1 Introduction
1. The Government's vision is to move to a secure,
low-carbon energy system in a cost effective way. Achieving this
goal will be no mean feat. Around a fifth of our existing generating
capacity is scheduled to close in the next decade and there are
also challenging climate change and renewable energy targets for
2020. DECC has estimated that up to £110 billion of investment
for new electricity generation and transmission infrastructure
is likely to be needed by 2020, which will require the current
rate of investment to more than double.
2. At a time when both company and government
balance sheets are stretched, and other faster growing economies
are also seeking substantial investment in energy infrastructure,
securing this level of investment represents an enormous challenge.
What is more, rising gas prices and growing levels of fuel poverty
have pushed questions of affordability to the fore. It will therefore
be vital that, as we move towards a new energy system, every effort
is made to maximise value for money and minimise costs to consumers.
3. Many witnesses argued that the framework in
which the market currently operates will not deliver the necessary
levels of investment (although some argued that the existing Renewables
Obligation would be sufficient to deliver investment in renewable
energy). There is clearly a problem in attracting investment at
the moment. We have already fallen behind schedule, with only
a third of the annual investment required in wind having been
delivered and the prospects for new nuclear looking increasingly
uncertain.[1]
4. As a result, DECC has been working to develop
a new framework that it hopes will provide the necessary incentives
to secure investment. One of the main goals of this work has been
to reduce the risks associated with investments in low-carbon
generation, thereby making them more attractive to prospective
investors.
5. The Government's initial proposals were published
for consultation in December 2010.[2]
We conducted an inquiry on these proposals and reported in May
2011.[3]
DECC subsequently published a White Paper in July 2011 and a technical
update in December 2011.[4]
We heard evidence on the technical update in January 2012.[5]
The pre-legislative scrutiny process
6. We indicated our willingness to conduct pre-legislative
scrutiny to the Department in January this year, but made clear
at the time that this should not be at the expense of an early
introduction of the Bill.[6]
The draft Bill was not published until 22 May 2012. We support
the Government's overall objectives for the electricity sector
and see electricity market reform as vital to achieving these
aims. We were therefore willing to take part in this process and
have done so in the spirit of making a constructive contribution
towards the Bill. We hope that the result will be better, more
workable and more effective legislation.
7. However, our efforts to provide robust and
effective scrutiny have been hampered by a number of factors.
First, the timescale in which we have been asked to conduct and
conclude our inquiryjust five sitting weekshas made
examination of what is a very complex set of proposals extremely
challenging. This timescale is well below the 12 sitting weeks
that a Joint Committee conducting a similar task would, by convention,
be granted.[7]
8. Second, we have been dismayed by the lack
of detail provided on key aspects of the proposals, most notably
on the crucial question of who will be the counterparty for the
new Contracts for Difference. In addition, DECC was still collecting
evidence as we carried out our inquiry in many vital areas (for
example, demand reduction, the Power Purchase Agreement market
and detailed design of the capacity market, to name but three).
It is very difficult for us to comment constructively on these
aspects without having had access to this evidence base.
Role of the Treasury
9. Finally, the refusal of the Treasury to provide
a witness or to answer our questions in writing has seriously
undermined the pre-legislative scrutiny process.[8]
Treasury Ministers have given evidence to this Committee on several
previous occasions and we are aware of at least one example of
a Treasury Minister giving evidence to a Public Bill Committee
on a Bill where it was not the departmental lead.[9]
We are therefore frankly astonished by the suggestion that providing
evidence to the Committee would "establish a precedent"
that would "undermine" its "role in Government
as spending arbiter" (in the past the Treasury's approach
has been more pragmatic, demonstrating an acceptance that, even
within the parameters of joined-up government, there is scope
for discussion and scrutiny of interaction between Treasury policy
and that of other government departments). [10]
10. Numerous witnesses told us that Treasury
policy (and in particular the levy control framework) was having
a direct impact on energy investment decisions. What is more,
the levy cap may, paradoxically, result in increased costs
to consumers and may damage prospects for growth in low-carbon
industries - exactly the outcomes the Treasury is seeking to avoid.
These are important questions that must be addressed, but the
Treasury's apparent refusal to engage with the possibility that
its policies may have unintended consequences risks derailing
DECC's proposals and producing a worse deal for consumers. All
Government departments must explicitly support a policy framework
that is evidence-based.
11. The draft Bill is a framework Bill, with
much of the detail to be contained in secondary legislation. One
witness argued that the Committee should undertake further scrutiny
of these proposals, when the final models are available.[11]
Since much of this detail is essential to understanding whether
the reforms are likely to be effective, we have not limited our
inquiry to the draft Bill itself, but have also explored some
of the broader policy questions relating to the proposed reforms.
12. We received 79 submissions of written evidence
and held five oral evidence sessions. We also held a roundtable
discussion with investors and financial analysts. A note of the
meeting, along with a full list of witnesses can be found at the
end of this report.[12]
We are very grateful to all those who contributed evidence to
this inquiry. We would like to express particular thanks to Dr
Robert Gross (Imperial College) and Professor Derek Bunn (London
Business School) who were Specialist Advisers to the inquiry.[13]
Suggestions that the Bill be scrapped
13. The Government's original proposals for electricity
market reform were based on four key measures: a Feed-in Tariff
for low-carbon energy, a Carbon Price Floor, an Emissions Performance
Standard and a Capacity Mechanism.[14]
The Carbon Price Floor has already been legislated for through
the Finance Act 2011, so the draft Energy Bill focuses on the
remaining three measures.
