Greening the Common Agricultural Policy - Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee Contents


2  Strategic Direction of the CAP

6.  The CAP's original purpose was to boost domestic production through market price support. As production rose the cost of the CAP increased and excess agricultural goods had to be stored at public expense. In 1992 CAP payments were decoupled from production and intervention prices for key agricultural commodities were reduced. Further reforms in 2000 and 2003 maintained the momentum away from payment for production and introduced environmental and animal welfare requirements for receipt of the new Single Farm Payment.[15] In The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013 report we noted the evidence supporting the Commission's focus on sustainability and the environmental performance of agriculture.[16] We concluded that "sustainable management of the EU's natural resources, biodiversity and landscapes" should be the CAP's third objective behind enhancing the EU's capacity to produce safe and high-quality food and enhancing the competitiveness and viability of the EU agricultural sector.[17] The Government response to that report concurred that "the CAP has a vital role in supporting the provision of environmental public goods".[18]

7.  Both farming and environmental organisations have criticised the Commission's proposals. However, there is a general consensus that there is a benefit in improving environmental outcomes and that within the EU, payments under the CAP should reflect that goal.[19] For example, the Wildlife Trusts, while describing the proposals as "unambitious", and "not ideal", did welcome the principle of a 'greener' CAP.[20] Peter Kendall, President of the National Farmers Union (NFU), described the proposals as "negative measures", rather than the "ones that are able to deliver win­wins, where we can become more productive and produce more food as well as protect the environment".[21] The National Trust (NT), which has a direct interest in 200,000 ha of farmland across the UK, welcomed the Commission's "ambition to 'green' the CAP", but believed that the proposals fall short of their aim.[22] The Trust had hoped "to see proposals that delivered much more for natural resources underpinning the farmed environment, preparing us for an uncertain future of climate and food insecurity".[23] Professor Charles Godfray, Chair of the Lead Expert Group of the Foresight Food and Farming Project, gave a general welcome to 'greening' but was concerned that the Commission had not recognised the wider policy environment that the Foresight project identified. He expressed concerns about "the way they are implementing the greening, by what they have proposed for Pillar 1, is rather formulaic or algorithmic, rather than setting incentives for the production of public goods".[24]

8.  Much of the evidence we received was necessarily tentative in its assessment of the Commission's proposals due to the lack of detail currently available about how the measures would work in practice. We support the Commission's broad goal that CAP payments be a method for improving environmental outcomes across Europe but we note that the lack of detail available about the Commission's specific proposals makes it difficult to make precise assessments of their potential impact and value.

LEGITIMISING PAYMENTS

9.  The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) described the 'greening' proposals as a missed opportunity to support European farming becoming more environmentally and economically sustainable.[25] Gareth Morgan, Director of Agricultural Policy at the RSPB described the Commission's "primary" aim to be "how you legitimise expenditure of €300 billion over the next seven years".[26] That view was shared by several witnesses, including the Country Land and Business Association (CLA), which noted that Commissioner Ciolos had been explicit about the need to legitimise CAP payments in the eyes of the public.[27] The CAP provides support to some 14 million agricultural holdings and affects nearly 50% of the EU's land area. It is the EU's single largest item of expenditure, at a cost of around €57 billion in 2010.[28] The Commission should wish to assure the general public that CAP payments are justified and legitimate. However, the Commission's primary consideration when designing revisions to the CAP should be the delivery of the desired agricultural, environmental, economic and social outcomes. The CAP's legitimacy in the eyes of the public will come from delivering those outcomes and securing value for money. We are concerned that the Commission is pursuing a greening agenda as a way to justify the continuation of direct payments, rather than as a means to deliver genuine environmental improvements across the European Union.

