House of Commons
Defence Committee

Defence implications of possible Scottish independence

Written Evidence

*Only those submissions written specifically for the Committee for the inquiry into Defence implications of possible Scottish independence and accepted as written evidence are included.*
List of written evidence

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Lyn Brayshaw and Andy Mackenzie
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Professor Andrew M Dorman
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1. Thank you for the opportunity to submit a memorandum of evidence for your inquiry into the defence implications if Scotland were to become independent. The evidence below addresses the main areas of interest identified by the Committee in announcing the terms of reference on 29 June 2012, as well as the specific questions addressed to the Ministry of Defence in the letter of 17 July 2012 from the Clerk to the Committee.

2. The UK Government’s position is clear: Scotland benefits from being part of the UK and the UK benefits from having Scotland within the UK. The UK Government is confident that the people of Scotland will choose to remain part of the UK, and is not planning for any other outcome. It is for those advocating independence to explain the nature and implications of an independent Scotland; it is the policy of the UK Government to maintain the integrity of the existing UK and we are supporting that position with evidence and analysis.

3. All parts of the UK, including Scotland, gain significant benefits from the provision of defence on a UK-wide basis in terms of: high levels of protection and security through sophisticated defence capabilities and substantial economies of scale through single, united armed forces and supporting organisations and infrastructure; significant international influence through a global network of relationships and alliances; and significant opportunities for defence industry, sustained by both UK domestic orders and exports in the global market.

The current contribution of Scotland to the overall defence of the United Kingdom in terms not only of specific items but of shared facilities and goals.

4. Scotland, as an integral part of the UK, plays a key role in the defence of the UK. It is currently the location of major bases for: the strategic nuclear deterrent; four regular infantry battalions and an air support regiment; two Royal Marines Commando units; and five squadrons of fast jets, including those providing the UK’s northern quick reaction alert force. There are also a significant number of reserve units, extensive training and testing areas and other facilities there. As at 1 July 2012, there were some 15,500 Ministry of Defence personnel located in Scotland, including some 11,000 regular armed forces and 4,500 civilian personnel, at some 50 locations across the country. Future plans envisage bases in Scotland for: all Royal Navy submarines; an Army brigade; and one of the Royal Air Force’s three fast jet main operating bases. Scotland benefits greatly from the presence of these bases, facilities and personnel, which provide significant employment opportunities and contributions to local economies.

5. Scots and Scottish-recruited units are an integral part of the UK armed forces and are highly integrated into the overall force structure of the UK’s very sophisticated fighting forces. In 2011/12, about 9% of recruits to the regular armed forces were recruited through Scottish recruiting offices. There are around 3,000 volunteer reserves and 17,000 cadets in Scotland. Scots have a proud and distinguished record of service in the armed forces. The majority of those who have served since the Act of Union have done so as individuals within the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force; their contribution to military operations has been substantial. That said, perhaps the most easily recognisable contribution of Scots to the armed forces has been the Scottish-recruited line regiments, which have an outstanding fighting history within the British Army.

6. The equipment and support of the UK armed forces provides significant opportunities for defence industry across all parts of the UK, with UK defence contracts sustaining key, advanced industrial capabilities. Many UK defence contractors are global players with significant exports. Many UK defence contractors benefit from contracts which are exempted from EU procurement rules for national security reasons that have to be placed or competed within the UK. In each of the last two financial years, between £12 billion and £13 billion pounds of Ministry of Defence contract expenditure was exempt from EU regulations. Although these exemptions were for a variety of
reasons, the majority of exempt procurements, particularly high value procurements, are for national security reasons.

7. There is a substantial defence industrial footprint in Scotland, ranging from design, manufacture, assembly and maintenance of complex warships on the Clyde and at Rosyth to the latest high-tech innovations in aerospace engineering, defence electronics and electro-optical systems in companies based right throughout Scotland. As part of the UK defence industry, the defence industry in Scotland has a highly skilled workforce and plays a key role in equipping and supporting the UK armed forces. Many of the Ministry of Defence’s prime contractors have sites in Scotland, including: BAE Systems, Raytheon, Rolls-Royce, Selex Galileo, Thales and Babcock Marine. UK defence contracts sustain thousands of skilled jobs in Scotland and generate billions of pounds for the economy.

8. The shipbuilding industry in Scotland forms a substantial part of the UK’s shipbuilding industry and is a major beneficiary of UK defence contracts. These currently include building and assembling Type 45 destroyers and the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers. Work in Scottish yards on the carriers is estimated to be worth about £1.3 billion and is anticipated to create or sustain nearly 5,000 jobs, including hundreds of apprentices.

9. It is important to understand that defence of the UK is planned, organised, resourced and managed on a UK basis to meet the needs of the UK as a whole. Defence capabilities and facilities are not operated by reference to the constituent parts of the UK they happen to be in, but are provided for the whole of the UK. Equally, defence goals are those for the UK as a whole rather than goals agreed by each of its constituent parts.

10. The UK has the fourth largest defence budget in the world. Agreed funding for defence over the period 2011/12 to 2014/15 is some £34 billion per year, which meets the NATO target to devote at least 2% of Gross Domestic Product to defence.

11. The UK armed forces are part of a single defence organisation and are directed and controlled through a single command chain. They are enabled and supported by single procurement, logistics, infrastructure, information, training and administrative structures and services.

12. It is important to emphasise that all parts of the UK gain significant benefits from the provision of defence on a UK basis. The formulation of defence policy and strategy and the planning and delivery of defence on a UK basis provides high levels of protection and security for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as well as the Overseas Territories, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man and British citizens abroad. As an integral part of the UK, Scotland receives the full benefits of this protection and security.

13. Defence of the UK is set within the overarching policy framework provided by the UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review under the National Security Council, integrating the work of the foreign, defence, home, energy and international development departments and all other arms of government contributing to national security.

14. UK defence capabilities include: the strategic nuclear deterrent; integrated, highly capable and well equipped naval, land and air forces, including reserves; and specialist capabilities such as command, control and communications, logistics, intelligence, special forces and cyber.

15. The UK also has a strong network of alliances and relationships: principally with the United States of America, but also as a leading member of the European Union and NATO, and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. These allow the UK to exercise significant global influence.

16. The UK is one of the largest contributors to NATO, in operational, military, financial and political terms. The UK makes a major contribution to international security through the Alliance in
terms of the full spectrum of capabilities it makes available to NATO and its willingness to deploy them. As such we exert significant influence on decision-making within the Alliance. This strong active presence helps the UK enormously to fulfil our security and foreign policy objectives.

17. Together these capabilities, alliances and relationships: ensure national security and resilience, protecting our people, economy, infrastructure, territory and way of life from all major risks that can affect us directly; and help to shape a stable world through actions beyond our borders to reduce the likelihood of specific risks affecting the UK or our direct interests overseas. The current highest priority risks are those from terrorism, cyber attack, international military crises and major accidents or natural hazards.

The implications for that defence should Scotland become independent, including those for personnel currently serving in the Armed Forces.

18. In the event of Scottish independence there would be many issues for the UK and Scottish Governments to address regarding future separate national defence and security arrangements, such as: separation of armed forces; basing; division of assets and liabilities; and potential cooperation. Without knowing what a future independent Scottish Government’s approach to defence would be, we cannot predict what the implications would be for defence of the UK or for defence of an independent Scotland. It must however be reasonable to assume that anything resembling fully integrated defence could not continue, because that would require binding commitments on both Scotland and the UK to maintain full compatibility across a range of essential matters such as defence expenditure, strategic foreign, defence and security policy aims (including the nuclear deterrent), the use of the armed forces on operations abroad and procurement priorities. This does not appear to be consistent with any conventional understanding of independence or national sovereignty.

19. The integration of the UK’s armed forces works to the benefit of the whole of the UK and an independent Scotland would be greatly weakened by separation. Although it would also be affected, given the relative size of the tax base and share of population, the rest of the UK would be better able to absorb and cope with the consequences. It is highly unlikely that the overarching policy and strategy, including continued membership of the UN, NATO and Common Security and Defence Policy, and the Military Tasks as set out in the 2010 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, would be significantly changed, although detailed implications for force structures and capabilities as set out in the Defence Planning Assumptions would need to be examined.

20. The equipment and support of the UK armed forces would continue to provide significant opportunities for defence industry in the UK, with UK defence contracts continuing to sustain key, advanced industrial capabilities. We would expect UK defence contractors to continue to be global players with significant exports. UK defence contractors would also continue to benefit from contracts exempted from European Union procurement rules for national security reasons that have to be placed or competed within the UK.

The possible shape and size and role of Scottish defence forces following independence.

21. It would be for an independent Scottish Government to decide what its foreign, national security and defence policies and strategies would be. Defence is a core function of an independent state and the Scottish Government would face difficult choices over its defence arrangements, including: the role of its armed forces, what threats it intends to counter and what foreign policy it intends to support; international relationships, including membership of NATO; the level of resources allocated for defence; and the future of the defence industry in Scotland. People in Scotland need to know how the Scottish Government proposes to provide for the protection and security of Scotland if it separates from the UK. It is our view, however, that whatever choices it made, an independent Scotland would lose significant benefits that are delivered by being part of the UK.
22. Although the Scottish Government has previously posited a number of options and has made a number of broad statements relating to defence in an independent Scotland, it has given no clear information on the detail of its plans and it is therefore difficult to say what the implications for the future defence of Scotland would be.

23. There is no doubt that a smaller nation of just over 5 million people would have a much smaller defence presence than that of the UK with over 60 million. There would be a much smaller tax base and a much smaller recruiting base. That would inevitably have implications for defence manpower and budget and the armed forces’ capabilities, including being able to protect its own territory and to deploy on exercises and operations, especially those connected with any international commitments.

24. Financing and equipping independent Scottish armed forces would be the responsibility of the Scottish Government. We have no real sense of the likely costs, but it is clear that the economies of scale we currently enjoy in the integrated UK armed forces would be reduced. Not just combat, but combat support (e.g. engineering, artillery and aviation) and combat service support (e.g. logistics, medical and welfare) would be needed, as well as command and control, equipment procurement and support, training, human resources and financial management. The Scottish Government would also need to consider what intelligence, cyber and Special Forces capabilities it would require. All this would be expensive to generate and would need to be built up almost from nothing. There would be considerable start-up costs.

25. The creation of independent Scottish armed forces would not be as simple as transferring existing Scottish-recruited or Scotland-based units as this would not create in any sense a coherent, credible or balanced force. The UK armed forces are a totally integrated, pan-UK organisation. Command and control, training, logistic support, equipment procurement - how these would be done in the context of an independent Scotland remain unanswered questions that would need to be addressed from scratch.

26. Furthermore, members of the UK armed forces could not simply be co-opted. Among the most difficult issues affecting defence would be questions in relation to citizenship, namely who was to be regarded as Scottish and how that would affect the obligations of Scottish members of the armed forces. An important point to note is that it is far from clear that individual members of the armed forces who came within an agreed definition of Scottish would automatically choose to join the armed forces of an independent Scotland. Those serving in the UK armed forces can expect varied and interesting careers within one of the most highly regarded and well equipped forces in the world. The prospect of smaller and perhaps less globally active armed forces could be for some a less rewarding prospect.

27. In terms of defence industry in Scotland, should it decide to separate from the UK, we are sure that companies there would continue to make strong bids for UK defence contracts; but they would then be competing for business in an international market. And it would only be eligible to bid for contracts that are competed outside the UK. It would no longer be eligible to bid for those contracts that are subject to exemptions from European Union procurement rules to protect essential national security interests and are therefore placed or competed within the UK. Similar considerations would apply to the security industry in Scotland; for instance, Scottish registered companies would not have a right to compete for any future government-to-government security contracts that the UK Government entered into.

28. The procurements of the Type 45 destroyers and the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers have been subject to such exemptions. Other than during the World Wars, the UK has not had a complex warship built outside the UK since the start of the 20th century at least. All the UK’s new complex warships are being built in UK shipyards and we remain committed to utilising UK industry in this area. So this is understandably a matter of concern for the ship building industry in Scotland.
The means and timescale of any necessary separation; whether and how any defence shortfall might be made good.

29. The UK Government is not making plans for independence as we are confident that people in Scotland will continue to support Scotland remaining in the UK in any referendum.

30. It is impossible to say at this stage how a separation would be effected and how long it would take. It would clearly be a highly complex, time-consuming and costly process; but it is not possible to place any figures on these.

The extent to which, and circumstances in which, an independent Scotland might continue to contribute to defence goals shared with other parts of these islands and other countries.

31. The Scottish Government has not set out any concrete proposals for sharing facilities, bases or support. Until it has set out credible plans for defence and security of an independent Scotland, it is not possible to say whether or not facilities, bases or support could be shared.

32. Although the Scottish National Party is due to re-consider its policy on NATO membership in the autumn, both its and the Scottish Government’s current policy is to commit to the Partnership for Peace. This is a valuable programme of co-operation between allies and other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area and many Partners make valuable contributions to NATO operations. But it is not the same as full NATO membership. It does not provide a voice in NATO’s senior decision making bodies, nor, because the Washington Treaty does not apply, does it bring with it NATO’s Article 5 collective defence assurance where an attack against one of the Allies shall be considered as an attack against all, if all NATO members agree.

33. The UK Government believes that Scotland is certainly stronger in defence terms as part of the UK within NATO and does not believe it would be in the interests of an independent Scotland not to be a member of NATO. However, if an independent Scotland decided that it wanted to be a member of NATO, the North Atlantic Council would need to decide whether or not it would meet the criteria for membership. There is no guarantee that NATO membership would be automatic.

NATO’s Strategic Concept, as agreed by all Allies at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, reiterated that NATO’s deterrence posture will consist of both nuclear and conventional forces and that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist. This posture was also affirmed in NATO’s Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, adopted unanimously by Allies at the Chicago Summit in May 2012. The Scottish Government’s position regarding nuclear weapons and their presence in its territory would therefore be an important consideration.

