1 Risks and safety assessments of
nuclear power plants
| (34290)
14400/12
COM(12) 571
| Commission Communication on the comprehensive risks and safety assessments of nuclear power plants in the European Union and related activities
|
| Legal base | —
|
| Document originated | 4 October 2012
|
| Deposited in Parliament | 5 October 2012
|
| Department | Energy and Climate Change
|
| Basis of consideration | EM of 16 October 2012
|
| Previous Committee Report | None
|
| Discussion in Council | No date set
|
| Committee's assessment | Legally and Politically important
|
| Committee's decision | For debate in European Committee A
|
BACKGROUND
1.1 The EU has some 140 nuclear power plants located on 58
sites in 14 Member States, and, although their overall safety
record is good, the European Council agreed in March 2011 that,
following the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, they should
each be subject to 'stress tests', and that the EU should review
its nuclear safety legislative framework in light of the lessons
to be learned from that accident. It was also agreed that the
stress test exercise would be organised in three phases —
self assessments by nuclear operators, a review of the self assessments
by national regulators, and peer reviews of the national reports
carried out by the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG)
in consultation with the Commission.
1.2 In a Communication in November 2011, the Commission provided
its initial assessment of the current situation, as well as some
preliminary ideas for future work, based on the progress reports
provided by the national regulators. However, although the document
outlined various measures which the Commission considered might
be needed to improve both the EU and the wider international nuclear
safety framework under the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), it acknowledged that no firm conclusions could be reached
until the stress test exercise had been completed.
1.3 In the meantime, the Communication confirmed that the
Commission saw scope for strengthening the legal framework at
EU and national level by improving both the technical measures
for safety, and the necessary oversight to ensure full implementation;
improving the governance, as well as the legal framework, of nuclear
safety; improving emergency preparedness and response; reinforcing
the EU nuclear liability regime; and enhancing scientific and
technological competence. However, it emphasised that these preliminary
indications would need to be further reviewed in light of the
final findings of the stress tests, and that it would also take
into account the findings of a Presidency-led Ad Hoc Group on
Nuclear Security (AHGNS).
THE CURRENT
DOCUMENT
1.4 This Communication, and its accompanying Staff Working
Document, provides a definitive response to the European Council's
mandate, identifying how the nuclear safety framework in the EU
can be improved, given the dynamic nature of nuclear safety, and
the need for it to be continually reviewed and updated, and seeking,
in the light of the review, to develop legislative, non-legislative
and project proposals. It notes that the work was split between
ENSREG (which conducted safety checks on all the power plants)
and AHGNS (which did not look at individual installations, but
instead assessed the state of nuclear safety in the EU as a whole);
that a number of EU neighbouring countries — notably Switzerland,
Ukraine and Croatia — were also involved in the process;
and that a number of the matters raised are being pursued within
the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Commission also says that,
as a result of issues identified during the peer review phase,
it has launched a study of the off-site preventive measures currently
in force, particularly in cross-border regions, and will make
recommendations as necessary.
KEY FINDINGS AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION
SAFETY MEASURES
1.5 The review found that there are no technical reasons requiring
the shutdown of any nuclear power plant in Europe, and identified
a series of good practices. However, it says that nearly all plants
need to undergo safety improvements, and that, although measures
were agreed internationally following the Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl incidents, their implementation is in many cases still
pending. It also notes the significant differences in national
approaches to deal with the consequences for existing nuclear
power plants of aircraft crashes.
1.6 The review noted that all participating countries have
begun to take operational steps to improve the safety of their
existing plants, including the management of severe accidents,
and that the costs of additional safety improvement is estimated
to be about €200 million per reactor unit, or around €10-25
billion in total over the coming years. It notes that the ENSREG
issued an action plan in July 2012, aimed at ensuring that all
affected Member States implement recommendations from peer review
groups in a consistent and transparent manner, with measures being
prioritised, and funding allocated, in favour of those bringing
the greatest safety benefits. At the same time, it says that an
assessment showed that there was a low likelihood of designs for
new plants being strongly affected by these measures, and that
large increases in new investment costs are unlikely if the best
available technologies are chosen.
SAFETY PROCEDURES
AND FRAMEWORKS
1.7 The Commission says that the key issues to emerge from
the stress tests were a lack of consistency in assessing and managing
external hazards to plant safety; significant differences in the
scope and depth of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment used to
characterise the safety of nuclear reactors, with there being
an urgent need in some Member States to bring them up to accepted
international standards; the need to update the Severe Accident
Management Guidelines (and for these to be implemented fully in
a number of Member States); and a need for improvements in safety
culture, Fukushima having shown that the tsunami hazard was under-estimated,
mainly due to human error, inadequate contingency plans and poor
communication.
