made over the past six years.

13. TASK FORCE HELMAND SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS HERRICK 13 – HERRICK 16

Operation Omid Char in October 2010 was devised and led by Afghan National Army forces from 3rd Brigade 215 Corps, in close consultation with the district governor. It was the largest operation in terms of size, numbers of soldiers and duration to have been planned, led and conducted by the ANA. Its objective was to secure a key area near Gereshk in Nahr-e Saraj; restrict insurgent freedom of movement; and visibly raise the profile of the Afghan Army in this important area of central Helmand.

Operation Omid Panj in January 2011 built on the success of Omid Char. It was conducted at the request of the district governor (and with even less ISAF input) by the ANA in the green zone north of the Helmand river. Its objective was to expand security around Gereshk and disrupt key insurgent supply routes in the area.

Operation Omid Shash in February 2011 saw a four day partnered Battlegroup level operation in Nahr-e Saraj (South) involving around 800 ANA and 500 British forces. It demonstrated the ability of the ANA to conduct large scale insertions, for the first time using helicopters in this role, to dominate battlespace which had previously been heavily contested by the insurgency.

Operation Omid Haft between 26 May and 7 June 2011 focussed on the Malgir and Loy Mandeh areas to expand the security zone around the key population centres in Nad-e Ali (North) and Nahr-e Saraj (South). It was a partnered operation that involved coordination operations within all three central Helmand districts to negate the insurgent threat in the tri boundary area bordering the three UK battlegroups areas of Lashkar Gah, Nad-e Ali (North) and Nahr-e Saraj (South).

Operation Qali Sharqay between 18 June and September 2011 was an ANA planned, Task Force Helmand (TFH) enabled operation to support the transition of lead security authority in Lashkar Gah, and to develop the independence and capability of 3rd Brigade 215 Corps building on the lessons from Omid Haft.

Operation Zamestani Peerozi ran between 17 and 23 December 2011. Planned and led by the ANA, with TFH in support. The aim was to insert a permanent ANSF presence into the tri-boundary area in order to set the conditions for the transition of security responsibility for Nad-e Ali and the transition of security responsibility for the police precinct of Babaji in Lashkar Gah to an ANSF lead.

Operation Shamali Kamarband in January 2012 was the TFH support to the ANSF Operational Design for central Helmand and aimed to establish and consolidate a security zone to the north of Gereshk, in Nahr-e Saraj. The ANSF Operational Design was a significant development, demonstrating for the first time a coherent ANSF plan for delivering against the provincial governor’s security priorities for the three central Helmand districts.

Operation Dastkash Muttahidana in February 2012 covered three concurrent operations to clear and hold the areas of Kopak, the Bowri dashte and Kopak in the Nad-e Ali district. This operation, planned and led by the ANSF, was in accordance with their Operational Design and aimed to support the transition of lead security responsibility for the district by taking and holding areas that had previously been insurgent areas of strength.

Operation Janubi Kamarband was a three day operation in February 2012 to secure the area south of Gereshk. This effectively established a security bubble to the south and, as a result of the earlier Shamali Kamarband, the north of the important economic hub of Gereshk.

Operation Now Roz in March 2012 was planned and led by the ANA to clear the areas of Yakchal and Gavband in the central part of TFH’s area of responsibility. These had previously been areas where the insurgent had enjoyed freedom of movement and was able to move supplies and weapons down towards the population centres of Lashkar Gah and Gereshk.

Operation Shafuq between 18 and 22 April 2012 was an ANA operation in combination with AUP, ANCOP and NDS forces to clear the Nad-e Ali dashte to the north of the Canal. It was an independent ANSF operation in support of governor led eradication of the poppy crop. TFH’s role was limited to providing support through wider disruption operations on the flanks.

Operation Axolamal in May 2012 – a series of operations across the TFH area was intended to pre-emptively suppress any attempted spring offensive by the insurgent. It aimed to demonstrate visible ANSF control and domination of the populated areas, and disrupt the movement of insurgents, supplies and weaponry within the more remote areas of the three districts.

Operation Maahi Buzurg was a Regional Command (South West) level operation into the Upper Gereshk Valley, within the TFH area of operations. The operation’s aim was to deliver an enduring security presence and expand Afghan governance into the area. TFH supported ANSF activity to the north of Gereshk and provided a screen to the east and west of the US Marine Corps operation in the area.

14. ISAF FORCE LAYDOWN

The following table gives the approximate troop contributions from each of the 50 troop contributing nations as at 15 May 2012. As such, it does not reflect the full extent of US surge recovery. These figures are indicative and actual numbers will fluctuate daily.

ISAF TROOP CONTRIBUTIING NATIONS [6]

15. UK FORCE LAYDOWN

The UK currently contributes 9,500 troops to the ISAF mission to Afghanistan on an enduring basis, although as the then Secretary of State for Defence announced on 14 February 2011, actual numbers on the ground fluctuate daily. The variations in the precise number deployed at any one time are for various reasons including periods of overlap during the roulement of units and individuals into and out of theatre, rest and recuperation, and routine surges of personnel to meet specific and time-limited tasks. Our enduring force level has remained unchanged since the then Prime Minister announced an uplift in our contribution to the ISAF mission in 2009. This number excludes UK Special Forces, who we have acknowledged operate in Afghanistan but in accordance with long standing practice do not specify the scale or nature of their activities.

This enduring force also excludes "surge" deployments, such as the Theatre Redeployment Pool (TRP) which deploys up to a maximum of 500 personnel into theatre focused purely on redeployment activity; or deployment of the Theatre Reserve Battalion (TRB) which is based in Cyprus but can be deployed rapidly and on the authority of the Chief of Joint Operations when a temporary need for additional troops is identified. The TRB was last deployed to central Helmand in July 2010 for a three-month period to further progress and consolidate gains in the UK’s area of operations following recent operations in the area.

The Prime Minister announced in July 2011 that our force levels would drawdown by 500 to 9,000 by the end of this year. The 500 troops drawing down as part of this reduction will all come from Helmand and will primarily consist of combat troops. The Secretary of State for Defence briefed the House in April in more detail on those manpower savings in April 2012.

Currently we have around 8,500 troops assigned to Helmand, most – but not all – in central Helmand where we are responsible, with the ANSF, for providing security for approximately 32% of the Helmand population. Camp Bastion, located to the north-west of the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, is our main logistics hub for the province; the main point of entry and departure by aircraft for UK troops; as well as the base for elements of the UK’s helicopter fleet. It is also the location of our main in-country medical facility. The UK also has forces assigned to Kandahar Air Field (approximately 500), to headquarters in Kabul (approximately 500), and holds several key command positions, including Deputy Commander ISAF (on a permanent basis).

16. HELMAND PROVINCE

International forces deployed to Helmand province operate within Regional Command (South West) currently commanded by the US Marine Corps (USMC) under Major General Charles Gurganus. The majority of UK personnel serving in Afghanistan operate under the command of the UK-led Task Force Helmand (TFH). TFH, which also contains significant Danish, Estonian and, to a lesser degree, Bosnian contingents, has responsibility for providing security in the centre of the province alongside the ANSF.