Effect of defence on the debate on UK governance

- Who in MOD is considering the effect of defence transformation on the debate concerning separation of the UK?
- Who in the MOD is looking at the implications for the security of the UK under the Crown of separation of the UK? Do the contingency plans, for example, include a federal UK (Crown) Defence Policy and Forces, formed from whatever political structures emerge?
- Is there routine assessment within the MOD of the regional implications of defence policy? If so, where is it carried out? To what extent are such implications considered when decisions are being taken?

34. The UK Government is confident that people in Scotland will continue to support Scotland remaining in the UK in any referendum and we are not therefore making plans for independence. Accordingly defence transformation continues as planned.

35. Leading up to the referendum, the UK Government will produce detailed evidence and analysis to assess the benefits of Scotland remaining in the UK. The protection of our citizens, including our defence capability, will be one of the key themes of this work alongside our position in the world and the economic benefits. Work on this in the Ministry of Defence is being led by the Director General Security Policy.
36. Defence and security is the first duty of any government, and the deployment of armed forces one of its weightiest responsibilities.

37. We are not aware of any successful precedent where armed forces have been shared by sovereign nations. Recent examples of separation of sovereign states – e.g. Czechoslovakia or Sudan – have seen the creation of independent armed forces. It is similarly not clear to us how it could work in this eventuality, given the possibility of disagreements over their use.

38. Defence policy is set on a UK basis within the overarching framework of the UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review under the National Security Council. The interests of all the regions of the UK are included in this. Any specific regional effects of decisions, such as where to base defence capabilities, are considered as part of regional impact assessments of individual projects. The Scotland Office also has a role in ensuring that any considerations for Scotland are reflected within the UK Government.

Effect of Scottish independence on UK security

- It is already clear that if Scotland were to become independent, the possible implications for the defence of the realm are likely to be very considerable. Where in the MOD is the work being done to assess them?
- What are the implications for Defence of the retention of the Union of the Crowns but separation of the Parliaments?
- Who in MOD/FCO/NSC is considering the implications for the Deterrent? And for the basing of nuclear-powered submarines?
- Is the MOD considering the implications for UK defence of the impact of independence on different political structures? How would it affect Alliances, UN, NATO, UK-EU, AUS-CAN-UK-US? What is the thinking on whether an independent Scotland could automatically remain a member of NATO? Would the position differ between a Scotland which continued to host the nuclear deterrent and one which did not?
- How would the air defence of RUK be assured from the North if Scotland did not possess an effective fighter/radar/C2 system?
- What are the precedents for joint basing and what might be the command and control arrangements in the event of one country being involved in an action and the other opposing it?

39. As explained earlier, work in support of the UK Government programme to produce detailed evidence and analysis to assess the benefits of Scotland remaining in the UK is being led in the Ministry of Defence by the Director General Security Policy. However, as also explained earlier, without knowing what a future independent Scottish Government’s approach to defence would be we cannot predict what the implications would be for defence of the UK or for defence of an independent Scotland.

40. Defence is a core function of an independent state; so even if an independent Scotland were to have the same head of state as the UK we would assume that it would have complete independence with separation constitutionally of foreign policy, defence and armed forces (as do, for example, Australia and Canada). It would still be for an independent Scottish Government to decide what its foreign, national security and defence policies and strategies would be, and hence its defence arrangements.

41. The UK Government has committed to maintain the strategic nuclear deterrent and to continue with the programme to renew it as debated and approved by a significant majority in Parliament in 2007. The UK Government is not making plans for Scottish independence; we have no plans to move the nuclear deterrent from Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde. The initial decision to base the nuclear deterrent on the Clyde was taken in the 1960s, with the introduction of the Polaris SSBNs. This decision was reviewed in the 1980s alongside the decision to introduce the Trident SSBNs. At that time it was concluded that the Clyde continued to offer the best location; nothing has happened since to alter that conclusion. Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde is the largest
single site employer in Scotland, hosting over 6,000 Naval Service, Ministry of Defence civilian and contractor personnel. The Base is a major source of employment for highly skilled workers and a significant contributor to the local economy. Plans are already in place to base all the Royal Navy’s submarines, including the attack submarine (SSN) fleet on the Clyde by the end of this decade. In addition to the facilities offered by the Naval Base, there are a considerable number of other facilities in Scotland which also support the SSBN and SSN fleets. These include ranges, training areas and industrial facilities.

42. If the result of any referendum on Scottish independence were to lead to the current situation being challenged, then other options would have to be considered. Any alternative solution would come at huge cost. It would be an enormous exercise to rebuild the facilities. It would cost billions of pounds and take many years. It is impossible to estimate sensibly how much it would cost to replicate the infrastructure, which would depend heavily on timescales and the precise scope of the facilities that might be required. Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde underwent a significant investment programme to prepare it for the introduction of the Vanguard Class submarines and Trident missile system; that programme cost in the region of £3.5 billion at 2011/12 prices. Any replication of facilities would cost at least that much and probably more.

43. International precedent suggests that, in the event of Scottish independence, the remainder of the UK would maintain its leading position in the major international institutions and organisations. Thus the remainder of the UK would continue in membership of NATO and the European Union and retain its permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council. It would remain one of the largest contributors, in political, policy, capability and financial terms, to all of those organisations. Similarly, the remainder of the UK would maintain its strong network of alliances and relationships.

44. As explained earlier, although an independent Scottish Government would need to decide whether it wanted to be a member of NATO, we do not believe it would be in the interests of an independent Scotland not to be. However, if it did want to be a member the North Atlantic Council would still need to decide whether or not it would meet the criteria for membership; and there is no guarantee that it would be automatic. NATO’s Strategic Concept, as agreed by all Allies at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, reiterated that NATO’s deterrence posture will consist of both nuclear and conventional forces and that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist. This posture was also affirmed in NATO’s Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, adopted unanimously by Allies at the Chicago Summit in May 2012. The Scottish Government’s position regarding nuclear weapons would therefore be an important consideration.

45. As regards air defence from the north, the UK and NATO would clearly seek to ensure that this was not undermined by Scottish independence. However, until the Scottish Government has set out clearly what its plans are, especially with regards to NATO membership, it is too early to decide any shape for a revised air defence posture of the remaining UK. Command and control arrangements would be a key factor in any such considerations.

**Financial effects**

- What assessment has been made of the financial cost of making good any shortfall in defence capability resulting from Scottish independence?
- What are the financial implications of the different options in respect of Scottish independence? For example, the Army is currently engaged in basing reform and the return of troops from Germany. What effect is the uncertainty having on these? Presumably the MOD does not intend to spend money on converting Scottish RAF bases for Army use if Scotland is to vote for independence? What consideration is being given to retaining spare accommodation capacity in the UK to guard against losing capacity in Scotland?
- What extra costs are resulting from any delay in decision-making?

46. No assessment of the financial implications for defence of Scottish independence has been made. There would be potentially significant costs of separation; particularly for an independent
Scotland which would likely face large start-up costs to set up its own defence arrangements, including separate armed forces, support and specialist capabilities.

47. The possibility of Scottish independence is not a factor in our decision-making regarding future defence arrangements, including basing options. We are continuing to plan for the future on the basis that Scotland will remain part of the UK; and we are not delaying decisions as a precaution against the unlikely event that Scotland might choose to separate. Although it will be better to have more certainty about Scotland’s future sooner rather than later, business continues as usual.

**Armed Forces Covenant**

- If it becomes necessary to move UK personnel and assets south of the border. What arrangements are foreseen for the provision of health, education and other social services for the personnel and their families during any handover period?

48. In the unlikely event that Scotland were to become independent, any relocation of UK armed forces personnel and their families would take full account of their needs for health, education and other social services, both for the long term and during any transition period.

*October 2012*
An Introduction to the Defence Implications of Scottish Independence

This evidence is submitted as independent analysis and does not necessarily reflect the views of the University of London, Royal Holloway, University of London or the Department of Politics & IR at RHUL.

1. A ‘yes’ vote for Scottish independence for the United Kingdom will have several implications for defence in both the UK and Scotland after Scottish withdrawal and for the newly-independent Scotland. While the event will be traumatic for the United Kingdom, the UK should be able to withdraw from the union with Scotland with little long term effect on the defence posture of HMG while an independent Scotland will need to manage the severe costs of establishing military command and control structures, capabilities as well as intelligence assets. The disintegration of a country and dissection of armed forces is not without precedence in recent history. The partition of India, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the break-up of Czechoslovakia all offer insights into some of the general problems that may be faced by a dissolution of the union. The Scottish Government has thus far failed to offer a comprehensive plan for Scottish defence following independence. This brief review of the key issues based on past cases serves to highlight areas for further study in both London and Edinburgh, so that in the event of Scottish independence both sides can plan accordingly to maintain their respective defence interests.

2. Bases – there are currently seven UK military bases located in Scotland (RNB Faslane & Coulport, Fort George, Kinloss, RAF Lossiemouth, Arbroath, Leuchars and Kirknewton). As a result of the new Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), this will be cut to three in the coming years. The most critical of these bases, post-independence, will be the Royal Navy base at Faslane, the home of the UK’s nuclear deterrent and the future home of the new fleet of nuclear Astute-class submarines. Following independence, the new Scottish Government will likely want to assume control of the bases in Scotland, although the SNP has declared that it does not want nuclear weapons in the country and thus discussion on the future of the fleet at Faslane would be front and centre. Due to the shear impossibility of re-locating the assets at Faslane in the near term (if ever) a condition of Scottish independence will need to be long-term basing rights of the UK fleet in Faslane. Such a situation is not without precedent. The establishment of the Irish Free State in 1921 included the maintenance of three treaty ports in Ireland that endured until 1938 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to a treaty between the Ukraine and Russia on the continued presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol. This agreement was recently extended until 2042.
3. Infrastructure – Although MoD property inside Scotland will most likely be transferred to Scotland (which will need to match a formula devised to determine how much Scotland contributes to UK defence and which then allocates property accordingly. Property and material in excess of Scotland’s financial investment in the MoD will necessitate payment by the newly independent Scotland). Scotland will still need to reproduce the wider command and control structure in which those bases operate. Military bases are only a cog in the machinery of national defence. The functioning of the bases in Scotland relies on a much wider network of Ministry of Defence institutions all located beyond the boundaries of Scotland. Scottish independence would result in a severing of these connections. A newly independent Scotland would need to reproduce the centralized functions of the Ministry of Defence in London, as well as developing the support capabilities provided by other parts of the MoD in the UK from logistics to educational institutions such as the Joint Command and Staff College (JCSC). Of course for some areas, such as the JCSC, it might be possible for Scottish officers to train while the UK is paid for such services by the new Scottish Government.

4. Equipment – dissolution of the Union would also require a division of military equipment between the two countries. This would most likely be part of a wider process of determining ‘ownership’ of assets as well as allocation of debt related to the past-procurement of such assets. It would be disingenuous of Mr. Alex Salmond and the SNP to believe that they should acquire weaponry, Land Rovers, helicopters, planes or ships (to name but a few pieces to be divided) without payment or assumption of debt related to such past procurement. It will thus be necessary to devise a formula for the transfer of equipment. It is worth noting that while there will be military bases in Scotland (which would be relatively easy to assess and transfer) much of the supporting equipment (especially lift capacity) is not necessarily linked to those bases.

5. Equipment Continued – Some critical pieces of equipment will be easily split as the SNP has, for example, disavowed the use and presence of the Trident nuclear deterrent in Scotland. While this may be an ethical point for the SNP, it also reflects fiscal reality. An independent Scotland would be a rump economy compared to that of the UK today (and of a UK post-Scottish independence). Compared to other small NATO/European nations, a Scottish defence budget would be paltry. Denmark and Norway, comparatively sized northern European nations spent 1.4 and 1.5 per cent on defence in 2010 for total expenditure of 2.8GBP billion and 4.2GBP billion respectively. If Scotland was independent in 2010 and spent 1.4% of the GDP on defence the budget would be approximately 1.7 to 2 £ billion. This would make Scotland among the smallest defence spenders in Europe. While it is possible for many nations in northern Europe to run on small budgets, this discounts the significant start-up costs and independent Scotland will incur in developing a Ministry of Defence, MoD support systems, equipment procurement as well as the development of intelligence capacity such as MI5 and to a lesser extent MI6.

6. Personnel – Division of personnel may well be one of the most difficult aspects of Scottish independence. Scots have been over represented as a percentage of
population in the armed forces of Great Britain since the act of Union. The martial history of the Scots and their contribution to the identity of Great Britain generally and the British Armed Forces in particular cannot be discounted. Military separation will be damaging to the psyche of the institution for a period. There is also the thorny question of allegiance and for which country one should serve. The clarion call of an independent Scotland may be enough to compel those of Scottish nationality to serve in the armed forces of an independent Scotland. Some may indeed enjoy the challenges of setting up a new military establishment. Those, however, wishing for more global engagement and involvement in a military force that, for the time being remains (technologically) second only to those of the United States, may very well opt to remain in the armed forces of Her Majesty. There may, of course, be Welsh, Irish and English who would wish to serve in the armed forces of the new Scotland. Historical precedent of this type in South Asia, the USSR and Czechoslovakia suggests that the militaries will split along socio-cultural lines. A process must be established to enable individuals to chose in which military they will serve.

7. Treaty Obligation & International Responsibilities – In the event of a ‘yes’ vote the issue of succession would need to be determined. If Scotland was considered a successor state of the UK 1707-2013, then it might be required to share some of the burden of the continued defence of territories linked to the former union such as the Falklands, Gibraltar, and Northern Ireland. There is also the issue of the UK seat at the United Nations (strictly speaking not a military/defence issue, but one related to defence and foreign affairs) and its attendant seat on the UN Security Council. Would the new, smaller UK inherit all of the previous treaty rights and commitments – as was the case with Russia post-USSR dissolution in 1991 – or would these be shared? This question will need to be answered.