One-size-fits all

10.  The Commission aims to improve the baseline level of environmental protection across all Member States by making farmers across the EU subject to largely the same requirements to qualify for a significant proportion of direct payments. Currently direct payments are conditional on farmers meeting the cross-compliance criteria: Statutory Management Requirements (SMR) and Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition (GAEC), which includes environmental elements.[29] The Commission proposes simplifying cross-compliance requirements by reducing the number of SMRs from 18 to 13 and GAECs from 15 to 8.[30]

11.  Despite the universality of cross-compliance requirements, Member States vary in how they implement and enforce those standards.[31] According to the Institute of European Environmental Policy (IEEP), introducing additional mandatory 'greening' measures into Pillar 1 provided a "stronger means of ensuring a basic level of environmental management" across the whole of the EU.[32] The CLA considered that, depending on their implementation, the 'greening' measures had the potential to provide environmental improvements in those Member States with rudimentary agri-environmental schemes or less demanding cross-compliance.[33]

12.  The UK is considered to be one of the leading Member States in terms of providing environmental improvements through the CAP, particularly through Entry Level Stewardship and Higher Level Stewardship agri-environment schemes.[34] The Secretary of State told us that the Commission recognised that the "UK is out there more or less in a league of its own, particularly with higher level stewardship schemes, which make very strong demands on farmers to address very real needs for biodiversity".[35] The CLA noted that if the 'greening' measures were intended to bring all Member States' basic farmland environmental management up to the standards of the best in Europe, they were unlikely to lead to any noticeable environmental enhancement in this country.[36]

13.  Critics of the Commission' uniform, one-size-fits all approach emphasised the diversity of agricultural and environmental conditions across the EU.[37] The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) doubted that the 'greening' measures would deliver additional environmental benefits for the EU because "in attempting to make them applicable across all Member States, they are far too basic in their approach".[38] The majority of Member States are concerned that the Commission's proposed rigid, one-size-fits-all approach appeared "to deliver more red tape than actual environmental benefit".[39] The Secretary of State did not think that Member States would reach agreement on the Commission's "sub-optimal" and "prescriptive" one-size-fits all approach.[40]

14.  Professor Benton, an expert in agri-environment scheme policy and the UK's Global Food Security Champion, while accepting the need for a "uniform framework", explained that implementation of the Regulations should allow for sufficient tailoring to local circumstances.[41] He stated that:

...what is the best strategy for one landscape, with its geographical setting and the mix of farm enterprises, may not be the best strategy for another area. The optimal management strategy will vary with landscape context, leading for a necessity for local tailoring of specificities of schemes to make maximum gains.[42]

He added that "even in the UK, how you would manage a Cornish landscape is very different from how you would manage a Norfolk landscape".[43]

15.  Natural England, the Government's statutory advisor on the natural environment agreed that there was benefit in Pillar 1 providing a degree of uniformity to ensure a 'level playing field' across the EU, but emphasised that the best results required "locally specific and locally tailored solutions".[44] Mr Morgan considered it "a bit unrealistic" to expect a Common Agricultural Policy to be tailored to the needs and circumstances of every region across the EU; he therefore considered that "we have to have some limits to what our expectation of the greening process through Pillar 1 can be".[45] The IEEP concluded that by "proposing a set of generally applicable, simple, annual payments" the Commission had placed greater value on a "common approach applied uniformly in all Member States over flexibility to address the diverse conditions in the EU-27".[46] We find it telling that the Institute concluded that "clearly, if only the UK situation needed to be considered, then the choices made would have been quite different".[47]

16.  Much of our evidence emphasised that environmental outcomes are best delivered by tailored and locally specific policies. There are also benefits in having sufficient uniformity in the general approach, not least to simplify the administration and protect the level playing field for farmers across the EU.[48] We recognise the need for a common policy to regulate aspects of the single European market, however, for policy areas such as the environment and rural development any policy must take account of the local circumstances: a one-size-fits-all approach will fail to deliver the desired outcomes.