1.8 Four main areas were identified for further improvement,
namely that European guidance should be developed on the assessment
of natural hazards in order to ensure consistency between Member
States; that a Periodic Safety Review of each nuclear power plant
should be carried out at least every 10 years; that recognised
measures must be implemented to protect containment integrity
as the last protection against radioactive releases; and that
accidents resulting from natural hazards should be prevented and/or
mitigated. The Communication says that the Commission and regulators
have agreed that national action plans with timetables for implementation
will be prepared and made available by the end of 2012, with peer
review methodology being applied to them in early 2013 to verify
that the stress test recommendations are consistently implemented
in a transparent way throughout Europe. It adds that the occurrence
of accidents, even in Member States with otherwise good safety
records, confirms the need for safety reviews at regular intervals
and for the sharing of information on operational experience,
and that safety assessments should be extended to off-site emergency
preparedness and response arrangements.
SECURITY ASSESSMENTS
1.9 The Commission notes that the AHGNS addressed five areas
— physical protection, (malevolent) aircraft crashes, cyber
attacks, nuclear emergency planning, and exercises and training
— but points out that security remains a Member State responsibility.
The Group's report highlights the need for Member States which
have not yet ratified the amended Convention on Physical Protection
of Nuclear Materials to do so urgently; the added value of the
services provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
the importance of regular and close cooperation between Member
States and neighbouring countries; and the need to define modalities
and fora for the continuation of EU work in this area.
LINKING SAFETY
AND SECURITY
ISSUES
1.10 The Commission says that sustained work is needed to
link these two areas and to address possible gaps, noting that
competence is shared between different authorities, and that it
intends to study this further.
EU NUCLEAR SAFETY FRAMEWORK
IMPLEMENTING
THE EXISTING
FRAMEWORK
1.11 The Commission says that the deadline for transposing
the Nuclear Safety Directive (2009/71/Euratom) was 22 July 2011,
that two Member States have still not completed transposition,
and that it has started infringement proceedings against the 12
Member States which did not meet that deadline. It now intends
to study the quality of the measures taken.
IMPROVING THE
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
1.12 The Commission says that it is crucial that the lessons
learned from Fukushima and from the stress tests are reflected
in the legislative framework, notably in relation to the differences
between Member States and the gaps in managing key safety issues.
In particular, it says that the Nuclear Safety Directive needs
to be amended as regards nuclear procedures and frameworks, the
role and means of nuclear regulatory authorities, openness and
transparency, and monitoring and verification.
1.13 The Commission notes that, as compensation for victims
of nuclear incidents or accidents is not covered by the current
EU legislative framework, it was not part of the stress test process,
but it also points out that Article 98 of the Euratom Treaty enables
the Council to adopt Directives to establish binding measures
in this area. It says that it will examine how the situation of
potential victims can be improved within the limits of EU competence,
and that it intends to introduce binding legislation on nuclear
insurance and liability, and to address compensation for damage
to the natural environment.
1.14 The Commission also considers the question of legislation
relating to contaminated food and feedstuffs, which it says is
subject to specific provisions as regards their placing on the
market, but which it believes needs to be revised to provide greater
flexibility allowing specific targeted reactions.
HUMAN RESOURCES
AND TRAINING
1.15 The Commission suggests that ensuring an experienced
work force should be a top priority, and notes that its Joint
Research Centre manages an Operating Experience Feedback initiative,
which will be open to all national nuclear regulatory authorities
wishing to participate.
STRENGTHENED
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
1.16 The Commission says that it will encourage all EU neighbouring
countries to share the results of their stress tests, participate
in peer reviews, and share experiences to improve nuclear safety
both within the EU and at its borders. Also, contacts are under
way to develop bilateral cooperation with Japan on stress tests
and regulatory issues, and the Commission will more generally
work with the European External Action Service to make best use
of existing external cooperation instruments in this field.
IMPROVING GLOBAL
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
1.17 The Commission says that, through the IAEA, the main
instruments governing nuclear safety are internationally agreed
safety standards and conventions, notably the Convention on Nuclear
Safety, where work is in hand to strengthen it. The Commission
also highlights the need to take into account IAEA safety standards,
and for the continuing commitment of EU Member States and institutions
to ensure that EU legislation is reflected as far as possible
in future revisions of the international nuclear safety framework.
