Protecting the Arctic - Environmental Audit Committee Contents

4  Governance of the Arctic

International treaties

126. Most land boundaries in the Arctic are not disputed, but maritime boundaries are less settled, including who 'owns' the North Pole area itself.[517] Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),[518] each state has an 'Economic Exclusion Zone' from 12 to 200 nautical miles offshore, giving them exclusive economic rights over the water and seabed resources.[519] Areas beyond the Economic Exclusion Zone are considered 'High Seas', unless states claim a right over an extended continental shelf.

127. Although a number of states have made overlapping claims to the continental shelf in the Arctic (Figure 3, page 58),[520] each Arctic state has reaffirmed their commitment to UNCLOS (or in the case of the US, accepted its provisions) as the legal framework for the orderly settlement of claims.[521] The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf receives submissions from states and provides advice to help determine the outer limit of states' continental shelves, although it does not make legal rulings.[522] States had ten years after ratifying UNCLOS to submit their claims,[523] although this timeframe has been "less than rigorously followed" and to date only two submissions (from Russian and Norway) have received a decision.[524] Shane Tomlinson from E3G was concerned that this was a "very untransparent and unaccountable process for outside observers" and that there was "very little opportunity for NGOs, civil societies or other groups to engage in this process".[525]

128. Greenpeace were concerned that the "lure of Arctic resources" was being reflected in competing claims for territory and an increase in military posturing in the region.[526] A number of Arctic States were "rebuilding their Arctic [military] capabilities or planning to do so)"[527] and a number of military training exercises had been undertaken.[528] However, much of the evidence we received pointed to the stability of the region.[529] Charles Emmerson from Chatham House noted a number of potential geopolitical 'stress points' in the Arctic. There were specific disagreements between Canada and the US over their maritime border in a potentially hydrocarbon-rich area of the Beaufort Sea, a dispute over fishing grounds around the Svalbard Archipelago between Russia and Norway, uncertainty over whether the Svalbard Treaty[530] applies to Svalbard's continental shelf, and disagreements as to whether the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage were internal waterways or international waters.[531] Nevertheless, he told us that the Arctic States had a willingness and the capacity to resolve these issues.[532] He told us:

    My concern is not about increased military infrastructure in the Arctic. It is much more about this being misunderstood or misinterpreted by other Arctic states. I believe that is a much greater concern ... But I think the Arctic as a cause of conflict in itself is a pretty unlikely scenario.[533]

129. The Brookings Institution reasoned that concerns about a "scramble for territory in the Arctic" had been motivated in part by States' desire to collect data to support their claims to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf; a "Russian 'flag planting' expedition [under the North Pole in 2007] was primarily designed to collect data".[534] Klaus Dodds believed that there was no 'Great Game' in the Arctic, and that the UNCLOS process was "orderly and peaceful".[535] It was in Russia's interest to maintain the Arctic as an "area of low tension".[536] Development of its offshore resources relied on access to European oil technology,[537] and the EU market was important for Russian gas, fish and other resources.[538] A 40 year dispute between Norway and Russia ended in July 2011 following a treaty on maritime boundaries, paving the way for new oil and gas exploration in the southern Barents Sea.[539] The Norwegian Government planned to open up the former disputed area for seismic survey.[540] The Brookings Institution believed the "Arctic offers lessons, and even elements of a model, for tackling evolving challenges in other regions".[541]

The Arctic Council

130. The political stability of the Arctic is in part the result of the co-operation of the states through the Arctic Council. The eight Arctic states[542] established the Arctic Council in 1996 as a "high-level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States ... on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic in particular".[543] The role of the Arctic Council has developed over time. It initially focused upon making assessments and analysing trends in the Arctic.[544] It has since moved on to developing a pan-Arctic legal instrument—an agreement on search and rescue—signed in May 2011, and there was work underway to develop another on Arctic marine pollution.[545] Many now saw the Council as the primary international forum for cooperation on Arctic matters,[546] although security and trade are not within its remit, and it plays a limited role (mainly in respect of environmental impacts) on issues such as shipping, energy and fishing.[547]

