Conclusions and recommendations
The impact of climate change on the Arctic
1. There is growing
evidence that the damaging effects of climate change are being
felt strongly in the Arctic. The ice-cap is retreating. In September
2012 it had reached its lowest extent since satellite records
began, and new evidence shows that it is also thinning faster
than previously thought. The general view that the ice-cap is
not at risk of a summer collapse in the next few years may need
to be revisited and revised. A collapse not only threatens the
unique ecosystems there, but would have damaging ramifications
for regional and global climate. (Paragraph 28)
2. There is a range
of views on the rate at which methane is being released in the
Arctic as a result of climate warming there, and whether and how
soon that might constitute a tipping point. Given its particular
potency as a greenhouse gas, however, there is a potentially serious
risk for global climate change from any significant methane release
in the Arctic. (Paragraph 34)
3. In the absence
of urgent action on climate change, there may be a number of tipping
points in climate-driven systems in the Arctic, which threaten
to rapidly escalate the danger for the whole planet. A collapse
of summer sea-ice, increased methane emissions from thawing permafrost,
runaway melting of the Greenland ice-sheet, and a collapse of
the thermo-haline circulation, may all be approaching in the Arctic
and will have disastrous consequences for global climate and sea
levels. These together comprise a wake-up call to reinvigorate
efforts to tackle climate change. A lack of consensus on precisely
how fast any tipping points are approaching in the Arctic should
not be used as an argument for inaction; rather it demonstrates
the need for continued and sustained research to underpin further
action. The UK makes an essential contribution to Arctic science,
and we look to the Government to continue supporting Arctic science
as a key component of its work on climate change. (Paragraph 45)
4. Geo-engineering
techniques for the Arctic at present do not offer a credible long-term
solution for tackling climate change. Further research is needed
to understand how such techniques work and their wider impacts
on climate systems. In the meantime, therefore, we remain unconvinced
that using 'technical fixes' is the right approach and efforts
should not be diverted from tackling the fundamental drivers of
global climate change. (Paragraph 50)
5. The risks to ecosystems
from the effects of Arctic warming and potential climate tipping
points, together with the additional risks from energy and shipping
development, make it imperative that any readily available opportunity
to make a difference is grasped. Tackling emissions from shipping
is such an opportunity, and the Government must engage positively
with the EU's efforts to look at options for doing this. (Paragraph
55)
Oil and gas exploration
6. Oil companies primarily
respond to market supply and demand. The Government's approach
in helping to avoid dangerous climate change is to encourage the
UK to reduce consumption, not supply, of fossil fuels, through,
for example, electricity market reform and the EU Emissions Trading
System. We are concerned that there appears to be a lack of strategic
thinking and policy coherence within Government on this issue,
illustrated by its failure to demonstrate how future oil and gas
extraction from the Arctic can be reconciled to commitments to
limit temperature rises to 2°C. The Government should seek
to resolve this matter. (Paragraph 64)
7. The development
of Citizens Advisory Councils to engage citizens in the oversight
of the Arctic oil industry should be part of the Government's
Strategy for the Arctic (Paragraph 92)
8. Drilling is already
going ahead in the Arctic and regulatory authorities are approving
plans to drill. However, only a small fraction of oil would be
recovered in the event of a significant oil spill in the Arctic
and it might take decades for wildlife to recover. Given the heightened
risks of drilling for oil and gas in the Arctic, including
a lack of conclusive evidence that oil spill response techniques
will work fully effectively in Arctic conditions, we conclude
that there should be a moratorium on drilling in the Arctic until:
· the regulatory regimes of all Arctic states
impose the highest available environmental standards, and require
the best available and safest technology to be used for all components
of drilling. The risk standard adopted must be 'As Low as Possible'
and the Government should work with Arctic states, including through
the Arctic Council, to help bring this about.
· a pan-Arctic oil spill response standard
is in place. The UK Government should seek to persuade the Arctic
Council to draw on the expertise of other states in its work to
develop such a standard.
· a much higher, preferably unlimited, financial
liability regime for oil and gas operations is in place throughout
the Arctic. Such a liability regime should require companies operating
there to demonstrate that they have adequate funds, financial
guarantees or insurance, to meet the costs of responding to an
oil spill. The UK Government should seek to advance this through
the Arctic Council and the IMO. Consideration should also be given
to setting up a liability deposit bond scheme which could be administered
by the Arctic Council.
· an oil and gas industry group is set up
to peer-review companies' drilling and spill response plans and
operating practices, reporting publicly. The Government should
seek, through the Arctic Council, to engage the oil companies
operating in the Arctic to set this up.