17.  In response to the Commission's overly prescriptive one-size fits all 'greening' proposals several Member States have together developed alternative proposals that would give greater flexibility and enable each country to implement measures better targeted to their own farming systems and environmental circumstances.[49] The Commission should grasp the opportunity to enable Member States to take sensible decisions about how measures can be tailored to local environmental circumstances and needs. We recommend that Defra continue to press the Commission to develop a less rigid approach to 'greening' that would enable individual Member States the flexibility to decide measures that work best in their local environment.

18.  Defra supported our conclusion in The Outcome of the independent Farming Regulation Task Force report that, as a general principle, regulation should be on the basis of outcomes rather than simple compliance with processes.[50] Rather than identifying desired outcomes, the Commission has taken an inflexible approach to 'greening' that would impose a single set of regulatory criteria across the range of farm habitats and methods found across the EU.[51] The Commission is more likely to find success if it focuses on setting the objectives of 'greening' and allows Member States the flexibility to design measures that work best in their local environment. Such an approach is not a diminution of ''greening'' but rather enhances the prospects of achieving appropriate environmental outcomes. There is a precedent for such an approach. Within the proposals for reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, the Commission has allowed for a much greater degree of regional control over fishing management measures, without diluting the important conservation and single market objectives of the common approach. In our report on EU proposals for Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy we concluded that "a more effective system of European fisheries governance could be achieved if high-level objectives only are set centrally by the European institutions while day-to-day decisions are delegated to regional groupings of Member States".[52] We consider that the Commission should consider a similar approach in relation to 'greening'.

19.  We recommend that Defra make the argument to the Commission that it should set the high-level objectives for a greener CAP and allow Member States the flexibility to determine how best to achieve those objectives. Such delegation has been proposed within the reform proposals for the Common Fisheries Policy and we recommend that Commissioner Ciolos consider how such an approach could be applied to the Common Agricultural Policy. We accept that complete decentralisation of these policy areas may be impossible to achieve within this round of CAP reform but we urge the Government to make the case that greater flexibility and increasing local decision-making should be the strategic direction of the CAP.

Simplification

20.  The CAP is currently complex, burdensome and expensive to administer and therefore the Commission has identified simplification as an objective for this round of CAP reform. Despite the Commission's commitment to simplification, our evidence suggests that the 'greening' proposals will create additional bureaucracy and complexity for farmers and paying agencies.[53] The UK Co-ordinating Body for the Common Agricultural Policy described the proposals as representing "considerable additional administrative complexity compared to the current regime".[54] According to Defra, that additional administrative complexity risks increasing the error rates in payments, which could lead to financial hardship for farmers and financial penalties for the Member State.[55] The RSPB supported reducing unnecessary burdens but noted that a degree of complexity would be necessary to achieve the policy's environmental objectives.[56] Similarly, the IEEP argued that delivering environmental benefits involves some administrative burden.[57]

21.  The farming organisations believed that the proposals would add complexity or administrative burden. For example the crop diversification measure may require the reintroduction of crop codes to differentiate between different crop types, as well as requiring additional mapping.[58] The EFA measure may also require additional mapping to calculate the eligible area.[59] The NFU predicted that 'greening' proposals may lead to a proliferation of artificial land swap agreements which would result in additional administration by the Rural Payments Agency.[60] The CAAV considered that the proposals "add new levels of complexity for both claimants and payment agencies and, as drafted, risk undermining the level of agri-environment commitment in the UK".[61]

22.  We consider it highly improbable that the Commission's proposals will deliver a simpler CAP. We recommend that Defra ensure that, as the negotiations continue, the Commission does not lose sight of the absolute need for a system of CAP payments that can be implemented and audited efficiently. The Commission must balance the often conflicting pressures of designing a policy that will deliver positive environmental outcomes with the need for a policy that can actually be implemented and delivered for a reasonable cost.