14. As we noted in our previous report on this
subject, "Electricity Market Reform" is really a misnomer,
since the proposals will not actually change the current British
Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) system
under which electricity is traded in the electricity market. Instead,
they will "bolt on" additional market mechanisms, taxes
and regulatory measures.[15]
As noted below, aspects of wholesale market reform appear critical
to EMR (para 125). We were therefore not surprised by the lack
of proposals to make changes to the wholesale market itself in
the draft Bill.
15. Many witnesses believed that there was a
need for reform of some kind (although it was widely known that
the starting point would not be radical market reform). However,
many also felt that the proposals as currently constructed
would not deliver increased investment in low-carbon generation.[16]
As the Low Carbon Finance Group put it, the proposals "at
present, do not form a framework or structure that financiers
believe they could present to, and secure approval from, credit
or investment committees".[17]
16. Some witnesses argued that the proposals
were fundamentally flawed and that the whole EMR process should
be stopped.[18]
However, others thought that it was still possible to revise the
proposals and to create a workable framework.[19]
While we are certain that significant changes are needed to the
draft Bill, we also recognise that scrapping the plans at this
stage would lead to even greater uncertainty, further delays in
securing much needed new investment, and would undermine the credibility
of UK energy policy. It would also seriously jeopardise the prospects
for meeting our 2020 renewable energy and climate change targets
and could even threaten energy security. It is therefore our intention
in this report to engage constructively with the proposals that
are on the table, rather than suggesting DECC rips up the Bill
and starts again; the perfect should not become the enemy of the
good. We aim to highlight the areas where DECC needs to carry
out further work before introducing its Bill and, where possible,
to make practical recommendations for how the draft Bill could
be improved.
17. As well as Electricity Market Reform, the
draft Bill also covers a number of other subjects (Energy Strategy
and Policy Statement, the Office of Nuclear Regulation, Offshore
Transmission and Government Pipeline and Storage System). Owing
to the time constraints in which we have conducted this inquiry,
we have not been able to include the detail of these other, less
controversial areas in our scrutiny.
Structure of this report
18. Our report relates to the Chapters of the
draft Bill as follows:
- draft Bill Chapter 1, Contracts
for Difference - Chapter 3 of this report
- draft Bill Chapter 2, Investment Instruments
- Chapter 4
- draft Bill Chapter 3, Capacity Market - Chapter
5
- draft Bill Chapter 4, Conflicts of interest -
Chapter 6
- draft Bill Chapters 5, Contingency Arrangements
and 6, The Renewables Obligation: Transitional Arrangements -
we have not examined these chapters in great detail.
- draft Bill Chapter 7, Emissions Performance Standard
- Chapter 7 of this report
19. As described above, we have focused our inquiry
on Part 1 of the Bill and we have not looked at Parts 2 - 4 in
great detail.
1 Committee on Climate Change, Meeting Carbon Budgets
- 2012 Progress Report to Parliament, June 2012 Back
2
DECC, Electricity Market Reform Consultation Document, Cm 7983,
December 2012 Back
3
Energy and Climate Change Committee, Fourth Report of Session
2010-12, Electricity Market Reform, HC 742 Back
4
DECC, Planning our electric future: a White Paper for secure,
affordable and low-carbon electricity, CM 8099, July 2011; DECC,
Planning our electric future: technical update, December 2011 Back
5
Oral evidence taken before the Energy and Climate Change Committee
on 24 and 25 January 2012, HC (2010-12) 1781-i and 1781-ii Back
6
Ev 107 (letter dated 31 January 2012) Back
7
Ev 107 (letter dated 24 May 2012) Back
8
Ev 111, Ev 115 Back
9
Child Poverty Bill, Public Bill Committee, 20 October 2009 Back
10
Oral evidence taken before the Energy and Climate Change Committee
on 4 May 2011, HC (2010-12) 1018-i; Oral evidence taken before
the Energy and Climate Change Committee on 1 December 2011, HC
(2010-12)1605 Ev 111 Back
11
Ev w54 Back
12
See Annex 1 Back
13
Relevant interests can be found at www.parliament.uk/ecc Back
14
DECC, Electricity Market Reform Consultation Document, Cm 7983,
December 2010 Back
15
Energy and Climate Change Committee, Electricity Market Reform
para 60 Back
16
Ev 117, Ev 123, Ev 127, Ev w34, Ev 151, Ev w79, Ev w89, Ev w101,
Ev 178, Ev w115, Ev 211, Ev 221, Ev w154, Ev w161, Ev w167, Q
46 [Mr McElroy], Q 96 [Mr Skillings], Q 97 [Prof Mitchell], Q
142 [Ms Hartnell, Mr Gardiner, Mr Kingsbury, Mr Temperton and
Dr Edge], Q 188 [Mr MacDougall and Mr Rehmanwala], Q 231 [Mr Steedman
and Ms Kelly] Back
17
Ev 211 Back
18
Ev 221, Ev w3 Back
19
Ev 117,Ev 155, Ev 161, Ev w61, Ev 176, Q 2 [Mr Anderson], Q 46
[Mr de Rivaz], Q 97 [Dr Kennedy], Q 98 [Mr Skillings], Q 188 [Mr
Taylor], Q 240 [Ms Kelly] Back
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