8. NATO - One of the thorniest questions on the issue of international obligations will be Scotland’s role vis-à-vis NATO. Scotland has articulated interest in being involved in the European Union and ESDP, which as a smaller economy will most likely help future economic transfers via infusions of funds from the EU to Scotland. However, Alex Salmond and the SNP have a firmly anti-NATO perspective. This is problematic because Scotland has depended on NATO for security for over 60 years now. A refusal to join the Alliance that helped secure Scotland in the Cold War and post-Cold War era would be seen as a direct affront to countries that Scotland might want to court post-independence. This would include not only neighbours such as Norway and Denmark, but also the USA and Canada. Furthermore, it could poison relations with England and Wales, who will see Scotland as ‘free-riding’ on English defence expenditure and commitment to NATO. The SNP can, of course, change its current policy, but this would mean, among other things, accepting NATO as a nuclear alliance – a position counter to the SNP position of nuclear weapons. It will not be easy for the SNP to do a u-turn on this issue and the implications of the current position vis-à-vis NATO need to be more clearly elaborated to the Scottish people.

9 – An independent Scotland will, over time, be able to develop a Scottish Defence Force that can act in the protection of Scotland and possibly may even contribute to future international operations via the UN or other international
organizations. Achieving such a force, however, will be costly, complicated and
difficult. The current Scottish leadership must be more honest and transparent
with the Scottish people about the challenges of defence in a post-independence
era. For England and Wales, a vote for Scottish independence will have
implications but they will be far less severe than for the newly independent
Scotland.

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strategy.*

*July 2012*
1. The Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has produced two reports in 2012 which relate to the terms of reference of the inquiry. Trident: Nowhere to Go argues that there are no viable and practical alternative locations, outside Scotland, for the Trident nuclear force. Disarming Trident presents a timescale for the deactivation of the Trident force, the removal of nuclear weapons from Scotland and the dismantlement of these weapons. This is a summary of these two reports.

2. Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker, in their book Uncharted Waters: the U.K., nuclear weapons and the Scottish question (2001), described how the Ministry of Defence (MOD) considered a number of alternative sites for Polaris in 1963. Trident: Nowhere to Go re-examines this issue in the light of documents released into the National Archives over the last five years.

3. There are geographic constraints on the location of a replacement for Faslane. Only sites on the West and Southwest coasts of Britain were considered in 1963, because nuclear submarines prefer to operate in water deeper than 100 fathoms. Submarines should have ready access to the base at all times. The difficulties moving Vanguard class submarines in and out of Devonport for refits suggest that Devonport might not be suitable. In addition, facilities for ballistic-missile submarines, in particular any dock or shiplift, should not be too close to urban areas.

4. Finding a replacement for Coulport would be particularly difficult. The objections listed in 1963 to alternative sites are only a starting point. Trident today requires a depot which is larger than was proposed for Polaris. Explosive safety distances have increased. This affects the spacing between facilities and their distance from inhabited areas. In addition, a Trident D5 missile has substantially more explosive power than a Polaris missile. Even though missile processing work was transferred to the United States, the MOD expanded Coulport to three times its original size, in order to accommodate Trident.

5. In 1979 the MOD recognised that it would be difficult to accommodate Trident at Coulport. The possibility of relocating the depot was raised. Sir Frank Cooper, Permanent Under Secretary of State at the MOD, said that it was “most unlikely” that they would be permitted to build a new depot on a greenfield site. This judgement was made during the Cold War and before the nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima. Today the only viable sites for new nuclear power stations are existing nuclear locations. Rebuilding Coulport on a greenfield site is unlikely to be a viable option.

6. Converting either of the two current nuclear submarine sites in England would be very difficult. Submarines movements in and out of Barrow are severely restricted by the shallow water in the estuary. Barrow is not a suitable site for an operational base or a depot.

7. The combined explosive power of eight Trident missiles is equivalent to 560 tonnes of TNT. The Office for Nuclear Regulation and the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator are unlikely to permit the handling of these missiles, or even the routine basing of armed Trident submarines, at Devonport because it is within a city which has a population of 250,000.
8. The Explosives Handling Jetty at Coulport is 3 kilometres from the nearest villages of Garelochhead, to the Northeast, and Ardentinny, to the Southwest. These safety distances cannot be replicated at any of the alternative sites in England and Wales which were shortlisted in 1963.

9. Trident could only be sited at Milford Haven if the oil and LNG facilities in the estuary were closed. Building a Coulport-sized depot at Falmouth would result in the evacuation of a large area of land. The proposed site for the nuclear-weapons depot would be far closer to Falmouth than Faslane and Coulport are to Helensburgh, which has a similar population.

10. In 1981 the MOD considered basing the Trident fleet, including nuclear warheads, at King’s Bay in the United States. Following advice from Washington, this option was not pursued. Compliance with the provisions of the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, including the need to maintain national control over nuclear weapons at all times, would be problematic. Operating Trident from King’s Bay would also make the force transparently more dependent on United States support.

11. The option of basing Trident in France is unrealistic for similar reasons. Because of spacing constraints, it would not be possible to share the existing site at Ile Longue. The British government would have to build separate facilities at a new location in France. This would be even more difficult than building a base and depot in England or Wales.

12. The conclusion of the Scottish CND (SCND) report is that there are no practical alternative locations for Trident. As a result, if the government of an independent Scotland maintained a stance of refusing to host nuclear weapons, then Britain would effectively cease to be a nuclear-weapon state. If Britain abandoned its nuclear arsenal this would improve the prospects for global nuclear disarmament and reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation.

13. Our second report, Disarming Trident, addresses the question of how quickly the Trident nuclear weapon system could be deactivated, removed from Scotland and disarmed. The submarine on patrol could return to base within 7 days. The system could be put beyond practical use within one additional day. The warheads could be offloaded into the magazines at Coulport within 8 weeks. Transporting the whole stockpile from Scotland could be completed within 2 years. It would take around 4 years to dismantle these weapons at Burghfield. The report suggests reactivating the Special Ammunition Site at RAF Honington as a temporary store. A sovereign Scottish government could legally insist that Trident must be removed and could present this as a realistic timetable.

14. Dr Bruce Blair, the leading world expert on the de-alerting of nuclear forces, described this timetable as “highly credible”. He added, “my studies have determined that many of the steps could be taken at a pace that is nearly twice as fast, though the more leisurely pace in the SCND timetable ensures a completely safe process of dismantlement”. Professor Richard Garwin, who has advised successive American governments on nuclear weapons issues, said “the missiles and nuclear warheads can be disabled within weeks and removed within two years and dismantled within four years, if that were judged to be desirable and the decision made to do so.” The Scottish Government’s response to the report was, “We are firmly committed to the earliest possible withdrawal of Trident from Scotland and to the pursuit of a world which is free from nuclear weapons. The suggested timetable is a welcome indication of how quickly Trident could be removed once Scotland has the power to decide its own defence and security policy.”
15. The attitudes of the governments of the Remainder of the United Kingdom (RUK) and of the United States would influence the ease with which these proposals could be implemented. It is sometimes said that both governments would firmly resist any attempt to achieve nuclear disarmament in this way. However I would challenge these assumptions.

16. The rationale for British nuclear forces during the Cold War was weak and it is now particularly fragile. Today, the fundamental concept that nuclear weapons give Britain status can only be whispered, or recorded in a Prime Minister’s autobiography.

17. The independence of Trident is at best suspect. In 1978, the Duff-Mason report defined “independence” as meaning that the UK would keep only 12 months supply of spare parts for the successor to Polaris.

18. There have always been some people in the Treasury and in other parts of the armed forces who have questioned the amount which the MOD spends on nuclear weapons. These concerns may not be very public, but in the current economic climate they are likely to be significant.

19. The United States government might embrace the prospect of British nuclear disarmament rather than seeking to undermine it. President Kennedy regarded the Polaris Sales Agreement (1963) as an error. President Carter was not enthusiastic about supplying Trident C4 to Britain. The UK’s nuclear weapons’ stockpile may become a more significant factor as the United States and Russia reduce their arsenals closer to the UK’s level. A re-elected Obama administration might not actively seek to sustain the status quo of the British nuclear force if this was challenged by Scottish independence.

20. There are many countries around the world who, at NPT conferences, argue that progress towards nuclear disarmament is too slow. These nations are unlikely to look favourably on any attempt by an RUK government to force another sovereign state to be the unwilling host of all its nuclear weapons.

Sources:

July 2012
Written evidence from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Summary

1. The Government should consider the future of Trident on the basis of real security needs, not in response to its potential eviction from Scotland. A full strategic review of UK possession of nuclear weapons is now essential.

2. It must acknowledge that nowhere in the UK is opposition to Trident stronger than in Scotland.

3. Its position of publicly discounting the likelihood of independence is not defensible, in light of the wider constitutional debate.

4. It should publicly discuss what it would seek to do with Trident in the event of Scottish independence.

5. It should acknowledge the difficulty of replicating the Clyde facilities, particularly Coulport, elsewhere in England or Wales and that it would encounter opposition to any such attempt.

6. It should be prepared to alter its stance in light of the Trident Alternatives Review and a full strategic review and countenance a non-replacement decision ahead of the referendum.

Trident location – the wider context

7. The discussion on the future of the Trident nuclear weapons system has been thrown into sharp relief by its emergence as part of the Scottish independence debate. CND welcomes all opportunities to discuss the future of Trident and the complex issues surrounding the system, including its location, but our over-arching concern remains the inappropriateness of British possession of nuclear weapons, its drain on the public purse and the negative security implications of our continued possession of such weapons of mass destruction, both for Britain and the world as a whole.

8. The British government should be driving forward the debate about the future of Trident based on Britain’s real security needs – as indicated by the National Security Strategy – and on making real progress on its nuclear disarmament commitments. A partial recognition of the need for a reassessment exists in the form of the Trident Alternatives Review. This should be extended to include non-nuclear options and its outcomes be considered in the light of a full strategic review.

9. This process should not be determined by a response to the potential eviction of nuclear weapons from Scotland. Such a potential eviction should of course concentrate the minds of relevant government ministers and their staff, but this situation should trigger the comprehensive review of nuclear weapons possession that has not yet taken place, rather than a casting
around for alternative locations which have already been ruled out on various grounds in the past. Leadership on nuclear disarmament, on the basis of our genuine security needs, is what is required from government today.

**Trident in the Scottish referendum debate**

10. Trident is certain to feature strongly in the referendum debate. Opinion polls show maintaining Trident is unpopular throughout the UK, but nowhere is it less popular than in Scotland. As the SNP’s Angus Robertson said in a recent debate, Trident replacement takes place,

'...in the face of opposition in Scotland. The majority of MPs from Scotland and the majority of Members of the Scottish Parliament have voted against Trident renewal. The Scottish Government are opposed to Trident, the Scottish Trades Union Congress is opposed to Trident, the Church of Scotland is opposed, the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland is opposed, the Episcopal Church of Scotland is opposed, the Muslim Council of Scotland is opposed, and, most important, the public of Scotland are overwhelmingly opposed to the renewal of Trident. A YouGov poll in 2010 showed 67% opposed, as against only 13%. There was majority opposition among the voters of all four mainstream parties in Scotland, including Conservative voters and Liberal Democrat voters. The Westminster Government are aware of the objections but are ploughing on regardless.'

11. The potential removal of Trident and the Vanguard submarines from Scotland will be debated throughout the referendum process. The strength of Scottish opposition to Trident suggests it will be a factor in favour of a ‘yes to independence’ vote.

12. However the Government and its representatives at the Ministry of Defence claim,

'...The UK is not making plans for Scottish independence and is not making plans to move the nuclear deterrent or other submarines from HM Naval Base Clyde.'

13. The Joint Committee on National Security Strategy recently underlined concern within Parliament at the Government’s stance when it stated its belief that ‘the possibility that independence might actually happen is being neglected in strategic planning.’

14. This is despite the growth in public discourse on the matter. In addition to the Defence Committee Inquiry, a Scottish Affairs Committee Inquiry, the recent report by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, discussion in the Welsh Assembly, and discussion at RUSI, CND’s own report,

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1 Angus Robertson, House of Commons Debate, 18 June 2012, c611
2 Peter Luff to Alison Seabeck, House of Commons Debate, 13 July 2012, c411W
Trident: Nowhere To Go, published in February added to the discussion.

15. However realistic the possibility of Scottish independence, and it would be unwise to make a judgment two years prior to the referendum, the Government appears to be burying its head in the sand by refusing to countenance it or discuss its ability to maintain Trident without the Scottish naval base.

16. It is therefore not defensible for the Government to publicly state it is not preparing for the possibility it will be asked to remove the submarines from the Clyde following the referendum.

17. It should consider the possible alternatives, and those alternatives should include the option of not replacing but dismantling the existing fleet and weapons. The appropriate forum to consider these alternatives would be a comprehensive strategic review of our possession of nuclear weapons.

Building new facilities or holding out on the Clyde

18. In line with the Government’s position that it does not expect the Scottish people to support independence, the Ministry of Defence has stated in Written Answer to a Parliamentary Question that, since it is not preparing to move Trident from the Clyde,

'The Department does not therefore hold cost estimates or other information that would relate to such changes.'

19. Since then, at the Scottish Affairs Committee, Nick Harvey gave more ground when stating on the same topic, that,

'It would be a very challenging project, which would take a very long time to complete and would cost a gargantuan sum of money. When the facilities there were upgraded for Astute and the previous upgrade of the nuclear deterrent, the cost of that upgrade in today’s prices was about £3.5 billion. That was upgrading an extant facility. If we were to replicate it somewhere else, that figure would be dwarfed by whatever that would cost. The costs would be absolutely immense.'

20. Adding significantly to the cost of maintaining a submarine-based nuclear weapon system would call into question how such developments would be funded and, as a result, call into question the entire project.

21. It is therefore not surprising that some in Government and the defence industry have sought to claim the UK could maintain Trident on the Clyde after potential Scottish independence.