131. Duncan Depledge and Klaus Dodds believed that the search and rescue agreement was likely to serve as a starting point for a more actively involved Council, which could result in a "significant shift in the Council's role from being a decision-shaping body to a decision-making body".[548] The Swedish Government's priorities for its Chairmanship (2011 to 2013)[549] included securing more "concrete decisions" in the Arctic Council and making the Arctic "voice heard".[550] Similarly, the Norwegian Ambassador told us that governance arrangements were in a "continuous process of being further strengthened".[551]

132. The Arctic Council's permanent members are the eight Arctic states and six organisations representing Arctic indigenous peoples but six non-Arctic countries have also been observers (of which the UK is one),[552] as well as nine Inter-governmental and Inter-parliamentary organisations[553] and eleven NGOs.[554] Ruth Davis believed that the Arctic Council was under increasing pressure to be something "other than just a club for Arctic nations", because many non-Arctic countries have "diplomatic, ... resource extraction or ... environmental protection interests in the Arctic".[555] Shane Tomlinson from E3G believed that Arctic governance was "quite fragmented", with a "deep division of strategic interest between littoral and non-littoral States on some issues, particularly on environmental and global public good issues".[556] Ruth Davis believed that the future of the Arctic should be guided through dialogue between a much wider set of countries, and argued that the UN is a more legitimate body to deal with Arctic issues.[557] Richard Steiner told us that the Arctic was "too critical and important to be left to the rather parochial political whims of the Arctic coastal states". He believed the notion that the eight Arctic states were the sole body governing the Arctic was "outdated", and called on the UN to convene a wider "true Arctic Council".[558]

133. There may be some appetite in the Arctic Council itself to increase the number of observer states. Norway recognised that other states may have "legitimate interests and concerns about development in the Arctic" and believed that any countries wishing to become an observer would be given a positive hearing.[559] Similarly, Sweden wanted to use its Chairmanship of the Arctic Council to improve communication on Arctic issues and "reach out to more parts of the world".[560] There are doubts, however, about whether Arctic states see a role for the UN or would welcome wider participation by others in Arctic governance, beyond being 'observers'. The June 2008 'Ilulissat declaration' by the Arctic's five littoral states announced that there was "no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean" as "the solid foundation for responsible management" was already provided by "an extensive international legal framework".[561]


134. That has not prevented some NGOs from calling to establish an agreement for a protected zone in the Arctic, to remain undeveloped. The extent of the Arctic over which individual countries have given some form of protected status doubled from 5.6% to 11% (3.5m square kilometres) between 1991 and 2010.[562] Marine areas are less represented than land[563] and the Arctic Council has stated that there is an "urgent need" to identify and protect "biologically important marine areas".[564] WWF were particularly concerned that the current level of protection of Arctic cetacean species' (whales, dolphins and porpoises) habitat was not sufficient to provide them "with the buffer that they will need to withstand the rapid changes to their environment that will occur as a result of global climate change—both directly as the ecosystems in which they live change, and indirectly as human industrial activities expand".[565] There was a "pressing need" to assess the effectiveness of current protection systems as a conservation tool.[566]

135. A number of existing protected areas might be threatened as they become viable for development. The Lofoten Islands are protected from petroleum activities until 2013,[567] but there is growing pressure from the oil and gas industry to open this area to exploration and it appears to be a key issue in the run up to the next Norwegian general election in 2013.[568] Bristol Bay in Alaska has recently become protected from offshore oil and gas development until 2017.[569] On land, there are a number of national parks and protected areas within the Bristol Bay region,[570] but there are also plans for what would be the largest open-pit mine in North America, at Pebble Mine.[571]