IMPLEMENTATION

23.  In The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013 we discussed the costs of administering Single Farm Payments in the UK. We concluded that Defra should "resist the imposition of policies that would create undue bureaucracy and burden for farmers or the government payment agencies".[62] The Rural Payment Agency has acknowledged the challenges of the CAP reform.[63] Its five-year plan states that "...there are aspects of the currently proposed scheme which are likely to entail a great deal of complexity for RPA, regardless of how our new systems and business models are constructed".[64] Those challenges come at a time of reducing funding for the agency.[65] The capability and capacity of the Rural Payments Agency will be critical to the successful implementation of the reformed CAP. Defra must ensure that the agency has the financial resources and expertise to deliver the new regime.

24.  There is a widely held view in UK agriculture that the Government gold plates European legislation. For example, in our Outcome of the Farming Regulation Task Force inquiry the CLA said:

Many pieces of EU law are minimum requirements, requesting the Member State to enforce implementing Regulations. It is up to the Member State to determine how much, or how little, to transpose. What has happened with Defra and its agencies is a policy of over-compliance when it is often the case this was never originally intended.[66]

25.  The NFU was concerned that Defra was under pressure from the environmental bodies to gold plate the 'greening' measures in order to enhance their environmental benefits".[67] It argued that "the 'greening' measures put forward at an EU level should be implemented evenly across the EU. There should be no opportunity for Member States to gold plate the measures or add in requirements beyond those stipulated at EU level".[68] The Secretary of State told us that the Government was "dedicated to prising gold plating off wherever we see it" and was "not about to install new gold plating".[69] Whatever the form of the final mandatory 'greening' measures, Defra must not gold plate 'greening' through imposing more demanding measures on UK farmers than apply elsewhere.

Food Security and food production

26.  In The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013 we reiterated our view that the EU will, through the reformed CAP, have a role in meeting future global food supply challenges.[70] We recommended that "any 'greening' of the CAP should be directed at activities that promote sustainability alongside competitiveness".[71] Professor Benton summarised the challenge:

... how do we increase food production whilst at the same time decreasing the rate at which we have been impacting on the environment, or even mitigate against that and make it better? Clearly, with the CAP, we need to have both.[72]

27.  Professor Godfray, Chair of the Lead Expert Group of the Foresight Food and Farming Project, described graphically the challenges to global food security and the potential consequences if those challenges were not met.[73] He agreed with our analysis that the CAP should not directly increase food production but should "enable our farming sector to respond to price signals".[74] He told us:

A leitmotif running throughout the Foresight Report was the need for sustainable intensification, so we will almost certainly have to produce more food from the same amount of land or, conceivably, less land. That does mean, as you say, producing more food, but doing it in a way that has less imprint on the environment. We should be as concerned about kilograms or calories of human food per unit of greenhouse gas emitted to the atmosphere as we are about yield per acre.[75]

28.  The balancing point between food production and environmental protection is naturally a concern for both farming organisations and environmental organisations. Mr Morgan argued that the reforms would have "serious problems" if food security and environmental quality were considered to be in opposition.[76] He did not think that the Commission had "approached this reform from any particular food security perspective".[77] While our witnesses acknowledged the importance of food security, the farming organisations did not consider the proposals addressed the issue sufficiently or identified the desired outcomes.[78] According to the NFU the EFA measure would remove 5.74 million hectares of land from food and energy production—equating to 31 million tonnes of wheat production.[79] The CLA added that that removal of productive land would not only reduce EU food output but also increase food imports from countries "where we have no idea what the environmental cost would be".[80]

29.  The Commission's Impact Assessment calculated that on average 2.7% of the current EU eligible area would be likely to count as part of the EFA and that figure would increase were landscape features to be included.[81] The IEEP considered farmers likely to allocate the least productive land to be used for the EFA first so that the percentage of productive land taken out of production by the measure will be well below 7%.[82] Nevertheless, the measure would in their view have an impact on production levels, particularly in areas of the EU dedicated to arable farming.[83]

30.  Some, however, argued that the measures would have little or no detrimental impact on food security.[84] Chris Gerrard, Director of Living Landscapes for the Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Northamptonshire Wildlife Trust said that in the context of food security the amount of land in production in Europe and the UK was less of an issue than the "distribution of food, the production of food, minimisation of waste and innovation in food production".[85]

31.  The principal purpose of the CAP is to support food production and, in the long term, the goal for the CAP must be delivering sustainable food production. In developing these proposals the Commission appears not to have considered food security and how 'greening' will interact with efficient farm production. In our view the Commission has missed the opportunity to encourage sustainable intensification of food production.