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4 Peter Luff to Jeremy Corbyn, House of Commons Debate, 30 January 2012, c424W
5 Nick Harvey, Uncorrected Transcript of Oral Evidence to be published as HC 139-iii, Scottish Affairs Committee, 13th June 2012
22. At the Scottish Affairs Committee, Nick Harvey stated, ‘I would have thought that relocation would be just about the least favoured option that it would be possible to conjecture,’ whilst RUSI’s Malcolm Chalmers in his paper stated the future Government of the UK after Scottish separation would be ‘almost certain to press for a longer-term foreign basing guarantee.’

23. However, Francis Tusa said at another hearing of the Scottish Affairs Committee Inquiry that, ‘Increasingly, one of the biggest red herrings is that Trident could not be moved from Scotland’, and argued the warheads at Coulport could be stored at Aldermaston and Burghfield and transferred by road to the new submarine berths. He has argued, ‘the number of options for moving the deterrent out of Scotland is huge’.

Nowhere To Go

24. In our own report, Trident: Nowhere To Go, CND argued that ‘relocation is not a serious option’ for the Ministry of Defence in the event of an independent Scotland ordering the removal of nuclear weapon facilities and vessels from Scotland.

25. Malcolm Chalmers, in his paper for RUSI, has also argued that,

‘relocation of these bases would be very difficult, if not impossible, to implement’ and that it would be ‘perhaps politically impossible to find a suitable alternative location for the warhead storage facility currently based in Coulport’.

26. The current location of the UK’s submarine-based nuclear weapon system on the Clyde was made fifty years ago when the Ministry of Defence drew up a list of possible locations for Polaris in Scotland, England and Wales.

27. We believe it would be too difficult to replicate the Clyde facilities at each of those previously considered sites in England or Wales – Devonport, Falmouth, Milford Haven and Portland. Such a base would requires the two key components of the Clyde, one, the site to berth and support the submarines, and second, a depot to store and handle nuclear warheads and missiles. There are particular problems with finding a suitable site for the latter.

28. In 1963 each of these locations were rejected and as Trident was ordered, Frank Cooper, Permanent Secretary at the MoD in 1979, stated that

‘while nothing is impossible, it is most unlikely that we would ever get agreement to a new ‘greenfield’ site in the UK’ for a nuclear submarine base.’

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6 ibid
7 Malcolm Chalmers, ‘Kingdom’s End?’, The RUSI Journal, 157:3, 6-11
8 Francis Tusa, Uncorrected Transcript of Oral Evidence to be published as HC 139-ii, Scottish Affairs Committee, 23rd May 2012
9 Malcolm Chalmers, ‘Kingdom’s End?’, The RUSI Journal, 157:3, 6-11
29. Both Devonport and Falmouth would require the abandonment of villages to develop an armaments depot and in both cases major concerns would remain about its proximity to residential areas and the political difficulty of securing local support, should a location that meets safety requirements be found.

30. Siting Polaris at Milford Haven would have resulted in the closure of one oil refinery in 1963. The MoD concluded that Polaris and the refinery were incompatible, on safety grounds. Introducing Trident in this estuary today would end three major petrochemical facilities and cut off one of Britain’s main sources of gas. The grounds for dismissing Milford Haven, as with all the other sites, are even stronger today than they were fifty years ago.

31. The existing Portland naval base in 1963 was ruled out because of the lack of a suitable site for a nuclear armaments depot in the vicinity. The base has since closed.

32. The difficulty of developing a new armaments depot, such as that at Coulport, is often cited as the most difficult question the government would have to face.

**Recent discussions have demonstrated opposition in alternative sites**

33. On the 18th June at Question Time, Carwyn Jones AM, First Minister of Wales, stated "I did notice the Scottish government no longer wishes to have the nuclear submarine base at Faslane, it no longer wishes to house the UK naval nuclear fleet. There will be more than a welcome for that fleet and those jobs in Milford Haven."

34. His comments have since been condemned by Plaid Cymru leader Leanne Wood who called an opposition day debate in the Welsh Assembly, and where Plaid AMs were joined by Liberal Democrat AM Kirsty Williams and Labour AMs Mark Antoniw, Mark Drakeford and Julie Morgan in opposing Trident.10

35. In Falmouth, the local Mayor Geoffrey Evans, has been reported as commenting 'It is ridiculous, how could they ever dream of doing that? I cannot see how they would get plans for a nuclear weapons facility through.'11

**Scrap Trident**

36. But whether or not there are alternative locations to the Clyde will be of little concern to the SNP and the Scottish people who wish to see Trident removed from Scotland. It is reckless to believe that, being strongly opposed to the UK’s submarine-based nuclear weapon system and having voted for independence, Scotland will agree to continue hosting such weapons.

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10 Welsh Assembly, Record of Proceedings, 4th July 2012
11 Falmouth 'nuclear store' plans revealed, Falmouth Packet, 7th May 2012
37. The Trident Alternatives Review may encourage new thinking on nuclear weapons possession within Government and should be extended to include non-nuclear options. Its findings should be considered together with the findings of a full strategic review of the UK’s nuclear weapons possession.

38. The UK Government should be prepared to remove Trident from Scotland, but it should also not plan to impose it on any other location in the UK.

39. The best contribution the UK Government can make to any debate on the presence of nuclear weapons in Scotland is to announce the scrapping of Trident and the cancellation of its replacement.

19 July 2012
I am writing to you today to discuss the Defence implications of possible Scottish independence, especially regarding Trident submarines.

Scottish opposition to Trident remaining at Faslane will cause near insuperable difficulties.

It would be virtually impossible to move the nuclear submarines to an alternative base, given the economic and political realities of today (although it might theoretically be possible for a government which had deep pockets and with nuclear weapons at the top of their agenda).

There would be massive public opposition to any alternative site. Even were one to be identified, a move would cost billions.

One cannot justify such expenditure on top of the vast existing cost of a weapon that does nothing to face real threats to our security and which promotes nuclear proliferation - especially when urgent measures for the health and wellbeing of citizens are being widely cut.

The consequences of Scottish independence are thus an additional reason to make plans to phase out Trident instead of replacing it.

I ask you therefore to do all in your power to ensure that Trident missiles are not replaced.

July 2012
Written evidence from Lyn Brayshaw and Andy Mackenzie

I am writing as I would like to make sure you are aware of the implications for Trident, while the Defence Committee is about to hold a new inquiry into the Defence implications of possible Scottish independence.

I believe that Scottish opposition to Trident remaining at Faslane will cause near insuperable difficulties. It would be virtually impossible to move the nuclear submarines to an alternative base, given the economic and political realities of today (although it might theoretically be possible for a government which had deep pockets and with nuclear weapons at the top of their agenda).

There would be massive public opposition to any alternative site. Even were one to be identified a move would cost billions. Such expenditure can not be justified on top of the vast existing cost of a weapon that does nothing to face real threats to our security and which promotes nuclear proliferation - especially when urgent measures for the health and wellbeing of citizens are being widely cut.

The consequences of Scottish independence are thus an additional reason to make plans to phase out Trident instead of replacing it.

July 2012
Written evidence from Jane Hill

I understand the defence committee is about to hold an enquiry into the implications of possible independence.

In light of this, I should like to make the following points:

- Scottish opposition to Trident remaining at Faslane will cause near insuperable difficulties.
- It would be virtually impossible to move the nuclear submarines to an alternative base, given the economic and political realities of today (although it might theoretically be possible for a government which had deep pockets and with nuclear weapons at the top of their agenda).
- There would be massive public opposition to any alternative site. Even were one to be identified a move would cost billions.
- One cannot justify such expenditure on top of the vast existing cost of a weapon that does nothing to face real threats to our security and which promotes nuclear proliferation - especially when urgent measures for the health and wellbeing of citizens are being widely cut.
- The consequences of Scottish independence are thus an additional reason to make plans to phase out Trident instead of replacing it.

July 2012
Written evidence from Alison Lea

I would like you to consider the following submissions in your new inquiry into the Defence implications of possible Scottish independence.

I am particularly concerned as to how Scottish independence will impact on the continued maintenance and proposed renewal of Trident missiles, now stored at Faslane. Studies indicate that there is substantial opposition from the Scottish people to Trident remaining at Faslane and that this will pose enormous - possibly insuperable - difficulties for maintaining Trident.

Studies, both recently and in the past, have shown that it would be almost impossible to move the nuclear submarines to an alternative base. Given the economic and political realities of today, even a government which placed nuclear weapons at the very top of their agenda would be unlikely to find an alternative location.

In the unlikely event that a site were to be found, public opposition to Trident missiles being located there would render the move impossible, and the cost would also be prohibitive, running into billions of pounds.

At a time of huge economic decline and cuts to public spending on vital services such as health and education, any additional costs on Trident would be completely unjustifiable. Many people already understand that Trident costs billions from the public purse without contributing at all to our quality of life. Many realise that Trident, despite its enormous cost, does nothing to protect our security effectively, and many believe that the very existence of Trident enhances our risks. It also contributes - in direct contradiction of our non-proliferation treaty - to the continuing promotion and expansion of nuclear weapons.

However, there is one very simple solution to the challenge posed by Scottish independence to Trident missiles: make plans to phase out Trident and do not replace it.

This decision is long overdue and will find support among a majority of the population. This will not only solve the problems of storage and safety arising from the existence of Trident on Scottish soil, but will also contribute to world peace by setting an example for others to follow towards a world where nuclear weapons are eliminated all together.

I urge you to place these considerations before the Defence Committee and to include them in any discussions relating to Scottish independence and Trident.

July 2012
Written evidence from John and Margaret Parry

We hope the prospect of Scottish Independence is concentrating members' minds on the futility of replacing Trident at the cost of £100 billion.

There is no alternative base available in the UK for nuclear submarines without vast expenditure and a campaign to persuade English voters that such expenditure is justified, at a time of savage cuts in the life-giving services of health, education and social welfare.

The whole premise of a nuclear deterrent is now outmoded, since the advent of suicide bombers. They would be quite happy to have their own bases destroyed if they could inflict damage on our nuclear capability - so there is no point in having it.

Please support realistic future scenarios, not this ludicrous anachronism.

July 2012
Written evidence from Andrew Hobbs

Secure Defence For Thyself

“Don’t Just Moan About It - Take Advantage Of It!”

The has been much rhetoric about the recent Strategic Defence & Security Review which has centred on the complete ‘cabbage’ the current (2012) British national (this term is used deliberately, as will be seen) Government has made of Britain’s defences. Assuming that there is even a morsel of truth in the allegations, it would appear that Her Majesty’s Government (one uses both terms advisedly) has indeed made just as much of a mess of Britain’s defences as they have of Britain’s education, transport and public health - and therefore all four of the key host nation support services that international investors expect.

The key date in the future of the defences of the British Isles would therefore appear not to be 2015, but 2014. The reason? International big business has finally lost both confidence in, and patience with, those ‘unintelligent cartoon characters’ in Westminster, and decided, not so much to break Britain up, as dismantle it according to the wishes of, and to a blueprint provided by, said international investors.

The obvious question is why now, rather than any time in the last 25 years? The answer to this is that the May 2011 Scottish Nationalist election victory (in defiance of a rigged electoral system) constitutes the political equivalent of a Final Warning - Britain’s national government, as an institution, has until the end of 2013 to prove that they can provide the four key host nation support services mentioned above to the standard expected by international investors. Judging by past performance, they will not get anywhere near! Sic Transit Gloria Britannia Magna.

A few remarks on the historical background will help to set the scene. It was realised some time in the last quarter of the 19th Century that Britain’s political system was strangling the economy. This resulted in, amongst other things, in a Bill for Scottish self-government [URLs in List of References] being before Parliament when the Great War broke out in 1914, and Bevan (in between inventing the NHS) receiving, and perhaps having commissioned, a report on the post WWII economic future of Northern England, which concluded that if the inhabitants were not given economic autonomy, they would sit down on the post-WWII reconstruction job. Well, they weren’t - and they did! This was in 1944, by the way.

This seems to be a continuing theme throughout post-1945 British politics, and what lies behind all the rhetoric behind the ‘North-South Divide’ is a sit-down protest against the post-1945 British political settlement by something like two-fifths of England’s population, along with the Welsh and Scots. Something else which is of interest is that the basic political settlement of the original post-1945 German Federal Republic was drawn up by British officials and administrators. An attempt to do something similar in Britain after 1945 met with a very rude answer from the (Labour) government of the day, with the results that we see. For a detailed description of the economic and administrative failures of the 1945-50 Labour
government, see Barnett [The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities 1945-50 Pan Books 1996]

So much for history - how did we get where we are? Thatcherism failed. This left the Conservative Party needing to produce some sort of economic showing in time for what became the June 1987 UK general election. The solution? A radical programme of economic\(^1\) and political decentralisation. This meant that not only did the Conservatives finally apply the correct solution to Britain’s post-1945 economic and social problems, but they had decisively won the election, and conferred upon themselves an opportunity to finally finish Labour as a national political force. What did the Tories do once the election was over? They threw it all away!! Idiots.

The Labour Party seems to be stuck some sort incomprehensible ‘statist’ mindset which completely fails to grasp Britain’s political and institutional heritage [The Day The World Took Off: the roots of the industrial revolution. Dugan & Dugan, 2000]. There is a school of thought, to which the author subscribes, which states that the Callaghan government’s mishandling of the Home Rule issue in the Autumn of 1978 ‘broke’ that administration, letting in the Conservatives, again with the results that we see. The response of New Labour, once elected, was to simply regurgitate, without taking any account of subsequent events, the 1978 proposals. This not only let in the Scottish Nationalists, but ruined the Welsh economy [typing in ‘Welsh Development Agency’ into Google displays the whole sorry story] and cannot have done the Northern [Hudson, 2004 & Tomany/Pike - documents in List of References] one any good either.