136. Shane Tomlinson from E3G told us that, against the background of the UNCLOS process, where Arctic states could claim extended continental shelf in the Arctic, there was a small area of the Arctic that was still unclaimed and uncontested and could be designated as a protected area under international conservation law (see Figure 3).[572] There were also calls for an 'Arctic Treaty', similar to that for the Antarctic, which would ban all commercial activity or development.[573] A resolution of the European Parliament in 2008 urged the European Commission to pursue an international treaty for the protection of the Arctic, starting with the unpopulated and unclaimed area at the centre of the Arctic Ocean.[574]

137. In July 2012, Greenpeace launched a campaign to have the Arctic declared an environmental sanctuary by the UN, banning oil and gas exploration and unsustainable fishing.[575] WWF, who have developed criteria for identifying places of conservation importance, favoured a proportion of the Arctic Ocean being designated as marine protected areas to "help prevent over-exploitation in the longer term" and areas which are "too valuable and vulnerable from any kind of perspective—environmental, ecosystem, social, cultural" being designated as "no-go zones" for oil and gas activities.[576] Dr Babenko of WWF believed that as oil and gas activities had already started, this was a more realistic proposal that an outright "ban" or "moratorium" on all activities in the Arctic.[577] In a similar vein, Richard Steiner recognised that a "complete blanket umbrella moratorium on Arctic drilling is unfeasible". But he believed that Arctic States could contribute areas within their Exclusive Economic Zone to an Arctic Sanctuary.[578]

138. We asked the FCO whether the Government would advocate setting up an Arctic Sanctuary. Jane Rumble from the Polar Regions Unit told us that the idea of a sanctuary had not been "particularly raised at the Arctic Council level for discussion" but that the Government's "tendency would be to take a highly protective stance" on areas beyond national jurisdictions in the Arctic.[579] Henry Bellingham MP, the then Under-Secretary, told us that this was "a hypothetical situation" because "the ice hasn't melted" and one of the key priorities was to sort out the continental shelf claims beyond the 200-mile EEZ limit.[580] He told us that the Government wanted to "work around consensus" and would want to see "what allies we had for a policy of that kind" because the Government "would not want to be completely isolated".[581]

139. We support the need for an internationally recognised environmental sanctuary covering part of the Arctic. The Government should urgently seek to gather support for this within the Arctic Council, and to encourage the Council and UN to begin a dialogue on the scope for this. We see the development of such a Sanctuary as a pre-requisite for further development of the Arctic's natural resources.

The UK's role in the Arctic

140. The FCO has the overall policy lead on Arctic issues within Government, but there are a further five departments with policy responsibilities in particular areas.[582] The Polar Regions Unit within the FCO represents the UK at Arctic Council meetings.[583] Some witnesses argued that given the importance of its remit, its capacity should be enhanced.[584] However, Jane Rumble, Head of the Unit, told us that its eight staff "co-ordinate a huge, vast, cross-Government network, and that is where all the resource is".[585] The Under Secretary of State told us that a "great deal of effort, time and resource [was put] into every senior Arctic Council meeting" and that the UK Government had representatives in attendance at "every single meeting of the Council".[586]

141. On the face of it the UK, as an observer state, has limited influence in the Arctic Council. The rules of the Council mean that as an observer, although the UK is invited to most meetings and can submit written statements, it cannot vote or address the Council. Observer states and organisations are excluded from any negotiations on binding agreements.[587] Dr Sommerkorn from the WWF noted that Arctic Council states had made it clear that they did not want "political level influence" from non-Arctic states.[588] Charles Emmerson told the Committee that "the UK should attempt to be a diplomatic innovator and entrepreneur" but not "stick their oar in where it is not wanted".[589] Henry Bellingham MP told us that he saw the UK's role in influencing the Arctic Council as one where it gets "items on the agenda and leads initiatives and discussions".[590] The Government had five key priority areas for the Arctic: scientific research, climate change, sustainable management of the environment, shipping, and the role the Government can play in Arctic Council governance.[591] The then Under Secretary of State told us that although not an Arctic country, the UK was the Arctic's closest neighbour and had a "significant stake in the sustainable future of the Arctic".[592] The Government aimed to work "closely and in a thoroughly co-operative fashion, with the Arctic states on all the key issues", but as a non-Arctic state he believed that it could not "throw [its] weight around; you have to win people's confidence, you have to win their trust ... by showing where we have areas of excellence".[593] Jane Rumble told us that the Government's role at the Arctic Council included "trying to ensure that they do not go off into a closed room and do something that will have some impact on the UK or any other non-Arctic state".[594]