Modulation

32.  There is substantial evidence that multiannual, voluntary and targeted Pillar 2-type schemes deliver better environmental outcomes then mandatory, generalised, non-contractual, annual actions under Pillar 1.[86] For example, Defra concluded that the 'greening' proposals would "fall short of delivering the level of environmental outcomes achieved by England's current Entry Level Stewardship scheme which delivers a basic level of environmental outcomes across 70% of England's agricultural area".[87] Professor Godfray advocated greater "modularity" by moving from the "formulaic" Pillar 1 approach to schemes in Pillar 2 that enabled the Government to use a more innovative approach to securing public benefits while providing farmers with an income.[88] The IEEP noted that the limited funding available through Pillar 2 and the reluctance of Member States to increase levels of co-financing meant that there were limits to what could be achieved through Pillar 2 schemes.[89] Mr Morgan, argued that as the Treasury would resist increasing the money allocated to agri-environment schemes, 'greening' had the potential for reducing the funding pressure on Pillar 2.[90] The Wildlife Trusts argued for a combination of high quality optional agri-environment schemes under Pillar 2 underpinned by mandatory environmental measures under Pillar 1.[91]

33.  In England, a significant proportion of the current Pillar 2 budget is funded through modulation. Modulation is the transfer of a percentage of each farmer's direct payment to the Pillar 2 budget. England uses a higher modulation rate (19%) than most EU countries (10%), or even the devolved administrations (11%-14%), in part because the UK currently receives the lowest Pillar 2 allocation of all Member States. In the Committee's previous CAP inquiry, farming groups said this created unfair competition and advocated either equal rates or no modulation at all. However, Defra argued that higher rates of modulation in England were needed to fund environmental stewardship schemes.[92]

34.  In The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013 we found that the variation in modulation rates across the EU made the distribution of funding between Member States more complex and less objective. Moreover, we believed that the current system was not in the interests of fair competition for UK producers within the EU market. We recommended that:

Defra should argue strongly for a more equitable distribution of Pillar 2 funding. If modulation is to continue, the rate at which payments are reduced should be common across the EU. Defra should ensure that it can meet its ambitions for delivery of agri-environment schemes from its Pillar 2 budget without recourse to higher modulation rates in England than apply in the rest of the UK, or in Europe.[93]

In response to our report the Government stated that:

The UK will seek distribution of funds based on clear, objective criteria, with Pillar 2 forming a greater share of a smaller CAP budget. Given the widely varying nature of farming and rural issues across the EU and within Member States, the UK believes that Member States should continue to be given the flexibility to allocate CAP funding in a way that best suits the requirements of their own regions and farming structures, providing it is consistent with the wider objectives of the CAP.[94]

35.  The Commission proposes that Member States will have the possibility of transferring up to 10% of their national envelope for Direct Payments (1st Pillar) to their Rural Development envelope; and the Member States that get less than 90% of the EU average for direct payments now may transfer up to 5% of their Rural Development funds to their 1st Pillar national envelope. Defra's written evidence to this inquiry makes it clear that they would like to continue modulation of direct payments under the new CAP:

The Commission proposals now provide for up to 10% transfer from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2 alongside greening. Flexibility to move resources between pillars is potentially the most flexible mechanism available to Member States to maximise the environmental outcomes from the CAP and the one delivering both the most additionality and the least disruption to existing agreements.