Where does Defence, as an issue, fit into all this? Simply, it is not so much a reserved (to central government) issue, as the reserved issue. Again, this seems to be a continuing theme of the Home Rule debate, although, on the other hand, the end of the Cold War and the continued absence of any ‘State’ military threat to Britain means that there has been no obvious need to discuss the matter further until now.

This appears to be changing, and that a non-national defence effort, based on additional (to the existing national effort) and independent military contingents initially based in Scotland will need to be put in place. The national Defence establishment will no doubt attempt to close down any debate and block any such effort, but it is no longer their decision.

Before we go any further, one things needs to be borne in mind, particularly by those who will be critical of this narrative. Alone of all the aspects of the political decentralisation debate (the author hesitates to use the term ‘devolution’), ‘defence’ is bedevilled by ‘he said/she said’ sources, which makes making any public contribution verging on the impractical. The author is satisfied that the military hierarchies, the major defence contractors, international communities such as the EU and NATO, and interested national ministries have all been actively discussing the matter since at least the mid-1980s, but these discussions are being deliberately being withheld, for reasons best known to the politicians and media establishment, from the public domain. Therefore, the message to any critics is this: “tell us what is really happening, then!!”.

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\(^1\) Covered in great detail in the Guardian between April 1986 and June 1987.
Put simply, is there a non-national defence job to be done? In a word, Oil. The story begins with a media story, a classic example of the ‘he said/she said’ syndrome, in early 2005 stating that effective recruitment for the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) had failed, and, as a consequence, the Royal Marines Commacchio Group [The URL for the history of this force is in the References], the unit assigned to protect Britain’s offshore energy resources, was being reassigned to protect Britain’s network of nuclear power stations.

This was supposed to have been interpreted by the international oil companies as a withdrawal of military protection of their investments (a key host nation support service, remember), which resulted in a progressive disinvestment in Britain’s oil and natural gas resources. This seems to have extended to onshore fields, as there has been at least one episode of the BBC Coast programme which interviewed at least one prospector who stated that he had been denied funding for developing promising onshore oilfields in Southern England. Given that the area is known to be an onshore oilfield equal to anything in the Middle East, this can only be the result of deliberate policy. There have also been at least two references on BBC Regional News to potential onshore oilfields in, as well as the South of England, Nottinghamshire and the Peak District (the latter actually being productive in WWII) not being developed, apparently for the same reason.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that a whole network of new, small, oil and gas companies has grown up, but they do not have the business resources to undertake large-scale developments, and if they suffer a major incident of any kind they will simply go out of business. They also appear to lack the business resources to undertake the major projects securing Britain’s energy supplies requires.

We now step forward in time some two years. There was a reference on the Times website that stated that the Scottish Nationalists’ successful 2007 election campaign (which resulted in them forming the minority administration that formed the basis for their 2011 victory) was paid for by the banks and the oil companies.

This means that we have to reconcile SNP buffoonery (the terms ‘numpty’ and ‘Wee Eck’ are not compliments!) with the relatively fair and competent SNP government of Scotland since 2007, which apparently led to their 2011 election victory. One obvious answer is that the SNP has been following a script drawn up by said banks and oil companies, and the proposed 2014 independence referendum is the culmination of this process.

It rather looks as though that these oil companies, whoever they are, have decided on a third option other than disinvestment or tolerating the bungling and adventurism of national government: get the Scots to do the job instead. Subsequently, there have been media stories that the French firm Total, the Korean National Oil Corporation and Gazprom are all investing in Britain’s oil and gas resources. While many will find the idea of the Russian military, for example, guarding Britain’s energy resources all very amusing, surely there is a better way?

This concept is further reinforced by a further media report [Moneyweek, April 16, 2010] which paints a very optimistic picture of Britain’s onshore oil prospects, and

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advising interested potential investors of the opportunities, which one must admit, seem to be considerable.

There appears to be a job for any putative Scottish military to do, which would be expected to be additional to the existing national contingents. It is against this background that any critique of the Scottish Defence Services proposal must be made.

The SNP has a statement of Defence policy on it’s website [URL given in List of References], but the author considers this to be a prime example of a ‘motherhood and apple pie’ statement, and the SNP, as in institution, should know better. For example, take the following statement:-

“The SDS [Scottish Defence Service - author} will initially be equipped with Scotland’s negotiated share of UK defence resources.”

In plain English, there will be a share-out of an already inadequate UK defence force. The whole point of having a separate Scottish defence force is to add to Britain’s military strength in order to carry out the home defence and NATO tasks that those ‘unintelligent cartoon characters’ in Westminster are systematically neglecting.

Another real classic is:-

“The priority of the Scottish Defence Services (SDS), in partnership with Scotland’s neighbours and allies, will be to safeguard our land, sea and air space”

Not with a share-out of the current inadequate set-up, they won’t! This sort of vague statement merely makes it difficult to operate Britain’s defences in such a way as to maximise international investment.

Probably the most serious idiocy is the following statement:-

“Scotland will maintain active defence commitments with its friends and allies through the United Nations, European Union and Partnership for Peace”

No mention of NATO!! The Unionist faction will be after this sort of sloppy statement like the proverbial ‘horse in a nosebag’. International investors will not be impressed…

It is not just the author who thinks this way. For example, consider the debate reported in the [Scottish] Evening Times on the 17th of May 2011 [URL in List of References].

A good example of SNP ‘defence’ idiocy was highlighted in the Commons by Labour MP Sandra Osborne, who asked Dr Fox [the national Defence secretary at the time] to comment.

He said: “It is extremely worrying that the SNP have previously had a position which is anti-Nato, and anti the nuclear defence of this country“.

“It is now time for a very serious debate on issues that ought to worry all those who
believe not only in the United Kingdom but in sound defence for the United
Kingdom.”

If the 2010 Strategic Defence & Security Review is anything to go by, we won’t get
it!!

Labour (who have nothing to shout about in the Defence arena) joined in the attack,
with Dunfermline and West Fife MP Thomas Docherty saying: “The idea that, if
Scotland split from the United Kingdom, all military establishments, personnel and
equipment would remain is delusional propaganda.”

The SNP should be countering these comments, not issuing motherhood-and
apple-pie statements for public consumption, and keeping the real negotiations behind
closed doors!

The best demolition of current SNP defence balderdash is to be found within a report
on the Herald Scotland website [URL in List of References], which records the
following conversation, which revolves around Alex Salmond’s defence of the
suggestion the SNP could adopt an “independence lite” option by sharing its military
facilities with a government in London:-

The First Minister said on the previous Sunday to the 17th of May, “Many, many
countries in the world share military facilities with friendly neighbours and there’s
absolutely no reason why Scotland wouldn’t be prepared to do that.”

This prompted General Sir Mike Jackson, the British Army’s former chief, to insist
soldiers could only have one “political master” and that, under independence,
Scotland would have to raise its own army.

The general is quite right, of course, which brings us to a brief summary of what the
defence review Dr. Fox expected in 2011 will be required after a successful 2014
Scottish independence referendum would look like.

We will need to start with what any putative Scottish military will actually have to do.
Protecting oilfields has already been mentioned, and one would expect offshore gas
fields to need protecting as well. Critics will no doubt question the need for this, but
what international investors want, international investors get. Similar considerations
would appear to apply to offshore wind generator ‘farms’, and offshore wave and tidal
energy installations. Another major project that seems to crop up in the media on a
regular basis is the proposed National Water Grid, intended to take water form those
parts of Britain in ‘water surplus’ (notably Scotland) and transport it to those parts of
Britain in ‘water deficit’.

The second role is to make up a portion of the deficiencies in national military
strength, with particular emphasis on home defence (which ties in with offshore
resource protection) and NATO commitment to the Arctic (also being clobbered by
Westminster military adventurism) - the ultimate political price for facilitating
Scottish independence.

Reference was made earlier to the Royal Marines Comacchio Group [RM Force
Protection Group website], which was (and presumably still is) supposed to be dedicated to protecting Britain’s offshore energy installations. Whether this is still the case is now irrelevant, as the confidence of the oil and gas industry as a whole has been lost.

Apparently, protecting oil installations (an one presumes other offshore energy installations) is know within military circles as OILSAFE. These OILSAFE operations will need to continue and expand to cover both these and Maritime Counter Terrorist (MCT) tasks throughout the British Isles. This will involve counter-terrorist operations against ships as well as oil and gas installations. In its wider role, the MCT force will need to undertake exercises in and near Norway as well as Britain and will need to mature into an effective and respected organisation. The author is not qualified on exactly what form any Scottish OILSAFE force would take, but some 700 personnel of all ranks would appear to be needed.

Before going any further, we must consider the great imponderable - recruitment. There is no current information of any kind, or even speculation, on how any putative Scottish military would recruit the necessary personnel. The whole operation would appear to stand or fall on this issue. While international investors could be expected to supply a suitable cadre of experienced individuals, the likelihood is that this would lead to the British media, quite literally, screaming “mercenaries”, which would lead to a political panic, which would wreck the whole operation. The author cannot answer this question, but would like to see the ‘people in the know’ come clean on the matter.

On the other hand, thanks to the wide coverage of modern military equipment available from amongst other places, the shelves of W.H. Smith, we can make a few speculations on what international investors would expect in the way of equipment. The basic missions would include methods of rescuing hostages on oil rigs, cruise ships and cross-channel ferries. Given the prospect of mounting a rescue operation against a North Sea oil rig from the freezing cold seas below, one can speculate that the equipment required would be extensive. One may also realistically expect that the oil and gas industry will have had their own audits, done by individuals with extensive military experience, and the resulting ‘shopping list’ will be extensive.

OILSAFE and MCT operations usually involve simultaneous assaults from the air and sea. We may therefore expect to see the purchase of enough infantry weapons to equip a 700-strong force. In the absence of helicopters from national sources, the Scots will need to purchase at least one squadron of medium lift helicopters (such as AW101 Merlins) and at last one squadron of smaller helicopters (such as Lynx Wildcat). A selection of rigid inflatable boats (RIBs) will be needed to assault ships and oil rigs from the water. This will all give the SNP leadership an ‘attack of the vapours’, but what international investors want, international investors get.

Interested parties will also expect a realistic Scottish contribution to remedying the deficiencies in Britain’s overall defences. Following on from the above, a few words on a putative Scottish Navy will be appropriate. Back in Autumn 1998, there was a standing joke in defence circles that the Scottish Navy would consist of three frigates
and two diesel-electric submarines\(^2\). So Comrade Salmond needs to be made to concede, firstly, no ‘penny packeting’, and, secondly, the principle of five major units. The obvious choice is five frigates. It is rumoured that the German Government is preparing to decommission all eight Type 122 frigates currently operated by the German Navy. Being German, these ships will not be cheap, but will be in absolutely top-class condition. Such a five-ship purchase will no doubt give the SNP leadership an even bigger ‘attack of the vapours’ (particularly when such a purchase would mean a loan secured against Scottish government revenues), but they must be made to realise that Scottish independence confers responsibilities as well as privileges.

There will also be a need for a minimum force of minehunters (six such vessels?) for both OILSAFE and ‘national’ missions. Interestingly, such vessels can also, with the appropriate mission computer software, ‘treble up’ as hydrographical survey vessels and inshore resource protection vessels.

Now, for the most expensive and controversial Scottish Naval purchases. OILSAFE operations outside the range of land-based helicopters and surface craft will require a large amphibious ship that can carry both helicopters and surface craft. On top of this, from a UK perspective, there is a need for such a ship than can cover for \textit{HMS Ocean} when she is under repair and for the Royal Navy’s dock landing ships when neither is in service (which will happen at some point), as well as make up the shortfall caused by the sale of a Bay-class vessel to Australia. This will mean that the Scottish Exchequer having to purchase and operate what is called a Landing platform Helicopter Dock (LHD) vessel. This will really cause ructions within the SNP! One would expect that the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors and/or BAE Marine to have ready a design and build plan for such a vessel in time for the 2013 upheaval. If not, they should have.

It should also be in mind, that, as of Summer 2012, the Royal Navy is beginning to think about a replacement for \textit{HMS Ocean}. A second example of the design which will be needed for the Scottish OILSAFE force is an obvious contender. This will also allow drawing office charges, specialised equipment cost etc. to be spread over two ships rather than one, lowering the unit cost for both.

Only slightly less controversial will be the need to purchase at last one replenishment vessel - again, because of the UK-level deficiencies in this area. Such a ship would need to be able to supply warships with fuel, drinking water, foodstuffs, spare parts, mail, etc. In addition to this ship, there may well be a need to construct and operate a ‘fleet tanker’ than can supply warships with fuel, and perhaps foodstuffs, drinking water and mail. This is all starting to look very expensive, and makes one truly appreciate the level of the defence failings at Westminster.

Almost as an afterthought, taking over the enforcement of what may well become the Scottish EEZ, will require the fisheries protection vessels operated by the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland (or whatever it is called these days) to be armed, fitted with helicopters, capable of at least 20 knots, and increased in number.

\(^2\) Told to the author at the time by a fellow \textit{aficionado} working in the MoD. The author’s reaction was ‘Salmond knows better than that!’
The putative minehunter fleet can help take care of inshore resource protection (see above), but at least six such ocean-going patrol vessels will be required (citing the Irish experience), along with at least four dedicated patrol aircraft. One hopes that the EU will pay for everything except armament, under the terms of the Common Fisheries Policy, but this will still ‘sting a bit’.

The SNP appears to recognise that Scotland will need a relatively small Air Force (over and above the helicopter squadrons mentioned above), but one also wonders if they have realised what this will involve. Once again, we are considering the requirements of international investors and remedying a part of UK-level deficiencies. One role that immediately stands out is air defence. With the RAF being dragged off to deal with the whims, fancies and panics of Westminster politicians, there must be some very sharp questions being asked about who is going to defend Britain against air threats.