Approximate figures for international forces operating within Task Force Helmand are as follows:

· Denmark – c. 360 pax

Denmark provides an infantry company, tank platoon, police mentors and associated support divisions to assist operations within Task Force Helmand. Additionally Danish training teams are based at the Regional Military Centre (Camp Bastion) and in Lashkar Gah training the Helmand Provincial Response Teams.

· Estonia – c.150 pax

Primarily comprised of a ground holding infantry company however, the Estonians also supply an Explosive Ordnance Disposal team and some staff posts.

· Bosnia Herzegovina – c. 50 pax

Force protection duties.

ISAF REGIONAL COMMANDS AND MAJOR UNITS [1]

17. INSIDER THREAT [2]

Insider-threat attacks are defined as those incidents where an ANSF member or members knowingly attacks and/or helps facilitate an attack against their ISAF Coalition partners or Afghan colleagues.

ISAF record data on insider threat attacks from across the Coalition [3] . Between May 2007 and 15 September 2012 ISAF report a total of 79 incidents where members of the ANSF attacked their Coalition partners. Of the 79 attacks, 67 resulted in Coalition casualties (120 deaths and 183 wounded). 18 members of the UK Armed Forces have been killed in seven fatal insider threat attacks.

Such attacks against ISAF personnel have nearly doubled year-on-year since 2008 (albeit from a low base, and set against the backdrop of a threefold increase in ANSF numbers since 2007). Attacks in 2012 have already surpassed those recorded in 2011.

Those responsible for these attacks are not representative of the ANSF, the Afghan Government, or the Afghan people. Despite these tragic incidents the overwhelming majority of UK and ISAF troops work well with their Afghan counterparts. Every day there are tens of thousands of interactions, without incident, between Coalition and Afghan forces . They sh are the same mission and goals.

Insider Threat Attacks:

Year	Attacks	Coalition Fatalities [1]
2007	2	2
2008	2	2
2009	6	10
2010	11	20
2011	21	35
2012 [1]	37	51
Total	79	120

The UK, ISAF and the Afghan Government are acutely aware of the threat posed by these incidents. At the most senior levels the Afghan Government recently held an emergency shura to examine the issue while in August ISAF called its inaugural Insider Threat Action Group meeting where ISAF and the ANSF agreed to a range of collaborative actions to further mitigate the risk. Commander ISAF has discussed the issue personally with President Karzai and has represented the concerns of the ISAF nations in the strongest possible terms.

We routinely assess and refine our force protection to best ensure the personal safety of our forces and meet mission requirements. ISAF and its Afghan partners have already taken extensive measures to reduce the threat from insider attacks. These have ranged from improved vetting procedures for ANSF members, tactical precautions such as the use of armed "Guardian Angels" to overwatch ISAF/ANSF interactions, an enhanced Afghan counter-intelligence presence in the ANSF and additional cultural awareness training.

Vetting remains a critical pillar of the mitigation strategy and the Afghans are strengthening the existing eight-step vetting process for recruits [4] . Amongst other measures the ANSF have: introduced re-vetting procedures for ANA soldiers returning from leave to check for signs that they have been radicalised while the Afghan MOD; doubled its numbers of dedicated counterintelligence personnel and recruited 900 religious and cultural affairs officers. These are assigned throughout the ANA down to Kandak (battalion) level to train and educate members of the ANA on cultural differences in order to mitigate the risk of insider attacks caused by disagreements, grievances or perceived offences.

UK national mitigation plans run in parallel to ISAF and Afghan Government work. Conceptual training on the threat delivered to personnel deploying on operations to Afghanistan places particular emphasis on cultural understanding in order to mitigate the threat posed by personally motivated attacks. Practical training is also provided both at home, as part of pre-deployment training and upon arrival in Theatre [5] .

Analysis indicates that there is no single overriding factor which triggers insider threat attacks. For a number of reasons understanding the motivation behind these attacks is challenging. In many instances the perpetrator is either killed or escapes, and in a significant number of cases it is simply not possible to attribute a motive with any certainty. Inflammatory events can act as a catalyst for insider threat attacks although they do not necessarily provide any greater clarity on trends. For example, following the mishandling of religious materials at Bagram Airfield in February 2012 there were a then unprecedented seven incidents within 14 days – five of which were confirmed as having religious motivations as the primary cause. In contrast, there were no such incidents attributed to the killings of civilians in Kandahar by a rogue US soldier in March 2012.

ISAF are not the only ones affected by the threat of insider attacks, since May 2007 the ANSF have suffered almost twice the number of attacks as ISAF. In the first seven months of this year 27 incidents were recorded where members of the ANSF were attacked from within their own forces. These attacks resulted in the deaths of 36 ANSF with another 30 left injured. Significantly there have also been multiple incidents where members of the Afghan security forces have risked their own lives to prevent or suppress attacks on Coalition forces and other ANSF members.

On 16 September ISAF issued a fragmentary order which included a change to the level at which partnering and mentoring of the ANSF is scrutinised and authorised. This is a prudent and temporary response to elevated threat levels arising, in part, from the release of the ‘Innocence of Muslims’ video. These measures are intended to reduce our profile and vulnerability to civil disturbances or insider attacks at a time of high tension. We have adjusted our force protection measures in other high periods of the campaign in response to conditions on the ground. These actions balance the tension of the recent video with force protection, while maintaining the momentum of the campaign. Under this guidance, and as conditions change, we will continue to adapt our force posture and force protection measures.

This directive is not a suspension of operations below Kandak level. Rather this is a change to the way ISAF forces assess and mitigate the risks associated with partnering. British commanders retain the flexibility to mentor at all levels in consultation with the Regional Commander. As General Allen, Commander ISAF has stated "ISAF remains absolutely committed to partnering with, training, advising and assisting our ANSF counterparts".

We recognise the risk that UK, ISAF and Afghan forces face from insider attacks. The personal safety of our deployed personnel remains a Defence priority – it is an issue that all in Government and the military chain of command take extremely seriously. We keep the level at which we mentor under review and will continue to do so through the process of security transition.

Partnering is not without risk but it is an essential component of our military strategy in Afghanistan and is key to the success of our security objectives. Developing the ANSF is a fundamental part of our work in Afghanistan, they have an essential role to play in providing long-term security and governance in the country. We continue to examine additional options to prevent this type of attack and are working with our Afghan partners at every level from ministers to soldiers and policemen, to decrease the threat to an irreducible minimum without prejudicing mission achievement. These incidents are of great concern but they will not derail our strategy.

18. HELMAND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM

The Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is a UK-led, multinational (UK, US, Denmark, Estonia), multi-agency effort comprising 200 staff in Lashkar Gah and in district centres across the Province (60% civilian; 20% military and police; 20% Afghan nationals).

UK staff comprise FCO, DFID and Stabilisation Unit (SU) (Conflict Pool funded):

Headcounts
FCO	19 UK British (UKB) 15 Locally Engaged (LE)
DFID	7 UKB, 2 LE
SU/CP	18 UKB PRT, 13 UKB District Stabilisation Teams Total 31 UKB, 31 LE
Totals	57 UKB, 48 LE

The Helmand PRT coordinates stabilisation and development work across Helmand, in collaboration with the Afghan Government. The PRT is working to achieve transition to Afghan-led delivery of security, governance and services by end of 2014.