Despite its preference for Pillar 2 schemes, the department did not commit to how the Treasury would respond to any increase in the co-financing commitment that Pillar 2 relies upon.[95]

36.  The transfer of funds from Pillar 1 direct payments to Pillar 2 voluntary schemes is opposed by the farming unions, who argue that it puts farmers at a competitive disadvantage relative to farmers elsewhere in Europe who enjoy higher direct payment rates as a result of their country's lower modulation rates.[96] The NFU were concerned that the Treasury would see the proposals as an opportunity to reduce national co-financing requirements if actions currently financed through the Pillar 2 were made compulsory in Pillar 1. Peter Kendall, President of the NFU, told us that as the Treasury would resist the additional co-financing burden of moving money from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2, the Government might be considering moving measures from Pillar 2 to Pillar 1. He described such an approach would have "phenomenal" implications for the Government's regulatory work.[97]

37.  The competitiveness of UK farmers will be reduced if they are exposed to higher modulation rates than their European counterparts. We therefore recommend that Defra does not set modulation rates higher than other Member States that receive similar single farm payment rates.

38.  We conclude that it is important that the two Pillars work together rather than at cross purposes to one another. However, increasing the burden on Pillar 2 is unlikely to be politically achievable, not least because of additional co-financing that would be required.

Competitiveness

39.  Most of the evidence we received argued that the three 'greening' measures were likely to have a negative impact on farm competitiveness and profitability.[98] The NFU noted that the proposals would not help farmers produce for the market and reversed previous reforms' focus on competitiveness.[99] Mr Kendall questioned whether, given the current state of the European economy, it was appropriate for the Commission to make proposals that would lead to production being exported outside the EU. The IEEP, however, argued that as the 'greening' measures would create a level playing field across all Member States and that UK agricultural competitiveness would be enhanced due to its record of taking a proactive approach to environmental issues.[100] The environmental organisations questioned the extent to which, in the long term, 'greening' would have a negative impact on competitiveness.[101] They highlighted evidence that greener agriculture had economic benefits across rural communities.[102]

40.  Of the three 'greening' proposals the EFA measure was identified as having the greatest potential impact on farm competitiveness due to the removal of productive land.[103] An analysis by the Agricultural and Horticultural Development Board (AHDB) found that the EFA measures alone would reduce the gross crop margin by between £38 and £48 per hectare. [104] The AHDB concluded that "The legislative measures, if implemented in the way they are currently set out, would seem to potentially have a large negative impact on UK combinable cropping farm-level profitability and production decisions".[105] A report from the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) concluded that the 'greening' proposals would "increase the costs of farming in the EU either directly or indirectly [...] reduce supply and increase market prices".[106] The ICTSD did conclude, however, that in the longer-term more sustainable agricultural practices may lead to higher yields.[107]

41.  The Commission acknowledges that its proposed measures will have an impact on farm competitiveness and that the impact will vary depending on the type of farm. For example highly specialised cropping farms are expected to be most affected by diversification and livestock farms are more likely to be affected by the permanent pasture requirement.[108] The Commission also estimates wider impacts on commodity prices through changes in crop production due to the crop diversification and EFA requirements. The 'greening' measures will also reduce farm incomes per agricultural worker.[109]

42.  We conclude that the 'greening' proposals will have a significant impact on the competitiveness of UK farmers. We urge Defra to continue to press the Commission to enable farmers to opt out of prescriptive mandatory measures in favour of those schemes that deliver environmental outcomes and do not diminish competitiveness.