This might explain a very interesting story that has cropped up in the aeronautical press in 2009. This involves a proposal to supply fifty-eight Saab Gripen New Generation fighters to an unidentified British governmental body. What makes this interesting is that the RAF has denied all knowledge of such a proposal, and one cannot see how the UK Treasury approving such a purchase. This raises the likelihood of Gripen International (the marketing body for this aircraft ‘jumping the gun’ (and making themselves look a bit daft), having recognised the need for an additional air defence force, with a secondary capability in anti-shipping attack and reconnaissance. This contract is supposed to be a complete ‘turnkey solution’, covering the aircraft themselves, spare parts, engineering support (including a mid-life update), weapons, training, in fact, everything except fuel and initial personnel selection. Such a proposal would be very tempting to an embryonic Scottish government under severe pressure from both international investors and NATO to get its defence act together. However, it should be recognised that fifty-eight aircraft may be too many for the Scottish budget. It appears than three twelve-aircraft squadrons, plus an attrition reserve) - a total of forty-four aircraft - should be sufficient. It should be feasible to further reduce the ‘bill’ by buying re-manufactured A/B models from surplus Swedish stocks.

Two more stories in a similar vein in circulation concern the RAF trying to sell its Tranche 1 Eurofighters to pay for Tranche 3 (which has apparently got as far as BAE Systems building an operational infrastructure at RAF Leeming - officially for the Saudi contract) and the European F-16 consortium having perhaps as many as 40 of these aircraft, in various states of disrepair and disassembly, available for purchase. Marshall Aerospace are a Lockheed-Martin accredited service centre, and would presumably welcome the extra work, what with the RAF’s Hercules fleet being withdrawn from service.

One must also bear in mind that a jet fighter force is only one part of an air defence system. The other ‘set of teeth’, as it were, concerns surface-to-air missiles. It is interesting to note that the Dutch Government [Air Forces Monthly, July 2011 issue] appears to be withdrawing a battery of Patriot missile systems from service. This is as well as the Stinger and Improved Hawk systems previously withdrawn and stored. A coincidence? We shall see. It would be interesting to know if enough of the older type of Rapier system (Field Standard B?) is still available form the UK national
stockpile. This system would be good enough to satisfy international investors, particularly if the Blindfire radars were bought as well. Several hundred missiles would still have to be bought, but the ‘sticker shock’ would be reduced.

As the Scottish air defence force would be dedicated to defending Britain, it ought to be practical to work with the existing UK ground radar and command-and-control network. Staying with the radar theme, it may be possible to fit a rudimentary Airborne Early Warning capability into the Scottish air defence budget. The Government of Singapore has recently replaced it’s four E-2C aircraft, and one wonders if they would still be for sale circa 2014. These aircraft have not only had all the recommended airframe and electro-mechanical upgrades over the years, but (reading between the lines) a whole series of upgrades to the radar and EW systems, making them the equal of anything the Americans are using. A lot of effort has gone into these aircraft, and it would be a pity if they went into the crusher.

The final element would be airborne tankers. The Edinburgh government could also order new RAF-standard A330s (ouch!), but what about the DC-10 the Dutch [Air Forces Monthly July 2011 again] intend to withdraw. His apparently has a non-standard electronic cockpit, so bidding scrap price +10% ought to secure this aircraft. The US Air Force KC-10s are basically the same aircraft, and have had hose-drum units fitted under the wings - so copy the installation. The arrival of more fuel-efficient airliners should mean further DC-10s being available at a good price.

Now for the most controversial purchase - maritime patrol aircraft. The UK government decision to scrap the Nimrods (remember the ‘offshore tapestry’ operations over the oilfields?) must have gone down like the proverbial lead balloon with international investors, so they would expect the Scots to provide at least a minimal capability in this area. While aircraft such as the ATR-72 and C-295 would be fine for fisheries protection work, something larger would be needed for long-range work. The obvious candidate would be the Lockheed Orion, and it appears that ten of the Canadian CP-140 model [Air Forces Monthly June 2011 P12][official Canadian Forces website] are available. Lockheed-Martin apparently make an airframe life-extension ‘kit’ (Marshalls are the UK accredited servicing centre) and EADS apparently manufacture a suitable mission system. The main political objective here is to ‘shame’ the UK government into making the majority contribution.

One obvious alternative would be to fit the Nimrod MRA4 mission system equipment to these aircraft - if current garbled media reports about the continued storage of this equipment are true! It should be feasible to obtain eleven more Orion airframes - the Portuguese are rumoured to have five in storage as well as many surplus American examples - to make up a total of twenty-one aircraft. The Scottish budget will not cover this, so the extra eleven aircraft will have to await Celtic Sea EEZ Management funds - see below.

Next in the list of national deficiencies is military air transport. As near as one can calculate, the overall British requirement is eighty-five Hercules-equivalents. Taking the C-17 as four of these, and the A400M as two, the proposed RAF fleet of each aircraft would give a total of seventy-six Hercules-equivalents, leaving a deficiency of...
nine. The obvious solution would be to purchase nine C130J-30s, but something much cheekier comes to mind. According to *Flight International* [31st May - 6th of June 2010 issue, P27], Airbus Military have ten A400M aircraft, surplus from British & German orders, available. Four of these are apparently to be sold to Kazakhstan, but this still leaves six- which will be enough.

Finally(!), we get to helicopters. As well as the two squadrons needed for OILSAFE and MCT work (see above), an interesting used aircraft deal comes to mind. The Dutch [*Air Forces Monthly* July 2011 yet again! ] intend to dispose of their 17-strong AS532 Cougar fleet. This ought to deal with any outstanding deficiencies in helicopter ‘lift’ arising from national misadventures. Another prospect that may be worthy of consideration is the eight-strong Portuguese SA330 Puma fleet, reputedly recently withdrawn in favour of the AW101. These aircraft are apparently already fitted with the more powerful Makila engines (and accompanying transmissions?), and the airframes are apparently if similar vintage to the RAF aircraft currently being rebuilt. One would therefore expect these aircraft to be able to be remanufactured to the RAF ‘HC2’ standard cheaper than the RAF themselves can do it. There is the usual collection of garbled and contradictory references in the aviation press, but it appears that these aircraft will be available by 2014. There are also either eight or ten (depending on which media story one reads) surplus RAF examples available, along with three ex-Chilean examples left on the hands of Eurocopter Rumania.

When one looks at the proposed structure of aviation training in Britain, it is as though provision for extra non-national contingents has been incorporated into such bodies as the current ‘national’ technician training system, the Defence Helicopter Flying School and the Military Flying Training System proposal. Certainly, apart form perhaps buying a squadron of Hawk(?) trainers for the jet fighter force, there seems to be little benefit in setting up a separate Scottish aircrew and technician training organisation.

Perhaps a few words in logistics would be appropriate. The obvious main base for the Scottish Navy would be Rosyth Dockyard, currently very short of Royal Navy work - another instance of a pre-planned facility? The UK military are very kindly vacating Kinloss and Leuchars airfields, which would make two excellent main operating bases for any putative Scottish Air Force, and one would expect Machrihanish, Stornoway and Turnhouse to be available as forward operating bases. It must be stressed that it will be necessary to build two Brigade-sized Army bases, allowing Kinloss to be used for aircraft.

One thing stands out regarding procurement - *for all that’s holy, buy off the shelf!!!* Every British defence project, according to Page [*Lions, Donkeys and Dinosaurs*, Random House, 2006] that has gone wrong, has been a bespoke development. This is not only a British phenomenon - take the Canadian CH-148 helicopter programme [*Air Forces Monthly*, June 2011, pages 80-95 incl.], for example. Small nations in general have no business in commissioning bespoke defence systems of any kind that duplicate solutions already commissioned by larger ones.

Another matter than stands out is bureaucracy. The SNP implies that they will take over a *pro rata* share of the UK defence bureaucracy. In view of the constant blunders perpetrated by this body, international investors are most unlikely to tolerate
such a measure. All that is really required is a few administrators to compile orders for consumable items, a press and public relations team, and a small team to compile Requests For Proposals and the resulting bids. The headcount for such a staff will be expected to be very firmly in the dozens, certainly less than a hundred.

As a final entry in this overview of what appears to be expected from a putative Scottish defence force, let us consider the SNP’s vanity project (or is it? Remember NATO’s Arctic adventures?), a Scottish Army. In view of Page’s comments about the British Army’s equipment, taking over the Royal Regiment of Scotland, as the SNP appears to propose, would at least give an opportunity procure weapons, ammunition and communications equipment that works reliably.. Again, no bespoke systems. However, it may prove worthwhile to set up and run a small arms and mortar ammunition factory, in view of the high rate of consumption of such items. An equipment repair organisation would also be worthwhile, to put a stop to price-gouging by the major defence contractors - another of Page’s themes.

How big would such a force be? According to Heyman [The British Army - a pocket guide 2002-2003, Pen and Sword, 2002], there are six Scottish infantry battalions, and the (after this book was published) recent consolidation of previously separate regiments into the Royal Regiment of Scotland appears to have retained this figure. Heyman implies that a brigade incorporates three battalions, which would give a field force of two brigades. This would also imply the formation of two armoured regiments and two regiments of self-propelled artillery, and single regiments each of ‘field’ equipment workshops, engineers (bridges, mines, etc), logistics, long-range anti-tank weapons, medical, air defence and military police.

Incidentally, the author has deliberately put the Army at the bottom of the list, as international investors will expect naval and air contingents to be given priority. The Scottish defence budget will therefore be somewhat stretched, which implies the purchase of second-hand equipment wherever possible. In a classic example of what the author has come to regard as stockpiling, it is rumoured that the Belgian Government is looking to dispose of the entire Belgian Army ‘Cold War’ armoured vehicle inventory en masse. While the Leopard-1 tanks would be a bit ‘light’ for the modern battlefield the CVR(T)s (the Belgians apparently built these under licence), AIFVs (the same as the Dutch YPR-765), M109s and Gepards may well be a different matter. One obvious source of superior tanks would be to see what the Germans and Dutch [Military Machines International July 2011 p46, p52/53] are able to provide.

Finally, how much all would this cost? The author has no idea! It must be reiterated that the Scottish military will take the size and shape international investors will demand, and would be expected to pay for.

There is also an obvious case for a non-national defence contingent based in Wales, albeit a much smaller one and initially confined to EEZ protection. Proposals have been published for joint Celtic Sea EEZ administration [Source Document PDF URL given in References] between the Governments of Britain, the Republic of Ireland, Spain and France. One must also bear in mind the Celtic Sea holds significant oil and gas reserves, which appear to be undeveloped for the usual reasons. Having a dedicated protection force that could not be dragged off somewhere on a Westminster whim would appear to facilitate such developments.
The problem here is cost. While the Welsh, given the opportunity, *which they do not have at present*, run the slickest and most professional economic development operation, the Welsh economy will have be rescued from the depredations of New Labour before any meaningful independent Welsh military can be considered. However, there may be a way round the problem, at least as far as EEZ protection is concerned.

One of the less well (in the daily press, anyway) publicised clauses of the EU Common Fisheries Policy [URL of CFP policy document given in References] is that the European Commission will pay for everything needed for an effective fisheries protection force, except weapons. With at least three other EU members backing up this proposal, two of whom are also NATO members, this raises the possibility of shaking the NATO money tree (for weapons and MCM gear) as well as the EU one. The only up-front cost would be that of the appropriate legal sanction.

It may be of benefit to speculate on what such a force would look like. It would have to be at least a minimum effective force, and to satisfy not only joint EEZ management expectations, but those of international investors. The immediate requirement would be for a mine countermeasures force to deal with potential mine and underwater IED threats to Milford Haven, which is, incidentally, a major import point for Britain’s natural gas supplies. In the absence of ‘professional’ comment on such matters (one wonders what Britain’s maritime lobby are waiting for!), the suggestion would be for six such vessels. One must also bear in mind that such vessels would also be able to undertake hydrographic survey and inshore resource protection missions.

The other component would be a larger offshore patrol vessels. Consulting the available literature [*Warships International Fleet Review*, June 2010 pages 18-21 incl.), at least two examples of the New Zealand *Otago* class (themselves based on an Irish design) would appear to fit the bill. One must also bear in mind civil contingencies - remember the Tywyn floods? This would appear to make the purchase of an amphibious vessel necessary. If the available budget can be made to stretch to such a vessel, an example of the New Zealand *Canterbury* design would be a good idea.

The non-national defence concept does has, one must admit, its amusing side - the minor players. Take the Shetlands, for example. Shortly before all this ‘war on terror’ rhetoric started (according to the author’s favourite such story publicly circulating), the Sullom Voe oil terminal had received a major, and very expensive, upgrade. Ever since, it appears that the oil companies have been trying to get the Shetlands County Council to provide a legal pretext for those same oil companies to put their own teams in to protect the place. However, we cannot, for political reasons, allow the likes of Blackwater/Xe/Academi/whatever they call themselves these days protecting a key part of Britain’s energy infrastructure, can we? While one would expect Total (who are undertaking major investments in the West Shetlands Basin) to get the French military to help, is this politically acceptable? The question here is what the oil companies are prepared to pay for? One would expect a proper job, but would they be prepared to pay for an independent Shetland Islands Defence Force?
One must also take into account Cornish bellyaching over fisheries protection and EEZ management. Again, one would expect the EU to pay for everything except weapons, especially for an entity in receipt of the highest level of EU funding. Judging from the publicly available material, the Grand Duchy would be able pay for the guns, if not quite from petty cash, but something near it. Again, this is a no-cost option for the British public purse, but would political sanction be forthcoming?

If one looks at British constitutional history, the City of Berwick-upon-Tweed keeps cropping up. This settlement is either part of England, part of Scotland, part of both or part of neither. In the process, Berwick has acquired the only (incomplete) example of a 16th Century ‘star’ fort in Britain, and a military barracks designed by the architect Vanburgh, which appeared to be the best such example in Britain when it was built. The significance of a Berwick Municipal Militia is political, namely giving the media something to snigger at while the real heavy metal goes in elsewhere.