Efforts are guided by the Helmand Plan, agreed between the Afghan Government and its international partners. The plan coordinates five core work strands:  Governance and Politics; Rule of Law; Counter-Narcotics; Population Engagement; and Socio-Economic Development. PRT priorities are focused on supporting Afghan Government accountability and legitimacy.

The Helmand Plan 2011-2014 provides the current, jointly agreed, guidance for intervention in Helmand. It seeks to develop the Government’s effectiveness and promote its legitimacy so that:

By the end of 2014, GIRoA [6] has the capacity independently to control, employ and maintain state institutions to ensure the insurgency, narco networks and criminality effects are reduced to a point where they do not pose a threat to the sustainability of GIRoA’s provision of governance to the population of Helmand.

Core Helmand PRT Priorities 2012-2014

The key message from the PRT’s recent Transition Review is to accelerate the transition to Afghan leadership in a way which increases legitimacy and accountability of the Afghan Government to the people of Helmand. There are three aspects to this: (i) inclusive legitimate political settlements; (ii) accountable governance; and (iii) accountable rule of law.

Inclusive Legitimate Political Settlements

The Afghan Government is creating the conditions for legitimate, inclusive political settlements. Experience suggests that the critical enabler is sufficiently capable ANSF to create freedom of movement. On the back of this the provincial government can take the lead in establishing Afghan Government governance and justice systems, and enable delivery of a package of basic services. To support inclusive and legitimate political settlements the PRT will:

a. Continue to invest in understanding Helmand politics and use its knowledge and networks to inform and, where appropriate, facilitate local political reconciliation, working at the Kabul, Provincial and District levels as needed.

b. Continue to support implementation and delivery of the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) in line with national and ISAF policy. The PRT will encourage Governor Mangal to link up every political settlement he makes, where feasible, with the APRP, to make them more accountable.

c. Support the reinforcement of political settlements with more formal governance structures such as District Community Councils and District Delivery Programme funding

d. Share the lessons learned from Helmand, so that they can be applied elsewhere.

Accountable Governance

Government will only have the trust and consent of the people for so long as it can deliver on their priorities. Just as at the national level, Afghan government in Helmand must be able to continue providing basic services beyond 2014.

The PRT will continue to work at Provincial level on developing the capacity of the provincial departments and institutions, and on the funding mechanisms on which sub-national governance at all levels will depend. The PRT will continue work to connect the District to the Province and the Province to Kabul. We will do this by:

a. Building on the District Delivery Plan the PRT will support the provincial administration in piloting locally accountable participatory planning and budgeting models. These will be designed to further incentivise political stability and be consistent with national developments in provincial planning, with a particular focus in less secure, contested areas.

b. Working with counterparts in the Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Director’s of Line Ministries and District Governors to develop their capacity and processes both to communicate their plans and service commitments; and for government to account for its activities both to local councils and civil society.

c. Supporting local government to become more responsive - by 2013 the PRT will have worked with counterparts in the Provincial Governor’s Office and Provincial Directors of the Ministry of Economy to develop simple and robust approaches to monitoring and evaluation that can inform future planning and programming.

Accountable Rule of Law

A fair justice system ranks second only to security for Helmandis in terms of perceptions of legitimacy of the Afghan Government. In many areas the Afghan police are the most visible face of the Afghan Government.  Effectiveness and behaviour are fundamental to trust in the Government. 

a. The PRT will focus more on values and behaviours in police training and place more emphasis on developing closer ties between the different police agencies and local governance to strengthen local accountability.

b. The PRT will ensure police training (delivered in large part by the military) is directed by senior police professionals to ensure development of core policing skills.

c. The PRT will continue work to strengthen the end-to-end justice system and to link the informal justice system to the formal and to protect informal justice actors from ideological insurgents and predation from informal powerbrokers and government officials. 

d. On the counter-narcotics (CN) side, the PRT will support interventions to reduce the amount of opium revenue funding the insurgency and corrupt lifestyles through tackling money laundering and a strong CN judicial process.  It will channel support for alternative livelihoods through the mainstream agriculture growth programmes and will fund a further year of support for Governor Led Eradication, in a way which puts it on a trajectory for Afghan Ownership and sustainability and tackles high levels of perceived corruption.

e. On the counter-terrorism (CT) side the PRT will continue to support development of an Afghan end-to-end CT capability with a rule of law emphasis on the collation of evidence and case preparation. This is critical to achieve security objectives but also to ensure confidence in the fairness of the system.

19. STABILISATION AND RECONSTRCUTION IN HELMAND

The Helmand PRT Socio-Economic Development and Governance teams lead programmes contributing to stabilisation and development efforts. These are funded by DFID and the UK Conflict Pool, as well as the US , Danish and Estonian Governments. International support to Helmand ’s development process is planned and executed on the basis of sustainable, ongoing support to the province beyond 2014, either through new implementing partners or national programmes. The aim of transition planning is to increase Afghan Government ownership and capacity, and ‘normalise’ the development relationship.

In line with military drawdown, the Socio Economic Development team has streamlined into three priority thematic delivery areas: social development, health and education; growth and livelihoods (private sector development and agriculture) and economic infrastructure. The focus is on building sustainability with a shift to on-budget programmes, away from direct delivery to capacity building support – equipping local government with the skills and tools necessary to manage budgets and links with central government, and operate and maintain key economic infrastructure (e.g. roads, power networks and waterways).

The governance team is securing support for provincial and district government in Helmand by improving public administration and allowing it to respond to people’s priorities. Helmand has been innovative on government accountability and elections; there are now seven elected district councils plus one elected municipal council, neither of which exists anywhere else in Afghanistan. Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme data shows councils are perceived as legitimate and credible connectors between government and people and election turnout is consistently increasing. They are providing a critically-needed accountability function over local Government and to some extent security forces, improving their quality and discouraging misconduct.

Quantity and Impact of Stabilisation and Reconstruction Activities in Helmand

With the help of DFID and Conflict Pool funding, Helmand has seen improvements to vital basic services:

Sector	Key improvements
Education	· 51% increase since 2008 in the number of schools open (164) · 55% increase since 2008 in the number of students enrolled (now 121,797 of which 23% are girls) · Perceptions of the government’s improvements to education services is high in central districts at 76% (13% increase since Sept 2010) [1]

Health	· 96% of the province’s health facilities open (58) · By 2013, 15 Comprehensive Health Clinics funded by the PRT will be complete · By 2013, a new midwifery school will have trained 58 midwives (52% more than in 2009) · Perceptions of the government’s improvements to health services is high in central districts at 76% (14% increase since Sept 2010)
Private sector	· To date, 7,366 students have graduated from UK-funded vocational training programme operating in six districts – including 1,251 females · Business development support given to 20 SMEs through UK-funded rural development programme · Perceptions of the government’s improvements to employment opportunities has increased by 19% since Sept 2010 to 61%
Infrastructure	· Between 2010 and 2012, the PRT has funded 270km of roads linking key economic district centres and repaired 45 key canal assets essential for irrigation. · Since Sept 2010 there has been a 20% increase in people in central districts believing the government has improved road conditions and a 31% increase in those believing road security has improved.
Governance	· 40 development projects (on rural rehabilitation, health, education, agriculture, irrigation and justice) will be implemented through GIRoA systems via the District Delivery Programme. · 77% of people in central districts currently believe the district government acts in their interests.

20. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Changeable political relations between ISAF and the Pakistan Government and the associated vulnerability of the Pakistan Ground Lines Of Communication (GLOCs) [7] make clear the need for alternative supply routes into and out of Afghanistan. During the most recent closure of the Pakistan GLOCs from November 2011 to July 2012, all non warlike UK surface freight destined for Afghanistan was diverted to the Northern Line of Communication (NLOC) via Latvia, Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Prior to the recent GLOC closure, approximately one third of UK non–warlike supplies used this route. 

The closure of the Pakistani borders to ISAF traffic while limiting in terms of good logistic management did not constrain UK operations on the ground. Alternative means were found to support forces in the field including maximising the use of available freight space on aircraft. Owing to the increased reliance on the airbridge during the GLOC closure greater scrutiny of UK in-theatre priorities was applied by Joint Force Support Afghanistan [8] to ensure the most pressing operational requirements were met. As a response to the closure of the GLOC and in view of the requirement to prepare to redeploy our holdings back to the UK, stores in Afghanistan have been subject to ‘aggressive housekeeping’ and sustainment reviews both of which have reduced the demands for routine re-supply and by extension have lessened the overall requirement to hold certain stores in theatre. During the closure a backlog in materiel for the Reverse Supply Chain (RSC) and increased delivery times for some commodities were encountered however, these were again mitigated through prioritisation and increased use of the airbridge.

The Pakistan GLOC is now in the process of re-opening with the current focus being on clearing the backlog of freight (963 Twenty Foot Equivalent units [9] as at 24 August) held in Pakistan which is not expected to be complete before November. The introduction of new freight onto the GLOC from either direction is subject to ongoing NATO MOU negotiations with the Pakistani Government, and will not be authorised to take place before the backlog is cleared. 

The Air Line of Communication (ALOC) via Pakistan is currently the MOD’s only option for transporting warlike supplies (i.e. armoured vehicles, ammunition and personal weapons) into and out of Afghanistan. Movement of freight by air, though subject to a number of variables (such as fly/sail/rail options) is a more expensive way to move materiel than ground transport alone, but there will always be a requirement to move some, more sensitive, loads by air. At present, the majority of equipment and materiel travels by air, and less sensitive and lesser priority materiel on the NLOC. However, the relative proportions are likely to change in favour of movement by ground routes once the Pakistan GLOC fully re-opens.

21. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT (HEALTH)

21.1. Overview

Defence Medical Services (DMS) is responsible for delivering and sustaining a deployed medical system, within an ISAF framework, configured to provide optimal consultant delivered care to UK Forces and other ISAF troops in the UK area of responsibility. DMS also provides consultant delivered emergency care to ANSF and local civilians, in accordance with ISAF medical eligibility criteria, and in support of the UK’s strategic end state of a stable and secure Afghanistan.

The UK is the lead nation for the Role 3 Hospital at Camp Bastion, setting the standards of care and governance practices within the hospital on behalf of ISAF. However, we continue to benefit from the support of other allies in the coalition. The US has contributed staff since April 2009; with the US Army currently providing 87 clinical and administrative personnel.   Denmark provided a large proportion of the hospital staff for three months in 2009 and has subsequently provided a surgical team during the summer of 2011 and a number of intensive care nurses.  Estonia has also supported the hospital through two deployments of surgical personnel, most recently in July 2012. These multinational contributions to the care of ISAF and ANSF casualties in Regional Command (South West) are a successful demonstration of NATO medical interoperability and wider ISAF cooperation.

Capacity at the Role 3 Hospital in Bastion has remained sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of the deployed UK force, as well as ISAF and ANSF casualties. The operational medical framework is continually monitored to ensure that sufficient capability/capacity is maintained, specifically reflecting both changes in casualty numbers and wounding patterns.

21.2. Aeromedical Evacuation to the UK

The Defence Medical Services continue to provide for the timely and rapid evacuation of patients from point of wounding to appropriate care in the UK, and the airbridge is prioritised as required to facilitate this. This is achieved whilst maintaining the highest standards of intensive care, clinical care and ongoing treatment whilst in transit.

In 2011, 1,147 patients were aeromedically evacuated from Afghanistan. To the end of July, 746 patients have been evacuated in 2012.

21.3. Disease and Non-Battle Injuries

While disease and non-battle injury (DNBI) rates in Afghanistan continue to fluctuate, levels remain within the norm for operations and peacetime duties. An unexpected peak of 11.2% (of deployed personnel per week) in May 2011 – for one week only – was investigated by the DMS Defence Consultant Advisor for Public Health, who concluded that the reported figures were due to a number of factors including better pre-deployment training of medical personnel on EPINATO (the system used to record medical attendances), an active campaign amongst troops to report illness at the earliest opportunity, and an element of over-reporting of certain conditions before a definitive diagnosis. There was no impact on operations and rates quickly returned to within expected levels, of between 5-10%.  

21.4. Manning and International Aspects

The current operational tempo continues to challenge manning with delivery of capability sustained by contributions from all three Services, volunteer Reserves, and use of contractors. National Health Service personnel were deployed to Afghanistan on a trial basis until 2011. However, while they proved a useful addition, particularly in niche specialities, contractors provide greater long-term flexibility and cost-effectiveness.

21.5. In-Theatre Capability Enhancements

DMS Defence Consultant Advisors continually review deployed medical equipment to ensure that deployed UK troops have the most appropriate capability available.

There are ongoing developments in the level of care on operations, contributing to increased survival and improved long-term morbidity rates. The following are exemplars of enhancement:

· The introduction of novel haemostatic (bleeding control) techniques to the front line is saving lives in the critical first few minutes, with regular updates of equipment as it evolves;

· The UK Medical Emergency Response Team, continues to deliver critical consultant led emergency care to the front line;

· Advances in resuscitation and blood transfusion, consequent upon Defence research;

· Allows maintenance of critical life support in readiness for surgery – ongoing research effort continues to refine these capabilities;

· Integration of Consultant led Emergency Medicine, Anaesthetic and Surgical teams on arrival at the Role 3;

· The deployment of advanced diagnostic capabilities, to a level never before deployed brings emergency care ever closer to that available in a major trauma centre;

· Two additional new Computerised Tomography scanners at Bastion, and;

· A new coalition MRI scanner at Bastion.

21.6. Royal Centre for Defence Medicine / Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Birmingham

The new Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham (QEHB) opened in June 2010. The transfer of services is staged over six phases; the military ward capability transferred as part of Phase 1 and is fully operational. The military ward provides care for Service personnel in single or four bedded rooms further instilling the military ethos within the establishment. The QEHB has the UK’s largest single floor critical care unit consisting of 100 beds. As part of the switchover the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine (RCDM) Clinical Unit Headquarters transferred to the QEHB in November 2011.

Leading edge care for the most complex and challenging polytrauma has been an enduring feature of the current campaign with a requirement for proven capacity to respond to an increase in casualty numbers. The treatment of these highly complex cases has afforded QEHB a level of experience and expertise that is unique in the UK. Much of this is due to changes in medical doctrine, informed by academic work at RCDM.