PENALTIES

43.  The recitals of the draft Regulation on direct payments emphasises the mandatory nature of 'greening' practices. The Regulation goes on to state that "Non-respect of the 'greening' component should lead to penalties". However, as the CAAV noted that, "neither the draft of the direct payments Regulation nor that of the finance Regulation gives any clue as to the penalty regime for breaching greening".[110] The RSPB argued that the "EU's long-term food security depends on maintaining the productive capacity of agricultural land. 'Greening' the CAP is therefore not optional: it is a necessity".[111] They therefore expressed a strong preference for farmers to receive a severe penalty for not meeting the greening requirements:

Sanctions for farmers and land managers who fail to carry out Pillar 1 greening measures must be severe enough to act as genuine deterrent. This may mean reductions exceeding the 30% greening payment itself may be required.[112]

44.  The NFU rejected the imposition of additional penalties if a farmer chooses to opt out of "greening". One of the NFU's principles for the future greening payments was that "a farmer who chooses to opt out of "greening" would forego the aid associated with the greening option but would face no additional penalty or sanction on their basic direct aid".[113] Mr Kendall told us that the NFU believed "environmental measures need to be targeted, farmers need to select what is best for their farms, and, much better, to be something you buy into rather than something you are forced into to get the right outcomes".[114] The Commission is reported to be hardening its line on penalties for 'intentional irregularities', including a maximum penalty of as much as 200% of a farmer's greening component being deducted.[115]

45.  We recommend that farmers that do not carry out 'greening' activities should not receive the 'greening' top-up payment but should not be subject to additional penalties. We recommend that, if a farmer chooses not to carry out 'greening', that that farmer's share of the Pillar 1 'greening' fund should able to be transferred to Pillar 2. Any Pillar 1 funding transferred to Pillar 2 under this approach would not be subject to the co-financing requirements.


15   See The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013 for fuller description of the origin and evolution of the CAP. Back

16   The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013, paras 44-46 Back

17   The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013, paras 34-43 Back

18   Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Fifth Special Report of Session 2010-12, The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013: Government response to the Committee's Fifth Report of session 2010-12, HC 1356 Back

19   Ev 98, 95, 85, 76, 69, 57, Q 5 [Mr Cotterell] Back

20   Ev 85; Q 96 [Mr Wilkinson] Back

21   Q 2 [Mr Kendall] Back

22   Ev w34 Back

23   Ev w34 Back

24   Q 118 Back

25   Ev 76 Back

26   Q 96 [Mr Morgan] Back

27   Q 3, Ev 56, Ev w9, w32  Back

28   The European Commission has proposed the overall CAP budget rise to €60.3 billion for the next financial year. "Commission proposes modest rise for CAP budget next year" Agra Europe, 1 May 2012 Back

29   Statutory Management Requirements (SMR), are embedded in EU Directives, such as those on nitrates and habitats. The precise standards required for Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition (GAEC) are set by Member States and relate, for example, to water protection, soil management and landscape. Back

30   The SMRs relating to control of bluetongue, foot and mouth and swine vesicular disease have been deleted. The GAECs relating to retaining permanent pasture and preventing the encroachment of vegetation have been removed- however these activities will still be required under the greening and eligibility provisions respectively. The optional GAECs on using appropriate machinery, retaining habitats and crop rotation have been dropped. New GAECs relating to maintaining wetlands and carbon rich soils have been added. Moreover, the Commission intends to incorporate additional rules stemming from the Water Framework Directive and the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive once these Directives have been implemented in all Member States Back

31   Ev w52 Back

32   Ev w52 Back

33   Ev 57 Back

34   Ev w52 Back

35   Q 196 Back

36   Ev 57 Back

37   Ev 50, Ev w11; "CAP subsidies must place greater focus on biodiversity, urge MEPs" Agra Europe, 1 May 2012 Back

38   Ev 99 Back

39   HC Deb, 7 November 2011, col 4WS Back

40   Qq 176, 200  Back

41   Ev 93,Q 39 Back

42   Ev 91, see Q 57 Back

43   Q 40 Back

44   Q 94 Back

45   Q 97; See Q 105 Back

46   Ev w52 Back

47   Ibid. Back

48   See Q 48 Back

49   "Alternative to EU's greening measures" Farmers Guardian, May 4 2012; XXX Back

50   Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Ninth Special Report of Session 2010-12, The Outcome of the Independent Farming Regulation Task Force: Government Response to the Committee's Tenth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1669; See Q 220 Back