Nothing has so far been said (nor will be speculated upon at this point) about English non-national defence. One reason is that legal sanction already exists in the nether regions of ecclesiastical law. A Spectator article (29th March 1995 - author Henry Thorold) states that the powers of the Prince Bishops of County Durham (which included the power to raise and operate armed forces) were never actually abolished. Upon whom they actually devolved is unclear, and would have be tested ‘in court’. Incidentally, the Bishop of Durham was originally expected in the Medieval period to watch the Scots. Equally interestingly, the Bishops of Hereford were expected to keep a watch on the Welsh, which they did, maintaining a garrison in the town of Bishops Castle until 1573. Again, these powers, should they, as expected, still exist, would need to be the subject of a legal case.

The other reason? The Westminster politicians will be sufficiently hysterical about the Scots and (to some extent) the Welsh getting their own military, and bringing England into the equation would cause the most monumental panic, and wreck the whole operation. International investors would not be impressed!
List of References

Scottish Devolution : Quote From HoC Library List


1911 Government of Scotland Bill A Bill to make better provision for the Government of Scotland. 1st reading 16/08/1911 Vol 29 c1929-36
1912-13 Government of Scotland Bill A Bill to make better provision for the Government of Scotland. 2nd reading 30/05/1913 Vol 53 c471-552
1914 Government of Scotland Bill A Bill to provide for the better Government of Scotland 2nd reading 15/05/1914 Vol 62 c1467-1549

Corresponding Hansard Reference

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1914/may/20/government-of-scotland-bill

Quote from History of Scottish Devolution

http://www.rampantscotland.com/features/parliamentc.htm

So Near and Yet So Far
If it had not been for the First World War, Scotland would have had a devolved Parliament in 1914. A Scottish Home Rule Bill had passed its second reading and the mood at the time was in favour of such a move - it was seen as natural development of the creation of the dominions in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. It was also seen as a way of dealing with Scottish legislation (still on a separate basis from that in England) allowing Westminster to deal with "bigger issues". It was Winston Churchill, MP for Dundee and one of 56 Liberal MPs at that time, who put forward the Bill, which only fell by the wayside as a result of WW1.

Further reading on the consequences of Scottish independence:-

A Shortened Version of the SNP’s Excellent “Talking Independence” booklet, from Stewart Smith.
Published by the University of Aberdeen
Available from the University’s website.
An excellent overview of what would be involved should Scotland become an independent state, as looks increasingly likely, given the continued failings of the UK’s national government.

The Lost Victory : British Dreams, British Realities 1945-50
Correlli Barnett
Pan Books 1996
0-330-34639-3
How Britain got into its post-1945 mess. The Conservatives have never done anything constructive to put things right when they have been in power, apart from their 1986-7 decentralisation programme. Conclusion? The British state has got to go if Britain is to progress socially as well as economically!
Chapter 1 explains why Britain's relatively flexible political system allowed the Industrial Revolution to 'take off' in Britain, rather than say, in France or China. Chapter 2 explains why fixed top-down political structures strangle economic innovation. The implication is that the post-1945 adoption in Britain of such structures has strangled the British economy, and, therefore, a return to the more flexible pre-1914 system is needed for economic recovery. A meaningful non-national defence effort ought to 'bootstrap' this.


Ignores setting-up of Northern Development Company by Thatcher Government circa 1986, and it's neglect by Major administration and apparent abolition by New Labour after 1997. Also ignores historical background : one Office of Lord President, one Grand Council, one unit!

http://www.thenorthernway.co.uk/downloaddoc.asp?id=798

The Governance of Economic Development In Northern England
J. Tomany & A Pike
UK Sparial Economics Research Centre

Again, talks around 1980s Thatcher Government policy. Therefore, fails to consider that The Blessed Margaret got something right!! However, does recommend, in effect, a return to the Northern Development Company (NDC)!

The main point from the above reports that we may not expect any Northern contribution to Britain's non-national defence effort until the Northern economy once again begins to function effectively.

Further reading:-

House of Commons Session 1987-88
Ref : HC 33HX
Inward Investment into Wales and its Interaction with Regional and EEC Policies
Minutes of Evidence
Wednesday 29 June 1988
Blows the above two documents out of the water! Chief witnesses were representatives of the Northern Development Company and Inward (which covered North-West England)
Royal Marines Comacchio Group URL:-


http://www.snp.org/node/6599
Statement of Scottish Nationalise Party defence policy. This URL is a link to the Party’s website.

http://www.eveningtimes.co.uk/news/editor-s-picks/snp-s-defence-policy-sparks-war-of-words-1.1101906
17 May 2011
A war of words has broken out over the SNP’s policy on the military after Defence Secretary Liam Fox said it was “worrying” and a Labour MP branded it “delusional”.

Says it all, really…

17 May 2011
More detail on the demolition of current SNP defence policy statements

Lions, Donkeys and Dinosaurs - Waste and Blundering in the Armed Forces
Lewis Page
Random House 2006
ISBN 0-434-01389-7
Paperback
£12.99

No doubt several copies are held in the management libraries of major international investors.

Air Forces Monthly June 2011
Editor : Gary Parsons
Key Publishing Ltd.
Page 09 : article on major Dutch defence cuts. References to withdrawal of AS 532 Cougars, DC-10 transport and Patriot missile systems.

Air Forces Monthly July 2011
Editor : Gary Parsons
Key Publishing Ltd.
Pages 94-97 inclusive : Article by Kees van der Mark on Netherlands defence cuts, with particular reference to aviation.

Military Machines International
Editor : Ian Young
The following items are examples of EU funding of fisheries protection in action.

EU Common Fisheries Policy URL:-

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/index_en.htm


Example of the principle of 50% EU funding in action


Report on Scottish fisheries protection vessels

July 2012
Written evidence from Margaret Dolan

I wish to express my great concern about the proposed alternative siting of trident in the event of Scottish independence or devolution.

The very existence of Trident is counter-productive to any genuine moves towards the ending of military conflict around the world.

This, therefore, is the ideal time to dispense with Trident altogether. One cannot justify the expenditure involved in maintaining or re-siting Britain’s weapon of mass destruction. It does nothing to face the real threats to our security, while positively promoting nuclear proliferation.

17 July 2012
**Written evidence from Nigel J Barnacle**

I wish to comment on the new inquiry into the Defence implications of possible Scottish independence. I believe that this has real implications for Trident replacement.

I feel that Trident replacement is non-affordable and unnecessary for the UK. Education, NHS, elderly care, youth unemployment all urgently need money, not Trident.

Scottish opposition to Trident remaining at Faslane is a crucial issue. An alternative base in England or Wales would be difficult and even more expensive. There would likely be huge public opposition to an alternative site. A move would cost billions.

Trident and its replacement do not add to our security. Indeed it promotes nuclear proliferation. A very worrying international issue.

Trident should not be put before the well being and quality of life of British citizens.

All the above leads me to believe that even more Trident should be phased out and not replaced.

Please also note/take into account the views from the experts at the 4 July Defence Committee.

Please share all his with the Defence Committee and seriously consider not replacing Trident.

We really don’t need it.

*14 July 2012*
Written evidence from Mrs Daphne Phillips

Trident is going to face public opposition, whether or not it remains in Scotland. The prospect of having to make a rational decision about Trident replacement must not be deferred.

The Government’s desire to blindly cling to Britain’s nuclear weapons system can longer be justified:

   a) Strategically, Trident is not a defensive weapon, and flouts the spirit of the Non Proliferation Treaty
   b) Logistically, Trident has no role in combating terrorist activity, or any other threats to British security.
   c) Economically, it will cost billions, at a time when all public services are being savagely cut, and the fabric of our civil life is threatened.

The Cold War philosophy of mutually assured destruction is totally unacceptable. Trident should be scrapped.

16 July 2012
Written evidence from John Meager

It is a realistic possibility that Scottish independence would give rise to a need to reappraise the role of the Faslane submarine base. Whilst there is strong local commitment, on employment grounds, to the retention of the Faslane facility, opinion more broadly in Scotland may well favour its closure.

In that event, what would be the UK Ministry of Defence's position - and options?

Transferring nuclear facilities - submarine, weapons, and all the assorted infrastructure - to a more politically favourable venue, in England, presumably, would require a financial outlay of at least aircraft carrier proportions. Is this likely to happen or is our political elite generally hoping it will not happen? Is this a reason why all major UK political parties are pro-Union?

Whilst some remote spot like Barrow-in-Furness might suit - so near Sellafield, of course - the simpler and more straightforward choice in all this is to save the money big time, stop trying to pose on the world stage and just ditch the idea of replacing Trident completely.

July 2012
1. There is currently no agreed term to define the remaining territory and this in itself will be a debate that sits outside the defence remit. For the sake of clarity this evidence refers to the United Kingdom minus Scotland as UK Remainder or UKr.

2. If Scotland voted for independence then there are two likely outcomes that come from this. The remaining parts of the United Kingdom may chose to remain together or alternatively they may chose individually or collectively to go their separate ways. If the former option is chosen then the defence implications fall on two parties – Scotland and UKr. If the latter option results then we are looking at up to four potential states – England, Wales, Northern Ireland (possibly merging with Eire) and Scotland. This report largely focuses on the former option but makes passing reference to the latter option examining the issues largely from a Scottish and English perspective. By implication the issues confronting Scotland will tend to also be similar for Wales and Northern Ireland.

3. The manner in which the Union breaks up will have profound implications for defence. The United Kingdom’s armed forces and defence infrastructure have not been designed with Scottish independence in mind. Thus the creation of separate armed forces for Scotland, UKr and possibly England, Wales and Northern Ireland will take time. This is particularly true for the nuclear deterrent whose infrastructure is split between main sites in England and Scotland. However, it applies elsewhere, for example, in the integrated air defence network which includes a series of radar sites located around the United Kingdom and two main fighter bases - Leuchars in the north (to be replaced by Lossiemouth) and Coningsby in the south.

4. Independence discussions will revolve, therefore, around two distinct timeframes - the separation phase, covering the period of disentangling and dividing assets and liabilities up, and the post-separation phase, the period that follows on. For all the armed forces the longer and more cooperative the former phase lasts the more beneficial the result is likely to be for all parties concerned.

5. The separation phase is likely to be further complicated by two other factors which are currently occurring and will overlap with the separation phase - the drawdown of British forces from Afghanistan as they end the combat role by 2014 and the withdrawal of British forces from Germany. Both these tasks pose a significant logistical challenge at a time when the British Army is planning to reduce the number and overall size of its logistical capabilities as part of its Army 2020 force adjustments. In other words the separation of armed forces.

6. There will also be a question of post-independence border and territorial waters arrangements and any defence support to them. Will the future border between the respective states be relatively open similar to that which currently exists in the land borders amongst the Schengen nations or is it likely to be a more closed border.

7. Finally, it is extremely unlikely that any of the parties involved in Scottish independence will view defence in isolation. Inevitably, issues surrounding defence will form

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1. The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Joint Services Command & Staff College, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence or any other government agency.
part of the greater bargaining that will inevitably form part of the separation. As a result, the armed forces can each expect to have compromises forced upon them.

8. For the states that emerge there will be a requirement to define a security and defence policy. For the Uk or England this is more likely to be closer to the current UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review with some adjustment made in recognition of the changed circumstances. For the UK/England the process should be easier given that the majority of expertise within government and the think-tanks are almost entirely based in England. Scotland will need to develop its own capability to look ahead and assess future security and defence challenges and establish an apparatus for deciding policies to tackle these challenges. The extent to which Scotland will be able to do this, especially in the early years, is questionable. Scotland will also need to establish what role they see, if any, for their forces deploying overseas. Will they, for example, deploy units on UN peacekeeping operations?

9. The emerging states will have a choice over whether to enter into membership of formal alliance and informal partnerships with other states. Currently the United Kingdom is a member of the United Nations with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council as well as membership of NATO and the European Union. It also has a number of other defence and security commitments such as the Five Powers Defence Agreement and the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence partnership. UK/England is likely to seek to retain such affiliations as part of its traditional approach to sharing risk. The one exception may be the European Union which will probably require a new application and a vote at home. For Scotland the way forward is less clear. The SNP has historically been anti-NATO and recently has talked about some form of partnership with the Nordic group of states. Such a move will not provide the security guarantees that NATO membership currently provides and is complicated by the different institutional affiliations of the Nordic states (i.e. Sweden in the EU whilst Norway is in NATO and Denmark is in both). The SNP have traditionally sought to retain EU membership but this may be complicated by the potential requirement to adopt the Euro as a new member.

10. During the transition phase there is the question of how the status of individuals will be determined. Is it to be determined by where they are domiciled at a particular point of time, the historical lineage of the unit they are then affiliated to assuming it has an affiliation with a particular part of the United Kingdom or is it for individuals to make an election? Will the needs of the emerging states play any part in this decision? For those already in the UK’s armed forces will their terms and conditions of service including pension entitlements transfer and be protected? Who pays for any redundancy costs if the combined requirement of the newly emerging states in a particular specialty is less than that currently provided by the UK’s armed forces? How will non-United Kingdom service personnel be treated?

11. Once the transition phase has passed the UKr/England will presumably treat any Scots wishing to join its armed forces in a similar way to citizens of Eire or the Commonwealth. They will therefore be subject to the same quota limits that apply (generally 15% with some exceptions notably the Irish Guards, Royal Irish Regiment and Gurkhas). For Scotland the pledge of the SNP to retain all six current infantry battalions is likely to be problematic given their continued under recruitment. They will therefore need to establish a policy for recruitment from abroad and decide whether there will be any quotas.
12. There will need to be established a process for dividing the existing defence assets. There are a number of potential mechanisms that might be applied. For example, where equipment or bases happen to be located at an agreed point in time or some form of share system based on a factor such as GDP, population, etc. There are problems with both of these options. First, some assets will not clearly be located in a particular state at a given point in time e.g. ships at sea, forces deployed outside the United Kingdom. Moreover, the future requirements for the new states (see below) does not necessarily equate with some equitable division of existing assets. Second, some capabilities, such as officer training are located solely in England but would be needed by all of the states that emerge from Scottish independence. If the latter option is chosen then a mechanism to value equipment and the defence estate will have to be established including a mechanism for dealing with disagreements.