142. Therefore, while Norway and Sweden believe that the UK's expertise on many Arctic issues played a constructive role in the Arctic Council,[595] it remains important that the UK approach any development of its future role in the Arctic sensitively. We explore below three main ways in which the UK might increase its influence on Arctic matters: brokering the relationship between Arctic Council members and others, using Arctic science and research as a basis for enhanced cooperation on environmental protection, and developing a 'UK Government' strategy for the Arctic.


143. Duncan Depledge and Klaus Dodds considered that the UK could use its position as an observer on the Arctic Council to play an important role liaising between Arctic Council states and others, including China and the EU.[596] Charles Emmerson believed that the UK was in a strong position in having well-established diplomatic relationships around the world to "broker all kinds of deals".[597] There might be an opportunity for that as the Arctic Council considered bids for new observer states.

144. The Arctic Council has set out criteria for admitting new observers, which include "recognising Arctic States' sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic", and "having demonstrated their Arctic interests and expertise relevant to the work of the Arctic Council".[598] It is currently determining 10 applications for observer status.[599] There has been disagreement within the Council on how to deal with them.[600] A final decision on applications is expected in spring 2013.[601] The Arctic Advisory Group believed that when other countries gain observer status, the UK's influence in the Arctic Council would "inevitably be diluted".[602] The Under Secretary of State told us that he was not concerned about such a possibility, however, seeing this as "an opportunity to have more friends with whom we could make a common cause". In any case, he told us, it would be for sovereign states to decide which countries should become permanent observers and the Government would expect all applicants to meet the Arctic Council's criteria.[603] Charles Emmerson, in a similar vein, highlighted a need for the UK not to overstep its own observer role.[604]

145. The European Union's and China's applications were most contentious. The EU's earlier bid for observer status had been turned down because of its policy on seal products, which had been a particularly sensitive subject for Canada and Denmark.[605] More recent European discussions on the need to develop an Arctic Treaty had been "negatively received" by Canada, Norway and Denmark.[606] China's interest in the Arctic may reflect its position as the world's biggest trader of goods and the second-biggest in terms of trade exported by ship, and its construction of a nuclear ice-breaker fleet.[607] Beijing warned in 2010 that dissident Liu Xiaobo being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize would damage relations between China and Norway.[608] The Chinese Premier did not visit Norway during a subsequent trip to Iceland and Sweden[609] and Norwegian exports to China have also fallen significantly.[610] The Norwegian Ambassador told us that Norway supported China becoming an observer at the Arctic Council, but noted that "in order to process the request for observer status, it is important to be able to speak and to have dialogue".[611] The Swedish Ambassador believed it was important to establish whether states that had applied to become observers had a full dialogue with all Arctic states, a prerequisite to becoming an observer.[612]

146. We explored the possibility of 'grand bargains' being reached in return for the Arctic Council granting observer status, and in particular whether this could be linked to action on 'black carbon' emissions (paragraph 52) from China. The Swedish Government thought that it would be useful to have China involved at the Arctic Council to enable a dialogue with them "on the consequences of this pollution".[613]


147. The UK has an active scientific community working on Arctic issues, giving the UK a direct presence on Arctic matters.[614] The UK has an established environmental research base in the Arctic at Ny-Ålesund, on Norway's Svalbard archipelago, for use by UK universities and research institutes.[615] UK Arctic science is well regarded,[616] and distinct from that of some Arctic coastal states because of a "willingness to consider similarities between the Arctic and Antarctica".[617] The UK's expertise in particular areas of science would "allow a very high profile in any Arctic science undertaken".[618]