51   "European court slams 'unfocused' Commission plans for CAP reform" Agra Europe, 24 April 2012 Back

52   Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2010-12, EU proposals for Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, HC 1563-I, para 23  Back

53   Ev 58, 68, 97, 101; Ev w35; Q 193; "CAP complication a necessary evil - Fischler" Agra Europe, 28 February 2012; "European court slams 'unfocused' Commission plans for CAP reform" Agra Europe, 24 April 2012; See Qq 83ff Back

54   Ev w 5 Back

55   Ev 101 Back

56   Ev 83 Back

57   Ev w 54 Back

58   Ev w 12; Ev 101. The scheme that preceded the Single Payment Scheme had 135 crop codes. Defra's initial analysis suggests that approximately 71,000 claims contain at least some arable land and might have to use additional land use codes. Back

59   Ev 101 Back

60   Ev 68; Q 14 [Mr Kendall] Back

61   Ev w 11 Back

62   The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013, paras 223-224 Back

63   HC 1028-i, Qq 28ff, 42ff  Back

64   Rural Payments Agency Five Year Plan 2012-2017, p 8 Back

65   Rural Payments Agency Five Year Plan 2012-2017, p 21; The RPA's Business as Usual Funding allocations are:
FY 2012/13 (£m) FY 2013/14 (£m) FY 2014/15 (£m)
Business as Usual 169.8 155.8145.7
Strategic Improvement Plan additional investment 20.012.1 5.0

 Back

66   EFRA Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2010-12, The Outcome of the Independent Farming Regulation Task Force, HC 1266, Ev 49 Back

67   Ev 68 Back

68   Ev 70 Back

69   Q 187 Back

70   The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013, paras 34-39 Back

71   The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013, para 143 Back

72   Q 38 Back

73   QQ 118-119 Back

74   Q 120 Back

75   Q 120 Back

76   Q 96 [Mr Morgan]. See "Trade-offs needed for food security", Farmers Weekly, 9 March 2012 Back

77   Q 96 [Mr Morgan] Back

78   Q3 [Mr Kendall, Mr Dunn] Back

79   Ev 71 Back

80   Ev 58 Back

81   Ev w53; See Impact Assessment: Common Agricultural Policy towards 2020, SEC(2011) 1153 final/2 Back

82   Ev w52ff, Ev 58 Back

83   Ev w 53 Back

84   Ev w 53 Back

85   Q 108 [Mr Gerrard]; See Q 43 Back

86   Ev w50; Q 10 [Mr Cotterell]; Qq 68-71 Back

87   Ev 99 Back

88   Q 134 Back

89   Ev w50 Back

90   Q 116 Back

91   Ev 87 Back

92   The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013, paras 125-135  Back

93   The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013, para 135 Back

94   Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Fifth Special Report of Session 2010-12 The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013: Government response to the Committee's Fifth Report of session 2010-12, HC 1356, page 9 Back

95   Q 147 Back

96   "Unions unite against UK CAP cost cutting plans" Farmers Guardian, 27 April 2012 Back

97   Q 31 Back

98   Ev 97 Back

99   Qq 4, 14 Back

100   Ev w54 Back

101   Qq 99-101 Back

102   Q 99 [Mr Morgan], Q 101 [Mr Wilkinson] Back

103   Ev 101 Back

104   Ev 67 Back

105   Ibid. Back

106   Ev 68 Back

107   Ibid. Back

108   EV 99 Back

109   Ev 67. The Commission's Impact Assessment shows that income per worker in the pig and poultry industries could fall by 25%, and in the dairy industry it could fall by nearly 6%. Back

110   Ev w11 Back

111   Ev 76 Back

112   Ev 84 Back

113   Ev 70 Back

114   Q 6 Back

115   "More flexible 'greening' measures with menu options gain support" Agra Europe, 1 May 2012 Back


 
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© Parliamentary copyright 2012
Prepared 1 June 2012