21.7. Defence Medical Rehabilitation Centre, Headley Court

The numbers and complexity of trauma survivors with amputations continues to rise. This has resulted in a requirement to increase staff numbers overall at Defence Medical Rehabilitation Centre (DMRC) including within the prosthetics department, and in the physical space required to support the prosthetics unit; this has required urgent estate works.

In September 2010 the construction of additional ward accommodation and associated dining space increased the in-patient bed capacity at DMRC to 96 established beds with access to 15 step-down beds within Wood House. Since then, the Jubilee Complex – comprising a 48-bed ward and separate therapy building – has been built to take the total number of beds to 144. The complex was declared operational in July 12, with the formal opening of the facility taking place in September 2012.

21.8. Mental Health Support

All deployed personnel undergo pre-operational stress briefing. In theatre psychological-education is delivered on arrival and throughout deployment the TRiM system [10] provides individuals with early support following traumatic events. A Force Mental Health Team consisting of three mental health nurses provides in-theatre mental health assessments and mental health liaison in forward areas. A Consultant Psychiatrist visits every three months, providing oversight and support. A permanent on-call consultant psychiatrist is available to provide specialist support by phone 24/7, and a UK-based team of a psychiatrist and a mental health nurse is at immediate readiness to deploy to the operational theatre to support the local team if required.

22. PERSONNEL WELFARE

22.1. Deployed Welfare Package

The Deployed Welfare Package (Overseas) (DWP(O)) Version 6 of May 2012 maintains its focus on communications from the operational Theatre to home, to maintain contact with families. Wi-Fi continues to be provided and rolled out to other forward areas where possible. The ratio of personnel to satellite telephone handsets is 15:1 and e-bluey (electronic letter system) machines have been provided to Theatre.

Service personnel get free phone calls at public expense based upon their tour length. These start at 30 minutes per week for short tours to 120 minutes per week for longer ones, and there is an additional 30 minutes over the Christmas period. There is also the Forces Mail and in Afghanistan, as in any other operational theatre, Free Forces Air Letters – more commonly known as ‘blueys’ – are available to all Service personnel, including, under certain criteria, Commonwealth forces. The Service families can use this method freely and have the benefit of the Enduring Families Free Mail Service (EFFMS) under which they can send packages under 2kg to named service personnel deployed on operations free of charge.

22.2. Leave Arrangements

There are two main elements to the operational leave – the Post Operational Leave (POL) which wherever possible is taken within one month of returning from operations and is calculated at one day’s leave for every nine spent in theatre plus all missed Bank Holidays. The other is Rest and Recuperation (R&R), taken during the tour of duty and in most cases taken back at home. With the normal Op HERRICK tour being six months, personnel will get a single two week period of R&R. A tour length of seven to eleven months qualifies for two periods and over eleven months qualifies for three periods. Where exceptional circumstances dictate personnel cannot take all that R&R during their tour, they will receive additional POL in compensation.

22.3. Decompression

Decompression is provided with the aim of reducing the stresses incurred on operations, as a first stage to returning to a normal life tempo. All Service personnel (and with effect from 1 July 12 all MOD civilian personnel) who have deployed from more than 31 days will undertake a period of decompression in Cyprus, as they return from operations. Decompression lasts for about 24 hours and is the first part of normalisation. Decompression allows personnel time to relax, adjust and reflect in a controlled environment prior to returning home.

23. COST OF OPERATIONS

The Defence Budget is not used to fund the additional costs of current operations – they are met from the Treasury Reserve. HMT funds the net additional costs MOD has incurred, but not the costs that the Department would have incurred regardless of the operation taking place (e.g. salaries). . Costs which would otherwise have been incurred by the MOD, such as the procurement of 'core' programmes, lie where they fall, and are not separately assigned to the Afghanistan operation. Any savings on activities that have not occurred because of the operation (e.g. training exercises) are also taken into account in arriving at the net figures.

Defence Resources can provide the actual net operating and capital costs of operations in Afghanistan funded by the Treasury, which to March 2011 totalled c.£13.3 billion. However, given the Department's purpose and how it is funded, it is not possible to identify which elements of the core Defence budget are being spent in Afghanistan.

THE ANNUAL AUDITED FIGURES FOR THE COSTS OF OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE 2001-02

(£M)	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11		Total
Resource	187	236	36	58	148	560	1,071	1,655	2,330	2,720		9,001
Capital Costs	34	75	10	9	51	178	433	968	1,491	1,054		4,303
FY Total	221	311	46	67	199	738	1,504	2,623	3,821	3,774		13,304

THE ESTIMATED COST OF OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AT SUPPLEMENTAL ESTIMATES 2011/12 FOR FY 2011-12

(£M)	2011-12 Forecast
Total Resource DEL	£ 2,982
Total Capital DEL	£ 1,156
Total Estimated Costs	£ 4,138

These figures conform to HM Government's Clear Line of Sight (CLoS), or Alignment, project and do not account for Cost of Capital, nor do they include the cost of provisions

The audited cost of the operation in Afghanistan will be published in the annual report and accounts later this year. Until that is published the best estimate is provided in the Supplemental Estimates, published earlier this year.

  

The total Net Additional Cost of Military Operations in Afghanistan in FY 11-12 is estimated to be £4.138 billion (excluding provisions). This is the figure which compares with the following numbers for previous financial years:

 

2010-11 £3.774

2009-10 £3.821

 

The breakdown is shown in the following table:

 

Operation	Direct Resource DEL £M	Non Cash Resource DEL £M	Capital DEL £M	Total SE DEL Request 2011/12 £M	Total SE AME Request 2011/12 £M	Total ME request 2011/12 £M
Afghanistan	2,469.4	512.9	1,156.1	4,138.4	8.7	4,025.6

 

In addition, the Conflict Pool provides funding for conflict prevention, stabilisation and discretionary peacekeeping activities, including for Afghanistan. Funding comes from a Treasury settlement which is separate and additional to departmental DELs. The Conflict Pool is jointly managed by FCO, DFID and MOD. The allocations and outturn for Afghanistan for FYs 2002/3 to present are given below.

(£M)	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	Total
Allocation	-	18	13.73	15.35	10	13.38	18.2	53.69	67	68.5	68.5	209.34
Spend	-	11.04	12.83	15.72	9.36	9.17	18.87	52.5	62.75	75.3	72.6	192.24
Allocation (CN)	-	-	10.08	11.47	10	10	10	-	-			51.54
Spend (CN)	-	-	8.1	9.91	10.15	9.67	9.85	-	-			47.68

In FY08/09 a new spending instrument, the Stabilisation Aid Fund (SAF), was established to provide stabilisation resources for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was in addition to the Conflict Pool. The SAF existed for one year; it was then subsumed into the Conflict Prevention Pool. The Conflict Prevention Pool, as it then was, was renamed the Conflict Pool at the start of FY 09/10. 

Final outrun for the SAF showed a total spend of £71.6million against a budget of £73 million. £53.7m of SAF funding was in Afghanistan. Programmes were run by MOD, FCO and DFID.

24. COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY

24.1. Cross Government Approach

The Cross-Government Afghanistan Communications Strategy sets out three objectives:

· To increase UK public confidence in HMG’s strategy in Afghanistan to build a secure, stable and viable Afghan state to protect our national security and reassure them that the mission is worthwhile.