148. The then Under Secretary of State told us that the UK had a "serious common interest" in Arctic marine and avian biodiversity and that in this area the UK could "add value" as an observer state.[619] The UK had played a role in working groups of the Arctic Council, particularly on flora and fauna,[620] and he flagged up biodiversity as an area of future research that the UK could use to increase its influence in the Arctic Council.[621] The Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) is managing a £15 million Arctic research programme, a "very substantial jump" in UK research resources, which they saw as a "measure of how seriously we take the Arctic".[622] NERC "drives [the UK's scientific engagement] with the Arctic Council".[623] The Swedish Ambassador highlighted scope for further research on the permafrost, where not enough international research was being done.[624] Professor Lenton believed that more research could be done on monitoring changes to the Arctic and modelling and conceptualising tipping point issues, including Arctic methane release.[625] Dr Sommerkorn from WWF highlighted the UK's work on ecosystems services, which he believed could usefully be exported to the Arctic Council's working groups.[626]

149. The Arctic Office in NERC has a role in "trying to promote British science in the Arctic and make connections".[627] An Arctic climate science network has been formed to link all the major national research programmes in the western Arctic, and NERC expected to extend this into the broader Arctic as a whole.[628] While science (rather than policy-making) would primarily determine what research was undertaken,[629] the Under Secretary of State thought that science was "a really important lever for influencing the development of Arctic policies" and that "promoting UK science, in a forum like the Arctic Council, has been essential to our strategy for appropriately influencing Arctic decisions". He told us that there was significant scope for research on black carbon, pollutants and biodiversity which could increase the UK's influence.[630]


150. All of the Arctic states have published Arctic strategies.[631] Each includes the promotion of economic and social development of their northern Arctic regions, whilst ensuring a balance with environmental protection,[632] although the Under Secretary of State contrasted the Arctic Strategies of Sweden, Norway and Canada which were "full and extremely elaborate" with that of Russia which "certainly requires further work".[633]

151. The UK has wide-ranging interests in the Arctic, including finance and investment, maritime shipping, insurance, engineering and environmental consultancy, as well as scientific research. Klaus Dodds and Duncan Depledge believed that the UK lacked a coherent policy towards the Arctic that fully reflected such interests, and believed a cross-departmental Government Arctic strategy would help "crystallise further co-operation between stakeholders and tease out UK Arctic interests, ranging from the effects of further climate change to commercial opportunities such as energy, shipping and tourism".[634] Shane Tomlinson from E3G believed that at present the various parts of Government with Arctic interests were not coming together.[635] He told us that the Government:

    ... is not prepared for a lot of the Arctic threats and opportunities as we move forward. It is quite comfortable with the status quo position of being a permanent observer on the Arctic Council and has not really wanted to rock the boat. However, shifting global dynamics means that we cannot retain this position moving forward.[636]

152. Rod Downie from WWF highlighted potential policy conflicts, where for example the UK was taking a leadership role in advocating carbon reduction but also looking to the Arctic for energy security.[637] WWF published earlier this year a set of principles that it wanted the UK Government to follow in its dealings with the Arctic.[638] Ruth Davis from Greenpeace wanted the UK to show evidence that it was pursuing strategic objectives, that were wider than simply securing the interests of extractive companies in the Arctic.[639] The Arctic Advisory Group believed that it was sensible for the UK to review its position in order to "identify any policy gaps caused by recent developments in the Arctic" and that assuming that the present "watching brief" approach would continue to protect UK interests would be "foolhardy" when other countries were actively reviewing their Arctic policies.[640]