REINFORCING NUCLEAR SECURITY
1.18 The Commission says that it will use existing competences
to encourage Member States to progress further on the implementation
of specific measures. In particular, it will continue to work
closely with them to reduce the threat of intentional chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, including acts
of terrorism; to revise the Directive (2008/114/EC) on the identification
and designation of European critical infrastructures; to table
by the end of the year a legislative proposal on network and information
security; to press for the adoption of a proposal to revise the
Union Civil Protection Mechanism to facilitate cooperation between
Member States; and to press for the speedy ratification by all
Member States on the amended Convention on Physical Protection
of Nuclear Materials.
NEXT STEPS
1.19 The Commission says that this exercise was unprecedented
in terms of its extent and the collaboration and commitment of
all the parties involved, and provides an international bench-mark
for nuclear safety assessments. However, it suggests that, although
the tests are now completed, they should be considered, not as
a one-off exercise, but as an on-going process, enabling the EU
to develop a comprehensive European approach to safety. In the
meantime, it describes the exercise as a major achievement, which
has led to a number of tangible results, including the identification
of plant improvements in all participating countries which are
being implemented or planned; the identification of weaknesses
in frameworks and procedures, as well as gaps in the legal arrangements;
and an essential building of first bridges between authorities
dealing with safety and security.
1.20 Looking ahead, the Commission:
- invites the European Council to commit Member States, and
participating third countries, to implement the recommendations
of the stress tests swiftly, noting that legal responsibility
for the operational assessment of safety at nuclear power plants
rests with Member States;
- will present by early 2013 an ambitious revision
of the EU Nuclear Safety Directive, which will be followed by
a further proposal on nuclear insurance and liability, along with
a proposal laying down maximum permitted contamination of foodstuffs
and feeding stuffs;
- will explore proposals in the Horizon 2020 Euratom
programme aiming to facilitate exchanges between Member States
of staff working in the nuclear field;
- will seek a mandate from the Council to participate
actively within the IAEA to secure improvements in the Convention
on Nuclear Safety;
- will continue to encourage scientific activities
aimed at further harmonisation of nuclear safety assessments and
practices in the EU; and
- will continue to contribute to the reinforcement
of nuclear security.
THE
GOVERNMENT'S
VIEW
1.21 In her Explanatory Memorandum of 16 October
2012, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department
for Energy and Climate Change (Baroness Verma) says that safety
remains the Government's top priority, and that, in addition to
the findings of the stress tests, it is putting in place measures
to ensure that the lessons from Fukushima are implemented. It
also remains of the view that the focus of the Commission and
Member States should be on ensuring the proper implementation
of the current EU nuclear safety framework, and it believes that
the proposals contained in the Communication to enhance nuclear
safety are already covered by the provisions of the current Directive,
which places a duty on Member States to ensure that national
frameworks are maintained and improved when appropriate.
1.22 The Minister notes that the Communication
also sets out the Commission's response to the findings of ENSREG,
and says that the Government is concerned that the Commission
appears to have reassessed the findings of ENSREG — its
own advisory body — and to have concluded that a revision
of the Nuclear Safety Directive is required, without having provided
any robust evidence of the need to do so. In particular, she
points out that the findings of ENSREG showed that, although some
site specific improvements were needed, none of the nuclear power
plants in Europe needs to be shut-down for safety reasons.
1.23 The Minister adds that the Government is
also concerned that the Communication could lead to the Commission
seeking to increase its competence in key areas of nuclear safety
and security, and undermine the independence and/or effectiveness
of ENSREG and national regulators. It will therefore be working
with the Commission and other Member States to ensure that any
new legislative proposals are evidence based, do not extend existing
Commission competences, and have the desired effect of putting
in place proportionate measures which are consistent with the
concept of seeking continuous improvements to nuclear safety.
It will also continue to resist the Commission's attempts to include
nuclear security in this work, which it believes is a matter which
should be dealt with by Member States.
CONCLUSION
1.24 Given the general public interest in nuclear
safety, the particular concerns arising in the wake of the Fukushima
accident, and the current debate over the role which nuclear power
might play in the UK's future energy mix, this is clearly a document
of some significance, and addresses a number of important issues
relating to safety and security. In addition, it does —
as the Government has pointed out — raise questions relating
to the division of competence in these areas between the Commission
and Member States. Consequently, although the document is only
a Commission Communication, and is to be followed by legislative
proposals in certain areas, we do see merit in the House having
an opportunity to express a view at this stage, whilst discussion
is still continuing. We are therefore recommending the document
for debate in European Committee.
|