13. Much of the academic analysis undertaken to date has focused on how defence assets might be divided in the event of Scottish independence. There is an additional element to this. There will also need to be a dividing of the defence financial commitments. In the United Kingdom the Ministry of Defence has led the way in embracing the Public Finance Initiative (PFI)/Public Private Partnership (PPP) concept. These contracts will either need to be renegotiated (who does this is another question) or the financial commitment taken on by one or more of the parties involved. In some areas this might be relatively straight-forward. An independent Scotland probably doesn’t need the capability represented by the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft programme whereas UKr or England will but will no doubt expect Scotland to contribute its share. Others are more complicated. Who pays for the PFIs associated with the Defence Academy currently based in England?

14. Defence acquisition post-independence will also raise issues and mostly lead to a defence consolidation in the UKr as employers move out of Scotland. Currently the defence industrial sector is not evenly distributed between the nations. It is highly likely that the sectors remain as they stand post-separation and instead industry is likely to move to support the separate nations. Thus, for example, whilst there is a heavy preponderance of shipbuilding in Scotland it would be politically difficult for a future UKr/England government to continue to acquire its warships from Scottish yards and not to look to retain an indigenous capability instead. Regional politics will play a part as will any alliance affiliations. The issue of knowledge transfer between the different states may arise. If the UKr/England remained in the European Union then even if it wanted to purchase defence equipment from Scotland it would be obliged to put out to tender any defence contracts it did not give to its own industry. Thus Scottish yards would have to compete with their Spanish, German and French equivalents. If unsuccessful, then the future of Scotland’s naval shipbuilding capability would be called into question simply because an independent Scotland would be unlikely to generate sufficient orders to make the retention of this capability viable and UK yards have not been particularly successful in recent years in obtaining overseas orders.

July 2012
An Independent Scotland’s Relationship to NATO, and Negotiations over the Removal of Nuclear Facilities

1. Summary

1.1 This submission addresses two subjects relevant to the committee’s inquiry – Scotland’s relationship with NATO and the basing of nuclear facilities on the Clyde. Whilst NATO is an explicitly nuclear alliance and will remain so for the indefinite future, some of its members have been able to pursue a mixed policy, one that supports Alliance nuclear policy whilst at the same time remaining distant from any direct involvement. It may therefore be possible for a newly independent Scotland to become a member of NATO, whilst also itself becoming nuclear free, though this posture may cause some unease with some NATO members.

1.2 If the newly-elected independent government were to insist on the removal of nuclear facilities at Faslane and Coulport, as seems likely, the negotiations with London are likely to revolve around timing. London will seek to delay the move long enough to avoid a requirement for interim facilities. This will be affected by a detailed assessment of the alternatives, one that has not yet been completed in recent times as far as we know. However it seems clear that such a transfer of facilities would be highly costly, adding somewhere in the order of an additional £8-£10 billion to the capital costs of the Trident renewal programme, and possibly a great deal more if the problems faced became significant. It may seem prudent to factor these issues into choices currently facing the government.

2. BASIC

2.1 The author of this submission is the Executive Director of BASIC since 2007, and prior to that a staff member since 2002. BASIC is the only peace and security non-governmental organization that is British-American in composition and focus. We work on both sides of the Atlantic to encourage sustainable transatlantic security policies and to develop the strategies that can achieve them. We partner with other international NGOs that share our goals and we promote public understanding of the danger of growing nuclear arsenals. We have charitable status in the United Kingdom and in the United States. We operate with offices in London and Washington, a small but committed staff, and an active network of influential board members and advisers, and patrons on both sides of the Atlantic.

2.2 BASIC has been conducting a research project these last three years into NATO’s nuclear weapons posture, involving roundtables with officials and stakeholders in NATO capitals throughout Europe. BASIC launched in February 2011 the BASIC Trident Commission here in London, which will report in early 2013. It should be noted that this submission is entirely unconnected with the BASIC Trident commission, and does not reflect any discussions being held within that forum, and certainly not the opinions of any of the Commissioners.

3. NATO – Scotland in NATO but nuclear-free?

3.1 In the event of Scotland breaking away from the rest of the United Kingdom, its new government would need to decide its relationship to various international bodies, such as the United Nations, the European Union and NATO. This last is particularly controversial, as the SNP currently has a policy of withdrawal.

3.2 NATO is a collective security Alliance that has been searching for a role ever since the end of the Cold War. While some of its members have been focusing on its traditional article 5 facility that enables its members to collectively protect the territory of all is its members, others have chosen to focus more on the global security responsibilities. This is more than just a matter of resource prioritisation; it goes to the heart of the nature of the Alliance and the sense of threat.
it faces today. Some countries closer to Russia, and with a history of occupation, see the country as the principal threat, and deterrence as the principal purpose of the Alliance. Others further to the west, led by Germany, tend to see Russia as a strategic partner, if not ally, as well as an important energy source, and believe that engagement will be better in the long run than isolation. This difference goes to the heart of the challenges facing the Alliance today, challenges that have not been resolved by recent summits, or the agreement of the new strategic concept.

3.3 Based upon BASIC’s extensive communications with officials across NATO in the last three years, we would conclude that while the November 2010 summit successfully concluded with an agreed strategic concept, followed in May 2012 with an agreed text for the deterrence and defence posture review, the deep rifts between NATO partners will continue. Principally this is because the world looks very different from the perspective of the Baltic states when compared with, say, Edinburgh. And whilst the Scandinavian countries are in some respects vulnerable strategically to the high North – principally a threat from Russian submarines and bombers – their response is generally one of engagement rather than containment.

3.4 Whilst opinion in Scotland towards NATO may currently be heavily influenced by the domestic perception of the relationship with London, foreign adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, and perceptions that the Alliance is still caught up in Cold War nuclear legacies, in future such opinion may be more influenced by how the Alliance can facilitate Scotland’s role in the world and its relationship with its near neighbours, much as say Norway does. It is this that may be influencing the SNP leadership to reconsider the party’s policy. Indeed in a recent BBC interview Angus Robertson referred explicitly to Norway.

3.5 Norway appears comfortable to sign up to Alliance policy that supports the continued relevance of nuclear deterrence, whilst at the same time playing a leading role as a non-nuclear weapon state within the NPT that questions the future for nuclear weapons in the international system. Whilst Norway plays a full and loyal role within the Alliance, including on the nuclear planning group, it also bans the deployment and transit of nuclear weapons within its territory in peace time, and its Foreign Ministry funds many groups looking to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons. NATO’s own Secretary General appeared to acknowledge this reality when visiting explicitly nuclear-free New Zealand in June, saying “Actually, we have quite a number of NATO Allies that are also nuclear free... they have exactly the same experience [as New Zealand]...”

3.6 The Scandinavian approach of a focus on strong defensive defence capabilities with modest defence budgets, and internationalist engagement through development aid and mediation, may come to be seen as popular in Scotland as an alternative to the current defence relationships within the UK context. Scotland may look to its relationship with Scandinavia as an alternative. If this were the direction that Scotland went, it is likely that NATO membership, on a different basis to that experienced today through London, could be seen as facilitating this transition.

3.7 Of course, such an explicit approach, whereby Scotland seeks to balance NATO membership with becoming nuclear free will not be welcomed by many other members, and could have an impact on the longer term cohesion of the Alliance. There is already some concern that key members of NATO are moving away from a commitment to nuclear deterrence, while others remain strongly of the opinion that it is essential. These differences are likely to increase in time, and a Scottish move seeking non-nuclear status within the Alliance can only exacerbate them.

3.8 The recent example of the debate over tactical nuclear weapons in Europe is instructive. The new German government announced its intention to seek the removal of US freefall nuclear weapons from its territory in October 2009, but swiftly clarified that it would not do so unless there was a consensus within the Alliance for such an action. This consensus was not forthcoming, and the accommodating compromise now seeks some kind of reciprocity from Russia. The German government appears willing, for the time being at least, to stick with current arrangements, though the crunch point is likely in future when serious investment is
required to replace the dual capable aircraft they deploy. The principal lesson to draw from this experience is that existing NATO members prize the cohesion of the Alliance very highly, and will move more slowly in executing their policy in the interests of bringing the allies with them.

3.9 On the one hand, unless Scotland is willing to be seen as an outlier within the Alliance its new government would need to be cautious in moving too quickly to expel nuclear weapons from its territory. On the other, what may seem to some as contradictory or ambiguous outcomes may be accommodated by the Alliance. This has relevance to the options facing a new Scottish government were it to be negotiating with the rest of the UK on the removal of the nuclear bases on the Clyde.

4 How important is the issue of Trident?

4.1 It seems likely that the issue will feature prominently in the referendum campaigns, not least because the Yes campaign will seek to use it to illustrate their case that Scotland exists under a defence and foreign policy that its population disagrees with. Opinion in Scotland is more clearly opposed to maintaining the nuclear deterrent, and in particular keeping it in Scotland (64% of Scots in a 2007 ICM poll stated their opposition to the maintenance of nuclear weapons there for the next 50 years).

4.2 Those supporting independence will also be seeking to strengthen their negotiating hand in the event of a vote in their favour. Whilst SNP leadership seems to be willing to reconsider its policy on NATO membership, the same would not be true around hosting Trident bases on the Clyde. It would be a strong card to play in negotiations for an independent Scotland, one that it would be difficult to drop in the face of public opinion.

4.3 Even if the referendum concludes with a no vote, the campaign itself will have raised the Trident issue at a sensitive moment, a year before the 2015 general election in which the issue is likely to feature as an issue that separates the two governing parties in London. It may also create long-term uncertainty within the Ministry of Defence around the confidence they need in order to make significant future investments in the facilities. This is not an issue in the short term – the Parliamentary Trident Renewal Initial Gate Report suggested that such investment was quite recent, and there were no plans for further investment in Scotland for some time now.

5 Options around relocation

5.1 It has been suggested by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces in evidence to the Scottish Affairs Committee in June that finding alternative sites south of the border for the facilities currently at Faslane and Coulport would be challenging and extremely costly. This opinion is shared by a number of analysts who have looked into the details. It would be possible to find alternatives if necessary, though all involve costs and draw-backs, and would take some time to establish. The principal alternative port to Faslane would need accessible facilities and deep water to enable the submarine easily to slip into the ocean without detection, but it is finding a site for the warhead storage and loading facilities at Coulport that would present particular challenges. Prof Malcolm Chalmers of RUSI concludes that the most likely viable site is Falmouth, Cornwall, which has deep water access, but this would require moving a significant number of civilians and the construction of new bunkers and handling facilities, both of which would require complex decision-making and consultation processes, as well as some significant expense, running into several £billions, increasing the current capital cost estimates for the renewal project considerably – a reasonable estimate would be in the order of £8 to £10 billion, or an additional 50%, though the total figure could end up being more if significant obstacles arise that involve major compensation or lengthy inquiries.

5.2 Given the political prominence already given by SNP politicians to the issue, and the positive response to this policy by a majority of the public, it would seem unlikely that in the event of a yes vote and the election of an SNP government that the new government would be in a
position to go back on this policy of forcing the bases out of Scotland. Equally, because the new government would generally be in a weak bargaining position with regards to other issues it would be seeking agreement with London upon, it seems unlikely that they would insist upon immediate removal at some considerable cost to the relationship. Demands for an immediate removal may just be an opening gambit.

5.3 Of course, a new Scottish government may not have an SNP majority. But this is hardly cause for comfort in London. The principal reason why the Scottish Labour Party has not itself come out against the continued basing of Trident in Scotland is because of its internal relationship with the rest of the Labour Party. It seems likely this dynamic would change with independence, and the makeup of a new Scottish government may simply influence just how strongly it would negotiate on this matter.

5.4 The principal focus of negotiations around the location of the nuclear bases will therefore likely be on a timetable for relocation out of Scotland. London would of course seek through negotiation to delay such a move, and would bring into play other issues for leverage. They would certainly want a delay long enough to survey, get agreement and construct alternative facilities south of the border, with sufficient leeway for contingencies and unforeseen challenges.

5.5 There is a possibility that London would need to consider transitionary arrangements. It has been suggested that the MoD may even approach France or the United States for basing. While both may have the capacity there must surely be significant complications, not just the obvious political disadvantage of being seen as dependent on another nuclear weapons state, but also the logistical challenge of linking that basing arrangements with the supply of UK warheads, and personnel. The MoD would want to avoid this if at all possible.

5.6 The cabinet office is currently studying alternatives to the current plans for Trident renewal. As far as I am aware they are not factoring into their modelling the uncertainty over the future of Faslane and Coulport. I believe this is unfortunate, particularly in the light of recent awareness of the importance of this issue. Even if the referendum were to return a no vote, this issue is likely to remain a cogent for the foreseeable future, rendering long-term investment at those bases more challenging.

20 July 2012
Written evidence from Gabrielle Grace

I understand that you are about to hold an inquiry into the defence implications of possible Scottish independence. I would like you please to take regard of some implications for the Trident system.

You will be aware that strong Scottish opposition to Trident remaining at Faslane will cause near insuperable difficulties.

It would be virtually impossible to move the nuclear submarines to an alternative base, given the economic and political realities of today - a move would cost billions. Furthermore there would be massive public opposition to any alternative site, even if one were to be identified.

It is not possible to justify this kind of expenditure when urgent measures for the health and wellbeing of citizens are being widely cut. Already the cost of Trident is the vast, yet it does nothing to combat the real threats to our security but rather promotes nuclear proliferation.

The consequences of Scottish independence are thus an additional reason to make plans to phase out Trident instead of replacing it.

July 2012
Written evidence from David Bargh

I am writing to you to lend my support to EDM 96 to scrap Trident. I have no arguments just some advice: "Thou shalt not kill". The insanity has to stop, better to be nuked than do the nuking.

*July 2012*