153. Charles Emmerson favoured greater coordination between the various government departments on issues of common interest, but believed it was important that any future UK Arctic Strategy was prepared from a deep knowledge of the interests of, and in consultation with, the Arctic states. He referred to a previous Arctic Strategy of the European Union which failed in this respect and had left them looking at if they were trying to "ramrod their way into the Arctic".[641] The FCO's Jane Rumble told us that the Government will "continue to play its very active role in making sure that [EU] competence is not extended and that it is articulated appropriately by the EU bodies".[642] We asked both the Norwegian and Swedish ambassadors whether they would welcome the UK developing its own strategy. The Norwegian Ambassador thought it would be "a positive thing, a good thing ... that can only be helpful".[643] The Swedish Ambassador though it would be "an excellent idea" and that "there are so many issues—environment, climate change, energy, transport, fishing—that could be part of such a strategy".[644]

154. Jane Rumble, on the other hand, believed that whilst some Arctic States would welcome the UK having a strategy, others would be sensitive about an observer state having a strategy over their territory:

    We have walked a bit of a fine line, in terms of not saying it is a strategy but making sure that we are clear on what we want to get out of the Arctic, why we are engaged in it and what our priority areas are.[645]

The Under Secretary of State did not believe there was a need for an Arctic Strategy as there was "very broad agreement, in terms of the sovereignty, the management and the governance" of the Arctic, and he thought that Arctic states "would see it as being unnecessary". He told us that:

    ... we have been asked this on a number of occasions in the past: is there a strategy as such? We do not have "an Arctic strategy". What we have is a clear policy, and within that policy are the initiatives and the priorities that I mentioned ... It is not something that we have decided upon, but it certainly is something that we have not ruled out. We have to be a little bit careful here. Obviously there would be issues around sovereignty if other countries decide they wanted to have a strategy for, say, the North Sea or the English Channel ... we have not lost out by not having an Arctic strategy. But as the number of different initiatives increase, as the number of different international organisations and different fora take an interest in the Arctic, as a key player would it help us to have an Arctic Strategy in the future? Yes, it might do.[646]

155. We recommend that the Government begin the development of an Arctic Strategy to bring together the UK's diverse interests in the Arctic and engage all stakeholders. Without one there is a risk that government departments may not be working in a cross-cutting way. Such a Strategy should include analysis of the potential impact of climate change on the Arctic and necessary responses (Part 2), as well as how and where the Government would act to support sustainable development in the Arctic (Part 3). It should identify potential end-states for the Arctic and how the Government intend to use its influence at the UN and Arctic Council to bring those about, taking account of the limits on the UK's ability to directly drive such changes. In particular, an Arctic Strategy should include:

·  a narrative on how the Rio principles and the outcomes from the Rio+20 Summit will guide the UK's approach to the Arctic (paragraph 3);

·  how the Government intends to use its science and research to increase its influence on Arctic matters (paragraphs 147-149);

·  how the Government plans to secure action against the pre-conditions we consider should be attached to further drilling in the Arctic (paragraph 106);

·  the need for an area of the Arctic to be set aside as a 'sanctuary' and protected from oil and gas development, to be progressed in dialogue with both the Arctic Council and the UN (paragraphs 136-138);

·  how the Government will use its influence at the IMO, UN and Arctic Council to help protect the Arctic from the possible impacts of increased international shipping, and how it will support relevant sectors of the UK economy to take advantage of future opportunities in a sustainable way (paragraphs 111 & 120);

·  the Government's commitment to support the sustainable management of Arctic fisheries (paragraphs 124 & 125);

·  consideration of the ideal of a 'wider' Council, convened under the UN, to allow the interests of non-Arctic states to be taken into account in the development and environmental protection of the Arctic, and identification of available levers to bring that about (paragraph 132);

·  how the Government will work to develop Citizens Advisory Councils to engage citizens in the oversight of the Arctic oil industry (paragraph 92); and

·  opportunities for 'grand bargains' that might be explored with potential observer states, including China, on wider environmental issues (paragraph 146).

Such a strategy must be developed (and expressed) in a sensitive way, and with the close engagement of Arctic countries, to avoid misunderstandings which might undermine the UK's influence. It should also be a foundation for the Government to actively engage the public in this agenda.