· To build understanding and support amongst Afghans for the international mission, and increase the confidence of the Afghan people in Afghan-led security, governance and development.

· To ensure the support of international allies, including Pakistan, to achieve shared policy objectives and make a long-term commitment to Afghanistan.

This is delivered through a wide range of communications activity, both by HMG and the through international military coalition in Kabul.

The Communications Strategy is directed by the National Security Council (Afghanistan) (NSC(A)). The NSC communications team work in close partnership with communications and policy officials in No. 10, FCO, MOD, DFID, Stabilisation Unit, British Embassy Kabul, Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team and the UK Delegation to NATO to discuss current issues. It will provide direction from the centre and ensure accountability and delivery of cross-government policy communications through the Pakistan Afghanistan Strategy Group, Pakistan Afghanistan Strategy Group (Deputies) and regular strategic communications groups.

Communication activities include regular media briefings by Ministers, a programme of Cross-Government briefings, a media embed programme to Helmand, quarterly meetings with key interest groups including NGOs and Parliament and the Afghan diaspora, digital diplomacy (websites, Twitter, Q&A), outreach events, seminars, debates and visits. The Strategy is also underpinned by detailed implementation plans led by Departments and coordinated by the NSC Communications Team, such as the Chicago, Kabul, and Tokyo implementation plans.

The UK public remains supportive of the Armed Forces serving in Afghanistan [11] , but less supportive of overall UK involvement in the country [12] . Opposition has grown over recent years at the same time as a reduced perception of progress. Media focus on the security challenge and continuing British casualties in the fight against the insurgency continues to impact upon public opinion on the international campaign.

24.2. MOD Communications Strategy

The Cross-Government Afghanistan Communications Strategy sets out three objectives:

· To increase UK public confidence in HMG’s strategy in Afghanistan to build a secure, stable and viable Afghan state to protect our national security and reassure them that the mission is worthwhile.

· To build understanding and support amongst Afghans for the international mission, and increase the confidence of the Afghan people in Afghan-led security, governance and development.

· To ensure the support of international allies, including Pakistan, to achieve shared policy objectives and make a long-term commitment to Afghanistan.

This is delivered through a wide range of communications activity, both by HMG and the through international military coalition in Kabul.

The Communications Strategy is directed by the National Security Council (Afghanistan) (NSC(A)). The NSC communications team work in close partnership with communications and policy officials in No. 10, FCO, MOD, DFID, Stabilisation Unit, British Embassy Kabul, Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team and the UK Delegation to NATO to discuss current issues. It will provide direction from the centre and ensure accountability and delivery of cross-government policy communications through the Pakistan Afghanistan Strategy Group, Pakistan Afghanistan Strategy Group (Deputies) and regular strategic communications groups.

Communication activities include regular media briefings by Ministers, a programme of Cross-Government briefings, a media embed programme to Helmand, quarterly meetings with key interest groups including NGOs and Parliament and the Afghan diaspora, digital diplomacy (websites, Twitter, Q&A), outreach events, seminars, debates and visits. The Strategy is also underpinned by detailed implementation plans led by Departments and coordinated by the NSC Communications Team, such as the Chicago, Kabul, and Tokyo implementation plans.

The UK public remains supportive of the Armed Forces serving in Afghanistan [13] , but less supportive of overall UK involvement in the country [14] . Opposition has grown over recent years at the same time as a reduced perception of progress. Media focus on the security challenge and continuing British casualties in the fight against the insurgency continues to impact upon public opinion on the international campaign.

24.3. Helmand Effort

Helmand effort

The PRT’s Strategic Communications team is focused on:

· developing the capacity of the Afghan Government to communicate to local nationals in Helmand;

· developing a sustainable private and state radio environment to convey those messages and hold the Afghan Government to account; and

· publicising the work of the PRT to people in the UK through an embedded journalists programme and digital engagement.

Funded through the UK Conflict Pool, the PRT’s Strategic Communication team established the Helmand Media and Information Centre (HMIC) in 2009. The HMIC is the press office for the provincial level government and issues press released on Afghan Government activity to a range of provincial and national level media outlets. The PRT continues to mentor the HMIC to develop its capacity to delivery public information campaigns on health, security and other issues.

The PRT has supported the expansion of State Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA) and is working with the US State Department to support the expansion of private station Radio Sabawoon, through providing equipment and radio transmitters. The expansion of the RTA’s AM signal across all of Helmand in June 2012 ensured that the province had access to non-ISAF radio for the first time. The expansion of Radio Sabawoon through the construction of three UK-funded towers in Musa Qalah, Garmsir and Gereshk will be completed by the end of 2012.

The PRT’s main vehicle for communicating back to the UK is through the cross-Government journalist embed programme. Working alongside Whitehall partners and Task Force Helmand, the PRT’s Strategic Communications Team organises and facilitates tailored embeds for visiting journalists.

The objective of the embed programme is to highlight the progress that is taking place in Helmand as well as the successes of the PRT and the wider international community. The embed programme works to the NSC’s communication strategy on Afghanistan.

The PRT also has a significant digital presence. We conduct digital outreach via the PRT Facebook page, the PRT website, and the Head of Mission’s blog and Twitter channel. The majority of our digital audience is based in the UK, the US and Afghanistan.

25. DRAWDOWN OF UK FORCES

25.1. Current Planning

President Karzai has stated, many times, his goal that the ANSF will have full security responsibility across the whole of Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Aligned with both this and the strategy agreed at the NATO Lisbon summit in 2010, ISAF is gradually and responsibly drawing down its forces to complete its mission by 31 December 2014.

The Prime Minister has been clear that British troops will not be in a combat role in Afghanistan beyond 2014 or in numbers comparable to those deployed there today. Our drawdown in Afghanistan will be steady and measured. In July the Prime Minister restated that there will be no immediate withdrawal of UK forces in Afghanistan nor will there be a cliff-edge reduction of our troops in 2014.

The UK will reduce its conventional force levels in Afghanistan from 9,500 to 9,000 by the end of this year. Though no further decisions on our force levels in Afghanistan have been made detailed planning continues to consider our force trajectory through to the end of 2014.

The Defence Secretary recently explained how commanders have been "surprised by the extent to which they have been able to draw back and leave the Afghans to take the lion’s share of the combat role". Military commanders in Task Force Helmand believe that their force requirements during 2013 will allow more flexibility in the way we drawdown as transition progresses. This idea is consistent with the Prime Minister’s desire to avoid a cliff-edge reduction in force levels, where all UK troops are pulled out en masse in 2014.

Decisions on UK force levels will be taken by the National Security Council, taking into account military advice, the pace of transition and conditions on the ground. The National Security Council will discuss the pace of our drawdown over the autumn and we expect to make announcements on our force levels in the coming months.

Across Afghanistan ISAF force levels will drawdown in a coordinated and coherent manner and at an appropriate pace for each area so as not to leave a security vacuum that could breed extremism. ISAF partners, including the UK, remain committed to helping the Afghans provide their national security until the ANSF take over full security responsibility across the country by the end of 2014.

