Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee Written evidence submitted by the City Remembrancer, Parliamentary Agent to the City of London Corporation
The City of London Corporation owns and manages around 11,000 acres of open space in and around Greater London. These areas are administered on a charitable basis for the purpose of public recreation and enjoyment. Many also provide important wildlife habitats.
Matters relating to the control of dogs form a significant part of the City Corporation’s work in this area. Indeed, in recent years it has been evident that problems caused by the inadequate or irresponsible control of dogs are an increasingly prominent source of concern among local communities and other users of the open spaces. The City Corporation has accordingly been keen to explore initiatives which could enhance its ability to tackle the irresponsible or intimidating use of dogs.
The Government’s recent proposals on micro-chipping and extending the scope of dangerous dogs legislation are therefore of considerable interest to the City Corporation. However, they raise complicated issues of policy and practicality, which are due to be discussed at forthcoming meetings of the City Corporation’s Open Spaces Committees.
Meanwhile, I should like to take this opportunity briefly to draw attention to another aspect of the regime for the control of dogs which affects the City Corporation in particular. This concerns Dog Control Orders under Part 6 of the Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act 2005. Such Orders can cover one of five prescribed matters, namely failure to remove dog faeces, failure to keep dogs on a lead, failure to put dogs on a lead when directed to do so, taking dogs onto land from which they are excluded, and taking more than a specified number of dogs onto specified land. The Orders can be enforced by a fixed penalty notice, which gives the advantage of a more modern and convenient mode of enforcement than that available for bye-laws.
Dog Control Orders are made primarily by local authorities, as the “primary authorities” under the Part. However, there is also the power to designate other bodies who exercise statutory powers over land as “secondary authorities” in respect of that land. Secondary authorities are capable of making Dog Control Orders where the local authority has not done so in relation to the same subject-matter. After extensive discussions with DEFRA, the City Corporation has recently been designated as a secondary authority for the control of dogs in respect of the open spaces it administers outside of the City.
Having achieved this designation, and subject to the necessary internal approvals, the City Corporation is set shortly to begin trials of Dog Control Orders in order to satisfy itself that they will provide an effective means of addressing the problems which have been encountered. While I am thus not in a position to convey any certain conclusion, it seems likely that Dog Control Orders will offer a more effective means of enforcing the proper control of dogs than the current regime of bye-laws. Given that the City Corporation has far greater day-to-day involvement with its open spaces than the various local authorities in whose areas they fall, including the making and policing of bye-laws, it would appear sensible for the Corporation to be able to take the lead in this area where necessary—not least because some local authorities may not be able to devote the necessary resources to introducing and implementing the Orders.
An issue arises, however, from the recent White Paper of the Home Office, “Putting Victims First: More Effective Responses to Anti-social Behaviour” (Cm 8367, May 2012). This proposes to abolish Dog Control Orders and to include powers for the control of dogs in a new “Community Protection Order (Public Space)”. It is not clear whether a “secondary authority” device such as that currently in place in respect of Dog Control Orders would be replicated in any new legislation. There would seem, however, to be merit in preserving the device. Although matters are at an early stage, it does appear that the ability to designate custodians of public land as secondary authorities capable of making statutory orders could prove a valuable tool for ensuring the proper control of dogs, and not one which should be lost without full deliberation.
It would not be appropriate for me to go into further detail at this point, given that new legislation seems to be some distance away, but I thought that it might be worthwhile to draw this matter to the attention of the Committee for the purpose of the current inquiry.
July 2012