517   Hans Island is claimed by both Canada and Denmark. Back

518   The USA has not ratified the Convention, but "largely abides" by its guidelines: see Q 1.  Back

519   Q 1  Back

520   Q 1; Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North, op citBack

521   Ev 170; In May 2008, 5 Arctic coastal states committed themselves in the Ilulissat Declaration to a legal framework for the Arctic region and an orderly settlement of claims. Back

522   Q 1 [Shane Tomlinson] Back

523   Annex II, UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. Back

524   The Brookings Institute, Chill Out-Why Cooperation is Balancing Conflict Among Major Powers in the New Arctic, May 2012. Back

525   Q1  Back

526   Ev 145; See also Q 1. Back

527   Chill Out-Why Cooperation is Balancing Conflict Among Major Powers in the New Arctic, op cit, Government of Norway, The High North: Vision and Strategies, 2011. Back

528   Q 236 Back

529   Ev w11, Ev 170, Ev w19; Q 236 [Charles Emmerson]; Chill Out-Why Cooperation is Balancing Conflict Among Major Powers in the New Arctic, op cit, Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North, op citBack

530   The Svalbard Treaty 1920 recognises Norway's full and undivided sovereignty over Svalbard. It provides for all treaty nations to have access to and residence in Svalbard. Right to fish, hunt or undertake any kind of maritime, industrial, mining or trade activity are granted to all treaty nations on equal terms. All activity is subject to Norwegian legislation, and there is no preferential treatment on the basis of nationality. Back

531   Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North, op citBack

532   Q 233  Back

533   Q 236  Back

534   Chill Out-Why Cooperation is Balancing Conflict Among Major Powers in the New Arctic, op cit. Russia had submitted claims to the continental shelf in 2001, but was required to submit more data. Back

535   Ev w19 Back

536   Duncan Depledge and Klaus Dodds, "The UK and the Arctic: The Strategic Gap", The RUSI Journal, vol 156, pp 72-79. Back

537   Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North, op citBack

538   "The UK and the Arctic: The Strategic Gap", op cit, pp 72-79. Back

539   Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North, op citBack

540   Ev 145 Back

541   Chill Out-Why Cooperation is Balancing Conflict Among Major Powers in the New Arctic, op citBack

542   Canada, Denmark (for Greenland), Iceland, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States of America. Back

543   Arctic Council's Website:  Back

544   Q 333 [Mr Traavik] Back

545   ibid Back

546   See: Ev w11, Ev w14; Q 232 [Charles Emmerson], Qq 330, 345 [Mr Traavik]. Back

547   Q 445 [Mr Bellingham]; Ev 170 Back

548   "The UK and the Arctic: The Strategic Gap", op cit, pp 72-79. Back

549   The Chairmanship of the Arctic Council is rotated every third year and in May 2011 Sweden took on the Chairmanship role until 2013. Back

550   Q 360 [Ms Clase] Back

551   Q 330 [Mr Traavik] Back

552   Others are: France , Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, and Spain.  Back

553   International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO), North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO), Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).  Back

554   Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas (ACOPS), Arctic Circumpolar Gateway, Association of World Reindeer Herders (AWRH), Circumpolar Conservation Union (CCU), International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA), International Union for Circumpolar Health (IUCH), International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), Northern Forum (NF), University of the Arctic (UArctic), and World Wide Fund for Nature-Global Arctic Program (WWF). Back

555   Q 13  Back

556   Q 1, 13 Back

557   ibid  Back

558   Q 388  Back

559   Q 333 [Mr Traavik] Back

560   Q 364 [Ms Clase] Back

561   The Ilulissat Declaration 2008. Back

562   Arctic Council's Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna working group, Arctic Biodiversity Trends 2010 - Selected Indicators of Change, 2010. Back