25.2. Redeployment

Work on managing the recovery of UK equipment is underway. Current plans aim to keep all relevant Line of Communication (LOC) options open to add resilience to redeployment. This includes surface routes through either Pakistan or the Central Asian Republics, where agreements are being progressed, and also by moving freight through a combination of air/sail and fly/rail/sail (the latter through NATO) routes. This is a complex area; each agreement is brokered separately and is subject to specific criteria and conditions.

The MOD is currently advancing agreements with the Central Asian Republics to secure bilateral, two-way surface transit and overflight options. We currently have an overflight agreement with Kazakhstan who are also considering a two-way surface agreement. We have finalised the text of three agreements (overflight, reverse [15] and armoured transport vehicles) with Uzbekistan and formal bilateral transit agreements were signed in September 2012. . We have discussed combined overflight and surface transit agreements with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and expect to conclude these negotiations in the autumn. NATO has secured two-way transit agreements with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan; which are for surface transit only and not overflight. NATO has also signed a sail/rail/fly agreement with Russia, which enables commercial flights from the Russian air base at Ulyanovsk into and out of Afghanistan to link with rail transit to the Baltic Sea.

OP HERRICK LINES OF COMMUNICATION

Where there are no time pressures, low grade materiel, equipment and supplies will be recovered by surface means in shipping containers. However, redeployment by air forms a significant part of the UK redeployment plan particularly for Protected Mobility vehicles, sensitive materiel and outsized loads. The approximate costs of the redeployment of surface containers range from £5,000 to £12,000 per container equivalent. The Air Line of Communication costs range between £10,000 and £30,000 per container equivalent, either returning directly to the UK by air or by one of the fly/rail/sail options. The detailed costs will vary depending on the specific option used.

Routine clearance has already started in Theatre to prepare for redeployment which, based on planning, will begin in earnest from 1 October 2012. Operational analysis is ongoing to enable full understanding of both the scale of redeployment and the flow of materiel and equipment out of Theatre. The initial estimate of the total quantity of UK in-theatre equipment was 11,000 twenty foot equivalent units; (this includes approximately 3,000 vehicles). This figure is being constantly refined as planning progresses.

Considerable analysis to determine exactly how much materiel and equipment needs to move is also underway. A figure of approximately 6,500 [1] twenty foot equivalent units of materiel is currently being used for movements planning after the consumption, selling, scrapping and gifting of materiel in theatre. Further analysis is being conducted on the range of options under consideration but planning is ongoing. Greater fidelity will be achieved on completion of the Force Element Table (FET) [2] during Herrick 17.  

Within the overall policy umbrella decisions on what to do with equipment will be made on a case-by-case basis using the principles of operational priority and value for money to the UK taxpayer. We are reviewing our policies on gifting to ensure that any gifted equipment is appropriate and follows Parliamentary, Treasury and National Audit Office rules. We are conscious that uncoordinated gifting could put ANSF sustainability at risk. The underlying requirement of any gifting must be that all gifted equipment is sustainable in terms of cost of ownership, support and enduring training. Our approach on gifting will, therefore, be coordinated with that of NATO and ISAF.

Cross-ISAF coordination will be an important factor in ensuring successful redeployment. To this end, strategic liaison with NATO continues through Joint Forces Command Brunssum [3] and SHAPE [4] working groups which are attended by MOD representatives. The SHAPE Air Movements Control Cell collates all multi-national reporting of each country’s Detailed Deployment Plans (DDP) to provide the ISAF fusion cell with oversight of country redeployment plans and flow rates. DDPs are typically submitted quarterly with the next submission scheduled for mid-November. Coordination of the ISAF nations’ DDPs will ensure better use of resources, de-confliction and where possible shared use of assets for ISAF redeployment. 

25.3. Enduring Presence

The UK and the international community are committed to Afghanistan for the long-term. At the NATO Summit at Chicago in May ISAF nations reaffirmed their enduring commitment to the country. At Chicago it was announced that a new NATO-led mission will be established in Afghanistan after transition completes. This mission will be based on the principles of train, advise and assist and will not involve international troops deployed in a combat role.

NATO is currently working to clearly define its post-2014 mission which the UK, as a NATO member, will support. Until that planning has matured, it remains premature to speculate what residual military presence, if any, the UK will have in Afghanistan after 2014 beyond our firm commitment to support the Afghan National Army Officer Academy.

It is likely that some UK forces will need to remain in Afghanistan in a non-combat role for a short period after completion of security transition to finalise logistics drawdown.

Afghan National Army Officer Academy

As illustrated by our Enduring Strategic Partnership document signed by the Prime Minister and President Karzai in January 2012, the UK will continue to have a close relationship with Afghanistan after transition completes. From 2013, and as announced by the Prime Minister in July 2011, UK troops will support the development of the ANA by providing lead coalition support at the new Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANA OA).

The UK will provide approximately 90 mentoring staff in total to the academy. Around 30 other mentoring staff will be provided by coalition partners. UK military personnel will also be deployed to sustain and protect the UK mentoring staff. The coalition manpower commitment will diminish over time as the Afghans increasingly take over the lead for the academy. The academy is being built by the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan and is due to open its doors to its first intake of students in 2013. Once fully operational it will accept three intakes of students per year; with an expected total of 1,350 male students and 150 female students trained annually. Specifically UK forces will be mentoring, assisting and advising Afghan instructors to run one year courses - based around the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst model - designed to teach Afghan National Army officers leadership and tactical skills.

Force Protection

Practical force protection measures are in place for all international troops who work closely with our partners in the ANSF and we will continue to review and employ best practice across the force. We will retain sufficient force numbers to ensure that we can properly protect our advisor footprint after 2014, and that we continue to have sufficient access to enablers such as medical facilities and support helicopters. The safety of our personnel is, and will remain, our top priority.

On the insider threat, we continue to work with the Afghans to ensure that recruits are properly vetted before they enter into any type of ANSF training in Afghanistan. In addition we work closely with our Afghan counterparts to improve our ability to identify and respond to any indicators of an internal threat before it leads to an attack. Recruits at the academy will be subject to a rigorous selection process before they are accepted on the course.

Support

The ongoing welfare of our deployed forces is a defence priority and the dynamic nature of transition will require agile and innovative application to ensure the underlying aims of welfare provision are met. This must be balanced finely with setting realistic expectation. Planning is ongoing that will ensure that any UK troops remaining in Afghanistan beyond 2014 will be resourced and supported appropriately.