· further independent research and testing
on oil spill response techniques in Arctic conditions is conducted,
including assessing the environmental side-effects of such techniques.
Only once response techniques have been independently proven to
be as effective as those used for temperate latitudes should drilling
be permitted to go ahead. Through the Arctic Council, the Government
should seek to persuade Arctic littoral states to carry out and
publish the results of such further research and testing.
· an internationally recognised environmental
sanctuary is established in at least part of the Arctic. (Paragraph
106)
Shipping and fisheries
9. An increase in
Arctic shipping is inevitably bringing new opportunities for UK
businesses and ports, and that will enable UK authorities to play
a regulatory role in future Arctic shipping. The Government should
review how it can support relevant sectors of the economy but
with a clear focus on meeting the requirements of sustainable
development of the Arctic. (Paragraph 111)
10. There are clear
risks from increased shipping to Arctic ecosystems and effective
standards must be put in place as soon as possible in readiness
for an inevitable increase in the volume of Arctic shipping. The
Government should use its influence in the IMO and Arctic Council
to:
· ensure the Polar Code, currently being
developed, is robust and provides for environmentally safe navigation
through Arctic waters. We are disappointed that the IMO chose
to not give evidence to us on this inquiry, which hindered our
scrutiny of the IMO's work to develop this Code;
· speed up the development of the Polar
Code by working with other members of the IMO to identify Chapters
that could be agreed to a quicker timeframe than the rest of the
Code. Although essential to reach international agreement on shipping
regulations, the pace of its work is slow;
· increase the maximum financial liability
of ship operators for pollution in the Arctic; and
· increase the protections afforded to the
Arctic under existing IMO shipping regulations, including seeking
support to designate the Arctic as a 'Particularly Sensitive Sea
Area' within the MARPOL regulations. (Paragraph 120)
11. The Government
should play a full role in developing a new international agreement
on the conservation and sustainable use of the marine biological
diversity of the Arctic beyond national jurisdictions. (Paragraph
124)
12. As an observer
on the Arctic Council, the Government should also seek to influence
Arctic states to regulate their fisheries sustainably. Any bilateral
agreements between the UK and other states should seek to ensure
that smaller boats, which more readily support sustainable fishing
practice, are able to benefit from any quotas agreed. (Paragraph
125)
Governance of the Arctic
13. We support the
need for an internationally recognised environmental sanctuary
covering part of the Arctic. The Government should urgently seek
to gather support for this within the Arctic Council, and to encourage
the Council and UN to begin a dialogue on the scope for this.
We see the development of such a Sanctuary as a pre-requisite
for further development of the Arctic's natural resources. (Paragraph
139)
14. We recommend that
the Government begin the development of an Arctic Strategy to
bring together the UK's diverse interests in the Arctic and engage
all stakeholders. Without one there is a risk that government
departments may not be working in a cross-cutting way. Such a
Strategy should include analysis of the potential impact of climate
change on the Arctic and necessary responses , as well
as how and where the Government would act to support sustainable
development in the Arctic . It should identify potential
end-states for the Arctic and how the Government intend to use
its influence at the UN and Arctic Council to bring those about,
taking account of the limits on the UK's ability to directly drive
such changes. In particular, an Arctic Strategy should include:
· a narrative on how the Rio principles
and the outcomes from the Rio+20 Summit will guide the UK's approach
to the Arctic;
· how the Government intends to use its
science and research to increase its influence on Arctic matters;
· how the Government plans to secure action
against the pre-conditions we consider should be attached to further
drilling in the Arctic;
· the need for an area of the Arctic to
be set aside as a 'sanctuary' and protected from oil and gas development,
to be progressed in dialogue with both the Arctic Council and
the UN;
· how the Government will use its influence
at the IMO, UN and Arctic Council to help protect the Arctic from
the possible impacts of increased international shipping, and
how it will support relevant sectors of the UK economy to take
advantage of future opportunities in a sustainable way;
· the Government's commitment to support
the sustainable management of Arctic fisheries;
· consideration of the ideal of a 'wider'
Council, convened under the UN, to allow the interests of non-Arctic
states to be taken into account in the development and environmental
protection of the Arctic, and identification of available levers
to bring that about;
· how the Government will work to develop
Citizens Advisory Councils to engage citizens in the oversight
of the Arctic oil industry; and
· opportunities for 'grand bargains' that
might be explored with potential observer states, including China,
on wider environmental issues.
Such a strategy must be developed (and expressed)
in a sensitive way, and with the close engagement of Arctic countries,
to avoid misunderstandings which might undermine the UK's influence.
It should also be a foundation for the Government to actively
engage the public in this agenda. (Paragraph 155)
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