563   ibid Back

564   ibid Back

565   Ev 163 Back

566   Arctic Biodiversity Trends 2010 - Selected Indicators of Change, 2010.  Back

567   Q 71 [Dr Babenko] Back

568   For example see: "Lofoten's troubled waters",, March 2012, "Pristine fishing area split on the prospect of oil", The Local online, Marc 2012. Back

569  Back

570  Back

571  Back

572   Q1 Back

573   Ev 145, Ev 163; Q 1, 13 [Shane Tomlinson] Back

574   Text adopted 9 October 2008.  Back

575   See Greenpeace's website:  Back

576   Ev 163; Q 71 [Dr Babenko] Back

577   Q 71  Back

578   Qq 388, 402  Back

579   Q 437 Back

580   Q 435 Back

581   Q 436  Back

582   Ev 170 Back

583   Q 408 [Jane Rumble] Back

584   Q 5 [Shane Tomlinson], Q 68 [Rod Downie], Q 241 [Charles Emmerson] Back

585   Q 441 [Jane Rumble] Back

586   Qq 405, 413 [Mr Bellingham]  Back

587   Q 434 [Mr Bellingham]  Back

588   Q 65  Back

589   Q 245  Back

590   Q 445  Back

591   Q 406 [Mr Bellingham] Back

592   Q 405  Back

593   Qq 405, 413 [Mr Bellingham] Back

594   Q 442  Back

595   Q 340 [Mr Traavik], Q 373 [Ms Clase] Back

596   Duncan Depledge and Klaus Dodds, "The UK and the Arctic: The Strategic Gap", The RUSI Journal, vol 156, pp 72-79; See also: Q 245 [Charles Emmerson] Back

597   Q 245  Back

598  Back

599   Recommendation of the Arctic Council Deputy Foreign Ministers, 14 May 2012.  Back

600   Lloyd's and Chatham House, Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North, 2012. Back

601   Recommendation of the Arctic Council Deputy Foreign Ministers, op cit.  Back

602   Ev w23 Back

603   Q 447, 448  Back

604   Q 237 Back

605   Q 244 [Charles Emmerson] Back

606   "The UK and the Arctic: The Strategic Gap", op citBack

607   The Economist, Pocket World in Figures: 2010 Edition, 2011. Back

608   "China's Nobel anger as Liu Xiaobo awarded peace prize", BBC news website, 8 October 2010. Back

609   "Chinese Anger continues over Nobel award to dissident", BBC news website, 11 October 2010; Q 235 [Charles Emmerson]. Back

610   "Despite Nobel, Norway favours China role in Arctic", Reuters, January 2011. Back

611   Qq 338 - 339 Back

612   Qq 369 - 371  Back

613   Q 372 [Ms Clase] Back

614   Q 238 [Charles Emmerson] Back

615   Ev 159 Back

616   Qq 268, 341  Back

617   "The UK and the Arctic: The Strategic Gap", op citBack

618   Qq 257, 268 [Dr Ellis-Evans] Back

619   Qq 406, 407  Back

620   Q 449 [Jane Rumble] Back

621   Q 444 [Mr Bellingham] Back

622   Qq 257,264 [Dr Ellis-Evans] Back

623   Q 444 [Mr Bellingham] Back

624   Q 362 [Ms Clase] Back

625   Q 46  Back

626   Q 66  Back

627   Q 268 [Dr Ellis-Evans] Back

628   ibid Back

629   Q 444 [Jane Rumble] Back

630   ibid Back

631   Q 240 [Charles Emmerson] Back

632   See: Ev 170 for the UK Government's review of the eight Arctic States' strategies. Back

633   Q 414 Back

634   "The UK and the Arctic: The Strategic Gap", op citBack

635   Q 5  Back

636   Q 1  Back

637   Q 57  Back

638   Ev 163 Back

639   Q 5  Back

640   Ev w23 Back

641   Q 240  Back

642   Q 446  Back

643   Q 332  Back

644   Q 363  Back

645   Q 438  Back

646   Qq 438, 443  Back

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© Parliamentary copyright 2012
Prepared 20 September 2012