Acronyms

 

AAF	Afghan Air Force
ABP	Afghan Border Police
ALOC	Air Line of Communication
ALP	Afghan Local Police
AME	Annually Managed Expenditure
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANA OA	Afghan National Army Officer Academy
ANCOP	Afghan Civil Order Police
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
APRP	Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme
AUP	Afghan Uniformed Police
BAG	Brigade Advisory Group
CAREC	Central Asia Regional Economic Co-operation
CBM	Confidence Building Measure
CJTF	Criminal Justice Taskforce
CLoS	Clear Line of Sight
CN	Counter Narcotics
CP	Conflict Pool
CSS	Combat Service Support
CT	Counter Terrorism
DDP	Detailed Deployment Plans
DEL	Departmental Expenditure Limit
DFID	Department For International Development
DMC	Defence medical Services
DMC	Directorate of Media and Communications
DMRC	Defence Medical Rehabilitation Centre
DNBI	Disease and Non-Battle Injury
DSTS
DWP(O)	Deployed Welfare Package (Overseas)
ECO	Economic Co-operation Organisation
EFFMS	Enduring Families Free Mail
EGF	European Gendarmerie Force
EIA	Enemy Initiated Attack
EUPOL	European Police Mission in Afghanistan
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FET	Force Element Table
FY	Financial Year
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GLOC	Ground Line of Communication
HMEP	Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programmes
HMG	Her Majesty’s Government
HMIC	Helmand Media and Information Centre
HMT	Her Majesty’s Treasury
HPC	High Peace Council
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISTAR	Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
JANIB	Joint Afghan NATO Inteqal Board
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
LAS	Light Air Support
LE	Locally Employed
LOC	Line of Communication
ME	Main Estimate
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRI	Magnetic Response Imagery
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCDC	National Drug Control Strategy
NCO	Non Commissioned Officer
NDS	National Directorate of Security
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NLOC	Northern Line of Communication
NSC	National Security Council
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan
PJHQ	Permanent Joint Headquarters
PMAG	Police Mentoring and Advisory Group
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
QEHB	Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham
R&R	Rest and Recuperation
RC (C)	Regional Command (Capital)
RC (E)	Regional Command (East)
RC (S)	Regional Command (South)
RC (SW)	Regional Command (South West)
RC (W)	Regional Command (West)
RC(N)	Regional Command (North)
RCDM	Royal Centre for Defence Medicine
RSC	Reverse Supply Chain
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration
RTA	Radio Television Afghanistan
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
SAF	Stabilisation Air Fund
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SE	Supplementary Estimate
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe
SI	Seriously Injured
SU	Stabilisation Unit
TFH	Task Force Helmand
TMAF	Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
TRiM	Trauma Risk Management
UKB	UK British
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USMC	United States Marine Corps
VSI	Very Seriously Injured

Herrick Tour Dates

 

UK operations in Afghanistan are conducted under the name Operation Herrick. Operation Herrick manning rotates on a six monthly basis with the exception of a small number of continuity posts which rotate every 12 months.

Dates of each Herrick tour referred to in the memorandum are as follows:

HERRICK 12 Apr 10 – Oct 10

HERRICK 13 Oct 10 – Apr 11

HERRICK 14 Apr 11 – Oct 11

HERRICK 15 Oct 11 – Apr 12

HERRICK 16 Apr 12 – Oct 12

HERRICK 17 Oct 12 – Apr 13

September 2012

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[1] UN – Aug 2008

[2] http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2011/

[3] The annual spring poppy harvest is usually characterised by a temporary decrease in EIAs, the early conclusion of the 2012 harvest resulted in a notable increase in EIAs in May and June, however, year-on-year EIAs subsequently dropped in July.

[4] Source: ISAF

[5] ISAF reporting from Jul 11 - Jul 12 shows the following regional breakdown of EIAs by Regional Command: RC(E) 39%; RC(SW) 31%; RC(S) 21%; RC(W) 5%; RC(N) 4%; RC(C) >1%

[6] Excluding the sectarian Ashura attacks in D ec 11 there were no high profile attacks in Kabul between Oct 11 and Apr 12. The gap of 168 days was the longest such break since 2009 and belied insurgent intent.

[7] March 2012 -March 2013

[8] Correct at time of writing 18 Sep 12.

[1] Inteqal translates in D ari and Pashtu as Transition .

[1] Source: NATO

[1] NATO Training Mission Afghanistan stood up in Nov 09.

[1] Until Apr 2012 ANA strength included AAF figures and civilians working for the Afghan Government and employed by the Afghan Min istry of Defence

[1] Overall ANP figures also include students in the Police Academy , Foreign Scholarships and NCO courses; and those officers who are awaiting training (i.e. officers that are on hold waiting to be placed in a billet). Members of the ANP in any of these groups are not counted within AUP, ABP pr ANCOP figures. This results in the reported variance between overall ANP levels and AUP, ABP and ANCOP totals.

[1] Includes all AUP enablers: Intelligence, Counter Narcotics, Anti-Crime, Medical, Fire, Traffic, Training Centres, MOI Headquarters.

[1] The UK ’s contribution to the Afghan National Army Officer Academy will be in addition to this £70m.

[2] 20 15 -2025.

[3] Level three – the ability to identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute and used printed and written materials associated with varying contexts.

[4] NTM-A has identified potential in US financial year 12/13 (between 30 September 2012 and 30 September 2013) for expenditure to accelerate enabler development within the ANSF. It seems likely that this expenditure, if it is made available, would be spread across logistics, aviation, counter-IE D , intelligence and surveillance, training and joint fires, with the training spend in areas such as technical, language and literacy training. There is no further clarity at this stage as to the detail or timing of this expenditure.

[1] Others includes Turkmen, Balooch, Nooristani, Bayat, Sadat, Pashayee, Arab & Qazel Bash

[1] Aug 11- Jul 12.

[1] Includes all elements of the ANP.

[5] Critically injured - the most serious casualties.

[6] Source: ISAF

[1] Source: ISAF

[2] COMISAF has changed the overarching name to recognise that both ISAF and ANSF are the target of attacks. In many attacks against Coalition forces members of the ANSF are also killed or injured. Attacks against contractors are also covered by the overarching Insider Threat term. The subset terms ‘Green on Blue’, ‘Green on Green’ and ‘Green on Brown (contractors)’ are still used to distinguish between the intended targets of attacks.

[3] Including civilian contractors.

[1] Including civilian contractors.

[1] Figures correct at 15 Sep.

[4] This includes endorsement by local elders, biometric data checking and medical (including drug) screening

[5] As part of the Reception Staging, Onward movement and Integration (RSOI) training.

[6] The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

[1] Statistics are taken from the Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme’s (HMEP) quarterly household surveys. Key districts (HMEP’s ‘group 1 districts) are defined here as the most densely populated districts in the Central Helmand River Valley (Lashkar Gah, Nahr-e Saraj, Nad Ali, Nawa, Garmsir and Marjah). These are the first districts to enter transition. D istricts included in ‘group 2’ are those lesser populated outer lying districts (Musa Qala, Sangin, Now Zad and Khaneshin).

[7] The Pakistan GLOC closes periodically for a variety of reasons. The most significant closure prior to Nov 11- Jul 12 was in summer 2011 when the GLOC was closed for nine weeks.

[8] The in-theatre Headquarters that oversees UK logistics.

[9] Based on the size of a standard container and used as the standard metric for redeployment activity.

[10] TRiM - Trauma Risk Management, a peer delivered risk assessment at 3 and 28 days following traumatic events, aiming to detect problems early, signpost personnel at risk to medical services and address stigma.

[11] Source: MO D polling.

[12] Source: various polling.

[13] Source: MO D polling.

[14] Source: various polling.

[15] Moving equipment from Afghanistan to the UK

[1] This figure is an estimate only and is liable to change as planning continues.

[2] The definitive document listing all capabilities and equipment that are to be moved.

[3] One of NATO’s three operational Headquarters, Brunssum in the Netherlands , serves as the higher Headquarters for ISAF.

[4] The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe is the Headquarters of Allied Command Operations – one of NATO’s two strategic military commands. SHAPE is located in Belgium .